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Category: Saban Kardas

  • One Festival, Two Celebrations: Novruz Highlights Political Tensions in Turkey

    One Festival, Two Celebrations: Novruz Highlights Political Tensions in Turkey

    One Festival, Two Celebrations: Novruz Highlights Political Tensions in Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 55
    March 23, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Novruz, marking the arrival of spring and beginning of a new year, is being celebrated in Turkey between March 20 and 24, along with other Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries. This year’s celebrations in Turkey showed that this cultural event still remains highly contested politically, and reflects Turkey’s challenges over the Kurdish question.

    Although its origins are disputed, various cultures and religious groups, including Persians, Zoroastrians, Kurds and Turkish communities in Central Asia and the Caucasus, observe Novruz, though seen as a local tradition mostly among the Kurds in Turkey. During the height of the PKK insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s, the PKK sought to politicize Novruz by organizing large-scale demonstrations, as part of its overall strategy of mobilizing Kurds against the Turkish state which, in turn, forbade Novruz celebrations. There were annual demonstrations and clashes between security forces and PKK supporters and sympathizers, trying to celebrate Novruz illegally in Istanbul and in Kurdish populated cities in Southeastern Turkey. The period preceding Novruz would often hijack the country’s agenda, caused by, in some cases, militants’ provocation of peaceful demonstrators and an overreaction by security forces resulting in violence.

    The Turkish state tried to avoid this accelerating cycle of violence, by capitalizing on growing cultural ties between Turkey and the new Turkish-speaking states in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In the mid-1990s, Turkish government officials embraced Novruz as a “Turkish festival,” emphasizing its roots in ancient Central Asian culture, and pre-Islamic Turkish mythology. Since then, state authorities have organized official gatherings, and Turkish statesmen have attended festivities, in an attempt to turn the Novruz into a national event. Recently, cabinet members indicated that they would support a parliamentary motion to declare Novruz as an official holiday (Radikal, March 4).

    Consequently the Turkish state, helped by improvements in the conditions of the Kurds, has restored the reputation of Novruz. Indeed, Turkey has taken significant steps to allow greater Kurdish minority rights, such as setting up a TV channel broadcasting in Kurdish on the state-run TRT network. Nonetheless, Novruz still remains a politically significant event for Turkey’s Kurdish population, and Kurdish nationalists resist attempts by the state to co-opt Novruz. Therefore, although scenes of violent clashes are largely absent, the political atmosphere remains tense on the eve of Novruz. This year’s celebrations took place against a similar background. Moreover, the ongoing local election campaigns increased the political importance of Novruz.

    President Abdullah Gul issued a message wishing happy Novruz to Turkey and the Turkic world. Although emphasizing Novruz as a shared tradition within the wider Turkish-speaking community, Gul noted, “Turkey is a country where people of different beliefs, languages, ethnic roots and cultures live together in peace, and which is home to different sociological realities and traditions. Our differences and diversity are our country’s greatest source of richness. Therefore, everyone will celebrate Novruz according to his own traditions” (www.cankaya.gov.tr, March 20).

    Indeed, proving Gul’s point, Novruz was celebrated “differently” across Turkey. On the one hand, public authorities including ministers and governors attended official Novruz ceremonies in major cities. Minister of Culture, Ertugrul Gunay, hosted the festivities in Ankara, where he called on the Turkish people to forget the bad memories of the past and celebrate such festivals in a spirit of tolerance. Gunay and his guests, including U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey, performed Novruz rituals and jumped over bonfires (www.ntvmsnbc.com, March 21).

    On the other hand, the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) organized activities in around fifty cities, and turned the celebrations into political rallies ahead of local elections. The party leader Ahmet Turk and other party officials travelled to different cities to attend these meetings. The DTP staged a demonstration in Diyarbakir on March 21, which it claimed to be the largest-scale Novruz celebration in the Middle East. Although Kurdish news sources claimed that around one million people attended the meeting (ANF News Agency, March 21), Diyarbakir governorship reported that only 75,000 participated (www.tempo24.com, March 22). During the demonstrations participants carried pictures of Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the outlawed PKK, and chanted his name.

    On March 21, Novruz was celebrated across Turkey through several gatherings organized either by the state or the DTP. Yet, the risk of violence at these demonstrations may have forced the police to increase security measures. Since pressures increased on the PKK to seek a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem, the PKK has disavowed the use of violence during these celebrations (ANF News Agency, March 20). Some feared that splinter groups within the PKK not wanting to end the armed struggle might seek to incite violence (Bugun, March 19). Indeed, Turkish police in Istanbul caught a group of PKK militants with plastic explosives, allegedly plotting attacks aimed at igniting social unrest (Cihan Haber Ajansi, March 31). In many celebrations, the authorities did not interfere with either speeches or songs in Kurdish. Security forces arrested some people for carrying emblems of Ocalan and the PKK, but overall the festivities were relatively peaceful.

    Turkey’s handling of Novruz with relative calm marks an improvement on previous years. But this also conceals two underlying political tensions. First, despite the Turkish state’s attempts to make Novruz a national festivity, two parallel sets of celebrations in fact reflected continued divisions within Turkish society. Second, the calm revealed ongoing uncertainty about the future of the Kurdish problem. Turkey is currently debating how a peaceful solution to this question might be achieved (EDM, March 17). Novruz demonstrations showed once again that Kurdish nationalists avoid accepting any solution to the Kurdish problem which excludes the PKK and Ocalan. Nor is it clear to what extent Turkey can accommodate these demands. For now, these issues are in abeyance, but such tensions could resurface after the local elections on March 29.

    https://jamestown.org/program/one-festival-two-celebrations-novruz-highlights-political-tensions-in-turkey/

  • Turkey’s Party Closure Laws

    Turkey’s Party Closure Laws

    European Criticism of Turkey’s Party Closure Laws Reignites Debate on Constitutional Reforms

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 52
    March 18, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Two recent reports by European institutions reignited the debate over political reforms that Turkey needs to undertake to bring its democratic practices up to European standards. The European Parliament (EP) and the Venice Commission criticized Turkey’s reluctance to continue with constitutional reforms, in particular its failure to amend the law on political party closures. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, in response, signaled that it would introduce a new constitutional reform package following the local elections.

    On March 12 the EP adopted a resolution on Turkey’s progress toward EU accession. After acknowledging Turkey’s efforts to reform the political system, the EP members expressed their concern about the “continuing slowdown of the reform process” since 2005. The report noted various areas in which further political reforms were needed, especially stressing the laws on closing down political parties. It called on the government to resume efforts to write a new civilian constitution (www.europarl.europa.eu, March 12).

    On March 13 the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe held a plenary session, during which it reviewed whether Turkish laws on the dissolution of political parties complied with European democratic standards. The commission concluded that “the general threshold is too low, both for initiating procedures and for prohibiting or dissolving parties. This is in itself in abstracto deviating from common European democratic standards.” The Commission praised the 2001 constitutional revisions, yet found them inadequate for protecting political parties. It too advised Turkey to seek a new constitutional reform that would amend legal provisions on regulating party closures (www.venice.coe.int; March 13).

    Both reports expressed concern about the fact that the Turkish judiciary frequently filed lawsuits for the closure of political parties, in some cases even against parties represented in parliament. Two major cases are significant. Last year, the AKP faced dissolution on the grounds that it had become the center of anti-secular activities. By a narrow vote the Constitutional Court decided not to shut down the party but nevertheless punished it by cutting in half the aid it received from the treasury. Since the fate of the incumbent party was at stake, the entire case posed a major threat to the stability of the Turkish political system. Similarly, the Constitutional Court is reviewing whether to shut down the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) on charges of separatism. The DTP’s predecessors were closed down by the court, which heightened tension in the country and posed major setbacks to a democratic resolution of the Kurdish issue. If the court rules in favor of closure in the case against the DTP, the exclusion of the party from the parliamentary processes is likely to avert a democratic presentation of Kurdish demands and undermine Turkey’s achievements in solving the Kurdish question.

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose party suffered from closure threats and has been considering changing the constitution, capitalized on these reports during the local election campaign. He announced that the AKP would return to the issue of constitutional reform after the elections. Rather than proposing a new constitution, he said, the government would introduce a package of partial amendments in four areas. If the amendments are accepted, individuals will be granted the right to apply to the Constitutional Court to challenge the constitutionality of laws, a post of ombudsman will be created to monitor state activities, and laws on political parties and elections will be changed (ANKA, March 13; Hurriyet Daily News, March 17). With regard to party closures, Erdogan later explained that the government would seek to bring Turkish regulations in line with the criteria established by the Venice Commission. He specifically stressed that parties not engaged in violence should function freely and not be punished for crimes committed by individual members (Sabah, March 15; Zaman, March 17).

    This was not the first time Erdogan had raised the issue of constitutional changes. Earlier, he had said that the government would start talks with the opposition parties to discuss a new civilian constitution following local elections. Representatives of the opposition did not, however, find Erdogan’s proposal sincere and refused to cooperate with the AKP (www.haber3.com, February 14).

    Herein lies the main obstacle to constitutional amendments: how to build the necessary political coalition for reforms. Not only European institutions but also most Turkish political observers agree that both the 1982 constitution, a leftover of the 1980 coup, and party closure practices are in need of revision; but without the support of the opposition, particularly the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the government is not in a position to go ahead with political reform and be sure that any changes will not be revoked by the Constitutional Court. The real question, therefore, is whether political parties can find consensus on a process for introducing new constitutional changes.

    Following the AKP’s landslide victory in the 2007 parliamentary elections, Erdogan promised that it would embrace all of Turkey and change the constitution in order to reduce growing polarization in the country. The AKP has failed, however, to generate trust among different segments of society. Nor could it find common ground with the opposition parties to introduce a new constitution. An attempt by the AKP to revise the constitution ended up in a dispute over the headscarf issue and sparked the closure case against the party. Since then, the chances for reforming the constitution have diminished even further. Democratic reforms have been given a lower priority on the AKP’s agenda, while polarization in society and among political parties has continued. The aggressive campaigns of the party leaders in the run-up to the local elections have increasingly pitted them against each other and undermined mutual trust.

    Delivering on constitutional reforms might indeed help Erdogan revitalize the EU membership process and gain him political support at home; but he appears to have lost credibility in the eyes of the opposition for embarking on such a move and will have a hard time building bridges. At this juncture, a “reconciliation commission” proposed by the parliamentary speaker, Koksal Toptan, could provide a possible strategy (www.cnnturk.com, March 13). The success of a new constitutional amendment package might hinge on Toptan’s ability to convince party leaders to put aside their differences and continue work on the necessary reforms.

    https://jamestown.org/program/european-criticism-of-turkeys-party-closure-laws-reignites-debate-on-constitutional-reforms/

  • Turkish Economic Stimulus Package Foresees Temporary Tax Cuts in Automotive and Other Sectors

    Turkish Economic Stimulus Package Foresees Temporary Tax Cuts in Automotive and Other Sectors

    Turkish Economic Stimulus Package Foresees Temporary Tax Cuts in Automotive and Other Sectors

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 50
    March 16, 2009 12:49 PM
    By: Saban Kardas

    The Turkish government announced a comprehensive economic stimulus package on Friday. The decision comes against the background of deteriorating economic indicators that signal a serious recession and mounting pressure from market players for the government to act swiftly to alleviate the crisis. Industrial production showed a record decline in January, falling 21.3 percent from the previous year (www.tuik.gov.tr, March 9). Accompanying drops in capacity utilization and growth figures and the rapid devaluation of the Turkish lira further exacerbated concerns about the economy.

    The International Investors Association of Turkey (YASED) published the results of a recent survey conducted among its members. Investors shared pessimistic expectations for the Turkish economy in 2009 and anticipated a recovery only in 2010. Among the measures they expected to be taken were the introduction of an urgent economic package and the conclusion of a loan agreement with the IMF (www.yased.org.tr, March 11).

    The government previously had maintained that the Turkish economy was better equipped than that of other countries to deal with the global financial crisis and would be able to survive the storm. The government therefore adopted a reluctant attitude toward negotiations with the IMF and sought to address the crisis with its own methods. It previously introduced three smaller packages, which did not satisfy expectations. Until now the most serious measure adopted by Ankara to avoid a recession was the decision made by the Central Bank in February to lower its benchmark interest rates to a record low of 11.5 percent. This move, however, was not sufficient enough to address the mounting economic problems in Turkey (Hurriyet Daily News, March 12).

    The government appears to have acknowledged that irrespective of the Turkish economy’s strengths, shrinking world markets and the resulting contraction in foreign and domestic demand remain the main challenges and that more serious measures are needed to stimulate the economy. On March 13 the government announced a package of economic measures amounting to 5.5 billion Turkish liras ($3.2 billion). The package will introduce temporary tax cuts for three months in the housing, home appliances, and automotive sectors. The new regulations will lower the private consumption tax rates (OTV) on the automotive sector and remove the OTV completely on home appliances, while the value added tax (VAT) on apartments over 150 square meters (1,614 square feet) in size will be lowered from 18 to 8 percent. The package also foresees measures to boost exports by allocating an additional 500 million liras ($296 million) to Eximbank, a state-owned bank geared to supporting exporters (Anadolu Ajansi, March 13). Pending cabinet approval, the package is expected to be put into force within the week (Anadolu Ajansi, March 15).

    The new tax regulations seek to stimulate domestic demand in Turkey’s leading industries. Industry Minister Zafer Caglayan explained the details of the reduction of the OTV on motor vehicles and said that it might be implemented as early as Monday. For automobiles with engines of up to 1,600 cubic centimeters, OTV will be reduced from 37 percent to 18 percent, and for vehicles with engines of between 1,600 and 2,000 cubic centimeters, it will be reduced from 6o percent to 40 percent (Anadolu Ajansi, March 15).

    The representatives of major automobile producers had been expecting the government to make such a decision for some time, and overall they welcomed this development. They noted, however, that although the package might relieve the sector’s problems temporarily by helping reduce the current inventory, it would be insufficient alone to solve the structural demand-side problems of the sector. Representatives from other economic areas also pointed out that given the three-month time limit on the tax cuts, the package would fall short of expectations and fail to stimulate the economy in the long run. Representatives of the housing sector noted that since only 5 percent of Turkey’s total real estate consisted of homes of more than 150 square meters, reducing the VAT on property was not likely to have a major effect. The VAT on houses with fewer than 150 square meters is already 1 percent (www.ntvmsnbc.com, March 13).

    In a related development, Turkey held direct talks with the IMF after a long break. Although the market players believe that an agreement with the IMF is urgently needed to restore confidence in the Turkish economy and reduce the volatility in financial markets, the government balked at such an accord. Turkey maintained that the conditions set forth by the IMF were “unacceptable” and against the country’s national interests, and indefinitely suspended direct talks with the IMF (EDM, January 29; February 18).

    The IMF announced last week that it had forwarded new proposals to Turkey regarding three issues that had caused disagreements, and Economy Minister Mehmet Simsek said that the IMF had acted more flexibly toward Turkish sensitivities. The reports boosted the markets, helping the lira regain its strength after hitting an all-time low against the dollar (www.yurthaber.com, March 12). A Turkish delegation led by Simsek attended the G-20 Summit in London, where they met with IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn and First Deputy Managing Director John Lipsk. Upon his return to Turkey, Simsek told reporters that Turkey and the IMF had agreed on consultations and to exchange opinions on the new offer. Noting that Turkey and the IMF had an agreement of principle, Simsek stated that Turkey had taken the IMF’s benchmarks into account in introducing its own package and would be mindful of the medium-term financial implications of such short-term measures (Cihan Haber Ajansi, March 15).

    It remains unclear how Turkey will finance the stimulus package, especially with further tax cuts; and a growing budget deficit set to increase this year. Nor is it clear at this stage whether incentives on consumption alone can really boost the economy without complementary measures to improve consumers’ income or decrease unemployment. Following local elections at the end of March, Turkey might finally go ahead and conclude the IMF loan agreement. With the IMF concerned about maintaining budgetary discipline and business circles seeking a more comprehensive economic recovery package, it is difficult to see how the government will find a middle road that will satisfy both parties.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-economic-stimulus-package-foresees-temporary-tax-cuts-in-automotive-and-other-sectors/

  • Human Rights in Turkey: Old Wine in a New Bottle?

    Human Rights in Turkey: Old Wine in a New Bottle?

    Human Rights in Turkey: Old Wine in a New Bottle?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 47
    March 11, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish media coverage of the “U.S. State Department’s 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” highlights how human rights issues might fall victim to domestic political discussions and strategic calculations. As in previous years the 2008 report on Turkey, despite identifying the progress achieved by the Turkish government, also emphasized the areas in which serious problems remained. Among other issues, the report referred to the rise in documented cases of torture, unlawful killings by security forces, poor conditions in prisons, interference in judiciary independence, limitations on the freedom of expression, restrictions on non-Muslim groups, violence against women, child marriages, and corruption (www.state.gov, February 25).

    Turkey’s mainstream media outlets that are critical of the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), especially those controlled by the Dogan Media Group (DMG), covered the report more extensively than in previous years. In particular, they highlighted parts of the report that condemned the government’s activities that allegedly contravened freedom of expression and created an environment of self-censorship for the media. Indeed, the report cited Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s lawsuits against journalists and cartoonists, his row with the DMG, and the fact that several large companies owning news agencies had instructed their journalists not to criticize the government for fear of losing business.

    Attention to the report in the Turkish media has as much to do with its timing and the ongoing political discussions in the country as it does with the report’s intrinsic merits. The AKP government has been engaged in a fight with the DMG, which is unlikely to ease anytime soon (EDM, February 20). Against this background, the report’s criticism of certain practices provided much-needed ammunition to the DMG’s struggle against the government. The DMG used the report to make a case that the group’s own criticisms of government policies were not a result of parochial business interests but rather were objective assessments. Even liberal columnist Mustafa Akyol, a supporter of Erdogan, concluded that “the prime minister needs a moment of reflection and self-criticism. He needs to soften his rhetoric and rationalize his focus” (Hurriyet Daily News, March 5).

    In response, Erdogan maintained that the heavy dose of censure in the report was a result of “an international campaign” by certain circles. Without naming the DMG, he was implying that the media group was behind this campaign. “I will ask Hillary Clinton about the report,” Erdogan added, referring to his forthcoming meeting with Clinton on March 7 (Taraf, March 1).

    It is no surprise that Erdogan’s attitude came under attack. Sedat Ergin claimed that the report had been prepared a long time before the recent tax row, and Erdogan’s accusation of an “international campaign” by the DMG was simply nonsense (Milliyet, March 6). Likewise, Burak Bekdil noted that Erdogan had continuously preferred to ignore the DMG’s critical news coverage by claiming that the DMG’s critical viewpoint was in line with that of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). Arguing that the correctness of the DMG’s stance was affirmed by the report, Bekdil maintained that the organization followed a neutral line. Bekdil then sought to ridicule Erdogan, saying, “Apparently, the CHP partisans have not only infiltrated the DMG but also crossed the Atlantic and successfully penetrated the U.S. State Department” (Hurriyet Daily News, March 4).

    During his private meeting with Clinton (EDM, March 9), Erdogan indeed raised this issue. According to Hurriyet, the flagship publication of the DMG, Clinton said that references to democracy, freedom of the press, and human rights reflected the high value Washington placed on these institutions; and she added that freedom of the press was an essential part of democracy (Hurriyet, March 7; Vatan, March 8).

    Other media outlets concluded, however, that Clinton had failed to challenge Erdogan on this issue forcefully. In an interview with CNNTurk, Clinton confirmed that she had discussed the report with Erdogan. Noting that such reports were prepared annually, Clinton said, “I fully understand…no politician ever likes the press criticizing them…overall…we think that Turkey has made tremendous progress in freedom of speech and freedom of religion and human rights, and we’re proud of that” (www.cnnturk.com, March 8). This tacit support for Erdogan was strongly criticized by The Washington Post, which wrote that Clinton had put economic and strategic interests before human rights advocacy and undermined the State Department’s efforts in this area (The Washington Post, March 10).

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, in an interview with NTV, attributed the publicity about the report to efforts by the DMG, without naming it, and noted that it was not a major item during the Erdogan-Clinton meeting. He went on to say that “The State Department too could make a mistake. This is not a report written by Clinton herself; it was written by lower-ranking officials, and there is no need to make a big fuss about it” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, March 8).

    The controversy over the coverage of the report shows how the commitment to human rights on the part of Turkish political actors remains tenuous. When it suits their agenda, they do not hesitate to benefit from coalitions they built with worldwide human rights and democracy advocacy networks to exert pressure on their opponents. When international criticism works against their interests, however, they denounce other groups’ resorting to similar tactics of using international leverage and label them as insignificant, or manipulated.

    https://jamestown.org/program/human-rights-in-turkey-old-wine-in-a-new-bottle/

  • Turkish-American “Strategic Partnership”: On the Way to Rejuvenation?

    Turkish-American “Strategic Partnership”: On the Way to Rejuvenation?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 45 March 9, 2009 01:42 PM Age: 3 hrs Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Foreign Policy, Turkey, Home Page, Featured By: Saban Kardas

    U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (left) greets Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan (Photo: EPA)

    U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Ankara on Saturday, the highest-level direct contact between the administration of President Barack Obama and the Turkish government so far, highlighted the value each side places on sustaining the Turkish-American partnership. In addition to her meetings with President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Clinton met with Foreign Minister Ali Babacan after which the two held a press briefing and made a joint statement about strengthening the bilateral relationship. Clinton also visited Ataturk’s mausoleum in Ankara and appeared on a popular show on the private NTV channel.

    The joint declaration stated that the parties “reaffirmed the strong bonds of alliance, solidarity, and strategic partnership…as well as the commitment of both countries to the principles of peace, democracy, freedom, and prosperity enshrined in the Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue document agreed to in July 2006” (www.turkey.usembassy.gov, March 7).

    Clinton had a chance to discuss a wide range of issues with Turkish officials including the Middle East peace process, Iraq, Afghanistan, energy security, the global financial crisis, terrorism, developments in the Balkans and the Caucasus, Turkey’s EU membership process, and the Cyprus problem. The continuing discussions on using Turkish territory as a possible route for US troops leaving Iraq reportedly occupied the major part of Clinton’s agenda during her private discussions with Erdogan and other Turkish officials (ANKA, March 8). In response to a question about Turkey’s possible role in the U.S. withdrawal plans, Clinton noted that the process was still in its initial phases and Washington would maintain discussions with Turkey on the subject. Babacan repeated his earlier remarks on the issue, emphasizing that talks at the technical level were already underway and that Turkey had a constructive approach to the subject (Anatolian News Agency, March 7).

    Another major item discussed was Turkey’s contributions to resolving conflicts in the region. Clinton reiterated American appreciation of Turkey’s role with regard to the Palestine issue and the indirect talks between Syria and Israel. Both sides said that they would work together to achieve a comprehensive and sustainable peace in the region. Likewise, Clinton expressed her country’s support for the process of reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia that Ankara initiated. Clinton also noted that Washington found Gul’s visit to Iran this week important (Sabah, March 8). Although some Turkish sources speculated that Gul might have carried messages from Washington to Tehran (Hurriyet, March 9), this has yet to be confirmed officially.

    Overall, statements from both sides stress that the two parties had useful discussions and found mutual ground on issues of common concern, which might herald a new era in Turkish-American relations. Achieving consensus on strategic matters aside, a major roadblock in Turkish-American relations has been the public animosity toward the United States and how to reverse the anti-Americanism that became strongly engrained in the Turkish body politic during the Bush years. Cognizant of these challenges, the American side did its best to appeal to the Turkish people, as reflected in Clinton’s appearance on a TV show targeting female viewers (EDM, March; www.ntvmsnbc.com, March 7).

    Likewise, Clinton capitalized on Obama’s vision of change to emphasize that Turkish-American relations were entering a new phase. She announced that Obama would visit Turkey in a month. A White House official said that Obama’s trip “will be an important opportunity to visit a NATO ally and discuss shared challenges,” adding, “It will also provide an opportunity to continue the president’s dialogue with the Muslim world” (www.cnn.com, March 7). It is not yet known, however, whether the speech Obama had promised to deliver in a Muslim capital during his first 100 days in office will be given in Ankara or in the capital of another Muslim country. Given the positive feelings of the Turkish people toward Obama’s election as president (EDM, November 7), the visit might indeed help improve the deteriorating American image in Turkey.

    A similar move in public diplomacy concerns attempts to diversify bilateral relations on the societal level. The joint statement announced that a new program called “Young Turkey/Young America: A New Relationship for a New Age” would be launched. It would establish ties between emerging young leaders from both countries “to develop initiatives that will positively impact people’s lives and invest in future ties between the leadership of [the] two countries” (www.turkey.usembassy.gov, March 7).

    The Turkish side was apparently satisfied with the trip. Speaking on the private NTV channel, Babacan said, “Turkish-American relations have entered a new phase … Our foreign policy priorities are completely in line with each other. In the new phase, the focus is on consultation and cooperation.” Underlining Turkey’s willingness to work together with the United States as partners, Babacan added, “Clinton emphasized Turkey as a strategic partner. She accentuated this more powerfully than the previous administration, and the new administration is aware of Turkey’s importance.” Nonetheless, Babacan debunked the overly optimistic expectations that Clinton’s visit indicated that Obama might not use the word “genocide’ in his Armenian Memorial Day address in April, This possibility was not completely off the table, he said (www.ntvmsnbc.com, March 8).

    In the 1990s, under the Bill Clinton presidency, the Turkish-American relationship flourished in many areas and came to be called a strategic partnership. The Iraq War and ensuing developments turned “strategic partnership” into an oxymoron to describe Turkish-American relations. Despite efforts to save the relationship from further deterioration, disagreements between Ankara and Washington were difficult to bridge. The 2006 Shared Vision document, which the Babacan-Clinton joint statement referred to, for example, outlined a framework of close cooperation and structured dialogue to regulate bilateral relations. It was not put into practice, however, and relations hit a low point in 2007, when Washington criticized the Turkish government for its silence on anti-Americanism in the country and Ankara censured Washington’s inactivity toward PKK terrorism. This time, there appears to be a more solid basis for rejuvenating the partnership: strong references to the 2006 document after a long break are coupled with both sides’ carefully worded statements, which take each other’s sensitivities into account, and a determination to address problems through dialogue without playing blame games. With political will on both sides, it is not be wrong to assume that finally they may not only “talk the talk” but also “walk the walk.”

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-american-strategic-partnership-on-the-way-to-rejuvenation/

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  • A Race to the Bottom for Turkish Democracy

    A Race to the Bottom for Turkish Democracy

    Bickering Between Erdogan and Baykal: A Race to the Bottom for Turkish Democracy?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 42

    March 4, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    The quality of political discussions in Turkey is hitting the bottom as local elections, slated for March 29, approach. Although candidates will be running for municipal posts, the aggressive campaigning by political parties has turned the election race into a national referendum on the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s performance in power (EDM, December 3). The importance attached to the election results has, in turn, heightened the debate between not only the mayoral candidates but also party leaders, leading to an exchange of harsh verbal attacks. The latest row in this war of words was between Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the AKP and the current prime minister.

    Determined to win a decisive victory in the municipal elections, Erdogan’s AKP began the election marathon earlier than its rivals. Talking to large crowds at election rallies, Erdogan challenged the leaders of the opposition parties and accused them of being afraid to go to the people. In response, Baykal and Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the Nationalist Action Party, started to appear in election meetings organized by their parties. Bahceli rejected Erdogan’s charges and maintained that his party was always in harmony with the people. He claimed, moreover, that Erdogan was using the state’s resources, including planes and helicopters, to mobilize support for his own party’s candidates (Milliyet, March 2). Similar charges against the government are being made by other parties as well, as the AKP’s use of state resources puts opposition candidates at a disadvantage (Radikal, February 24; EDM, February 2).

    In the last week of February, the bickering between Erdogan and Baykal took a confrontational and nasty turn, with both leaders using very harsh words. Baykal maintained that the crowds Erdogan talked to were brought together by state resources, and he invited Erdogan to a TV debate so that they both could discuss everything openly. Erdogan declined the invitation and challenged Baykal to meet people on the ground (ANKA, February 22).

    Against this background, at an election rally on February 28, Baykal lambasted Erdogan’s indifference to criticism and maintained that by constantly bashing the opposition and the media in the election rallies, Erdogan avoided talking to the people about the real economic and social problems. Baykal also maintained that although his party had used a cooperative approach and proposed a package of suggestions about how to deal with the economic crisis in response to Erdogan’s earlier challenge, Erdogan ridiculed Baykal and simply responded to him by saying “mind your own business,” implying that Baykal would never come to power. Baykal went on to say that “this demeanor is maganda style. This is not the demeanor expected from a prime minister… We are used to seeing the elegance, kindness, and respect of past leaders. This kulhanbeyi style, this maganda style may look good on Erdogan [as a person], but it does not look good on [Erdogan as] the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic.” In addition to his use of the words maganda (a pejorative term in Turkish to describe crass, rude and uncultured persons) and kulhanbeyi (rowdy), Baykal quoted a popular Turkish saying to disparage Erdogan: “You have become a prime minister, but you could not become a man (adam). You will hardly become a man, because you don’t know what you are talking about. You say one thing today, quite another thing tomorrow” (www.nethaber.com, February 28).

    Speaking at his own party’s rallies in other towns on Sunday, Erdogan said that although he knew very well how to respond to Baykal, his code of ethics and upbringing would not allow him to use such words in office. He said that he would remain a gentleman and seek redress in the courts. Maintaining a polemical tone, however, Erdogan says that after he quits politics, he might respond to Baykal with similar language. “My nation chooses a real man as its prime minister,” Erdogan added (Cihan Haber Ajansi, March 1; Aksam, March 2).

    On March 2 Erdogan’s attorneys filed defamation lawsuits against Baykal and Mustafa Ozyurek, the speaker and chief accountant of the CHP, who also used the word maganda during a press conference on February 27 to describe Erdogan’s conduct. The attorneys maintained that Ozyurek “aimed to attack Erdogan’s personal rights and [make] completely erroneous accusations of the most insulting nature” that could not be considered freedom of speech (Anadolu Ajansi, March 2; Today’s Zaman, March 3).

    Responding to these developments in an address to the CHP’s parliamentary group, Baykal defended his remarks and maintained that he had not insulted Erdogan personally in any way. Citing several instances in which Erdogan had insulted him and others, Baykal said that although Erdogan had sued him several times in the past for minor things, he himself had avoided resorting to the courts as a means of resolving their disputes. He noted that he had only criticized the prime minister’s behavior and words and would continue to do so as long as Erdogan acted in a this manner. Referring to Erdogan’s words that he would watch his deportment as long as he was prime minister, Baykal added that his reaction to Erdogan might have served a purpose after all by reminding the prime minister of his responsibilities in office (www.cnnturk.com, March 3).

    This case of bickering between Erdogan and Baykal is neither the first nor the last one. The history of Turkish political life is rich in similar episodes of political leaders engaging in a war of words against each other. This recent row, however, perhaps more than any previous one, amounts to a race to the bottom for Turkish democracy. The entire election campaign has been dominated by calls for duels, charges of corruption, and mutual accusations about the leaders’ demeanor—all overshadowing substantive public deliberation on political issues. It is, moreover, ironic that local election campaigns are being hijacked to such a great extent by national political considerations and populism. Regardless of which party wins the next elections, Turkish democracy might being the biggest looser.

    https://jamestown.org/program/bickering-between-erdogan-and-baykal-a-race-to-the-bottom-for-turkish-democracy/