Category: Armenian Question

“The great Turk is governing in peace twenty nations from different religions. Turks have taught to Christians how to be moderate in peace and gentle in victory.”Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary

  • Serious Turkish diplomacy

    Serious Turkish diplomacy

    By: Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett
    October 29, 2009 05:25 AM EST

    Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was expected to come to the White House on Thursday for a meeting with President Barack Obama. Erdogan’s visit has now been postponed, and the decision to postpone comes on the heels of the Turkish leader’s high-profile visit to Iran this week.

    When Erdogan does come to Washington, Obama would do well to listen to his Turkish visitor about the current state of play in the strategically vital Middle East. Erdogan will come to Washington not only at a time of strong domestic support for his government and the ruling Justice and Development Party, a moderate Islamist party that has dominated Turkish electoral politics in this decade, but also at a time of increasing influence for Turkey in the broader Middle East — while America’s influence in the region continues to decline.

    We spent several days in Turkey last week, where we heard Erdogan describe his country’s “zero problems” policy vis-à-vis its neighbors. Regarding the Middle East more specifically, Erdogan’s chief foreign policy adviser explained to us that Turkey’s approach to the region is based on four principles:
    1. Engage all actors;
    2. respect the results of all democratic elections (including those in the Palestinian territories in 2006 and Iran in 2009);
    3. increase cultural and economic relations among countries in the region; and
    4. work with regional and international organizations to maximize possibilities for engagement.

    Turkey is, of course, a member of NATO and has long had a positive economic and strategic relationship with Israel. But, working from these four principles, the Erdogan government has in recent years effected major improvements in Turkey’s relations with a much wider range of Middle Eastern states, including Iran, Iraq and Syria.

    This opening to the broader Middle East has been very strongly in Turkey’s interest. Expanding trade and investment links to Iran, Iraq, Syria and other regional states has boosted the growth of Turkey’s economy and reinforced its status as an “emerging market” of international significance. Moreover, closer ties to Middle Eastern countries, along with links to Hamas and Hezbollah, have made Ankara an increasingly important player across a wide spectrum of regional issues.

    Erdogan wants to position Turkey to act as a mediator between its Muslim neighbors and the West — including the United States, which needs to move beyond nice speeches by Obama and undertake concrete diplomatic initiatives to repair its standing in the Middle East.

    But if Washington is too shortsighted to see the necessity of realigning its relations with key Middle Eastern actors such as Iran, the Erdogan government’s opening to the broader Middle East gives Ankara a wider array of strategic options for pursuing Turkish interests — the essence of successful diplomacy.

    During his visit to Tehran this week, Erdogan met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — a rare honor for a foreign leader. (In 2007, Russia’s then-President Vladimir Putin was also accorded a meeting with Khamenei.) Turkey’s expanding ties to the Islamic republic — including gas supply contracts and preliminary agreements for major upstream and pipeline investment projects — are essential to consolidating Turkey’s role as the leading transit “hub” for oil and gas supplies to Europe. While in Iran, Erdogan said that he hopes Turkish-Iranian trade — currently valued at roughly $10 billion — will double by 2011 and strongly supported Iranian participation in the Nabucco gas pipeline. Meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Erdogan criticized international pressure on Tehran over its nuclear activities as “unjust and unfair” while other states maintain nuclear weapons.

    These statements signal that Turkey may well move ahead and conclude significant upstream and pipeline contracts in Iran despite U.S. opposition. The U.S. position on this issue is detached from economic reality. However much the Obama administration resists admitting it, the Nabucco pipeline will almost certainly not be commercially viable in the long run without Iranian gas volumes. In the end, Turkey’s approach to Iran does more for Western interests than does the U.S. approach. Under the Erdogan government, Ankara is increasingly confident that it can pursue its interests in the Middle East without either succumbing to U.S. pressure or fundamentally sacrificing its relationship with Washington. Erdogan’s planned visit to the White House strongly suggests that this confidence is eminently justified.

    Israelis and some of Israel’s friends in the United States decry what they see as the expansion of Turkey’s ties to other important Middle Eastern states at the expense of Turkey’s ties to Israel. Ankara has indeed been sharply critical of Israel’s military campaign in Gaza and its role in the continuing humanitarian crisis there — a posture manifested in Erdogan’s highly publicized walkout from a joint event with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum and the postponement of NATO military exercises in Turkey that would have included Israeli forces. But criticism of Turkey from pro-Israel circles misses an important reality: At this point, Israel arguably needs a relationship with Turkey more than Turkey needs a relationship with Israel.

    There is an important lesson here for the Obama administration. America no longer has the economic and political wherewithal to dictate strategic outcomes in the Middle East. Increasingly, if Washington wants to promote and protect U.S. interests in this critical region, it will have to do so through serious diplomacy — by respecting evolving balances of power and accommodating the legitimate interests of others so that U.S. interests will be respected. Turkey’s Middle East policy provides a valuable model of what that kind of diplomacy looks like.

    Flynt Leverett directs the New America Foundation’s Iran Project and teaches international affairs at Penn State. Hillary Mann Leverett is CEO of Stratega, a political risk consultancy.

    © 2009 Capitol News Company, LLC
  • Turkey leads the Muslim world

    Turkey leads the Muslim world

    Ankara has healed relations with and between its neighbours. But it cannot bring itself to be diplomatic with Israel

    • Stephen Kinzer
      • Stephen Kinzer
      • guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 27 October 2009 17.00 GMT
      • Article history

    This week’s visit to Iran by the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is to be warmly welcomed. Turkey is playing a highly positive new role in the Middle East. It seeks to be a conciliator, a mediator, a peacemaker. Reaching out to Iran is an ideal way for it to play this role.

    Turkish leaders have spent several years pursuing a goal they call “zero problems with neighbours“. They have been highly successful. Turkey is on good terms with Greece, Bulgaria and Iraq. As for Syria, with which it almost went to war a decade ago, visa requirements have been abolished, and foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu asserted in Aleppo earlier this month that the two countries share “a joint destiny, a joint history and a joint future”. This came just days after Turkey’s highly promising breakthrough with Armenia, under which their border is to be reopened and diplomatic relations restored after a 16-year break.

    Now Turkey is moving to a second, even more ambitious stage of its regional policy: “no problems between neighbours.” Its leaders realise that Turkey’s future prospects depend on regional stability, and are actively seeking to resolve disputes in the neighbourhood. Because of its size, its economic power, its history and its well-developed though still incomplete democracy, Turkey is uniquely placed to be both a model and a broker.

    For most of Turkey’s modern history, the Muslim world has seen it as an apostate. Atatürk’s reforms pulled it so far from Islam that it seemed to have no religious legitimacy. Besides, it was perceived as Washington’s lackey, stigmatised by its embrace of American policies that many Muslims found abhorrent.

    Neither of those objections applies to Turkey today. It is governed by pious Muslims and has its own foreign policy. Its leaders are warmly welcomed in many places where, in the past, they would not even have cared to visit.

    Under other circumstances, Egypt, Pakistan or Iran might have emerged to lead the Muslim world. Their societies, however, are weak, fragmented and decomposing. Indonesia is a more promising candidate, but it has no historic tradition of leadership and is far from the centre of Muslim crises. That leaves Turkey – which, by happy coincidence, is eager to play this role.

    One dark spot, however, has emerged to blot this happy picture. Turkey has begun to distance itself from Israel. This month it cancelled its participation in a joint military manoeuvre with the Israeli defence forces. Its leaders speak out angrily against Israeli policies – most notably prime minister Erdoğan, who at this year’s Davos conference denounced Israel’s invasion of Gaza as a “crime against humanity”. One of the region’s most important relationships is fraying.

    Turkish leaders are allowing emotion to affect their attitude toward Israel. They are understandably angry over Israeli misdeeds. If Turkey is to be a bridge among nations, though, it cannot afford gratuitously to alienate any. The United States has brought itself much grief by isolating Iran; it would be just as foolish for Turkey to reject Israel.

    Like Iran, Israel is a pariah in many circles, and is frozen out of Middle East security arrangements. This is bad for all parties. Pushing Israel into a corner, or making Israel feel that it is alone and friendless, does not serve the cause of peace.

    Turkey has a history of excellent relations with Jews, and was one of the first countries to recognise Israel. Turning its back on that legacy, as it has apparently begun to do, contradicts its new diplomatic role as a broker of compromise. The contribution Turkey can make by playing that role is far greater than the feel-good effect of lashing out emotionally at Israel’s excesses.

    For Turkey to strengthen ties with Iran is good – as long as it does not turn its back on the United States. For it to cultivate relations with Hamas and Hezbollah is also good – but not if it breaks with Israel. Turkey shows unique promise as a regional peacemaker. To play that role, however, it must follow a cardinal rule that the US has for years ignored: shape foreign policy according to national interest, not emotion.

  • Turkey Reveals True Intentions in Protocols Game

    Turkey Reveals True Intentions in Protocols Game

    Asbarez Post
    Tuesday October 27, 2009

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    Turkey Reveals True Intentions in Protocols Game

    Protocols Ratification to Be Held Hostage For Concessions on Karabakh

    Turkey’s parliament will not ratify the normalization agreements with Armenia unless international efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict yield a breakthrough that favors Azerbaijan, according to Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.

    “In order to get a yes [vote,] we need to have some progress in the [Karabakh] peace talks because Azerbaijan is a strategic ally and almost a domestic issue for Turkish foreign policy,” Davutoglu said in an interview with Al Jazeera television aired on Monday. The international community should help to end “the illegal occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijani territories” if it wants a speedy normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, he said.  More…


  • Turkey to recompense $1.1 billion for low-priced Azeri gas

    Turkey to recompense $1.1 billion for low-priced Azeri gas

    TURKISH-ARMENIAN PROTOCOLS ARE AT WORK


    [ 28 Oct 2009 15:18 ]

    Trend News Agency

    Baku. Rashad Suleymanov – APA-ECONOMICS. Turkey will pay the difference between the old price it has paid for Azeri gas since April 2008 after the gas agreement expired and the new price to be agreed on with Azerbaijan, said Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yilldiz.

    According to him, Turkey has continued to import natural gas from Azerbaijan although the gas supply agreement expired in April 2008.

    “Today we no longer buy low-priced gas from Azerbaijan. In accordance with the new price to be agreed upon, we will pay the difference”, he said, adding that Turkey is continuing talks with Azerbaijan’s SOCAR on natural gas, and hopes to reach an agreement soon.

    Turkish media report that Turkey will have to pay at least $1.1 billion to Azerbaijan as price difference compensation if the new gas price is around $250 per 1,000 cubic meters, compared to the current price of $120. .

  • Turkey: An Ally No More

    Turkey: An Ally No More

    by Daniel Pipes
    Jerusalem Post
    October 28, 2009


    the Middle East Forum, headed by Daniel Pipes

    1029

    The foreign ministers of Turkey and Syria met in Aleppo in October 2009.

    “There is no doubt he is our friend,” Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, says of Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, even as he accuses Israel’s foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman of threatening to use nuclear weapons against Gaza. These outrageous assertions point to the profound change of orientation by Turkey’s government, for six decades the West’s closest Muslim ally, since Erdoğan’s AK party came to power in 2002.

    Three events this past month reveal the extent of that change. The first came on October 11 with the news that the Turkish military – a long-time bastion of secularism and advocate of cooperation with Israel – abruptly asked Israeli forces not to participate in the annual “Anatolian Eagle” air force exercise.

    Erdoğan cited “diplomatic sensitivities” for the cancelation and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu spoke of “sensitivity on Gaza, East Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa mosque.” The Turks specifically rejected Israeli planes that may have attacked Hamas (an Islamist terrorist organization) during last winter’s Gaza Strip operation. While Damascus applauded the disinvitation, it prompted the U.S. and Italian governments to withdraw their forces from Anatolian Eagle, which in turn meant canceling the international exercise.

    As for the Israelis, this “sudden and unexpected” shift shook to the core their military alignment with Turkey, in place since 1996. Former air force chief Eytan Ben-Eliyahu, for example, called the cancelation “a seriously worrying development.” Jerusalem immediately responded by reviewing Israel’s practice of supplying Turkey with advanced weapons, such as the recent $140 million sale to the Turkish Air Force of targeting pods. The idea also arose to stop helping the Turks defeat the Armenian genocide resolutions that regularly appear before the U.S. Congress.

    1030

    Ministers of the Turkish and Syrian governments met at the border town of Öncüpınar and symbolically lifted a bar dividing their two countries on October 13.

    Barry Rubin of the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya not only argues that “The Israel-Turkey alliance is over” but concludes that Turkey’s armed forces no longer guard the secular republic and can no longer intervene when the government becomes too Islamist.

    The second event took place two days later, on October 13, when Syria’s Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem announced that Turkish and Syrian forces had just “carried out maneuvers near Ankara.” Moallem rightly called this an important development “because it refutes reports of poor relations between the military and political institutions in Turkey over strategic relations with Syria.” Translation: Turkey’s armed forces lost out to its politicians.

    Thirdly, ten Turkish ministers, led by Davutoğlu, joined their Syrian counterparts on October 13 for talks under the auspices of the just-established “Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation Council.” The ministers announced having signed almost 40 agreements to be implemented within 10 days; that “a more comprehensive, a bigger” joint land military exercise would be held than the first one in April; and that the two countries’ leaders would sign a strategic agreement in November.

    1031

    The cover of Ahmet Davutoğlu’s book, “Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position.”

    The council’s concluding joint statement announced the formation of “a long-term strategic partnership” between the two sides “to bolster and expand their cooperation in a wide spectrum of issues of mutual benefit and interest and strengthen the cultural bonds and solidarity among their peoples.” The council’s spirit, Davutoğlu explained, “is common destiny, history and future; we will build the future together,” while Moallem called the get-together a “festival to celebrate” the two peoples.

    Bilateral relations have indeed been dramatically reversed from a decade earlier, when Ankara came perilously close to war with Syria. But improved ties with Damascus are only one part of a much larger effort by Ankara to enhance relations with regional and Muslim states, a strategy enunciated by Davutoğlu in his influential 2000 book, Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu (“Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position”).

    In brief, Davutoğlu envisions reduced conflict with neighbors and Turkey emerging as a regional power, a sort-of modernized Ottoman Empire. Implicit in this strategy is a distancing of Turkey from the West in general and Israel in particular. Although not presented in Islamist terms, “strategic depth” closely fits the AK party’s Islamist world view.

    As Barry Rubin notes, “the Turkish government is closer politically to Iran and Syria than to the United States and Israel.” Caroline Glick, a Jerusalem Post columnist, goes further: Ankara already “left the Western alliance and became a full member of the Iranian axis.” But official circles in the West seem nearly oblivious to this momentous change in Turkey’s allegiance or its implications.

    The cost of their error will soon become evident.

    Mr. Pipes is director of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University.

  • Turkey’s Prime Minister Troubled by Armenia’s Diaspora

    Turkey’s Prime Minister Troubled by Armenia’s Diaspora


    By Appo Jabarian
    Executive Publisher / Managing Editor
    USA Armenian Life MagazineDuring a recent interview with the Wall Street Journal, Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan went on a temper tantrum against Diaspora Armenians.

    When asked about the Protocols, Armenia, and Artsakh (Nagorno Karabagh), Mr. Erdogan said: “I believe when President Sargsyan was on an international visit, he was faced by a reaction from the Armenian Diaspora. So what he does in face of the reaction of the Diaspora is very important. If he can stand firm, and if it is the government of Armenia and not the Armenian Diaspora that is determining policy in Armenia, then I think that we can move forward. As far as we’re concerned there is no problem. But it is up to the government in Armenia.

    Next, he added: “What is important and I would like to underline this, because this is perhaps the most important point is that Armenia should not allow its policies to be taken hostage by the Armenian Diaspora. It should be up to the government to carry out its policies.”

    It’s all too clear that Mr. Erdogan wants to divide and conquer. The Turkish Prime Minister is working overtime to create a wedge between Armenia and its 8-million strong Diaspora.

    Will the denialist Turkish leader succeed in stripping Armenia from its number one social, economic, and political ally, the Armenian Diaspora?

    It was because of a strong opposition by Armenians both in the homeland and the Diaspora to the unfair terms of the Protocols, including Ankara’s demand that Armenia give up its pursuit of Artsakh’s independence, Turkey back-paddled and started to distance itself from the Artsakh issue, separating it from the normalization of diplomatic ties with Armenia.

    But that should not misguide the Armenians into thinking that Turkey is doing Armenia and Armenians a favor. They are entitled to carry out the Destalinization/Deturkification process of the Armenian territories. Artsakh is the first of many steps leading to the ultimate reunification of Armenia through the establishment of Federal Republics of Armenia.

    In 1921, the following Eastern Armenian provinces of Artsakh (1), Nakhitchevan (1), Gandzak (1), Javakhq (2), Ardahan (3), Kars (3), and Igdir (3) were stalinized under the infamous Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. They were carved out of Armenia of 1918 and were arbitrarily “gifted” respectively to the newly Sovietized Azerbaijan (1), Georgia (2), and Kemalist Turkey (3).

    Now that the infamous Protocols are signed, Armenians in Armenia and around the world have no choice but to derail its ratification in the National Assembly. Armenia’s capitulation to unfair Turkish demands shall not be allowed to linger. Turkey should be stopped and Armenia should be saved. Otherwise, Mr. Erdogan’s obvious anxiety over the Diaspora Armenians activism will definitely multiply.

    He should take no solace from the temporary support of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, acting as a proxy for the multi-national oil/gas conglomerates.

    Secretary Clinton: The Oil Lady

    During ’08 U.S. presidential primary election season, then candidate Hillary Clinton used to refer to then President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney as “The oilmen.”

    So now, since she is eagerly catering to energy multi-national corporations’ thirst for faster profits at the expense of Armenia and Armenians, she must be called “The Oil Lady.”

    On October 14, The Washington Post reported that Secretary Clinton “executed some deft diplomacy last weekend as the leaders of Turkey and Armenia signed a potentially historic deal to establish normal diplomatic relations and reopen their borders. We say ‘potentially’ because there are some big obstacles to implementing the accord, which we’ll come back to. … The rapprochement between these two nations matters to the United States for a number of reasons. It could help stabilize the volatile Caucasus region, open the way for new corridors for the export of gas and oil to the West, ease Russia’s political domination of Armenia, and remove a major irritant from U.S. relations with Turkey. The Obama administration worked diligently to promote the accord. … President Obama played a part by sidestepping a campaign promise to formally recognize the mass killing of Armenians by Turks during World War I as ‘genocide.’”

    The Moscow, Europe and U.S.-based energy giants have set their eyes on the construction of their oil pipeline linking the oil and gas fields of Central Asia to Europe via Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey. But why pursue it at dire consequences for Armenia and Diaspora Armenians? Why allow Turkey to exploit the opportunity by forcing Armenia to give up its demands of lands in Turkish-occupied Western Armenia; Reparations for the Turkish-executed Armenian genocide?

    By abusing the political opportunity, Turkey has poured more gasoline on the fire, igniting worldwide Armenian condemnation. But who is to blame for the fact that Turkey is deeply troubled by Armenia’s Diaspora? Turkey!