Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Erdogan Responds to Sarksyan’s Remarks By Backing Azerbaijan

    Erdogan Responds to Sarksyan’s Remarks By Backing Azerbaijan

    Erdogan Responds to Sarksyan’s Remarks By Backing Azerbaijan

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 146

    July 29, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a one-day working visit to Baku, where he met the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to discuss various bilateral and regional issues. Erdogan deliberately chose Baku as the destination for his second official trip abroad, since he formed his new government after emerging victorious in the June 12 parliamentary elections. Erdogan’s first trip was paid to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) last week. The choice of these two destinations and the messages delivered during Erdogan’s contacts reflect Erdogan’s determination to stand firm on Turkey’s traditional position on the two important foreign policy issues. In TRNC, Erdogan drew red lines by saying that Turkey would not accept the EU’s terms, and a solution to the Cyprus issue will be based on Ankara’s own priorities. In Azerbaijan, Erdogan reiterated his determination to continue with Ankara’s Baku-centered policy in the South Caucasus.

    The improvement of economic ties between the two countries was a key item on the two leaders’ agenda. For his part, Aliyev highlighted the investments by Azerbaijani companies in Turkey, which has exceeded $4 billion, and added that Azerbaijan plans to invest another $6 billion in Turkey, especially in the petrochemicals industry. However, in the long-standing issue of the transit of Azerbaijani gas through Turkey to European markets, the two leaders failed to announce a breakthrough. Erdogan noted that the bureaucrats will continue to work on the remaining articles to finalize a deal, which was reached one year ago.

    A concrete outcome of the visit was the announcement of the parties’ determination to hold the first meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSC) in Turkey. This form of partnership has been a new instrument, which Turkey has developed to foster its bilateral relations with neighbors and countries deemed to be strategically important. Despite the initiation of such platforms with Iraq, Syria, Greece and Russia, the delay in the conclusion of the Turkey-Azerbaijan HLSC was an issue of concern for some time. To a certain extent, it reflected the ongoing disagreements, caused by Turkey’s thwarted rapprochement efforts with Armenia. Erdogan, thus, emphasized the importance he places on holding the first HLSC, which might be interpreted as yet another sign of a thaw between Ankara and Baku.

    An additional issue on which Turkey has sought a breakthrough for some time relates to Azerbaijan’s removal of visa requirements for Turkish citizens. Although Turkey unilaterally lifted visa requirements for Azerbaijani citizens and managed to sign mutual visa liberalization agreements with other countries, including Russia, a similar agreement with Azerbaijan has been on hold. During Erdogan’s Baku trip, Aliyev said that the Azerbaijani side was not ready to move to a visa-free travel regime and would need more time to complete necessary preparations (Anadolu Ajansi, July 27).

    Azerbaijani-Armenian problems and the recent developments in Turkish-Armenian relations also occupied a large part of Erdogan’s agenda in Baku. On the eve of Erdogan’s departure to Baku, Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan’s remarks about Mount Ararat (located within Turkey’s borders) shocked observers. Attending the Armenian Language Olympics, Sarksyan responded to a question from an Armenian youth as saying “I think my generation has managed to fulfill its debt when it was necessary to protect the part of our Motherland, [Karabakh], from the enemies. We managed to do it. … “[Any return of historic territories in Western Armenia] all depends on you and your generation” (Hurriyet, July 26).

    A statement issued by Turkish foreign ministry strongly condemned Sarksyan’s comments as “extremely irresponsible behavior,” and took them as an indication “that he does not intend to work for peace” (www.mfa.gov.tr, July 26). During his contacts in Azerbaijan, Erdogan also echoed similar messages, going as far as claiming that Sarksyan should issue an apology for his mistake (www.cnnturk.com, July 27).

    More importantly, Erdogan capitalized on this development to reiterate his earlier position on the complicated relations between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia. On the one hand, he defined the situation in Karabakh as one of clear occupation by Armenia, which in his view has not demonstrated a constructive attitude toward the resolution of the dispute. Erdogan found Azerbaijan’s approach to the problem constructive, and called on the international community to take the necessary steps for the resolution of the dispute.

    On the other hand, Erdogan interpreted Sarksyan’s comments as indication of Armenian’s official position and criticized those who ask Turkey to take steps toward the resolution of its problems with Armenia. Turkish-Armenian normalization, which gained momentum in 2009, had to be stalled partly after Erdogan declared that Turkey would not proceed with its rapprochement unless progress was achieved in the Karabakh dispute (EDM, June 1, 2010). Some have asked Turkey to take limited steps to maintain the momentum in Turkish-Armenian normalization such as the partial opening of the border, even before a solution is reached in the Azerbaijan-Armenian disputes. Referring to these arguments, Erdogan reiterated clearly that Turkey will not proceed with the re-opening of border, before Armenia solves its problems with Azerbaijan (Cihan, July 27).

    Erdogan’s reiteration of Ankara’s position was important, especially considering that it was preceded by some positive remarks from Armenian NGO leaders – in Ankara to attend a civil society dialogue – following their meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Foreign Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu. Reportedly, Davutoglu painted an optimistic picture, expressing his hope that the border will be eventually re-opened and Armenians might even be able to buy homes in Turkey , July 20). Indeed, this was not the first time Davutoglu expressed his determination to pursue the Turkish-Armenian normalization efforts, despite many obstacles presented by the domestic politics in both countries and the tight coupling between this process and the Karabakh issue (Today’s Zaman, September 30, 2010).

    However, against the background of the failure of the Kazan summit to produce any progress on the Azerbaijan-Armenia dispute, Davutoglu has yet to formulate a genuine strategy to break the Turkey-Armenia-Azerbaijan stalemate so that he can proceed with Turkish-Armenian normalization, which would be a major victory for his “zero-problems-with-neighbors” policy. The statements by Sarksyan and Erdogan’s harsh response only add to the complexity of this already daunting task.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-responds-to-sarksyans-remarks-by-backing-azerbaijan/

     

  • Turkey Recalibres Its Policy On Libya

    Turkey Recalibres Its Policy On Libya

    Turkey Recalibres Its Policy On Libya

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 139

    July 20, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey has hosted an important meeting, which marked the drastic transformation its policy on Libya has undergone. Although Turkey initially expressed strong opposition to military intervention against the Gaddafi regime, over time it adjusted its policy and managed to coordinate it with Western powers and various Muslim nations that have been working to end Gaddafi’s rule. The Libya Contact Group, bringing together these powers, held its fourth meeting in Istanbul, co-chaired by Turkey and the UAE, on July 15.

    Predating the meeting, Turkey had undertaken several steps to forge closer ties with the Libyan rebels. Despite its opposition to the use of force, Ankara later agreed to the transfer of the operation to NATO command and joined the Libya Contact Group. However, Turkey’s insistence on a negotiated settlement, and its slow pace in cutting its ties with Tripoli arguably drew a wedge between Ankara and Tripoli-based National Transitional Council (NTC) (EDM, April 19).

    While distancing itself from Gaddafi, Turkey progressively repaired its ties with the NTC. After joining the Contact Group, Turkey intensified its criticism against the Gaddafi administration. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan argued that a new period was to start in the history of Libya and called on Gaddafi to relinquish power. More importantly, following the temporary closure of the Turkish embassy in Tripoli the day before, Erdogan emphasized that Turkey would continue to work with the NTC to find a political solution (www.mfa.gov.tr, May 3).

    During the second meeting of the Contact Group in Rome in the same week, Turkey argued for an immediate ceasefire and insisted on a roadmap it proposed earlier in April to end the conflict (Hurriyet, May 5). However, the inability of the Contact Group to agree on determined action and the deepening of the civil war rendered Turkey’s proposal largely ineffective.

    Turkey then moved toward consolidating ties with the opposition, which came in mid-May when the chairman of the NTC, Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, visited Turkey and met the president, prime minister and foreign minister. Although Turkish leaders described the NTC as a legal and credible representative of the people of Libya, they stopped short of extending official recognition. Satisfied with Turkey’s de facto recognition of their administration, Abdul-Jalil emphasized that they would discuss ways to improve trade with Turkey and how Ankara could assist the country’s reconstruction and provision of humanitarian aid. He also sought to make the case that the rebel forces held sympathy toward Turkey’s position and earlier protests against Turkey in Benghazi were due to a misunderstanding. More importantly, he said the NTC would honor all the agreements signed in the past by the Tripoli government, meaning that Turkish business investments in the country would be protected. Granted, reflecting perhaps a divergence with Turkey, Abdul-Jalil underlined the necessity of the military option to topple Gaddafi, though he avoided any request for Turkish military assistance (Anadolu Ajansi May 23; Zaman, May 25).

    The real boost for Ankara’s ties with the NTC came when Davutoglu visited Benghazi. Arguing that Turkey and Libya shared the same destiny, he extended support to the Benghazi administration by describing it as the legitimate representative of the country, and adding that Turkey would soon appoint an ambassador to Benghazi. At the same time, Davutoglu made a commitment to provide $100 million in project credit and $100 million in cash credit, in addition to the $100 million Turkey previously provided. Davutoglu reiterated Turkey’s call for a roadmap, based on an immediate ceasefire, delivery of humanitarian assistance, an end to Gaddafi’s rule, and maintenance of Libya’s unity, and argued that a ceasefire should be established before the beginning of Muslim holy month of Ramadan (Anadolu Ajansi, July 3).

    The Turkish government also took a major step, by issuing a decree to freeze the assets of Gaddafi and his family in Turkey, imposing a ban on their entry into Turkey, and opening the way for seizing the control of Arab-Turkish Bank which was partly owned by Libyan Foreign Bank. The decree also spelled out other measures to implement the arms embargo in line with the UN Security Council Resolution (Radikal, July 3). Mahmoud Jibril, the NTC’s spokesman on foreign affairs, paid a visit to Turkey to finalize the loan deal, where he also requested that Ankara grant access to the frozen assets. The Turkish side, however, declined to unfreeze the assets, citing the existing UN resolutions (Hurriyet Daily News, July 6).

    Ahead of the Contact Group meeting in Istanbul, Davutoglu reiterated the need to reach a truce before Ramadan, while arguing that the Turkish proposal would constitute the basis for discussions. Although Ankara also extended an invitation to China and Russia, they declined to attend, arguing that the issue should be handled in the UN Security Council (Sabah, July 14). In his address at the opening of the meeting, Davutoglu expressed support for NTC’s request for the release of $3 billion from the frozen assets and its equal distribution in Tripoli and Benghazi (www.mfa.gov.tr, July 15).

    While recognizing the NTC as the legitimate governing authority in Libya until an interim authority is set in place, the contact group took various decisions to aid the political transition, and assist the NTC in political, economic, financial and administrative fields. For instance, the final declaration urged participants to “open credit lines to the NTC corresponding to 10 percent to 20 percent of the frozen assets by accepting them as collateral” (www.mfa.gov.tr, July 15).

    Although the conclusions outlined a roadmap for the political transition after the end of Gaddafi’s rule and decided to heighten pressure on Tripoli, the meeting failed to present clear answers as to how the current military stalemate will be overcome. Likewise, despite the incorporation of some of the elements from Turkey’s own roadmap, there was no decision to halt military operations in Ramadan. Granted, the process leading from the outbreak of the crisis in Libya to the holding of the Contact Group meeting in Istanbul reflects the high degree of flexibility on the part of Turkey. More importantly, it demonstrates Ankara’s determination to work closely with the United States, as was reflected by the warm welcome US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton received from Turkish leaders during her stay in Turkey.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-recalibres-its-policy-on-libya/

  • Turkey Meets Over Half Its Defense Requirements Domestically

    Turkey Meets Over Half Its Defense Requirements Domestically

    Turkey Meets Over Half Its Defense Requirements Domestically

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 100

    May 24, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    The 10th International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF), held in Istanbul on May 10 – 13, was an important venue to demonstrate the transformation of the Turkish defense industry in recent years. Organized biannually since the 1990s, the event featured over 600 companies or company representatives from 49 countries, including Turkey, while delegations from over 70 countries visited (www.idef11.com). Delivering an address at the inauguration, President Abdullah Gul reiterated the importance Turkey attaches to the defense industry. He referred to Turkey’s efforts to increase local input in defense procurement through greater utilization of various joint production programs and boosting domestically designed production (Star, May 11).

    Despite some international representation, the fair largely served to exhibit products of Turkish producers, as well as to publicize the achievements of Turkey’s flagship defense projects in recent years. Leading defense companies such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing and EADS were also present, but Western defense observers reportedly maintained that “in nature, the fair remains mostly a Turkish, regional and Middle Eastern event.” In a development reflecting the regional nature of the event, the largest deal struck at IDEF 2011 was reportedly an agreement for Turkey’s export defense equipment to Qatar, including small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), worth $120 million (Hurriyet Daily News, May 13).

    Armored vehicles, Turkey’s major export items, which find buyers in the Middle East and South Asia, were on display at the event. Moreover, a great deal of publicity was devoted to Turkey’s main battle tank project, which was developed in partnership with South Korea’s Hyundai Rotem, supplying the technological know-how (EDM, August 7, 2008). Turkish military vehicle producer, Otokar, introduced the first prototype of the tank at the fair, named Altay. Otokar expects the tanks to be ready for sale by 2016.

    Similarly, the results of Turkey’s national warship projects were also publicized at the fair. A Turkish corvette designed and produced in Turkey’s shipbuilding yards was on display. In recent years, Turkey has placed greater emphasis on developing its national capacity to build warships of different classes to meet the Navy’s needs. Murad Bayar, the head of the Under Secretariat for the Defense Industry (SSM), the organization in charge of procurement programs, argued recently that Turkey is capable of producing aircraft carriers domestically (Star, May 8).

    Another high publicity weapons system on display was various UAV projects. The Turkish armed forces use several small-sized UAVs produced in Turkey and SSM has recently signed a contract with another defense manufacturing firm to produce tactical UAVs (Anadolu Ajansi, January 4). Turkey has also been working to develop a national medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV system to reduce its dependence on the United States and Israel for strategic intelligence gathering. ASELSAN, contractor for Turkey’s MALE UAV project, announced recently that its UAV, named ANKA, successfully passed test flights and could become operational in one year’s time. Defense industry analysts expect the UAV market to record rapid growth in the coming years. They argue that with its recent investments in the UAV sector, Turkey is poised to emerge as a leading supplier in its region (Haberturk, May 9).

    Turkey is also working on a national attack helicopter project, ATAK, in partnership with Italy. Meanwhile, to meet the Turkish army’s needs for general attack helicopters, Turkey has been evaluating various offers for some time (EDM, July 7, 2009). Turkey finally made a decision on a long-awaited tender and awarded the deal to U.S. Sikorsky. Turkish Defense Minister, Vecdi Gonul, described the $3.5 billion deal as a milestone, as it would involve joint helicopter production (Anadolu Ajansi, April 21).

    Although foreign participation remained limited, the expanding product line on display at IDEF underscored the transformation of the Turkish defense industry and its expanding potential to meet the needs of the armed forces. In that regard, the recent figures released by the Defense Industry Manufacturers’ Association also represented a bright picture for the sector (Anadolu Ajansi, April 26). In 2010, 52 percent of Turkish armed forces weapons systems needs were supplied by domestic producers. This development was seen as a success story, as the SSM had set the target of meeting 50 percent of the TAF’s needs domestically. In 2003, the ratio of domestic production in the military procurement total was only 25 percent.

    At the same time, the total volume of Turkish arms exports reached $634.2 million in 2010, five percent less than the previous year, reflecting the impact of the global financial crisis. Nonetheless, considering that in 2004 Turkey’s exports were only $196 million, there is a visible improvement in its overall export potential. Representatives of the sector aim to reach an annual export volume of $1 billion this year and $2 billion by 2016. According to other statistics, total revenues for Turkish defense firms reached $2.7 billion in 2010, again a significant leap from $848 million ten years earlier. Reflecting this growing economic potential, Turkey invested over $500 million in research and development activities in 2010.

    Determined to maintain this momentum, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan argued during a recent meeting with businessmen that the Turkish defense industry’s annual revenues will exceed $8 billion in five years (Hurriyet, May 19). Indeed, it has been part of Erdogan’s goals to achieve self-sufficiency in military procurement since his party came to power in 2002. In 2004, Turkey overhauled its military modernization programs and rules on military procurement, seeking to increase the domestically manufactured share. The recent advances in that direction have pleased Erdogan, as he constantly refers to the transformation of the Turkish defense industry in his state of the union addresses (Anadolu Ajansi, October 30, 2010).

    While Turkey was largely dependent on defense sector imports during the 1990s, the military modernization programs during that decade were focused on joint production with foreign manufacturers to supply the Turkish army. These facilitated the emergence of a domestic arms industry. In the last decade, the Turkish defense industry has increasingly shifted in the direction of national design and production, based on the accumulated experience and technology transfers achieved through international partnerships. This growth, which is geared toward meeting the Turkish army’s needs, has been achieved largely thanks to support and protection provided by the Turkish government. Yet, the Turkish defense industry seems to be moving to a new phase of mass production for international markets, where it is likely to face fiercer competition.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-meets-over-half-its-defense-requirements-domestically/

  • Turkey Refuses to Stop Second Mavi Marmara

    Turkey Refuses to Stop Second Mavi Marmara

    Turkey Refuses to Stop Second Mavi Marmara

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 97

    May 19, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    The Turkish-Israeli relationship has been in a limbo since the deadly Mavi Marmara incident in late May 2010, and various efforts to bridge the differences have failed (EDM, July 7, December 10, 2010). The approaching anniversary of the flotilla incident has reignited the debate on the future of Turkish-Israeli relations. Representatives of international advocacy groups, including the Turkey-based Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH), are planning to hold the Freedom Flotilla II to shed light on Israel’s blockade over Gaza. Around fifteen ships from various nations are expected to take part in the flotilla, to which over 10,000 volunteered to join. As the Middle East experiences troubled times, however, concerns have grown that this development might escalate the tensions. In a recent meeting, the flotilla organizers reiterated their determination to go ahead with their plans, though they indicated that they might postpone it until late June in order to avoid the intermingling of this campaign with the upcoming Turkish elections, slated for June 12 (Cihan, April 11).

    There has been rising concern in the United States over how the “second Mavi Marmara crisis” might unfold. Thirty six members of Congress sent a letter to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan requesting that he prevent the second convoy and dampen the tensions. The members of the House, including both Turkey sympathizers and critics, expressed their deep concern over the developments and called on Erdogan to develop positive relationship with Israel. They also underlined Israel’s right to defend itself and argued that Israel would be forced to board the ships and search for weapons if a second flotilla sails to Gaza, raising the risk of another crisis (Sabah, May 13).

    In an interesting development amidst these reports, Turkish media speculated that the Israeli Ambassador to Turkey, Gaby Levy, paid a visit to the Turkish foreign ministry to relay Israel’s concerns and prevent a second Mavi Marmara crisis. Reportedly, he told Turkish diplomats that “the new flotilla is also [organized] for provocative purposes. If a similar situation emerges again, there will not be violent actions as in the Mavi Marmara. But, be assured, all that is necessary will be undertaken [by Israel].” Those words were interpreted in the Turkish media as akin to veiled threats (Haberturk, May 14).

    Turkish diplomatic sources reportedly maintained the position that Turkey officially cannot stop the convoy. Although Ankara could advise the organizers to cancel their plans, it would not be able to tell a civilian initiative not to go to Gaza. Moreover, according to some sources, intervening now might undermine Turkey’s position, as it would raise the question as to why Turkey had not stopped the first flotilla (www.cnnturk.com, May 16).

    The low attendance to the reception at the Israeli embassy in Ankara commemorating the foundation of the State of Israel was yet another occasion highlighting the ongoing tensions. While no member of the cabinet was present at the reception on May 16, foreign ministry officials and the Turkish military were represented at lower levels. Similarly, opposition parties did not have significant representation at the reception. The low interest in the event was interpreted in the media as the Turkish government’s boycott of Israel (Sabah, May 17).

    Meanwhile, there has been speculation that Turkey was threatening to withdraw from a UN panel investigating Israel’s attack on Mavi Marmara. The Palmer Commission, set up by the UN Human Rights Council in June 2010, was expected to present its report to UN Secretary-General Ban-ki Moon by mid May. Turkey’s objections to certain sections of the draft report, however, and the draft’s failure to name Israel’s actions in international waters as a violation of international law reportedly angered Turkey. While the announcement of the panel’s conclusions has been delayed, the Turkish media even maintained that Turkey threatened to withdraw from the panel if the final report appears to be favoring an Israeli point of view (www.cnnturk.com, May 16).

    In a live TV appearance evaluating Turkish foreign policy, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also commented on these various issues on the bilateral agenda. Davutoglu presented a different interpretation to the picture that has emerged in the Turkish media (Hurriyet Daily News, Anadolu Ajansi, May 17). Regarding the press reports that Levy issued a warning to Turkish foreign ministry to stop the organization of the second flotilla, Davutoglu contended that it was out of the question. On the contrary, Davutoglu maintained that Turkey summoned Levy in order to send serious warnings to Israel and convey Ankara’s expectation so that last year’s bitter experience would not be repeated. Davutoglu also criticized those who call on the Turkish government to stop the second flotilla, arguing that telling a civil society organization what to do would be an undemocratic approach.

    Davutoglu acknowledged Turkish dissatisfaction with the content of the draft report prepared by the UN fact finding mission, but rebuffed claims that Turkey would withdraw from the panel. Nonetheless, he added that Ankara’s response will be strong, if the final report contains elements that contradict the initial report last year, which was more favorable to the Turkish position. Last year’s report appeared to describe Israel’s actions in Gaza and the raid against Mavi Marmara as incompatible with international law. Regarding the delays in the presentation of the report’s findings, Davutoglu also put the responsibility on Israel, arguing that Israel delayed submitting its report to the UN panel.

    Davutoglu also sought to make the case that the task of the UN mission is not to reconcile Turkey and Israel, but “to serve justice.” “Why were nine civilians killed? Who dares to kill civilians in international waters? We want this to be described. We do not want a mediator with Israel,” Davutoglu added.

    Although Egypt now allows for the flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza following the fall of Mubarak, the organizers of the Freedom Flotilla remain determined to press ahead with their plans for a second convoy, largely to publicize their position worldwide. Also, Davutoglu’s comments indicate that Turkey remains determined to seek retribution for Israel’s deadly raid. Moreover, Turkey wants Israel’s acknowledgement of its responsibility and the issuing of an official apology. It may be too early to expect an improvement in the Turkish-Israeli relationship any time soon.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-refuses-to-stop-second-mavi-marmara/

     

  • Turkey Balances Its Ties With West and Islamic World in Libya Operation

    Turkey Balances Its Ties With West and Islamic World in Libya Operation

    Turkey Balances Its Ties With West and Islamic World in Libya Operation

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 62

    March 30, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s position on the unfolding events in Libya has caused a great deal of confusion for observers of Turkish foreign policy. Despite its objections to the use of military force to solve the impending civil war, Turkey has eventually changed course, by agreeing to the transfer of the military operations to NATO command and taking part in non-combat military missions.

    When the violence first broke out, Turkey was apparently caught unprepared to deal with a crisis that involved various issues. While the Turkish government had declared its support for the pro-democratic movements in the Middle East, it failed to offer unequivocal support to Libyan revolutionaries. Turkish construction firms’ multi-billion dollar investments and the presence of thousands of Turkish workers in the country constrained Turkey’s options. Consequently, Turkey gave timid responses to Gaddafi’s brutal use of force, which drew international criticism. Turkish leaders expressed vehement opposition to international sanctions or use of military force to stop Gaddafi’s aggression. Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, went as far as criticizing the motivations of the Western powers, arguing that they were after Libya’s natural resources (EDM, March 4).

    Although Turkey successfully evacuated its citizens from Libya, it maintained the same rhetoric critical of the Western policy. One Turkish diplomat visiting Washington to explain Turkey’s position argued that Turkey had to tread cautiously considering the uncertainty over the future of Libya in a post-Gaddafi scenario (Anadolu Ajansi, March 3). However, the gains achieved by the rebel forces cast doubts over Turkey’s policy. Some commentators increasingly argued that by failing to side with the Libyan rebellion, Turkey might risk becoming the loser in the future determination of Libya’s political structure (Haberturk, March 13).

    Another criticism of Turkey’s policy was raised on moral grounds, given that Turkey apparently offered no viable solution to halt Gaddafi’s atrocities other than to constantly counsel him to step down from power. This challenge became urgent, as the heavily armored Gaddafi forces repelled the rebel forces back to Benghazi. As international concern grew over Gaddafi’s use of force against civilians in the recaptured towns, the debate on the military option was reignited. Following UN Security Council Resolution 1973, authorizing a no fly zone, the Western powers led by the United States and France accelerated consultations for military operations.

    Turkey still insisted that military intervention should be avoided and a negotiated settlement might be possible. Ankara even proposed observing a ceasefire, when Gaddafi announced that he would impose a unilateral ceasefire. Nonetheless, Turkey underlined that it would back an arms embargo, provision of humanitarian assistance and the no-fly zone, in line with the UN Security Council resolution (IHA, March 18).

    However, the continuation of Libyan forces’ attacks and Gaddafi’s threats to enter Benghazi prompted the Western powers, joined by some Arab leaders, to act swiftly. France, leading the interventionist camp, gathered likeminded powers in Paris, to which Turkey was not invited (Anadolu Ajansi, March 19). When French aircraft started bombing Libyan military targets, Turkey continued its vocal criticism, calling for an immediate halt to operations, so that the destruction of Libyan infrastructure and killing of civilians could be prevented. Also angered by France’s sidelining of Turkey, Erdogan argued that by acting recklessly against Libya, Sarkozy was only interested in his political career, not the wellbeing of the Libyan people (Zaman, March 22).

    The lack of consensus within the pro-intervention camp as to how to handle the operations and what command and control roles NATO should play again brought Turkey to the forefront. Erdogan listed some conditions that needed to be met if NATO was to be given such a role. When the NATO Council met in Brussels, Ankara raised objections to the use of NATO beyond the enforcement of an arms embargo. It took President Barack Obama to telephone Erdogan before Ankara dropped its objections to the transfer of the operation to NATO (Anadolu Ajansi, March 23).

    On March 25, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, announced that Turkey’s concerns and demands had been met. Meanwhile, the Turkish parliament also authorized a motion that permitted the Turkish military to participate in the international force in Libya and allowed the government to undertake a multi-dimensional contribution. According to the deal, it was reported that the NATO base in Turkey’s Aegean town of Izmir might be one of the operational centers for the NATO mission in Libya. Also, though not providing combat forces, Turkey would continue to contribute five warships and a submarine to operations for use solely for humanitarian purposes (Hurriyet, March 25).

    Pro-government media sources heralded this development as a major achievement for Turkish diplomacy. Also, Western powers’ decision to invite Turkey to the London conference on March 29, unlike the Paris summit, was viewed as a victory over France. Erdogan said that by transferring operations to NATO’s command Paris would be sidelined. Also, Turkish sources later explained that they insisted on a broad-based participation in the London Conference so that the operations would not be perceived as exclusively Western (www.haber7.com, March 25).

    Attending the London Conference on Tuesday, where an agreement to continue operations was reached, Davutoglu reiterated Turkey’s position. Turkey would not participate in combat operations or airstrikes but it would take a role in the provision of humanitarian assistance and the enforcement of an arms embargo (www.ntvmsnbc.com, March 29). Earlier, Erdogan announced that Turkey would also take control of Benghazi airport to ensure the delivery of aid. Erdogan called for an end to military operations and asked for an immediate ceasefire. Arguing that Turkey maintained communication with not only the Gaddafi regime but also the rebel forces, he added that Ankara could mediate a ceasefire (Anadolu Ajansi, March 28).

    As Erdogan emphasized repeatedly in his justification of Turkish policy, he is against placing the country in a position where it would be forced to take military action against another Muslim nation. Here, he constantly refers to the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan, where miscalculated US interventions resulted in the destruction of the country and killing of innocent civilians, and Turkey’s decoupling from US policy gained him popularity at home and abroad. Turkey’s removal of its objections to NATO’s involvement also shows that it still values its partnership with the West and can prioritize Alliance unity. Ankara took seriously the intervention by President Obama and as in other crises with NATO it did not abandon its ally altogether.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-balances-its-ties-with-west-and-islamic-world-in-libya-operation/

     

  • Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?

    Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?

    Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?

    by Şaban Kardaş

    Today’s Zaman, 20 March 2011, Sunday

    Turkey’s policy on Libya so far has drawn criticism from many angles, most notably due to the growing dissonance between Ankara and the international community on the issue of pursuing coercive policies against the Gaddafi regime’s use of brutal force against its own people to crack down first on the peaceful demonstrations and later the uprising across the country.
    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other Turkish officials have expressed opposition to imposing sanctions on Libya, as the United Nations Security Council was evaluating the unfolding crisis. Later, as the attention shifted towards the establishment of a no-fly zone or even a military intervention against the Gaddafi forces, Turkey again objected to those calls.

    Against this background, it is often possible to hear criticism that Turkey is pursuing immoral policies or taking a pro-Gaddafi stance. Interestingly, however, Erdoğan not only claims that Turkey is in fact the only country that follows moral politics in this case, but he also maintains that the Western powers contemplating coercive policies against Libya are driven by material interests. There is indeed a dilemma here: How come a country claiming to follow an ethical approach to the crisis has been against the actions whose declared aim is to end the crimes against humanity perpetrated by Gaddafi forces?

    One can point to various reasons why Turkey is openly opposed to a more robust international reaction to the Gaddafi regime. As some Turkish diplomatic sources underline, in a situation where Turkey has investments in the country worth billions of dollars and many Turkish citizens have been stranded in Libya, it would not be wise to take a clear side in the unfolding civil war between the Gaddafi regime and the opposition forces. One can sympathize with this argument, for above all, the Turkish government is obliged to protect the interests of its own citizens and cannot be expected to take any action which might put them in harm’s way. Moreover, one can also debate the justifiability of military action on practical grounds. Indeed, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu made such an argument when he stated his reservations to a military option, saying that it would make the situation even worse and that a foreign military presence would not be welcome by the Libyan people, including the leaders of the rebellion against Gaddafi. From a realpolitik point of view, these are all plausible arguments, and many other Western leaders have utilized similar justifications.

    Yet, one is puzzled by Erdoğan’s statements on the subject, which makes one think that there is more to Turkey’s objections to sanctions or a no-fly zone. Erdoğan’s position is rather categorical in the sense that his opposition is not based necessarily on the content of the policy instruments under consideration. For instance, when he said he was against the introduction of sanctions because they would hurt the Libyan people and that sanctions would never work, there was in fact nothing in the list of sanctions approved by the UN Security Council to harm the Libyan people per se. They targeted the Gaddafi regime and called for an investigation into the violations of human rights. Similarly, on the issue of using military instruments or inviting NATO to play a role in such a scenario, Erdoğan again raised a categorical objection. He not only maintained that a military option would create more trouble, he also questioned the involvement of NATO. For him, intervention in Libya will not be NATO’s business, as its only task is to protect member states. This was quite a puzzling statement coming from a Turkish leader, if one recalls that it was Turkey that advocated NATO’s humanitarian interventions in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. Although no NATO member was under attack, Turkey worked hard to convince the alliance to intervene in Bosnia and later Kosovo to protect its coreligionists against the Serbian forces. This is quite a dramatic change, indeed.

    ‘The seduction by analogy’

    Such categorical objections raised by Turkish leaders suggest that they might partly be suffering from what Yuen Foong Khong once called “the seduction by analogy” problem. Analogies guide the thinking of leaders in crisis situations. When confronted with a situation full of unknowns, many decision makers relate the crisis at hand to past instances that have resemblance to the case at hand. When carefully selected, analogies in fact are useful tools; for instance, they might help reduce the time for processing information and choose the right policy responses. However, analogies may also result in disastrous foreign policy decisions. Decision makers may resort to analogies as an excuse to avoid investing the necessary time to study the particularities of each case. Moreover, once formed, analogies can become self-perpetuating myths and act as mental shortcuts, in that decision makers may be seduced to interpret new developments under the light of familiar experiences from the past. As a result, more often than not, the lessons drawn from past analogies are applied to new cases without careful consideration of the underlying differences and similarities.

    A close examination of Erdoğan and other Turkish officials’ statements on Libya shows that the analogies they often resort to are the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. The misguided American interventions in these two cases and the resulting destruction have affected the thinking of Turkish leaders in the last decade. For years, Turkish leaders have watched how sanctions imposed on the Saddam regime produced nothing but misery for the Iraqi people. Moreover, having spent much of their energy on addressing the threats and risks created by the US military interventions, Turkish decision makers have grown increasingly skeptical of the ability of the international community to implement military instruments. This formative experience has bred an aversion against foreign involvement which has come to be seen as a source of humanitarian tragedy and regional instability.

    The analogies of Afghanistan and Iraq have shaped Turkey’s thinking in recent years, when foreign involvement in Turkey’s neighborhood was up for debate. A large part of Turkey’s opposition to US policy on Iran is based on the negative lessons drawn from these two experiences. Turkey’s thinly veiled opposition to American assistance to Georgia during the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 was also affected by the same mode of thinking on foreign intervention. It seems the same analogies are at work again and have come to determine Turkey’s position on Libya as well. At the same time, the use of such analogies, blended with anti-imperialistic rhetoric, resonate well with the Turkish public, which has turned increasingly nationalistic.

    What is at stake in Libya is the risk that the unfolding civil war might take a dramatic turn and warrant an international military action that might fall under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Although Turkey has taken part in humanitarian interventions in the past, it has failed to develop a principled position, and its approach has evolved case-by-case. Short of any principled position on humanitarian intervention, Turkish leaders are easily seduced to follow analogies that happen to fit to their domestic political agenda. However, they need to engage in a serious reconsideration as to whether they are using the right analogies in Libya, and whether Bosnia or Kosovo would not be better fits. More importantly, if they are serious about pursuing moral politics, they need to come to terms with cosmopolitan ideas and formulate a principled position on humanitarian intervention, independent of contextual factors.

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