Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Turkey’s Syria Policy: The Challenge of Coalition Building

    Turkey’s Syria Policy: The Challenge of Coalition Building

    Turkey’s Syria Policy: The Challenge of Coalition Building

    February 17, 2012 / Saban Kardas

    Turkey is in the international spotlight over the Syrian uprising. So far, it has focused largely on the humanitarian situation taking a moral high ground on the civilians trapped by the conflict. Either due to its own ambitious rhetoric or the preferences of other regional and international actors, Turkey is expected in some circles to lead international efforts to end the actions perpetrated by the Baath regime. If necessary, this includes the use of force. Following the failure of the Arab League’s peace plan at the UN Security Council, Turkey has vowed to mobilize a coalition of like-minded states to address the unfolding humanitarian crisis. This effort epitomizes the limited but crucial role Turkey could play here: facilitating a coalition at the regional-global nexus, so that a coercive diplomatic solution short of military intervention is forged.

  • Rising Gas Consumption Reveals Structural Problems in Turkey’s Energy Policies

    Rising Gas Consumption Reveals Structural Problems in Turkey’s Energy Policies

    Rising Gas Consumption Reveals Structural Problems in Turkey’s Energy Policies

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 32
    February 15, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    Heavy winter conditions have strained natural gas supplies in Turkey, shedding critical light on the country’s over reliance on hydrocarbons. Due to the record increases in household consumption and electricity demand, which coincided with interruptions in gas imports from Iran and Azerbaijan, concerns were raised as to whether Ankara’s current contracts meet its actual demand, and how this will affect its future energy policies.In early February, some media reports speculated that Russian gas shipments through the Western line declined by 30 percent. However, it was later explained that the declining shipment was due to Ukraine’s tapping the gas from the same route beyond normal levels, and Russia did not officially cut its exports to Turkey (Aksam, February 4). As Turkey’s largest gas supplier, Russia has been reliable so far. In the past, Russia even stepped in to make up for deficient quantities of gas when Turkey encountered shortages with other suppliers, especially Iran. Last December, Turkey agreed to renew a supply contract with Russia, which also foresaw a partial reduction in price in return for Ankara’s support for the South Stream project. In hindsight, it appears that Ankara’s decision to renew that contract, despite its initial objections, was motivated in part by the anticipated increased demand.

    The imports from Iran, the second largest supplier, have been problematic. Upon failure to bridge the differences in negotiations that were in progress, the Energy Minister Taner Yildiz announced that Turkey had decided to take Iran to the International Court of Arbitration. The negotiations pertained to two interrelated issues. While Turkey is contracted to import 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually gas from Iran, it maintains that Tehran fell short of meeting that target and it imported around 7 bcm to 8 bcm per annum. Ankara wanted to import the excess amount accumulated in the last two years. Also, Turkey was demanding a discount, as it paid the highest price for Iranian gas. The law suit was lodged on the first issue, and if no agreement is reached in the price discount dispute, Turkey will also take it to arbitration in March (Radikal, February 1).

    A few days later, gas supplies from Iran fell dramatically, due to technical problems. Reportedly, the compressor stations were experiencing technical failures. As a similar problem was also encountered with gas supplies from Azerbaijan, Turkey’s third largest provider, the gas flow from the eastern pipeline declined by around 85 percent. While on average the flow was around 40 million cubic meters (mcm) per day, it fell to 6 mcm per day. Turkey’s average daily consumption also reached as high as 192 mcm per day, while last year it was around 171 mcm per day (Anadolu Ajansi, February 7).

    The technical problems were solved within a few days and the gas flow returned to normal levels, but this development underscored the fragile nature of the country’s gas supplies. To alleviate growing public concerns, Yildiz announced that there was no immediate risk to shipments from Russia, and consumers will not experience any shortages. Turkey undertook several precautions. The power stations that convert natural gas to electricity either stopped production or shifted to secondary fuels. Also, Turkey made greater utilization of LNG conversion stations and tapped the reserves in underground storage facility in Silivri. Periodically, electricity supplies were also interrupted in some areas (Zaman, February 4).

    Despite the minister’s efforts to reassure consumers, experts highlight several problems in Turkey’s natural gas supplies. Electricity producers complained that the secondary fuels are more expensive and increase the price by around 10 percent (Milliyet, February 5). Due to rising demand and declining production at natural gas-based power plants, electricity prices skyrocketed in the free market where producers and distributors meet (Zaman, February 13). Producers and distributors are concerned that electricity generation costs have exceeded the price guarantees in the contracts, forcing them into net losses. Yildiz contradicted those claims, arguing that such seasonal fluctuations need to be seen as normal developments (Anadolu Ajansi, February 14).

    Moreover, shortcomings in reserves were also revealed during this crisis. Turkey’s underground storage facilities in Silivri have a capacity of 2.6 bcm and BOTAS is expected to keep 2.1 bcm in reserves, which will be enough to meet Turkey’s needs for around two weeks. As Turkey tapped these reserves in response to declining deliveries, it has been argued that BOTAS’ failure to fill it to full capacity before the winter was a major mistake. However, BOTAS issued a statement, maintaining that it stored quantities above the minimum levels required by existing legal provisions (Zaman, February 9). Granted, this development underscores Turkey’s poor capacity in managing its strategic reserves. It also demonstrates that despite its claims to be emerging as a major energy hub Turkey’s current capacity to manage that hub still remains unsatisfactory.

    To enhance that capacity Turkey finalized a protracted tender last fall with a Chinese company that will construct storage facilities in Tuz Golu (Salt Lake) near Ankara, which will have a capacity of 1 bcm. More importantly, the electricity producers’ association painted a very grim picture of the balance between demand and contracted gas supplies. While Turkey’s current contracts enable it to import around 170 mcm daily, its average daily consumption is around 180 mcm per day.

    They maintain that the problem is not just conjectural and cannot be explained by seasonal conditions. Rather, Turkey’s excessive reliance on natural gas for electricity generation appears to be a source of the problem (www.haberturk.com, February 13). According to Energy Market Regulatory Agency, Turkey imported 40 bcm gas and consumed 43.5 bcm in 2012, its consumption is expected to reach 48.5 bcm. While around half of Turkey’s electricity is produced from natural gas, slightly over half of its gas imports are used in power plants.

    Electricity producers argue that Turkey urgently needs to reduce the share of gas in electricity generation to around 30 percent through greater use of renewables, domestic resources and nuclear power. This is a problem emphasized a long time ago and energy strategy documents have stated it as their objective to undercut dependence on gas. Yildiz also reiterated it recently. There is a broad consensus inside Turkey on the need to significantly revise its energy policies, but it seems there is less consensus on “how” and “how soon” Turkey should achieve a more balanced energy mix.

    https://jamestown.org/program/rising-gas-consumption-reveals-structural-problems-in-turkeys-energy-policies/
  • Turkey Confronts Syria Imbroglio

    Turkey Confronts Syria Imbroglio

    Turkey Confronts Syria Imbroglio

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 26
    February 7, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    The failure of a recent UN Security Council resolution that sought to calm Syria has once again highlighted the dilemmas Turkey has faced in its efforts to end the humanitarian catastrophe in this neighboring state. Ankara joined international outrage, condemning the Syrian regime on the one hand, and expressing concern over China and Russia using their UN veto, on the other. While calling for urgent action and exploration of fresh options to stop the bloodshed, Ankara, nonetheless, reiterated its reservations about international intervention.

    The proposed UN Resolution would have supported the Arab League’s peace plan. In the negotiations preceding the vote, Moscow’s objections prompted Western powers to soften the resolution’s tone. The failure to satisfy Russia’s expectations that the Syrian opposition is also given sufficient warning and Assad is not forced to leave power created a delicate situation. The lack of a breakthrough on a compromise draft prompted the backers of the resolution to put it to the UN Security Council for a vote. Hours before Russia and China vetoed the draft resolution, Assad forces continued their violent campaign, shelling Syria’s third largest city Homs, which, according to many reports, killed hundreds of people.

    While video footage showing Syrian forces’ alleged atrocities and the conflicting accounts of the death toll could not be independently verified and the Assad regime denied such reports, this development triggered an acute reaction in Turkey both at the governmental and popular levels (Anadolu Ajansi, February 4). Turkish anger was further fueled by the fact that the attack on Homs was executed on the anniversary of the infamous Hama massacre of 1982, when Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, had tens of thousands of people killed. Moreover, reportedly, during the bombardment of Homs some mosques were targeted, while Muslims were celebrating a sacred night marking the birth of the Prophet Mohammed.

    More remarkably, the clashes between the Syrian army and the forces of the Free Syrian Army spread to the Turkish border, and gunfire was heard in the border villages in the Turkish province of Hatay throughout the night. While some Syrian villagers fled to refugee camps in Turkey, where thousands of people including the leaders of the Free Syrian Army were already taking shelter, bullets from the clashes hit the homes in Turkish villages, which were televised live, raising public interest in these developments (Sabah, February 5).

    Like in other nations, Turkish people also organized demonstrations outside Syrian diplomatic representations in protest against these developments (www.turkiyegazetesi.com, February 5). Though the demonstrations were not large-scale, they have nonetheless attracted a significant number of people since the beginning of the uprisings. This development was also important because it signified a gradual transformation in Turkish people’s perception of the situation in Syria. Previously, Turks focused more on the geopolitical aspects of the Syrian uprising than the humanitarian tragedy caused by the regime’s brutal crackdown, believing that there was Western manipulation to change the regional balance of power. Many Turks, including conservative segments of society, harbored suspicions about the root causes of the uprisings and were critical of the Turkish government’s outward opposition against the Damascus regime, believing that it was acting as a subcontractor of the West (EDM, November 15, 2011). The recent demonstrations indicate that the Turkish public might become more supportive of their government’s policy on Syria and focus on the humanitarian aspects of the crisis.

    The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, attending the Munich Security Conference together with other world leaders, criticized Moscow and Beijing. Questioning the morality of their behavior, Davutoglu maintained that they acted with a Cold War mentality and the price for the vote would be paid by the Arabs and Turks in the region. Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey would continue to support the Syrian people’s struggle. Expressing solidarity with Syrians, Davutoglu added that Turkey would embrace the entire population of this country if they needed Turkey’s help (www.ntvmsnbc.com, February 4).

    Ankara’s ties with Damascus became contentious at the outset of the Syrian uprising and, over time, Turkish leaders broke with their former ally Assad and asked him to step down. Meanwhile, Ankara supported the umbrella organization, the Syrian National Council in bringing together opposition groups, as well as hosting thousands of refugees (EDM, August 10, 2011). The presence of members of the Free Syrian Army in refugee camps has led to speculation that Turkey was arming the rebels against Damascus. When an earlier attempt at imposing sanctions on Syria failed in October 2011, due to Russian and Chinese objections, Ankara went ahead and adopted sanctions in coordination with Western powers. Turkey also coordinated its diplomatic initiatives with regional countries and worked hard to ensure the peace plan by the Arab League would succeed. Davutoglu undertook enormous diplomatic efforts to convince Tehran, the chief regional ally of Damascus, to work together toward a solution of the crisis and the prevention of sectarian tensions in the region (EDM, January 10). In a subsequent effort, he traveled to Moscow to exert pressure on Damascus (Anadolu Ajansi, January 25).

    As his reaction to the recent failed resolution at the UN demonstrates, Davutoglu has been frustrated over the lack of progress on the diplomatic front. Two statements released by the foreign ministry regarding the ongoing atrocities by Damascus and the UN Security Council vote reflect similar thinking (www.mfa.gov.tr, February 4). While the first statement maintained that “The shelling by a country’s official security forces of its own cities constitutes the most concrete indication that the government of that country has totally lost its legitimacy to rule,” the second statement argued that “The stage that has been reached by the regime’s suppressing the desire of the Syrian people for universal values […] with the use of guns, violence and mass executions has acquired a threatening nature in which international peace and security is at risk.”

    This sort of language is one that values human rights over the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention and Ankara has so far underlined clearly that the Syrian regime has lost its right to legitimately rule the country. Turkey, however, has not gone as far as advocating international intervention, and believes that any solution has to come through international legitimacy. Short of international consensus on a UN-orchestrated solution, Ankara is left with little options for changing the situation on the ground.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-confronts-syria-imbroglio/
  • Turkey Has to Develop Large Firms in Order to Become an Active Player in Energy Sector

    Turkey Has to Develop Large Firms in Order to Become an Active Player in Energy Sector

    Turkey Has to Develop Large Firms in Order to Become an Active Player in Energy Sector

    Tuesday, 24 January 2012

    Journal of Turkish Weekly (JTW) conducted an exclusive interview with Saban Kardas. Saban Kardas is assistant professor at TOBB University of Economics and Tecnology in Ankara. He is also assistant editor of Insight Turkey, a quarterly journal in circulation since 1999, which is published by SETA Foundation. 

    Q: Would Turkey not be successful if it pursued its energy policy through TPAO, equipped with specific power and well-designed by the state, rather than extending state aid? In this context, is the Azerbaijan SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic) a successful model? Is it possible for Turkey’s energy policy to be changed substantially?

    A: To start with, Turkey and Azerbaijan’s energy policies are different, and will be misleading to start analysis of Turkey’s energy policies with a comparison between them. While as an energy rich producing country Azerbaijan envisions a different set of priorities in its energy policies, Turkey’s energy policy is driven by first and foremost a concern to meet its own needs. Beyond that, Turkey works to assume a role in energy policies as a transit country. The shaping of energy policies in the countries of origin on the one hand and transit countries, i.e., countries that host the transportation routes, on the other, as well as specific institutional structures they devise take place in different settings.

    Going back to the core issue raised in your question: whether Turkey should develop its energy policies by moving to a private-sector driven model or a model based on some form of state control or intervention in the market. Alongside TPAO, BOTAS needs to be mentioned in the context of transit projects. There are market pressures on BOTAS to reduce its market share. There is also a similar expectation from external players, especially the EU. Turkey is responding to these expectations and reducing state involvement but it is difficult to say that it has progressed to an extent that it can satisfy the demands coming from outside. There are different arguments made in support of the opposing models, referring back to your question. As it is sometimes underlined in the ongoing discussions in Turkey, it makes sense to reduce the element of state intervention to the extent possible. From a liberal logic, one can make the argument that a more effective and efficient system can be developed by this approach.

    However, as a counter line of thought argues, in markets regulating strategic commodities, energy being one of them, there are some reasons to adopt some degree of state-control. The key concern in Turkey is that if such a strategic commodity is left to market forces alone, it is hard to develop competitive national players. Such concerns on Turkey’s part have been underlined in the debate taking place in the energy markets. It is widely believed that as it seeks to assert its importance in energy geopolitics, Turkey has to develop large firms in order to become an active player in this field. Firms with big capital need to emerge for global competition. It is not unlikely to occur in free market conditions, but it will be difficult. The best way to do so would be to develop an energy giant with state support. For this reason, Turkey, as in the case of BOTAS, was for some time resisting the pressures to move to a free market-oriented model and retain it as a major player, despite the pressures coming from outside. Recently, as it has been brought to the public’s attention in the context of gas purchase contracts from Russia, Turkey in fact has started to reduce the monopoly over natural gas imports. Similarly, the domestic distribution grid has been privatized to a large extent. Granted, overall, Turkey is heading to a more market-oriented model. Yet, as stated by Energy Minister Taner Yıldız on several occasions, despite a market-oriented model, Turkey wants to retain a decisive capacity for the state to make critical interventions in the operation of market. This appears to be the official prognosis for the future of the state in energy market.

    Going back to the question on the SOCAR (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic) model, it is early to answer this question, in the sense that the process of SOCAR’s consolidation in the market has yet to be finalized. In this context, what SOCAR is trying to do is in essence to replicate GAZPROM model of Russia, i.e., using its position as a major producer to develop projects aiming to penetrate into downstream markets and gain control over transportation and distribution networks, so that it can maximize profits. The Trans-Anatolia agreement is the most obvious example for SOCAR’s quest to play such a prominent role. Seen from that perspective, this model is not applicable to Turkey, given that Turkey does not stand a chance to become a player in the chain running from the source or producing nations to the distribution networks. So, it is hard to compare Turkey’s energy sector to SOCAR model, given the structural differences.

    Since the SOCAR model is still in the making, one has to wait and see how it will come into full fruition and whether it will accomplish its objectives. It is early to make a realistic assessment. But so far, Azerbaijan is exporting oil and gas and in addition to that it has undertaken major investments in Turkey’s energy sector. So, one can safely say that it has accomplished some progress in downstream markets as well. To sum up, in Azerbaijan, one might expect the emergence of a structure similar to the one in Russia and it has recorded some progress in that regards.

    At this point, one has to note some problems with the GAZPROM model, assuming that SOCAR also pursues a similar approach. In this model, there are debates as to the fusion of the state and business interests; i.e., political authorities shaping the economic decisions or economics dominating political decisions, all the while GAZPROM and other energy giants being at the center of these intermingling relations. If SOCAR follows a similar route to the Russian model, in the mid- to long-term, how the relationship between politics and economics will be forged and whether interest groups formed around energy industry may eventually hinder democratization and good governance are issues that beg closer inspection. If Azerbaijan might be opting for this model, such questions also need to be discussed more candidly.

    Finally, Turkey will unlikely to follow these models. As underlined, while moving toward a market-oriented model, Turkey will develop a structure that enables effective state interventions into the market, through the control of a critical share by the state.

    Q: The signing of the agreement regarding the Trans-Anatolian pipeline, which included Azerbaijan and Turkey, can be considered a blow to Nabucco on the one hand, and giving permission to South Stream might make Europe more dependent on Russia on the other. Was it a reaction against France because of the political air in recent months?

    A: Personally, I do not think the recent developments regarding pipeline projects are directly related to the Armenian allegations. For instance, France has not been particularly supportive of Nabucco. On the contrary, the French are somehow involved in South Stream, having overtaken some of the shares in the project. So, it is difficult to argue that Turkey wanted to hurt France by thwarting Nabucco. There is no such direct connection, and Turkey’s decision(s) are not intended to convey a message to Europe. Both the Trans-Anatolian and the South Stream pipelines should be assessed based on their particular conditions, as well as from Turkey’s own perspective, and how Turkey sees them in line with its priorities in energy policies.

    I don’t think Trans-Anatolia is a blow to Nabucco. Turkey is a country that has always supported the Nabucco as a strategic project and clearly has expressed its commitment. Nabucco continues to play a key role in Turkey’s objectives to become an energy hub. But there are certain structural problems in the Nabucco project itself, and unfortunately, they have not been clearly resolved so far. As is well known, uncertainty over dedicated supplies, lack of financing and lack of unequivocal purchase commitments are other major hurdles. Previously, there used to be uncertainty over the transit regime which occasionally led to crises between Turkey and the EU. Through an understanding Turkey reached with the Europeans earlier, it eliminated those problems.

    One of the drivers of the Trans-Anatolian pipeline is Azerbaijan’s quest for an independent role in energy markets, which I underlined earlier. Turkey has taken a step in support of Azerbaijan’s role. But while providing this support, Turkey also reiterated the fundamental rationale of the Nabucco, i.e., giving approval to a direct corridor from the Caspian basin to European markets traversing Turkey. Turkey hereby sent a signal and reiterated its earlier position that it will not be an obstacle to the so-called Southern corridor. There were some uncertainties regarding the future of the Nabucco project as originally envisaged, which obviously delayed its realization. There had been concerns that the original design might be overambitious and aim at unrealistically high capacity. The joint Azerbaijani-Turkish initiative now enables a reconfiguration of Nabucco in more manageable scales. It is difficult to say that this route is altogether dead, as the rationale underpinning it also is at the core of the Trans-Anatolia.

    Turkey’s support for South Stream is a separate debate, because there is a direct competition with Nabucco there. Turkey has taken similar complementary steps in the past as well. After supporting Nabucco, Turkey demonstrated that it would not be the country that prevents South Stream. In that regards, we can say Turkey has not adopted a new position. The recent moves towards Trans-Anatolia and South Stream is a continuation of the previous position in the recent context.

    Q: The energy agreement signed by Turkey in recent weeks further brought Azerbaijan and Turkey together. In the coming years, will Ankara develop an Azerbaijan-oriented policy despite Yerevan, or create its own policy regarding energy?

    A: Based on the previous discussions, it is worth emphasizing a few points. Firstly, it is difficult for Turkey to develop independent energy policies under the current conditions. If we are talking about supply security in this context, it has different implications. If we are discussing this question in the context of Turkey’s goal of becoming an energy transit corridor, it needs to be handled differently.

    If we try to answer your question in this second dimension, i.e., energy transportation, it is difficult for Turkey to develop energy policies independent of Azerbaijan in the short to medium term. For Turkey to emerge a transit corridor and develop major transit routes, the producers of oil and gas have to give their approval. Azerbaijan is the first and only viable option at this point. In this sense, the Trans-Anatolian agreement signed with Azerbaijan, and the earlier agreements signed at the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council summit between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Ilham Aliyev, finalized Turkey’s first real transit agreement in natural gas markets. Although we have been proud of becoming a hub country, so far it remained at the rhetorical level and has yet to be realized. The compromise reached subsequent to the treaty signed with Azerbaijan allows Turkey to become a natural gas transit route for the first time. In this context, it is difficult for Turkey to develop a policy completely independent of Azerbaijan.

    Apart from this, which alternative players are there? Exporting natural gas reserves in northern Iraq through Turkey has been on the agenda of the northern Iraqi leaders. However, there are problems between Baghdad and provinces as to how to use the natural resources of Iraq. The other option is obviously Iran. Tehran’s strained relations with America, among other factors, limit the ability of Iran to emerge as a major alternative for Turkey’s ambitious to become a transit hub. On the other hand, Russia does not want to market its natural gas through Turkey.

    However, it can be said that Turkey has a growing role at present regarding the oil transportation. The Yumurtalik–Kirkuk pipeline, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipelines or tankers through the sea lanes play an important role in the transportation corridors controlled by Turkey. Beyond these developments, Turkey also has achieved limited progress in terms of reaching its ambitions. Especially, concerning the transport of Kazakh and Russian oil through Turkey, major issues remain. In short, as of now, talking about a role independent of Azerbaijan is difficult.

    Going back to the other issues raised in the question, yes, there has been a rapprochement between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Particularly, the current government’s policy is in favor of close relations with Azerbaijan and we might expect the continuation of this policy. There is no reason for Turkey to give up its Azerbaijan-oriented policy in the upcoming years, especially if the economic partnership continues to deepen between them, as is the case currently. These ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan, in a sense, create disincentives for a possible rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. For Turkey to be drawn into normalization process, the Armenian side, in its approach towards Turkey, has to understand that there is not only an emotional dimension in the Turkish-Azerbaijani relationship, or a strategic dimension, but there is also a very strong economic dimension. It would be advisable for Armenia to consider its position on Turkey by taking into account these various angles.

    Tuesday, 24 January 2012

    Journal of Turkish Weekly

  • Turkey Plans Serial Production In National Weapons Programs

    Turkey Plans Serial Production In National Weapons Programs

    Turkey Plans Serial Production In National Weapons Programs

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 16
    January 24, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    The head of the under-secretariat for the defense industry, Murad Bayar, has outlined Turkey’s armaments objectives in coming years. This year, Turkey plans to finish tests on several national weapons systems that have been developed and move to the serial production phase. In the next stage, building on that momentum, Turkey plans to increase its arms exports as well as reduce its reliance on imports (Anadolu Ajansi, January 23).

    During the past decade, Turkey has embarked on ambitious programs to reduce its dependence on external sources for the procurement needs of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the second largest army in NATO. On the one hand, through stringent rules on procurement tenders, Ankara wanted to ensure that domestic firms will take part in the production of imported weapons systems, as well as enabling technology transfers. On the other hand, building on the accumulation of knowledge gained from these joint projects and the assistance and subsidies provided to the domestic arms industry and R&D activities, Turkey has been working to develop several “national” weapons systems. So far, Ankara’s ambitious national arms projects included the development of a national warship, main battle tank, attack helicopter, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and an infantry rifle.

    Turkey has been cooperating with Italy’s Augusta-Westland on an attack helicopter project, which is aimed at resolving the Turkish army’s deficiencies in its fight against the PKK. Earlier, a prototype of this helicopter was developed, which is going through flight and weapons systems tests (EDM, September 29, 2009). Turkey is proud of the attack helicopter deal and sees it almost as an advertisement for its recent national projects. Turkey obtained the sole production license from Italy and introduced the necessary modifications, in order that it meets the specific operational needs of its army in mountainous terrain. Moreover, reflecting its self-confidence in indigenous technological abilities, the electronic systems and the software of the helicopter will be developed in Turkey, meaning it will have full control over the platform’s operation. The weapons installed on the helicopter will also come from national weapons developed domestically in recent years, including Cirit laser-guided rocket systems.

    Bayar announced that they are planning to finish firing tests and start the first deliveries to the TAF this year, and complete the delivery of 51 helicopters in the coming years. Bayar also noted that once this platform is added to TAF’s inventory, it will have good marketing prospects. This system will be in demand, Bayar believes, especially in countries that are currently fighting terrorism, given that Turkey developed it with such considerations in mind. Several Middle Eastern countries are believed to be considering ATAK. After successfully passing the flight tests in summer 2011, ATAK has also been invited to submit its bid to a procurement tender in South Korea (Sabah, September 25, 2011).

    Another major project is the main battle tank ALTAY, developed in partnership with South Korea’s Rotem (EDM, August 7, 2008). This project seeks to increase the TAF’s firepower in conventional warfare through the procurement of 250 third generation main battle tanks. Currently, ALTAY is in its design phase and the initial deliveries are expected to start from 2013. Bayar noted that this year they plan to develop the first prototype and start the necessary tests.

    Turkey also has been working on another ambitious project to bolster its surveillance and intelligence gathering capabilities. In need of actionable intelligence in its fight against the PKK, Turkey has relied on the United States and Israel to either lease or buy UAVs. This cooperation, however, proved difficult to sustain given the tensions encountered in its bilateral relations with Israel and occasionally the US. Turkey has launched an indigenous medium altitude long endurance (MALE) UAV system program that will initially meet the TAF’s reconnaissance requirements, and later a modified version with combat capability will be developed. The prototypes are going through several tests. Following the maturity tests, Bayar expect the five prototypes to be put into operation and their serial production will start. Ankara sees this project also as a sign of prestige, as it will join the few nations with this technology and eventually develop the potential to export it. Similarly, Bayar expects that the first indigenous satellite developed by Turkey, the Gokturk-2, will be launched into space this year.

    Another project has been the development of a national infantry rifle. Turkey is currently conducting tests on a rifle designed and developed domestically, and anticipates moving to the mass production stage this year. The country has also been running a national warship program, MILGEM, to develop a littoral combat capacity. Under the project, the Turkish Navy will be supplied with eight corvettes and four frigates, as well as exploring possibilities for exports. The first corvette has already been delivered, while the second is undergoing tests.

    Recently, Ankara announced plans to develop a national fighter jet. Bayar described it as a long term objective, which would mark Turkey’s elevation to a higher class in arms producing countries. Turkey is currently considering this option and will soon initiate two-year long feasibility studies. If the project is deemed feasible, further work will be authorized to develop the first prototype in ten years’ time and serial production in the following decade. Turkey has also announced another ambitious program to develop long-range missiles with a range of up to 2,500 km (www.trt.net.tr, January 13).

    Although Turkey remains a major arms importer, through these programs it is now able to procure slightly more than half of its needs from domestic sources. Currently, Turkey is producing short range missiles, armored vehicles and personnel carriers, training aircraft, small UAVs, etc. Especially in advanced weapons systems, Turkey remains dependent on imports, and addressing that deficiency is one of the objectives of the procurement programs. In the future, while seeking to increase the share of domestic contributions, Turkey will also work to bolster its export figures to $1 billion, from last year’s $800 million. Overall, two principles will underpin Turkey’s defense industry policies, as underlined by Bayar: depth, i.e., increasing the national contributions in the new platforms through the development of sub-systems; and sustainability, or, building a viable arms industry that can sustain mass production at competitive prices.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-plans-serial-production-in-national-weapons-programs/
  • Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq

    Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq

    Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq

    Turkey Works to Prevent Sectarian Rift in Iraq

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 12

    January 18, 2012

    By: Saban Kardas

    As Turkey struggles to avert crises involving its neighbors Syria and Iran, Iraq has emerged as yet another issue that needs immediate attention from Turkish diplomacy. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s recent remarks critical of what he considered to be Ankara’s “interference” in Iraqi internal affairs threatens to worsen the already tense situation in the Middle East.

    In an interview broadcast by state television, Maliki sent a stern warning to Ankara asking it to stop its interventions in Iraqi domestic affairs. Maliki maintained that Turkey had acted as though it ruled Iraq, and went on to claim that the current path taken by Ankara might invite disaster and civil war in the region. He warned that if Turkey continued the same rhetoric, it might suffer repercussions from its actions, because it also has different sects and ethnic groups (Anadolu Ajansi, January 13).

    Maliki’s inflammatory rhetoric was triggered by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s remarks in the previous week. Both in his conversation with Maliki and in his public addresses, Erdogan urged the Iraqi leadership to take swift measures to reduce tensions in Iraq, which were caused by an arrest warrant being issued for the Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi (Anadolu Ajansi, January 10). Maliki issued an arrest warrant for Hashemi, a leading Sunni politician, shortly before the withdrawal of US forces on the grounds that he was leading a death squad targeting Iraqi politicians. Fearing for his safety, Hashemi escaped to northern Iraq controlled by the Kurdistan regional government. The clampdown on Hashemi and other Sunni ministers triggered a new wave of attacks against the Shiites, raising questions about the sustainability of the fragile coalition government, as well as the future of the country as a unified entity.

    Turkey initially refrained from direct involvement in the unfolding crisis over the arrest warrant against Hashemi and exclusion of Sunnis from key government positions. It drew attention to the risks that the recent rift could escalate into sectarian conflict, with destabilizing effects for the entire region. It also maintained communication with the Kurdistan regional government to forge national consensus. Regionally, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also sought to mobilize a joint Turkish-Iranian response to address the Shiite-Sunni disagreements, which lie at the core of the ongoing crises in Syria, Bahrain and Iraq (EDM, January 10).

    However, the recent spree of bombings in Baghdad prompted Erdogan to raise this issue publicly. Raising concerns about the inability of Iraqi political authorities to prevent bloodshed, Erdogan maintained that he has lost his optimism for the future of democracy in this country, as the government laid siege to the houses of coalition partners. Erdogan challenged Maliki to assume his historical responsibility and work to maintain the unity of Iraq, adding that those who instigate chaos with sectarian instincts would go down in history as devils. Echoing speculation that Iran might be behind the recent political crisis in Iraq, Erdogan also warned other countries endeavoring to exert influence in Iraq to act in a prudent and responsible manner (Anadolu Ajansi, January 10).

    While Erdogan was trying to promote common sense on the part of his Iraqi counterparts, he also provided further ammunition to Maliki and his Shiite block that seem determined to take a stand against Turkey to bolster their position in Iraqi domestic politics. Following Maliki’s televised criticism of Ankara, the Turkish envoy in Baghdad was summoned by the Iraqi deputy foreign minister to be reminded of Iraq’s expectation that Turkey must avoid actions which could disturb good neighborly relations (Anadolu Ajansi January 16). In response, the Turkish foreign ministry summoned the Iraqi ambassador in Ankara, who was told that Turkey found unacceptable the allegation that it is interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs. It was only natural for Turkey to pursue the stability of its neighbors, according to Turkish foreign ministry officials (www.ntvmsnbc.com, January 16).

    This development is likely to invite a harsh response from the Turkish side in the days ahead, but it has already pleased Hashemi and his supporters. Reportedly Sunni politicians, who feel threatened by the government crackdown, were approaching Turkish officials to take a more effective role in order to thwart a sectarian conflict. Hashemi also expressed his debt to Turkey, adding that Erdogan had personally worked to support his cause in recent months. Reiterating his concerns about receiving a fair trial in Baghdad, he vowed not to return to the capital before his safety is ensured (www.ntvmnsbc.com, Today’s Zaman, January 16).

    Clearly, this dispute raises many questions about Turkey’s Middle East policy. At one level it reignites the possibility of sectarian conflict in the region. Turkey has purposefully refrained from sectarian considerations in its foreign policy, and has sought to embrace all major groups, a policy which was most clearly observed in Iraq. When a violent civil war destabilized Iraq in the wake of the US-led invasion in 2003, Ankara played a major role in convincing the Sunni groups to withdraw their support from the insurgency and join the political processes in Baghdad. During the government vacuum that ensued after the Iraqi elections of 2010, Turkey again prioritized Iraqi unity and urged the al Iraqiyye list representing Sunni groups to work with the Maliki-led coalition.

    As the risk of sectarian conflict may have increased in the wake of the Arab Spring, Turkey once again wants to spearhead preventive measures to avert such a scenario. In Iraq, while seeking to play a similar role and prevent further polarization and eventual partition of the country along sectarian lines, Turkey arguably runs the risk of being drawn into sectarian divisions, as the Sunni groups are obviously in search of an ally to balance Maliki’s bloc that interestingly is supported by not only Iran, but also the United States.

    Also, this might have repercussions for the Turkish-US relationship. Despite its objections against the invasion of Iraq, Turkey worked closely with the United States, hoping that this would be the best way to prevent the country’s descent into chaos and total breakdown. In the process leading to the withdrawal of US forces, Ankara again coordinated its policy with Washington. However Washington’s support for Maliki, whose reckless show of force and exclusion of Sunni groups from government positions, might also expose new divisions between Ankara and Washington.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-works-to-prevent-sectarian-rift-in-iraq/