Category: Saban Kardas

Turkey Maintains Reservations About US Missile Defense

Turkey Maintains Reservations About US Missile Defense

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 190

October 21, 2010 02:11

By: Saban Kardas

Turkey’s position on US efforts to create a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Europe has emerged as another source of tension in US-Turkish relations. The Bush administration originally contemplated the installment of a missile shield in Eastern Europe, yet failed to achieve its stated objectives in the face of strong Russian opposition. At the time, Turkey expressed a cautious position on such proposals, arguing that it should not proceed in a manner threatening to Russia. Recently, the Obama administration revived the idea as a central component of its policy of containing the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program.

Turkey has been considered as a possible location for the system, possibly hosting a radar battery on its soil, which would detect missiles launched from its surrounding regions so that they could be intercepted by missiles stationed in Turkey or Eastern Europe. The US also moved to present the revamped program as a joint NATO project, in obvious attempts to garner wider diplomatic support, and perhaps ease Ankara’s concerns. However, given Turkey’s position on the Iranian nuclear issue, which already had pitted it against the US, Ankara has remained lukewarm towards invitations from Washington to join the project. The recent trend in Turkish foreign policy towards pursuing independent policies and growing questions as to whether it is still committed to the Alliance and its traditional relations with the US has made Turkey’s position all the more puzzling.

This issue has been at Turkey’s doorsteps visibly at least since Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Turkey in early September (EDM, September 8). Similarly, during his visit to Turkey in early October, NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, discussed this issue (www.cnnturk.com, October 8). Ankara’s position was again one of the main items when NATO foreign and defense ministers met on October 14 in Brussels to discuss the Alliance’s new strategic concept, which will be adopted at the NATO summit in Lisbon next month. Rasmussen urged alliance members to consider the proposal for adopting a missile shield seriously against threats from rogue states, as underlined in the draft strategic concept.

In Brussels, Turkish foreign and defense ministers, Ahmet Davutoglu and Vecdi Gonul, respectively, held a separate meeting with their US counterparts Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates. They conveyed Turkish concerns, especially its uneasiness with the proposed system being perceived as targeting Iran and Syria. They emphasized that the project must proceed as a defensive system, without designating any country as a potential aggressor. Otherwise, it could make these countries feel encircled and heighten tensions in the region. Turkey also reportedly expressed its desire to place the system under NATO’s command, and have it cover the entire territory of NATO members. Regarding the use of Turkish territory as a possible site for the system, the Turkish side apparently maintained its reservations (Dogan, October 14; Cihan, October 16).

Speaking to reporters upon his return to Turkey, Gonul, however, did not rule out Turkey’s participation. Gonul rejected labeling Turkey’s stance as simply putting up objections, noting that the two sides were negotiating, which will continue until the Lisbon summit. Interestingly, Gates also denied speculation that the US was pressuring Turkey and said they were simply continuing negotiations with an ally. Gonul preferred to highlight the potential benefits of the missile shield for Turkey’s own security. Referring to some smaller scale defense systems Turkey is undertaking, Gonul maintained that if a future NATO missile shield also covers Turkey, it might help the country save huge costs (Zaman, October 16, October 17).

Gonul apparently sees some opportunity for Turkey to participate in the missile shield project, since most of the costs would be borne by the United States. Turkey has considered missile defense systems since the 1990’s, but has failed to build an operational system, given its inability to shoulder the enormous costs of such a project and its limited technological know-how. One Turkish defense expert, Mustafa Kibaroglu, stressed that Turkey might opt to benefit from this project by seeking to gain a say in the decision making processes of the system and sharing technological expertise (Hurriyet Daily News, October 20).

During his trip to the US where he attended the 29th annual American-Turkish Council (ATC) conference in Washington, Gonul, accompanied by Turkish government officials and diplomats, continued the talks on the issue with their American counterparts. “Contrary to some press reports, we are not pressuring Turkey to make a contribution. But we do look to Turkey to support NATO’s adoption at the Lisbon summit of a territorial missile defense capability,” Gates said, underscoring the ongoing difficulties in bridging the differences of opinion (Today’s Zaman, October 20).

Unlike Davutoglu, who has been the architect of Turkey’s controversial Iran policy, Gonul might be less concerned about Turkey’s Iran portfolio and more sympathetic to the idea of benefiting from the missile shield project. Nonetheless, Ankara’s reservations over the ramifications of the project for its relations with its neighbors still run deep. Davutoglu has emphasized on many occasions that Turkey does not perceive any threats from the Middle East, and recently added that regional countries do not pose a threat to NATO, either (www.cnnturk.com, October 20).

Turkey might increasingly find itself between a rock and a hard place. Irrespective of whether NATO designates any targets, Iran, whom the US has already dubbed as a “rogue state,” might nonetheless perceive the missile shield as a threat. Turkey, thus, will find it hard to explain its support for the missile shield to its Middle Eastern neighbors, especially as it pursues a “zero problems with neighbors” policy and forges deeper regional integration in the Middle East. In contrast, given the deep-running problems currently bedeviling US-Turkish relations, caused by the row over the Iranian nuclear issue and Turkey’s disputes with Israel, Turkey might not afford to be the deal-breaker at NATO. Ankara already sparked the ire of the US and other NATO members, when it contemplated vetoing Rasmussen’s election last year (EDM, April 6, 2009).

Nonetheless, it may still be too early to determine the conditions under which Turkey could give its consent. Indeed, Turkey might prefer to continue “negotiations” on this issue until the Lisbon summit, and perhaps beyond.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-maintains-reservations-about-us-missile-defense/

October 21, 2010
Turkey Seeks Closer Economic and Strategic Ties with China

Turkey Seeks Closer Economic and Strategic Ties with China

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 186

October 15, 2010

By: Saban Kardas

Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabo’s official visit to Turkey on October 7-8, marked a new phase in Turkish-Chinese relations. During the joint press briefing with Wen’s Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan, both leaders emphasized the importance they place on each other in their external relations and called their flourishing ties a “strategic partnership.” The parties signed eight agreements to develop further cooperation in various areas, including trade, transportation and combating terrorism (Anadolu Ajansi, October 9).

Erdogan preferred to highlight the agreement to switch from dollars to their own currencies in bilateral trade. Turkey also signed a similar agreement with Russia and Iran, its other major trading partners. Through such bilateral agreements, Turkey appears determined to underscore its willingness to pursue independent policies in the global economic and financial order, which has been structured around US primacy. As such, Ankara seeks to readjust to a post-American-led world order, as the existing global order is currently in flux. On many occasions, Turkish leaders have emphasized that the gravity of the global economy has been shifting towards Asia, and that Turkey, which had been traditionally integrated into the Western world, now needs to readjust its economic and political priorities.

It was therefore no surprise that Erdogan described the decision to use mutual currencies as a step to cement the strategic partnership between China, the economic giant which is likely to dominate the world economy in the years to come, and Turkey, an emerging economy which currently ranks 17th. China and Turkey have been the two major economies recovering rapidly from the global financial crisis, which may precipitate greater coordination between both powers in the context of the G-20 summit and other international platforms.

However, there remains a major trade imbalance in China’s favor, which Turkey must quickly address. While Turkey’s imports from China were around $12.7 billion, Turkey’s exports amounted to only $1.6 billion in 2009. Ankara’s strategy is to redress this imbalance through the promotion of Chinese investments in Turkey, increasing tourism from China, and gaining greater exposure for Turkish products in China. Through more intensive cultural exchanges within the next three years, Turkey hopes to accomplish the latter objectives (Today’s Zaman, October 9). However, given China’s track record in achieving a positive trade balance with its partners and its low production costs, it remains to be seen how far Turkey can penetrate Chinese markets.

Erdogan also referred to the prospects of joint projects in energy and nuclear power as yet another aspect of bilateral economic cooperation. Since Ankara signed an agreement with Moscow to construct the country’s first nuclear power plant, preparations have been underway for the construction of additional plants. While Turkey has been in talks with a South Korean company regarding the second plant (EDM, March 24), others, including Japanese companies, have recently approached Ankara on the same issue, raising expectations of growing competition in this sector. Given China’s recent drive to build numerous nuclear reactors, including some of the world’s most advanced, its experience in this field might make it a new entrant into the Turkish energy sector, though there is currently no concrete offer on the table. China has already won various large contracts to build major infrastructure projects, including modern railways in Turkey.

History also plays a role in these flourishing ties, as references to the idea of reviving the historic Silk Road abound. Earlier, Iran also expressed interest in a similar idea, in the context of the Economic Cooperation Organization (www.irna.com, September 24). The Turkish side has worked on various projects to improve the transportation infrastructure in order that goods could flow easily between China and Turkey as well as through Central Asia (www.trt.net.tr, October 9). Such projects, in Ankara’s view, will also serve as the best remedy to bring stability to volatile Central Asia.

However, historical factors also emerge as a source of friction in Sino-Turkish relations, as was demonstrated clearly during Wen’s visit. Following Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s historic visit to China in late June 2009, violent clashes in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region left many Turkic Muslim Uighurs dead in July 2009. Turkish leaders, which had come under pressure for ignoring the plight of Uighurs, moved to criticize Chinese policy in Xinjiang. Erdogan went as far as claiming that the killings amounted to “nearly genocide” (EDM, July 15, 2009). However, in the subsequent period, Sino-Turkish relations rapidly normalized, despite the efforts of the Uighur diaspora in Turkey to pressurize the government (EDM, August 19, 2009). Later, Turkey and China also started discussing cooperation in combating terrorism (Terrorism Monitor, October 1, 2009).

Since China has represented the Uighur resistance as subversive terrorist activities, possibly with ties to the global al-Qaeda network, such cooperation with Turkey has been deemed valuable. In this context, Wen emphasized during the joint press briefing that they discussed boosting bilateral cooperation in fighting terrorism and extremism. Such talks, ironically, took place while Uighur activists organized demonstrations outside to protest against Wen’s visit and Ankara’s policy towards China (Hurriyet, October 9).

Ankara’s position on Uighur demands, which might appear as backpedaling, mirrors Turkey’s earlier experience with the North Caucasus diaspora. In order to preserve the flourishing Turkish-Russian bilateral relationship, Ankara adopted a cooperative approach and restrained the activities of the Caucasian diaspora during the second Chechen war, a policy which continues to date (EDM, April 14). In the otherwise strong relationship with China, Uighur pleas for greater recognition are likely to remain a sore point. Yet, the Turkish government seems determined not to let the Xinjiang issue spoil growing economic and political ties with China.

An apparent indication of this determination came earlier this month, when a Turkish daily reported that in late September and early October, the Turkish and Chinese air forces held joint drills in Turkey’s Central Anatolian province of Konya (Taraf, October 2). Although Turkey refrained from using its more advanced F-16’s and flew only F-4’s upon US expression of concern over protecting sensitive technology, its decision to deepen military ties with China to such a level, the first such exercise China has conducted with a NATO member, reveals much about Turkey’s new strategic priorities.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-seeks-closer-economic-and-strategic-ties-with-china/

October 16, 2010
Damascus Repeats Call For Turkish Involvement In Talks With Israel

Damascus Repeats Call For Turkish Involvement In Talks With Israel
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 180

October 6, 2010 03:26 PM
By: Saban Kardas

Turkey and Syria held the second ministerial meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council in Syrian city of Latakia. The Turkish delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, was composed of twelve ministers including Taner Yildiz, Vecdi Gonul and Besir Atalay (the energy, defense and interior ministers respectively). The meetings reviewed the agreements and protocols, signed between the two countries. The conclusions will be followed up with a monitoring mechanism and more concrete decisions will be made during the next prime ministerial meeting in December (Cihan, October 3).

Much of the talks concerned economic cooperation. In line with their earlier demonstration of intent to move towards economic integration in the Middle East, comprising also Lebanon and Jordan (Sabah, June 10), the Turkish and Syrian delegations discussed the details of creating a free trade zone, easing customs procedures, building new transportation networks including fast trains between Turkish and Syrian cities, among other initiatives. Moreover, they also considered cooperation in agriculture, environment, health, energy and other fields (Anadolu Ajansi, October 3).

The bilateral energy partnership was a major item on the agenda. Yildiz announced that Turkish and Syrian national petroleum companies agreed to form a joint oil exploration company. Syria also allocated seven fields to Turkey without a tender, where exploration will start as soon as both sides resolve the remaining details of their joint enterprise. Yildiz announced that the work on the connection of the Arab natural gas pipeline with the Turkish grid, which might eventually supply Nabucco pipeline with gas from Egypt through Syria, might be concluded within one year (Anadolu Ajansi, October 4).

However, for Ankara, such initiatives in the Middle East have a broader meaning than strictly commercial concerns. During the joint press briefing, Davutoglu emphasized Turkish views on security in the Middle East. Davutoglu maintained that two competing “visions” prevailed in the Middle East: one seeking to destabilize the regional order by sowing the seeds of conflict and supporting terrorism, and the other seeking to maintain regional peace and stability through mutual cooperation. He referred to the high level strategic cooperation councils Turkey launched with Syria and other neighbors as instruments that will contribute to the second vision. He also underscored how Syria joined Turkey in its commitment to a peaceful neighborhood through dialogue and cooperation (Dogan Haber Ajansi, October 4).

In Davutoglu’s view, to the extent that regional countries could expand the scope of the second vision and build regional organizations, they will be able to narrow the scope of the first one, hence eradicate the sources of instability in the Middle East. If such regional cooperation succeeds, it will not only benefit the entire region, but bolster Turkey’s own security by creating a belt of stability around the country.

Perhaps, the most immediate area where this approach has manifested itself is Turkey’s fight against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Aware of the cross-border dimensions of the Kurdish problem and PKK terrorism, Ankara has been working to address this issue through both domestic reforms and regional diplomacy (EDM, September 29). Turkey wants to engage its Middle Eastern neighbors through various cooperation platforms in order to thwart any logistical, financial or manpower support the PKK might receive from the region. Especially in light of the Turkish government’s recent initiatives to solve the Kurdish issue, Syria, perhaps, has been the most cooperative neighbor, as the Syrian government has repeatedly expressed its support for Ankara’s Kurdish initiative as well as its right to fight against terrorism.

As an extension of these collegial ties, Atalay (playing a leading role in the Turkish government’s Kurdish initiative) and Gonul held important talks with their counterparts during the meetings in Latakia. The head of the Syrian delegation, Hasan Turkmani, President Bashar al-Assad’s aide, reiterated their willingness to deepen security cooperation with Turkey (Anadolu Ajansi, October 3). Last week, Turkmani, accompanied by some military officers, visited Ankara to discuss the Syrian contribution to Turkey’s fight against the PKK (Anadolu Ajansi, September 29).

For its part, Syria also hopes to gain strategic leverage from its closer ties with Turkey, beyond the immediate economic benefits. Syria increasingly considers Turkey as a reliable ally against Israel, though Turkey’s involvement in Syrian-Israeli relations has been confined largely to the role of a mediator. Turkey managed to facilitate indirect contacts between the Syrian and Israeli sides in the second half of 2008, which arguably came very close to reaching a settlement on the Golan Heights. This process, however, was interrupted by Israel’s offensive on Gaza in December 2008-January 2009.

Israel’s Palestine policy also opened a new era in Turkish-Israeli relations. Ankara and Tel Aviv were increasingly mired in a cycle of crises, which resulted in the replacement of the so-called Turkish-Israeli “strategic partnership” with a pattern of enmity. As a result, Israel lost its trust in Turkey and questioned the latter’s impartiality. Turkish leaders repeated on many occasions their readiness to resume indirect talks with Ankara’s support. Despite Damascus welcoming the Turkish proposal, the Israeli side continuously rejected it given its lack of trust in Turkey (EDM, July 23, 2009).

Recently, international efforts to revive the Syrian-Israeli dialogue have intensified. As France and the US, among others, have sought to convince Assad to agree to a new round of talks, Assad conveyed his willingness to see Turkey involved in this process (Zaman, September 17). Following the strategic council meeting in Latakia, the Syrian Foreign Minister, Velid el-Muallim, reiterated that Damascus views Ankara as an honest and reliable actor, while international efforts should focus on supporting Turkey’s mediator role (www.sana.sy, October 4).

Although constantly glorifying Turkey’s successful mediation in 2008, the Syrian side refuses to acknowledge that this was made possible by Israel’s view of Turkey as an impartial broker that could open a channel between Tel Aviv and Arab capitals. Syria’s insistence on Turkey’s “impartial mediation,” even after it is long foregone in Israel’s eyes, serves only to underscore that, after all, Ankara is valuable to Damascus not as a reliable mediator per se, but as a reliable ally.

https://jamestown.org/program/damascus-repeats-call-for-turkish-involvement-in-talks-with-israel/

October 6, 2010
Kurdish Question Dominates Turkish Politics

By: Saban Kardas

Kurdish unrest in Turkey.

Having received unequivocal backing from voters in the constitutional referendum, the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) has moved to address Turkey’s structural problems, most notably the Kurdish question, through a combination of domestic measures, as well as regional and international diplomacy.

The resolution of the Kurdish issue has been one of the main targets of the AKP government. The AKP first sought to address this issue through domestic political reforms in the early 2000’s, also benefiting from the relative calm prevailing in southeastern Anatolia, thanks to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) suspending its operations. However, granting greater cultural rights to the Kurds as part of Turkey’s EU accession process or devising socio-economic policies proved to be ineffective. The threat posed by the PKK’s separatist terrorism lingered, as the organization managed to maintain its manpower in safe havens in Northern Iraq.

The PKK’s resumption of its campaign of violence in the second half the decade caught Ankara by surprise, triggering a heated debate. Faced with the PKK’s deadly attacks against Turkish military outposts from its bases in Northern Iraq, the AKP bowed to pressure and considered seriously pursuing stronger military measures to tackle this problem. Coordinating its policies with the US and the Northern Iraqi Kurdish authorities, the Turkish army undertook incursions into Northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK militants in the winter of 2007-2008. Greater security cooperation and intelligence sharing between Turkey, the US and Iraq, or the enhanced military operations inside Turkey could put an end to the PKK’s terrorist attacks.

Meanwhile, the AKP government launched an ambitious “Kurdish opening” in 2009, yet failed to garner popular and political support for the measure. The government’s mishandling of the opening, coupled with the PKK’s and pro-Kurdish parties’ uncooperative attitude turned the entire Kurdish initiative into a near fiasco (Terrorism Monitor, February 19). The government could change the terms of the debate only through its smart moves to table the constitutional amendment package in the first part of 2010, arguing that the Kurdish issue could also be addressed as part of a broader “democratization agenda” (EDM, May 5).

PKK violence, however, continued throughout the spring and summer, which exposed the failure of the Turkish security apparatus in fighting against the PKK formations inside and outside Turkey (Terrorism Monitor, July 8). The escalation of the conflict could be avoided only through the PKK’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire prior to the referendum, which was partly facilitated by some civil society organizations. Following the referendum, the PKK sent signals that it would resume its campaign, unless Turkish security forces halted their operations by a self-declared deadline of September 20. A deadly mine explosion killing nine civilians on September 16 reignited the debate on terrorism (www.haber7.com, September 16). Though the PKK denied its involvement in the attack, it was a stark reminder that the PKK remained a potent force that could deal a serious blow to Turkey’s security. The PKK decided to extend the “non-action” period until this week as a goodwill gesture (Radikal, September 20).

Moreover, the success of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in boycotting the referendum in the Kurdish-speaking provinces reiterated once again that the ethnic Kurdish movement still enjoys substantial support in the region and continues to harbor ambitious demands for greater political rights. Indeed, the BDP representatives even went as far as demanding democratic autonomy (EDM, September 20).

Faced with this double-edged challenge, the AKP now seeks to address this issue through complex diplomatic traffic. There have been numerous visits undertaken by cabinet members and security bureaucrats. Turkish Interior Minister, Besir Atalay, was in Arbil over the weekend, where Kurdistan Regional Government sources expressed their support for Turkey’s fight against terrorism and the peaceful resolution to the problem (www.trt.net.tr, September 27). He is expected to soon meet his Syrian and Iraqi counterparts. The Head of the Turkish Intelligence Agency, Hakan Fidan, visited Washington last week, and might visit northern Iraq soon. On September 28, a US delegation led by Lloyd James Austin, commanding general of the American forces in Iraq, visited Turkey to discuss the joint efforts (Yeni Safak, September 29).

These contacts are undertaken within the framework of a joint “action plan” agreed in April to combat the PKK, as a result of the trilateral security mechanism between Turkey, the US and Iraq (IHA, April 11). Through closer cooperation with the US and the Iraqi Kurds, the action plan would have helped Turkey to take stronger military measures to eliminate the threat posed by the PKK, which to date has proved ineffective.

Although the recent initiatives also seek to address the security aspects of PKK terrorism, security cooperation through the trilateral mechanism might be secondary to the AKP government’s policy of exploring a non-military solution to the problem in a new political setting. The goal of the contacts is to somehow convince the PKK to extend its unilateral ceasefire, halt its operations inside Turkey, and turn its non-action into a permanent truce (Hurriyet Daily News, September 27). Once the guns fall silent, the government hopes to find a suitable environment within which it can address the Kurdish problem through domestic political reforms.

The crux of the issue is what will happen to the thousands of PKK militants. In this process, the PKK will possibly withdraw its forces from Turkey into Northern Iraq. In the most optimistic scenario, PKK militants might voluntarily turn themselves in and reintegrate themselves into civilian life, if the AKP’s democratic solution succeeds. Since this is highly unlikely, Turkey expects the Iraqi Kurds and the US to take steps towards the disarmament of these PKK militants and eventually end the PKK’s military presence.

However, given the uncertainty over the future of Iraq and the US military presence in the region, it might be unrealistic to expect either the US or the Iraqi Kurds to demilitarize the PKK. Turkey will still need to maintain its operational capability to carry out operations inside Iraq, as reflected by the government’s decision to table a motion for the extension of the Turkish army’s mandate to do so. It seems that there is no easy choice between the use of force and diplomacy.

https://jamestown.org/program/kurdish-question-dominates-turkish-politics/

September 30, 2010
Turkey Bolsters Ties With Turkic States

Turkey Bolsters Ties With Turkic States Turkey Bolsters Ties With Turkic States

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 170

September 22, 2010

By Saban Kardas

Turkey hosted the tenth summit of Turkic-speaking countries in Istanbul on September 16. The Istanbul summit, bringing together Turkish, Kazakh, Azeri, Kyrgyz and Turkmen leaders, took steps towards furthering institutionalizing this inter-governmental platform, in line with the conclusions of the previous meeting in Nakhchivan in October 2009. Through the Nakhchivan declaration, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had formed a Turkic-Speaking Countries Cooperation Council –or Turkish Council, as Turkey seeks to promote it. In Istanbul, the leaders agreed to implement measures to make the new bodies operational, including the Council of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers, Council of Senior Foreign Ministry Officials, Wise Men’s Council and Permanent Secretariat. Moreover, they agreed to set up other institutions to protect joint cultural heritage, form a union of universities, and create a fund to support research activities (Anadolu Ajansi, September 16; for an English text of the final declaration, see: Today’s Zaman, September 17).

Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, the host of the summit, emphasized the importance of the meeting to strengthen the commonalities among the brotherly nations in terms of language, history, religion and cultural values. He called upon the leaders to diversify relations in various areas. The leaders attending the summit highlighted the role of this burgeoning cooperation in contributing to peace and pledged to deepen solidarity to boost regional stability, human rights and a market economy.

The conclusions of the meeting reflect the Turkish government’s desire to play a greater leadership role in the Turkish speaking world. Although Ankara sought to forge closer ties among these states in the early post-Cold War period, it failed to realize this ambitious objective. However, in recent years, the Turkish government has demonstrated its willingness to revitalize cooperation among Turkic countries. The recent decisions are, thus, products of Ankara’s determined moves in that direction (EDM, November 23, 2008). After the Nakhchivan declaration was passed last year, Gul presented it as a major success on Turkey’s part (www.euractiv.com.tr, October 6, 2009). Turkey expects the Turkish Council to develop based on the model of other similar organizations, such as the Commonwealth, Arab League or Francophonie (www.tcbb.gov.tr, September 16). Nonetheless, in an example of the limitations before this objective the Kazakh, Turkmen and Kyrgyz leaders spoke at times in Russian during the summit (Dogan Haber Ajansi, September 16).

In a move that underscored Turkey’s leadership role, the first rotating presidency was assumed by Turkey and a senior Turkish diplomat, Halil Akinci, former ambassador to Moscow, was appointed as the Secretary-General of the council (Zaman, September 16). So far, there have been irregular summits as well as bilateral meetings between different states. Ankara believes the establishment of a permanent secretariat in Istanbul would increase the visibility of the council in regional and international affairs and contribute to the institutionalization of governmental ties.

Speaking at the summit, Gul went as far as maintaining that “from now on, we are one nation, but six states.” The phrase “one nation, two states,” has been used to define the warm ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan. It remains to be seen if other Turkic states will embrace it to the same extent to identify themselves so closely with Turkey. Ankara has been unable to convince all Turkic states to participate. Uzbekistan has deliberately avoided attending the summits since the early 2000’s. Turkmenistan has also been aloof to this platform for some time. In that sense, Turkmenistan’s representation at the Istanbul summit can be considered as a positive step. Nonetheless, referring to its foreign policy principle of “positive neutrality,” Turkmenistan did not sign the Nakhchivan declaration. Uzbekistan again was absent from the Istanbul summit, underscoring continuing divisions.

Besides its importance for intra-Turkic cooperation, the Istanbul summit also provided a venue for the participating leaders to hold various bilateral meetings with their counterparts to discuss issues of specific relevance. Turkey, for its part, used that opportunity to deepen ties with Azerbaijan. On the margins of the summit, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Azeri President, Ilham Aliyev, signed a framework agreement to form the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (Hurriyet, September 15). Ankara has signed similar agreements with several countries, mainly its Middle Eastern neighbors. The agreement with Baku was in preparation for some time, and its conclusion further highlights Ankara repairing its ties with Azerbaijan following the row caused by the Turkish-Armenian normalization process.

Moreover, the energy ministers from Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan discussed energy cooperation. Ankara already has an agreement to purchase Turkmen gas, provided that transit problems are resolved. Thus, Turkey wants to contribute to the resolution of the disputes between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, for it would also deepen cooperation as part of the East-West energy corridor and enable the export of Turkmen gas to Europe through Turkey. Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, noted that they avoided discussing the status of the Caspian Sea, especially border issues. He stressed that it could still be possible to develop trilateral cooperation in some undisputed sectors of the Caspian even before other major issues were resolved. Azeri Energy Minister, Natiq Aliyev, also expressed hope that the remaining disagreements could be resolved so that Turkmen gas could be exported through the Caspian and Azerbaijan. The Turkish side welcomed this meeting as a positive step, which might boost prospects for the Nabucco pipeline (Anadolu Ajansi, September 15).

For some time, the Turkish government has been criticized for its neglect of Central Asia in its foreign policy priorities (EDM, June 25). In contrast, the government has presented its recent steps in the South Caucasus and Central Asia as proof that it has been pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy. Therefore, Ankara widely publicized the Istanbul summit as a great success. Nonetheless, those skeptical of the government urge caution and argue that one should wait to see if the declaration will be matched with deeds before judging the success of the government’s recent initiatives within the Turkic world (www.211yyte.org, September 17).

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-bolsters-ties-with-turkic-states/

September 22, 2010
Referendum Deepens Fragmentation in Turkey

Referendum Deepens Fragmentation in Turkey

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 168

September 20, 2010

By Saban Kardas

In the Turkish referendum held on September 12, voters supported the constitutional amendment package promoted by the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). Despite earlier forecasts and opinion polls, the changes were approved by a wide margin: 58 percent voted in favor, while 42 percent opposed the amendment (Anadolu Ajansi, September 13). This rather surprising outcome will have significant implications for Turkish politics, possibly accelerating social fragmentation.

The referendum marks a major victory for the ruling AKP. Through their aggressive campaign, the opposition parties Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) had worked hard to present the referendum as a vote of confidence for the government (EDM, July 13). These two parties, which formed a “no front” against the reform package both during the parliamentary debates and in the referendum, had substantial reasons for objecting to the proposed constitutional changes. Yet, overall their mobilization strategy was based on a knee-jerk criticism of the AKP’s policies. In contrast, the AKP stated on many occasions that they would not capitalize on yes votes and present them as support for the AKP. The AKP, instead, defined the changes as a move towards the democratization of Turkish politics. Other smaller parties on the right of the political spectrum, which supported the AKP’s argument, mobilized their supporters in favor of the changes. However, for a great portion of Turkish voters the content of the constitutional changes was less important than their party affiliation (Hurriyet Daily News, September 15).

The results can be interpreted as a reaffirmation of domestic support for the AKP’s tenure in power. This success represents the sixth major electoral victory for the AKP under Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Since 2002, the AKP has won two parliamentary elections and two municipal elections, and managed to pass constitutional amendment packages in two referendums. Following the latest result, many observers expect the AKP to win the next national elections slated for 2011. With this unprecedented track record, the AKP machinery has emerged almost as an invincible force in the Turkish political scene, raising the question as to how it will use its power. AKP representatives already indicated that they would revive the debate on introducing a new constitution, most likely following the 2011 elections. Many liberal and reformist groups, as well as the European Union, therefore, welcomed the referendum result, because they believe that the expression of support for the constitutional changes will put pressure on the AKP to maintain its momentum towards the further democratization of the Turkish political system. Earlier, the AKP had come under criticism for slowing the pace of political reform required by the EU membership process (Hurriyet Daily News, September 14).

A more interesting question, however, concerns how Erdogan, who can claim credit for AKP’s unprecedented track record, will use this power to secure his personal position in Turkish politics. Many observers expect Erdogan to run for the presidency after the current President Abdullah Gul’s term expires in 2012. The next president will be elected by popular vote according to the constitutional changes of 2007. One drawback for Erdogan is that in Turkey’s parliamentary system, presidents can exercise only limited influence. Given Erdogan’s interest in political power, he might also push for a more radical overhaul of the Turkish political system. Erdogan has already initiated a debate on replacing the current parliamentary system with a presidential system. It remains a possibility that Erdogan will revive such a debate, in order that he might eventually lead a strong presidential system (Anadolu Ajansi, September 13).

This unprecedented popular support and resulting latitude that the AKP and Erdogan have gained in restructuring the Turkish political system has triggered anger among the AKP’s opponents. Erdogan announced that his party will seek consensus with other parties, as they work on a new constitution. However, many of the AKP’s critics argue that after the AKP managed to curb the power of the Turkish military, it has moved on to undermine the power of other state institutions, mainly the independent judiciary. The AKP’s critics believe that as a result of the recent constitutional changes, the system of checks and balances has already been undermined, and if the AKP continues on its current path, it might eventually form a civilian despotism and suppress secular segments of the society.

Therefore, the representatives of Turkey’s secularist opposition and speakers from the high courts have maintained that although they respect the people’s choice in the referendum, they would continue their struggle to maintain judicial independence and not allow the AKP to take complete control of all state institutions. As a result, the fragmentation in Turkish politics and society appears to be deepening. The aggressive campaign prior to the referendum and the statements from the representatives of the AKP and its opponents indicate that secularist and nationalist groups represented by the CHP and MHP on the one side, and conservative and liberal groups represented by the AKP on the other, will remain engaged in a fierce battle over how to define Turkey’s political system and values. Moreover, this fragmentation also has geographic ramifications. While the provinces in central Anatolia and the Black Sea region supported the constitutional changes, the provinces in the western coastal areas and Thrace voted against the changes. This distribution corresponds closely to the results of the 2009 municipal elections, whereby coastal areas voted for the CHP and MHP and central Anatolian provinces voted for the AKP (EDM, March 31, 2009).

Another division is hidden in the voting patterns in the Kurdish speaking provinces in Eastern Turkey. Pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) called on its supporters to boycott the referendum. Low voter turnout in many of the eastern provinces shows that the BDP controls a large section of the Kurdish vote, which corresponds to the results of the 2009 elections. With this boost of self-confidence, the BDP is likely to intensify its campaign to disconnect the Kurdish-speaking areas from Turkey’s mainstream political system, in line with its strategy of demanding “democratic autonomy” for the Kurds. As such, the referendum results might also deepen the divisions around the Kurdish issue, further accelerating Turkey’s social fragmentation.

https://jamestown.org/program/referendum-deepens-fragmentation-in-turkey/

September 20, 2010