Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Turkey Strengthens Nuclear Cooperation with Russia

    Turkey Strengthens Nuclear Cooperation with Russia

    Turkey Strengthens Nuclear Cooperation with Russia

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 213

    November 30, 2010

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, welcomed the recent progress in Turkey’s first nuclear power plant project that will be built by Russia and underscored Ankara’s determination to develop nuclear energy through foreign partnerships. Yildiz told reporters that Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, signed the inter-governmental agreement, which was recently ratified by both houses of the Russian parliament (Anadolu Ajansi, November 29).

    After various futile efforts to issue a license for the construction of the country’s first nuclear plant in Akkuyu-Mersin on the Mediterranean coast through competitive bidding, Ankara opted for a more controversial method. Instead of an open tender, Turkey pursued a bilateral cooperation route and signed an inter-governmental agreement with Russia in May during Medvedev’s visit to Turkey (EDM, May 20). Under this agreement, Rosatom will build, own and operate the Akkuyu-Mersin plant comprising four 1,200 mega watt (MW) units. Rosatom will also raise the finances for the project and will posses 100 percent equity in the $20 billion project company undertaking the construction and operation of the plant. In the long-term, the Russian side will likely retain at least 51 percent of the company. A Turkish firm, Park Teknik, and the Turkish state electricity generation company –EUAS– may take significant shares in the project, while the state company will provide the site, and the state electricity distribution company, TETAS, will buy a designated proportion of the electricity generated at a fixed price of $12.35 (www.worldnuclear.org, November 29).

    Through the completion of this project and other subsequent nuclear plants, the Turkish government hopes to bolster Turkey’s energy interdependence. In the new energy strategy document published in April, Turkey vowed to reduce its heavy dependence on imported fossil fuels, through greater utilization of Turkey’s renewable resources and nuclear energy. The construction of the first plant is expected to begin by 2014 and 5 percent of Turkey’s total electricity consumption will come from nuclear plants by 2023 (EDM, April 29).

    Eager to see the construction work start, the Turkish government finalized the ratification process for the inter-governmental agreement this summer. However, the debates in the Turkish parliament reflect how the government’s energy policies and nuclear policy continue to evoke criticism from opposition parties. Representatives from the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), junior opposition Nationalist Action Party and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party criticized the government for failing to protect Turkish interests. Overall, they maintained that under the current agreement, Turkey would be unable to receive nuclear technology transfers and will remain a sole consumer of “Russian” electricity produced on Turkish soil. CHP representatives went as far as accusing the government of “betraying the country and insulting the Turkish nation… [succumbing to Russian plans]” (Anadolu Ajansi, July 15). Thanks to its majority, the government managed to secure the ratification of the agreement in parliament.

    Speaking of Medvedev’s approval of the agreement, Yildiz noted that it will accelerate the work on the project. Yildiz expects to meet Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Sechin, in Istanbul in mid-December to discuss the details related to forming the project company. Once those issues are resolved, Yildiz expects the project to proceed at a much smoother pace and overcome licensing issues, and obtain permission for the construction to commence (Cihan, November 29).

    Ankara believes that from its partnership with Moscow, it will also receive help in developing its own nuclear technological know-how and infrastructure. Unlike its critics, the government believes that foreign partnerships will not hinder this objective. For instance, responding to questions in parliament, Yildiz referred to the experience of South Korea, noting that while that country relied upon imports to start building its nuclear plants in the 1970’s, it is now one of the countries which has developed its own nuclear technology.

    Perhaps, in appreciation of the South Korean success story, Ankara held talks with the South Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) over the construction of the second plant in the Black Sea coastal city of Sinop. This coincided with South Korea’s new strategy of expansion in a bid to construct nuclear plants overseas (EDM, March 24). After an optimistic start, marked by various bilateral meetings and an exchange of high level visits, it was revealed that due to conflict over prices, state purchase guarantees and the share of state ownership in the nuclear plant, the talks had broken down. Yildiz argued that Turkey had a “plan B” if it proved unable to reach an agreement with South Korea and it will remain committed to its objective of having two plants by 2023 (www.usak.org.tr, Today’s Zaman, November 10). Quite expectedly, it was announced during Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s, visit to South Korea that the talks came to an inconclusive end (Anadolu Ajansi, November 13).

    After the failure of the talks with South Korea, Yildiz said that Turkey would continue its quest for a second agreement. Yildiz also ruled out the possibility that Ankara may grant the second site to Moscow. “Neither Russia, nor Turkey are considering [a second agreement],” Yildiz said. Yildiz announced that the Japanese Toshiba would be invited to Turkey for negotiations on the planned construction of the second plant. Although Tokyo has wanted to enter into such talks with Ankara for some time, the Turkish government has avoided this, “out of courtesy for the ongoing talks with South Korea,” as Yildiz put it (Anadolu Ajansi, November 15, November 25).

    Nonetheless, it is instructive to note that, although no official contact with Japan on nuclear cooperation had taken place, the Turkish energy ministry and the Japanese New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization signed a letter of intent to cooperate on clean energy, energy productivity and the use of renewable energy in Ankara (Anadolu Ajansi, November 9). Therefore, the “plan B”’ Yildiz referred to was evidently the Japanese option. Turkey seems determined to consider seriously the diversification of its nuclear partnerships, by exploring, and perhaps pitting against each other, all options on the table.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-strengthens-nuclear-cooperation-with-russia/

  • Erdogan Discusses Missile Defense with Obama Ahead of NATO’s Summit in Lisbon

    Erdogan Discusses Missile Defense with Obama Ahead of NATO’s Summit in Lisbon

    Erdogan Discusses Missile Defense with Obama Ahead of NATO’s Summit in Lisbon

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 207

    November 15, 2010

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s reserved position on the US-led missile shield ahead of NATO’s Lisbon Summit on November 19-20 continues to remain a major issue affecting Turkish-US relations. Since the US values this project as part of its overall policy on the Iranian nuclear program and its agenda of transforming NATO, Turkey’s rather reluctant attitude has raised questions about its commitment to the Alliance and its relations with the United States (EDM, October 21).

    There is growing consensus among foreign and domestic observers that pressure has been building on Turkey to clarify its position, especially at a time when most other NATO members (as well as Russia) seemingly adopted a cooperative position. If Turkey still treats NATO as the centerpiece of its defense and security policies, according to the argument, Turkey cannot diverge from its allies at this critical juncture.

    Earlier, Turkish officials dismissed any suggestion that Turkey is being pressured to support the project. However, one cannot deny the requirement of acting in concert with its allies, which is increasingly forcing Turkey to make a decision. In preparation for the Lisbon Summit, President Abdullah Gul convened a meeting, bringing together Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, and other top officials (Anadolu Ajansi, November 5). Recent statements by Turkish leaders reflect a broad consensus at the apex of the Turkish state, formed through such meetings. Overall, it appears that Turkey is unlikely to yield to pressure, and will perhaps continue to negotiate until the Lisbon summit to have its demands recognized by its allies.

    The missile shield also emerged on the agenda during Erdogan’s meeting with President Barack Obama at the G20 Summit in Seoul, where he conveyed Turkey’s sensitivities regarding the project (www.cnnturk.com, November 13). Commenting on his meeting with Obama, Erdogan reiterated Ankara’s position on the missile shield. First, he emphasized that as a NATO member, Turkey would take part in the project provided that it is developed within the NATO umbrella. Second, in Ankara’s view, the plans for the missile shield should not list any country as the potential target. Third, the project should provide protection for the entire Turkish territory as well as other members, underscoring the principle of the indivisibility of security. Moreover, the US needs to offer Turkey clarifications about the location of the system, and the technical details about its deployment and decision-making procedures.

    Erdogan also added that Turkey has yet to reach a decision. However, Erdogan underlined that he found the US responsive to Turkish demands for further clarification in the ongoing talks, and the points he listed would constitute the basis of Ankara’s position. At the Lisbon summit, Turkey will be represented by Gul, Davutoglu and Defense Minister, Vecdi Gonul. Depending on whether NATO officials satisfy Turkish concerns, Ankara would make a decision on participation in the program.

    During a hearing in the Turkish parliament on the foreign ministry’s budget, Davutoglu, ruled out any pressure on Turkey, yet admitted that NATO is justified to make contingency plans against the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. However, Davutoglu made a nuanced point, which he has been reiterating for some time. Davutoglu accepts that as a member of the Alliance, Turkey will act in coordination with its allies, but he emphasized that as an equal partner, or “owner” as he described it, of the Alliance, Turkey wants its voice to be fully heard since decisions in NATO are taken collectively (Anadolu Ajansi, November 12, Hurriyet Daily News, October 30).

    In other words, Davutoglu believes that Turkey’s role in NATO is not solely confined to saying “yes” or “no” to a decision already taken; rather it wants to take part in making critical decisions that will affect the future of the Alliance as a whole. Davutoglu rejects the presentation of Turkey as an outlying country that needs to be convinced by the rest of the allies. Rather, Turkey is at the center of Alliance and wants to actively shape its threat perceptions. In that regard, the missile shield debate has a broader meaning for Turkish foreign policy. It provides a major test for the sustainability of Davutoglu’s new foreign policy doctrine that emphasizes independent action and agenda-setting in international affairs.

    Likewise, Davutoglu maintains that the US-led missile shield should not undermine Turkish relations with its neighbors. As Erdogan emphasized, Turkey opposes mentioning any country as the target of the anti-ballistic system. Although ballistic missile programs of many countries are cited as posing a risk of proliferation, hence they are used in justifying developing a NATO missile shield, it is no secret that Iran has been viewed as the most immediate source of such a threat. Since Turkey raised reservations about referring to Iran as a potential threat during an earlier NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels last month, there have been signs of acknowledging Ankara’s concerns by US and NATO officials. In an interview, NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, declined to name Iran as a potential threat that the planned missile shield is designed to counter (The New York Times, November 2).

    Turkish concern over the impact of the missile shield for relations with its neighbors again shows how another pillar in the new Turkish foreign policy affects Turkey’s thinking on this issue. Turkey has been working to overcome historical rivalries and build friendlier relations with its neighbors, as summarized in the “zero-problems-with-neighbors” doctrine. Turkey is concerned that if the proposed missile shield ends up singling out Iran or Syria, it might compromise its regional policy. Therefore, Davutoglu has been repeatedly arguing that NATO should avoid taking action that might draw new lines of division, making Turkey a “frontier country” as in the Cold War.

    Granted, Turkey so far has refrained from categorically rejecting the project, which adds some degree of predictability to its response in Lisbon. Turkey also has laid out its priorities unequivocally, which seem to be appreciated by other NATO members. It will be up to the other Allies to reach a common understanding with Turkey, so that a joint position is adopted in Lisbon.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-discusses-missile-defense-with-obama-ahead-of-natos-summit-in-lisbon/

  • Turkish Government and Opposition React to EU Commission’s Progress Report

    Turkish Government and Opposition React to EU Commission’s Progress Report

    Turkish Government and Opposition React to EU Commission’s Progress Report

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 206

    November 12, 2010

    By: Saban Kardas

    On November 9, the European Commission published its 2010 progress report on Turkey’s performance in the accession process. Against the background of the declining popularity of EU membership in Turkey, the report has raised interest in the EU process. Yet, it remains to be seen if this renewed attention might really re-energize Turkey’s long-stalled membership drive.

    Turkish-EU relations entered a period of stalemate in the second half of the decade, which followed a period where the rapid pace of reforms helped Turkey secure a date for the start of accession talks in 2005. The causes of this deadlock have appeared enigmatic, as both the Turkish government and the EU highlighted each other’s mistakes. European circles criticized the slow-down in the Turkish government’s political reform agenda, and its uncompromising position on the Cyprus dispute. Ankara’s resistance to opening its ports to Greek Cypriot vessels was a case in point from the EU perspective. For the Turkish government, by contrast, factors internal to the EU were largely responsible for the slow progress. The EU was unable to remove the obstacles created by some anti-Turkish member states, such as the Greek Cypriot or French veto against the opening of negotiating chapters or the debate on “privileged partnership” initiated by the French and German leaders. More importantly, the Turkish government has complained that the EU has failed to fully reciprocate the reforms delivered by Turkey, and has treated the Turkish Cypriots unjustly (EDM, June 29, 2009).

    As the mutual blame game led nowhere, there were concerns as to whether Turkish-EU relations might grind to a halt. The debate following the 2008 progress report, where the EU again urged Turkey to take reforms more seriously, coincided with many international experts advancing the provocative argument that 2009 would be a make or break year (EDM, January 12, 2009). Although the Turkish government streamlined its efforts for preparation towards membership in 2009, through the establishment of a new ministerial post for EU affairs, nothing the Turkish government accomplished was close to a breakthrough that could end the stalemate. As a result, Turkish-EU relations remained in its rather stagnant state throughout 2009 and 2010, though none of the parties dared to take steps that might end the membership process.

    The 2010 progress report did not contain any elements of surprise, as it was largely written in a balanced manner in both its criticism and praise of the Turkish government’s performance (www.avrupa.info.tr, November 9; Hurriyet, November 10). Overall, it was based on the commission’s earlier position that Turkey will have to recognize that it is subject to a rigorous set of criteria for accession, similar to those applied to other candidates, and Turkey should focus on maintaining a convincing track record and avoid any expectation of short-cuts. Similarly, the EU is also expected to be credible so that it could provide Turkey with a legitimate membership prospect. The report also retained another theme which has attracted greater sympathy in recent years, that Turkey’s new foreign policy activism could be an asset for EU’s external relations.

    Overall, the report underlined Turkey’s mixed progress towards aligning its own regulations with the EU. While the EU recognized the improvements in immigration, it also underlined other areas where Turkey needed to undertake further reforms. Again, in foreign policy issues, while the EU welcomed Turkey’s constructive role and contribution to energy security, it also noted that no major initiatives were undertaken on the Cyprus issue, urging it to play a more constructive role

    In a development which was welcomed by the opposition parties and other groups critical of the government, the report pointed out Turkey’s shortcomings on many issues pertaining to political and cultural rights. It raised growing concerns about the freedom of the press, the ongoing problems in the treatment of minorities, and the inability of the government to produce any tangible results through the Kurdish initiative. While the report welcomed the steps towards democratization and supported the recent constitutional referendum package, which introduced some changes to the composition of high courts, it expressed concern over presidential appointments to those institutions as well as some university presidents. In anticipation of the government’s likely drive for rewriting the constitution following the 2011 elections, EU sources also noted the importance of building consensus for future constitutional reforms.

    The opponents of the AKP preferred to highlight those aspects of the EU’s view of Turkey, which are critical of the government’s track record on individual rights. They particularly highlight parts of the report listing the prosecution of journalists, writers or politicians for their expression of opinions. Also, many experts attending a panel discussion in Ankara on November 11 agreed that, though the report overall offered a balanced account of Turkey’s progress, its critical tone towards certain practices of the government has never been clear.

    Ironically, government sources also welcomed the report, arguing that it largely met Turkey’s expectations. Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, interpreted the report’s affirmation of Turkey’s new foreign policy as an indication that discussion on whether Turkey was shifting its strategic axis was baseless. Yet, Davutoglu criticized the EU for its unfair assessment of the situation in Cyprus, arguing that the current situation on the island was not of Turkey’s own making and that Ankara could not be expected to solve the problem in isolation. A press release posted on foreign ministry’s website reiterated Davutoglu’s views on the issue (www.mfa.gov.tr, November 9).

    Similarly, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and State Minister for EU Affairs, Egemen Bagis, were positive about the report as the EU’s affirmation of Turkey’s place in the EU. Responding to the criticism in relation to limiting individual rights and freedom of expression, Erdogan denied those charges, arguing that there cannot be a completely uncontrolled exercise of freedom in any democracy. Regarding the specific cases of rights’ violations or legal investigations mentioned in the report, Erdogan maintained that they were committed by the judiciary, not the government.

    Overall, both the government and the opposition seem to prefer to maintain their commitment to the EU, because they can manipulate it to support their own positions politically, as they see fit.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-government-and-opposition-react-to-eu-commissions-progress-report/

  • Regional approach in Turkish foreign policy and the case of Afghanistan

    Regional approach in Turkish foreign policy and the case of Afghanistan

    Regional approach in Turkish foreign policy and the case of Afghanistan

    by
    Şaban Kardaş*

    11 November 2010, Thursday

    Today’s Zaman

    The activism of late observed in Turkish foreign policy demonstrates a clear preference for a regional approach to international relations. It has been almost a mantra for Turkey’s new foreign policy elite to promote regional actors’ ownership of economic and security affairs in their own neighborhood. Various such initiatives that Turkey has been spearheading recently in its adjacent regions, including the Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans and beyond, underscore Turkey’s emergence as a regional power willing and able to assume leadership roles in those regions. Turkey has been pursuing customs and visa liberalization with many of its neighbors, while initiating strategic cooperation councils with others. Similar to Turkey’s initiation of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in the 1990s, Turkey has also launched a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Complementing these efforts are various other bilateral or trilateral processes under its patronage, such as the ones between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, or between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

    These regional cooperation schemes are driven by a unique mix of principled and instrumental reasons. On the one hand, by forging closer economic and political ties among regional actors and providing a venue for the exchange of opinions between rival forces, Turkey hopes to promote interdependence, hence the formation of peaceful regional orders, as an end in itself. In that sense, Turkey can be seen as acting as a “good international citizen,” seeking to project a progressive, liberal internationalist outlook in its own neighborhood. Perhaps, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s depiction of Turkey as an “order instituting” power — though some find this term implies imperialistic tendencies, as reflected in the notorious debate on neo-Ottomanism — summarizes well Turkey’s desire to foster peaceful neighborhoods.

    On the other hand, Turkey definitely has some self-interested reasons to invest in these sometimes costly projects, as the eventual rise of peaceful neighborhoods is likely to create a belt of stability surrounding Turkey, thus boosting its own security. Moreover, this new approach to regional affairs, equipped with soft power instruments, can reduce the anxiety of other actors, thus facilitating Turkey’s penetration into new areas in pursuit of commercial and political interests. It is, therefore, no wonder that the Turkish business community is also actively supporting the new cooperation schemes initiated by the government, as they are the most immediate benefactors of the new “trade and economic development promote peace” approach.

    A recent case to show the contours of this new approach is Turkey’s efforts to form a platform to aid the stabilization and recovery of Afghanistan in the wake of the decades-old civil war and a devastating foreign intervention. In addition to various other contributions it has made towards the stabilization of Afghanistan, Turkey also initiated the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA). The fourth meeting of RECCA, co-chaired by Davutoğlu and his Afghan counterpart, Zalmai Rassoul, was held in İstanbul on Nov. 3, bringing together officials from neighboring countries as well as representatives from international organizations. On the sidelines of the conference, a business forum organized by the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK), and an academic forum organized by the Foreign Ministry and Boğaziçi University, also took place, underscoring the multidimensionality of Turkey’s new approach.

    The RECCA idea follows on Turkey’s accumulated experience from the platform of countries neighboring Iraq, which has played a critical role by forestalling the involvement of regional countries in Iraqi domestic affairs to capitalize opportunistically on the internal weaknesses of the country in the transition period. As such, regional actors’ coordination of their policies, though to a limited extent, has played a substantial role in dampening the tensions in the Middle East, and preventing further destabilization of Iraq and the region.

    Afghanistan’s challenges and prospects

    The discussions taking place at the RECCA academic platform, which I also attended, highlighted the challenges as well as the prospects of the regional approach to Afghanistan. The RECCA process has yet to produce concrete outcomes, but even the clear expression of support and commitment from Afghanistan’s neighbors to regional cooperation model as the best way to ensure Afghanistan’s economic development and political stabilization can be considered as a substantial achievement.

    If the neighbors get together around the same table to discuss their possible contributions and coordinated action, instead of jockeying for power, in Afghanistan, Turkey deserves some credit. If the idea of regional ownership takes hold in this volatile corner of the world and trust among the neighboring countries can be established, it might offer the best way to tackle the many destabilizing forces that are all trans-boundary and require regional responses, such as terrorism, drug and human trafficking and organized crime. Such a regional approach can also facilitate the undertaking of massive investments needed to build transportation infrastructure and health and education facilities, as well as (re)building a functioning government apparatus. Especially promising is the prospect of constructing roads, railways and pipelines traversing Afghanistan so that it emerges as a transportation hub to facilitate the free flow of minerals, goods and people both in East-West and North-South directions.

    A major challenge before this rather optimistic vision, however, is the poor condition of the existing regional institutional architecture, both in terms of physical infrastructure and legal regulations. Turkey has been single-handedly advocating this project, yet it is unclear if other regional countries do share the same degree of enthusiasm and commitment to sustain it, short of Turkey’s contributions. The countries in the region have lagged behind other parts of the world that have come a long way towards setting up effective regional organizations. In an environment where many of the regional countries are beset with political and economic crises of their own, there are grounds to maintain skepticism towards the prospects of a regional approach. Therefore, outside involvement from the international community seems necessary to maintain the momentum.

    At this juncture, there emerges yet another major challenge before the regional cooperation approach to Afghanistan: What role outside players, or the international community, should be allowed to play. Ideally, one might argue that outside actors could play constructive roles by bringing in valuable technical expertise or financial resources to build functioning regional institutional mechanisms and ease Afghanistan’s socioeconomic restructuring. Despite the bad reputation of foreign involvement, which in many ways is responsible for the current standing of this country, the current Afghan government wants to see the continuation of foreign involvement, including that of the US. In the Afghan view, which is also shared by Turkey in principle, regional cooperation should proceed in tandem with the assistance of the international community. Other actors, especially Iran, are rather eager to approach regional cooperation from an exclusivist point of view, seeking to reserve the management of regional security and stability to regional actors exclusively and confine the involvement of the international community to the provision of development assistance only. This is part of Iran’s power play, in which it works to end the penetration of the US in its immediate periphery to the extent possible, as in its advocating of a similar position in the Persian Gulf.

    This is a dispute Turkey definitely does not want to take part in, but it will have to confront those questions increasingly, as the regional emphasis in its foreign policy gains pace. Turkey will come under pressure to weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing its regional approach on the basis of regional exclusivity or greater harmonization with the international community.

  • Turkey Tries to Engage Mongolia, Despite Dim Prospects

    Turkey Tries to Engage Mongolia, Despite Dim Prospects

    Turkey Tries to Engage Mongolia, Despite Dim Prospects

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 199

    November 3, 2010

    By Saban Kardas

    Turkey and Mongolia held their sixth Joint Economic Commission (JEC) meeting in Ulaanbaatar on October 26. Deputy Prime Minister, Bulent Arinc, headed the Turkish delegation, and Mongolia’s Environment and Tourism Minister, Luimed Gansukh, signed a memorandum of understanding to boost economic and commercial relations. Related protocols also signed during Arinc’s four-day trip concerned an exchange of experience between KOSGEB (Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization) and its Mongolian counterpart, and cooperation between the Turkish State Planning Organization and Mongolia’s planning unit on development (Anadolu Ajansi, October 26; www.kosgeb.gov.tr, October 27).

    Turkey established diplomatic relations with Mongolia in 1967. As a corollary of Ankara’s growing interest in Central Asia following the independence of the Turkic republics, Mongolia also started to attract Ankara’s attention. The two countries signed a trade, economic and technical cooperation agreement in May 1992, which also initiated the JEC, and heralded a wave of other agreements to follow in subsequent years (www.tika.gov.tr, Mongolia Country Report, July 2005). Turkey set up its permanent diplomatic mission in Ulaanbaatar in 1996, while Mongolia opened its representation in Ankara in 1997. Through various agreements, Turkey stepped in to share the experience it accumulated in free market economics with Mongolia, which was seeking to move away from a socialist economy, and facilitate the latter’s integration into the world economy. Ankara specifically concentrated its assistance on the creation of basic economic and administrative infrastructure and the emergence of small and medium scale companies in a free market economy.

    Although Mongolia joined the World Trade Organization in 1997, its overall foreign trade volume remains low. Its exports are largely in minerals, leather and textiles, while it imports machinery and fossil fuels. Trade relations between Turkey and Mongolia also remained very limited, largely due to distance, and lack of direct transportation routes. The bilateral trade volume reached $14 million in 2008, while it dropped to $5.5 million in 2009 after the global financial crisis. There is an enormous trade imbalance in Turkey’s favor (www.mfa.gov.tr). While Turkey exports processed food, machinery and soap, it imports some animal products. Turkish investments and construction operations in the country have also remained at negligible levels. Various Turkish trade associations, seeking to expand Turkish business opportunities in Mongolia, had urged Turkish firms to invest in energy, natural resources, agriculture, telecommunications, construction and tourism (www.btso.org.tr, May 4, 2005).

    During Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s historic visit to Ulaanbaatar in July 2005, the first prime ministerial visit since the establishment of diplomatic ties, both parties issued a joint declaration to boost bilateral cooperation. The Turkish Eximbank offered a $20 million credit to Mongolia, an issue which had been lingering for some time (www.ankara.mfat.gov.mn, July 19, 2005).

    Although this visit and subsequent JEC’s increased Turkey’s assistance to Mongolia’s economic transformation, such calls overall failed to prompt Turkish businessmen to invest in Mongolia. The Turkish-Mongolian Business Council, organizing a meeting in Istanbul ahead of Arinc’s trip, stressed the low volume of Turkish investment. The council pointed to the growth potential of Mongolia in the future, and called on Ankara not to fall behind Chinese, Russian and Western companies that increasingly invest in the untapped natural resources of this country (www.deik.org.tr, October 7).

    Unlike the poor standing of their economic ties, Turkey and Mongolia had close political relations, as was reflected in a myriad of bilateral agreements and mutual visits. Mongolia became one of the major recipients of development assistance, provided by Turkey’s official agency, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA). Since 1994, TIKA has carried out various educational, social and cultural programs in Mongolia, and opened a coordination office in 2005. TIKA projects focused on the improvement of Mongolia’s administrative infrastructure, training of bureaucrats and security personnel, developing statistics and accounting practices, among other initiatives (www.tika.gov.tr, July 2005).

    TIKA has also run a project since 1995, entitled “Turkish Monuments in Mongolia,” which emphasized the historical-cultural dimension of Turkey’s interest in this country. Mongolia hosts many historical monuments remaining from the earlier Turkish states established in Central Asia. Energized by the approaching eighth centennial celebrations of the Mongolian Empire in 2006, the Turkish government accelerated this project. Following Erdogan’s 2005 visit, Turkey has spent substantial resources on the excavation and renovation of many Turkic and Mongol monuments. Moreover, in recent years Turkey has funded the construction of roads to enable access to those historical sites. Perhaps, this historical significance of the country and the linguistic affinity explain Turkey’s political interest in Mongolia, incommensurate with the extent of their economic ties. The Turkish foreign ministry also acknowledges the role played by shared the cultural background in facilitating political ties (www.mfa.gov.tr).

    Similarly, Turkey has provided scholarships to many Mongolian students to enable them to study at Turkish universities and military academies. Various private Turkish-Mongolian schools also offer education up to high school level in Mongolia, while Turkology departments have been opened in some Mongolian universities. The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs offers scholarships to Muslim Mongolian citizens of Kazakh origin to receive Islamic education in Turkey. Overall, there is a lively educational and cultural exchange between the two countries.

    Most Turkish analysts agree that Mongolia is a distant, yet culturally close country. Nonetheless, some Turkish analysts find Ankara’s policy towards Mongolia lacking. They portray Mongolia as a country seeking to balance the pressures from its large neighbors, namely China and Russia. They believe Turkey could serve as the virtual “third neighbor,” if it pursues correct policies. Turkish analysts further contend that the poor standing of economic relations between Turkey and Mongolia, and most importantly their inability to develop closer military cooperation, are largely due to pressures from Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing have blocked Turkey’s shipments of military equipment to Mongolia or joint exercises between the Turkish and Mongolian Special Forces. Therefore, some analysts support the Turkish government’s development assistance, educational exchange programs and cultural projects, while urging Ankara to go further and facilitate Ulaanbaatar’s efforts to play a more influential role in international organizations in order to break its encirclement. Moreover, Turkish Airlines have failed to launch direct flights to Ulaanbaatar, which would symbolically mark establishing of a direct link to Turkey (www.usak.org.tr, January 4; Turkiye, March 31).

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-tries-to-engage-mongolia-despite-dim-prospects/

  • Turkey Considers Cooperation with Greece on Illegal Immigration to Europe

    Turkey Considers Cooperation with Greece on Illegal Immigration to Europe

    Turkey Considers Cooperation with Greece on Illegal Immigration to Europe

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 194

    October 27, 2010

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, met his Greek counterpart, George Papandreou, on the margins of the Mediterranean Climate Change Initiative conference near Athens last week. The positive reporting of the Erdogan-Papandreou meeting marks the deepening rapprochement between the two countries, after their normalization slowed down in the second half of the 2000’s.

    Characterized traditionally by historical enmity and territorial disputes, Turkish-Greek relations have undergone a remarkable improvement in the past decade. The so-called Greek-Turkish rapprochement started with the two earthquakes that devastated both countries in 1999. The mutual assistance and solidarity the two nations extended to each other in response provided fertile ground to develop closer political ties. As a result, Greece, which had blocked Turkey’s EU membership process, changed its policy and became an advocate of the EU’s enlargement to include Turkey. Since coming to power, Erdogan has ascribed special importance to normalizing ties with Greece, as reflected in his close personal relationship with the former Greek Prime Minister, Kostas Karamanlis.

    However, in parallel with the deterioration of Turkish-EU relations, Turkish-Greek relations also experienced difficult times in the second half of the 2000’s. Although the Turkish-Greek trade volume has expanded throughout the decade, there has been little concrete progress over the political disputes that had traditionally dominated their relationship. The Turkish side largely preferred to pursue a policy of constructive ambiguity, and adopt a gradual approach to solving the disputes, while the Greeks from time to time expressed their disappointment over the ongoing uncertainty. Turkey’s resistance to referring the Aegean disputes to the International Court of Justice and the ongoing “dog fights” between Turkish and Greek fighter jets in the Aegean Sea remained a major source of disagreement, resulting in an occasional heightening of tension (EDM, June 22, 2009).

    The global financial crisis, which dealt a serious blow to the Greek economic system, ironically, provided another fresh impetus to resolve bilateral disputes. In that context, the recent talks follow on Erdogan’s historic trip to Greece in May, when the two countries signed over 20 agreements to develop relations in various fields, including energy, the environment and illegal immigration. They also decided to launch the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, which complemented similar arrangements Turkey has formed with its other neighbors. Erdogan also expressed Turkey’s readiness to help Greece to recover from the financial crisis, through what he called “enhanced economic partnership” The two sides, however, failed to reach any concrete agreement on the major issues in the bilateral relationship, such as the conflicting claims in the Aegean Sea, the status of the minorities, or the Halki seminary and the Cyprus issues (Anadolu Ajansi, May 15).

    Granted, Turkish leaders’ extension of a friendly hand to Greece and their statements calling for dampening military tensions in the Aegean through closer bilateral dialogue was ground-breaking in many ways. This thinking is largely in line with Ankara’s recent policy of pursuing “zero problems with neighbors,” and prioritizing economic cooperation over political disputes. Indeed, as a stark reflection of this new thinking, Turkey will reportedly not include Greece, Russia, Iran and Iraq as enemy countries in its national security document, which is currently being revised.

    Speaking to Greek TV stations, Erdogan, also expressed clearly that Turkish flights in the Aegean have decreased significantly and that Ankara supports the idea of ceasing them entirely (Today’s Zaman, October 21). By de-securitizing its relationship with Greece and its other neighbors, Turkey hopes to reap the benefits of peace dividends, by significantly cutting military expenditures and instead focus on mutual economic gains. In the case of Greece, by turning the Aegean into a basin of peace, the Turkish government hopes, for instance, to enable the exploration of offshore hydrocarbon resources, and further cooperation in the transportation of oil and gas to European markets.

    It appears that the technical level contacts between both countries have continued since May, seeking common ground in their political disputes. In the wake of the latest trip, both parties are talking more resolutely about a shared strategic vision and pursuing win-win cooperative policies. Toward these objectives, there are stronger indicators that they might be involved in serious discussions on the resolution of thorny issues, including the Ecumenical Patriarchate and joint Turkish-Greek initiatives to curb illegal immigration to the EU. Following his meeting with Papandreou, Erdogan vowed to start cooperation on illegal immigration, so that they could tackle what he called a “common problem.” The Greek media even speculated that by the end of the year the parties might finalize a compromise agreement on the resolution of the Aegean disputes, on which they had already agreed in principle (Anadolu Ajansi, October 22; www.ekathimerini.com, October 25).

    Most Turkish media outlets preferred to present Erdogan’s trip as a major achievement which boosted his popularity in Greece. Similarly, the Greek media also underscored the optimism generated by the Erdogan-Papandreou meeting (Taraf, October 24). However, some Greek observers maintain that the Papandreou government’s closer dialogue with the Turkish government “may ring alarm bells in many circles in Greece which would interpret it (and they do) as an indication of Greece losing diplomatic ground in the Aegean, or even in Greek Thrace” (Hurriyet Daily News, October 24).

    In any case, the resolution of the remaining disputes with Greece serves the Turkish government’s foreign policy objectives. Especially by addressing the illegal immigration issue and the reopening of the Halki seminary, Turkey can remove major obstacles which have bedeviled its accession process into the EU. The EU has been expecting Turkey to harmonize its practices on illegal immigration with European regulations, and reopen the Greek Orthodox seminary to show its support for human rights. Moreover, through its constructive dialogue with Greece, Ankara solicits the support of Athens within the EU. Recently, the Turkish government has tried to mobilize the pro-Turkey EU members so that they could break the stalemate over membership talks. Reportedly, in exchange for its cooperation on the illegal immigration issue, Turkey expects Greece to at the very least, assist with the relaxation of European visa regulations for Turkish citizens.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-considers-cooperation-with-greece-on-illegal-immigration-to-europe/