Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Turkey’s Energy Minister Pressures Nabucco Partners

    Turkey’s Energy Minister Pressures Nabucco Partners

    Turkey’s Energy Minister Pressures Nabucco Partners

    Publication: Volume: 6 Issue: 75
    April 20, 2009 02:19 PM
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 17 Turkey’s Energy Minister Hilmi Guler, attended a meeting on the future of the Turkish energy sector where he highlight the need to invest in renewable energy resources and diversify its hydrocarbon supplies. In that context, Guler sent important messages to Turkey’s Nabucco partners. Asked about the current standing of the Nabucco project, he said that draft intergovernmental and host government agreements had been conveyed to Ankara’s partners. “We told them that if we receive their response this month, we are ready to sign the agreement in June…we have full confidence that we can conclude the project, provided that our partners respond to the letter promptly” (www.haberturk.com, April 17).

    During the past fortnight Guler has repeatedly stressed this point. On various occasions, he expressed Turkey’s dissatisfaction with the slow pace of progress and tried to pressurize its European partners. Satisfied with the results of the Budapest Summit in January, where the EU supported the Nabucco project by earmarking 250 million Euros ($324 million) to help the consortium secure loans, Turkey wanted to fast track the process. Noting that Turkey was the driving force behind the project, Guler argued that the Europeans were preoccupied with small details and if Ankara took charge, the project would be completed within three years. He contended that the Europeans have finally realized that Turkey could not be reduced only to a “transit country” (Radikal, February 1).

    By mid-March, however, the EU debated reducing funds allocated for Nabucco and removing it from its priority energy projects, before eventually deciding to maintain the project. Guler said that even if the EU were to drop its financial backing, it would not affect the scheduled progress of Nabucco:

    “The Nabucco project will be concluded under any circumstances. Just as we finished the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Shah Deniz project and the Turkey-Greece interconnector, we will also finish this project. The credit issue can be considered as a detail. There will be alternatives and we will discuss them with our partners” (www.cnnturk.com, March 19).

    However, despite his powerful rhetoric, Guler failed to address how Turkey will generate the necessary funding in the midst of the global economic crisis. Guler was assuming that as long as a consensus existed on the political-strategic level, the remaining problems over financing could easily be resolved. As the subsequent developments showed, that consensus cannot be taken for granted.

    The declining commitment of the European partners was obvious and Guler’s statements also reflected those changes. On April 12, he again criticized the attitude of the Nabucco partners, which he repeated within different platforms. According to Guler, in their initial responses to Turkey’s draft proposals, its partners raised issues which had already been agreed. To avoid such problems, and accelerate the process, Guler sent the Europeans a letter requesting that they “submit to Turkey what they all agree on and sign on to it” (Anadolu Ajansi, April 12).

    Funding problems aside, questions about how to supply Nabucco are far from settled, which has a direct bearing on any evaluation of the project by investors. The declining European interest in Nabucco has already forced Azerbaijan -the only country to commit gas to the project- to reconsider exporting through Russia. A related political challenge has been posed by the tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan, caused by Baku’s discomfort surrounding Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, which might ignore its concerns. Although Guler ruled out the negative implications of the Turkish-Azeri frictions for the Nabucco project, uncertainty over Baku’s plans further complicates the investor climate, delaying a European response to Turkey’s draft proposals.

    Against this background, the haste with which the Turkish government is seeking to move the process forward might be an indication of an underlying sense of nervousness about the fate of the project. Ankara appears impatient to secure European commitment to the Nabucco project and start without further delay. It has blamed its European partners for the current stalemate in the negotiations.

    On the other hand, the Turkish government rarely acknowledges its own part in these delays, such as the covert threat to use the Nabucco as a bargaining chip to accelerate Turkey’s stalled EU accession process, or its insistence on privileged access to gas transiting its territory to serve domestic demand, or its futile efforts to include Russia in Nabucco. No matter how justified Turkey might be on these issues, the government might have miscalculated the potential damage caused by its bargaining tactics (Taraf, March 3). Turkey’s aggressive rhetoric about becoming an energy hub may alienate some of its Nabucco partners.

    Nor has Ankara appreciated the complexity of energy geopolitics in general or the discussions taking place inside the EU. Turkey mainly acted on the assumption that given its strategic location it could dictate terms to Brussels, forgetting that Nabucco had to compete with other rival projects to receive European backing (EDM, March 4, 5, 16). Likewise, Turkey hoped that the U.S. administration might support the project. But as Obama’s European trips showed, Washington does not enjoy the leverage over major EU members ascribed to it by Ankara. It is unclear when a European response will emerge, but it could disappoint the Turkish government.

     http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34882

  • Turkey and Armenia Delay Re-opening the Border

    Turkey and Armenia Delay Re-opening the Border

    Turkey and Armenia Delay Re-opening the Border

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 74
    April 17, 2009 02:27 PM Age: 5 min
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Turkey
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 16 Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan attended the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Foreign Ministers Council in Yerevan. Following his BSEC meetings, Babacan discussed the recent developments between Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan. President Barack Obama’s historic visit to Turkey earlier this month had triggered media speculation that Ankara would deepen its rapprochement with Armenia despite Yerevan’s differences with Baku. Some claimed that Turkey might announce the re-opening of its border with Armenia during Babacan’s visit to Yerevan (Wall Street Journal, April 2). However, political realities have since diminished expectations for a rapid breakthrough.

    Concerned that it might lose its leverage on Armenia as a result of any thaw in Ankara-Yerevan relations, Baku raised objections. Moreover, the prospects that Turkey might “betray” Azerbaijan generated domestic uproar against the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, with opposition parties and civil society organizations organizing activities to demonstrate support with their Azeri brethren (EDM, April 9). As a result, Ankara took steps to reassure Baku that any Turkish-Armenian normalization would not come at the expense of Azerbaijan (EDM, April 10). After fast-tracking the negotiations with Armenia over the past year, the process has now stalled.

    Armenia’s President Sarksyan further fuelled discussions within Turkey when he reportedly claimed that the border might re-open before his visit to the country in October (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 10). Responding to Sarksyan’s remarks, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan clarified Turkey’s position by stating that unless a solution was found on the Karabakh issue, Turkey would not take additional steps toward opening the border (Radikal, April 11).

    Babacan told reporters on his way to Yerevan, that Turkey was seeking a comprehensive solution to regional problems. He said that efforts to normalize relations must connect the process between Turkey and Armenia with Yerevan’s ties with Baku. “We do not say, let’s first solve one problem and solve the other later,” Babacan added (Today’s Zaman, April 17). 

    Babacan’s remarks served to reiterate Turkey’s position that the re-opening of the border with Armenia must be linked to the resolution of Armenian-Azerbaijani territorial issues, which he also repeated during his meetings in Yerevan. Babacan held talks with Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan and Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, part of which was also attended by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. He had separate discussions with Lavrov and Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Mammad Guliev on regional issues (Anadolu Ajansi, April 16). Although the Turkish media claimed that Babacan, Sarksyan, Nalbandian and Lavrov also held a joint meeting, this was denied in an April 17 statement issued by Turkey’s Foreign Ministry (www.trt.net.tr, April 17).

    The Turkish press reported that during his closed talks with Sarksyan, Babacan said that Ankara will not take any steps that might disappoint Baku. The parties also agreed that the Turkish-Armenian negotiations would continue at political and technical levels. Moreover, Babacan reasserted Turkey’s continued support for the parallel talks between Sarksyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (Hurriyet, April 17).

    Speaking to reporters in Yerevan, Guliev repeated Azerbaijan’s position that Ankara needs to protect Baku’s interests while conducting its rapprochement with Armenia. Any progress, in his view must be conditional, based on Yerevan’s cooperation in talks over Karabakh. The Armenian side, however, has resisted attempts to link the two sets of talks. Responding to a question during the BSEC press briefing, although he expressed his hope that the border might be opened soon, Nalbandian noted that no agreement was reached. He also said that the current negotiations for the resolution of the Karabakh dispute was being carried out within the framework of the Minsk process (www.cnnturk.com, April 16). 

    The AKP government places considerable value on Turkish-Armenian diplomacy, which it views as part of its overall policy to resolve problems with its neighbors. The re-opening of the border and the normalization of relations with Armenia will have a symbolic foreign policy meaning for the AKP, showing that its “multi-dimensional” theme justifies closer ties with all of Turkey’s neighbors, rather than only prioritizing the Middle East. Indeed, a settlement of the disputes with Armenia will help Ankara remove the Armenian “genocide” claims from the table in its relations with the United States.

    Despite an internationally favorable environment for the AKP’s policies, however, the re-opening of the border will be challenging. Ankara postponed such a politically risky decision, hoping that in the meantime it will alleviate Azerbaijan’s concerns. Indeed, since the beginning of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, Ankara’s calculations have hinged on the assumption that it could convince Azerbaijan’s government to resolve its own problems with Armenia -removing Baku’s veto. However, Azerbaijan appears determined to resist pressures to remove its objections, unless Armenia relaxes its position on Karabakh.

    Recognizing that both Washington and Moscow remain significant players in the region, Ankara also seeks their support as leverage on Yerevan. Yet, as Turkey attempts to buy time to remove Baku’s objections, it risks jeopardizing Armenia’s commitment to the talks. The stalling of the process “has left Armenian politicians and pundits questioning the wisdom of further overtures to the Turks” (EDM, April 14). Against this background, the recent agreement between Yerevan and Tehran to construct a railway connecting Armenia to Iran’s Persian Gulf was interpreted by the Turkish media as Yerevan’s “Plan B” (Hurriyet, April 16). Through such projects Armenia could ease the economic consequences of the Turkish-Azeri embargo, which might undermine one of Ankara’s arguments that Yerevan badly needs normalization with Turkey in order to secure access to the outside world.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-and-armenia-delay-re-opening-the-border/

  • Chief of the Turkish Army Redefining the Political Role of the Military

    Chief of the Turkish Army Redefining the Political Role of the Military

    Chief of the Turkish Army Redefining the Political Role of the Military

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 72
    April 15, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey’s Chief of the General Staff, General Ilker Basbug, delivered a speech at the War Academies Command in Istanbul on April 14 addressing several issues including civil-military relations, national identity, the role of religion, and the fight against terrorism. In a two-hour speech broadcast live on nine TV stations, Basbug tried to erase the image of the military being opposed to religion. He underlined the need to recognize sub-national cultural identities, reiterated his support for the secular and democratic regime in Turkey, drew a distinction between terrorists and innocent civilians and called for a more healthy civil-military relationship (www.tsk.mil.tr, April 14).

    Many of the phrases used by Basbug, such as “the people of Turkey” or “terrorists are human beings too,” were considered as “firsts” for the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), and interpreted as a marked shift in the military’s position on social and political problems. In a symbolic gesture, the TAF opened a press briefing to journalists known for their fierce criticism of the military’s interference in politics, signaling its willingness to reach out to broader sections of Turkish society (Turkish daily, April 15).

    For some Turkish analysts, this represents the military’s attempt to adjust to the recent drastic changes within Turkish politics and society. Its new leadership realizes that although elements within the Turkish military interfered in the presidential election through the April 27, 2007 memorandum, it was unable to prevent the election of Abdullah Gul. The AKP’s victory in the July 2007 general elections demonstrated that the Turkish society opposed such military interference in the political process. Moreover, the alleged involvement of a growing number of serving and retired military officers in the ongoing Ergenekon investigation has undermined the popularity of the military, further tilting the balance in favor of civilians, which increased the pressure on the TAF to redefine its position on civil-military relations (Hurriyet, April 14).

    Nonetheless, Basbug is known as an outspoken commander whose leadership style does not restrict him to the military, and has strong opinions on the key challenges facing the country (EDM, August 15, 2008). Basbug regularly holds consultation meetings with journalists, academics and intellectuals, which is consistent with his approach and visionary outlook. He regards tackling broader social problems as a self-declared duty.

    In this context, Basbug set the tone at the outset of his speech: “I will address the issues of civil-military relations, the fight against terrorism, democracy and secularism from an academic perspective.” He quoted international philosophers and writers as well as the works of Turkish scholars, and referred to scientific studies to support his arguments. Rather than offering an exclusively military-security perspective, he presented a sociological analysis of these issues. On terrorism, for instance, Basbug called for studying its root causes and understanding why militants join terrorist organizations.

    Although the moderation of the military leadership is welcomed by civilians and is viewed as a sign of the normalization of Turkish democracy, it has allegedly weakened Basbug’s image and authority amongst the officer corps. The arrests of several military personnel, in addition to retired high ranking military commanders, in the previous wave of the Ergenekon investigation caused disquiet inside the Turkish military. Military officers expected Basbug to state publicly his stance on Ergenekon and the overall role of the Turkish military (Hurriyet, April 14).

    Despite his extensive coverage of civil-military relations during his address, Basbug made no direct comment on the Ergenekon investigation. He indicated that he might hold a separate press conference to present his opinions on current issues (www.cnnturk.com, April 14). Basbug’s speech received a mixed reaction from Turkish analysts, partly reflecting his cautious approach based on his awareness of often contradictory expectations. For some, the speech heralded a new era. They found Basbug liberal and supportive of a pluralist democracy. Similarly, some argued that his remarks signaled the TAF might be preparing to support an amnesty for the PKK terrorists. Critics alleged Basbug’s speech was only a compilation of previous statements on these issues and contained nothing new. However, they conceded that there was a shift in the way the military communicates with the public. Basbug adopted moderate language and avoided any hint of confrontation with the political authorities (www.kanaldhaber.com.tr, April 14; Milliyet, Radikal, Hurriyet, Taraf, April 15).

    Basbug’s speech revealed the limits on further civil-military reform. He was keen to reassert the interests of the TAF and protect its privileged position. Despite recognizing the constitutional restrictions on the military and acknowledging the supremacy of the government, he called on politicians to consult the military and respect its autonomy. He expressed support for democracy and sought to reach out to the conservative sections of society, while claiming that two smear campaigns were underway against the TAF. One led by those criticizing the TAF using the pretext of promoting democracy, and a second from those seeking to mobilize religious opposition against the military. In particular, Basbug reiterated his ardent opposition to “religious communities” (cemaat), and their growing social, economic and political power. Finally, despite his recognition of Turkey’s cultural diversity, he insisted on protecting the nation-state from globalization. Basbug claims to approach controversial issues from a sociological perspective, while some of his uncompromising views contradict trends within Turkish society.

    https://jamestown.org/program/chief-of-the-turkish-army-redefining-the-political-role-of-the-military/

  • Turkish-Iraqi-American Trilateral Security Mechanism Focuses on PKK Terrorism

    Turkish-Iraqi-American Trilateral Security Mechanism Focuses on PKK Terrorism

    Turkish-Iraqi-American Trilateral Security Mechanism Focuses on PKK Terrorism

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 70
    April 13, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The trilateral commission established between Turkey, the United States and Iraq to facilitate security cooperation against the activities of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Northern Iraq continues to operate. However it remains uncertain if it will produce tangible results that satisfy Turkey’s expectations to eliminate the PKK threat. Last week, two Turkish soldiers died in a clash with PKK militants, in which seven terrorists were killed, and this could signal an escalation of the PKK’s militants’ activities ahead of summer. This incident increases the pressure on the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) to take urgent military measures.

    On April 11 Turkey’s Minister of Interior Besir Atalay travelled to Baghdad for a ministerial level meeting of the trilateral commission where he met the Iraqi National Security Minister Shirwan al-Waili and the Charges d’Affairs of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Patricia Butenis (Anadolu Ajansi, April 11, Hurriyet Daily News, April 12). A five-point declaration was subsequently issued, denouncing the PKK as a terrorist organization which endangers the security of all parties. The statement also added that Baghdad will ban the activities of the PKK and its proxy organization in Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party. The commission reviewed its progress, and reaffirmed their determination to continue working on limiting the political, military and media activities of the PKK.

    The trilateral mechanism was initiated in November 2008, following a change in Turkey’s anti-terrorist policy against the PKK (Terrorism Monitor, December 8, 2008). Iraqi Kurds, who for a long time had refused to cooperate with Turkey on the issue, also changed their position and joined the process as part of the Iraqi delegation. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has taken a stronger line since then and promised to curb the activities of the PKK. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that a branch of the trilateral mechanism will be established in the Northern Iraqi city of Arbil, which highlighted the thawing in Turkey’s relations with the KRG (Today’s Zaman, February 24).

    From Ankara’s perspective, the conclusions of last weekend’s meeting will test the commitment of the Iraqi Kurds to the “joint fight against the PKK.” During President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Iraq in March, KRG officials expressed their support and offered a plan to disarm the PKK militants in the areas under their control (EDM, March 24, 29). As a further expression of their determination, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, himself a Kurd, gave Gul a warm welcome and threatened the PKK during their joint press briefing: “either lay down arms, or leave Iraq” (www.cnnturk.com, March 24). The Turkish side interpreted Talabani’s statement as a successful sign for Turkey’s new policies in general and Gul’s visit in particular.

    Soon after Gul’s return to Turkey, however, Talabani’s subsequent remarks raised questions about the sincerity of the Iraqi Kurds’ to cooperate. Talabani, who is also the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, visited Northern Iraq, where he met Mesud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, who had been travelling in Europe during Gul’s visit. The two leaders discussed relations between the Kurdish groups, as well as the KRG’s ties with the central government in Baghdad. Talabani also briefed Barzani about his contacts with Turkey. Referring to the local Kurdish media, the Turkish press reported that Talabani retracted his earlier position and denied having called on the PKK to “lay down arms or leave Iraq.” Talabani argued he was misunderstood and clarified his position by saying that the disarmament of the PKK was Turkey’s proposal and he was simply referring to it (Dogan Haber Ajansi, April 1).

    Familiar with the Iraqi Kurdish politicians’ reneging on their promises in the past, the Turkish media covered this development extensively, and the opposition parties criticized the government’s reliance on the Northern Iraqi Kurdish groups to handle the PKK threat (www.haber7.com, April 7). In response to a question on the subject, Gul stated “I would like to believe what Talabani said during the joint press briefing” (Anadolu Ajansi, April 3). Gul later hardened his tone against Baghdad, and in an interview on Iraqi TV he called on the government to keep its promises. Noting that Turkey respected Iraq’s territorial integrity, Gul added “if Baghdad cannot solve this problem, we can… If some of the areas used by [the PKK] are not under the control of the central administration, leave it to us and we will take care of it” (Milliyet, April 11).

    Before leaving for Iraq to attend the meeting of the trilateral commission, Atalay said that Turkey expected concrete steps from Baghdad and the Northern Iraqi authorities. According to the Turkish press, the declaration issued after the meeting reaffirmed Talabani’s earlier warning to the PKK, and Atalay emphasized Turkey’s satisfaction with the process, especially his partners’ willingness to continue joint efforts against the PKK presence in Northern Iraq (www.cnnturk.com, April 12).

    The dynamics of the recent developments between Ankara-Baghdad-Arbil illustrate the continuity of the AKP’s Kurdish policy and the fight against terrorism. The decline in the AKP’s electoral support within the southeastern provinces in last month’s local elections was interpreted as a failure of the “domestic” pillar of the government’s Kurdish policy (EDM, March 31). If Turkey cannot ensure the compliance of Baghdad and the KRG to deliver on their promises, it will come to be viewed as a serious blow to the “external” pillar of the government’s anti-terrorist policy. Obviously, this situation makes Ankara anxious to secure tangible results from the trilateral process, but uncertainty remains as to whether the declarations will be translated into effective action. What also adds to Ankara’s sense of urgency is the fear that the advent of spring will witness an increase in militant attacks on Turkish military targets, and raise pressure on the government to immediately address the threat posed by the PKK.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-iraqi-american-trilateral-security-mechanism-focuses-on-pkk-terrorism/
  • The Alliance of Civilizations Forum: A Major Test for Turkish Diplomacy

    The Alliance of Civilizations Forum: A Major Test for Turkish Diplomacy

    The Alliance of Civilizations Forum: A Major Test for Turkish Diplomacy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 67
    April 8, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 6-7, Istanbul hosted the second United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) forum, co-chaired by Turkey and Spain under the auspices of the UN to foster international dialogue and cooperation. The forum was attended by five heads of state, 26 foreign ministers, 11 ministers and high-level officials from 12 international and regional organizations, providing an opportunity for Ankara to discuss bilateral relations with its neighbors and showcase Turkey’s growing international profile (Anadolu Ajansi, April 7).

    The UNAOC began in 2004 following the Madrid bombings, as part of Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luiz Rodriguez Zapatero’s aim of building closer links between the Western and Islamic worlds, and combating terrorism through dialogue rather than force. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan supported this idea, which became a joint Spanish-Turkish initiative. In addition to several working meetings, its first forum was hosted by Spain in January 2008 and around 100 countries have joined the organization (www.aocistanbul.org; www.unaoc.org).

    The second UNAOC forum reflected the high value placed on resolving common problems through dialogue. In their addresses, world leaders also emphasized the promotion of mutual respect, tolerance and diversity, to overcome conflict and achieve peaceful coexistence (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 7). UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon highlighted the possible conflict prevention role of the platform: “All too often, the United Nations must deal with fires after they break out. Through the UNAOC, we can stamp out the sparks before they catch” (Today’s Zaman, April 7).

    Participants submitted their national plans and regional strategies for joint projects and agreed on developing programs to increase communication among the young and facilitate greater access to information technology to promote intercultural understanding. Additional programs will support academic research, organize workshops to study the challenges of doing business in a multicultural environment, and develop joint media educational programs (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 7).

    Moreover, the UNAOC plays a major part in the foreign policy agenda of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and his governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has supported the initiative since its inception. The project has been used by the AKP to advance its political vision, emphasizing dialogue and consensus in conducting Turkey’s foreign relations. This is an extension of their own transformation from a more doctrinaire, anti-Western Islamic movement to a pro-EU, moderate conservative party. Fostering international dialogue is regarded as vindication of the AKP’s image as a movement which synthesizes Western and Islamic values. Most importantly, Turkey’s leading role in this new forum is valuable for the AKP’s leadership, offering a high profile opportunity to represent the Muslim world, which they view as a core mission (Radikal, November 12, 2006).

    The AKP government has recently undertaken several initiatives reflecting their belief that Turkey could serve as a bridge between East and West, and advocate the rights of the Islamic world. For instance, Turkey’s policy during the Gaza crisis, or its position over appointing the new Secretary-General of NATO was driven by such considerations. Critics allege that Turkey might be drifting away from the transatlantic community and becoming more Middle Eastern. Nonetheless, the AKP has insisted that the party remains committed to the country’s Western orientation, and these new openings within the Islamic world should be interpreted as complementary to Western interests in the strategically vital regions surrounding Turkey. The AKP also highlights its successful foreign policy by pointing to the praise Turkey has received from the international community, including the EU and the United States, for its contributions to global and regional peace through such projects.

    These high-level gatherings serve Turkish diplomacy in other ways. On the sidelines of the forum, several bilateral and multilateral talks took place, which enabled Turkish leaders to discuss controversial foreign policy issues. President Barack Obama made a brief appearance at the UNAOC reception on the first day, expressing U.S. backing for Turkey’s efforts. He reiterated his support for rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, urging the foreign ministers of both countries to finalize the normalization process. Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, in addition to meeting his Armenian counterpart, held separate talks with the Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis, to discuss ways to resolve the Cyprus issue (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 7).

    The forum, however, also demonstrated Ankara’s current dilemma as it seeks to improve its relations with Armenia. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev declined an invitation from President Abdullah Gul to attend the UNAOC, preferring instead to send his daughter to represent the country. The Turkish media claimed that Aliyev was boycotting the UNAOC forum “in reaction to Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, prior to a breakthrough on the problem of Karabakh” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 6). Although Babacan denied this during his press briefing, arguing that Turkey and Azerbaijan were still “one nation, two states,” Ankara’s inability to ensure higher level representation from Baku coupled with Aliyev’s recent statements, reflect underlying divisions between the two countries. As Turkey builds bridges across cultures and normalizes relations with its neighbors, it risks damaging its traditionally closer relationship with Azerbaijan.

  • Turkey Reaches Compromise Over New Head of NATO

    Turkey Reaches Compromise Over New Head of NATO

    Turkey Reaches Compromise Over New Head of NATO

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 65
    April 6, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    NATO members took important decisions during the April 3-4 summit, celebrating the Alliance’s 60th anniversary. Following intense negotiations to ameliorate Turkey’s reservations, on April 4 NATO leaders named Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Ramussen as their new Secretary-General. Turkey’s agreement sparked controversy in Turkey as to whether Ankara had used the threat of veto prior to the summit as an effective bargaining chip.

    Turkey had signaled that it might veto Rasmussen’s appointment, based on its misgivings in his handling of the “cartoon crisis,” and his government’s refusal to address Turkey’s concerns regarding the activities of the pro-PKK Roj TV in Denmark (EDM, March 26).

    Turkey maintained its objections during the summit as President Abdullah Gul resisted pressure from European leaders, and reiterated Turkey’s concerns, which raised tensions and threatened to publicly expose the lack of consensus amongst the allies. The deadlock was finally broken only minutes before the conclusion of the summit. Announcing Rasmussen’s appointment, the current Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told a news conference: “there has been discussion over the past 36 hours but the fact that we are standing here next to each other means a solution has been found also for the concerns expressed by Turkey, and we all very much agree and are unanimous” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 5).

    President Barack Obama’s intervention apparently played a crucial role in securing the deal. Gul explained that he held a long and fruitful meeting with Obama, which was later joined by Rasmussen, during which Turkey’s concerns were alleviated. Gul added that “if we had not been convinced, we would not have hesitated to use our natural right,” implying that Ankara was prepared to veto Rasmussen (www.gazeteport.com.tr, April 4).

    Obama was not alone in approaching Turkey’s leaders to convince them to drop their objections to the EU-backed candidate Rasmussen. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi telephoned his Turkish counterpart and close friend Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Berlusconi was so occupied in a lengthy last-minute cell-phone conversation with Erdogan, that he could not join the other heads of state during the closing ceremonies, including the group photo.

    According to Erdogan, what changed Ankara’s position was Obama’s personal assurances to Gul that he would be the guarantor of the deal. The Turkish press reported that the package offered to Turkey included the following points: NATO’s deputy secretary-general, deputy assistant secretary-general for arms control, and special envoy for Afghanistan would be drawn from Turkish diplomats, and Turkish officers would receive command positions in the alliance’s military structures. Moreover, Rasmussen himself agreed that he would issue an apology to the Muslim world for the infamous cartoon crisis, and the Danish government would take steps to close the Roj TV (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 4).

    It is unclear whether the episode was a success for Turkish diplomacy. It might be considered a failure, because, as many diplomatic observers had previously expected, Turkey could not risk undermining transatlantic consensus and ultimately had to lift its threat of veto. Conversely, it might be seen as success, because, Turkey held its ground until the last moment, and received concessions which appeared to satisfy its demands.

    On April 5, the headlines in Turkish newspapers included: “Turkey shaped NATO” (Yeni Safak), “Turkey won arm wrestling” (Sabah), “He will apologize in Istanbul” (Star). Commentators from the pro-government press compared Turkey’s attitude towards NATO to Prime Minister Erdogan’s Gaza policy and his high profile walkout in Davos. They argued that, unlike past governments which were submissive to western pressures, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government successfully defended the country’s national interests, and advocated Turkey’s preferences within an international organization. A commentary in Zaman on April 5 argued that through tough bargaining, Turkey had achieved its strongest position to date within the Alliance’s command structures. While the Islamist Vakit asserted that Turkey was no longer a country which would grant concessions without receiving anything in return.

    However, newspapers more critical of the government, represented Turkey’s “conditional approval” as a major defeat. On April 5 one Cumhuriyet columnist maintained that after weeks of bullying, Erdogan simply bowed to a Western imposition, only receiving minor concessions in return. Vatan maintained that Ankara failed to stand firm, and had to accept an insulting attitude from its European allies, while Erdogan did more harm than good by raising tensions ahead of the summit. They added that after Turkey perpetuated the image of Rasmussen as “the enemy of Islam,” a face saving compromise became more difficult to achieve. Hurriyet‘s editorial highlighted the contradictory pre-summit statements of both Erdogan and Gul; whereas Erdogan had argued uncompromisingly that Turkey was opposed to Rasmussen, Gul said that Turkey would not object to any name in principle. This discrepancy at the apex of the state, combined with drawing back from the veto threat had harmed the country’s national interests (Hurriyet, April 5).

    Although the compromise preserved the Alliance’s unity, its implications for Turkish diplomacy will be uncertain until Rasmussen takes office in August. After failing to convince its European allies to significantly increase their troop deployments to Afghanistan, Obama’s ability to foster consensus over appointing the next Secretary-General of NATO can be considered as a partial success for his leadership. For their part, Turkish leaders did not disappoint Obama, demonstrating the high premium they place on rejuvenating Turkish-U.S. relations. Obama must now deliver his side of the deal, and enforce its terms on Denmark and other European allies in order to help his Turkish counterpart claim success for this controversial decision.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-reaches-compromise-over-new-head-of-nato/