Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan

    Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan

    Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 87
    May 6, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The recent uncertainty surrounding Turkish-Azeri relations is giving way to a new period of optimism, ahead of high level diplomatic contacts. Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will meet Azeri officials in a bid to reassure Baku of Ankara’s intention to protect Azerbaijan’s interests during the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process.

    Turkey’s policy of conducting diplomacy within the South Caucasus in coordination with Azerbaijan, came under strain when it attempted to accelerate normalizing its relations with Armenia. Baku expressed its reservations over the rapid increase in diplomatic activity between Ankara -Yerevan which it perceived as “developing at the expense of Azerbaijan.” Azerbaijani officials tried to understand the content of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and how this might affect Turkish-Azeri relations (EDM, April 29, May 4). At the height of the discussions on President Obama’s April 24 address, the possibility that Ankara might ignore Baku’s sensitivities was often discussed within both countries. In addition to the reaction of Azerbaijani officials, such speculation added to public outrage toward the AKP government’s policies, both within Turkey and Azerbaijan. While delegations of Azeri parliamentarians and civil society organizations visited Turkey to garner political support for their plight, their Turkish counterparts also traveled to Azerbaijan in order to express solidarity with their Azeri brethren. Azeri deputies frequently appeared on live discussion programs on Turkish TV, seeking to mobilize public opinion, exerting additional pressure on the AKP government.

    Against this background, the Turkish government is now refocusing its attention on addressing those concerns. At the same time, the Turkish press reported that Baku has toned down its criticism of Ankara’s policies toward Armenia. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev wants to reinforce bilateral ties, ensuring that he is kept informed about the progress on Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and securing greater leverage over Ankara’s policies toward Yerevan. Toward that end, Aliyev has decided to send a special envoy to Turkey (Referans, May 2).

    Turkey’s first attempts to reach out to Baku came on May 4 when Azerbaijan’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Araz Azimov, visited Ankara and held talks with Turkey’s newly appointed Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Since it was Davutoglu’s first meeting after assuming office two days earlier, it had a symbolic meaning -demonstrating the value that Davutoglu attaches to Turkish-Azeri ties. In addition to exploring ways of improving bilateral relations through more frequent and high profile meetings between the leaders of the two countries, they also exchanged opinions on regional issues (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 4).

    As a further boost to Ankara’s policy to regain Baku’s confidence, Erdogan will visit Baku on May 12-13, and then meet Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on May 16 (Anadolu Ajansi, May 4). While commenting on his forthcoming trip, Erdogan sought to deflect recent criticism from Baku and domestic opposition parties. He maintained that his government did not deserve such heavy criticism, which he characterized as an unnecessary reaction to Turkey’s policy of rapprochement; especially concerning Ankara’s intention to re-open its border with Armenia. Erdogan also emphasized that some Azeri officials’ statements had hurt Ankara. He added that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations will also serve Baku’s interests and he will seek to remove any misunderstandings during his visit next week (ANKA, May 5).

    Moreover, Erdogan’s plan to meet Putin reflects Ankara’s belief that Russia remains a significant stakeholder in the resolution of Turkish-Armenian-Azeri problems and must act in concert with Russia, in order to advance its interests within the South Caucasus. Russia is one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group working to resolve the Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and has been mediating in talks between Baku and Yerevan.

    President Gul is taking additional steps toward addressing concerns over Ankara’s policies from Baku and domestic opposition parties. Gul met the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party Deniz Baykal, who had lambasted the recent moves towards rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, arguing that Erdogan had betrayed Baku. Gul briefed Baykal about the developments within the South Caucasus in an attempt to influence Turkish public opinion (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 5).

    Gul also plans to hold two separate meetings with Aliyev and the Armenia’s President Serzh Sarksyan during the Eastern Partnership and Southern Corridor meetings in Prague on May 7-8 under the sponsorship of the Czech Republic, which currently holds the EU presidency (Anadolu Ajansi, May 5). In addition to discussing issues including energy security, the Prague summit will provide an opportunity to consider the resolution of problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Baku and Yerevan frequently conduct part of their diplomatic negotiations on the sidelines of such multilateral forums. In preparation for the Prague summit the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, met the foreign ministers of both countries separately in Washington. Clinton expressed her support and encouragement for these bilateral talks ahead of the Prague summit (www.cnnturk.com, May 5).

    The Gul-Aliyev meeting might equally hold symbolic meaning, marking an improvement of ties between Ankara and Baku, after their recent tension. Previously, Aliyev had declined to participate in multilateral meetings where he might meet Gul, spurning Gul’s invitation to attend the Alliance of Civilizations platform in Istanbul (EDM, April 8) and later cancelling his participation in an energy summit in Sofia, attended by Gul (Takvim, April 23). The Turkish press speculated that Aliyev was deliberately avoiding these meetings to convey his discomfort over Ankara’s failure to consult him on the Turkish-Armenian talks. Gul consistently denied any such row, and even claimed that he kept Aliyev informed about developments by telephone (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 28). A face-to-face meeting between the two leaders might remove the basis for any future speculation, as well as mend strained Turkish-Azeri relations.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-prioritizing-its-relations-with-azerbaijan/
  • Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 84
    May 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 27, Turkey and Syria launched their first joint military exercise on their border. The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to enhance joint training and interoperability, and are expected to be followed by similar exercises in the future. On the same day, during the 9th International Defense Industry Fair in Istanbul, both countries signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries (www.tsk.tr, April 26, Hurriyet, April 28). These developments once again strained Turkish-Israeli ties, re-opening the debate on Turkey’s commitment to its Western orientation.

    Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, called the exercises disturbing, though noting that Turkish-Israeli strategic relations will survive this challenge (www.ynetnews.com, April 27). Israel’s Ambassador to Turkey, Gabby Levy, told reporters that Tel Aviv was following the drill closely to understand its goal and content (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28). DEBKAfile reported that, to protest against this development Israel was preparing to “slash its military exchanges with Turkey to prevent the leakage of military secrets to an avowed Arab enemy” and it would “discontinue sales of its … drones and sharply reduce its military ties with Turkey” (DEBKAfile, April 27).

    Moreover, an Israeli strategic analyst Efraim Inbar, referring to unnamed Turkish military officers, maintained that the joint exercise not only raised questions over Turkey’s relationship to Israel, the United States and NATO, but also “the Turkish military is not happy about this. It does not like Syria, and views it as a problematic state” (Jerusalem Post, April 27).

    During his second press briefing within the past fortnight, Turkish Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug was asked to comment on Israel’s reaction to the Turkish-Syrian exercise. Basbug criticized the remarks of the Israeli sources by saying “Shall we ask for Israel’s approval? Israel’s reaction does not concern us. This is between Turkey and Syria” (www.cnnturk.com, April 29). Other Turkish military officers talking to the press reportedly held similar views (Star, April 30).

    In addition, though noting that it was only a small-scale exercise, Basbug described it as important because it was held for the first time. A Turkish military analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan, added that “Turkey has similar deals with more than 60 countries. Besides, the exercise involved at most a total of 60 men from both sides. If it is held only at platoon level as reported, then really it holds only a symbolic value aimed against smugglers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, operating along the border” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 29).

    Although the exercise might be inconsequential militarily, it has enormous political significance, which partly explains Israel’s reaction. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war ten years ago over the latter’s harboring of PKK militants, their new security cooperation heralds a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it highlights the changing alignments of Turkey within the region.

    One explanation for the flourishing of the so-called Turkish-Israeli alliance throughout the 1990’s, which led to the establishment of closer military cooperation, was the common threat perceptions concerning Syria. Turkey was so frustrated by Damascus supporting the PKK that in 1998 it had to amass its army along the border and threaten to use force unless Damascus ceased its support. Following the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in the late 1990’s diplomatic relations improved, reflecting Turkey’s new policy of normalizing relations with the Middle East. The real push came with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Fostering closer ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors became one of the cornerstones of the AKP’s new multi-dimensional foreign policy -which is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (EDM, March 25).

    Under the AKP, Ankara and Damascus have overcome their differences and promoted the growth of economic, social and cultural ties between the two countries, as expressed symbolically in the close personal ties between Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey resisted attempts to isolate Syria diplomatically, and has served as the conduit for opening Damascus to the outside world. Most significantly, it has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria by arranging indirect talks between the two countries.

    Diplomatic analysts had once discussed a Turkish-Israeli axis against Syria, while clearly the interests of Turkey and Syria are now converging, which permits the development of military cooperation. These alternating roles have naturally raised questions as to whether Turkey might be trading its strategic ties with Israel for a new partnership with Syria. Although many Western analysts argue that Turkey may be drifting away from the West under the AKP’s new foreign policy, the crucial support of the secular Turkish military must be considered before reaching any conclusion.

    Israeli and some Western sources criticize the AKP for following an ideological foreign policy agenda and seeking to decouple Turkey from its traditional transatlantic orientation, instead increasingly serving Islamist and Arab interests. The AKP, in contrast, presents its search for autonomy and normalization of its relations with its neighbors as reflecting geopolitical reality, and argues that this serves both Turkish and Western interests in the surrounding regions.

    The military leadership’s expression of support comes to the aid of the AKP as it pursues several controversial foreign policy initiatives. These include the rapprochement with Syria and criticism of Israel, notably during the Gaza crisis. This approach does not represent parochial “Islamist” concerns, but rather they enjoy the backing of broader segments of the Turkish political and military elite. Despite their occasional differences of opinion over domestic political issues, particularly on the question of secularism, the government and the military have managed to reach a consensus over foreign policy, which suggests that a simple distinction along Islamist versus secular might no longer be relevant to understand Turkish foreign policy.

  • Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 84
    May 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On April 27, Turkey and Syria launched their first joint military exercise on their border. The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to enhance joint training and interoperability, and are expected to be followed by similar exercises in the future. On the same day, during the 9th International Defense Industry Fair in Istanbul, both countries signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries (www.tsk.tr, April 26, Hurriyet, April 28). These developments once again strained Turkish-Israeli ties, re-opening the debate on Turkey’s commitment to its Western orientation.

    Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, called the exercises disturbing, though noting that Turkish-Israeli strategic relations will survive this challenge (www.ynetnews.com, April 27). Israel’s Ambassador to Turkey, Gabby Levy, told reporters that Tel Aviv was following the drill closely to understand its goal and content (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28). DEBKAfile reported that, to protest against this development Israel was preparing to “slash its military exchanges with Turkey to prevent the leakage of military secrets to an avowed Arab enemy” and it would “discontinue sales of its … drones and sharply reduce its military ties with Turkey” (DEBKAfile, April 27).

    Moreover, an Israeli strategic analyst Efraim Inbar, referring to unnamed Turkish military officers, maintained that the joint exercise not only raised questions over Turkey’s relationship to Israel, the United States and NATO, but also “the Turkish military is not happy about this. It does not like Syria, and views it as a problematic state” (Jerusalem Post, April 27).

    During his second press briefing within the past fortnight, Turkish Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug was asked to comment on Israel’s reaction to the Turkish-Syrian exercise. Basbug criticized the remarks of the Israeli sources by saying “Shall we ask for Israel’s approval? Israel’s reaction does not concern us. This is between Turkey and Syria” (www.cnnturk.com, April 29). Other Turkish military officers talking to the press reportedly held similar views (Star, April 30).

    In addition, though noting that it was only a small-scale exercise, Basbug described it as important because it was held for the first time. A Turkish military analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan, added that “Turkey has similar deals with more than 60 countries. Besides, the exercise involved at most a total of 60 men from both sides. If it is held only at platoon level as reported, then really it holds only a symbolic value aimed against smugglers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, operating along the border” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 29).

    Although the exercise might be inconsequential militarily, it has enormous political significance, which partly explains Israel’s reaction. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war ten years ago over the latter’s harboring of PKK militants, their new security cooperation heralds a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it highlights the changing alignments of Turkey within the region.

    One explanation for the flourishing of the so-called Turkish-Israeli alliance throughout the 1990’s, which led to the establishment of closer military cooperation, was the common threat perceptions concerning Syria. Turkey was so frustrated by Damascus supporting the PKK that in 1998 it had to amass its army along the border and threaten to use force unless Damascus ceased its support. Following the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in the late 1990’s diplomatic relations improved, reflecting Turkey’s new policy of normalizing relations with the Middle East. The real push came with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Fostering closer ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors became one of the cornerstones of the AKP’s new multi-dimensional foreign policy -which is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (EDM, March 25).

    Under the AKP, Ankara and Damascus have overcome their differences and promoted the growth of economic, social and cultural ties between the two countries, as expressed symbolically in the close personal ties between Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey resisted attempts to isolate Syria diplomatically, and has served as the conduit for opening Damascus to the outside world. Most significantly, it has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria by arranging indirect talks between the two countries.

    Diplomatic analysts had once discussed a Turkish-Israeli axis against Syria, while clearly the interests of Turkey and Syria are now converging, which permits the development of military cooperation. These alternating roles have naturally raised questions as to whether Turkey might be trading its strategic ties with Israel for a new partnership with Syria. Although many Western analysts argue that Turkey may be drifting away from the West under the AKP’s new foreign policy, the crucial support of the secular Turkish military must be considered before reaching any conclusion.

    Israeli and some Western sources criticize the AKP for following an ideological foreign policy agenda and seeking to decouple Turkey from its traditional transatlantic orientation, instead increasingly serving Islamist and Arab interests. The AKP, in contrast, presents its search for autonomy and normalization of its relations with its neighbors as reflecting geopolitical reality, and argues that this serves both Turkish and Western interests in the surrounding regions.

    The military leadership’s expression of support comes to the aid of the AKP as it pursues several controversial foreign policy initiatives. These include the rapprochement with Syria and criticism of Israel, notably during the Gaza crisis. This approach does not represent parochial “Islamist” concerns, but rather they enjoy the backing of broader segments of the Turkish political and military elite. Despite their occasional differences of opinion over domestic political issues, particularly on the question of secularism, the government and the military have managed to reach a consensus over foreign policy, which suggests that a simple distinction along Islamist versus secular might no longer be relevant to understand Turkish foreign policy.
    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-syrian-security-cooperation-testing-turkish-foreign-policy/

  • Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 82
    April 29, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 22, the Foreign Ministries of Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland issued a joint announcement saying that Ankara and Yerevan had agreed to work toward improving their relations within the framework of a roadmap under Swiss auspices. United States’ diplomats were also closely involved in the talks which preceded the deal. Although the decision appears as a breakthrough in resolving this long-term dispute, significant obstacles remain before the completion of the rapprochement.

    The joint statement read as follows:

    “The two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has been identified” (www.mfa.gov.tr, April 22).

    Subsequent statements from diplomatic sources clarified that no agreement has been signed and that the parties agreed to continue working toward fully normalizing their bilateral relations. Although the content of the ongoing talks were not disclosed officially, the deal is likely to include establishing diplomatic representations in their respective capitals, gradual re-opening of the border, Armenia’s recognition of Turkey’s international borders, and forming a joint committee of historians to examine the disputed events of 1915 (Sabah, April 24).

    Many observers believe that if the process can be concluded successfully, it will not only end the long-standing enmity within the South Caucasus, but it also will redefine the geopolitical map of the region -helping to connect Armenia with Western interests in the region. Therefore, the decision was welcomed by the international community as a constructive step toward reconciliation. A statement from the U.S. State Department commended these efforts and called on the parties to proceed with the talks without any preconditions and within a reasonable time frame.

    Initially this was anticipated against the background of the ongoing dialogue, which had accelerated over the past year. This was given a renewed impetus following Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s historic visit to Yerevan in September 2008. In addition to their various bilateral talks, the foreign ministers of both countries also met within the context of multilateral initiatives, raising expectations that a deal could be achieved. Earlier press reports speculated that the two capitals had agreed on a roadmap in late March, but they were debating the proper timing to announce this decision (EDM, March 27; Hurriyet Daily News, March 30). After Obama’s recent high profile trip to Turkey, Turkish-Armenian reconciliation was considered imminent.

    However, following Obama’s visit, Ankara stepped back from its commitment to find a solution in an effort to allay concerns in Baku. The Turkish Prime Minister and other officials declared publicly that they would avoid steps which might damage Azerbaijan’s interests, and Turkey would not re-open its border with Armenia unless the latter ended its occupation of Azerbaijani territories (EDM, April 17). These developments rendered an agreement less likely.

    The announcement that the parties had held secret talks and committed publicly to a roadmap represented a major breakthrough. Nonetheless, there have been conflicting accounts from each side as to whether concessions were made on preconditions to start the negotiations. The continued mystery surrounding the content of the talks may prove an obstacle to a final settlement. Nationalist forces and the opposition, both within Turkey and Armenia, remain opposed to the way in which the rapprochement is being conducted -in an absence of public scrutiny. Secret diplomacy is the key to achieving a breakthrough in such protracted disputes, and supporters of normalization on both sides insist that the governments should not bow to public pressure to abandon the process (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 26). Nonetheless, the widening gap between the governments’ rhetoric and reality risks undermining this controversial foreign policy.

    The Armenian government came under intense domestic criticism, and a minor coalition partner withdrew from the government. Similar problems within Turkey have further complicated these efforts. The AKP government proceeded with the normalization without first preparing public opinion for such a radical decision. It has also failed to keep the opposition informed. Turkish opposition parties are now calling on the government to stop conducting diplomacy behind closed doors, and inform parliament of the current standing of the talks (Ortadogu, April 28).

    Moreover, the Turkish government is criticized for failing to give clear answers as to how the Turkish-Armenian roadmap might impact on Azerbaijan. Apparently, Turkey proceeded with the rapprochement without ensuring Armenia’s response to Azerbaijan’s demands, and this stance contradicted Ankara’s earlier statements that it would protect Baku’s interests. For some Turkish observers, this is an indication that the government did not have a genuine desire for reconciliation with Armenia, but it agreed the roadmap only to remove the word “genocide” from Obama’s April 24 message (Sabah, April 27). For others, Ankara’s zigzagging shows that it is acting opportunistically, which undermines the trust of its partners (Hurriyet Daily News, April 24).

    President Gul ruled out any damage to relations with Baku due to the roadmap, and maintained that it will serve the interests of both Baku and Ankara. The Turkish government is attempting to convince Azeri politicians that its efforts toward resolving its problems with Yerevan also promote Azerbaijan’s interests within international forums (Zaman, April 24). Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s discomfort with these developments is well known.

    After noting that he was not in a position to tell Ankara how to handle its relations with Yerevan, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, said during a visit to Brussels, that Baku reserved the right to revise its policies according to the evolving realities in the region. Referring to the conflicting news about the content of the Turkish-Armenian roadmap deal, Aliyev added “The world, the region and the Azeris want to know whether the Karabakh issue was removed from the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. This is a simple question and has a simple answer” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28).

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-and-armenias-rapprochement-watched-carefully-by-azerbaijan/

  • Turkey Uneasy Over Obama’s Statement on Armenia

    Turkey Uneasy Over Obama’s Statement on Armenia

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 81
    April 28, 2009
    By Saban Kardas
    President Barack Obama’s long awaited statement on the Armenian Remembrance Day caused mixed reactions on both sides of the dispute. Although Obama refrained from referring to the killing of Armenians as “genocide,” which reflected well on Turkish diplomacy, his clear expression of support for the Armenian position caused anger in Turkey. In his statement, Obama said:

    “Ninety four years ago, one of the great atrocities of the twentieth century began. Each year, we pause to remember the 1.5 million Armenians who were subsequently massacred or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire. The ‘Meds Yeghern’ must live on in our memories, just as it lives on in the hearts of the Armenian people” (www.whitehouse.gov, April 24).

    Obama came under criticism by the supporters of the Armenian genocide claims for stopping short of using the word “genocide” to describe the events of 1915 -a pledge which he made during his election campaign. Like other presidents before him, Obama apparently prioritized realpolitik and did not want to harm the strategic relationship with Turkey by risking a negative Turkish reaction over the controversial issue. Moreover, there is a more immediate reason for him to avoid the term: Obama does not want to jeopardize the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. His carefully worded statement is yet another indication of his support for the bilateral talks, to which Turkey and Armenia responded positively by announcing a roadmap to work toward the normalization of their relations.

    Nonetheless, this prudent act on Obama’s part did not entirely satisfy Turkish expectations. Ankara focused on the aspects of Obama’s description of the events of 1915 which are regarded as unacceptable from the Turkish perspective. In spite of this, the phrases Obama chose to depict the Armenian suffering were a serious blow for Turkish diplomacy, which had done its utmost to exclude the word “genocide” from the White House statement. Despite backtracking from his campaign promise, Obama called the killing of Armenians a great atrocity and used the Armenian term “Meds Yeghern” (great disaster) to describe the events, as well as noting that his views on that period of history remained unchanged.

    Turkish officials and politicians uniformly criticized Obama’s statement, calling it one-sided and historically inaccurate. Turkish President Abdullah Gul said he disagreed with parts of Obama’s statement, adding that “in particular, there are hundreds of thousands of Turks and Muslims who lost their lives in 1915. Everyone’s suffering has to be shared.” A press statement released by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also maintained that some expressions in Obama’s statement combined with the interpretation of the events of 1915 were unacceptable from Turkey’s perspective (Anadolu Ajansi, April 25).

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was more pointed in his criticism: “the statement is far from satisfying. We cannot accept it as it is.” Erdogan questioned Obama’s attitude and argued that by giving credence to Armenian claims, Obama had bowed to short-term political considerations. “We are deeply saddened by politicians’ attempts to exploit the events of 1915 for electoral concerns,” Erdogan added. Reflecting a sense of “disappointment” with Obama, Erdogan maintained that Turkey is not a country that can be manipulated with empty promises (Hurriyet, April 27).

    Representatives of the opposition parties also criticized Obama’s statement. The leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party argued that he used only the Armenian side’s terminology. Whereas the leader of the Nationalist Action Party alleged that the statement taken in its entirety, supported unequivocally Armenian genocide claims. The opposition found Obama’s account of the 1915 events as distorting historical reality. Moreover, they capitalized on this incident to criticize the government’s foreign policy, maintaining that in order to prevent Obama from using the word “genocide” involved making concessions to Armenia in breach of Turkey’s national interests -which also alienated Azerbaijan. Characterizing Obama’s statement as the starkest proof yet of the government’s failed approach, they called for a reversal of such “submissive” policies, and backing away from the rapprochement with Yerevan (Anadolu Ajansi, ANKA, April 25).

    The strong reactions from both the government and the opposition raised questions as to how this development might damage Turkish-American relations. Since Obama’s inauguration, Turkey and the United States have revitalized their strategic partnership. Yet Ankara made it clear that a miscalculated American intervention in the Armenian issue might spoil Turkish-American relations.

    In its official responses so far, Turkey has not taken punitive measures to protest against Obama’s statement. Turkish diplomatic sources reported that U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, James Jeffrey, was invited to the Foreign Ministry to discuss the developments. Ankara’s concerns and uneasiness regarding the statement were relayed to him, but no official note of protest to Washington was presented (ANKA, April 27).

    For its part, Ankara must have realized that despite its intensive diplomacy, it has failed to influence Western public opinion in favor of its view of the events in 1915. This episode shows that the government cannot sustain its policy of denial, and should develop a new approach to explain its own version of events. Nonetheless, Turkey is unlikely to sever ties with the United States, though the controversy demonstrates how the politics of the Armenian “genocide” can potentially undermine Turkish-American relations. The periodic resurrection of this debate in American politics hijacks Turkish-American relations, perpetuating a crisis of trust. Nor does it further the interests of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, since American intervention threatens to derail any genuine desire to find a solution in Ankara. In the face of domestic opposition, no Turkish government can afford to proceed with a dialogue with Armenia or maintain friendly relations with the United States if Washington is perceived as taking sides.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-uneasy-over-obamas-statement-on-armenia/
  • Turkey’s Veteran Islamist Erbakan Visits Iran

    Turkey’s Veteran Islamist Erbakan Visits Iran

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 76
    April 21, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Following the restoration of his political rights, veteran Islamist politician and former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, 83, returned to active politics, raising questions about the leadership of the Islamist Felicity Party (SP). Erbakan, the legendary leader of the National Outlook Movement (NOM) advocated a political Islamist platform in Turkish politics, and formed a succession of political parties since the 1970’s -training activists who became influential figures within Turkish political life. He skillfully mobilized the Turkish electorate behind his Welfare Party (RP) in the 1990’s and succeeded to rule the country in a coalition government between 1996 and 1997. His policies while in power irked Turkey’s powerful generals who perceived the RP as a direct threat to secularism and staged a campaign to force Erbakan out of power, known as the “February 28 process.” Erbakan was forced out of office, and subsequently the Constitutional Court closed down the RP in 1998, suspending political rights of Erbakan and other RP officials. The crackdown on Islamic social networks during the “February 28 process” led to a crisis within the Islamist movement, whereby the new generation questioned the platform and strategies of the NOM instilled by Erbakan. The split between the pro-Erbakan old-guard and the reformist wing became visible when the Constitutional Court shut down the WP’s successor Virtue Party (FP) on similar grounds in 2002. The two groups separated, with the reformists organizing themselves around the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power following a landslide election victory in 2002 and continues to rule Turkey. In contrast, the FP’s traditionalist offshoot, the SP, was defeated.

    Although he took over the SP leadership after his five-year ban came to an end in 2003, Erbakan faced political restrictions in another RP-related case. He was found guilty of forgery in the so-called “lost trillion case’ concerning the loss of more than one trillion Turkish Liras in Treasury grants to the RP. In addition to his political ban, he was sentenced to two years and four months, which he began serving under house arrest in May 2008. Citing Erbakan’s ailing health, in August 2008 President Abdullah Gul pardoned him, paving the way for the removal of his political restrictions (Today’s Zaman, April 6).

    Erbakan constantly expressed his opinions on political developments through his public appearances in the SP’s election rallies and other platforms. He acted as a vocal opponent of the governing AKP, criticizing it for following pro-Western policies and betraying the NOM spirit. After the restoration of his political rights in April, Erbakan’s press briefing in the SP headquarters was interpreted as marking his return to “active politics.” Despite his advanced age, he set himself an ambitious timescale for putting the SP on the political map, voicing the same anti-Western and confrontational discourse he had been advocating for decades (ANKA, April 10). Following his press briefing, Erbakan visited Iran, where he received a warm welcome from Iranian officials including President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. Erbakan and Iranian leaders vowed to continue their struggle against “Western imperialism and Zionism” and pursue the establishment of a pan-Islamic union (www.saadet.org.tr, April 19; Hurriyet, April 20).

    Erbakan’s return to politics has raised questions about the future leadership of the SP. Though his political socialization took place within the NOM tradition, the current party leader Numan Kurtulmus, a professor of economics, in many ways distinguished himself from traditionalists. Distancing himself from the doctrinaire outlook of the NOM cadres, Kurtulmus is known as a person who has embraced broader segments of society (www.cafesiyaset.com, December 16, 2008). He declined invitations from the governing AKP to join their ranks, and instead continued his political career within the SP, and eventually took on the challenging task of revitalizing the NOM tradition in Turkish politics. He overcame opposition from traditionalists and was elected as the new SP leader in October 2008 -succeeding Erbakan. He maintained his allegiance to Erbakan’s ideals but avoided being viewed as his caretaker (www.timeturk.com, October 22, 2008).

    Now that Erbakan has returned to the party, Kurtulmus’ position appears vulnerable. Kurtulmus was not present at the Erbakan press briefing, which triggered speculation that there might be an underlying leadership struggle within the party (www.habervitrini.com, April 11). Fuelling these rumors, Erbakan avoided telling reporters what his future role will be within the party. Kurtulmus ruled out such a contest, arguing that “we do not have a leadership problem. Mr. Erbakan does not harbor such goals… he has valuable views and we will continue to benefit from them” (Anadolu Ajansi, April 12).

    Alternatively, Erbakan might portray himself as an “intellectual guide” for the NOM, enabling him to exert influence over the SP. Though he may not assume the party chairmanship directly, given his personality, he is unlikely to disengage entirely from the SP and its policy making, not least for the purpose of consolidating his son’s position in the party. Since many analysts attributed the SP’s success in last month’s local elections to its new leader Kurtulmus, who was able to imbue a sense of dynamism through his moderate political discourse, the return of the old-guard Erbakan might damage the party’s future performance within Turkish politics.

     http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34886