Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    Understanding the Turkish-Israeli row

    by Şaban Kardaş*

    The deterioration of the relationship between Turkey and Israel has become a conspicuous element not only of Turkey’s foreign policy but also the overall course of recent affairs in the Middle East, raising questions about the future of the region’s security.
    The most immediate issue of contention in the relationship is Turkey’s demand that Israel apologize and compensate appropriately for the killing of eight Turkish citizens and one Turkish-American by Israeli commandos aboard the Mavi Marmara humanitarian aid ship in May 2010. The ship was part of a flotilla which was trying to break Israel’s naval blockade of the Gaza Strip and raise awareness of the humanitarian tragedy caused by the blockade. A proper explanation of the causes of the current stalemate, however, requires going beyond this singular event and undertaking a more nuanced analysis into the underlying dynamics shaping Turkish-Israeli relations in recent years, which also paved the way for the Mavi Marmara raid and the subsequent rapid deterioration of bilateral ties.

    The Mavi Marmara incident and the ensuing crisis grew out of a complex background characterized by the Turkish government’s constant criticism, increasing in recent years, of Israel’s Palestinian policies, which especially gained momentum after Israel’s brutal offensive into the Gaza Strip in the winter of 2008-2009. Other events in the intervening period, including the Davos incident and “low chair” crisis, only accelerated the tensions. Efforts to find a solution through mediation or secretly discussing the ways in which Israel could issue an apology to Turkey failed.

    Given the high-level domestic stakes involved, both parties refrained from backing down and instead opted to continue their confrontational approach. Apparently, given their lack of urgency about reaching a compromise, they must also have calculated strategically that they could tolerate the costs of a breakdown in the relationship.

    Looking at the Palmer report

    Complicating matters further, the conclusions reached in the Palmer report, commissioned by the UN secretary-general to bridge the parties’ competing claims, have to the contrary risked deepening the divisions. The report’s controversial findings not only undermined Turkey’s efforts to internationalize the issue but also argued dubiously for the legality of the naval blockade of Gaza. In response, Turkey announced a series of punitive measures, intended to hold Israel accountable for the Mavi Marmara incident and challenge the legality of the blockade. Turkey’s statement that it would deploy its navy to ensure safe passage in the eastern Mediterranean was arguably the most contentious measure, as it could potentially escalate into a direct military confrontation.

    To understand Turkey’s perspective in the sequence of events culminating in the current standoff, one must look at a number of interrelated factors pertaining to the transformations of the strategic outlook of the Turkish foreign policy elite towards the new Middle East, and Israel’s role and place in it.

    First, Turkey has been working to redefine its priorities in response to what it perceived as a shift in the regional balance of power to its advantage. Second, Turkey viewed the declining influence and power of the United States, as well as President Barack Obama’s promise of a new American foreign policy in the Middle East, as an opportunity for regional powers to assert their influence. Third, and related to these points, Turkey has operated on the assumption that it has not only more space in which to maneuver but also a greater ability to develop autonomous policies in the region. Fourth, Turkey’s perception of threats from the Middle East has declined, reflected in the famous “zero problems with neighbors” policy, as Turkey pursued economic and political rapprochement with countries in the region.

    All these interrelated factors have coalesced in ways which have fostered a perception on the part of Turkish decision makers that a new Middle East is being built, one that is based on justice, equality and freedom, whereas Israel, with its power-based policies, remains stuck in a mentality representing the old Middle East. Turkish leaders saw themselves tasked with a project to build a peaceful and stable regional order based on principles of cooperative security, economic interdependence and universal moral standards. In this environment, the state of exception that Israel represented in the region, as reflected in Israel’s unjust policy toward the Palestinians, its defiance of UN decisions, its noncompliance with the non-proliferation regime and its protection by the US, was construed as an obstacle to Turkey’s regional aspirations. Unable to adapt to the new reality, Israel, in the Turkish perception, has increasingly isolated itself in the region and emerged as the source of regional instability.

    Believing that Israel can no longer afford to act in a business-as-usual fashion in the new Middle East, Turkey has moved to adopt moral politics, seeking to correct Israel’s policies. Consequently, the shared ground and joint strategic outlooks that enabled the Turkish-Israeli partnership of the 1990s has been replaced by a rather confrontational and competitive dynamic, which provide the background for the recent successive crises, especially since 2008. Through its moral politics, Turkey hoped that it could publicize Israel’s inhumane treatment of the Palestinians in various international forums, make it accountable before the international community, and eventually force it to recognize the Palestinians’ rights. Turkey somehow hoped the new foreign policy vision promised by the Obama administration would facilitate its pursuit of a moral politics with regard to Israel.

    Unwilling to yield to Turkey’s new posture, however, Israel refused to back down. At the same time, the complex dynamics of Israeli domestic politics limited the prospects for a negotiated settlement with Turkey, including some form of an apology and compensation to the victims of the Mavi Marmara raid. In this environment, Turkey’s insistence on linking the Mavi Marmara dispute with its demand that the Gaza blockade be lifted further pitted the two countries against each other, as the Israeli side was apparently unconvinced that the closure of the Mavi Marmara incident alone would settle the dispute. Last but not least, though the United States has not come out against Turkey’s increasingly assertive stance against Israel, it has not joined Turkey’s bandwagon either, rendering Turkey’s moral politics largely ineffective. The declining influence of the US has in effect meant that there is no actor capable of mediating between the parties. Turkey’s constructive role in the recent Hamas-Israel prison swap deal and its implementation raised expectations that the Turkish-Israeli tension might ease, as well. After all the events that have transpired, however, there will be no easy going back, and it will be hard to salvage the relationship without a significant transformation in the strategic outlooks of both sides. Turkey expects Israel to change drastically, which is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.

    *Şaban Kardaş is an assistant professor of international relations at TOBB University of Economics and Technology in Ankara.

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  • Arab Spring Sees Turkish-Iranian Rivalry Take a New Turn

    Arab Spring Sees Turkish-Iranian Rivalry Take a New Turn

    Arab Spring Sees Turkish-Iranian Rivalry Take a New Turn

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 186

    October 11, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s decision to host a NATO early warning radar in the US-led missile defense program continues to reverberate, especially for its relations with Iran. High ranking Iranian officials repeatedly criticize not only Turkey’s cooperation with the United States on the missile shield, but also Ankara’s recent foreign policy initiatives. These include the Turkish government’s efforts to set a model for the transformation of the regional countries in the wake of the Arab Spring, Ankara advocating a two-state solution for the Palestinian problem, or its increasingly assertive position on Syria.

    The decision on radar deployment apparently was a tipping point for Iranian officials, who now vocally criticize Turkey on a myriad of issues (EDM, September 20). Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said during a live TV interview that Iranian officials told their Turkish counterparts it was wrong to grant such permission and it would not benefit Turkey , October 5). Major-General Yahya Rahim-Safavi, the military advisor to the Iranian supreme religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, also maintained that Turkey had recently committed various strategic mistakes and would pay a heavy price if it failed to change course (Hurriyet, October 9). The Deputy Head of Iran’s Armed Forces’ Joint Chiefs of Staff Brigadier-General Massoud Jazayeri joined the wave of protest and urged Turkey to rethink its long-term strategic interests and side with Muslim nations instead of the West (www.presstv.ir, October 10).

    Iranian officials criticize Turkey on a range of issues of substantial importance. First, Iranian leaders increasingly label the missile shield as a project that is designed to boost Israel’s security against a counter-attack from Iran in case Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, considering that Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan repeatedly rebuff such claims, which were also raised by Turkish opposition parties, it appears that the Iranian campaign is driven by a concern to discredit Turkey in the eyes of regional countries.

    In order to contextualize Iran’s accusations against Turkey, it might be useful to recall Erdogan’s recent criticism of Israel’s nuclear program. As late as last week, Erdogan continued his recent criticism of Israel, going as far as arguing that he saw Israel as a threat to the region and surrounding countries, because it possessed the atomic bomb. Moreover, Erdogan raised a related criticism, when he pointed to the double standards of world powers: while Iran came under international scrutiny because of its nuclear program, there had been a lack of comparable debate on Israel’s nuclear weapons (Anadolu Ajansi, October 5). Iranian officials’ lambasting of Turkey through manipulative accounts, despite Erdogan’s staunch position on Israel at the expense of harming relations with the West, reveals their intent and approach toward Turkey.

    Iranian officials have recently expressed differences of opinion on the Palestine issue. Erdogan’s stance on Israel’s treatment of Palestinians has not necessarily contributed to forging common ground with Iran. Erdogan devoted a large portion of his address at the UN General Assembly last month to the rights of the Palestinians, supporting their bid for recognition. While Turkey has invested a great deal of political capital advocating a two-state solution in international venues, Khamenei, in a recent address at an international conference on the Palestinian Intifada, labeled this formula as tantamount to capitulation to the demands of “Zionists.” Rejecting the Palestinians’ bid for statehood at the UN, Khamenei argued that any solution based on the recognition of Israel’s right of existence would threaten the stability and security of the Middle East. Describing Iran as the greatest defender of the Palestinians, Khamenei criticized other regional powers that maintain close relations with Washington , October 1).

    Moreover, Turkish-Iranian divergence exists in an undeclared rivalry for regional leadership over the Arab Spring. For some time this rivalry was only evident in the realm of speculation by analysts. While Iran has been working to put its imprint on the regional transformation, by labeling the popular uprisings as an “Islamic awakening,” Turkish government sources or analysts close to the government have highlighted how Turkey’s democratic and capitalist model inspired the Arab revolutions. Perhaps in the first ever direct affirmation of this rivalry, Rahim-Safavi criticized Erdogan’s recent visit to the region. In Cairo, Erdogan stressed a secular-democratic form of government, which seems to have angered the Iranian leadership, sparking their more direct confrontation with Turkey.

    A related area of tension is over competing positions on the Syrian uprising. Faced with the continuation of the Baath regime’s violent campaign to suppress the popular uprising, Turkey has progressively downgraded its ties with Damascus, as well as providing shelter to the Syrian opposition. Turkey’s imposition of sanctions might also negatively affect Damascus’s direct ties to Tehran. Iran, viewing the maintenance of the current regime in Syria as vital to its penetration to Lebanon and Palestine, has grown anxious over Turkey’s policy on Syria, again reflected in Rahim-Safavi’s reactions.

    Some common themes are emerging in Iranian views on Turkey. First, there is a continuous and sustained reaction to Turkey, and it is worth noting that the mounting criticism of the country came from the religious leadership and the Revolutionary Guards. Second, Iranian officials work hard to present Ankara’s recent foreign policy initiatives as simply following the dictates of the US, in order to sustain their oft-repeated argument that they are the only genuine independent power in the region.

    Finally, there is a deliberate attempt to discipline Turkey by sending harsh messages as to how the country should behave. It is unclear whether this rhetoric reflects self-confidence on the part of the Iranian leadership or anxiety over Turkey taking an anti-Iranian position and siding with the US, which might lead to Iran’s isolation in the region. The Iranian side appears ready to exploit economic ties if necessary, in an effort to discipline Turkey. They daringly refer to Turkey’s gas purchase contracts with Iran as well as Ankara’s plans to boost the bilateral trade volume to $20 billion, going as far as sending veiled threats that Ankara might suffer if it fails to reverse its current position and accommodate Iranian concerns.

    https://jamestown.org/program/arab-spring-sees-turkish-iranian-rivalry-take-a-new-turn/

     

  • Turkey Pursues Mixed Aims Over Supply Contract Cancellation With Russia

    Turkey Pursues Mixed Aims Over Supply Contract Cancellation With Russia

    Turkey Pursues Mixed Aims Over Supply Contract Cancellation With Russia

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 182
    October 4, 2011
    By: Saban Kardas
    After the failure of Turkey’s apparently last-ditch effort to renegotiate the price for Russian gas, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz announced Turkey would not renew the supply contract through the “Western pipeline,” scheduled to expire at the end of the year. The contract was originally signed in 1986, which was a major turning point for Turkish-Russian relations, as Turkey went ahead with this deal in Cold War conditions. Since then, Turkey’s energy ties with Russia have flourished, in parallel with the overall improvement of bilateral relations.

    Under the contract, Turkey imports 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas through the Balkans, which is distributed in Istanbul and the surrounding areas. Turkey also has other supply agreements with Gazprom through the same pipeline and the Blue Stream pipeline, and additional supply agreements with Azerbaijan and Iran, as well as importing LNG from Algeria and Nigeria. Granted, Turkey’s imports from Russia account for almost two-thirds of its total gas consumption.

    In addition to its concerns over the strategic liability generated by this overdependence, Turkey has raised several demands vis-à-vis Gazprom for some time. Ankara has confronted the problem of over-contracting, which emerged as a major issue following the contraction of its energy consumption in the wake of the global financial crisis. As Turkey had to incur penalties resulting from take-or-pay provisions, it has been demanding an easing of the supply terms. Moreover, given the calculation indexes linking gas and oil prices, Turkey, along with other importers, has been complaining about the hike in its energy bills. Again, Turkey’s demand for price revision has largely fallen on deaf ears, which became an issue during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s trip to Moscow earlier this year. His Russian counterparts only deferred the issue for further discussion (EDM, March 18).

    The parties were expected to notify their decision for the cancellation of the 1986 agreement six months prior to the expiration date, or it would be renewed automatically. Gazprom responded positively to Ankara’s request for the postponement of the date for notification to the end of September. Gazprom’s concession to Italy’s ENI in a similar plea partly encouraged BOTAS to expect a similar outcome (Sabah, July 25). Yet, Gazprom, instead, raised the price in its quarterly revision (Radikal, August 10).

    While an agreement was not forthcoming in the lingering talks and the deadline was approaching, Yildiz threatened not to renew the contract, citing a 39 percent increase in prices over the last 29 months. In a swift reaction, Gazprom officials downplayed the minister’s remarks, arguing that they received no confirmation to that effect from BOTAS, which was their partner in Turkey (Hurriyet, September 29; EDM, September 30). However, Gazprom officials apparently undervalued some nuances: after all BOTAS was a public corporation and the Turkish government was very sensitive to energy issues, not to mention the fact that Turkey’s concerns were long on the agenda.

    With the Russian side’s failure to meet the expectation for discounts, Yildiz announced that BOTAS conveyed to its partners the decision to end the contract (Anadolu Ajansi, October 1). While the decision seems to halt about 15 percent of Turkey’s supplies, Yildiz sought to allay concern that it might lead to gas shortages, citing the ongoing supply contracts with Russia and other countries, as well as the import contracts signed by the private sector. Alexander Medvedev, the Director-General of Gazprom Export, also confirmed this development, noting that Gazprom will continue to supply the same volume to Turkish end-users through existing and new customers, including those from the private sector (www.cnnturk.com, October 3).

    This development was possibly sparked by various interrelated considerations, which is hidden in Yildiz’s remarks. First, there seems to be strategic reasoning. Through this move, Turkey wants to send a signal that it is determined to break its over-reliance on natural gas (especially for electricity generation) on the one hand and Russian gas on the other. It is instructive that Yildiz explained in detail how Russia was unresponsive to Turkey’s demands for price revision for a long time, and added that with this move Turkey demonstrated that it was not devoid of options for supply diversification. Granted, for Turkey, Gazprom has been a reliable supplier and will likely remain a major supplier in the years to come. Given that Yildiz also acknowledged that point and added that the private sector would likely sign new contracts with Russia, it seems that this move largely seeks to enhance Turkey’s bargaining position in the future.

    A second and related point suggests that this development is driven by Turkey’s ongoing project of liberalizing its energy markets. In particular, the Turkish government has been criticized for its slow pace in decoupling BOTAS’s transportation grid and its monopoly on imports. Private companies have already secured supply contracts in some instances, and it was reported that Gazprom did not concede to the transfer of contracts to private importers. With this decision, the government hopes private companies will take over the contracts with Gazprom, hopefully on more favorable terms, while simultaneously reducing BOTAS’s market share, which is also a requirement the EU has put before Turkey. It remains to be seen, however, if this move will enhance Turkey’s bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Russia and other suppliers. There is reason to doubt whether private companies bidding for smaller volumes of gas will be able to gain a better bargaining power than what BOTAS has accomplished so far vis-à-vis Gazprom.

    Third, the decision seeks to contain BOTAS’s losses, which has been selling gas to domestic consumers below its actual costs. On the same day that Yildiz announced the termination of the contract, BOTAS issued new prices for residential and industrial consumers, which implied price hikes of over 10 percent. While BOTAS cited the declining value of the Turkish Lira and increases in gas prices in international markets, this major price adjustment came as a shock to consumers. Instead of paying for unused gas, BOTAS had kept the prices constant in order not to curb consumption. The latest price hike, accompanied by efforts to reduce BOTAS’s market share and its take-or-pay obligations, seeks to improve the company’s financial standing, which has been running huge losses due to such practices in gas sales. But Turkish consumers – who became accustomed to this indirect subsidy – are unlikely to welcome the development.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-pursues-mixed-aims-over-supply-contract-cancellation-with-russia/
  • Turkey Threatens Greek Cypriots Against Unilateral Oil and Gas Exploration In the Eastern Mediteranean

    Turkey Threatens Greek Cypriots Against Unilateral Oil and Gas Exploration In the Eastern Mediteranean

    Turkey Threatens Greek Cypriots Against Unilateral Oil and Gas Exploration In the Eastern Mediteranean

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 177
    September 27, 2011 01:53 PM Age: 1 days
    By: Saban Kardas
    Amidst growing concerns about the escalation of Turkish-Israeli tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, Ankara’s decision to undertake seismic exploration for oil and gas – in retaliation for the Greek Cypriot administration’s ongoing exploration activities – further raised tensions in the region. Recently, the Greek Cypriots issued a license to a US firm, Noble Energy, to launch exploratory offshore drilling for gas off Cyprus. Turkey condemned immediately this development, viewing it as an attempt to undermine the rights of Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, since the resumption of reunification talks on the island has recently reappeared on the agenda, Turkey believes this move will be potentially damaging to further diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. Therefore, the Greek Cypriot side should avoid such unilateral provocative actions, and delay discussing drilling projects until after a political solution to the existing division is found (Hurriyet, September 13).

    Later, Ankara went as far as issuing warnings that it would undertake its own exploration work and boost its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, should the Greek Cypriots proceed with their plans. Energy Minister Taner Yildiz also added that the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), in cooperation with a Norwegian firm, was preparing to carry out seismic surveys off Northern Cyprus. To this end, Turkey started talks with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) to conclude a continental shelf delineation accord to determine the areas for exploration (Anadolu Ajansi, September 19).

    Despite Ankara’s threats of retaliation, the first phase of Noble’s drilling activities started on September 18. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reacted harshly to this development, adding that Turkey would dispatch naval and air force assets to the area. While in New York to attend the UN General Assembly, Erdogan raised the issue during his talks with President Barack Obama. More significantly, he signed the continental shelf agreement with the leader of the TRNC, Dervis Eroglu. Erdogan argued “to caution international oil/natural gas companies that have and will undertake business with Greek Cypriots. Our Ministry of Energy is working to ban admission of these companies from energy projects in Turkey and impose a series of sanctions upon them” , September 21). The Greek Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias described Turkey’s actions as provocations and sought to highlight the issue during his address at the UN General Assembly (Hurriyet, September 23).

    In a demonstration of determination, a Turkish ship set off for seismic exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean sea, escorted by frigates and submarines (www.haberturk.com, September 23). As the issue was internationalized and risked militarization, especially coinciding with the UN General Assembly, efforts were made to cool down the tensions. While the Greek side seemed disinterested in Erdogan’s proposal for the simultaneous renouncement of the exploration work, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon also intervened to resolve the dispute. As a more concrete proposal, Eroglu presented to Ban Ki-moon another plan which would involve mutual suspension of such exploration (Anadolu Ajansi, September 25). While Ankara expressed support for this proposal, the Greek Cypriot side has yet to accept it.

    A promising step toward achieving a diplomatic solution was the telephone conversation between Erdogan and his Greek counterpart Yorgo Papendreu. While discussing the agenda for the next high level strategic cooperation council, the two leaders expressed their desire to address bilateral tensions (Anadolu Ajansi, September 26). However, in the absence of any concrete steps by the Greek Cypriots to halting their exploration plans, Yildiz said that the Turkish seismic exploration ship will start its operations today (September 27). Yildiz also added that the TPAO was in touch with the firms interested in carrying out drills in partnership with Turkey (Cihan, September 27).

    Exploration of the underwater energy resources around Cyprus has been a matter of controversy for some time, as it has been intermingled with the unresolved Cyprus issue and, by implication, Turkey-EU relations. The EU admitted into membership the government on the Greek part of the island as the sole representative of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004, but Turkey has protested against this decision because it ignored the rights of Turkish Cypriots who established the TRNC as a separate state. Turkey remains the only country to recognize the TRNC, though the Turkish government has supported talks for the reunification of the two communities on the island. However, at least since the collapse of the Annan plan in 2004, which was backed by Turkey, there is a line of thought in Turkish politics that views a two state-formula as the most viable solution for the Cyprus dispute. If the current tensions continue to escalate, with each side carrying out unilateral drilling projects, this development might de facto pave the way for a two-state solution. Whether the Turkish government has moved in the direction of adopting such a position remains to be seen.

    At the same time, Ankara’s refusal to recognize the Greek Cypriot administration’s claim for full sovereignty over the island poses a major obstacle to the Turkish bid for EU membership, further complicating the issue. Turkey has sought to delay the exploration of energy resources by linking it to the resolution of the dispute, which has angered the Greek Cypriot side. For instance, in protest over what it viewed as Turkey’s veiled threats against exploring their energy resources in the Mediterranean, the Greek Cypriot administration has been vetoing the opening of the Turkish-EU accession talks in energy and other chapters. As Turkey reacts to such policies, Turkish-EU relations have already become deadlocked.

    Only recently, Erdogan threatened to freeze Turkey’s relations with the EU, if the Greek Cypriot government is allowed to assume the EU presidency in 2012 before a political settlement is found on the future of the island (Anadolu Ajansi, July 20). Such statements by Turkish leaders continue to present obstacles to Turkey’s EU accession process, which is already stalled due to numerous issues. However, Ankara’s brinkmanship over the drilling issue shows that it is increasingly unconcerned with the EU’s negative reactions, perhaps indicating the degree to which Turkey is keen to pursue unilateral policies in the Eastern Mediterranean.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-threatens-greek-cypriots-against-unilateral-oil-and-gas-exploration-in-the-eastern-mediteranean/
  • Turkey Risks Confrontation With Iran Over NATO Missile Shield

    Turkey Risks Confrontation With Iran Over NATO Missile Shield

    Turkey Risks Confrontation With Iran Over NATO Missile Shield

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 172
    September 20, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey has signed a memorandum with the United States on the deployment of a US radar station in the country, which will form part of the missile defense shield project to boost the protection of NATO members against potential missile threats from the East. Earlier this month, the Turkish foreign ministry confirmed that preparations had reached the final stage, and Turkey would host early warning radar to contribute to the Alliance’s missile defense system. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stressed that as part of the integrated NATO project, Turkey will host only radar components, and no interceptors would be installed in the country (NTV, September 4). Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan also maintained that after very detailed examination by the Turkish armed forces and foreign ministry, and broad-based consultation at cabinet level, they decided to proceed with the project, as it would enhance the country’s security (Anadolu Ajansi, September 6).

    On September 14, the Turkish press publicized the signing of the memorandum by the foreign ministry under-secretary Feridun Sinirlioglu and US Ambassador to Turkey Francis Ricciardone concerning the deployment of the radar at a military base in eastern Turkey, which is expected to be operational by the end of the year. The onsite security at the radar station will be provided by around 50 US personnel, while the area will be protected by the Turkish armed forces. The Turkish foreign ministry also confirmed these developments: “site surveys and the necessary legal regulations have been concluded, and the installation of the radar at a military facility in Kurecik has been decided” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, www.mfa.gov.tr, September 14, Cihan, September 19).

    The radars in Turkey, together with interceptors in Romania and Poland and missile launchers based on warships in the Mediterranean, will be part of the defensive system to protect NATO members against potential missile attacks. When the shield was endorsed by the Alliance at the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2010, it was surrounded by many controversies. Concerns over the feasibility and financing of the project aside, the most controversial aspect was Turkey’s reservations about it, which cast doubt on the future of the system (EDM, October 21, 2010).

    At the time, Turkey worked hard to ensure that Iran was not singled out as the country against which the system was developed, fearing that such a development would damage its ties with its neighbors with whom it had forged stronger relations. Over several months of discussion prior to the summit, Turkey even threatened to veto the project, leading to tensions in US-Turkish relations. Ankara later dropped its objections, arguing that the project would also boost its efforts to acquire defensive capabilities against increasing threats from ballistic missiles. Though Turkey claimed credit for preventing Iran from being named in the Lisbon declaration, Western political and military officials have made no secret of the fact that Iran’s missile capability and nuclear program was the main source of concern triggering this project.

    Iran has expressed its uneasiness over these developments. When Turkey first announced that it would go ahead with the plans, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi criticized the project. “The West claims the radar system [in Turkey] is to confront Iranian missiles, but they should be aware that we will not tolerate any aggression against our national interests,” Vahidi said (Hurriyet Daily News, September 7). Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson, Ramin Mehmanparast, joined the criticism, noting that “We expect friendly countries and neighbors…not to promote policies that create tension and which will definitely have complicated consequences… Iran condemns any action that creates an arms race in the world and region” (www.worldbulletin.com, September 8). Likewise, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also warned Turkey against this development: “Turkey is among our brothers and sincere friends, but when enemies deploy a missile system there and admit that it is against Iran, we should be careful” (www.farsnews.com, September 17).

    The agreement is proving to be controversial domestically. Amongst Turkish public opinion, there is widespread perception fed by speculative newspaper reports that the missile shield is being built to protect Israel. Main opposition party representatives also express similar views, accusing the government of signing an agreement that would protect Israel, which Erdogan refuted as nonsensical (Anadolu Ajansi, September 6). As a NATO partner, Israel arguably seeks to be protected by the system, while US officials express willingness to fuse information obtained through the radars in Turkey and Israel for greater operability of the system. Yet, Davutoglu insisted that the information gathered through the radar station would not be shared with Israel. Moreover, he stated that Turkey used its veto threat to thwart Israel’s attempt to open an office at NATO Headquarters in Brussels under NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue program (CNN Turk, September 18).

    The Turkish government wants to signal that it remains steadfast in its policy of isolating Israel rather than simply bowing to pressure from Washington to deploy radars on Turkish soil. Instead, the government conveys the message that Turkey willingly participates in the project, because it deems the system vital for its own security. Yet, so far Iran appears unconvinced by this interpretation and might risk a confrontation with Turkey over the issue.

    The extent to which Iran reacts to Turkey’s move remains to be seen. But, Iran’s reference to “escalation” is important in many ways. Part of Iran’s military strategy is based on using its missile program as deterrence against attack by the United States and Israel. If the missile shield project is fully developed, it will reduce the utility of Iran’s missile system, perhaps forcing it to boost its strike capacity, hence triggering an arms race. This is certainly a scenario Turkey wants to avoid, and it will have to tread carefully to allay Iran’s anxiety. However, at a time when Turkey and the United States appear to be working closely in the Middle East, Ankara will likely find it difficult to convince Tehran.

    In contrast, the decision on the basing of the radars signifies a major turning point in US-Turkish relations, as part of Turkey’s broader strategic reorientation of its Middle East policies in a direction in tune with its senior ally. After years of rather confrontational relations, Ankara and Washington are now going through a much more cooperative phase in the region, using also the momentum generated by overlapping policies in response to the Arab Spring.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-risks-confrontation-with-iran-over-nato-missile-shield/

  • Turkey Seeks to Internationalize Mavi Marmara Dispute With Israel

    Turkey Seeks to Internationalize Mavi Marmara Dispute With Israel

    Turkey Seeks to Internationalize Mavi Marmara Dispute With Israel

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 163
    September 7, 2011
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkey has announced various measures, in an effort to punish Israel for its failure to meet its demands for the Mavi Marmara incident last year, in which nine Turkish citizens were killed by Israeli soldiers. Ankara’s decision came on the eve of the announcement of the Palmer Commission’s report on the incident, established by the United Nations to investigate the competing claims by the parties. Previously, the announcement of the report was postponed for several months in the hope that it could be fine-tuned to live up to both sides’ expectations, and a diplomatic solution could be orchestrated to dampen tensions. While the report was finally due to be officially announced on Friday, it was leaked to the US press, which sparked Ankara’s reaction.

    Though Turkey’s move appeared sudden, it has been in the works for some time. Since the Mavi Marmara incident, on the one hand, the Turkish government has made an apology an essential condition for normalizing relations with Israel, and, on the other hand, it questioned the legality of the Gaza blockade. Israel’s refusal to compromise on both points has gradually deteriorated Turkish-Israeli relations, raising concerns in Washington over the implications of the rift between the two key US allies. Meanwhile, its inability to persuade Israel to change position has put the Turkish government in a difficult position domestically, as nationalist forces have criticized it for failing to protect the nation’s interests and prestige.

    Though severing bilateral ties through the initiation of some low-key measures, Turkey’s strategy was based on the internationalization of the issue to the extent possible to make Israel accountable before the international community. The initial statement from the UN Security Council and the Goldstone Report on the Gaza conflict released in September 2009 were in line with Turkey’s position. Turkey, thus, invested high hopes on the Palmer Commission’s inquiry, expecting that a decision favoring its position will result in confirmation of the nonconformity of the Gaza embargo with international law, and further generate worldwide pressure on Israel, forcing it to accommodate Turkey’s demand for apology.

    While waiting for the conclusion of the Palmer Commission’s work, the Turkish government considered more forceful measures against Israel, since the indications were such that the report might fail to live up to Ankara’s expectations (EDM, May 19). Moreover, although attempts were underway to find a negotiated solution –four secret talks in six sessions were held- and there was even speculation that the Israeli government was considering an apology, this process did not seem promising, either. Days before the submission of the Palmer report to the UN Secretary-General last month, Tel Aviv made it clear to Washington that it would not issue an apology, to which Ankara responded by saying that Turkey would go ahead with forceful measures, should Israel fail to apologize, pay compensation to the victims, and end the blockade (Radikal, August 17).

    As a head-on collision became imminent, Washington was reportedly seeking ways to avert a total collapse of the Turkish-Israeli relationship. Having managed to reestablish a collegial working relationship with Washington in the context of the Arab Spring, Ankara was keen to give a chance to Washington’s efforts. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reportedly agreed to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s last-ditch offer to postpone the report until the end of September during their face-to-face meeting in Paris. However, the leak of the report to the US media a few hours later angered Turkish leaders, who interpreted this development as the work of the Israeli lobby, seeking to undermine any prospects of a compromise deal including some form of apology (www.ntvmsnbc.com, September 3).

    The tipping point was naturally the content of the report, as it was in disagreement with the Turkish theses. While the report described the Israeli use of force as excessive and unreasonable, it also found Turkey and the organizers of the flotilla partly responsible for what happened aboard the Mavi Marmara. Making no mention of an apology, the report asked Israel to make only “an appropriate statement of regret … in respect of the incident in light of its consequences,” and pay “a sufficient amount” to the injured and the victims’ families. The report also found Israel’s blockade to be a legitimate security measure.

    Turkish leaders denounced the report, maintaining that it would not be a binding UN document, and for Turkey it was non-existent (www.tccb.gov.tr, September 3). Davutoglu outlined a five-point strategy, which Turkey hopes will make Israel pay for the incident. First, diplomatic ties with Israel will be downgraded to a second-secretary level. Second, all military agreements with Israel will be suspended. Third, Turkey will take all measures deemed necessary to ensure the safety of maritime navigation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Fourth, renouncing Israel’s right to the Gaza blockade, Turkey will work to mobilize the UN General Assembly to bring this issue before the International Court of Justice. Fifth, Turkey will support legal action against Israel to be undertaken by the families of Mavi Marmara victims (Anadolu Ajansi, September 2). The Israeli side welcomed the report and insisted that they would not apologize and continue to enforce the blockade, signaling their readiness to face the consequences of Turkey’s precautions and confront Ankara where necessary (www.ntvmsnbc.com, September 4).

    As Turkey seeks not only retribution for the Mavi Marmara incident but also correction of Israel’s policy towards the Palestinians, to which Israel obviously will continue to object, these developments risk leaving irreparable damage to bilateral ties. The most critical aspect of Ankara’s intended measures appears to be the decision to boost the Turkish naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean for the purpose of ensuring safe navigation. Taken together with Turkey’s rejection of the Gaza blockade, it might risk escalation of the crisis into a direct military confrontation. Moreover, Turkey’s preparation to bring Israel before the International Court of Justice will also further heighten the tensions on the political front. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s plans to visit Gaza as well as the upcoming vote on Palestinian statehood at the UN General Assembly will only aggravate these tensions.

    Whether Turkish-Israeli relations can be salvaged and who will mediate between the sides remain more uncertain than ever, and surprisingly the United States could exert little influence, if any, on both sides. But one thing remains certain: Turkey has so far failed to internationalize its disputes with Israel and will perhaps have difficulty in achieving this in the coming weeks.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-seeks-to-internationalize-mavi-marmara-dispute-with-israel/