Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Gul Hosts Karzai and Zardari for a Trilateral Summit in Istanbul

    Gul Hosts Karzai and Zardari for a Trilateral Summit in Istanbul

    Gul Hosts Karzai and Zardari for a Trilateral Summit in Istanbul

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 5 Issue: 232
    December 5, 2008 02:19 PM Age: 3 hrs
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Turkey, Foreign Policy
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey is hosting another major international gathering, marking its growing profile in regional and international diplomacy. Turkish President Abdullah Gul has brought together Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari in a trilateral meeting being held in Istanbul on December 5 (www.cnnturk.com, December 5).

    This is the second such trilateral summit that Turkey has arranged. The presidents of Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan met for the first time on April 29 and 30, 2007, in Ankara. At that time the Pakistani and Afghan leaders issued the so-called Ankara Declaration, which underlined their intention to take concrete steps toward regional development and the fight against terrorism. Following the meeting, the parties agreed to form a joint working group to follow up on the conclusions of the summit and maintain the trilateral process (Stratejik Analiz, June 2007; www.asam.org.tr).

    Gul extended his invitation for a new meeting to his counterparts during the UN General Assembly in September 2008, and they accepted. After deliberations over the scheduling, the three heads of state finally decided to meet in Istanbul. The main items on the summit agenda are cooperation in security and the economy. The joint working group composed of senior-level officials met the day before to discuss the specific areas set in the first trilateral meeting. Given Turkey’s experience, the parties are expected to reach an agreement to train Afghan and Pakistani officers in Turkey’s anti-drug trafficking and anti-terrorism educational centers. The joint declaration prepared by the working group will be approved by the leaders and made public. Moreover, representatives of the business sector met within the framework of the Istanbul Forum founded by the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) with it’s the equivalent bodies from Afghanistan and Pakistan (www.cankaya.gov.tr, December 3; www.cnnturk.com, December 5).

    The inclusion of the private sector and economic issues as a separate group reflects Turkey’s recent foreign policy philosophy that a comprehensive solution to political problems can be built on the foundations of strong economic cooperation.

    Some Turkish observers nonetheless criticize the fact that the real purpose of such a “trilateral” mechanism has never been clear, and the details of such talks have not been made public (ANKA, December 4). Several bilateral contacts undertaken as part of the wider event are significant. On the sidelines of the summit Karzai and Zardari are holding bilateral talks with each other, and each is meeting separately with Gul.

    By initiating this trilateral process, Turkey is seeking to increase trust between the two neighbors through high-level contacts, as well as build an infrastructure for cooperation (www.trt.net.tr, December 5). Turkey’s main asset is its positive bilateral relations with both neighbors and its relatively neutral position toward their bilateral problems. Turkey has traditionally considered Pakistan a sister nation and maintained close ties with Islamabad, despite the occasional changes in each country’s domestic politics. Turkey has had a similar relationship with Afghanistan. It has played an active role in international efforts to rebuild Afghanistan and has supported the central government since the U.S. invasion. Turkey has been part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since its inception.

    Moreover, as a Muslim country integrated into Western security architecture, Turkey is in a unique position to facilitate cooperation between these countries and the Western powers. Turkey’s new role from January 2009 as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council is likely to also augment its leverage in this area.

    Turkey’s bilateral meetings with Pakistan and Afghanistan further highlight its attempts to become involved in the current sensitive issues of South Asian diplomacy. Prime Minister Erdogan visited New Delhi in November (EDM, November 25). Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa was in Turkey on December 2 as Gul’s official guest, and several bilateral agreements were signed during his stay (www.cankaya.gov.tr, December 3).

    Turkey’s activism in the region is particularly welcome to Pakistan. Pakistani sources praised the contribution of past Turkish efforts in “removing misunderstandings and enabling the two countries [Pakistan and Afghanistan] to focus on collaborative measures for bringing stability to the region.” Pakistani foreign office officials also expect the trilateral meeting to contribute to progress and prosperity in the region (Associated Press of Pakistan, December 4; www.thearynews.com, December 4).

    Islamabad is also taking advantage of Turkish mediation in other countries. The United States and Afghanistan have criticized Islamabad for failing to fight the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants in Pakistan’s tribal areas. When U.S. missile strikes and American incursions into Pakistani territory raised tension in the region, Pakistan approached Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to use his county’s influence among NATO members and the United States to stop these military operations (www.dunyabulteni.net, November 3).

    After the deadly terror attacks in Mumbai severed relations between India and Pakistan, Erdogan and Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan engaged in extensive telephone diplomacy with Pakistani and Indian officials, contributing to worldwide efforts to ease tension between the two nuclear nations. At his Pakistani counterpart’s request, Erdogan spoke with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, calling on them to prevent tension between India and Pakistan from escalating. An additional asset here was Turkey’s good relations with India (Zaman, December 1).

    Turkey’s role in initiating this trilateral dialogue highlights its new role as a peace-broker in regional disputes. Turkey has successfully asserted itself as a mediator in the talks between Syria and Israel and between the Palestinians and Israel. It has proposed a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform and has offered its services to mediate in the Iranian nuclear issue. This new activism has earned Turkey applause. U.S. President George W. Bush recently called Gul to congratulate him for his country’s efforts in fostering cooperation between the presidents of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as Turkey’s constructive role in Iraq (Anadolu Ajansi, December 4).

    https://jamestown.org/program/gul-hosts-karzai-and-zardari-for-a-trilateral-summit-in-istanbul/

  • Can Turkey’s AKP Survive the Upcoming Local Elections?

    Can Turkey’s AKP Survive the Upcoming Local Elections?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 5 Issue: 230
    December 3, 2008 10:15 AM Age: 1 days
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Turkey, Domestic/Social
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish politics is entering a new era of contestation and heightened debate with the approach of the March 2009 municipal elections. The influence of partisan politics in local elections is usually moderate, but Turkish experts generally believe that municipal elections have been shaped by trends in national politics. When they are held right before parliamentary elections, they have served as “opinion polls” and signaled the winners. When held after parliamentary elections, local elections have functioned as vote of confidence for the incumbents (Radikal, November 23). In that sense, their meaning goes well beyond electing the next mayor or city councilman; they have come to pose serious tests to governing parties. The AKP passed such a test with great success: after its landslide electoral victory in the November 2002 general elections, there were questions on the part of the secular elites about how the AKP would govern Turkey, given its origins in previously-banned Islamic parties. The results of the March 2004 municipal elections, in which the AKP increased its strength, served as a reaffirmation of popular support for the AKP’s policies, removing many of the remaining objections to the new government. Since its electoral victory in the July 2007 general elections, many new issues have arisen; and the AKP has been consumed by domestic political developments, as well as the impending economic crisis. The local elections might be another opportunity for it to gain fresh legitimacy.

    The first challenge to the AKP is on the issue of reforms. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his AKP have been criticized by pro-reform circles as well as EU officials for slowing down domestic transformation. After coming to power in 2003, the AKP implemented drastic changes in the country’s economic and political structures, preparing the ground for the start of EU accession negotiations in 2005. Since then, domestic transformation has been relegated to a secondary status on Erdogan’s agenda. Particularly after the Constitutional Court’s controversial decision on the closure case against the AKP, which fell short of shutting down the party yet imposed fines for being a center of anti-secular activities, Erdogan appears to have completely abandoned the political reform project, including making a new, more liberal constitution.

    Reformers have been troubled by Erdogan’s close relationship with the new military leadership (Taraf, October 17). The EU officials have also criticized the Erdogan government for seeking to substitute its foreign policy activism for domestic reforms (www.fox.com.tr, November 27). Even his own supporters have started to raise objections to Erdogan’s new style in government, reflecting the dissatisfaction among the AKP’s core constituencies as well (www.ntvmsnbc.com, November 6). Despite mounting criticism, Erdogan has insisted on the rectitude of its policies. Against this background of AKP soul-searching on the political spectrum, the local elections will put to test Erdogan’s nationalist and pro-status quo political platform and his confrontational leadership style (Today’s Zaman, November 29).

    Another major challenge is the electoral battle in southeastern Turkey, which is predominantly populated by Kurdish-speaking voters. Since the July 2007 elections, the AKP has sought to project itself as the representative of the entire political spectrum in Turkey, including conservative Turks, liberal reformists, and Kurds. As a matter of fact, the AKP came out as the first party in ballots in the Kurdish provinces. Since then, the AKP’s motto has been “We will win Diyarbakir too” (Aksam, December 4, 2007), which implied that the AKP was intent on winning the major provincial municipalities controlled by the pro-Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP). The AKP’s aspirations to be an all-encompassing party, coupled with Erdogan’s increasingly pro-nationalist discourse, pitted it against the DTP.

    Erdogan had continuously claimed that the AKP abhorred identity politics and any form of ethnic, regional, or religious nationalism (Anadolu Ajansi, June 4, 2006). Ironically, through its antagonism toward the DTP, the AKP might have triggered just such identity politics. The growing tension between the two parties over their competition for Kurdish votes accounts for much of the street violence in the eastern and western parts of Turkey, as well as the radicalization of Kurdish and Turkish nationalist sentiments. Some Turkish political observers believe that the AKP might have fallen into the DTP’s trap by going along with the latter’s confrontational approach (www.haber7.com, November 29). Local elections in the region will partly demonstrate whether the people will support the DTP or the AKP— in other words, solving the Kurdish problem through meeting their demands for more political and ethnic rights versus solving the problem by providing more social and economic development projects in Kurdish areas.

    The AKP government has also come under criticism for its delayed response to the financial crisis, which is another major source of challenge. Initially, the government maintained that Turkey might escape the effects of the global crisis and resisted the calls for seeking international assistance. Recently, the government came to terms with the reality of the economic crisis and initiated negotiations with the IMF. Experts argue that short of an agreement with the IMF, the Turkish economy might undergo a serious recession (Referans, December 3). In the meantime, the crisis has affected the production sector, with some industries starting to shut down their plants and lay off workers or put them on unpaid vacation (Referans, October 27, November 11). After all, the AKP came to power as a result of its rivals’ failed economic policies, and it has been able to hold on to power thanks to its successful handling of the economy. If massive unemployment were to break out, it might have devastating consequences for the AKP’s performance in the elections. Nonetheless, experts note that it may be too early to tell how far the economic crisis will go and whether it may affect voting behavior. They note in particular that the Turkish people are aware that the current crisis has been caused by the global financial system; hence, people might not necessarily rush to blame the AKP government for the sagging economy (Milliyet, December 3).

    Despite its shortcomings, the AKP, like Erdogan for that matter, is far from being a lame duck. It still has several weapons in its arsenal. First, given Turkey’s unitary state structure, the central government controls enormous resources. As the incumbent party, it could channel resources to alleviate the conditions of crisis-stricken segments of society, preventing erosion in popular support. Second, the AKP and its predecessors made their reputations through their successful track record in local government, and the Turkish electorate still recognizes them as the “party of services.” Finally, the opposition parties are in complete disarray, and there is still no plausible alternative on the horizon that has the capability to knock the AKP down.

  • Armenian Foreign Minister Visits Turkey

    Armenian Foreign Minister Visits Turkey

    Armenian Foreign Minister Visits Turkey, Reaffirms Determination for Dialogue

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 5 Issue: 228
    December 2, 2008 01:47 AM Age: 25 min
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Armenia, Turkey
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia continue to take steps toward resolving their problems through diplomatic channels. High-level meetings coinciding with international gatherings have become an ordinary development, showing the confidence and progress gained so far.

    Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian visited Turkey on November 24 to discuss the details of Armenia’s assumption of the rotating presidency of the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). During his trip to the BSEC’s permanent secretariat in Istanbul, Nalbandian also had dinner with his Turkish counterpart Ali Babacan. The two ministers discussed the progress in Turkish-Armenian talks, which had been taking place at lower levels since the historic meeting between the presidents of the two nations in Yerevan and the trilateral meeting between the foreign ministers of Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in New York in September (Anadolu Ajansi, November 24).

    Nalbandian emphasized that there were no major obstacles to the normalization of bilateral relations and called for “opening a new page.” He repeated the Armenian position that diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia should be resumed without any preconditions and that Turkey should open the border. Babacan emphasized that Turkey sought a permanent solution with Armenia. He noted the importance of settling the Karabakh dispute and called for accelerating the Armenian-Azeri dialogue (Milliyet, November 25; Today’s Zaman, November 30).

    Nalbandian was asked by Turkish journalists, “What makes you so optimistic, despite the fact that the parties are maintaining their positions?” He responded by saying that negotiations were continuing on a “constructive, sincere, and open” basis. He noted that the momentum for solution was there and the parties should take advantage of it (Zaman, November 25). Reflecting the same spirit, Babacan said that all three parties should make the best use of the window of opportunity made possible by the trilateral dialogue. “If the window is closed, it may be difficult to reopen it,” said Babacan (Hurriyet, November 26).

    The intention to normalize relations is definitely there, but why did Babacan emphasize the need for urgency? On the Armenian side, there is definitely a desire to end the severe economic problems caused by negative relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. It hopes to settle bilateral disputes and open the country to the outside. Nonetheless, Sarkisian’s approach in favor of a diplomatic solution has increasingly come under criticism by nationalist forces at home and from the Armenian diaspora (EDM, November 25). Failure to deliver acceptable solutions might alienate those elements supporting dialogue.

    On the Turkish side, uncertainty about the incoming American administration’s policy on the Armenian issue create an urgency to address the problem. If Turkey can resolve the bilateral problems through diplomatic dialogue with Armenia, it could successfully undermine the Armenian diaspora’s efforts to influence the Obama administration against the Turkish interpretation of the Armenian genocide (Radikal, November 25).

    Nalbandian and Babacan decided to maintain high-level meetings between the foreign ministers with the participation of Azerbaijan whenever possible. Commending Turkish President Abdullah Gul for his “wise” decision to visit Armenia in September, Nalbandian announced that Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian would travel to Turkey in October 2009 to attend the next soccer game between the national teams of the two countries (Hurriyet, November 25). Diplomatic sources also disclosed that Nalbandian had invited Babacan to attend the next BSEC ministerial meeting scheduled to be held in Yerevan in April 2009. Although the Turkish side has not officially accepted the invitation, observers expect Babacan to attend this meeting (Zaman, November 27).

    A new occasion for holding talks between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia might be provided by another international gathering later this week. The foreign ministers of Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan will be attending the forthcoming Ministerial Council meeting of the OSCE in Helsinki on December 4 and 5.

    The involvement of Azerbaijan is becoming increasingly crucial for Turkey’s own rapprochement with Armenia (Anadolu Ajansi, November 25). For Ankara, having Azerbaijan on board is crucial because it seeks to obtain approval from Baku for Turkey’s normalization with Armenia, such as opening the border or establishing diplomatic relations. For Armenia, maintaining this dialogue is necessary to resolve its bilateral disputes with Azerbaijan, which remain a major obstacle to comprehensive peace in the region. Thus, Turkey is working to normalize its relations with Armenia on the one hand and mediate between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the other.

    On December 1 Babacan is on an official visit to Baku at the invitation of his Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar Mammadyarov to discuss bilateral relations as well as the details of his meeting with Nalbandian. Babacan is expected to explore the possibility of arranging a three-way meeting in Helsinki. Before departing for Baku, Babacan told reporters that the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan would meet with the co-chairs of the Minsk group in Helsinki, following which he would meet his counterparts individually. He did not, however, announce a tripartite meeting yet (Ihlas Haber Ajansi, November 30).

    The Babacan and Mammadyarov meeting focused on energy cooperation, regional developments, the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP), the opening of Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, and Azerbaijan’s problems with Armenia. They discussed Karabakh issue in detail, and Mammadyarov clarified Baku’s policy on this dispute. During the joint press briefing following the meeting, Babacan reemphasized the urgency of solving the Karabakh problem now, and underlined the connections between solving Azerbaijan-Armenian problems and Turkish-Armenian problems. Although diplomatic observers had expected Babacan to discuss trilateral consultations in Helsinki, no such meeting was announced (www.ntvmsnbc.com; Cihan Haber Ajansi, December 1).

    As the noted Turkey analyst Cengiz Candar observed, the OSCE meeting would bring together not only the three countries but also other players that had attempted to mediate between Armenia and Azerbaijan. If the Helsinki talks could achieve progress in the Karabakh issue, it could pave the way for concrete steps toward normalization between Ankara and Yerevan in 2009 (Radikal, November 25).

    Turkey has also used this diplomatic traffic to begin setting in motion the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) that would bring together Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Since proposing the organization in the wake of the Russian-Georgian war, Turkey has conducted several meetings with the respective parties to ensure their participation. Babacan told reporters that representatives from the five countries would convene for the first time during the OSCE meeting in Helsinki. The members of the group will use the opportunity to specify the goals, principles, and mechanisms of the CSCP (Cihan Haber Ajansi, November 30).

    https://jamestown.org/program/armenian-foreign-minister-visits-turkey-reaffirms-determination-for-dialogue/

  • ERDOGAN VISITS INDIA: BILATERAL TRADE AND TURKISH-ISRAELI-INDIAN ENERGY COOPERATION ON THE AGENDA

    ERDOGAN VISITS INDIA: BILATERAL TRADE AND TURKISH-ISRAELI-INDIAN ENERGY COOPERATION ON THE AGENDA

    By Saban Kardas

    Tuesday, November 25, 2008

    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited India from November 21 to 24, against a background of growing economic ties between the two nations. Erdogan was the first Turkish prime minister to visit India since Bulent Ecevit’s visit in 2000. Erdogan met Indian President Pratibha Patil, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee. He visited India’s historical and cultural sites and technological centers and held meetings with Turkish and Indian businessmen (www.akparti.org.tr, November 21-24). 

    Turkish State Minister Mehmet Aydin, Minister of Industry and Trade Zafer Caglayan, and Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Hilmi Guler were part of the Turkish delegation. Earlier this year, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan and Minister of State for the Economy Kursat Tuzmen visited India, and President Abdullah Gul is expected to go there in the first half of 2009. This busy diplomatic agenda, as the latest of Turkey’s ambitious openings to its neighboring regions, shows that the AKP government considers India a strategic partner and major market in East Asia (Cihan News Agency, November 20).

    Also accompanying Erdogan were a large number of Turkish businessmen who explored opportunities for joint projects with their Indian counterparts. The meeting was reminiscent of former President Turgut Ozal’s trips to Central Asia and the Balkans in the early 1990s, which helped facilitate the Turkish business community’s penetration into new markets, making the country more competitive in the global economy.

    Throughout his visit, Erdogan underlined the conditions that created a favorable environment for closer economic cooperation between the two countries. First, he noted that Turkey and India shared historical ties and that they had no current political problems with each other (Cihan News Agency, November 21).

    As a matter of fact, the Turkish people are sympathetic to the cause of the Kashmiri Muslims; and Turkey has traditionally maintained a close friendship with Pakistan, India’s archrival. Nonetheless, Turkey and India are not parties to a political dispute that might poison economic relations. Since the AKP government came to power in 2002, the trade volume between the two countries has almost quadrupled, reaching $2.6 billion in 2007 (Referans, November 19).

    Second, Erdogan emphasized Turkey’s role as a bridge between different continents and civilizations. He also said that Turkey, as a developing economy at the intersection of three continents, provided access to energy, trade and transportation routes, and major markets. He invited Indian businessmen to invest in Turkey and take advantage of the economic opportunities that Turkey provided (Anadolu Ajansi, November 21).

    Indian ambassador to Turkey Raminder S. Jassal spoke to Turkish journalists before Erdogan’s visit. His remarks, as well as those of other Indian politicians during Erdogan’s visit, clearly show that the Indians are aware of Turkey’s strategic position in the global economy. Echoing Erdogan’s positive views about the potential for improving bilateral relations, Jassal described Turkey as the “center of energy in the region.” He also outlined various projects that are currently under way as well as Indian companies’ plans to invest in Turkey (Today’s Zaman, November 18).

    Erdogan attended a Turkish-Indian business forum in New Delhi, which was sponsored by Turkey’s Foreign Economic Relations Council (DEIK). A report published by the DEIK on the status of trade and economic relations between Turkey and India noted that the major areas of cooperation were energy, tourism, and communications. Turkey seeks to attract a greater share of the increasing foreign investments of Indian firms. The report shows that Indian companies are interested in investing in mining, pharmaceuticals, construction, the automotive industry, energy, communications technology, and sugar production in Turkey. The report also pointed to trade inequality in bilateral relations: Turkey’s exports to India amounted to $545 million from January to September, while its imports reached $1.9 billion (Referans, November 19). It was noted, however, that since Turkey’s imports were mainly raw materials, the imbalance was not a major concern for the Turkish economy (Cihan News Agency, November 20).

    During his trip, Erdogan underlined both parties’ willingness to increase the trade volume to $6 billion by 2010. To this end, he said, the two countries had agreed to form a working group that would prepare the groundwork for the establishment of a free-trade zone between India and Turkey (www.ntvmsnbc.com, November 24).

    One spectacular joint project concerned energy transportation. India is eager to diversify its energy supplies and seek alternative routes to transport the oil it imports from Russia. Erdogan and Guler noted India’s interest in joining the Turkish-Israeli Med Stream project. The three countries had already started feasibility studies about connecting Turkey’s Ceyhan port to the Red Sea through a undersea pipeline and announced that the project might be completed by 2011 (Sabah, September 13). The project will carry Russian oil from the Turkish port of Samsun on the Black Sea to Ceyhan, feeding the Med Stream pipeline. This alternative could enable India to load Russian crude into tankers at an Israeli port. When the project is completed, it will reduce the transport time to India from 39 to 16 days, while cutting the shipping costs significantly. Guler added that he would meet his Israeli and Indian counterparts in the coming days to discuss this project further (www.cnnturk.com, November 24).

    The parties announced that they would increase cooperation in nuclear energy, which is significant given Turkey’s plans to build nuclear power plants and India’s experience in this area. They also noted their determination to join forces in fighting terrorism. Reflecting on their consensus on a broad range of issues, Erdogan said, “Turkey made a strategic decision to develop relations with India in all fields” (Zaman, November 23).

  • TURKEY PUSHES FOR CLOSER POLITICAL TIES WITHIN THE TURKIC-SPEAKING WORLD

    TURKEY PUSHES FOR CLOSER POLITICAL TIES WITHIN THE TURKIC-SPEAKING WORLD

    TURKEY PUSHES FOR CLOSER POLITICAL TIES WITHIN THE TURKIC-SPEAKING WORLD

    By Saban Kardas

    Monday, November 24, 2008

     

    The speakers and delegates of the parliaments of the Turkish-speaking countries—Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkey—met in Istanbul on November 20 and 21 for a Conference of Turkic-Speaking Countries’ Parliamentary Speakers. Turkish Speaker of Parliament Koksal Toptan, Azerbaijani Speaker of Parliament Oktay Seidov, Kyrgyz Speaker of Parliament Aytibay Tagayev, and Vice-president of the Kazakh Senate Mukhammet Kopeyev signed a declaration for the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries (TURKPA) (Anadolu Ajansi, November 21). The body is open to admitting other countries in the future.

    Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed launching the TURKPA at the summit meeting of the Turkic leaders in 2006. At the time, given Turkey’s more extensive experience in parliamentary democracy, Nazarbayev requested the Turkish Parliament to coordinate efforts toward establishing the proposed assembly. In February the parliamentary deputy speakers met in Antalya to prepare the groundwork for the assembly. A second meeting in Astana in March produced a draft declaration, which was expanded during the conference in Istanbul (www.tbmm.gov.tr, November 21).

    Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Speaker Toptan addressed the conference. Referring to the shared historical, cultural, and linguistic ties among the founding members, Toptan called the declaration a historic step toward expanding cooperation. He noted that if these countries could manage to act together in a spirit of solidarity, they could bring peace, stability, and prosperity to Eurasia (Cihan Haber Ajansi, November 21). Gul also stressed that “our brotherhood [of Turkish countries] does not target anyone. Instead, it represents a union of hearts and minds [that has been created] to promote the peace, stability, and welfare of the region” (Zaman, November 22).

    Kyrgyz Speaker Tagayev emphasized that closer cooperation among the legislative bodies of these countries could lead to the creation of necessary legal regulations and could also facilitate cooperation in financial, scientific, and cultural cooperation (Cihan Haber Ajansi, November 21). In particular, Gul emphasized that parliamentary cooperation could facilitate the realization of joint projects in economics, transportation, and communications, as well as in the fight against common security threats, such as terrorism and radical movements, drug smuggling, and illegal weapons trafficking (Ortadogu, November 21).

    The primary goal of the new assembly is to boost relations among the parliaments of the participating countries, provide a platform for exchanging views, and explore joint projects. Although details about its exact institutional structure, rules of procedure, and committees are unavailable, it was suggested that it might resemble the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (www.assembly.coe.int/; ANS Press, November 22). Gul also referred to similar initiatives in other regions as possible models to follow (www.cankaya.gov.tr, November 21). Sayyad Aran, the Azerbaijani consul general in Istanbul, told reporters that the assembly would meet annually. He also noted that the next meeting, which is scheduled to take place in Baku in 2009, would lay out the assembly’s working procedures (APA, November 22).

    Turkey’s leading role in the creation of the assembly is no surprise, given its interest in promoting cooperation with Turkic-speaking countries. Shortly after the dissolution of the East bloc, Turkey initiated several projects to deepen ties with its cousins in the ex-Soviet space. Both the state and private entrepreneurs played a major role in developing extensive relations in economics, culture, and education. Although successive Turkish governments have refrained from promoting a pan-Turkic agenda toward the region, which was advocated by nationalist circles within Turkey, the idea for closer political integration between Turkey and Turkic-speaking countries has always guided Ankara’s policies in one form or another. The Turkish state has institutionalized several mechanisms to facilitate political cooperation among these countries.

    The major such multilateral platform has been the summit of the heads of state of Turkic-Speaking Countries, bringing together Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. After the first gathering in Ankara in 1992, seven subsequent meetings have been held at irregular intervals. During the seventh meeting in Istanbul in 2001, internal friction about establishing closer ties among the Turkic states surfaced. Despite Turkey’s expectations to the contrary, the presidents of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the two countries that are also absent from the TURKPA conference, declined to attend the summit.

    The failure of high-level summits to institutionalize concrete projects and their ineffectiveness in resolving bilateral and regional problems were reportedly behind Turkmenistan’s decision to opt out in 2001. Publicly, Turkmenistan’s official policy of positive neutrality was given as the reason for its reluctance to maintain closer political ties with the rest of the Turkic world. The lukewarm relationship between Turkey and Uzbekistan largely explains Tashkent’s negative attitude toward the summit (www.tusam.net, December 2, 2006). It was recently reported that Baku would host the ninth summit in the first quarter of 2009 (Trend News Agency, November 11).

    The establishment of TURKPA was among the ambitious goals announced at the eighth summit and represents a successful step toward realizing common aims. President Gul, in his address to the TURKPA conference, said that the organization’s meeting after the Baku summit would be held in Bishkek. He also noted that other goals set at the eighth summit would soon be realized. By the Bishkek summit, the legal framework for setting up a Permanent Secretariat in Turkey to streamline the activities of the summits of Turkish-speaking countries would be finalized. Gul also expressed Turkey’s support for the idea of creating a committee of experts (Aksakallar Kurulu), as proposed by Kazakh President Nazarbayev (www.cankaya.gov.tr, November 21).

    It remains to be seen whether the members of TURKPA will be able to turn rhetoric into mutually beneficial cooperation and convince the two opt-outs to join their ranks by the time the leaders of the Baku summit in 2009.

  • ERDOGAN VISITS THE UNITED STATES: ECONOMY AND RELATIONS WITH OBAMA ON THE AGENDA

    ERDOGAN VISITS THE UNITED STATES: ECONOMY AND RELATIONS WITH OBAMA ON THE AGENDA

    By Saban Kardas

    Monday, November 17, 2008

    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited the United States to attend the G-20 Summit, where he joined the leaders of developed and industrializing nations to discuss the global financial crisis. In addition to his participation in the summit activities, Erdogan held bilateral meetings with several world leaders.  

    In his public statements throughout the trip, Erdogan underlined the importance of international cooperation in fighting the global crisis. Having emphasized the experience that Turkey had gathered from its own economic recovery programs as a result of the devastating crises of the 1990s and early-2000s, Erdogan maintained that his country represented a hope and a model for those countries seeking a way out of the current crisis (www.akparti.org.tr, November 13; Yeni Safak, November 16).

    These inflated statements aside, how the AKP government will cope with the global financial crisis and whether it will seek help from the IMF had been matters of debate (EDM, October 31). Since the AKP came to power in 2002, reducing Turkey’s dependence on the IMF has been one of the government’s primary economic goals. The AKP has been arguing that Turkey could overcome the current crisis without significant support from the international community. Since the previous stand-by agreement with the IMF expired in May, Turkey has been resisting another arrangement with the IMF because of the strict fiscal conditions it would impose (New York Times, November 7).

    During the G-20 Summit Erdogan met with Managing Director of the IMF Dominique Strauss-Kahn on November 14, and their teams had additional talks on November 15. Erdogan also met the President of the World Bank Robert Zoellick. The World Bank is expected to increase credits to Turkey to support various projects dealing with small and medium-sized enterprises and renewable energy (www.cnnturk.com; Anatolian Agency, November 15).

    The statements coming from both sides following the meeting between Erdogan and Strauss-Kahn indicate that Turkey might be reversing its stubborn position on IMF aid. Both parties stressed that Turkey would maintain cooperation with the IMF in the future. Economic sources speculated that a new stand-by agreement worth $15 to $20 billion might be signed soon, although differences of opinion remain about the extent and kind of IMF aid to Turkey (www.tgrthaber.com.tr, November 16; Today’s Zaman, November 17). Experts believe that the decision, albeit late, to start negotiations with the IMF is a step in the right direction (Referans, November 17).

    Erdogan also gave two public talks, in which he outlined the parameters of the new activism in Turkish foreign policy and Turkey’s strategic partnership with the United States, as well as developments in domestic politics. On November 13 Erdogan spoke at a conference at Columbia University, entitled “Turkey’s Role in Shaping the Future” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, November 14). On November 14 Erdogan discussedTurkish foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. During these addresses, he congratulated U.S. President-elect Barack Obama and emphasized that Turkey was ready to work with the new administration, provided that it was sensitive to Turkey’s priorities.

    On relations with Armenia, Erdogan repeated Turkey’s position that the issue must be dealt with by the parties concerned through channels of dialogue already established. He warned the incoming administration not to let ethnic lobbies dictate American policy and spoil bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States (Hurriyet Daily News, November 17).

    On the issue of nuclear proliferation and Iran, Erdogan highlighted Turkey’s new-found role as peace broker and criticized U.S.-led efforts against Tehran. Earlier in the week, the New York Times reported that Erdogan had offered to mediate between Iran and the incoming Obama administration (New York Times, November 11). During his talk at the Brookings Institution, Erdogan said that given the trust Turkey had built up with Iran, it was better positioned than the EU’s troika to facilitate talks with Tehran. Some of his remarks on this issue were, however, more controversial. Erdogan maintained that trying to force Iran to drop its nuclear program while other countries maintained nuclear arsenals was no ground for reducing tension. He instead urged the countries pressuring Iran to eliminate such weapons themselves, which would be a better basis for a comprehensive solution (www.cnnturk.com, November 15). Erdogan’s call for “total nuclear disarmament” has been criticized as a fundamental deviation from Turkey’s official position (Milliyet, November 15).

    On the issue of Iraq, Erdogan emphasized Turkey’s positive contributions to the reconstruction efforts there. He criticized Obama for setting a clear exit date, however. He expressed concerns about a premature American withdrawal, arguing that Iraq’s infrastructure had not matured enough. (Cihan Haber Ajansi, November 14). U.S. State Department Deputy Spokesman Robert Wood criticized Erdogan’s assessment as overly pessimistic (Washington Times, November 15).

    There were questions about whether Erdogan would meet Obama during the trip; but because Obama has decided not to meet foreign leaders before his inauguration, Erdogan searched out people who were likely to shape Obama’s policies. In a separate meeting during his visit, Erdogan met with Obama’s advisers Madeline Albright, Jim Leach, and Philip Gordon (Yeni Safak, November 15). Some Turkish observers believe that the choice of the Brookings Institute as the venue of Erdogan’s speech in Washington, D.C., was also part of Turkey’s attempts to influence the incoming administration. Veteran journalist Cengiz Candar noted that despite its non-partisan position, Brookings was regarded as a pro-Democrat organization and many Brookings specialists, such as Philip Gordon, who were familiar with Turkey may end up working in the new administration (Referans, November 15; Today’s Zaman, November 17). Another senior analyst, Semih Idiz, however, argued that Erdogan’s controversial statements on Iran might ironically rock the boat, just as Erdogan was seeking to build bridges (Milliyet, November 17).

    Only time will tell whether “think-tank diplomacy” will put Turkish-American relations on the right track. In any case, given Erdogan’s critical position on Obama’s declared policies, it will be interesting to see how the new administration will manage relations with Turkey.