Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Erdogan’s Moscow Visit Produces Mixed Results

    Erdogan’s Moscow Visit Produces Mixed Results

    Erdogan’s Moscow Visit Produces Mixed Results

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 54

    March 18, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    On March 15, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, accompanied by a large delegation of businessmen and cabinet members, travelled to Moscow. Though on balance it produced mixed results, the visit constitutes yet another major step in the flourishing Turkish-Russian ties, characterized as a multi-dimensional strategic partnership. Both during his meetings with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and other bilateral gatherings he attended, Erdogan underscored the multi-dimensional character of the relationship and the determination to further deepen it (Anadolu Ajansi, March 15).

    On March 15, Erdogan attended the Turkish-Russian Business Forum in Moscow, organized jointly by leading Turkish business associations. Addressing around one thousand businessmen from both nations, Erdogan reiterated earlier objectives set by his government to boost the bilateral trade volume, in order that it reaches $100 billion in the coming years (EDM, January 25).

    Despite the announcement of such ambitious objectives, however, Turkish-Russian trade volume stood at around $27 billion last year, down from $38 billion in 2008, reflecting the impact of the global financial crisis. Most of this trade is accounted for by Turkey’s energy imports from Russia, creating a trade deficit in Russia’s advantage. To address this deficit, Turkey has requested that Russia implement some measures to bolster the import of Turkish goods. Thus far, there has been no major progress in this area.

    Traditionally, the construction projects Turkish contractors undertook in Russia have partly compensated for the trade deficit. Through such investments, Turkish businesses have recorded valuable profits, and many Turkish engineers and workers have found employment opportunities in the Russian construction market. However, in recent years Turkish developers have faced difficulties in securing new projects in Russia. This was due partly to the contraction of the construction industry as a result of the global financial crisis and to the growing competition from other countries. As Russia launches new highway projects and prepares for a fresh round of infrastructure investments in preparation for the 2013 Summer Universiade Games in Kazan and 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Turkish contractors hope to benefit. Erdogan raised this issue with his Russian counterparts, and reportedly the Russian authorities also expressed their desire to see greater Turkish participation in the upcoming construction boom. It remains to be seen if the Russians will really offer privileged treatment to Turkish constructors in the months to come, or if such words are only sweeteners to please the Turkish side.

    However, both parties agreed to finalize the ongoing preparations for visa free travel. Starting from mid-April 2011, citizens from the two countries will be able to visit the other country visa free for 30 days. This development is expected to accelerate not only mutual visits but also the bilateral trade volume. Turkey has been placing great value on this agreement, as the government uses many of the recently initiated visa liberalization deals as an indicator of success for its new foreign policy doctrine of integration with its neighbors.

    Another area where the parties demonstrated commitment to further the bilateral relationship was cooperation in nuclear energy. Turkey had awarded the contract for the construction and operation of its first nuclear power plant to Russia. Joining the worldwide wave of going nuclear, Turkey has been planning to build up to three nuclear plants in the coming decades. In the wake of the recent catastrophes in Japan which resulted in damage to its nuclear reactors, however, nuclear safety issues appeared on the agenda, forcing many countries to reconsider their plans for opening new nuclear power plants. In Turkey, the groups that had objected to nuclear power plants reignited this debate, calling for the suspension of the projected plants, especially given the fact that Turkey is situated on geological fault-lines. Before his departure for Russia, Erdogan ruled out any cancellation of the nuclear contract, adding that no project was risk-free (Anadolu Ajansi, March 15). During his meetings in Moscow, Erdogan reassured his Russian counterparts about his commitment to see this project through and announced that construction would start as early as May. Yet, it seems Turkey asked Russia to improve the safety precautions for the project. While currently the plant was expected to withstand magnitude 8 earthquakes, it might have raise it to an even higher magnitude.

    However, limited progress was made on other energy projects. Turkey has been asking for price reductions for the natural gas it imports from Russia and the easing of “take-or-pay” clauses, especially in view of its declining energy consumption due to the financial crisis. Despite Ankara’s insistence and ongoing negotiations for some time, the Russian side has not accommodated Turkish concerns on this issue and in the planned Samsun-Ceyhan bypass oil pipeline. Reports indicate that there was no concrete progress on the remaining disagreements in energy projects, and Moscow deferred the issue for further discussion of the technical details. Responding to a question on this topic during the joint press briefing with Erdogan, President Medvedev said they would evaluate Turkey’s demands within the framework of existing agreements. Turkish media even speculated that when he failed to receive any concessions from Medvedev, Erdogan’s delegation raised this issue again during the meeting with Putin (www.turkrus.com, March 16). In contrast, the Russian side complained about Ankara’s delays in authorizing the construction of part of South Stream in Turkey’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, which in their view obstructs the further progress of the project (Cihan, March 16).

    On March 16, in a ministerial meeting attended by both sides the two countries held their High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) meeting. This is a new framework for bilateral cooperation, which Turkey established with various neighboring states in recent years. Following the initiation of a HLSCC with Syria and Iraq, Turkey moved on to sign similar agreements with Jordan, Greece and Russia and has recently taken a step towards forming one with Azerbaijan. Under this framework, both sides form committees to discuss ways to improve cooperation in various areas, and the leaders hold biannual summits to set the broader direction of bilateral partnership. Although Turkey publicizes such summits as indicators of strategic cooperation with its neighbors, the failure to bridge the remaining differences with Russia show that there are significant diverging interests which might set serious barriers to further cooperation.

     

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogans-moscow-visit-produces-mixed-results/

     

  • Turkey Diverges From Western Position On Libya

    Turkey Diverges From Western Position On Libya

    Turkey Diverges From Western Position On Libya

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 44

    March 4, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey has pursued a policy over the popular uprising in Libya reflecting the unique ties it had developed with this country. More importantly, Turkey’s position in the ongoing debate concerning the involvement of the international community in the form of sanctions or possible military intervention increasingly sets Turkey apart from Western policy.

    Turkish construction firms have penetrated the Libyan market, signing major contracts in the country since the 1970’s. With the lifting of international sanctions against Libya in the early 2000’s, the construction industry experienced a new boom, as well as creating fresh business opportunities. During his visit to Libya in 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made an effort to further improve economic ties with Libya, as part of Turkey’s proactive foreign trade strategy of gaining new markets for businesses abroad. Indeed, Turkish contractors received a good share of the new business opportunities. Turkish firms undertook projects worth over $15 billion in recent years, and over 20,000 Turkish people were living in Libya, mostly employed in the construction sector. Moreover, in recent years, Turkey’s exports to this country also increased, reaching $2 billion in 2010 (www.cnnturk.com, February 21).

    When the protests started to spread across Libya, the fate of Turkish investments and workers in the country was the main concern shaping Ankara’s response. Initial reports of looting in some construction sites, and growing concerns about the safety of Turkish workers, forced the government to open a crisis desk. According to Trade Minister, Zafer Caglayan, Turkish investments in the country were guaranteed by the Libyan government and their first priority would be to ensure the physical safety of Turkish citizens (Zaman, February 22). With the rapid deterioration of the situation, the Turkish government launched what it called the largest evacuation operation in history. Through the utilization of aircraft and ferries, Turkey successfully evacuated its citizens and people from many other nations, which received widespread coverage in domestic and international media.

    However, as international attention shifted towards the atrocities committed by the Gaddafi regime against the protestors, Turkey’s policy diverged from the US or Western position. The Turkish opposition criticized the government for failing to openly condemn Gaddafi’s brutal use of force and expressing support for the Libyan people (www.ntvmsnbc.com, February 21). Given the presence of large numbers of its citizens, Turkey, perhaps understandably, was timid in its reaction to the Gaddafi regime. However, the government’s subsequent statements on Libya demonstrated that it pursued a different policy based on differing assumptions, compared to its Western partners.

    Ahead of the UN Security Council meeting last weekend, where the UN decided to impose a range of sanctions against the Libyan regime, President Barack Obama telephoned Erdogan to discuss the developments. Although the statement released by the White House maintained that the two sides agreed on joint action, representatives from the Turkish government stressed that Turkey would not support any action that could be considered in contravention of the principle of “nonintervention in domestic affairs” and Turkey would prefer that international involvement remained limited to providing humanitarian assistance. Turkish journalists based in Washington started to talk about a “rift” between Ankara and Washington (Zaman, February 28).

    Indeed, Erdogan’s subsequent statements clearly revealed those diverging policy perspectives. Addressing the Turkish public over the weekend on the eve of the UN Security Council meeting, Erdogan expressed his strong opposition to sanctions, arguing that sanctions did not work in the past and they would hurt only the people. Interestingly, he called on the international community and Western countries to approach the Libyan issue from a humanitarian perspective, not on the basis of oil interests (Anadolu Ajansi, February 27).

    As the discussions gained pace on the imposition of a no fly zone over Libyan airspace to prevent Gaddafi forces from crushing the opposition forces, Turkey’s differences with Western policy also became visible. Meanwhile, having evacuated its citizens from Libya, the US, in line with many Western governments, adopted harsher language critical of the Libyan regime, calling on Gaddafi to step down or face the consequences. While the US boosted its naval presence in the Mediterranean, attention also focused on the role of NATO in possible military action against Libya.

    Again, Erdogan took a clear stance against NATO’s involvement in any operation against Libya. While visiting Germany to meet with Turkish people living in the country, Erdogan reacted to the news stories. “All sanctions and interventions that will hurt Libyan people cannot be accepted… What does NATO have to do in Libya? … We are against it,” Erdogan said (Hurriyet, February 28). Those statements made headlines in many newspapers on the following day, which indicated how well Erdogan’s views resonate with Turkish public opinion on the issue. Moreover, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, also expressed objections to foreign intervention, arguing that the deployment of foreign troops in the country would not be welcome by the local people and foreign involvement would further complicate the situation (Hurriyet, March 2).

    Through his recent statements, Erdogan has implied that the West was driven by material interests, rather than genuine humanitarian considerations about the Libyan people. Such rhetoric mirrors the position advocated by the leaders of Iran or Venezuela, who have been arguing that the West is seeking to capitalize on the unrest in the country to re-colonize Libya, or occupy it to extract its oil. Moreover, Erdogan’s statements, for instance, on sanctions reveal that his objection to sanctions is not based on content per se. Although Erdogan has maintained that sanctions would hurt the people, there was in fact nothing in the list of sanctions approved by the UN Security Council to that effect, as they were specifically targeting the Gaddafi regime and called for investigations into human rights violations. In that sense, Erdogan has been presenting a categorical objection to any sanctions or international intervention, which reflects not only policy differences but also ideological dissonance with the international community.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-diverges-from-western-position-on-libya/

  • “Revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda

    “Revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda

    “Revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 24

    February 3, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey has been following closely the unfolding popular “revolutions” in Tunisia and Egypt. While the Turkish public expressed support towards the masses demanding political liberalization, the Turkish government adopted a cautious approach initially, indicative of some of the contradictions that have been inherent in its policies towards the Middle East for some time.

    Turkey, like many other countries, was taken by surprise over a crisis of this magnitude. Nonetheless, Turkish leaders’ rather delayed response to the popular demands in the region points to larger factors underpinning the government’s foreign policy. Especially, as this development risks straining the delicate balancing act Turkey has been performing in the region, between the Arab states on the one hand and the undemocratic authoritarian or monarchic regimes on the other. The Turkish government has gained the sympathy of the “Arab streets” owing to the successes of Turkish cultural products and to Turkey’s recent foreign policy activism in defense of some Arab causes, such as the Palestine issue. Partly in order to avoid antagonizing many of the regimes in the region, with whom it has been trying to forge closer ties, Turkey at the same time has refrained from pursuing an openly pro-democratization agenda.

    Despite the emphasis Turkish government occasionally places on democracy as a foundational principle for its domestic and foreign policies, it has come under criticism on the grounds that it prioritized its relations with these regimes at the expense of people’s demands for greater democratic rights. The most controversial case in point was the Iranian elections in 2009, where Turkey was one of the first countries to congratulate President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and remained silent on the regime’s ensuing violent crackdown on the opposition (EDM, June 18, 2009).

    Despite the Turkish government’s rather ambiguous position on democracy promotion, it must be acknowledged what Turkish scholar Kemal Kirisci once called the “demonstration effect” Turkey has in the region. Turkey’s experiment with popular democracy and a free market economy, especially its integration of Islamic groups into legitimate political channels, has been closely followed by many reformists in the Muslim world. The transformation of political Islamist groups in Turkey and their renunciation of non-democratic methods, which culminated in the incumbent AKP Party adopting a liberal-democratic economic and political platform, are taken as the most obvious indication of the success of this so-called Turkish model. Seen from this perspective, it is possible to hear somewhat inflated arguments among many Turkish analysts to the effect that Turkey’s rising profile in regional affairs and its vocal advocating of Arab causes, which demonstrated the failures of the authoritarian regimes, played a role in the recent wave of revolutions. According to different versions of this argument, the Turkish model of democratization inspired the “Arab streets” and precipitated these revolutions. Such views are also raised by the members of the AKP Party (Hurriyet, January 30).

    Among Islamists and to some extent liberals, there is a tendency to identify positively with the demonstrators demanding for greater political rights and transparency. This struggle reminds many Turks of Turkey’s experience with democratization, whereby they managed to fight against authoritarianism or military control over civilian politics and move towards a government representative of popular will. For instance, many Islamist intellectuals draw parallels between Turkey’s experience with a one-party regime and the Kemalist ideology and the experience of Tunisia under Bin Ali. By labeling the ousted Tunisian leader’s rule as Kemalism par excellence, they seek to drive home the argument that such authoritarian forms of government are no longer sustainable in the region, including Turkey. Consequently, they use it as a basis to call for further reform of the Turkish political system (Today’s Zaman, January 25). That positive identification of Islamist with the transformations there also might have an ideological dimension to it, as the Tunisian Islamic thinker and the leader of the En-Nahda movement Rashid Al-Ghannushi and the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood have had an intellectual impact on the Islamic groups and intellectuals in Turkey.

    As a reflection of such widely-held sympathy towards these revolutions shared by Turkish people and many political groups, there have been protests outside Egyptian diplomatic representations, demanding Mubarak’s resignation. It is increasingly possible to hear arguments calling on the government to play a more proactive role towards the resolution of the deepening crisis Egypt. One Turkish expert on Egypt, Ahmet Uysal, called on the government to give up its complacency, and interject itself more resolutely to prevent Egypt’s descent into instability by showing a way out of this stalemate towards democracy. In this view, only then will the Turkish government be able live up to its promises that it will play a leadership role in the region (www.sde.org.tr, February 1).

    Davutoglu, however, denied the criticisms that Turkey has remained silent on the developments in Tunisia and Egypt. Davutoglu rather put the blame on the Turkish media, arguing that despite his statements in support of people’s democratic demands, Turkish commentators largely overlooked them and created such a false image about the government’s policy (IHA, February 1).

    Perhaps with such criticism accumulating, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan finally came out and invited Mubarak to respond to his people’s desire for change. “Hear the people’s outcry and their humane demands… governments cannot stand against people,” Erdogan said (Anadolu Ajansi, February 1). Many Turkish media outlets provided wide coverage of Erdogan’s statement and took it as an indication of Turkey’s emergence as a major actor that could help to resolve this crisis. Nonetheless, during our conversation on the subject in Dubai, a long-time observer of Turkish and Middle Eastern politics, Yusuf Serif of Al-Arabiyya, underscored that Erdogan’s response came rather late. Though finding Erdogan’s statement daring compared to other regional leaders’ silence, Serif draw attention to the fact that Erdogan delivered it only after the United States and other Western actors made similar arguments publicly and US President, Barack Obama, telephoned Erdogan last weekend.

    The “revolutions” in the region are still unfolding and it will be interesting to observe as to whether and how the Turkish government will maneuver in a timely and efficient manner in these uncharted waters.

    https://jamestown.org/program/revolutions-in-egypt-and-tunisia-highlight-dilemmas-of-turkeys-democracy-promotion-agenda/

  • Turkish-Iranian Economic Ties Flourish

    Turkish-Iranian Economic Ties Flourish

    Turkish-Iranian Economic Ties Flourish

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 35

    February 18, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, paid a four-day state visit to Iran starting on February 13, to discuss ways to further bilateral cooperation. The sheer frequency of such high level mutual visits between the two countries in recent years indicates the growing multi-dimensional ties between Ankara and Tehran. Coupled with the convergence of both countries’ positions on many regional problems, the Turkish-Iranian cooperative relationship in economic and political affairs has been one of the most constant elements in the emerging Middle Eastern geopolitical map which is often fluid and full of uncertainties.

    Given Turkey’s involvement in international efforts to find a solution to the diplomatic standoff over Iran’s nuclear program, this issue has occupied a large part of Gul’s agenda. So far, Turkey has objected to the Western policy of pursuing coercive instruments to halt the Iranian nuclear enrichment program which has raised suspicions in the West that Iran might eventually opt to acquire nuclear weapons. Turkey has, instead, operated on the assumption that the Iranian nuclear program was driven by peaceful purposes and advocates a diplomatic solution through dialogue and engagement with Iran, which occasionally pits it against the United States (EDM, June 1, 2010).

    Gul’s remarks on this issue highlighted the extent to which Turkey seeks to take into account Iran’s concerns. Gul underlined that Iran needs to be offered an honorable solution to end this standoff. Commenting on this issue, Gul said that he agreed with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to continue joint efforts on a new road map to explore the possibilities of addressing this issue. Gul also added that Turkey will remain committed to its facilitator role so that this issue could be solved through diplomacy and dialogue. Indeed, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, accompanying Gul in Tehran, met his Iranian counterpart as well as Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. In the wake of the latest meeting between Iran and P5+1 countries held in Istanbul last month, which ended in failure (EDM, January 25), Turkey has remained steadfast in its insistence on a diplomatic solution. While Western leaders, including European officials issued statements calling on Iran to be forthcoming, Turkey is worried about any further escalation of tension and has been calling for the continuation of dialogue. Thus, in talks with his Iranian counterparts, having evaluated the Istanbul meeting, Davutoglu discussed the details of Turkey’s future contributions to this issue. Davutoglu said that the next meeting between Iran and world powers might also take place in Istanbul (Anadolu Ajansi, February 15, 17).

    Bilateral economic cooperation was another item pursued during Gul’s visit to Tehran. In parallel to the Turkish government’s recent policy of deepening economic exchange with its neighbors, Ankara has wanted to further trade ties with Tehran. In recent years, the Turkish-Iranian trade volume has grown enormously. In 2010, bilateral trade reached around $10 billion. However, it has been a major challenge for Turkey to fix the major trade deficit in Iran’s favor, generated by Turkey’s hydrocarbon imports from Iran. While Turkey’s exports were about $3 billion, its imports were around $7 billion last year. At least since Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Iran in October 2009, where he had vowed to raise the trade volume to $30 billion (EDM, October 29, 2009), Turkey has endeavored to increase its exports, through various measures, including forming joint economic commissions, easing border trade, trade fairs and plans to use national currencies in bilateral trade. Despite an absolute increase in exports, those policies have so far failed to break Turkey’s vulnerability, partly due to Iran’s rather protectionist economic policies. Moreover, Turkish firms’ plans to boost the volume of their investments in Iran have been stalled because of restrictive Iranian regulations on foreign investments.

    Thus, reflecting Turkey’s determination to break this unfavorable economic pattern, Gul brought with him a large group of businessmen who sought to agree on trade deals with their prospective Iranian partners. During Gul’s visit, several Turkish-Iranian business forums were convened in major Iranian cities including Tehran, Esfahan and Tabriz, by the representatives of Turkish business associations. Attending those forums, Gul reiterated the target of raising the trade volume to $30 billion. He emphasized clearly Turkey’s dissatisfaction with “over-protectionist” economic policy in Iran and called for the elimination of restrictions. For some time, there had been bilateral talks on preferential trade agreement. Gul said that some Turkish officials accompanying him would remain in Iran to negotiate conditions for a free trade deal instead (Anadolu Ajansi, February 15).

    Indeed, the conditions seem ripe for such a deal, as both countries have their own incentives to increase the bilateral trade volume. For its part, Turkey’s recent foreign economic strategy is built on diversifying export markets as a tool to stimulate growth and cushion the negative effects of the global economic crisis. Partly as a result of Turkish exporters’ penetration into new markets in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, Turkey has managed to overcome the crisis, without major assistance from international financial institutions.

     

    For Iran, trade with Turkey has assumed a vital importance in the wake of the new round of sanctions initiated by the US. Although Turkey announced that it would comply with the UN-authorized sanctions, it would not implement the more stringent list of sanctions imposed by the US and European countries. There has been speculation that Iran might be subjected to more economic pressures following its “uncooperative” attitude during the talks in Istanbul. Moreover, recent reports indicate that the sanctions have started to hit Iran hard after some of Iran’s traditional partners including the UAE decided to restrict their trade with Iran.

    Against this background, Turkey is becoming a major lifeline for Iran. As underlined by Turkish expert Bayram Sinkaya in a recent report, “thanks to both Turkish-Iranian political rapprochement and their policy of furthering economic cooperation, Turkey has started to replace Dubai, which has been Iran’s most important trade partner and operations center. Especially since June 2010 … Iranian businessmen have redirected [their operations] towards Turkey as an alternative to Dubai. As a result, over 600 firms have been set up by Iranian businessmen in Istanbul alone” (www.orsam.org.tr, February 10). It remains to be seen if growing Turkish-Iranian trade might arise as yet another divisive issue in Turkish-US relations and how Turkey will handle those tensions.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-iranian-economic-ties-flourish/

     

  • Davutoglu Outlines the Contours of the New Turkish Foreign Policy

    Davutoglu Outlines the Contours of the New Turkish Foreign Policy

    Davutoglu Outlines the Contours of the New Turkish Foreign Policy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 4

    January 6, 2011

    By Saban Kardas

    The Turkish foreign ministry is currently holding its third ambassadors’ conference, entitled “Visionary Diplomacy: Global and Regional Order from Turkey’s Perspective,” which brings together diplomats serving in Turkish missions worldwide. These conferences, held since July 2008, have been a major component of Ahmet Davutoglu’s agenda for restructuring Turkish foreign policy. Especially since Davutoglu’s appointment as the foreign minister in May 2009, he has embarked on a comprehensive project to reform the functioning of the ministry. The work is underway to create new rules and practices on not only the training, selection and the promotion of Turkish diplomats, but also the inner organizational structure of the ministry. Moreover, there are plans to open new embassies in various countries in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. Davutoglu uses this transformation as an opportunity to promote younger and talented diplomats and enable them to serve in key posts.

    The weeklong conference provides a venue for Turkish diplomats to evaluate the past year’s activities and set goals for the New Year. In addition to various functions held in Ankara, the second part of the gathering takes place in an Anatolian province. By adding this component, Davutoglu hopes to bridge the gap between the diplomats, often viewed as existing in their ivory towers, and ordinary people. This year, diplomats will continue the conference in the Erzurum province to mingle with townsmen and provide a firsthand explanation of the new Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, it is becoming a tradition to invite foreign statesmen to the conference. This year, Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, will take part in the activities in Erzurum, while the Pakistani and Afghan Foreign Ministers, Shah Mahmood Qureshi and Zalmai Rassoul respectively, attended the first part in Ankara (Aksam, January 3).

    Davutoglu’s opening address on January 3 was perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the conference (www.mfa.gov.tr, January 3). Davutoglu provided a balance sheet of the new Turkish foreign policy, finding Turkey’s performance satisfactory, and placing Turkey among ten countries in terms of their contributions to global peace and security.

    Davutoglu also reiterated Turkey’s position on the controversial subjects on Turkish foreign policy agenda, ranging from relations with its neighbors to the Cyprus dispute. Emphasizing that Turkey would continue to pursue EU membership, Davutoglu placed the main responsibility for the stalemate in the accession process on the EU. Davutoglu criticized the EU’s inability to open new negotiation chapters, and the political obstacles placed before Turkey, especially the EU’s “unjustified” demands on the Cyprus issue.

    Davutoglu commented widely on Turkey’s growing profile in the Balkans, South Caucasus and the Middle East. Reiterating the familiar argument that these regions have been beset with crises, the Turkish foreign minister underscored Turkey’s constructive efforts towards the resolution of local disputes. Davutoglu especially took pride in visa liberalization and free-trade deals and high level strategic cooperation councils Turkey has initiated with regional countries, including Syria, Iraq, Greece and Russia. Rebuffing charges that Turkey is pursuing imperial or what some call “neo-Ottoman” policies, Davutoglu stressed that Turkey respects the sovereignty of nation-states and has no desire to reign over other nations (www.mfa.gov.tr, January 3).

    Moreover, in this context, Davutoglu offered a vocal defense of the new activism in Turkish foreign policy, which is occasionally criticized by domestic and foreign observers on the basis that many of Davutoglu’s ambitious projects are unrealistic or driven by an ideological agenda. Those critics usually point to Turkey’s emerging ties especially with Middle Eastern countries as an “indication” of a “shift of axis” in Ankara’s foreign policy away from the West. Davutoglu highlighted Turkey’s continued commitment to its relations with the West, reiterating his earlier argument that the new activism is largely a consequence of Ankara’s concern to redefine its place in the global balance of power in line with its growing power potential. “We want the world to know that we no longer find the clothes designed for us and the roles assigned to us sufficient. If they call it a shift of axis, then so be it,” Davutoglu maintained (www.mfa.gov.tr, January 3).

    A large part of Davutoglu’s speech, thus, reflected this self-confidence and was devoted to his views on the structure of the international system and Turkey’s place in it. Davutoglu offered an elaborate critique of the current international order, arguing that it harbors many inequalities and injustice, hence its need of revision. For some time, Davutoglu has argued that historically, following every major war, victorious powers established international orders which provided for peace and stability. Since the Cold War ended without a decisive victory, the redefinition of the new international order still remains a task to be accomplished.

    Davutoglu believes Turkey has a role to play in this process and will contribute to the emergence of the new global economic, political and cultural norms. To do so, Turkey has to give up its traditionally passive or “reactive” policies and instead pursue a proactive foreign policy agenda. If Turkey rises to this challenge, it will influence the rewriting of the rules of the international order, commensurate with its new power profile. In that context, Davutoglu emphasized boldly in his address that as Turkey assumes such a role in the remaking of the global order, it could further distinguish itself from other powers by emphasizing moral and ethical concerns. By highlighting Turkey’s engagement with Africa and under developed countries, Davutoglu contended that Turkey has increasingly become a “wise country” in the international community (www.mfa.gov.tr, January 3).

    As an indication of Turkey’s “global responsibility,” Davutoglu and other Turkish leaders have frequently referred to Turkey’s non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council during the last two years, as well as in many international and European institutions. Davutoglu seems determined to set a new target for Ankara: going beyond membership in the existing international organizations and working towards the redefinition of the global economic and financial institutions, or the very basis of the international order. This is a daunting task in itself and it remains to be seen how far Davutoglu will progress in accomplishing it in 2011.

    https://jamestown.org/program/davutoglu-outlines-the-contours-of-the-new-turkish-foreign-policy/

  • Turkey’s bid for global actorhood: Davutoğlu’s new foreign policy lexicon

    Turkey’s bid for global actorhood: Davutoğlu’s new foreign policy lexicon

    Turkey’s bid for global actorhood: Davutoğlu’s new foreign policy lexicon

    by Şaban Kardaş
    06 January 2011, Thursday
    Today’s Zaman
    The Turkish Foreign Ministry just held the third annual gathering of its ambassadors serving worldwide. This year’s meeting, organized under the theme “Visionary Diplomacy: Global and Regional Order from Turkey’s Perspective,” was kicked off with a conference in Ankara on Jan. 3.
    The most remarkable part of the conference was Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s opening address, in which he offered a first-hand evaluation of his vision of Turkey’s place in the world.

    The activism of late observed in Turkey’s foreign relations is largely attributed to Davutoğlu, an academic by profession who emerged as the architect of Turkish foreign policy under the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party) since its coming to power in 2002. Although Davutoğlu already played the lead role in the redefinition of Ankara’s external relations during his tenure as chief advisor to the prime minister on foreign policy issues between 2002 and 2009, his imprint on the making of Turkish foreign policy became particularly visible following his appointment as foreign minister in May 2009. Since then, Davutoğlu has embarked on a comprehensive project to restructure the Turkish diplomatic service so that it can live up to the requirements of the diplomatic activism he has been advocating.

    In his address at the conference, as well as in the interviews he gave to the Turkish press in the last few days of 2010, Davutoğlu outlined a proactive foreign policy vision, underscoring Turkey’s determination to be reckoned with as a major player in regional and global affairs. Moreover, he offered a defense of Ankara’s new foreign policy direction, and countered the arguments of those circles in the West and inside the country who maintain that Turkey has been “shifting its axis.” Davutoğlu’s presentation at the conference, though reiterating many of his earlier arguments, conveyed them in a systematic manner, providing a good reference for those seeking to understand the new Turkish foreign policy lexicon.

    Turkey’s place in the international order

    Perhaps one of the most conspicuous aspects of Davutoğlu’s discourse is a deliberate effort to initiate a debate on the structure of the international order and situate Turkey’s international positioning within this broader context. As a matter of fact, on many occasions, the critique of the international order has been taken up by President Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkish leaders increasingly question the legitimacy of the current international system, on economic, political and, more importantly, moral grounds. They have expressed their unease with the injustice and inequality taking place in the international order based on the post-World War II geopolitical reality, in an effort to make a case that it is in need of redefinition. They have been calling for the reform of international organizations, including the United Nations and global financial institutions, and arguing that the West and the United States should share power and responsibility with other actors.

    In a related move, Davutoğlu assigns Turkey a leading role in the redefinition of the global order. Indeed, this is where Davutoğlu offers an added rationale for foreign policy activism. In his view, Turkey cannot remain complacent in a world that is in flux. Turkey can no longer be a reactive actor that takes for granted the established international order created by major powers. On the contrary, at a time during which debate on the basic institutions and principles of the international system is under way, Turkey should be “among the countries that will lay the foundations of this order.” In his usual way of using metaphors to make his point, Davutoğlu wants Turkey to become one of the “city planners” that pursues a dynamic foreign policy agenda and takes an active role in the formulation of a new institutional architecture for world politics.

    More importantly, Davutoğlu’s vision for Turkey’s role in the international arena has strong moral and idealistic undertones. He sees Turkey actively contributing to the emerging global culture, helping bridge civilizational differences. Similarly, he believes Turkey can make a unique contribution in the redefinition of the world order, as it can act as a “wise country,” i.e., one that can foresee potential crises and develop preventive measures and one whose opinion is taken seriously by other countries. As a wise country of humanity, Davutoğlu wants Turkey to conduct its foreign policy on the basis of respected universal principles, stand up for its values, and act as the voice of human conscience. In this regard, for instance, Turkey increasingly focuses on the issue of underdevelopment and socioeconomic injustice. In addition to many initiatives Turkey has undertaken in Africa, it will also host the UN summit on the Least Developed Countries later this year.

    This new lexicon with global references, being developed by Davutoğlu, departs from the parameters of conventional Turkish foreign policy. While its foreign policy priorities were geared largely towards the territorial defense of the country and the protection of Turkey’s interests in various bilateral disputes with neighbors, Turkey has moved past this mentality. In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has been increasingly engaged in the diplomatic affairs of its surrounding regions. A large part of Davutoğlu’s vision and proactive agenda builds on this legacy. However, Davutoğlu seeks to move beyond this regional focus and to assert a role for Turkey on the global level. He does not hide dissatisfaction with Turkey’s current standing in global politics, arguing that “we have to make it known that we find the roles assigned to us and the dresses designed for us unsatisfactory.”

    A current mismatch of objectives

    Such an ambitious discourse critical of the global order has been voiced in world history by many rising powers that are unsatisfied with the existing status quo. Such calls are usually precipitated by power shifts in the global system, which transform the existing balance of power. Davutoğlu’s vision definitely has a material basis to build on. Given the country’s expanding economic power, wealth and geopolitical clout, Turkey’s relative material power is on the rise.

    Thus, many Turks want their country to play a larger role than in the past. Nonetheless, realizing Turkey’s objective of reconfiguring the global order is likely to face many challenges; not the least, the question of having sufficient resources and a suitable political environment to sustain multifaceted global commitments. Similarly, there is an obvious mismatch between the objectives Davutoğlu set for Turkey and the country’s current reality. For instance, despite his vision of advocating the cause of less developed countries, Turkey itself still ranks 83rd in the United Nations’ human development index.

    When confronted with those questions, Davutoğlu maintains, “We have a right to it, we have experience to do it and we are capable of doing it.” Moreover, for Davutoğlu, global leadership is a matter of perception, as much as having the necessary material resources. He believes that if Turks can overcome “the inferiority complex” and move beyond a “torn identity,” as argued by Samuel Huntington, they will emerge self-confident and better able to take part in global processes. True it may be, however, power and material capabilities will remain an essential variable in international relations. 2011 will be a major test for Davutoğlu’s ability to blend Turkey’s resources and historical experience to make a rightful bid for global actorhood.

    *Şaban Kardaş is an assistant professor of international relations at TOBB — Economy and Technology University and the assistant editor of Insight Turkey.
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