Category: Saban Kardas

  • Turkey Reports Signs of Economic Recovery

    Turkey Reports Signs of Economic Recovery

    Turkey Reports Signs of Economic Recovery

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 112
    June 11, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Data recently released by the Turkish Statistics Institute (TurkStat) has raised expectations that the economy might be on its way to recovery. According to TurkStat, the capacity utilization rate within the Turkish manufacturing sector increased for the third consecutive month in May (www.tuik.gov.tr, June 10). Although the improvement is attributed largely to the AKP government’s economic stimulus packages, it remains uncertain whether domestic demand alone can sustain economic development.

    Starting in the second half of 2008, the Turkish economy felt the impact of the global financial crisis: industrial production output, exports, economic growth and industrial capacity utilization rates dropped dramatically, while unemployment soared (EDM, February 18). In January and February, the industrial capacity utilization rate dropped to 63.8 percent and hit a record low in the last two decades, presenting the starkest evidence of the contraction within the Turkish economy. In an attempt to prevent a deeper recession, the Central Bank gradually cut its interest rates. In addition, the AKP government, which was under fire for failing to take effective precautions, adopted several economic packages. In March, temporary tax cuts were introduced in major sectors including automotive, housing and household appliances in order to stimulate domestic demand (EDM, March 16).

    Recent economic trends indicate that these precautions slowed the pace of the downturn. In March, the capacity utilization rate increased for the first time since September 2008 and has continued to climb; it moved from 63.8 percent in February to 64.7 in March, and to 66.8 in April and 70.4 percent in May.

    While confirming this trend, TurkStat’s report highlighted low domestic and foreign demand as the major factors negatively affecting the capacity utilization. Although in May the capacity utilization rate indicated a 12 percent decline compared to the previous year, demonstrating the extent of the economic downturn, the report provided other signs of recovery. The production volume in May increased by 7.6 percent compared to April, which is estimated to continue growing by 6.7 percent in June. The sales volume increased by 6.4 percent in May and this is forecast to continue in June (www.tuik.gov.tr, June 10).

    The recent figures were interpreted by government officials as a sign that Turkey might be able to mitigate the full impact of the crisis. The Minister of Trade and Industry Nihat Ergun attributed the growth in the capacity utilization to the production triggered by the government’s earlier economic packages. He argued that a slow recovery was now under way. Nonetheless, he avoided drawing an overly optimistic picture, and added that without the complementary expansion in foreign demand, the recovery might be short-lived (www.cnnturk.com, June 10).

    Indeed, following the introduction of the latest economic package, several companies that were considering halting their production dropped these plans. Likewise, many companies that had applied for the government sponsored short term pay compensation, in order not to lay off their employees stopped receiving those benefits and began paying full salaries (Zaman, April 13). Moreover, a report published by an Ankara-based think-tank found that a majority of the automotive sales were financed by consumer savings and seller credits, rather than bank loans. The report suggested that this might prove an important indicator, signaling the growing consumer confidence in the market -a key factor for economic recovery (www.tepav.org.tr, June 4).

    The stimulus package has provided temporary relief, but it is uncertain what will occur after the tax incentives expire this month. Since the global economy is unlikely to recover in the short term, foreign demand cannot serve as the main stimulant for the Turkish economy. Therefore, the key question might be whether Turkey’s domestic demand can sustain its economic growth. Some experts maintain that with improved economic coordination and more intensive public involvement in the functioning of the economy, Turkey can stimulate domestic demand and maintain its economic growth (www.tepav.org.tr, May 27). However, other analysts expect that, short of any major surge in foreign demand, it will be difficult to sustain such economic growth in the second half of 2009. On the contrary, they forecast that the automotive sector is likely to face “renewed sharp contraction in the second half of 2009 and a slow recovery beyond that” (Hurriyet Daily News, May 29).

    Since the automotive sector is one of the engines of Turkish economic development, the government needs to implement additional measures to redress the deficit caused by this contraction. With such considerations in mind, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the fifth economic incentives package on June 4. The package seeks to enhance the economy’s competitive power and eliminate regional discrepancies through region, sector and project specific incentives and investments. Businesses investing in poorer regions such as in eastern Turkey will be entitled to free land, tax breaks on corporate taxation, and government assistance for employees’ social security premiums, etc. An additional package aims to reduce unemployment by funding various seasonal public works, such as repairing schools and hospitals and planting trees, as well as providing vocational training. With this new package, the total cost of the stimulus packages for 2009 and 2010 is expected to reach 60 billion TL ($38.7 billion) (www.32gunhaber.com, June 4).

    The government’s economic policy is driven by the need to reduce the impact of the crisis on households to prevent the erosion of its political popularity. In this context, it has elongated the negotiations with the IMF to sign a loan deal, which might have imposed tighter budgetary rules on public spending. Recent reports suggest that in response to the signs of recovery, the treasury has an alternative plan to continue the economic program without a stand-by agreement with the IMF (Referans, May 20). The government has managed to slow the downturn and escape a deep recession, but it is still too early to determine when the Turkish economy will experience a permanent recovery. Moreover, if the global crisis continues beyond 2009 the heavy financial burden of the stimulus packages on the budget might return to haunt the Turkish economy, and possibly damage the government’s popularity.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-reports-signs-of-economic-recovery/
  • Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through “Soccer Diplomacy”

    Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through “Soccer Diplomacy”

    Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through “Soccer Diplomacy”

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 107
    June 4, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz discussed energy issues with Azeri officials on the sidelines of a recent soccer game. Following his talks, Yildiz commented on the status of the Turkish-Azeri talks on pricing gas imports and Turkey’s position on the Nabucco project. The incident echoes what was referred to as the “soccer diplomacy” conducted last year between Turkey and Armenia.

    The Turkish and Azeri national soccer teams played a friendly game in Turkey’s central Anatolian city of Kayseri on June 2. There was huge public interest and over 30,000 spectators decorated the stadium with the Turkish and Azeri flags. They carried placards and chanted slogans reflecting the sense of solidarity between the two nations: “We are all Azeris,” “Karabakh belongs to Turks,” “We cannot be divided” (www.nethaber.com, www.tumspor.com, June 2).

    The sporting fixture also provided an additional venue to discuss contentious bilateral issues. The president of the Azerbaijani state petroleum company (SOCAR) Rovnag Abdullayev (also the head of the Azeri soccer federation), was in the audience. He watched the game alongside the head of the Turkish soccer federation and Yildiz. On the periphery of this event, Yildiz and Abdullayev continued their talks on pricing Turkey’s gas imports from Azerbaijan. Abdullayev flew back to Baku together with the Turkish ambassador to Azerbaijan in the same private jet (Hurriyet, June 3).

    Yildiz told reporters that both sides shared their views as well as new proposals on pricing. He added that the Azeri side will respond after further evaluating the Turkish proposals. Although Yildiz found Azerbaijan’s request for further deliberation quite natural as part of the negotiation process, he also stressed his hope that it might be accelerated. “It will be in both countries’ interest to reach a solution as soon as possible. Over the next week, technical delegations will continue their work on the [mutual] proposals. My opinion is that without losing further time, an agreement on Shahdeniz-I and Shahdeniz-II should be reached. Our Azeri brothers said they would help us on this issue” (Anadolu Ajansi, June 3).

    Abdullayev offered reassurance that no difficult issues existed between the two countries, but he said that there was no reason to rush into the project. He added “a thirty-year agreement and other issues cannot be resolved in one or two days. The game provided an opportunity to discuss these, but commercial matters cannot be concluded in haste… We received Turkey’s proposals on oil and gas and we will study them” (Milliyet, June 4).

    Currently there are two major elements on the agenda of the Turkish-Azeri gas talks. Azerbaijan expects Turkey to revise gas import prices. Moreover, anxious to transport its gas to European markets, Baku wants Ankara to adopt a more cooperative position on the Nabucco project.

    Under the terms of an agreement in 2001, Turkey annually imports 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from Azerbaijan’s Shahdeniz-I site at a price of $120 per thousand cubic meters, which is far below current global energy prices. Turkey also plans to purchase 8 bcm of gas from the Shahdeniz-II for its domestic consumption. Since the 2001 agreement ended in April 2008, Turkey has continued to import Azeri gas at the old price. In recent months, Baku has demanded the revision of the price to reflect the current market value, although Ankara has reportedly been unenthusiastic (EDM, May 1).

    During his trip to Azerbaijan in May, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan promised that a new and “fair” price will be found (EDM, May 14). Yildiz, who accompanied Erdogan to Baku, later said that “the price [offered] was as fair as possible… I cannot give a figure. But it is not as high as [the price for] the Russian gas. We are trying to agree on a price that is not completely disconnected from world markets and one that will satisfy both us and our Azeri brothers” (Hurriyet, May 16). However, the fact that a final decision has not been reached, shows that Turkey’s price offer did not necessarily satisfy the Azeri side, and they preferred to continue the talks until a “fair” price is agreed.

    During his contacts in Kayseri earlier the same day, Yildiz commented on the future of the Nabucco project. Turkey has been viewed as the main obstacle to the conclusion of the intergovernmental transit agreement for the Nabucco pipeline, yet recent remarks emerging from Ankara has raised hopes for ending the stalemate (EDM, May 15, June 1). Yildiz reiterated Erdogan’s earlier optimism for signing the intergovernmental agreement in June, but added that the continuation of the negotiations indicated that a consensus on the exact date had not been reached (www.ntvmsnbc.com, June 3).

    Yildiz was asked about the Nabucco Managing Director Reinhard Mitschek’s earlier comments that Turkey’s demand for “the 15 percent out-take is not on the table” (Reuters, May 29). In response, Yildiz insisted that Turkey’s demand was still under consideration. After noting that lively bargaining was occurring, he maintained that the Europeans appreciated Turkish concerns. “They are not completely indifferent to 15 percent. The real problem is about its modality… It might be possible to exclude it from the intergovernmental agreement, and then regulate it under another agreement” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, June 3).

    This is not the first time that European and Turkish officials have issued contradictory statements on the Turkish position on the 15 percent issue (EDM, April 20). Ankara appears determined to get the best deal out of the Nabucco negotiations, even at the risk of further stalling the project and perhaps undermining Azerbaijan’s interests. For its own part, Baku also shows that it does not want the “brotherhood” to eclipse the country’s commercial interests, and will continue negotiations until a “fair” deal is finally secured.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-azeri-talks-on-gas-prices-continue-through-soccer-diplomacy/
  • Arinc Demands the Resignation of Turkey’s Media Watchdog

    Arinc Demands the Resignation of Turkey’s Media Watchdog

    Arinc Demands the Resignation of Turkey’s Media Watchdog

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 110
    June 9, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey continues to debate the implications of an ongoing controversial fraud case in the German courts involving, among others, individuals close to the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). After the Turkish courts launched this case, the Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc added a new dimension to the debate. Arinc has publicly called on the head of the top media watchdog, the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK), Zahid Akman, who was implicated in the case, to resign from his post, which has reignited tension between the government and the opposition.
    German prosecutors initiated legal proceedings against a charity established by Turks living in Europe. Deniz Feneri e.V. (Lighthouse e.V.) allegedly channeled donations made in Germany to private corporations in Turkey owned by close allies of the AKP. When these reports first emerged, it triggered controversy, since media outlets in the Dogan Media Group questioned the involvement of AKP supporters and the government’s silence over allegations of corruption (EDM, September 11, 2008; February 20).

    The German court requested judicial assistance from the Turkish authorities concerning several individuals, including Akman, for their involvement in the case. The German investigation identified Akman “as the shareholder and executive of three companies in Germany. The German authorities also documented that Akman was the executive of a German-based cooperative, into which another investigation was launched because of fraudulent activities” (Hurriyet Daily News, June 8).

    The opposition and other critics of the AKP accused the government of stalling the investigation into the Turkish side of the Lighthouse case, by using various delaying tactics. They speculated that there might be evidence contained within the dossier sent by the German court establishing links between the Lighthouse case and officials close to Erdogan. If the money transferred to Turkey was used to finance the AKP’s activities, it might have serious political repercussions within the country. Since the Turkish constitution prohibits political parties from receiving funds from foreign countries or organizations, such links might result in another closure case being instigated against the governing AKP (Hurriyet, May 14; Hurriyet Daily News, June 3).

    Although Akman has been the subject of a parliamentary inquiry, and a court case was filed to overthrow him, he has remained defiant (ANKA, May 12). Finally, Arinc said that he had asked Akman to resign during a private meeting, in order to avoid any damage to the RTUK. He added that Akman had agreed (www.haberturk.com, May 21). Arinc is one of the leading figures within the AKP and is known for his strong stance against corruption. Since he was appointed as the deputy prime minister during the last cabinet reshuffle, he has stressed his commitment to pursuing an ethical approach to politics. As the state minister, Arinc also oversees the RTUK.

    Arinc’s statements were welcomed by other members of the AKP government as well as the speaker of the Turkish parliament Koksal Toptan (www.cnnturk.com 22 May). The cabinet speaker Cemil Cicek even implied that Akman could have been asked to resign by the prime minister -prior to Arinc’s request (www.haberturk.com, May 25).

    After one week of silence, Akman spoke to Haberturk in an effort to clear his name. He said he was not asked by Arinc to resign; Arinc only inquired as to “whether he was considering resigning.” Akman refused saying that stepping down would have been perceived as an acknowledgement of guilt. He maintained that the allegations are being used to weaken the RTUK’s reputation. He added that he will remain in his post until his tenure ends on July 14, and he will not seek any extension. Finally, he challenged those “who were seeking to undermine his reputation” and said that “at the right moment,” he will respond to these allegations (www.haberturk.com, May 30).

    Although Haberturk reported that Akman claimed he enjoyed the firm backing of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, his lawyer denied this (Anadolu Ajansi, May 29). In the meantime, as part of the Turkish investigation, an Ankara court issued precautionary measures against the properties of Akman and other individuals. Responding to a question on these developments, Erdogan said that he was not in a position to defend Akman. “He has continued to defend himself very well and will continue to do so,” Erdogan added (Anadolu Ajansi, June 6).

    On June 6 Arinc repeated his call for Akman’s resignation. He added that he had no authority to remove the RTUK chief because he is appointed by parliament -nor can he be removed by Erdogan. He also emphasized that no AKP member was implicated in the fraud case. Later, Erdogan reacted harshly to speculation that the money from Lighthouse was funneled to the AKP (Anadolu Ajansi, June 6 and June 9).

    The opposition parties, however, did not find the government’s arguments convincing. They believe that the government has failed to adequately address the issue. One CHP representative, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, known for previously publicizing corruption cases involving AKP members, asked Arinc to resign, arguing that it was shameful that a minister was unable to command a bureaucrat under his authority (Anadolu Ajansi, June 1). Moreover, the CHP leader Deniz Baykal, accused the government of failing to force Akman to resign, and argued that the government’s delay had provided an opportunity for Akman to conceal evidence (Taraf, June 8).

    Depending on the progress of the current case, tensions within Turkish politics might increase. The opposition parties will continue to press the government to take action against Akman and the corruption allegations, since such high profile cases allows them to weaken the AKP’s popularity. As Akman struggles to clear his name and leave office with an unblemished record, the AKP will have to protect its image as a corruption-free party -perhaps ultimately by sacrificing Akman.

    https://jamestown.org/program/arinc-demands-the-resignation-of-turkeys-media-watchdog/
  • The Kurdistan Regional Government Launches Oil Exports through Turkey

    The Kurdistan Regional Government Launches Oil Exports through Turkey

    The Kurdistan Regional Government Launches Oil Exports through Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 105
    June 2, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has started to export its oil to European markets, under partnerships with Turkish and other international energy companies. Following a new consensus on the distribution of revenues between the central administration in Baghdad and the KRG, oil from the Tawke and Taq Taq fields will be transported via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan in the Mediterranean.

    A crucial aspect of the project has been the entry of international companies into the flourishing regional economy. The KRG has tried to attract foreign investment as a means to generate wealth and consolidate its authority within northern Iraq. Having successfully attracted foreign capital, the KRG signed independent contracts for the development of the oil fields, which caused a dispute with the central Iraqi government. In May, KRG officials announced that they received Baghdad’s approval to export oil through Iraqi pipelines (www.krg.org, May 10). Although it allowed these exports, “the central government still refuses to recognize the production-sharing agreements Kurdish authorities have signed with oil firms.” This situation created uncertainty regarding the payment of foreign investors’ revenues, but the statements from KRG officials indicate that this will not become a major issue (Today’s Zaman, June 2).

    A joint venture between the Turkish company Genel Enerji, a subsidiary of the Cukurova group, and the Canadian-Swiss Addax Petroleum will run the operations in the Taq Taq field in Erbil. Their joint investments are valued at over $350 million. The Norwegian DNO operates the Tawke field in Dohuk, where the Genel Elektrik also holds a 25 percent stake (Hurriyet Daily News, June 2). The investors designate Taq Taq as “a potentially world class oil field” (www.addaxpetroleum.com). KRG sources also claim that the oil from this region is high quality and expect the new production to “improve on the overall quality of the present Kirkuk oil mix.” Oil from the Tawke field will be directly transferred to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik through an auxiliary pipeline. As a temporary measure, the crude from the Taq Taq will first be transported by road to the existing local pipeline networks – and from there it will connect to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik export pipeline (www.krg.org, May 8).

    Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Company (SOMO) will market the exported oil from both fields and the revenues will be deposited in the federal account. Under the Taq Taq deal, Baghdad will receive 88 percent of the revenues, 17 percent of which will go to the KRG. Foreign investors will receive a 12 percent share. The Tawke deal reportedly has similar stipulations (www.krg.org, May 8; www.alarabiya.net, June 1).

    Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, KRG President Masoud Barzani, KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, as well as other dignitaries from the KRG and representatives of the investors participated in a ceremony held in Erbil to celebrate the export deal. Talabani described this development as a “historic step” and contended that it signified how the Iraqis can work together for the prosperity of the country. In a move to allay concerns over the legality of the contracts, Talabani said “these contracts are legal, constitutional and legitimate and they are in the interests of the Iraqi people” (www.alarabiya.net, June 1).

    Earlier, one KRG representative, Halid Salih, also emphasized that they were acting within the boundaries set by the Iraqi constitution. He noted that they entered into agreements with foreign companies according to the constitution, which granted greater autonomy to regional governments to explore oil following its revisions in 2005 (Cihan Haber Ajansi, June 1).

    Echoing similar sentiments, Nechirvan Barzani described this project as a gift of the KRG to the Iraqi people. He emphasized the KRG’s respect for the central administration, but stressed how hard they worked to secure a fair share of the region’s revenues. Barzani explained that:

        “Fortunately, we possess abundant natural resources … We must use these resources … for the benefit of all the people of Iraq… We signed contracts with international oil companies in order to bring capital, technology, know-how and experience to our region and to the entire country… We are proud to contribute to Iraq’s increased production and revenues. In reality, revenue-sharing will bind us together more than any political slogan” (www.krg.org, June 1).

    Oil exports will begin at an initial rate of around 100,000 barrels per day. 60,000 barrels will be pumped from the Tawke field, while the remaining 40,000 of the light crude will come from the Taq Taq field. Havrami said the crude exports from both fields are expected to reach 250,000 barrels per day within one year, 450,000 barrels per day by the end of 2010 and 1 million barrels per day by 2013. According to current price estimates, within four years, the annual revenues from exports might reach $20 billion (www.tempo24.com.tr, June 2).

    This agreement highlights the prospect for mutually beneficial economic cooperation, if internal political disagreements are set aside. Since the country urgently needs revenues to recover from the effects of a devastating war, the wealth brought by the oil exports might offer further incentives for political reconciliation, and help heal the feud between the KRG and the central administration. Nonetheless, it remains unclear how other political actors within the Iraqi political scene will react. Other than President Talabani, himself a Kurd, non-Kurdish members of the Shiite Arab dominated Iraqi central government did not attend the ceremony, which might indicate some enduring disagreement. Similarly, Iraq’s Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani also reportedly questioned the legality of the KRG’s deal.

    In any case, such joint projects have the potential to boost not only ties between the KRG and the central administration, but also Ankara’s relations with both the KRG and Baghdad. Economic collaboration serves as a major driving force to sustain the existing security cooperation partnership within the region (EDM, April 13).

    https://jamestown.org/program/the-kurdistan-regional-government-launches-oil-exports-through-turkey/
  • Erdogan Prioritizes Foreign Policy in State of the Union Address

    Erdogan Prioritizes Foreign Policy in State of the Union Address

    Erdogan Prioritizes Foreign Policy in State of the Union Address

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 104
    June 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On May 30 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivered his State of the Union address, focusing on Turkey’s enhanced profile in regional diplomacy. Erdogan provided details relating to his trips to Azerbaijan, Russia and Poland, and discussed recent foreign policy initiatives, most importantly Turkey’s role in energy security. Erdogan attempted to boost public confidence in the foreign policy agenda, which he described as “very active, dynamic and intensive,” essentially offering a restatement of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government’s position on these issues (www.bbm.gov.tr, May 30).

    Erdogan highlighted Ankara’s role in energy policies, which he described as one of the most important issues on the global political agenda. He illustrated how his government had “turned Turkey’s geographic position into an effective foreign policy instrument,’ while arguing that the country’s location enables it to act as an “energy corridor and terminal” between Western markets and the Middle Eastern or Caspian energy producers. However, he noted that if Turkey fails to develop longer term planning, it will be unable to fully capitalize on these opportunities or meet its domestic needs.

    Erdogan’s views on energy geopolitics reflect the growing energy demands of an emerging economy. Although Turkey has initiated various projects to increase its domestic production and invest in alternative energy sources, its domestic energy output accounts for only one third of the country’s needs. Recent Turkish foreign policy initiatives have endeavored to turn this ongoing dependence on imports from a liability into an asset, by capitalizing on Turkey’s position between the suppliers and Western consumers.

    Erdogan maintained that the AKP government had taken important steps toward diversifying suppliers and energy transportation routes. After summarizing several existing and planned oil and gas pipeline projects across Turkish territory, Erdogan added that Turkey had become an integral part of the discussions on ensuring European energy security. He claimed that once these projects are completed, “Turkey will emerge as the fourth largest hub after Norway, Russia and Algeria, in supplying gas to Europe.” He also suggested that the Turkish port of Ceyhan will become an “important energy distribution center and the largest oil sale terminal in the eastern Mediterranean.”

    In that context, Erdogan prioritized the Nabucco project, since it will consolidate Turkey’s role within European energy security. He hoped the construction of the pipeline will begin soon and become operational by 2010: “we will sign the [intergovernmental] agreement in June,” he added. Erdogan’s statements also reflect recent changes in Turkey’s position over the stalled Nabucco project, which raised expectations that the intergovernmental agreement might be concluded in June (EDM, May 15).

    Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives in the South Caucasus were another key feature of Erdogan’s agenda. After noting Turkey’s cooperative policies within the region, he highlighted his trip to Azerbaijan. He underlined the close ties between the two nations by referring to the growing bilateral trade volume, and Turkish investment in Azerbaijan’s economic development.

    Erdogan also stressed Turkey’s continued support for international initiatives to resolve regional issues, most importantly the Karabakh question. He repeated his government’s recent stance on the Azeri-Armenian dispute by maintaining that “Turkey and Azerbaijan will continue to share a common destiny, and walk on the same path” and that Turkey “will protect Azerbaijan’s interests as much as our own interests.” He warned the Turkish and Azeri peoples against those “who work to undermine the friendship and brotherhood between the two countries through false claims” (www.bbm.gov.tr, May 30).

    He was clearly seeking to alleviate domestic concern over the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia. Nationalist forces within Turkey had successfully mobilized public opinion against the AKP government’s overtures toward Armenia. They argued that it had betrayed the interests of Azerbaijan, by separating the Turkish-Armenian normalization from Azeri-Armenian negotiations. The mounting domestic pressure and criticism from Baku forced the government to reduce the pace of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement (EDM, April 29, May 6). Erdogan’s trip to Azerbaijan as well as other recent high level contacts between the countries, has served to reassure Baku (EDM, May 14). Nonetheless, these moves toward Baku added to uncertainty surrounding the future of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, and Turkish politicians have recently proven reluctant to comment on the issue.

    He also referred to the recent naval exercises carried out by the Turkish military in the Aegean and Mediterranean. Erdogan stressed the use of high-technology weaponry and said the successful conclusion of the exercises was proof of the country’s power of deterrence in the region. Moreover, he emphasized that the Turkish army not only ensures national defense, but it also makes significant contributions to global security.

    Erdogan’s address provided significant clues concerning Ankara’s strategic vision, which underpins the thinking of the Turkish political elite on foreign affairs. Erdogan repeated the geopolitical argument that Turkey is uniquely located in a strategic position at the intersection of several regions. He maintained that Turkish foreign policy strategies are devised with the aim of turning this position into an asset. Moreover, he reflected on how a constant search for markets and energy supplies to sustain Turkey’s economic development now drives many of the country’s foreign policy initiatives. Equally, he revealed that military power remains an essential component of Turkish foreign policy, despite the government priding itself on its effective use of soft power.

    Erdogan’s use of geopolitical rhetoric also highlighted the shifting priorities of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government. He said that since a large part of Turkey’s territory is in Asia, that part of the world naturally occupies a vital place in Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. This admission is important, since some analysts describe the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East and the South Caucasus as an indication of an ideological shift and the emergence of neo-Ottomanism – whereas Erdogan rightly explains it as a geopolitical necessity.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-prioritizes-foreign-policy-in-state-of-the-union-address/
  • Davutoglu signals Turkey’s growing agenda-setting role within the Islamic world

    Davutoglu signals Turkey’s growing agenda-setting role within the Islamic world

    Davutoglu signals Turkey’s growing agenda-setting role within the Islamic world

    Turkey Calls for OIC Involvement in Conflict Resolution

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 102
    May 28, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On May 23-25 the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu participated in the thirty sixth session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Foreign Ministers Council in Damascus. As well as marking Turkey’s increased profile within regional diplomacy, the event provided an opportunity for Davutoglu to hold several bilateral meetings with his counterparts.

    Envoys from Muslim states discussed a wide range of issues, and considered proposals for mitigating Western Islamophobia, increasing the OIC’s role in conflict resolution, and raising its visibility in humanitarian affairs. The Turkish Secretary-General of the OIC, Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, also organized a brainstorming session on the organization’s role in promoting peace and security. Reminding its members of the numerous conflicts taking place within the Muslim world, he called on them to consider developing OIC’s mechanisms for conflict resolution, including establishing future peacekeeping capabilities (www.oic-oci.org).

    Since his election in 2005, Ihsanoglu has launched several initiatives to reform the organization, and his recent proposal is consistent with such efforts. Turkey has welcomed his appointment and praised the subsequent activities of the OIC under his leadership, as evidence of the country’s increased profile in international diplomacy.

    Commenting on his discussions during the conference, Davutoglu told reporters that Turkey supported Ihsanoglu’s initiatives to reform the institution, and added that the proposal for greater OIC involvement in conflict resolution was developed in coordination with Ankara. He said “We cannot expect others to solve our problems… This [conflict resolution] is its [OIC’s] founding mission. Although everyone acknowledges this mission, there is no mechanism to realize it.” Davutoglu added that the formation of peacekeeping forces might be considered at a later stage, but it is urgently required to develop conflict prevention mechanisms which address the crises within the Islamic world (www.cnnturk.com, May 24).

    Davutoglu said that all participating countries respected Turkey’s recent initiatives and Ankara’s leading role in regional diplomacy, while having high expectations from Turkey. Davutoglu argued that Turkey is no longer a country that is merely a passive recipient of an agenda from international organizations. He called the country’s new role as surukleyici (pioneer or leader) and added that Turkey is now acting as an agenda-setter within international organizations (Anadolu Ajansi, May 25).

    In his address, Davutoglu touched on several issues facing Muslim communities, including the plight of Palestine, the instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the denial of minority rights to the Turkish community living in Western Thrace and the frozen conflict in Karabakh. He highlighted Ankara’s constructive policies and effective use of its soft power toward the resolution of these issues. Emphasizing an urgent need for “peace, dialogue, communication and stability,” Davutoglu called on Muslim countries to respond to their contemporary challenges: “There is a new geostrategic, geopolitical and geoeconomic culture within the Islamic world. We need to develop a new vision according to the expectations, traditions and values of our era” (Anadolu Ajansi, May 24).

    Davutoglu also held several bilateral meetings, including with the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, the Arab League Secretary-General Amr Musa and the foreign ministers from other OIC countries, including his Iranian, Iraqi and Azeri counterparts (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 24). The statements emerging from these discussions emphasized the new sense of cooperation that exists between Turkey and its eastern neighbors, which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has fostered since coming to power in 2002.

    Davutoglu demonstrated a constructive attitude toward Baghdad and Damascus. Following his meeting with Iraq’s foreign minister Hoshyar Zebari, Davutoglu told reporters that Turkey will release more water from its dams on the Euphrates to meet the needs of Iraqi farmers threatened by a drought. Earlier, an Iraqi delegation composed of Sunni leaders visited Ankara and submitted similar proposals. Turkey has now officially opened the dams and increased the water flow to Syria and Iraq (Yeni Safak, May 24; Hurriyet Daily News, May 25).

    As the former chief advisor to the Turkish prime minister and now in his role as foreign minister, Davutoglu has been the architect of the new Turkish foreign policy (EDM, March 25, May 4, 8). Davutoglu’s geopolitical approach to international relations has been complemented by his understanding of the role played by civilizations in world history. In Davutoglu’s weltanschauung, the Islamic civilization faces a major challenge and needs to transform itself in the fields of economics, politics, culture and education to meet its contemporary challenges. He links the transformation in Turkish domestic and foreign policies to this broader trend, and assigns the country a “special mission” in this process. He does not want to enforce Turkish leadership on other Islamic countries, but he believes that Turkey can set an example. In his view, other OIC countries will naturally come to recognize Turkey’s leadership if it can develop constructive policies within the Islamic world.

    His efforts to boost Turkish ties within the Islamic world have led some analysts to criticize his policies, by representing them as a drift away from the West -making Turkey more Islamic or Middle Eastern. However, though the Islamic world has been increasingly more central in Turkish foreign policy priorities, such initiatives are not necessarily at the expense of the country’s Western orientation. Since his appointment as foreign minister, Davutoglu has pursued an active agenda aimed at revitalizing stalled Turkish-European relations, improving ties with the United States, and refocusing Ankara’s attention on Central Asia. This reflects Davutoglu’s emergence as a major geopolitical thinker, advocating a more proactive and multi-dimensional foreign policy -balancing Ankara’s interests within several regions simultaneously along Turkey’s fragile Eurasian periphery.

    The real question may not be ideological -whether Turkish foreign policy is drifting away from its traditional Western orientation- but a practical consideration. Davutoglu faces the challenge as to whether Turkey can sustain this ambitious, multi-dimensional foreign policy agenda, and fulfil the many expectations this creates without overstretching its resources.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-calls-for-oic-involvement-in-conflict-resolution/