Category: Saban Kardas

Admiral Mullen Discusses Critical Military Engagement in Turkey

Admiral Mullen Discusses Critical Military Engagement in Turkey

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 160

September 8, 2010

By Saban Kardas

Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Turkey last week. Although the official purpose of Mullen’s visit was to congratulate his Turkish counterpart General Isik Kosaner, recently appointed as the Chief of the General Staff, this introductory visit had no fixed agenda. Mullen had a chance to gauge Turkey’s position on many of US policies in the surrounding regions. In his meetings with Turkish military and civilian leaders, Mullen exchanged opinions on US withdrawal from Iraq, the Iranian nuclear issue and the international military presence in Afghanistan, as well as reiterating US support for Turkey on various issues such as its struggle against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and sales of military equipment for the Turkish armed forces (Hurriyet, Cumhuriyet, Radikal, September 5).

On the issue of Iran, Mullen downplayed recent disagreements, arguing that both Turkey and the US share the common objective of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. However, as Ankara’s earlier diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear standoff attested, such blanket mutual understanding was not enough to eliminate major differences of opinion over how best to deal with Iran (EDM, June 1). Ankara’s objections to a tougher US position and insistence on a diplomatic solution culminated in Turkey’s vote against a US-brokered UN Security Council resolution authorizing a new round of sanctions in June. Coupled with other crises, such as the problems encountered in Turkish-Israeli relations, this development further strained bilateral relations, prompting many US politicians and interest groups to question the strategic partnership with Turkey. In this tense environment, in August the Republicans blocked President Barack Obama’s nominee for the next Ambassador to Turkey, Frank Ricciardione. The vacant post highlighted how tenuous Obama’s Turkey policy remained, as well as the impact of Ankara’s recent policies on US domestic politics.

While for Washington a combination of diplomatic efforts and punitive sanctions is needed to deal with Iran, Ankara still believes that constructive diplomacy must be prioritized. Earlier in August, Mullen had raised tensions in the region, following his statement that military options against Iran remain on the table, which invited a harsh reaction from Iran, placing Turkey in a difficult diplomatic position (AFP, August 3).

In this context, Mullen adopted a rather balanced tone in Ankara and said that he had no plan to question Turkey over the Security Council vote and emphasized that he welcomed Turkish leaders’ statements that they would comply with UN sanctions against Iran. Nonetheless, this last point underscored continued differences over Iran. The Turkish government has reiterated on many occasions that it would implement only sanctions authorized by the UN, not the stricter set of measures being introduced by the US and the European countries.

Mullen also referred to ongoing discussions within NATO pertaining to the formation of a missile defense system against Iran, which will be part of the agenda of the upcoming NATO summit in November. Turkey is one of the possible locations for radars and interceptors. However, the Turkish position on this issue remains unclear, and it is unlikely to welcome such a proposal considering Ankara’s sensitivity to Tehran’s concerns.

Turkey’s contribution to the international military effort in Afghanistan was also discussed. Praising Turkey’s critical role in ensuring Afghanistan’s security through its provision of troops and training to Afghan security personnel, Mullen requested that Turkey maintains its military contribution after its command over international troops in Kabul and the surrounding area expires in October. Turkey has contributed to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since its inception immediately after the US invasion of the country in 2001, and has assumed the command of ISAF on many occasions. Although the US has pressured Turkey to increase its troop levels, Ankara has refused to do so, on the grounds that non-military means should be used to address the root causes of the conflict. Washington has come to acknowledge Ankara’s concerns on this issue, but wants to ensure that Turkey maintains at least its current level of commitment to ISAF.

An additional area discussed during the bilateral talks was Turkey’s specific role in US withdrawal plans from Iraq. Ever since the Obama administration announced its withdrawal plans, there has been speculation that Turkey would serve as one of the exit routes for US troops and military equipment (EDM, March 9, 2009). Denying such reports, Mullen stressed that he was not in Ankara to negotiate the terms of the US military exit from Iraq through Turkey. Since the transfer of military units will require authorization from the Turkish parliament, it is unlikely that Washington will seriously consider this option. Indeed, a recent statement from the Turkish foreign ministry also ruled out such an option, though welcoming the possibility of moving non-combat elements through the country. If an agreement is reached, Turkey would be ready to create a safe zone for the transfer of technical equipment (Sabah, September 3).

The visit by Mullen underscores the extent to which US-Turkish relations are characterized by military-strategic issues, and how the United States needs Turkey’s cooperation at best and at the very least its acquiescence for the successful execution of its military engagements in the regions surrounding Turkey. Therefore, Turkey is a key part of discussions on major US military campaigns, which serves as a constraint on Washington and prevents it from severing ties with this critical ally over its independent policies. Turkey, in contrast, relies on US assistance and the transfer of military technology, which curbs any tendency on its part to pursue unilateral policies. Aware of this mutual interdependence in military-security affairs, civilian and military bureaucrats from both sides have intensified their efforts to maintain the pace of cooperation. Recently, Turkish foreign ministry officials visited Washington to reiterate Ankara’s determination to maintain strategic ties with the US. This message will perhaps be repeated during the visit to the US later this month by Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, and Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, as part of the UN General Assembly.

https://jamestown.org/program/admiral-mullen-discusses-critical-military-engagement-in-turkey/

September 9, 2010
Turkish Civilian-Military Relations Overhauled

Turkish Civilian-Military Relations Overhauled

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 156

August 12, 2010

By Saban Kardas

The recent Supreme Military Council (YAS) meeting served as an additional showdown between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the country’s military leadership. When the four-day long YAS meeting ended on August 4, it failed to fill key posts, raising questions about the future command structure of the Turkish military, as well as the overall direction of the civil-military relationship.

A prime function of the YAS was to discuss the status of military personnel expecting appointments or retirements in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). The established traditions regarding the promotions and appointments in the Turkish military’s upper echelons, which are based on tenure and seniority, have been implemented strictly. Although the government and the president have the final say in appointment and promotion decisions, traditionally, the civilian authorities endorse the list suggested by the top military brass.

The AKP government’s active interference in appointments this year has been an important exception to the rule. In the words of one Turkish security analyst and close observer of military affairs, Nihat Ali Ozcan, it was “the biggest crisis ever encountered by the Turkish armed forces in its history” (Hurriyet Daily News, August 4).

The ongoing investigations into different coup plots in which several active and retired military officers are charged over their involvement in plans to overthrow the government eventually affected the promotions. On the eve of the YAS meeting, a court summoned 19 officers, and various retired officers, to testify in a probe, including the current First Army Corps Commander, General Hasan Igsiz. None of the suspects surrendered to the police, and appealed against their arrest.

The government refused to consider the promotion of military officers, implicated in the coup plots. Particularly, the government objected to Igsiz’s appointment as the commander of the Land Forces, who was implicated in two investigations. His alleged involvement in a campaign to defame the government through setting up various web sites, known as “Internet Memorandum,” angered Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Moreover, the government delayed the promotion of 11 high ranking officials for whom arrest warrants were issued in the ongoing coup investigation, known as “Sledgehammer.” These various cases are connected to a probe into an alleged gang, Ergenekon, seeking to dismantle the incumbent government.

Reportedly, the current Chief of the General Staff (CGS), General Ilker Basbug, insisted on Igsiz’s promotion, raising tension between the government and military. There was a consensus that the current Land Forces Commander, Isik Kosaner, would replace Basbug as the new CGS. However, in the absence of an agreement on who would replace Kosaner due to President, Abdullah Gul, and the government’s refusal to sign Igsiz’s appointment, the decision was postponed.

Thus, when the results of the YAS were announced on the fourth day, it left the two key posts, CGS and Land Forces commander, unfilled. Naval Forces Commander, Admiral Esref Ugur Yigit, and Air Forces Commander, General Hasan Aksay, remained in their posts for another year, while Necdet Ozel was appointed as the new head of the Gendarmerie General Command (Anadolu Ajansi, August 4). Several efforts were made to address this crisis, through various meetings between the president, top government officials and military headquarters.

To complicate matters further, General Atilla Isik, who was expected to assume the Land Forces command instead of Igsiz, announced his request for retirement on August 5. The Turkish press speculated that Isik was protesting the government’s interference with the military’s inner workings over the appointment. Arguably, Basbug sought to mobilize force commanders to submit their resignations to protest against the government. Through such moves, it was further argued that Basbug was seeking to shape the future line of command, by opening the way to promote officers close to him. In particular, Basbug was allegedly seeking to block the new Gendarmerie commander Ozel’s succession of Kosaner as the CGS in 2013 (Bugun, August 6). Isik dismissed such speculation, and denied the allegations that he offered to resign due to pressures from within the military (www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 6). Nonetheless, this development delayed the resolution of the appointment crisis.

On Sunday, Erdogan announced a breakthrough, saying that the government and military had reached an agreement. Following president Gul’s approval, the standoff over the new command structure ended. Kosaner was appointed as the chief of staff, while the current EDOK commander General Erdal Ceylanoglu, who was appointed as the Commander of the First Army in the YAS meeting, was appointed as the new commander of the armed forces. Aegean Army Corps Commander, Hayri Kivrikoglu, became the Commander of the First Army. Ceylanoglu assumed the command of the armed forces, instead of the more senior General Ozel. Although this practice contravened the established rules, it secured Ozel’s path to become the CGS in 2013, replacing Kosaner (www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 9).

For supporters of the Erdogan government, this development marks a step towards greater civilian control over the military. In their view, even the fact that the current military leadership insisted on the promotion of officers under investigation highlighted its disregard for the ongoing judicial process and civil supremacy. They see the government’s insistence on shaping the top command chain, despite the military’s opposition, as a strong vindication that civil-military relations will be normalized, and the military will have to learn how to obey the rule of civil law. For critics and opposition parties, however, the government is interested in curbing the power of the military in order to consolidate its power in Turkish politics. By pointing to the timing of the court orders, they argue that the government is using the ongoing legal process to sweep the anti-government officers from office.

However, underlying this crisis is a power struggle between the military and the Erdogan government, and it appears the government has won in the latest showdown. Nevertheless, it may be too early to suggest that it signals an outright victory. Depending upon the outcome of controversial legal cases, civil-military relations may evolve in a different direction than desired by the government and its supporters.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-civilian-military-relations-overhauled/

August 13, 2010
Turkey’s “Economic Recovery” Raises Questions

Turkey’s “Economic Recovery” Raises Questions

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 150

August 4, 2010

By Saban Kardas

The Turkish Exporters’ Assembly (TIM) announced statistics on Turkish export figures in July 2010. Turkey exported around $9.5 billion in goods, which amounted to a 5.97 percent increase since July 2009. Between January and July 2010, its exports increased by 13.14 percent compared to the same period last year and reached $64.2 billion. Turkey’s leading export industries were in the automotive, textiles and chemicals sectors (www.tim.org.tr, August 1).

The export trends are an important indicator in order to understand the Turkish government’s handling of the economy in the face of the global economic crisis. After coming to power in 2002, the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) managed to stabilize the Turkish economy, which had suffered from a series of home-grown financial crises throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s. The Turkish economy reported record growth rates under the AKP’s rule, with Turkish exports surpassing the important psychological threshold of $100 billion.

However, the global financial crisis shattered this optimistic picture. Under pressure from a contracting global economy and weak domestic demand, Turkey’s production sector was badly hit, resulting in a hike in unemployment figures. With the lessons learned from earlier financial crises, however, Turkish financial institutions weathered the storm successfully. Ankara did not experience the collapse of the mortgage system or a credit crunch, and the Turkish banking sector grew even in those difficult conditions.

Nonetheless, the Turkish government came under criticism for its economic policies. For skeptics, the government could not take effective measures to protect the economy, especially through its refusal to accept international assistance (EDM, April 2, 2009). Some Turkish business groups pressured the government to conclude a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) so that it could serve as an anchor of stability and attract fresh loans to non-financial sectors. Others argued that Turkey could overcome financing problems independently without the IMF’s help. After many rounds of talks, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, refused to sign a loan deal with the IMF, on the grounds that it would reduce Turkey’s flexibility to initiate appropriate measures. Instead, Erdogan’s government launched various stimulus packages to boost domestic demand and initiated a medium-term economic recovery plan (EDM, September 23, 2009).

The government’s efforts helped revitalize industrial production, easing the effects of the crisis. For a healthy recovery, however, it was necessary to expand Turkey’s export volume, given the limitations of its domestic market to sustain industrial growth alone. The trends in exports are thus a key indicator to understand the fate of Turkey’s crisis recovery policies.

Supporters of the government’s economic policy have referred to the country’s ability to avoid a major economic breakdown without outside help and the signs of recovery in recent months. In their view, through its successful road map, Turkey proved its self-sufficiency and resilience to crises, and that it could sustain this momentum without the injection of foreign capital through an IMF deal (Today’s Zaman, March 11).

Thus, Turkish government officials welcomed the recently announced export figures as further evidence that Turkey was emerging from recession. In a written statement, Turkish State Minister, Zafer Caglayan, responsible for foreign trade, interpreted these developments as signs that Turkish export levels were on the path to recovery. He analyzed the trends in exports and argued that the government will be able to reach the export volume predictions of the medium-term economic plan (www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 1).

Nonetheless, Turkish economists call for caution in evaluating Turkey’s performance in coming out of recession. For instance, a leading Turkish economist, Guven Sak, based on the results of a study conducted by the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), identifies a worrying pattern. He argues that although the export volume in the global economy expanded in the first quarter of 2010, Turkish exports remained rather stagnant. He reached the conclusion that while the global economy is rapidly returning to pre-crisis levels, Turkey is having difficulty catching up with these wider trends; Turkey was able to recover only 75 percent of the export volume lost due to the crisis. Thus, he called for a more effective export promotion strategy (Referans, July 29, www.tepav.org, July 28).

Indeed, reaching new markets has been a key component of the government’s recent foreign economic strategy. Caglayan and other Turkish officials have traveled extensively in order to boost Turkey’s foreign trade. For instance, Caglayan was in the US recently. Traditionally, Turkish exports to the US remained limited compared to its trade ties with the EU and Turkey now seeks to gain a larger share of the US market. Similarly, Turkey wants to form a free trade zone in the Middle East to include Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, hoping that it might improve Turkish trade with the region. A meeting in Istanbul brought together the representatives of these countries last weekend, where they agreed further steps towards realization of this objective (Anadolu Ajansi, July 31).

The need for a more effective export-oriented growth strategy, in addition to penetrating into new markets, is also recognized by the government. In a recent meeting aimed at formulating a road map for Turkish exports, bringing together representatives from the treasury, central bank and other state institutions, Caglayan stressed that industrial products still accounts for nearly 80 percent of the country’s exports. The meeting concluded that Turkey had to reduce its dependence on the export of low and medium-technology products and move to more profitable sectors. Also, the meeting highlighted Turkey’s heavy reliance on foreign energy sources as a liability affecting its foreign trade balance (Anadolu Ajansi, July 12).

This last point highlights another major challenge facing Turkey’s economic recovery: dependence upon imports to sustain its economic growth. Parallel to the increase in domestic production and exports, Turkish imports also soared in recent months. The foreign trade deficit, which had been a prime source of concern for the Turkish economy, contracted sharply during the global financial crisis. Figures released recently show that as of June 2010 the foreign trade deficit increased by 34.9 percent since last year and Turkey’s exports are far from meeting its imports (www.tuik.gov.tr, July 30).

https://jamestown.org/program/turkeys-economic-recovery-raises-questions/

August 5, 2010
Slow Progress in Turkish-Armenian Normalization

Slow Progress in Turkish-Armenian Normalization

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 139

July 20, 2010

By Saban Kardas

Turkey’s prospective participation in a six-day NATO exercise in Armenia in September, and the informal Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) meeting in Astana, reignited the debate on the stalled Turkish-Armenian normalization process. The Armenia 2010 exercise will focus on post-earthquake civil emergency drills.

A senior columnist in the daily newspaper, Radikal, Murat Yetkin, first publicized Turkey’s agreement to participate in the exercise and, if the need arose, the Turkish border would be opened to vehicles in order to supply the disaster-hit areas in the scenario. Local administrative sources were examining the condition of the transportation infrastructure, which corresponded with the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, visiting the region, promoted speculation that it might lead to the “border opening” (Radikal, July 14).

According to a subsequent story in Hurriyet, Turkish diplomatic sources confirmed Ankara’s participation, involving three or four personnel, and added that they were also making the necessary preparations to temporarily re-open the Turkish-Armenian border. Such an opening of the border would involve the transfer of NATO equipment into Armenia, through the Dogukapi border crossing in the Turkish city of Kars, where the governor’s office concluded the roads and railways were in good condition, also adding that the crossing could stay open for a month (Hurriyet, July 15).

Turkish media speculated that such cooperation might help to reduce political tension, and this incident may serve as a model to test the ground for the long-delayed opening of the Turkish-Armenian border. However, Armenian diplomatic sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, signaled that they were not planning to request Turkey’s assistance in this matter. They dismissed the Turkish statement as “a public relations stunt aimed at burnishing Turkey’s image” (Radio Free Europe, July 16).

This harsh reaction underscored the extent of the divisions between Turkey and Armenia. After taking various groundbreaking steps in 2009, which culminated in the signing of the protocols in October, Turkey and Armenia failed to sustain the initial momentum. For its part, the Turkish government had to put the rapprochement process on the backburner, faced with resistance from the nationalist domestic opposition and the concerns raised by Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, maintained on many occasions that Turkey remained committed to the spirit of normalization and would seize every opportunity to continue with the process. For Davutoglu, relations with Armenia remain a major challenge to his “zero problems with neighbors” policy. He maintains that the normalization process, though slow, still continues and if Armenia takes constructive steps, it could prove successful.

However, as Turkish leaders previously emphasized on various occasions, without any concrete progress in the Azeri-Armenian dispute, Turkey will not undertake further steps towards the normalization of its diplomatic relations with Armenia, including the re-opening of the border. Therefore, Turkey has urged the Minsk group to refocus on the Karabakh dispute on the one hand, and work to facilitate the resolution of this conflict on the other.

Responding to a question submitted by a Member of Parliament from the Nationalist Action Party during a parliamentary debate, Davutoglu defended the government’s policy, arguing that the Turkish-Armenian process also stimulated efforts to resolve the Azeri-Armenian dispute.

Davutoglu also noted that the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan pertaining to the return of the occupied Azeri regions were underway. He indicated that negotiations have reached the level of discussing the details for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in zones from which Armenian forces are withdrawn, though he denied rumors that Turkey also submitted a proposal to supply such peacekeeping units (Anadolu Ajansi, July 16).

Moreover, addressing the Karabakh dispute has been of great concern internationally, especially considering the fluctuating tensions in the region due to deadly armed exchanges between Azeri and Armenian forces along the ceasefire line.

Ahead of the informal meeting of the foreign ministers of the OSCE in Astana, expectations were raised that Azerbaijan and Armenia might achieve some progress. Prior to his departure for Astana, Azeri Foreign Minister, Elmar Mammadyarov, said that he was expecting that an Armenian withdrawal from the Kalbajar and Lachin regions, currently under Armenian occupation, would be tabled during the discussions in Astana. Since these issues were previously agreed upon through Russian mediation, he asked the Armenian side to abide by earlier promises. Nonetheless, he complained that Armenia was raising fresh issues, and deviating from the earlier consensus (www.azernews.az, July 16).

Baku argues that only after its demand for the immediate return of occupied territories is met, can it reciprocate on other demands by Armenia, such as the status of the Lachin corridor connecting Karabakh to Armenia. This position has also been supported by Turkey for some time, so that it could reenergize its own normalization process with Armenia. The meeting between Mammadyarov and his Armenian counterpart, Edward Nalbandian, in Astana as well as the efforts by the Minsk group co-chairs, however, failed to meet such expectations. The Minsk group released a statement stressing that “the efforts made so far by the parties to the conflict, were insufficient to overcome existing differences” and expressed “regret over recent developments that have exacerbated tensions in the region (www.azernews.az, July 17).

Following his meeting with Davutoglu, Mammadyarov held a press conference concerning his meeting with Nalbandian. He criticized his Armenian counterpart, arguing that the Armenian side made a last minute move and stepped back from a deal, despite the fact that they had come close to reaching an agreement. He expressed disappointment with the Armenian side, saying they were not interested in any progress (Dogan Haber Ajansi, July 17).

Davutoglu also regretted the failure to reach an agreement. In an apparent show of solidarity with his Azeri counterpart, he referred to the speculation about re-opening the border. He ruled out this possibility for the time being, adding that no one should have such expectations (Cihan Haber Ajansi, July 17). Last week’s developments underscored, once again, the complicated manner in which Turkish-Armenian normalization is mired in the Azeri-Armenian dispute.

https://jamestown.org/program/slow-progress-in-turkish-armenian-normalization/

July 21, 2010
Constitutional Court’s Partial Endorsement of Reform Package Divides Turkish Politics

Constitutional Court’s Partial Endorsement of Reform Package Divides Turkish Politics

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 134, July 13, 2010

By Saban Kardas

The Turkish Constitutional Court issued another controversial ruling on June 8, sparking a heated debate. Since the constitutional reform package initiated by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) failed to receive the necessary votes in parliament, it was submitted to a referendum, scheduled for September 12. The reform package introduces changes to the elections law, composition of higher courts, as well as allowing for the prosecution of past coup perpetrators and expanding various freedoms (EDM, May 5). However, a plea was brought to the court, asking for the annulment of the reform package on the grounds that it violated certain principles of the constitution. Although the court partially annulled some sections, it endorsed the overall package, clearing the way for the referendum.

A major line of discussion concerns the repercussions of the ruling on Turkey’s state structure, in particular the separation of powers. According to the constitutional review system set by the 1982 constitution, prepared by the military regime at the time, the constitutional court is authorized to review parliamentary decisions only from a procedural point of view. Critics argue that by taking up this case on substantial grounds, the court exceeded its jurisdiction and curtailed parliament’s legislative powers. This debate is a reincarnation of the discussions in 2008, when the court overruled changes to the Turkish constitution, which would have ended the ban on the headscarf on university campuses. In contrast, those defending the court’s interpretation of its review powers in an expanding manner, argue that such judicial activism is necessary to ensure the survival of Turkey’s secular regime. In their view, by curbing the legislative autonomy of parliament on the basis of the “unchangeable articles of the Constitution,” the court is able to keep a lid on the excesses of the government; hence, preserving the secular characteristic of the current regime.

Some AKP members questioned the legitimacy of the court’s ruling, arguing that it overstepped its authority. Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, however, refrained from adopting such a position, and instead maintained that they were content with the ruling, because the final package that will be put before the Turkish public met their expectations (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 10).

While Erdogan also vowed that they would start a campaign to mobilize the Turkish public behind the reform package, the opposition parties, announced that they would start counter campaigns against it. As the referendum approaches, only minor rightist parties declared that they would favor the proposed changes. Major opposition parties have declined to support the AKP’s drive for constitutional reform. A shared concern among the opposition is that through such reforms, especially efforts to change the composition of higher courts, the AKP once again demonstrated that it is not interested in genuine democratization. Rather, it is seeking to deepen its grip over the state institutions, and creating a type of civilian despotism. Beyond that, each opposition party has its own specific objections.

The main opposition, secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP), has argued that the AKP is intent on undermining the fundamental principles: consequently, its agenda should be objected to at any cost. It was, in fact, the CHP that pleaded to the constitutional court for the annulment of the reforms. Since the CHP appealed to the court with similar controversial requests in the past, the AKP criticizes it for conducting politics in court rooms, and avoiding the ballot box. Although the court removed some of the controversial provisions from the current package, the CHP is not fully satisfied with the ruling, and will campaign against the package in the referendum. The CHP has recently elected a new leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who gained popularity after his stern criticism of the AKP’s social and economic policies and publicizing corruption accusations against the AKP. Kilicdaroglu’s calls for an ethical policy have reenergized the CHP’s standing in Turkish politics, as anti-AKP voters increasingly turn to him as their new hope. The CHP, thus, sees the referendum as an opportunity to deal a blow to the AKP, and maintain the momentum generated by Kilicdaroglu’s election (www.cnnturk.com, July 10).

The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) has been pursuing knee-jerk opposition to the AKP’s policies. As part of its policy of non-cooperation with the AKP, the MHP has opposed the reform package from the outset, saying that those policies will deepen social fragmentation. Nonetheless, the MHP expressed dissatisfaction with the court’s decision to review the reforms on substantial grounds. The MHP, in contrast, has suggested that Turkish people should be allowed to decide on the fate of the package, and it will ask its supporters to vote “no” (Anadolu Ajansi, July 10).

Many observers expect Kurdish voters to support the reform package, but the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) would ask its supporters to boycott the referendum (Zaman, July 11). Overall, the BDP is critical of the political system and it has asserted that Turkey’s democratization depends upon rewriting the entire constitution on a civilian and pluralist platform. For the BDP, the partial amendments cannot eliminate the authoritarian legacy of the 1982 constitution and serve only the AKP’s own interests. Nonetheless, during the debates in parliament, the BDP first claimed that it would follow a constructive approach. It sought to negotiate with the AKP to include certain changes into the package, such as lowering the election threshold and changes to anti-terrorism laws (www.cnnturk.com, March 23). Faced with the AKP’s inflexibility over those demands, the BDP has expressed its opposition, and will now boycott the referendum.

Increasingly, the referendum over the constitutional amendment is turning into a mini-election, ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for next year. The AKP has hoped to reenergize its grassroots support through the constitutional reform package, when it was coming under pressure for failing to maintain its reformist spirit. Now, it finds itself in a situation of having mobilized a counter coalition, whose only common denominator is the opposition to the AKP. Already troubled by other domestic issues, the AKP will have a difficult time mobilizing a winning coalition in the referendum, yet its success may also help it ensure victory in parliamentary elections next year.

https://jamestown.org/program/constitutional-courts-partial-endorsement-of-reform-package-divides-turkish-politics/

July 14, 2010
Turkish-Israeli Relations Deteriorate Further

Turkish-Israeli Relations Deteriorate Further

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 130

July 7, 2010

By Saban Kardas

Turkish-Israeli relations continue to worsen, despite attempts to heal the divisions caused by the flotilla crisis. Ankara has asked Tel Aviv to issue an official apology for the killing of its citizens, pay compensation to the victims’ families, accept an independent international probe into the incident, return the confiscated ships and end its blockade on the Gaza strip. Although Turkey threatened to sever ties if Israel fails to deliver, how far Ankara might go with its “punitive” actions has been a matter of controversy (EDM, June 7).

Thus far, the steps Israel has taken are far from meeting Turkish expectations, as acknowledged by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Burak Ozugergin (Anadolu Ajansi, June 30). For instance, Israel defied a UN-proposal to form an international commission and instead launched its own internal inquiry. The Israeli panel had only limited powers to examine “whether Israel’s Gaza blockade and the flotilla’s interception conformed with international law and also investigate the actions taken by the convoy’s organizers and participants.” Although the panel’s mandate was expanded slightly by the Israeli cabinet, Turkey continues to dismiss it (www.worldbulletin.net, July 4).

There has been no progress on compensation for the killings. Similarly, Israel has not taken any steps to return the three ships it confiscated during the raid. Although Tel Aviv announced some measures to ease the Gaza blockade, humanitarian aid is not flowing into the area freely. Therefore, the Turkish government has continued its criticism of Israel on various domestic and international platforms. During the G20 summit in Toronto, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, labeled Israeli actions as state terrorism and vowed to pursue this issue until Israel changed its attitude on Turkey’s conditions (Anadolu Ajansi, June 28). Again, during his state of the union address, Erdogan continued with the same level of criticism against Israel (Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

Nonetheless, a secret meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, and Israeli Industry and Trade Minister, Ben-Eliezer, in Brussels altered the terms of the discussion (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 1). Although the meeting was allegedly “secret,” the manner in which it entered the press demonstrated that both sides did not want it to remain secret. They probably sought to send signals that they were willing and able to discuss ways of overcoming the stalemate, despite the confrontational public rhetoric adopted by their leaders.

While government sources from both countries confirmed the meeting, it had significant reverberations on each side. In Israel, the meeting caused a major debate, as it turned out that Ben-Eliezer was acting in consultation with Prime Minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, and Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, while Israel’s hard-line Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, was not informed.

The Turkish opposition also capitalized on this story, presenting it as an indication of the government’s “insincere” foreign policy. Opposition parties argued that while the government was lambasting Israel publicly for domestic political reasons, it continued dialogue with Israel behind closed doors. Responding to such criticism, Davutoglu ruled out any “inconsistency” in the government’s foreign policy and defended the meeting. He argued that, the meeting was requested by the Israeli side and he used that opportunity to state Ankara’s demands directly to Israeli officials (www.cnnturk.com, July 1).

However, subsequent exchanges between Turkish and Israeli sources showed that the parties were far from overcoming differences. In defiance of Turkey’s account of the secret meeting, Netanyahu argued that no compensation was discussed and the panel formed by Israel would satisfy the demands of the international community. Although expressing regret for the loss of life, Netanyahu ruled out any apology and compensation (www.cnnturk.com, July 3).

This statement prompted Davutoglu to issue further harsh remarks directed at Israel in an interview with Hurriyet, which appeared as an ultimatum: “Israelis have three options: they will either apologize or acknowledge an international impartial inquiry and its conclusion. Otherwise, our diplomatic ties will be cut off” (Hurriyet Daily News, July 4). Davutoglu also indicated that Turkey could not wait indefinitely and would continue to take measures to isolate Israel, which might include extending a flight ban on Israeli military aircraft over Turkish airspace to civilian flights as well.

In response, Israeli sources again rebuffed Turkey’s demands for an apology. Liberman and Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Yigal Palmor, slammed Ankara’s harsh rhetoric. “When you want an apology, you do not use threats or ultimatums… Everything leads us to believe that Turkey has another agenda in mind,” Lieberman maintained (AFP, July 5; Today’s Zaman, July 6).

Turkish-Israeli tensions have been an important issue affecting the course of Turkish-US relations, which also experienced recent turbulence. Since the Davutoglu-Ben-Eliezer talks took place after Erdogan’s meeting with the US President, Barack Obama, at the G20 summit, some speculated that Washington was behind this development. Moreover, Obama arguably sought to convince Erdogan to drop his demand for an international investigation into the flotilla incident (www.cnnturk.com, July 4). Davutoglu has rejected the suggestion that the meeting was held due to American pressure.

Although it might be difficult to confirm what role US diplomatic sources played in the latest meeting, US efforts to mend ties between Turkey and Israel are no secret. Since the parties started bickering immediately after the revelation of the “secret” meeting, it might indicate that they were encouraged by Obama to meet. Indeed, Turkish-Israeli ties were one of the items on the Erdogan-Obama meeting, where Erdogan extended his gratitude to Obama for his constructive role in the flotilla crisis (Anadolu Ajansi, June 28).

However, it seems Obama has been less successful in dampening the tension between the two allies in the Middle East and in convincing Erdogan to drop his critical rhetoric towards Israel. The row over the secret meeting, obviously seeking to bridge differences, demonstrated the depth of the Turkish-Israeli rift. As a final straw, it was announced that Turkey will not attend a US-Israeli-Turkish joint naval search-and-rescue exercise, scheduled in the Eastern Mediterranean next month. Dubbed “Reliant Mermaid,” the drill has been held regularly over the past decade (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 5).

https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-israeli-relations-deteriorate-further/

July 7, 2010