Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program

    Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program

    Turkey Wants to Resume Talks on Iranian Nuclear Program

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 6
    January 10, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, paid a crucial visit to Tehran on January 6, amidst the increasing confrontation between Iran and the West. The visit mainly provided an opportunity to address bilateral issues, as it followed a heated debate in recent months which questions whether Turkey and Iran were involved in an undeclared rivalry in the Arab Spring. The two countries’ diverging positions on Syria, Turkey’s decision to host NATO’s early warning radar, as well as differences on the Palestinians’ quest for recognition, arguably pitted the two against each other. The confrontational mood was further worsened by harsh statements against Turkey by Iranian politicians and high-ranking officials (EDM, October 11, 2011).

    As such statements even led to direct threats voiced by some Iranian lawmakers and military officers, indicating that Iran might take military action against NATO facilities in Turkey, Davutoglu was prompted to convey his uneasiness and demand an explanation. Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, visited Ankara in an effort to allay Ankara’s growing concerns. Reiterating the two countries’ friendship, Salehi sought to assure his Turkish counterpart that such remarks reflected personal opinions and did not represent official Iranian policy on Turkey (Anadolu Ajansi, December 14, 2011).

    Ankara also downplayed such threatening remarks as personal opinions, in an effort to maintain channels for dialogue with Tehran. Though not hiding the differences of opinion on regional issues, Davutoglu and other Turkish officials prefer to focus on issues of converging views and continue to view Tehran as a major stakeholder in the region whose cooperation is essential. More importantly, Davutoglu is keen to reassure his Iranian counterparts that Turkey will not take part in any direct military action against Iran, which seems as a calculated move to comfort Tehran and convince it to steer away from the path of escalation.

    With such considerations in mind, Davutoglu paid a working visit to Iran on January 6, to meet Salehi and other Iranian officials. Davutoglu worked hard to stress the defensive nature of the ballistic missile shield and reiterated that Turkey would not let its territory be used in any attack against Iran. The two ministers also agreed to continue to discuss regional issues, and meet at least twice each year (Anadolu Ajansi, January 5).

    Beyond the immediate Turkish-Iranian frictions, Davutoglu addressed a number of regional issues with Iran. Foregoing the speculations of rivalry, Davutoglu invited his Iranian counterparts to work together in order to address the escalating tensions in the region, which some claim could lead to Sunni-Shiite sectarian divisions. In the last two days, because the uprising in Syria, the ongoing political crisis in Iraq, and the situation in Bahrain involve some sectarian elements, Davutoglu increasingly refers to an imminent danger of sectarian conflict and warns against a new Cold War in the Middle East (Dogan, January 8).

    Moreover, the uncertain future of the dispute over the Iranian nuclear program, especially in view of US sanctions policy and the Iranian brinkmanship in the Strait of Hormuz is a growing concern for Turkey. Ankara recognizes Iran’s right to develop peaceful nuclear technology, but also invites the country to be more transparent about its ongoing program and allay concerns on the part of Western powers.

    Since the talks held between Iran and the P5+1 in Istanbul one year ago, diplomatic channels were largely closed. In order to push things forward on that front, Davutoglu seems to have attempted shuttle diplomacy. In the wake of his Tehran trip, he announced that he was in touch with Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign policy chief, on this issue. Davutoglu raised expectations by maintaining that both parties were ready to resume nuclear talks in Turkey. Earlier, Salehi also expressed his readiness to return to nuclear talks in a suitable time and venue agreed upon by the parties, adding that Turkey would be the best option (Anadolu Ajansi, January 8). Commenting on this development, US State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, said that the US remained in consultation with Turkey over Davutoglu’s trip and agrees with Turkey’s goal of bringing Iran back to the negotiating table and complying with its international obligations, though they might differ on tactics. She also emphasized Washington’s readiness to resume discussions, though adding that Iran has yet to formally convey its decision to start the talks (Today’s Zaman, January 7).

    Adding urgency to the matter, the United States and its European allies are initiating a new wave of sanctions to pressure Iran on the economic front. The sanctions recently approved by President Barack Obama involve penalizing the financial institutions doing business with Iran as well as halting oil imports from Iran, by targeting its Central Bank. Turkey abides by the sanctions regime introduced by the UN Security Council in the summer of 2010, but refuses to implement the unilateral Western sanctions on the grounds that they are non-binding. However, there has been growing US expectation for Turkey to join the new sanctions, while Ankara seeks an exemption, given its oil and gas imports from Iran, requiring it to work with Iranian financial institutions.

    A visit by a US delegation led by Deputy Secretary of State, William Burns, to Ankara on January 9, offered an opportunity to discuss these issues. During his talks with Turkish officials, the US delegation, among others, solicited Turkey’s support for unilateral sanctions. Prior to the meeting, some senior US Congressmen and diplomats visited Turkish government officials and bureaucrats, underscoring the importance attached to this issue (Haberturk, January 9).

    Commenting on the visit, Nuland dismissed the argument that Turkey opposes US policy on Iran. She emphasized that the US acknowledges Turkey’s sensitivities given Ankara’s trade ties, but the two sides will continue their dialogue on how to maximize the pressures on Iran to force it to comply with its international obligations (Haberturk, January 10). Turkish sources also reported that Ankara does not want to see a further escalation of the already heightened tensions in the region (Sabah, January 10).

    Uneasy at the growing escalation, Ankara seeks to dampen tensions through a reassertion of its facilitator role and engaging the parties, without taking any side. Once again, Turkey is walking a diplomatic tightrope due to its difficult neighbor’s relations with the West.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-wants-to-resume-talks-on-iranian-nuclear-program/
  • Turkey Reiterates Commitment to Southern Corridor with Trans-Anatolia Pipeline

    Turkey Reiterates Commitment to Southern Corridor with Trans-Anatolia Pipeline

    Turkey Reiterates Commitment to Southern Corridor with Trans-Anatolia Pipeline

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 1
    January 3, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of understanding that will facilitate the transit of Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe, changing the calculations over the EU-backed Southern Corridor concept. In October 2011, the two countries signed numerous agreements regulating the volume and price for Turkey’s gas imports from Azerbaijan as well as the transit terms for Azerbaijani gas exports to Europe through Turkish territory (EDM, November 1, 2011). Among these documents they agreed to work on a dedicated pipeline that will transport gas from the second phase of the Shah Deniz gas field through a pipeline from Turkey’s eastern frontier to its western border, in addition to using the existing Turkish grid for transiting Azerbaijani gas.

    On December 26, 2011, Turkey’s Energy Minister Taner Yildiz and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Natig Aliyev, signed a memorandum of understanding on the construction of the Trans-Anadolu natural gas pipeline. The Trans-Anadolu consortium will be formed by the State Oil and Gas Company (SOCAR) and Turkey’s BOTAS and TPAO. While the Azerbaijani side will hold 80 percent of the shares, the Turkish participants will control the remaining 20 percent, but the stakes might change over time, as the consortium will be open to participation by other international energy companies. The construction work is scheduled to start in 2012 and be completed in 2017, when the Shah Deniz-II is also expected to become operational. The pipeline will have an initial annual capacity of 16 billion cubic meters (bcm), which could be increased to 24 bcm. The 6 bcm capacity will be used for consumption in Turkey’s western regions, while the rest of the throughput will constitute Azerbaijan’s exports to Europe. Since Turkey will retain the re-export rights for its imports from Azerbaijan, the total volume of gas available for European markets could increase depending on the market conditions. Though the construction costs will be determined after feasibility studies, Yildiz estimated these costs at around $5 billion (Anadolu Ajansi, December 26, 2011).

    This development raises many interrelated issues about the future of bilateral relations, as well as the EU’s Southern Corridor project seeking to diversify European natural gas supplies tapping into Caspian basin reserves.

    With this decision, Turkey and Azerbaijan took another step to cement their evolving strategic partnership, while Ankara also reconfirmed its Baku-centered South Caucasus policy. Energy occupies a major place in both countries’ ambitious foreign policy agendas. While Azerbaijan is eager to capitalize on its developing hydrocarbon reserves to emerge as a major regional actor in the South Caucasus, Turkey has sought to use its geographic location as an asset to establish itself as a major transportation corridor for oil and gas from the Caspian basin and Central Asia as well as the Middle East.

    Given Azerbaijan’s need for a reliable export route and Turkey’s interest in sustainable throughput to feed its ambitions to become an energy hub, there are economic and strategic imperatives forcing the two countries to forge a closer partnership in the energy sector, which is further strengthened by overlapping perspectives on regional issues. Such a shared vision led to the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline marketing Azerbaijani oil globally and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline exporting Azerbaijani gas to Turkey, part of which is re-exported to Greece by using the Turkish grid. With the successive energy deals signed in recent years, including a rising volume of Azerbaijani investments in Turkey’s energy sector, and deepening political dialogue such as the establishment of a high level strategic cooperation council, the two countries are healing the frictions caused by Turkey’s thwarted normalization efforts with Armenia.

    Currently, there seems to be a strong determination to develop joint energy projects and turn this partnership into a solid axis in the South Caucasus and beyond. Natig Aliyev’s remarks that with the trans-Anatolia project the two countries will work in European energy markets together reflected this shared vision (www.ntvmsnbc.com, December 26, 2011).

    Moreover, the implications of this development for the EU-backed Southern corridor remain a matter of controversy. The competing projects including Nabucco, Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy (ITGI) and Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) submitted their bids to the BP-led consortium operating the Shah Deniz field in October 2011. While Azerbaijan and the consortium were expected to make their decision, the trans-Anatolian project has altered the equation in the ongoing competition to secure access to Azerbaijan’s export volumes.

    To complicate these calculations even further, Turkey also moved to sign an accord with Russia by the end of 2011. An agreement finalizing Turkey’s approval for the construction of South Stream in its territorial waters in the Black Sea was signed in Moscow by the heads of BOTAS and Gazprom, overseen by Yildiz and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. With this decision, which Russia had been expecting for over one year, Turkey removed its objections to the South Stream project, which Russian sources expect to be completed by 2015. In return, Yildiz claimed that he secured guarantees from the Russian side to resolve the dispute over the western pipeline in terms favorable to Turkey, especially including a reduction in the price for gas imports from Russia (Anadolu Ajansi, December 29, 2011).

    The Turkish government has faced the criticism that by taking these controversial steps it is effectively killing the Nabucco project, which it claimed to have deemed as a strategic priority (Hurriyet, December 31, 2011). For its part, the Turkish government has been arguing that the trans-Anatolian project was in fact complementary to Nabucco and Southern corridor projects, as it will reduce the costs of the other projects (Anadolu Ajansi, December 26, 2011; Yeni Safak, November 19, 2011).

    Ankara considers that it has fulfilled its responsibilities towards the Nabucco project by granting the necessary permissions earlier for its construction on its territory. The recent deal on the trans-Anatolian project in that context reiterates that Turkey would not be the deal-breaker in Southern corridor projects, as it effectively resolves issues pertaining to the transit of Azerbaijani gas. More importantly, the willingness of the BP-led Shah Deniz consortium, for Azerbaijan and Turkey to undertake a major portion of the transportation corridor might allow Nabucco and other projects to redesign themselves on scalable terms. Now it will be up to other Nabucco partners to do their part, readjust to the new conditions, and find a supply source, which remains the main obstacle before the project.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-reiterates-commitment-to-southern-corridor-with-trans-anatolia-pipeline/
  • A Reality Check On US-Turkish Relations

    A Reality Check On US-Turkish Relations

    A Reality Check On US-Turkish Relations

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 223
    December 8, 2011
    By: Saban Kardas
    US Vice President, Joe Biden, paid a working visit to Turkey, which provided an opportunity for a reality check of the current condition of US-Turkish bilateral relations. In addition to meeting with Turkish leaders, Biden attended the Global Entrepreneurship summit, which was developed as a new platform by the Obama administration to foster dialogue and cooperation with the Muslim world. Throughout his public appearances, Biden praised Turkey’s economic and political achievements, highlighting its potential to serve as a model for other nations.

    Beyond these words of praise, his contacts largely served to reiterate the growing consensus between the two countries, rather than breaking new ground on any major issue. While seeking to mobilize Ankara’s support for key US strategic interests in the Middle East, Biden at the same time worked to assure his Turkish counterparts about the continuation of US strategic involvement in ensuring regional stability. In charge of the Obama administration’s Iraq portfolio, Biden’s visit to Ankara was preceded by his earlier stopover in Iraq. In many ways, the US experience in Iraq was also a major turning point for Turkish-American relations. Following the disagreements caused by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, bilateral relations cooled, resulting in serious questioning on both sides concerning the future of the alliance that tied both nations together. Over time, the two countries adjusted their policies in Iraq, as they soon realized that they have major stakes in the stabilization of this country. Their coordinated action in Iraq has been an important development that helped maintain strategic cooperation in recent years. In an environment where the region is in flux in the wake of the Arab Spring and the US military withdrawal is imminent, however, Turkish concerns over the future of Iraq have become even more worrisome. In that regard, Biden largely worked to convey the message to Turkish leaders that the United States will remain committed to that country after the military withdrawal.

    Obviously, another issue of shared concern is the evolving situation in Syria, which runs the risk of destabilizing the region. Despite its initial argument for a controlled transition under Assad’s watch, Turkey has increasingly criticized the Syrian government forces’ brutal crackdown against the opposition and emerged on the frontline of the international efforts to prevent further killing of civilians. As Turkey recently announced a new round of sanctions against the Assad regime in similar fashion with Western powers, the visit provided an opportunity for exchanging information and discussing ways to further coordinate policy on Syria. However, this convergence is putting the Turkish government in a risky situation as Turkey moves to initiate economic sanctions, which might hurt certain constituents and especially local economy. Therefore, although Turkey has followed a policy in tune with the Western and US position, it has to tread a fine line to avoid being seen as too closely aligned with the United States. Most opposition parties and nationalist circles in Turkey view the government as implementing a program in Syria imposed upon it by the United States and interpret Biden’s visit as Ankara’s submission to Washington in its regional policies (Yenicag, December 4).

    Iran was another major item on Biden’s agenda. Biden reportedly sought to convey the message that the US policy of isolating Tehran through coercive measures was effective and they needed to be pursued vigilantly (Hurriyet, December 3). Yet another source of friction in the bilateral relationship once, the recent change in Turkey’s policy on Iran has pulled Ankara and Washington together, also leading to a series of threatening statements coming from Tehran. Granted, Turkey remains reluctant to impose new sanctions against Iran, in an effort to avoid putting further strain on its relations with Iran.

    In return for Ankara’s more cooperative position on issues of interest to the United States, Washington has been more forthcoming in its support for Turkey’s fight against the terrorist campaign by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has seen escalation in recent years. Biden reiterated recent steps undertaken by the United States, including the stationing of Predator drones in Incirlik to increase Turkey’s information gathering capacity, and selling three Super Cobra helicopters to Turkey. Moreover, Turkish President Abdullah Gul seemed content with Biden’s statements that even after the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, Turkey would continue to receive support from not only the United States, but also Iraqi groups in its fight against the PKK , December 2). Though such statements obviously are important signs of commitment from a symbolic and political point of view, the level of military contribution is unlikely to bolster Turkey’s operational ability against the PKK and change the situation on the ground decisively in favor of the Turkish army.

    Granted, the accelerating pace of the US-Turkey security partnership has been an issue of concern in terms of the ongoing process of domestic transformation inside Turkey. Some commentators who have grown critical of the AK Party government’s democratic credentials and its commitment to fundamental rights have been expecting the West and the United States to act as a restraint against the “authoritarian tendencies” of the government. Troubled by the new realignment between Ankara and Washington, they have expressed concern that the US might turn a blind eye to the government’s conduct in domestic politics. One commentator argues that “the Turkish government takes it as carte blanche to be careless about political freedoms, to limit free speech and to crush the Kurdish opposition in return of its ‘great’ role in regional politics” (Hurriyet Daily News, November 15).

    Partly in an effort to allay such concerns, US delegations visiting Turkey and US diplomats based in Ankara often emphasize the importance of respecting basic rights. Maintaining the same tradition, Biden highlighted the need for a free political climate, and urged Turkey to maintain the momentum for rewriting a more civilian and democratic constitution (Anadolu Ajansi, December 4). It remains to be seen if such statements will be followed by deeds in the coming months and whether the US will observe the AK Party’s domestic conduct in a manner to satisfy its critics.

    https://jamestown.org/program/a-reality-check-on-us-turkish-relations/
  • Erdogan Confronts Official History

    Erdogan Confronts Official History

    Erdogan Confronts Official History

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 216
    November 29, 2011
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took a groundbreaking step, by issuing a state apology for the killings committed by the state security forces in the historical Dersim – today’s Tunceli – region, predominantly populated by Alevis. The 1937 massacres were long considered a dark part of the Republican history, mirroring also many other repressive practices undertaken by the Republican elite as part of the modernization and nation building project. Until very recently a healthy debate on the subject was difficult. While Erdogan’s apology is a vindication of the progress achieved in the democratization and liberalization of Turkish political culture in recent decades, it also comes as a carefully calculated political maneuver that seeks to bolster his party’s position in the domestic balance of power.

    In parallel to issuing the apology, Erdogan made public the state documents that lay out the details of the Dersim events. In response to what it claimed to be a rebellion led by a local chief of a Zaza-speaking tribe in the Dersim region, the Turkish government used heavy force including air strikes which cost the lives of thousands of people (Anadolu Ajansi, November 23). Erdogan’s call for confronting that brutal episode with courage has immense repercussions for the official political narrative in Turkey.

    Since its inception in the wake of the First World War, the modern Turkish republic has sought to forge an ethos of a modern state that is formed around a common national identity. Through education and other institutions, the republican state apparatus sought to eliminate ethnic and religious differences in an effort to develop an official Turkish identity to which arguably all people living in Anatolia voluntarily subscribed. As the documents released by Erdogan attest, the state at times resorted to coercive instruments against the groups that resisted the policies of the early republican era.

    This official acknowledgement largely shatters the image of a somewhat mystified Turkish state and the idea of unitary nation joined around a common fate. As an immediate effect, the relatives of the victims, some of whom recently launched a legal battle to restore the rights of their family, welcomed the state apology (www.haberaktuel.com, November 23). Beyond this, other groups that traditionally felt victimized by the Turkish state also expressed satisfaction with the soul searching by the Turkish government. The members of the Armenian and Greek communities and other non-Muslim groups as well as followers of various Sufi brotherhoods that were subjected to a variety of repressive practices now feel empowered to demand a more open and freer debate on those dark episodes throughout the history of republican Turkey. As Turkey prepares to engage in a new period of intense debate on rewriting its constitution, the dismantling of the authoritarian official political narrative is seen as an opportunity by liberal forces.

    There are obviously also political calculations behind Erdogan’s move, given its timing and the manner it is framed. While announcing the historical documents, Erdogan also pointed to the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) as the culprit of the crimes. Erdogan was obviously drawing a parallel between today’s CHP and the Turkish statesmen of the time, since Turkey was governed by a single-party rule of the CHP until the transition to democracy in the 1950s. Erdogan called on the CHP’s current leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who himself is also an Alevi from Tunceli, to apologize for the massacres on his party’s behalf.

    Erdogan’s remarks immediately resonated through the ranks of the CHP. Erdogan’s announcement came against the background of a heated debate on the Dersim events that had already started inside the CHP. Although differing views on Dersim events occasionally led to frictions inside the CHP, the recent debate was triggered quite unexpectedly. A CHP deputy, Huseyin Aygun, contested the official history and claimed that the Turkish state planned the massacres in Dersim. In his account, the people there were simply defending themselves, not leading a rebellion, as claimed by official history (Today’s Zaman, November 10). Aygun had in fact challenged Erdogan earlier through a parliamentary inquiry to release the state documents and invited him to issue an apology (Anka, September 14).

    While, in the ensuing debate inside the CHP, some deputies even called for Aygun’s expulsion from the party, Erdogan and his AK Party skillfully took advantage of this crack in their opponent’s ranks. Erdogan and key AK Party figures increasingly raised the pressure on Kilicdaroglu to confront the history and acknowledge his party’s misdoings by opening the party’s own classified archives and agreeing to initiate a parliamentary inquiry, prior to Erdogan’s announcement of the documents. Kilicdaroglu’s ambivalent reaction to Erdogan satisfied neither those revisionists who are calling for confronting with the Dersim incident nor the opposition who sharply oppose to opening such a debate. However, this debate provided yet another opportunity for the anti-Kilicdaroglu figures to work for regrouping themselves into a formidable counter-block inside the party (www.ahaber.com, November 26).

    The growing infighting in the CHP since then also attests to how deeply the Dersim question affects the CHP’s identity, especially its controversial relationship with the Alevis. Despite the persecution at the hands of the CHP-governed Turkish state, the Alevis have come to evolve as strong supporters of the CHP. The CHP’s advocating of a secular political platform and life style appealed to the Alevis, who historically felt victimized by the Sunni majority and in recent years viewed the CHP as a bulwark against the “Islamization” of Turkish society and politics under right-wing parties.

    Although the AK Party wanted to make inroads into the Alevi constituencies, its so-called “Alevi opening” had failed to pay any significant dividends. The CHP still enjoyed support among the Alevi voters in the latest parliamentary elections. Erdogan’s recent move, though admirable, is unlikely to swing the Alevi voters to his party, but many Alevi associations are already demanding the CHP engage in a more sincere discussion on their identity and the not-so pleasant history of their encounter with the Turkish state (Haberturk, November 28). Even the very fact this debate is taking place in the CHP’s ranks is likely to set the CHP on an inward trajectory. Subsumed with yet another round of internal debates, the CHP will find it difficult to launch a credible opposition to the AK Party for some time.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-confronts-official-history/
  • Turkey’s Involvement In Syria Raises the Stakes For Its Government

    Turkey’s Involvement In Syria Raises the Stakes For Its Government

    Turkey’s Involvement In Syria Raises the Stakes For Its Government

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 211
    November 15, 2011
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkey has accelerated its contact with the Syrian opposition, while maintaining its criticism of the regime’s ongoing violent crackdown on the uprising. This development is in parallel to the growing involvement of the Arab League in the Syrian uprising. A recent deal agreed between the Arab League and Damascus heightened expectations for ending the months-long bloodshed. However, in a move reminiscent of the Baath regime’s delaying tactics while Turkey was seeking to convince President Bashar al-Assad to heed protesters’ calls earlier this year, the Syrian security forces continued their violent campaign even after the deal was announced. This reckless behavior prompted the Arab League to suspend Syria from membership. Rather than backing down in the face of growing regional isolation, the Baath regime preferred to launch a verbal assault on fellow Arab nations, accusing them of pursuing a very dangerous course of action (www.aljazeera.com, November 14).

    Pro-regime protestors have attacked several diplomatic representations, which included attacks on the Turkish embassy in Damascus by a crowd of 1,000, and on consulates in Aleppo and Latkia. In response, the Turkish government issued an official protest, evacuated the families of diplomats, asked its citizens not to travel to Syria, and summoned the Syrian charge d’affaires in Ankara (www.mfa.gov.tr, November 13). While the Syrian Foreign Minister, Waled al-Moallem, issued an apology for the attacks, this did not prevent his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu from arguing that Turkey would adopt a “decisive attitude” against these attacks and continue to support “the Syrian people’s rightful struggle” (Today’s Zaman, November 14).

    These developments lend support to the arguments of the Syrian opposition. The opposition for a long time broke ranks with the Damascus regime, making clear that they would not settle for political reforms alone and their struggle would continue until Assad relinquishes power (EDM, June 7). In the intervening period, the opposition has been working hard to gain international recognition, and generate larger international momentum behind the military option – similar to the Libyan case.

    In the aftermath of these recent events, Davutoglu met with the Syrian National Council, a group seeking to form a united front against the Syrian regime, which reportedly asked for permission to open an office in Turkey (Anadolu Ajansi, November 13). Previously, Turkey had hosted several meetings of the opposition groups, and Davutoglu had also received representatives from the Syrian opposition (Sabah, October 18). Moreover, Turkey has provided shelter to refugees fleeing the crackdown in tents inside Turkish border. At the same time, Ankara has imposed an arms embargo on Damascus and expressed its readiness to impose further sanctions.

    With these courageous steps and Turkish leaders’ constant calls on the Syrian regime to listen to the people’s voice, Turkey has emerged at the forefront of international efforts for pro-democratic regime change in the country. Normally, Turkey’s pursuit of such a policy might have jeopardized its ties to other authoritarian Arab nations in the region, but given the increasing number of deaths in Syria, even monarchies in the region have asked Assad to leave power. Thus, the recent toughening of the Arab League’s position eases Turkey’s restraint in this unfolding crisis, as it provides a regional endorsement for its actions. Turkey is also acting in close coordination with the Arab League.

    However, there is a strong body of opinion in Turkey critical of the government’s increasingly vocal confrontation with Syria. For many analysts, this new state of affairs in relations with Syria marks an obvious weakness in the government’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy, under which Turkey had sought to forge closer relations with Damascus and other capitals in surrounding regions. The fact that Turkey is on the brink of going to war against a leader with whom Turkish leaders had established a close friendship is seen as an indication of the failure of Turkey’s Middle Eastern policy.

    Another line of criticism argues that the government is going too far in its stance on the Syrian regime and its decision to support the opposition. They question the prudence of extending shelter to the opposition groups of a neighboring country, which contradicts Turkey’s established state traditions, and argue that if Assad succeeds in surviving this challenge, Ankara will be left with no options to maintain normal relations with Damascus. Yet another criticism presents the Syrian uprising as being orchestrated by Western powers to change the political map of the region. In that view, Turkey’s assertive policy is also part of the same plan and is imposed upon it by Western powers. This somewhat conspiratorial thinking is at times raised even by members of the main opposition, the Republican People’s Party (Cihan, November 10).

    While defending the government’s policy during a parliamentary hearing on his ministry’s budget, Davutoglu rebuked such allegations of “subcontracting.” Davutoglu defended Turkey’s position by saying that “in foreign policy, we make the plans, set the principles and develop the discourse. Sometimes when this is just and right, it might be in harmony with the United States. Sometimes with Iran … sometimes with Russia … sometimes with the EU. Thus, just because the United Sates is also taking a stance, shall we turn a blind eye to Syria?” Davutoglu justifies Turkey’s policy on humanitarian grounds and rejects any suggestion that Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy has failed. In this view, Turkey’s solidarity essentially lies with the Syrian people, and in an environment where the regime oppresses unarmed civilians Turkey cannot remain impassive (www.haberturk.com, November 14).

    Granted, this new policy raises several security challenges. Since Iran, Russia and China still support Damascus, Turkey risks severing its ties with Iran over this issue (EDM, October 11). Moreover, Assad signaled several times that if Damascus is cornered, there will be extreme repercussions in the region, creating security challenges for all the regional actors. For Turkey, such threats usually bring to mind the issue of Damascus resorting to the “PKK card,” meaning it could use its leverage over some groups within the PKK to accelerate attacks on Turkish civilian and military targets. While President Abdullah Gul and other Turkish officials have warned Syria not to inflame the PKK (Star, November 9), there is no guarantee that Damascus will not choose this option when needed, nor is it clear what instruments Turkey will use to deter Damascus from following that path.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkeys-involvement-in-syria-raises-the-stakes-for-its-government/
  • US-Turkish Security Cooperation Deepens

    US-Turkish Security Cooperation Deepens

    US-Turkish Security Cooperation Deepens

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 206

    November 8, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    The US-Turkish bilateral relationship is entering a new period of cooperation. While part of the positive mood characterizing the relationship is attributable to the US-Turkish coordinated action in the context of the Arab Spring, the recent changes in Turkey’s threat perceptions have also played a role. Overall, although the rejuvenation of the partnership might be welcome news, the manner in which it has come about reflects an underlying weakness in US-Turkish ties, i.e., it is still characterized by a security-dominant discourse.

    After many years of confrontation during the Bush Presidency, epitomized by Turkey’s resistance to US plans prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkish leaders welcomed the election of President Barack Obama (EDM, November 7, 2008). Although Obama’s call for a fresh approach to US foreign policy in the Middle East excited the Turks, both parties were often involved in disagreements and clashed over many issues. Turkey’s deteriorating relationship with Israel caused discomfort on the part of US policy makers, and the US policy of pursuing punitive measures against the Iranian nuclear program angered the Turkish government. The resulting frictions were not limited to the Middle East, as Turkey and the United States diverged on other issues, such as Turkey’s stalled rapprochement with Armenia or Turkey’s posturing in NATO.

    In the wake of the Arab Spring, both parties increasingly coordinate their policies. Ankara and Washington have given up their initial silence and increasingly supported the popular uprisings in the region. On Egypt, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan maintained close dialogue with Obama, as he adopted a pro-democracy position and called for the end of Mubarak’s rule. Despite Erdogan’s initial criticism of NATO’s military intervention in Libya, Turkey later joined the coalition and became an ardent supporter of the opposition that eventually toppled Gaddafi. On Syria, Turkey, in line with the Western world, has advocated regime change, moving in the direction of imposing sanctions on the Baath regime (EDM, July 20, August 10).

    The changing threat perceptions have also drawn the two countries together. For the US, the planned withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan make Turkey an indispensable partner in the region. As the entire region experiences a period of turmoil, with its constructive policies toward these war-torn countries, Ankara emerges as an element of stability that can help fill the security vacuum and safeguard some US interests. Turkey’s constructive attitude in Iraq has been known for some time, as it had helped contain the deepening of civil conflict and extended assistance to facilitate US withdrawal from the country. In the context of Afghanistan, Turkey has also actively worked to mobilize the regional and international actors for the reconstruction of this country, a goal the United States deeply appreciates. In this context, Turkey hosted the latest round of the trilateral summit in Istanbul in the first week of November, which brought together the Afghan and Pakistani presidents under the Turkish President’s watch (Anadolu Ajansi, November 3).

    For Turkey, the primary motivation for reinvigorating the relationship is its immediate security concerns, which have been heightened in recent months. In response to the acceleration of the PKK’s terrorist campaign, Turkey’s military shortcomings in counter-terrorism increasingly underscore its ongoing dependence on the US for its defense procurement needs. Moreover, as the Middle East has been more volatile – characterized by a heightened risk environment – Turkey obviously needs a more solid anchor. These new conditions apparently resulted in Ankara reevaluating its ties with Washington, and abandoning its confrontational rhetoric, which resulted in a series of recent decisions.

    Indeed, Turkey-US security cooperation has remarkably increased recently. The most visible indication for this policy shift came with Ankara’s decision to host the NATO early warning radars on its soil (EDM, September 20). Later, the United States committed to Turkey’s fight against the PKK, by agreeing to the basing of US unmanned Predator drones at Incirlik base to supply Turkey with actionable intelligence. Moreover, an interagency delegation led by US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Alexander Vershbow, to discuss how to improve the joint struggle against the PKK was another major development (Anadolu Ajansi, October 28).

    Furthermore, Washington finally decided to sell three Super Cobra helicopters to Turkey, which Turkey had requested for some time in order to use against the PKK (www.ntvmsnbc.com, October 30). The fact that the sale is unlikely to encounter opposition from the Senate, despite many lawmakers’ discomfort with Turkey’s harsh policy on Israel, has underscored how largely the administration’s views on Turkey is shared in the US policy community.

    It was against this background that Turkey’s Defense Minister Ismet Yilmaz, while attending the American-Turkish Council’s annual conference in Washington, argued that Turkey and the US are rediscovering each other and are going through a unique period (Anadolu Ajansi, November 2).

    Despite this positive mood, however, the reinvigoration of the US-Turkish partnership in many ways resembles the dynamics of bilateral relations in the Cold War and early post-Cold War era, when security-related considerations formed the basis of the alliance. Various efforts to bolster the volume of economic ties and foster closer societal dialogue still continue but the prevalence of security issues is undeniable. It remains to be seen how sustainable this new cooperative phase is, especially if one factors in the possible change of administration following the US presidential elections. Even the current administration continues to accentuate the need for Turkey to mend ties with Israel, which currently remains uncertain and an element of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Nor is it clear if the efforts to pass a resolution in the US Congress on the genocide allegations might spoil the relations again, as the centennial of the 1915 events is approaching. But, at any rate, currently the United States acknowledges Turkey’s quest for a more autonomous foreign policy course in the Middle East, which it views as beneficial to US interests. Turkey, for its part, is aware of the US interests in the region and refrains from engaging unduly confrontation, as was the case in the Iranian nuclear issue.

    https://jamestown.org/program/us-turkish-security-cooperation-deepens/