Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Erdogan Refuses to Negotiate IMF Deal for Turkey

    Erdogan Refuses to Negotiate IMF Deal for Turkey

    Erdogan Refuses to Negotiate IMF Deal for Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 63
    April 2, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Official data released after the local elections in Turkey shows that the global financial crisis has affected the economy more severely than the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has acknowledged. Turkey’s economic growth dropped sharply in the last quarter of 2008, and its exports declined by around 35 percent last month. These developments have increased the pressure on the government to conclude a prompt loan deal with the IMF, but Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan remains unconvinced.

    Many analysts attribute the decline in the AKP’s electoral fortunes in the local elections to the government’s failure to either acknowledge or take action over the economic crisis. Many economic indicators, including unemployment reaching its highest level in recent years, have undermined the government’s claims that the crisis was not affecting Turkey as badly as other developing economies. Indeed, the AKP’s loss of votes within major industrial centers such as Denizli, Kayseri, Bursa and Gaziantep was caused by soaring local unemployment rates, and if the government fails to redress these trends, it could face a rapid collapse in its popular support.

    Turkey’s official statistics agency (TUIK) announced on March 31 that GDP fell by 6.2 percent in the last quarter of 2008, while the annual rate of growth dropped to 1.1 percent (www.tuik.gov.tr, March 31). This sharply contrasts with the Turkish economy’s average 7 percent annual growth rate, and marks the first contraction of the economy since the AKP came to power in 2002. These figures also indicate that private investments shrank significantly, while government spending increased ahead of local elections. Although the government introduced various small-scale stimulus packages to help support public investments and prevent a sharper decline in GDP, this also increased the current account deficit.

    Additional evidence of the impact of the economic crisis on Turkey appeared in the unofficial export figures released by the Association of Turkish Exporters (TIM) on March 30 (Anadolu Ajansi, April 1). According to the TIM, Turkey’s exports fell in March by 34.92 percent to $7.1 billion compared with last year. Official statistics released by TUIK also confirmed that in February, the country’s exports declined by 24.9 percent to $8.3 billion, whereas imports fell by 47.6 percent (www.tuik.gov.tr, March 31). Exports in the automotive industry, Turkey’s flagship export, continued to drop during the past six months, plunging by 53.8 percent in the first quarter of 2009, according to the local exporters association in Bursa (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 1).

    A comparison of Turkey’s economic downturn with other developing economies reveals it is among the most rapidly shrinking economies in the world. Noting that other countries have managed to grow, or contract at lower rates despite the global crisis, Turkey’s economic slowdown may have started even before the present crisis, and the government should admit its own failures and take urgent measures (www.cnnturk.com, April 1). Indeed, given the shrinking domestic demand and declining exports, some forecast that the annual growth rate will continue to drop, and fall behind the government’s projected growth rate of 4 percent in the 2009 budget. The budget deficit is expected to widen in response to lower industrial output and falling tax revenues. In the first quarter of 2009, the government reached its budget deficit estimates for the entire year (Hurriyet Daily News, April 1).

    Representatives of the working class and the businessmen are now repeating their criticisms of the government’s economic policies. They believe that the election results should be viewed as a warning sign for the AKP, consequently forcing it to prioritize the economy. The government is facing growing pressure to revise its spending plans and modify the 2009 budget in order to resume talks with the IMF, which were suspended over disputes relating to financial regulations and the government’s spending and tax policies. The head of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association, Arzuhan Dogan Yalcindag, called on the government to revise the budget so that it realistically reflects the conditions of the Turkish economy (www.haber7.com, April 1). Many observers expected the government to conclude an agreement with the IMF after the elections, because IMF loans might ease Turkey’s fiscal problems and stimulate the economy. Last month, the IMF forwarded revised proposals to Turkey aimed at addressing Erdogan’s concerns about the contents of the standby agreement (EDM, March 16).

    Before his departure for the G20 summit in London, Erdogan said that he objected to an IMF condition that Turkey should adopt strict tax auditing measures requiring a comparison of individuals’ wealth and their spending. These measures were most likely intended to prevent tax evasion and increase state revenues. However, fearing that such measures might reduce cash flows to the markets, Erdogan challenged the IMF by saying “we will not sign such a thing” (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, April 1). Erdogan and his economic minister might be meeting IMF officials in London, but there is still no indication as to whether Turkey will resume direct talks. Although the AKP is expected to be more cooperative towards the IMF, especially following the outcome of the local elections, Erdogan appears determined to maintain his populist pre-election rhetoric, adding to the uncertainty about the future of the Turkish economy.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-refuses-to-negotiate-imf-deal-for-turkey/

  • Turkey’s Local Elections Forces Reconsideration of Domestic and Foreign Policies

    Turkey’s Local Elections Forces Reconsideration of Domestic and Foreign Policies

    Turkey’s Local Elections Forces Reconsideration of Domestic and Foreign Policies

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 62
    April 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    The mixed results of the Turkish local elections on March 29 raised questions over the future direction of the governing Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) policies (EDM, March 31). The government is unlikely to call a snap election, but the relative decline in the AKP’s share of the vote will have significant implications for Turkey’s political landscape, compelling more recognition of public opinion and limiting the scope for assertive domestic and foreign policies.

    Turkey’s local elections directly affect national politics, and have been traditionally considered as a de facto vote of confidence for the incumbent government. Moreover, prior to the March 29 elections, the AKP pursued an aggressive campaign, which effectively turned the local elections into a national referendum on its policies (EDM, December 3). Now, having fallen below the thresholds it set for itself, the AKP is seeking to redefine its priorities in Turkish politics.

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan convened meetings with his cabinet ministers and party members to assess the causes of the decline, while considering a cabinet reshuffle and other changes within the party (Star, March 31). Beyond these short term changes, the elections are likely to have an enduring resonance on the AKP’s domestic and foreign policies. Though it remains to be seen what path it will choose, there appears to be two alternatives: either the AKP will follow a reformist line and initiate major change, or it will prefer prudence and avoid proactive policies.

    The AKP’s core supporters, conservative center-right voters and liberals, expect the government to abandon its complacency, and resume domestic reforms. The EU and western observers also share similar views. They believe that the AKP owes its past electoral success to the pro-democratization agenda, which it adopted at the outset. For them, the AKP’s recovery depends on its ability to revive its former reformist image. If the AKP chooses this alternative, it will have to refocus on constitutional changes, and intensify the EU membership process in order to satisfy the reformists’ demands (Sabah, March 30).

    Reformists also want the AKP to pursue a more proactive foreign policy. Many observers had argued that following the local elections, the government would press ahead with ambitious foreign policy initiatives, including normalizing its relations with Armenia. EU officials have suggested Turkey might take further steps in this process, such as opening the border with Armenia following President Barack Obama’s visit to Turkey on April 6-7 (Hurriyet, March 30).

    It is unclear whether the AKP can fufil these expectations. The AKP was founded as a party representing diverse interests, and, since its establishment, Erdogan’s charismatic leadership has united the various factions within the party. The sense of over-confidence imbued by successive election victories and the presence of a strong leader, led the AKP to develop a top-down approach to politics. The party’s largely unchallenged dominance enabled it to conduct domestic and foreign policies in an unrestricted manner.

    The new voting patterns, however, are a stark reminder to the AKP that the Turkish electorate is sensitive to the implications of the government’s policies, and may withdraw their support when necessary. The pre-occupation with re-election in the next national elections, slated for 2011, will be the AKP’s main concern. Equally, it will tread a fine line between satisfying the demands of its core constituencies and responding to the challenges posed by the opposition. Since the AKP cannot take its popular support for granted, it might be more circumspect in its domestic and foreign policies. These pressures, in turn, might curb the AKP’s activism, and force it to adopt more conformist policies.

    The government will need to form broad based coalitions with opposition parties in order to implement its domestic reforms. However, having gained ground on the AKP, major opposition parties such as the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), have little incentive to cooperate with the government. Moreover, Erdogan’s antagonistic attitude during the election campaign will complicate building coalitions with his rivals, who have already announced their opposition to his position on constitutional amendments (EDM, March 4). Against this background, relations between the government and the opposition are likely to remain tense, and it is questionable whether the AKP can deliver radical democratization reforms (Radikal, March 30).

    The AKP’s leftist, nationalist, secularist and Islamist opponents are united in their objection to its foreign policy. They view the AKP’s policies as a “betrayal of Turkey’s national interests,” and they are critical of the AKP’s policy of rapprochement with Armenia. Previously, the AKP largely ignored any negative public reaction and the opposition, in its efforts to normalize relations with Yerevan. However, now that the AKP is more vulnerable to public scrutiny, faced with pressure from a stronger opposition, it may adopt a cautious approach and avoid foreign policy risks. Therefore, although normalizing relations with Armenia will continue, it may be premature to expect radical steps, such as opening the border or establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia (ANKA, March 30).

  • Local Elections Herald a New Era For The AKP

    Local Elections Herald a New Era For The AKP

    Local Elections Herald a New Era For The AKP

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 61
    March 31, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s local elections on March 29 produced mixed results, with the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) emerging victorious, yet underperforming compared with earlier elections. The AKP received a 38.86 percent share of the vote, while the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) gained 23.10 and 16.08 percent respectively. The AKP’s support fell from 46.6 percent in the 2007 general elections and 41.7 percent in 2004 local elections (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, March 30). While retaining its popularity within major cities, it failed to further expand this and lost several mayoral posts. The gains made by opposition parties raise the specter of imminent changes in Turkish politics.

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, acknowledging his party’s losses, emphasized that the AKP did not fall below its performance in the local elections in 2004. It received almost the total percentage of votes cast for its two rival parties (www.cnnturk.com, March 29). The representatives of the opposition parties, in contrast, referred to their increases in the share of the vote, and the “erosion” of the incumbent party’s popular support.

    The results exposed wide regional variations and followed an apparent trend in previous elections: whereas the AKP controlled central Anatolia, the CHP and MHP were popular in the Aegean and Mediterranean coastal provinces as well as in the northwestern provinces in the Thrace region. Significantly, the MHP regained some of its past strength in central Anatolia, challenging the AKP’s dominance over center-right voters. In addition to the defeat it suffered vis-à-vis the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) in the southeastern provinces, the AKP’s support also declined in some northern regions. The Islamist Felicity Party (SP), an alternative to the AKP for some conservative voters, also increased its vote to 5.17 percent.

    The local elections marked the first decline in the AKP’s share of the vote since the general elections in 2002. Despite surpassing its major rivals by a clear margin, the psychological effect of this decline is undeniable. Previously, the party claimed to be the only viable choice for the electorate. However, a series of electoral victories arguably bred a sense of overconfidence, which left the AKP in general, and Erdogan in particular, open to accusations that they have grown insensitive to criticism, either from society or opposition parties, and developed an authoritarian style of leadership. Faced with losing popular support, the AKP will likely soften its discourse, and foster compromise with the opposition.

    Turkish opposition parties, however, are now seeking to capitalize on the AKP’s apparently declining support, claiming that it has entered a period of rapid decay (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, March 29). Whether such drastic erosion is occurring remains to be seen, but the results may force the AKP to reconsider its policies. Indeed, Erdogan expressed dissatisfaction with the polls and admitted that the AKP must assess the causes of its decline. Meanwhile, he is expected to reshuffle his cabinet, possibly replacing some high-profile ministers involved in preparing the AKP’s discredited election strategy (www.cnnturk.com, March 29; www.ensonhaber.com, March 30). The AKP will also need to reevaluate its economic policies as well as the Kurdish question and the pursuit of political reforms.

    Thus far, the government has ignored charges that the Turkish economy has been badly impacted by the global financial crisis. Although some of the AKP’s populist policies helped cushion the full effects of the crisis, economic considerations played a major role in the local elections. Particularly, the declining performance of the AKP in the Marmara, Aegean, and Thrace regions, as well as some Anatolian cities, reflected the impact of the crisis in Turkey’s industrial heartlands. In this context, the AKP will come under intense pressure to secure a loan from the IMF which it has tried to avoid, consequently leaving the country in a weaker bargaining position than before.

    Moreover, the results represent a blow to the image of the AKP as an inclusive party, representing not only conservative Turks and Kurds but also liberal and secular voters. There appear to be limits to the AKP’s appeal to the Turkish people. Its failure to gain support within the western coastal provinces and in the Thrace region, and the traditionally less conservative central Anatolia, shows that the AKP has been unable to diversify its appeal. The DTP’s strong performance in the southeastern provinces is a setback for the AKP’s policies on the Kurdish issue. It shows that “identity politics” remains on the popular agenda, and the AKP’s policy of providing services and socioeconomic incentives alone cannot resolve the Kurdish problem. Crucially, the higher profile of the DTP suggests it cannot be ignored as a major stakeholder in any resolution of the Kurdish problem. Paradoxically, the AKP’s initiatives on the Kurdish issue, though failing to satisfy Kurdish voters, alienated some Turkish voters in the west, in turn boosting the MHP’s popularity.

    The AKP has been a largely populist party, attracting votes from across the political spectrum. Since it is potentially losing ground to its rivals, it will come under pressure to address the deeper causes of these failures, or risk the further erosion of its popular support. Whether it can formulate consistent policies to address these multiple challenges, particularly over the looming economic crisis, will be an immediate and major test for the AKP’s government.

    https://jamestown.org/program/local-elections-herald-a-new-era-for-the-akp/

  • Gul Denies Saying “Kurdistan” During Iraq Visit

    Gul Denies Saying “Kurdistan” During Iraq Visit

    Gul Denies Saying “Kurdistan” During Iraq Visit

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 60
    March 30, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Iraq might be regarded as a turning point in Turkey’s Kurdish issue, perhaps more than its implications for improving Turkish-Iraqi ties (EDM, March 24). On the plane to Baghdad, Gul reportedly used the word “Kurdistan” to describe the Kurdistan Regional Administration (KRG) in Northern Iraq, in stark contrast to Turkey’s past political discourse. Although Gul later denied these reports, the discussions they triggered confirmed Turkey’s more nuanced approach towards the Kurds, as well as revealing the remaining obstacles.

    Consistent with Turkey’s recent policy of combating PKK terrorism partly through rapprochement with Baghdad and the local authorities in northern Iraq, Gul met the KRG Prime Minister, Nechervan Barzani, who reiterated that his administration will not allow the PKK to use Iraqi Kurdistan to carry out attacks inside Turkey. Barzani called on the PKK to abandon its violent campaign, although it is unclear how viable this will prove, since the PKK was not consulted at the outset. The KRG initiative is a response to the new geopolitical reality of Washington’s decision to withdraw from Iraq and the revitalization of Turkish-U.S. cooperation. The Iraqi Kurds believe that their chances of rapidly gaining independence have diminished, and continued antagonism against Turkey by covert support for the PKK’s activities could undermine their goal of establishing a viable administration within the region. Moreover, they recognize that closer ties with Ankara might stimulate the regional economy and benefit both parties.

    Gul now recognizes that a confrontational policy towards the KRG is no longer sustainable. Since 1991, the KRG has gradually evolved within northern Iraq, first enjoying de facto autonomy, and later gaining official recognition under the new Iraqi constitution. Ankara attempted to prevent this embryonic administration from developing into an independent Kurdistan, fearing this might strengthen the independence movement amongst Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Although in the 1990s Turkey maintained ties with the Northern Iraqi Kurdish groups in order to conduct operations against the PKK, it refrained from actions that implied an official recognition of the KRG. In the late 1990s, Ankara’s ties with the KRG started to fragment, particularly after the U.S. invasion in 2003 as this became an open confrontation. Equally, Iraqi Kurds intensified their support for the PKK, further alienating Turkey. Ankara prioritized maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdistan as the “red lines” of its Iraq policy, which was perceived as bullying by the Iraqi Kurds.

    Since 2003, Ankara has acknowledged the shifts within regional politics, and readjusted its policies accordingly. For instance, despite its initial opposition to a federal Iraq, Turkey has accepted the new Iraqi constitution which established a federal structure and consequently legitimized the KRG. Most importantly, Turkey decided to abandon pursuing coercive measures, and instead used its political influence and economic power to pacify the Iraqi Kurds (Radikal, November 3, 2005). Although the first signs of rapprochement appeared in 2005, the PKK’s resumption of violence poisoned these relations, reigniting tension between Ankara and the Iraqi Kurds. When Turkey sought their cooperation against the PKK, Iraqi Kurds defied Ankara’s “pressures.” Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani, himself of Kurdish origin, challenged Ankara by saying “We would not hand over any Kurd to Turkey, even a Kurdish cat” (Sabah, October 22, 2007). This new situation further delayed normalizing relations, which only finally transpired in late 2008 (Terrorism Monitor, December 8, 2008).

    Gul’s groundbreaking visit to Baghdad overcame several historical taboos. He allegedly used the word “Kurdistan,” adding that this was the region’s official name in the Iraqi constitution. When this was reported, it made headlines in many Turkish newspapers (Radikal, March 24). Gul’s reference to the region as Kurdistan was interpreted as the strongest expression yet of the change in Turkey’s position on the Kurdish issue. Believing that it denotes a Kurdish desire for independence, Ankara has avoided using this term, and instead referred to the KRG as “the regional administration in the North of Iraq.” Gul’s remarks overshadowed his whole trip and invited criticism from domestic opposition parties claiming he had effectively renounced Turkey’s policy on the Kurdish issue, and undermined its fight against terrorism (Milliyet, March 25).

    On returning to Turkey, however, Gul denied these reports, and clarified his remarks by saying: “inside Iraq, according to their constitution, there is a regional Kurdish government in Iraq’s north. I also met their prime minister; these are very normal things” (Anadolu Ajansi, March 24). Journalists travelling with Gul were divided on whether he specifically used the term “Kurdistan,” though a majority claimed that he did (Hurriyet, March 26).

    It is difficult to substantiate what Gul said. He might have resorted to the use of official terminology within Turkey, in response to pressure from the nationalist opposition, or he could have been dissuaded by bureaucrats from using the controversial term. In any case, the incident illustrates domestic resistance to the new policy despite Ankara’s courageous diplomatic steps. Therefore, despite the optimistic mood that ensued after Gul’s trip to Baghdad, there are grounds to doubt that a solution of the Kurdish issue is imminent.

    https://jamestown.org/program/gul-denies-saying-kurdistan-during-iraq-visit/

  • PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 7 March 26, 2009

    Category: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Home Page, Turkey, Iran, Terrorism, Featured
    By: Saban Kardas, Nihat Ali Özcan
    The United States Treasury Department added the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (Parti bo Jiyani Azadi la Kurdistan – PJAK) to its list of designated terrorist groups on February 4. [1] Operating on the Iranian-Iraqi border under the umbrella of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan – PKK), PJAK has sought to create an autonomous Kurdish region within Iran since its formation in 2004, though the relationship between Iran and the PKK dates back to the creation of the Islamic State of Iran in 1979. This development also highlights unique dynamics of the relationship between a terrorist organization (the PKK) and a state sponsor (Iran).  

    The decision to designate PJAK as a terrorist group brought to the forefront the trajectory of Iran-PKK ties, which traditionally have oscillated between sponsorship and enmity. In this article, we will look at the ebb and flow of sponsorship-enmity dynamics between Iran and the PKK, and put this relationship into the context of regional developments.

    The PKK established contacts with Iranian Kurds who rebelled against Tehran following the Iranian revolution of 1979. Since then, the PKK’s relationship with the Islamic Republic has gone through several phases that can be analytically divided into five distinct periods. The first period (1980-1982) covers the immediate aftermath of the Islamic revolution. The establishment of the Iran-Syria alliance and Iran’s war with Iraq marked the second era (1982-1988), during which a sponsorship relationship gradually took root. During the third period (1988-1997), Iran and the PKK redefined the sponsorship relationship to adjust it to the new geopolitics brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fourth period (1997-2003) can best be described as controlled cooperation, during which the parties struggled to maintain a fragile partnership under the pressure of the rapidly shifting regional balances of power. During the fifth era (2003-2009), starting with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a rather adversarial relationship emerged between the parties, which occasionally turned into open confrontation.

    First period

    Initial encounters between the PKK and the Islamic Republic date back to the first years of the revolution. The Iranian Kurds, seeking to take advantage of the post-revolutionary turmoil and the onset of the Iran-Iraq war, initiated a rebellion against Tehran. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, tasked some of his militants with establishing contacts with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, which was leading the rebellion against Tehran at the time. Ocalan was reportedly urged by Jalal al-Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), to engage Iranian Kurds. [2]

    The initial years of the PKK-Iran relationship were characterized by enmity, developing as they did under the shadow of the new Iranian regime’s Islamic credentials and the PKK’s Marxist agenda. Moreover, the possibility that the PKK might ignite a desire for independence among Iranian Kurds further exacerbated Iran’s suspicions of the PKK. However, subsequent developments replaced this short-lived period of ideological antagonism with a spirit of pragmatism dictated by changes in regional diplomacy that provided a fertile ground for the emergence of a sponsorship-alliance relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Marxist PKK.  

    Second period

    The emergence of the Iran-Syria strategic alliance in 1982 had direct repercussions for Iranian-PKK ties as well. In response to the geopolitical shifts brought about by the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, including the deterioration of U.S.-Iranian relations, Tehran and Damascus were increasingly drawn towards each other. A shared interest of this new alliance was the undermining of two pro-Western countries in the region through subversive activities, namely Turkey and Israel. To do this, the Tehran-Damascus axis decided to support the PKK and Hezbollah. [3] Following this agreement, Iran dispatched its Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon through Syria to train Hezbollah fighters. The PKK froze its ties to al-Talabani and signed a partnership agreement with Barzani. [4] This agreement allowed the PKK to relocate its militants in Syria to northern Iraq through Iranian facilitation.

    From Iran’s perspective, it had many incentives to engage in such a relationship:

    • Tehran and Ankara were involved in an enduring rivalry.

    • The Islamic revolution increasingly pitted Tehran against the secular regime in Ankara, adding an ideological fervor to the competition.

    • The close ties between Ankara and Washington exacerbated Tehran’s fears of Ankara. As part of American plans to contain the Islamic regime, some airfields in Turkish territory close to the Iranian border were expanded (Cumhuriyet, November 16, 1982). Moreover, the United States relocated some of the listening stations it had to withdraw from Iran to eastern Turkey, raising Iranian concerns about Turkey.

    • Following the revolution, many supporters of the Shah’s regime, seeking to reach Western countries, first flew to Turkey. Revolutionary leaders were worried that these refugees, whose numbers were in the millions, could organize themselves in Turkey to undermine the new regime.

    • The Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline carrying Iraqi oil to world markets through Turkish territory brought extra revenue to Baghdad, helping it to finance its war against Iran.
     
    These pragmatic reasons led Iran to support the Marxist PKK in its efforts to undermine Turkey. Nonetheless, Iran always denied its support for the PKK, which was partly a reflection of the fact that Iran needed to maintain relations with Turkey (Cumhuriyet, May 3, 1987). For instance, it had to use Turkish territory to ensure a flow of logistical supplies to maintain its war against Iraq.
    Despite Tehran’s official denial of any support to the PKK, its sponsorship gradually increased towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war. As the senior partner, Iran exerted some limitations on the PKK. [5] The PKK could not attack Turkish targets within fifty kilometers of the Turkish-Iranian border and would refrain from operating among Iranian Kurds. It also agreed to share the intelligence it gathered about Turkey and American bases there with Tehran. In return, Iran provided the PKK with weapons, medical assistance and logistical facilities. Through entering this relationship, the PKK gained access to a wider area of operability and eventually expanded its influence into the Turkish interior.
     
    Third period

    Concerned about the growing influence of the PKK among Iranian Kurds after the Iran-Iraq war, Iran changed its attitude towards the PKK and arrested some of its militants. [6] Nonetheless, this situation soon changed. Although Iran’s Kurdish population posed a challenge, it was not a vital threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. Since the Sunni Kurds were a numerically small minority dwelling in the periphery of the Iranian political system, Iran regarded the problem as manageable. A more serious threat was presented by Azeri nationalism, especially after Azerbaijan emerged as an independent country. Turkey’s increasing profile in the Caucasus and Central Asia (backed by the United States) and the growth of Azeri nationalism within Iran became major issues of concern for Tehran, which found itself forced to restore its ties with the PKK. Indeed, a growing number of PKK activities during the 1990s took place mostly around Turkey’s northeastern and Caucasus borders. [7] In this way, Iran sought to hinder Turkey’s ties to the Caucasus and Central Asia and limit its influence in the region. One direct effect of this policy was that the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline had to be postponed for another nine to ten years. The intensification of PKK terrorist activities consumed much of Turkey’s energy, turning its attention inward.

    Fourth period

    In this stage, Iran gradually reduced its support to the PKK parallel to a declining threat perception. The Turkish-Iranian competition lost its intensity as Azerbaijan and Azeri nationalism were no longer perceived as major challenges. Similarly, Syria’s diminishing support of the PKK following the capture of Abdullah Ocalan resulted in Tehran reconsidering its ties to the PKK. Iran adopted a wait-and-see approach given that the regional balance of power was full of uncertainties. Last but not least, the 9/11 terror attacks and the Global War on Terrorism made Tehran more cautious as it sought to avoid being labeled as a sponsor of terrorism.

    Fifth period

    The Iran-PKK relationship, which started to deteriorate following the capture of Ocalan, turned into one of open confrontation in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The extensions of the PKK operating among the Iranian Kurds declared the founding of PJAK in 2004 (see Terrorism Monitor, June 15, 2006).  Drawing on its past networks, the PKK consolidated its power among Iranian Kurds within a short period. It capitalized on the legacy of Kurdish nationalism and resistance to Tehran introduced to the region before the local Kurdish movement was crushed by Iran, while building its own economic and political networks. To give PJAK a local character, some Iranian Kurds were recruited to its leadership cadres. Despite PJAK’s claim to the contrary, it operated under the PKK umbrella and sought refuge in the Kandil Mountain region. As an indication of these organic ties, militants recruited from Turkey were sometimes deployed in Iran, while militants of Iranian origin sometimes took part in PKK operations inside Turkey. [8]  

    The PKK’s growing visibility in Iran and an acquiescent American attitude towards the PKK presence in northern Iraq (which came to be perceived as a de facto rapprochement between Washington and the PKK) pitted Iran and the PKK against each other. PJAK has increasingly engaged Iranian military personnel since 2003 in a bid to gain media attention. In response, Iran has occasionally shelled PJAK positions in the Kandil Mountain region. There were also unconfirmed reports from Kurdish sources of cross-border operations by Iranian security forces in September, 2007 (Today’s Zaman, August 24, 2007; McClatchy, August 23, 2007). Like Turkey, Iran preferred to present PJAK as an extension of the PKK and lent support to Turkey’s fight against the PKK. In this way it sought to boost its own popularity among the Turkish public and to undercut Turkish-American ties.  

    Although the Bush administration added the PKK to the list of designated terrorist organizations, it was more tolerant toward PJAK, which led to allegations that America and Israel supported PJAK as a way to destabilize Iran. [9] Shortly after coming to power, the Obama administration designated PJAK as a terrorist organization controlled by the PKK. By this decision, Washington signaled that it would adopt a more principled approach in the fight against terrorism. This development also signifies a change in the American attitude towards the intricate relationships between Turkey, Iran and the PKK. Turkey welcomed the decision and saw it as the fruit of its new policy of building international coalitions to eradicate PKK terror, particularly through closer collaboration with the United States and northern Iraqi Kurdish authorities. A statement from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined Ankara’s satisfaction with the U.S. acknowledgment of PKK-PJAK ties (Anadolu Ajansi, February 6).

    The PKK, in contrast, increasingly feels that it is being encircled as a result of recent developments. PJAK officials condemned the U.S. designation and claimed that for over a year the United States already had a de facto policy of pleasing Turkey and Iran by intensifying pressure on PKK and PJAK. The organization noted that northern Iraqi authorities were also supportive of this new policy (Gundem Online, February 12; February 17). PJAK challenged the Obama administration, arguing that the terrorist designation would not deter their struggle.

    Conclusion

    Iran is carefully observing developments in Iraq and the evolution of Turkish-American relations. The next stage in the sponsorship-enmity cycle between Iran and the PKK will depend on Iran’s assessment of the changes in the regional balance of power and threats to its national security. To escape the pressures exerted by close coordination between Turkey, the United States and the Kurdistan Regional Government of northern Iraq, the PKK will have an incentive to redefine its relationship with Iran. Despite Iranian-PJAK border clashes, PKK leaders are already sending warm messages to Tehran (Gundem Online, February 24). Whereas playing the “Iran card” might increase the PKK’s bargaining power, Iran also has reasons to maintain the continued availability of the “PKK card.” Considering the ongoing uncertainty over the future of the region (especially northern Iraq) in the wake of a partial U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and discussions over the Iranian nuclear program, Iran might not want to see the PKK disappear from the game completely.

    Notes:

    1. www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg14.htm.
    2. Cemil Bayik, Parti Tarihi, Damascus, 1996, p.58.
    3. For the background of this relationship, see: Huccetulislam Hasimi Muhtesemi’s (former Iranian ambassador to Damascus) memoirs. Turkish translation: Dunya ve Islam, 1990, pp.53-64.
    4. Bayik, op.cit. pp.75,77.
    5. Abdullah Ocalan, Parti Tarihimiz Boyunca Disaridan Dayatilan Tasfiyecilik Uzerine (Damascus, 1991), p.17
    6. Bayik, op.cit. p.92.
    7. Reports submitted to PKK’s Fifth Congress, Damascus, 1995, p.283.
    8. For the personal records of PKK militants killed see: www.hpg-online.com/sehit/sehit_kunyeleri/2008_a.html .
    9. Seymour Hersh, “The Next Act,” The New Yorker, November 27, 2006. The U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Ross Wilson, denied those allegations; See www.cnnturk.com, June 30, 2008.  www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/12/AR2007091201133.html

     
    https://jamestown.org/program/pjak-iran-and-the-united-states-kurdish-militants-designated-terrorists-by-the-united-states/
  • Ankara Debates Rasmussen’s Candidacy

    Ankara Debates Rasmussen’s Candidacy

    Ankara Debates Rasmussen’s Candidacy for NATO Secretary-General

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 58
    March 26, 2009 05:36 PM
    By: Saban Kardas

    Discussions over the replacement of the current NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, scheduled to step down on July 31, has intensified, ahead of the Alliance’s April 3-4 Summit. Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, supported by key European allies, has emerged as the main contender for the post. After Washington decided to support Rasmussen, it was reported that Turkey might block Rasmussen’s bid, by using its veto power in NATO (Reuters, March 22). These discussions illustrate Turkey’s delicate position within NATO, and how the troubled course of Turkey’s European integration affects its position within the transatlantic alliance (EDM, February 9).

    During Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to NATO headquarters on March 10, speculation mounted concerning the post. Traditionally, the post of secretary-general has been held by a European, whereas the Alliance’s top military officer has been an American. In addition to Rasmussen, other possible candidates for the post are the Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, Norway’s Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere, and former British Defense Secretary Des Browne. However, Bulgaria’s Foreign Minister Soloman Passy is currently the only official candidate.

    Western media sources presented an unclear view of the possible position of European NATO members on their preferred candidate for the post, which was also reflected within Turkey. An absence of any European consensus might influence Washington to switch its support to Canadian Defense Minister Peter MacKay. Germany, Britain and France, reportedly agreed privately to back Rasmussen who had been tipped as an ideal candidate, not least considering his commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq. In response, Biden left Washington’s options open, saying that the U.S. would continue to deliberate on possible candidates. International observers claimed that based on Turkey’s objections to Rasmussen, Washington might explore other alternatives (Washington Post, March 8; Der Spiegel, New York Times, March 10).

    The Turkish media interpreted these developments as implying that the U.S. had to distance itself from Rasmussen in response to Turkish opposition (Milliyet, March 11). Nonetheless, Washington apparently continued its dialogue with its European allies, and changed its position on Rasmussen. On March 21, NATO diplomats and a U.S. source confirmed Washington’s backing for Rasmussen, but these sources added that securing Turkey’s support would become the focal point in securing a consensus (Reuters, March 21). The next day, citing an anonymous Turkish official, Reuters claimed that Turkey could in fact veto the appointment of Rasmussen, suggesting he was “tainted” from Turkey’s perspective, though its position was not fixed, the official said “it may come to the veto… We will have to see” (Reuters, March 22).

    Misgivings in Ankara over Rasmussen’s candidacy include his opposition to the country’s future membership in the EU, Denmark’s alleged support for the activities of pro-PKK, in particular the militant Roj TV during his administration, and his government’s handling of “the cartoon crisis.” Speculation that such concerns might trigger Turkey’s objection to Rasmussen has long been known. Foreign Minister Ali Babacan recently defined Turkey’s ideal candidate for the post: “a person who understands and embraces the vision, common values and ideals of the organization well, who will be able to maintain [the Alliance’s] relations with all countries in good terms, and whom all member states could trust,” though he did not specify Ankara’s preferred candidate (Anadolu Ajansi, March 5).

    Against this background, Turkey’s media coverage of the controversy has contained a degree of exaggeration (Hurriyet, Sabah, Radikal, March 23). Vatan claimed that Washington’s statements indicate an ‘undeclared crisis’ between Turkey and the U.S. However, it was noted that U.S. backing for Rasmussen was announced only through an unidentified diplomatic source, and it was claimed that Ankara reciprocated by voicing its opinion in a similar manner (Vatan, March 23).

    It is unclear whether Ankara can veto Rasmussen. Many diplomatic observers believe that although Turkey would not be pleased to see him securing this post, it will ultimately accept the transatlantic consensus. Although at face value Turkey’s arguments appear motivated by only narrow concerns, its objections are in fact more principled and take account of NATO’s wider interests (Hurriyet Daily News, March 6). Regarding Turkey’s claim that the Danish government failed to act decisively over the PKK issue, there are also broader implications for the Alliance. Denmark’s attitude towards the activities of Roj TV in propagating the views of the PKK, recognized as a terrorist organization by NATO members, seems to contradict the Alliance’s counter-terrorist agenda. This, at the very least, reflects internal differences of opinion over a common definition of terrorism, which makes more difficult the presentation of a united stance on countering the threat.

    Additionally, Turkey’s assertion that the Danish government failed to act in a responsible manner to alleviate the worldwide concerns of Muslims after the publication of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad within the Danish media, equally has broader significance. Given that NATO treats Afghanistan as a crucial mission, and maintains close relations with other Muslim nations, a candidate with a controversial reputation might face problems in developing ties within the wider Islamic world. From Turkey’s perspective, with its image as a bridge between the Islamic and western worlds, airing the concerns of Muslims is an important part of Ankara’s new foreign policy.

    Considering these reasons, although Turkey might refrain from ultimately using its veto, it would not easily make concessions in response to European pressures to appoint Rasmussen. Since there is no need to name the next NATO Secretary-General at the April Summit, Turkey might force the Alliance to continue their deliberations on possible alternatives. In this case, the burden of forming a “winning coalition” around an alternative name would be placed on Turkey. This presents a real test for Turkish diplomacy: whether Ankara can switch from non-cooperative strategies in the form of threatening to use its veto, to instead achieve its objectives through more constructive diplomacy.

    https://jamestown.org/program/ankara-debates-rasmussens-candidacy-for-nato-secretary-general/