Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • European Energy Security and Nabucco Occupy a Central Place in Erdogan’s Brussels Trip

    European Energy Security and Nabucco Occupy a Central Place in Erdogan’s Brussels Trip

    European Energy Security and Nabucco Occupy a Central Place in Erdogan’s Brussels Trip

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 12
    January 20, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Brussels on January 18 and 19 to discuss Turkish-European relations. The trip, the first of its kind since 2004, comes against the background of criticism that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has abandoned its commitment to EU membership. Critics point to the government’s reluctance to take steps to break the deadlock in negotiations since the talks started in 2005. The AKP, in contrast, highlights the EU’s own mishandling of the accession process with Turkey and the EU’s internal problems following the 2004 enlargement. As some observers have called 2009 the “make or break year,” Erdogan recently began a new bid to revitalize Turkey’s stalled membership process by appointing a new state minister to lead the negotiations (EDM, January 12). His trip provided an important forum to reaffirm the parties’ willingness to mend fences and renew trust.

    Erdogan held meetings with Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso, High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and President of the European Parliament Hans Gert Pottering. He also spoke with representatives of the Turkish community, gave a talk at the European Policy Center, and delivered the keynote address at a dinner organized by Friends of Europe.

    Throughout his trip, Erdogan emphasized that his government would make 2009 a “leap year.” Rebuffing criticism that the government lacked determination, Erdogan argued “the EU is our top priority, and we don’t have any alternatives to it.” Showing his self-confidence in Turkey’s future contribution to the EU, Erdogan also said that Turkey would not be a burden on the EU but was ready to share its burdens. He emphasized the compatibility of both sides’ interests, including energy security. On their part, EU officials pressed for more reforms on trade unions and minority rights and underlined the need to convince the European public about Turkey’s accession. Yet, they welcomed Ankara’s efforts to deliver some reforms to comply with the EU’s expectations and stressed the common areas of strategic interest (www.cnnturk.com, January 19, Zaman, January 20).

    Overall, Erdogan appeared to be unwavering from his previous positions. First, he repeated the AKP’s claim that “Turkey did its homework.” Although the EU institutions and domestic pro-reform groups continuously criticize the government for failing to deliver on the reforms required by the EU, Erdogan highlighted his government’s “achievements,” which in his view were sufficient to fulfill Turkey’s part of the agreement. He referred to the recently opened Kurdish-language channel on the state-owned TV network and the legislative reforms on laws regulating foundations and freedom of opinion. With regard to Turkey’s shortcomings in meeting the EU’s demands, he put the blame on the Turkish opposition parties, arguing that they had failed to support the government’s reform efforts in parliament (www.cnnturk.com, January 19).

    Second, Erdogan also repeated his previous criticism of the EU’s unfair attitude in the accession process. Unsatisfied with the slow pace of accession negotiations, Erdogan has been calling on the EU to accelerate the process by opening more than two chapters per presidency (every six months). He asked the future presidencies to break with this “routine.” He also complained about the EU’s delay in approving the end-of-screening reports on nine chapters since 2006. Turkey started talks on 10 of the 35 chapters, and it has completed negotiations on only one. The EU has put several chapters on hold, due to the objections of the Greek Cypriot administration and France (Today’s Zaman, January 20).

    Calling on the EU to revitalize the process, Erdogan said, “We are not requesting privileged treatment; we ask for equal and fair treatment.” He was echoing Euro-skeptic sentiments among the Turkish public, which increasingly feels that the EU is applying double standards against Turkey by treating it differently from other candidates. In that regard, he also maintained that the declining support for EU membership in the opinion polls was caused by negative remarks of some European leaders about Turkey (Hurriyet Daily News, January 20).

    As part of his complains that internal EU politicking posed obstacles to Turkey, Erdogan did not hesitate to name the Greek Cypriots. He lambasted the EU’s decision in 2004 to admit the Republic of Cyprus without resolving the divided status of the island (Anadolu Ajansi, January 19). Since its accession to the EU, according to Ankara, the Greek Cypriots have blocked the start of negotiations with Turkey on crucial chapters, most significantly energy.

    Given the growing importance of energy security on the EU agenda in the wake of the Russian-Georgian war and the Russian-Ukrainian standoff, the implications of the energy issue for Turkey’s membership process occupied an important part of Erdogan’s portfolio. As the Budapest Summit on Nabucco approaches, the EU is to support the Nabucco project, which would transport Caspian gas to European markets through Turkish territory (EDM, January 16).

    Erdogan stated at the European Policy Center on Monday that if Turkey were confronted with a deadlock in the energy chapter, it might have to revise its position on Nabucco. This raised concerns that Turkey might be threatening to use its position in energy security as a bargaining chip for Turkish-EU talks. Erdogan also said that although some countries didn’t want Turkey to cooperate with Iran in energy transportation, “cutting ties with Iran is out of question. Nobody can dictate our [energy] policies” (ANKA, January 19).

    Nonetheless, following his meeting with Commission President Barroso on the second day, Erdogan ruled out a threat, saying that Turkey would not “use energy as a weapon.” Barroso emphasized areas of mutual cooperation and highlighted Turkey’s strategic position in particular. He pointed to the need for a good partnership in energy security between Turkey and the EU and praised Turkey’s constructive role in Middle Eastern diplomacy (Anadolu Ajansi, www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January 19).

    European officials constantly remind Turkey that its strategic position alone will not suffice to bring it full membership. Nonetheless, at a time when the EU is pressed hard in energy security, Turkey’s geography apparently does pay some dividends. Responding to Erdogan’s call for help against the EU members blocking negotiations, Barroso promised his full support to start talks on the frozen chapters moving again.

    If both Erdogan and Barroso can keep their promises, the former delivering on postponed reforms and the latter removing internal EU obstacles, Turkish-EU relations may experience a new phase of dynamism, similar to that from 2002 to 2005.

    https://jamestown.org/program/european-energy-security-and-nabucco-occupy-a-central-place-in-erdogans-brussels-trip/

  • Where Will Turkish-Israeli Relations Go After Gaza?

    Where Will Turkish-Israeli Relations Go After Gaza?

    Where Will Turkish-Israeli Relations Go After Gaza?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 11
    January 19, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    As Israel’s only ally in the region, increasingly vocal criticism from Ankara and the streets of Turkey about the operations in Gaza raises questions about the future of Turkish-Israeli relations. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had refused to talk to Israeli leaders before a ceasefire was reached. Nonetheless, in response to growing calls from across the political spectrum for breaking off ties with Israel or imposing sanctions, Erdogan said that this was out of question, stressing that Turkey could not afford the political consequences of such a decision (Anadolu Ajansi, January 17).

    Likewise, on a live TV show Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan ruled out severing diplomatic relations with Israel, because such a populist move would not serve regional stability and would undermine Turkey’s mediation attempts by closing channels of communication. Nonetheless, Babacan confirmed earlier press reports that he had refused to meet Israeli Foreign Minister “Tzipi” Livni, who wanted to visit Ankara. Babacan told Livni on the phone that unless she wanted to discuss conditions for a ceasefire, “it did not make sense to pay a good-intentions visit” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 16). Earlier, Babacan had indirectly criticized American support for Israel, by saying, “Israel will continue its operations as long as it gets a green light from some countries” (www.kanaldhaner.com, January 15).

    Erdogan uses every opportunity to express his criticism of Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the silence of the international community. He has addressed large public gatherings, such as party meetings preceding municipal elections, which have been important forums for airing his views on Gaza. During a party congress, for instance, he questioned the silence of the international community over Israel’s disregard of numerous UN Security Council resolutions (www.cnnturk.com, January 16). Similarly, when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Ankara on Friday, Erdogan told him that Turkey had expected the UN to be more proactive (Star, January 17).

    Before his departure to Brussels on Sunday, Erdogan called on the Western leaders to demonstrate a resolute attitude toward Israel. Criticizing international efforts to reach a settlement by excluding Hamas from the negotiation table, Erdogan maintained that “Hamas is a party that won elections. The West, which has failed to respect Hamas’s democratic openings, is responsible for the current situation” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, January 18).

    When addressing the representatives of the Turkish community in Brussels, the developments in Gaza and Turkish diplomatic efforts again occupied a central place. Although he found Israel’s unilateral declaration of a ceasefire important, he said that the continuing presence of Israeli forces in Gaza was an issue of concern and asked Israel to give assurances that it would allow uninterrupted humanitarian aid. Referring to Hamas’s decision to halt its military activities, Erdogan maintained that the new situation approximated what he had sought to achieve through his earlier diplomatic initiatives (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 18).

    Erdogan’s claim of credit for Turkey’s contributions to regional diplomacy is not baseless. Despite its critical tone toward Israel, Ankara has maintained ties with both parties to the conflict, hoping to find a peaceful solution. In addition to its own diplomatic efforts (EDM, January 5), Turkey has supported the Egyptian plan of January 6, which was also backed by France and called for an end to violence first, followed by talks on allowing access into Gaza and ensuring the security of Gaza’s borders.

    In the run up to Sunday’s Sharm el-Sheikh summit, co-hosted by Egypt and France, a Turkish delegation led by Ahmet Davutoglu shuttled between Cairo and Damascus meeting with Hamas leaders in Syria in an effort to mediate between the parties. On Friday, Turkey had offered the parties its own draft agreement for a ceasefire, which Babacan called a “solid offer.” On Saturday the Turkish delegation told reporters that parties were close to a mutual understanding on the terms of a ceasefire. On Sunday Israel and then Hamas declared a ceasefire (Anadolu Ajansi, January 17).

    President Abdullah Gul represented Turkey at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, which was also attended by leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Germany, Spain, Britain, Italy, and the Czech Republic, as well as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Secretaries General of the UN and Arab League. Gul welcomed the conclusions of the summit but asked Israel to pull out from Gaza entirely and to lift the embargo. He also emphasized the need to reach reconciliation between Palestinian factions for a sustainable peace in the region, which Turkey had advocated since the beginning of the crisis (Hurriyet, January 19).

    Although following the summit the European leaders went to Israel to a dinner hosted by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Gul returned to Ankara. Turkish reporters speculated that Gul had not been on the invitation list and interpreted this as Israel’s grave disrespect toward Turkey (www.stargundem.com, January 18). Gul, however, dismissed these claims and maintained that the European leaders went to Israel to discuss the details of an earlier deal between Israel and the United States, which would regulate American involvement in monitoring the border crossings between Gaza and Egypt (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January 18).

    Since the beginning of the crisis, Turkey has said that it was ready to send troops to the region as part of an international force to monitor either a ceasefire or patrol the border between Gaza and Egypt in order to allay Israel’s concerns about weapons smuggling. Gul told reporters that there had been no decision to for such an international force in Sharm el-Sheikh. As a matter of fact, specific arrangements for monitoring weapons traffic remained unresolved at the summit, with French President Nicolas Sarkozy pledging that the European leaders would provide Egypt and Israel with the necessary technical, military, and naval assistance.

    Gul also emphasized that Turkish-Israeli relations would continue, although Turkey would not hesitate to criticize Israel’s blatant human rights violations, which outraged the entire Turkish population. He maintained that such misguided policies were the greatest threat to Israel’s own security and noted that the Palestinian problem was the source of many problems throughout the world. He asked the incoming Obama administration to contribute to the peace process, noting that “the just and determined involvement of the United States will go a long way toward a long-term resolution of the problem” (ANKA, January 18).

    Turkey’s policy toward the Israeli invasion of Gaza continues to reverberate in its external relations. Whereas Erdogan is praised by people in Muslim countries (EDM, January 15), Ankara is criticized by Western observers who view the recent developments as potentially damaging to Turkey’s relations with the West. According to Dr. Ian Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, although Turkey’s initiatives are worthy of praise, by departing from “the transatlantic consensus on how to deal with Hamas,” Turkey “loses credibility as an interlocutor” (Hurriyet Daily News, January 18).

    https://jamestown.org/program/where-will-turkish-israeli-relations-go-after-gaza/

  • Turkey Is Optimistic About Nabucco as Budapest Summit Approaches

    Turkey Is Optimistic About Nabucco as Budapest Summit Approaches

    Turkey Is Optimistic About Nabucco as Budapest Summit Approaches

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 10
    January 16, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    In the midst of the gas transit row between Russia and Ukraine and discussions on diversifying the continent’s energy supplies, Turkey is pleased to see an opportunity for itself.

    Turkey is seeking a mediating role in the diplomatic standoff between Russia and Ukraine. Following his visit to Moscow, Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler told reporters that Turkey’s talks with the two parties were continuing and it was ready to mediate, if necessary by hosting a meeting in Turkey. Noting that some Balkan countries that were hit by the crisis, such as Bulgaria, were demanding gas from Turkey, he announced that Ankara was holding talks for building alternative supply routes to them. It will be similar to Turkey’s exports to Greece and might help these countries weather future energy interruptions. Guler also was content that the importance of the Nabucco project for diversifying Europe’s energy supplies was appreciated. He told reporters that Turkey was determined to realize this project, and concrete steps to make it operational would be taken soon (Anadolu Ajansi, January 15).

    Ahead of the Nabucco summit to be hosted by Hungary this month, it appears that Turkey’s hand has been strengthened. Despite calls for prioritizing energy security following a similar crisis in 2006, the EU has failed to reduce energy dependence, which has raised questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s energy policy (Hurriyet, January 15). The latest Russian-Ukrainian crisis prompted a debate on diversifying both sources and gas transportation routes through alternative pipelines. The EU and Russia now have incentives to support projects that bypass Ukraine. Gazprom’s Nord Stream and South Stream projects, under the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, respectively, are in progress. Since South Stream is a rival to the Nabucco project and European countries have differing preferences, it will be interesting to observe how pipeline politics develop.

    The Nabucco project, originally projected to open in 2013, will carry gas from the Caspian basin, the Middle East, and Egypt to Europe by routes stretching through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary and terminating at the Baumgarten hub in Austria. The 3,300-km (1,980-mile) project is expected to cost approximately €7.9 billion ($10.5 billion) (www.nabucco-pipeline.com).

    Nabucco has gained increasing favor because of efforts to open European access to the resources of the Caspian (EDM, January 6). The Czech Republic, which currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency, is intent on speeding up the preparations for Nabucco. Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek proposed that the EU make the realization of the project a top priority (www.trt.net.tr, January 14). Nonetheless, other EU members such as Italy back South Stream (EDM, June 25, 2007).

    One major obstacle to the project has been whether the consortium can secure enough gas to make the project feasible. Turkey, hoping to project itself as a major player in gas markets through Nabucco, has worked hard to find sufficient gas resources. Its efforts to bring Turkmenistan on board did not produce any results in mid-2008 (www.asam.org.tr, May 2, 2008), because of Turkmenistan’s contracts with Russia, and concerns about transporting the gas across the Caspian Sea. A trilateral summit between the presidents of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey in late November 2008, however, was interpreted as “quiet support” for the Nabucco project (EDM, December 1). Since then, European leaders have also been encouraging Turkmenistan to join the project. Recently it was suggested that the prospects for realizing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) had increased, particularly following the Russian-Ukrainian dispute. Although “the route and means for Turkmenistan’s gas to cross the Caspian Sea has not yet been decided,” it is claimed that the TCGP could be integrated into Nabucco (www.isn.ethz.ch, January 15). Nonetheless, Turkmenistan has yet to commit gas exports to Europe through Nabucco.

    Currently, the only supplier that is committed to Nabucco is Azerbaijan. Turkey has been pushing for including Iranian gas in the project, but the diplomatic standoff between Iran and the West over the Iranian nuclear issue raises questions about the likelihood of connecting Iranian Tabriz-Erzurum gas pipeline to Nabucco. Moreover, the reliability of Iran is also unclear, given the problems Turkey has encountered in its imports from Iran in the past. Turkey also hopes to connect gas from Iraq and Egypt to the Nabucco line.

    Turkey had even raised the possibility of Russia joining the Nabucco project. During his visit to Moscow in February 2008, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan invited his Russian counterpart to join the project (Turkish Daily News, February 21, 2008; EDM, February 28, 2008). Later, Guler argued that the South Stream and Nabucco projects could be combined (Today’s Zaman, March 21, 2008). Nonetheless, Russian officials continued to scorn Nabucco for being infeasible.

    Another concern is whether this ambitious project could be completed, given the global economic crisis. Reinhard Mitschek, Managing Director of Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH, maintained that “the actual situation of the markets is more or less a benefit for projects like Nabucco.” As positive developments, he referred to falling steel prices and the willingness of banks to support long-term infrastructure projects in times of crisis (www.nabucco-pipeline.com, January 9).

    Turkey’s demands from other shareholders (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Germany, and Austria), particularly those relating to the pricing mechanism, have been considered another obstacle by experts (EDM, December 12). Speaking after a working meeting in Istanbul on January 13, Mitschek maintained that the parties were close to signing the intergovernmental agreement, emphasizing consensus among countries involved in the construction project about how to “share the benefits and risks of the project equally, each owning a 16.6 percent stake in the project.” Mitschek argued that its flexibility in receiving gas from many sources and being open to different partners and commercial models was what gave Nabucco a competitive advantage over its rivals. He also counted the many benefits of the project to Turkey but said that “we should not mix the two issues. Our consortium is about the transmission of the gas, not about the trading of gas” (Today’s Zaman, Hurriyet Daily News, Milliyet, January 14).

    Guler told reporters that Turkey had submitted its own draft of the intergovernmental agreement to its partners and was awaiting their response (Cihan Haber Ajansi, January 15). Nonetheless, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has not confirmed that he will take part in the Budapest summit. Disagreements over Turkey’s demands, as well intra-EU bargaining, are likely to continue until the leaders meet on January 27.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-is-optimistic-about-nabucco-as-budapest-summit-approaches/

  • Can Egemen Bagis Revive Turkey’s Stalled EU Accession Process?

    Can Egemen Bagis Revive Turkey’s Stalled EU Accession Process?

    Can Egemen Bagis Revive Turkey’s Stalled EU Accession Process?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 6
    January 12, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan selected Istanbul parliamentary deputy Egemen Bagis as the new chief negotiator for Turkey’s membership negotiations with the European Union. Erdogan also moved the Secretariat General for EU Affairs (ABGS) from the Foreign Ministry to the Prime Minister’s office under Bagis, who was promoted to the rank of state minister (www.cnnturk.com, January 9, 10). The move came amid criticism that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government had stalled the EU accession process.

    The post of chief negotiator was previously held by the current Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, who had filled that position at the same time as his other ministerial appointments in the successive AKP governments. Since the beginning of the memberships talks with the EU in 2005, Babacan acted as the chief negotiator parallel to his positions as economics minister and later foreign minister. The government’s reluctance to appoint a “full-time” negotiator had been a constant source of criticism and was taken by the pro-reform circles as a sign of the low priority that the government attached to the EU project. Especially since Babacan’s assumption of the post of foreign minister, it has been clear that this double assignment was unsustainable, as it became increasingly difficult for Babacan to fulfill his responsibilities as chief negotiator. At the beginning of 2008, Babacan said “2008 will be the year of the EU; you will be surprised [by our reforms]” (Sabah, February 3, 2008). As 2008 closed, however, Turkish-EU relations hit a low point, with no major reform recorded on critical issues. For reformists, 2008 was a lost year (Taraf, December 31, 2008).

    Indeed, myriad international crises taking place in Turkey’s neighborhood engulfed Babacan’s agenda. Turkey’s policy of asserting itself as a major actor in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus coincided with its new role as a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Leading Turkish experts interpreted this growing foreign policy activism as essentially detrimental to the EU project.

    Having identified a trend among Turkey’s political elite of declining enthusiasm for “full membership” and a growing preference for “privileged partnership,” Ziya Onis, a professor of international relations, argued that “The counterpart of this in the foreign policy realm is an approach based on ‘soft Euro-Asianism’ in which … an attempt is made to develop a friendly relationship with all neighboring countries but without the EU providing the main axis or the reference point for foreign policy” (“Recent Foreign Policy Attitudes in Turkey,” DIIS Brief, November 2008).

    In a December 2008 Report, the International Crisis Group maintained that 2009 would be the “make or break” year. The report expected both sides’ attitude at this critical threshold to determine the future direction of Turkey’s European Union vacation, and presented two alternative paths: a breakthrough or a collapse of membership talks. Though recognizing the EU’s own mistakes, the report put the blame for the poor status of relations on the Turkish government’s failure to keep up with the EU’s reform expectations (“Turkey and Europe: The Decisive Year Ahead,” International Crisis Group, Report No: 197, December 15, 2008, www.crisisgroup.org).

    The urgency placed on the year 2009 stems from the fact that the EU will review Turkey’s progress on the issue of ports this year, which is viewed by some as a de facto ultimatum. In 2006 the EU suspended negotiations on eight chapters, because Turkey refused to open its air and sea ports to Greek Cypriot vessels. Babacan had earlier played down the EU pressure and rejected treating this review as an ultimatum. He instead pointed his finger at the EU for stalling in the accession process (Zaman, December 19).

    The appointment of a state minister whose sole responsibility it is to lead membership negotiations, along with the new institutional arrangement, is taken as an indicator of the government’s decision to refocus its attention on the EU project. EU representatives welcomed Bagis’s appointment. Erdogan is scheduled to visit Brussels on January 19, the first such trip in four years (Milliyet, January 10).

    It remains to be seen, however, whether the resumption of the EU project will be geared toward full membership or whether Turkey will settle for some sort of “privileged partnership.” Erdogan’s appointment of the chief negotiator from the AKP’s own ranks, instead of a bureaucrat, and bringing the ABGS under his authority indicate his determination to maintain full control over the membership talks and proceed at the AKP’s own pace. Some observers are critical of this decision: “independent of Mr. Bagis’s appointment, [the danger] is that the government was trying to politicize its relationship with Europe and move the process away from the bureaucracy to its own appointees,” Today’s Zaman wrote (January 11).

    Since it is no secret that Euro-skeptic arguments enjoy popularity within Erdogan’s own cabinet, Bagis will have to bargain with other ministers to revitalize the accession process. One advantage he will have in this battle will be his close association with Erdogan. Since joining party before the 2002 elections, Bagis, 38, had been a member of parliament and served in the party and government in many capacities. Most importantly, he was renowned as one of Erdogan’s top advisors in foreign relations. Since the 2007 elections, he also has been the AKP’s deputy chairman for foreign affairs. With his fluency in English, Bagis has taken part in negotiations on many international problems. He received his education in American schools and worked in the United States prior to joining the party. Given this experience, he has played a major role in the conduct of Turkish-American relations. Bagis has been one of the staunchest advocates of Erdogan and has commanded his respect and support. Although Erdogan has occasionally replaced his other top aides because of political disagreements or public pressure, Bagis has managed to maintain his place in Erdogan’s close circle (Hurriyet Daily News, January 10).

    The future of Turkish-EU relations might depend on what role Bagis foresees for himself and whether he will cave in to the growing anti-EU sentiment. If he can chart an independent role as the chief negotiator and develop an assertive portfolio to revitalize the membership talks, he might be the new hero of liberal-reformists. In this case, he could use his ties to Erdogan as leverage to overcome intra-cabinet obstacles. He might as well continue to act as Erdogan’s man, in which case he is more likely to maintain the same populist attitude, continuing to blame the EU for the shortcomings in the process and avoiding major reforms.

    https://jamestown.org/program/can-egemen-bagis-revive-turkeys-stalled-eu-accession-process/

  • “We Will Not Let Our People Go Cold,” Says Turkish Energy Minister

    “We Will Not Let Our People Go Cold,” Says Turkish Energy Minister

    “We Will Not Let Our People Go Cold,” Says Turkish Energy Minister

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 4
    January 8, 2009 04:20 PM
    By: Saban Kardas

    The dispute between Russia and Ukraine over natural gas prices continues to threaten the energy supply to Europe in the midst of plunging temperatures (EDM, January 5). The disruptions caused by the row between the Russian gas company Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftohaz has already led to the halting of deliveries to many European countries that are dependent on Russian gas. Amid mutual accusations and contradictory claims by both parties, several European leaders and European Union officials have asked those involved to relax tensions (BBC News, January 7).

    As a country that depends heavily on natural gas for electricity production and household heating, Turkey is also discussing the implications of the crisis. Turkey’s gas imports from Russia amount to 65 percent of its total needs of 135 million cubic meters (MCM) per day. Turkey imports 40 MCM of gas from Russia a day via the West pipeline passing through Ukraine and Bulgaria and another 35 MCM through the Blue Stream pipeline underneath the Black Sea. Turkey also imports around 15 MCM of gas from Iran and 17 MCM from Azerbaijan per day. The state-owned Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) has signed various contracts to secure the import of the following amounts annually: 16 billion cubic meters (BCM) via Blue Stream, 14 BCM through the West pipeline, 10 BCM from Iran, and 6.6 BCM from Azerbaijan. Moreover, BOTAS has also signed agreements with Nigeria and Algeria for 1.2 BCM and 4 BCM, respectively, of liquefied natural gas (LNG) (Cumhuriyet, January 7).

    The International Energy Agency (IEA) maintains that if the gas supply and winter conditions remain unchanged, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece may face problems (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January7). Since Turkey already confronted a similar crisis in 2006, it has had greater experience in learning how to deal with these types of shortages.

    At the beginning of the crisis, representatives from BOTAS and the Energy Ministry announced that the Ukrainian crisis was not affecting Turkey and the gas flow from both West line and Blue Stream, as well as from Iran, was continuing. They also noted that Turkey did not expect a cutoff in the West line but that there were contingency plans in case this did happen. BOTAS officials noted that the underground tanks were full and Turkey could increase the capacity of Blue Stream up to 50 MCM by activating a compressor station in Corum (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January 2).

    When the news about Russia’s decision to cut off gas to Ukraine arrived, Energy Minister Hilmi Guler told reporters that gas supplies from the West pipeline had been completely halted. Guler also noted that the gas supplies from Blue Stream would soon be increased to 48 MCM per day. He assured the Turkish public, “We will not let our people go cold” (Anadolu Ajansi, January 6).

    Guler announced that Turkey had already started to implement some precautions. First, the ministry asked the power stations producing electricity from natural gas to switch to secondary fuels. Although Reuters reported that in three stations electricity production had been halted (Hurriyet Daily News, January 8), energy officials have denied these claims, saying that production was continuing normally (Cihan Haber Ajansi, January 8).

    Moreover, if the supply shortages continue, the ministry plans to cut gas delivery to industrial facilities producing their own electricity from natural gas that is sold at subsidized prices. Since falling industrial production due to the global economic crisis has already reduced Turkey’s energy consumption, such reductions would probably not create major power supply problems. Nonetheless, experts note that using alternative sources such as fuel oil to produce electricity is likely to increase production costs by up to 20 percent (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, January 7).

    Furthermore, like other countries, Turkey has started tapping strategic reserves and using LNG. Guler noted that six ships were scheduled to bring additional LNG in January; and, if need arose, Turkey would seek additional deliveries. According to official sources, if deliveries arrive as scheduled, Turkey will be unlikely to experience major shortages. At the same time, Turkey is working to expand the daily supply capacity of its underground reserve depots.

    A source from the Iranian Embassy in Ankara said that Iran was ready to increase its gas exports to Turkey to offset the shortfall, as long as Iran’s domestic consumption did not prevent it (Today’s Zaman, January 7). Minister Guler said, however, that additional supplies from Blue Stream would be enough to maintain the supply balance and that Turkey would not take up the Iranian offer. Last winter, when Iran cut exports to Turkey due to its own domestic needs, Gazprom helped avoid shortages by increasing its supplies to Turkey. Given this experience, Turkey’s reluctance to rely on the Iranian option is understandable.

    Overall, the goal of these measures is to reduce the impact of the crisis on households. Since major metropolitan areas rely on natural gas for heating, the public has become increasingly worried about these developments. In response to this concern, the IGDAS gas distribution company in Istanbul issued a statement maintaining that the gas and LNG depots supplying the city had sufficient reserves and that there were no grounds for anxiety about shortages in Istanbul (www.nethaber.com, January 6). The precautions in place have already reduced Turkey’s daily consumption from 130 MCM to 107 MCM (www.cnnturk.com, January 7).

    Despite the optimistic statements from official sources, energy expert Necdet Pamir maintains that Turkey’s reserve capacity is too limited, which makes it vulnerable to such supply shocks. Moreover, Pamir notes that switching to secondary sources for electricity production by buying LNG on spot markets incurs additional costs (www.cnnturk.com, January 7). Some experts claim, however, that under the contract between Turkey and Russia, Gazprom will have to compensate Turkey for its losses (Cihan Haber Ajansi, January 6).

    Other experts refer to the positive implications of the crisis for Turkey. Bahadir Kaleagasi, the Turkish Industry and Business Association Representative to the EU, notes that the row once again demonstrates the vulnerability of Europe’s energy supplies. The EU will come under pressure to diversify transportation routes, which will strengthen Turkey’s position in negotiations over the Nabucco project for supplying Europe with gas by means of pipelines going through Turkey (ANKA, January 7).

    https://jamestown.org/program/we-will-not-let-our-people-go-cold-says-turkish-energy-minister/

  • Erdogan Searches for Diplomatic Response to Israeli Invasion of Gaza

    Erdogan Searches for Diplomatic Response to Israeli Invasion of Gaza

    Erdogan Searches for Diplomatic Response to Israeli Invasion of Gaza

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 1
    January 5, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Israel’s ongoing offensive against Gaza has generated waves of anger among the Turkish public and Turkish political elite. Paralleling mounting street demonstrations throughout Turkey are international attempts by the country’s leaders to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The attacks came amid Turkey’s growing involvement in the Middle East as a significant power seeking to exert influence through nonmilitary means, including economic and trade relations, cultural exchanges, and its new-found role as a regional peace broker. The governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has successfully involved Turkey in attempts to resolve the region’s protracted problems, most importantly Israel’s entangled relations with its Arab neighbors.

    When Israel launched air strikes on December 27, Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the high number of civilian deaths and emphasized Turkey’s concern that the developments might undermine regional stability (www.mfa.gov.tr, December 27). Erdogan criticized the operation and labeled Israeli aggression as an act against Turkey’s peace initiatives, noting that through this action Israel had shut the door on diplomacy. He said that any diplomatic contact with Israel was meaningless at that point and called on the United Nations to intervene to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. He also cancelled his plan to call Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to discuss Israel-Syria negotiations, because Israeli aggression was also “an act of disrespect toward Turkey” (Radikal, December 27).

    Erdogan’s disillusionment with Israel can be better understood given Olmert’s visit to Ankara a few days earlier, during which they discussed the status of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and Olmert asked Erdogan to revitalize the Israeli-Syria talks (www.cnnturk.com, December 23). Erdogan was preparing to play a more assertive role as a peace-broker in 2009, but Israel’s unrestricted use of force and apparent “insincerity” toward Turkey might have shattered his optimism about finding a comprehensive solution to Middle Eastern conflicts through dialogue.

    In response to Israel’s uncompromising position, the Erdogan government embarked on a diplomatic offensive to mobilize the international community. Since the outbreak of the crisis, Erdogan has spoken to world leaders such as the UN Secretary-General and European politicians (Anadolu Ajansi, January 4). He went on a “Middle East tour” to consult with regional leaders and explore a common position against Israel. On the first step of his shuttle-diplomacy, he met with the leaders of Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, as well as Palestinian politicians. The second step of his tour took him to Saudi Arabia. Following his meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Erdogan announced Turkey’s proposal for a two-stage plan to calm tension in Gaza. The first stage would be a ceasefire supervised by international peacekeepers, including Turkish forces. The second stage would seek to find a common ground between rival Palestinian groups in order to achieve a sustainable peace in the region (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 2; Sabah, January 3).

    In the midst of these initiatives, Turkey appears to be seeking ways to bridge the divisions among Arab countries as well. While some Arab countries tend to feel that Hamas has the main responsibility for the collapse of talks with Fatah and are seeking to isolate it because of its alleged connections to Iran, Turkey is arguing against its isolation (Referans, December 30). At a time when Hamas is also coming under international criticism for sparking Israeli aggression, Erdogan defended the organization by saying that “agitation does not come from Hamas; rather, Israel has created fertile ground for this agitation.” Referring to a June 2008 deal brokered by Egypt, he maintained that “Hamas complied with the six-month long ceasefire. Yet, Israel did not lift the embargo. The people of Gaza are living in an open prison.” Erdogan went on to add that “Turkey could sponsor Hamas’s conditions for a ceasefire at the UN Security Council [UNSC], because Hamas’s trust in the Palestinian authority and Egypt has been shaken” but it still had full confidence in Turkey (Yeni Safak, January 3; www.cnnturk.com, January 4).

    Here, Erdogan had in mind Turkey’s new role as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, which it assumed this month. However, the United States’ threat to veto any resolution to halt Israeli attacks, as reflected in the January 3 consultation meeting of the SC, will not make it easy for the Erdogan government to use this avenue for supporting Palestinian interests. It is also important to note that Erdogan has repeatedly emphasized Turkey’s willingness to work in tandem with Egypt as a defender of the Palestinian cause.

    At the same time, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan met with his counterparts. He phoned the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Secretary General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, himself a Turk, and arranged an emergency meeting of the OIC Foreign Ministers (www.mfa.gov.tr, December 28). The final communiqué of the OIC meeting held on January 3 strongly condemned “the ongoing barbaric Israeli assault on the Palestinian people in Gaza” and proposed a number of measures to mobilize the international community to relieve the suffering of Palestinians and end Israel’s attacks (www.oic-oci.org, January, 3). Similarly, Turkey also urged the Arab League’s foreign ministers to work toward a ceasefire and facilitate reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas.

    The start of Israel’s ground offensive despite these efforts raises questions about the future of Turkish-Israeli relations. In response to a question, Erdogan had earlier said, “Inter-governmental relations cannot afford emotions. Yet, injustice cannot be permitted either. If there is oppression, we cannot support it. We seek to solve it through talks” (Zaman, January 2). Given Israel’s lack of interest in “talks,” on the one hand, and Turkey’s pro-Hamas position and exclusion of Israel from its diplomatic initiatives, on the other, it will be interesting to see how Erdogan will advocate Palestinian rights in international forums and whether Turkish-Israeli cooperation can survive the storm.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-searches-for-diplomatic-response-to-israeli-invasion-of-gaza/