Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Turkish Army holds Seminar for NATO Members and Partners

    Turkish Army holds Seminar for NATO Members and Partners

    Turkish Army holds Seminar for NATO Members and Partners

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 122
    June 25, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 22-23, the Turkish army organized the tenth Silk Road General/Admiral seminar in Istanbul, which brought together around 119 military officers from NATO countries, Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, and the members of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The theme of this year’s seminar was cooperation between NATO and its partners. However, the Turkish media preferred to highlight the Chief of the Staff General Ilker Basbug’s remarks in its coverage of the event, which provided important clues concerning the military’s perceptions of the country’s security policies and its efforts to eliminate the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

    As an active member of the transatlantic Alliance, Turkey has played a leading role in NATO’s post-cold war transformation. Through the PfP training center in Ankara, established in 1998 -one of the first examples of its kind- Turkey has organized several training programs and seminars for officers from NATO and its partner countries. These activities played a major role in the integration of several Eurasian, Balkan and Mediterranean nations into the broader transatlantic security architecture. Launched in 2000, the “Silk Road Flag Officers Seminars” is one of those initiatives, whose purpose is “to familiarize participants with NATO’s global missions and developing role in collective security and the European security architecture” (www.bioem.tsk.tr).

    In his opening address, Basbug laid out Turkey’s views on the Alliance. He described NATO as a “dynamic and operational organization” and maintained that it performs three vital functions: ensuring the collective security of its members, reinforcing the transatlantic link, and providing a security umbrella so that members can focus their attention on common security challenges. He stressed that Turkey wants to see NATO as the primary political and military institution in the transatlantic community, and considers it as a key pillar of Turkish security policy. Basbug contended that “Turkey is not only a country that contributes to NATO. But it has also provided vital leadership, [through its lead role in NATO operations]” (Anadolu Ajansi, June 22).

    Basbug discussed the transformation of the global security environment and its implications for NATO. He argued that “in today’s chaotic world, risks and threats cannot be handled with military instruments alone. In order to eradicate such threats, it is of utmost importance that the international community utilize the elements of both military and civilian power,” and develop instruments for conflict prevention. He maintained that, in addition to performing its existing strategic and operational tasks, NATO is under pressure to take on new missions and responsibilities in order to respond to newly emerging threats. He identified two challenges before the transatlantic community: NATO’s internal transformation and its enlargement. First, Basbug noted that Turkey supports NATO’s efforts for restructuring itself to adjust to new conditions. He expressed his hope that comprehensive security cooperation could be developed between NATO and other international organizations, non-NATO countries and NGO’s.

    In addition, Basbug discussed Turkey’s views on NATO enlargement. He reiterated Ankara’s position that NATO membership should be open to all European democracies that can fulfill the requirements, and added that Turkey will continue to support NATO’s open door policy because it contributes to the realization of “the idea of a free and united Europe.” He emphasized that Macedonia should also be given an opportunity to gain membership. Given its historical ties, Turkey considers this Balkan country as its ally, and supports its bid for joining NATO.

    The Deputy Chief of the General Staff Hasan Igsiz also addressed the closing session of the seminar. He emphasized the need to develop joint positions against common threats to global security and expressed Turkey’s support for NATO’s open door policy. Igsiz also called on the transatlantic community to resolve the differences of interpretation encountered in the existing agreements on NATO-E.U. cooperation (Anadolu Ajansi, June 23). Given its unique position as a non-E.U. NATO member, and the troubled course of Turkish-E.U. relations, Turkey occasionally comes under criticism for using its position in NATO as a bargaining chip and complicating NATO-E.U. coordination (EDM, February 9).

    Basbug devoted the rest of his speech to terrorism, which he described as the most serious asymmetric threat affecting the international community. He stressed that a proper counter-terrorism strategy should employ both military and non-military instruments. Above all, it should be human-oriented and be based on “winning hearts and minds.” These views are similar to what he has advocated in domestic politics for some time (EDM, April 15).

    Moreover, he maintained that, at the international level, this threat can only be addressed through the collective efforts of all nations. Basbug called on NATO members to “minimize the differences in their positions and policies, and take a common stance in this struggle.” Here, Basbug was implicitly voicing Turkey’s complaint that some NATO members were not sensitive to Turkey’s struggle against the PKK. Ankara argues that the complacency of some European countries toward the activities of the PKK in Europe undermines the spirit of solidarity within the Alliance. Therefore, Basbug sent a warning by saying: “There is no guarantee that those countries unaffected by terrorism today will not be targeted tomorrow.”

    Basbug recalled Turkey’s decades old struggle against the PKK, and maintained that the country will pursue a comprehensive approach in its own fight that considers all aspects of the issue. Nonetheless, he added that “it is futile to think that economic and socio-cultural measures alone might end terrorism, while terrorist groups remain armed. Therefore, we are determined to fight against the terrorist group [the PKK] until it is completely disbanded and [the terrorists] lay down their arms” (www.tgrthaber.com, June 22).

    These remarks received widespread attention within the Turkish media. President Abdullah Gul has been pushing for a new process to address the Kurdish issue through dialogue, and possibly a general amnesty for PKK militants (EDM, May 7, 19). Gul had argued that a consensus had emerged among the state institutions and he raised expectations for a breakthrough. Basbug’s remarks, however, show that the Turkish political and security elite are far from sharing a common position, and it may not be realistic to expect the “historic solution” as advocated by Gul.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-army-holds-seminar-for-nato-members-and-partners/
  • Turkish Government and Opposition Remain Divided over Foreign Policy

    Turkish Government and Opposition Remain Divided over Foreign Policy

    Turkish Government and Opposition Remain Divided over Foreign Policy

     

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 121
    June 24, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 23, the Turkish Parliament approved a motion that will authorize the government to renew the term of the Turkish peacekeeping force contributing to the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), for one more year, effective from September 5. The parliamentary discussions preceding the vote demonstrate that differences remain between the governing AKP and the opposition parties in regards to their approaches to foreign policy.

    Reflecting its growing involvement in Middle Eastern politics, Turkey played an active role during the 2006 summer war between Israel and Hezbollah. To pacify Lebanon following the Israeli military strikes, the U.N. Security Council enhanced the mandate of UNIFIL in August 2006 to undertake additional tasks, including monitoring the cessation of hostilities and helping the Lebanese armed forces to expand its authority in the south (www.unifil.unmissions.org).

    European nations expressed an interest in fielding a peacekeeping force to prevent the destabilization of the entire region. Given the Turkish army’s experience in peacekeeping operations, and Turkey’s ties to both Israel and Arab nations, there emerged an expectation that Turkey could play a central role in this initiative. The participation of Turkey as a Muslim nation was seen as necessary in order to prevent the impression that the international force was seeking to impose a “Western” plan. It was even suggested that Turkey could lead the international force, on its own or jointly with France. Although Israel reportedly favored this idea, Hezbollah sources did not welcome it (Yeni Safak, June 25, 2006).

    Moreover, Turkish public opinion was strongly opposed to the participation of Turkish soldiers in such a controversial mission. Since this international force was perceived as a measure to contain Hezbollah, there were concerns that the Turkish forces might be forced to engage in armed conflict with Hezbollah militants, which might have complicated Turkey’s friendly relations with Arab states. Given the growing anti-American sentiments within Turkish society, this force was portrayed as an occupation force acting on behalf of Israel (Yeni Asya, August 14, 2006). Despite this domestic opposition, the government preferred to cooperate with the international community. It conducted a careful risk analysis, and the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul consulted other regional actors and the major political factions in Lebanon to gauge their reactions to any military deployment (Zaman, August 15, 2006; Aksam, September 3, 2006).

    As a compromise solution, Ankara agreed to contribute to the UNIFIL with non-combat units, and stressed that it would not participate in the demilitarization of Hezbollah. The Turkish Parliament approved the deployment in September 2006, following intense discussions. The opposition parties voted against the motion, but given its parliamentary majority, the AKP was able to obtain the necessary authorization (Turkiye, September 6, 2006). The Turkish contingent was deployed to Lebanon in October 2006 (Sabah, October 12, 2006), and the mandate of the force was renewed in 2007 and 2008. The Turkish armed forces have contributed patrol boats to the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force and a military engineering company to assist the reconstruction efforts in Lebanon (www.tsk.tr; www.unifil.unmissions.org).

    As the mandate of the Turkish contingent expires in September, the government forwarded a motion to the parliament seeking an extension. Since the AKP’s recent foreign policy initiatives have encountered strong resistance from opposition parties, the fate of the motion was unclear. In another recent parliamentary debate, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), supported by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), literally waged a “war of attrition” to prevent the passage of a bill concerning mine clearance on the Turkish-Syrian border. The bill eventually passed after these delays, only after the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan pressured the deputies from his party (EDM, May 21, 29, June 5).

    No major discussions emerged over the governmental motion extending the mandate of the Turkish contingent, which might be related to its forces not encountering any serious issues thus far. The CHP continued to approach the UNIFIL from a skeptical perspective. The CHP speaker maintained that the UNIFIL’s mission is not limited to the provision of humanitarian services and ensuring regional stability alone. Rather, its purpose is to provide conditions for a future military operation to “eliminate Hezbollah and… act as a shield to protect Israel in the event of such an operation.” He also maintained that despite U.S. President Barack Obama’s rhetoric on mending fences with Turkey, he has not been sensitive to Turkey’s interests in the Middle East, most importantly regarding the PKK issue. The MHP speaker praised the achievements of the Turkish force, but restated his criticism of the policies pursued by other international actors toward the Middle East. The opposition parties failed to oppose the government’s motion, but demanded that it act more assertively to protect Turkish interests vis-à-vis international actors -in particular the United States. In his address to parliament, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey’s contributions to Lebanon has to be discussed in the context of its new strategy of contributing to global and regional peace. Davutoglu maintained that, both through its soft power and military capabilities, “Turkey is playing an order instituting role” in its region (www.tbmm.gov.tr, June 23).

    Nonetheless, the parliamentary discussions highlighted the underlying divisions between the AKP and the opposition parties, over their positions on how to harmonize Turkey’s regional policies with those of other global actors. The opposition maintains a deep-rooted skepticism toward the agendas of international actors in the Middle East. In contrast, the AKP considers Turkey’s cooperation with the international institutions and Western nations as complementary to its own regional policies. As the AKP strives to promote the country’s regional power status, it triggers suspicions among some circles in the West that view this new policy as a departure from Turkey’s Western orientation. However, on the domestic front, the AKP’s concern not to challenge the interests of international actors, exposes it to criticism for failing to adequately protect its national interests. How Davutoglu manages this “double-challenge,” might prove a major test of his skills as a geostrategist.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-government-and-opposition-remain-divided-over-foreign-policy/
  • Health Reasons Force Erdogan to Cancel Athens Visit

    Health Reasons Force Erdogan to Cancel Athens Visit

    Health Reasons Force Erdogan to Cancel Athens Visit

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 119
    June 22, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 20 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan cancelled a planned trip to Athens. Although his health condition was offered as the reason for the last-minute cancellation, it did not prevent speculation that Erdogan sought to use the pretext of his health concern to protest about recent Greek diplomatic initiatives against Turkey.

    Erdogan was scheduled to visit Athens to attend the opening the new Acropolis Museum. Prior to the opening ceremony, Erdogan was expected to meet Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis, and both were to address bilateral issues including the conditions of minorities, as well as recent developments regarding the Cyprus dispute (Cihan Haber Ajansi, June 19). On the morning of June 20, Erdogan attended some meetings in the Aegean town of Izmir. He was expected to fly to Athens later that afternoon and return to Turkey that night. It was later announced that Erdogan had telephoned Karamanlis and informed him of his cancellation. He told Karamanlis that he would like to visit Athens at the earliest opportunity. A statement from Erdogan’s office explained that due to sunstroke, which Erdogan experienced during his visit to Edirne on June 19, his doctors had recommended rest. On June 21 he also cancelled the rest of his program in Izmir and his trips inside Turkey, and returned to Istanbul to rest over the weekend (ANKA, June 20).

    Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc told reporters on June 21 that Erdogan was in good condition, and would resume his functions the following day. Arinc added that Erdogan had experienced temporary hypertension related to weariness, but this was not a serious problem. After resting in Istanbul, Erdogan was expected in Ankara on June 23, to attend an AKP party meeting and also have a working lunch with E.U. ambassadors (Anadolu Ajansi, June 21).

    However, the official statement did not satisfy some diplomatic observers who believe that political motives were behind Erdogan’s last-minute decision. They suggested two issues which might have influenced Erdogan’s decision: Karamanlis’ public complaints about the Turkish Air Force allegedly violating Greek airspace in the Aegean Sea and the E.U. Presidency’s latest conclusions which referred to Turkey as a country of origin and transit in illegal immigration, at Greece’s urging (Radikal, Hurriyet Daily News, June 21). The Greek media also speculated that Erdogan might have cancelled his trip to express his displeasure over these developments. They argued that Erdogan might have wanted to avoid confronting Karamanlis on the Aegean and illegal immigrants’ issues (Anadolu Ajansi, June 20).

    An interrelated set of disputed claims by Ankara and Athens in the Aegean Sea has proved a major long-standing bilateral source of tension between the two countries. Due to the ongoing controversy over the delimitation of national airspace, Flight Information Regions (FIR) and military over-flight rights, Turkish and Greek fighters engage each other in tactical military provocations (so-called “dog-fights”), which frequently heighten tensions between the two countries. Greece considers the flights of Turkish jets in the disputed zones as violations of its national airspace or transgressions of the FIR. During his contacts in Brussels in the context of the E.U. Summit, Karamanlis reiterated Athens’s complaints concerning Turkish jets’ “violations of Greek airspace,” and added that he “discussed this issue with Obama and would raise it during [his] meeting with Erdogan” (www.cnnturk.com, June 19).

    The Greek attempt to use the E.U. as leverage to pressure Turkey on a different issue also reportedly angered Ankara. Last week, the European Council discussed the challenge of illegal immigrants, and ways to improve cooperation with countries of origin and transit. The presidency conclusions issued at the end of the summit announced that, as part of its external policies, the E.U. will seek to sign readmission agreements with major countries of origin and transit. By the time such agreements are concluded, the E.U. will require the implementation of existing bilateral agreements (www.eu2009.cz, June 19). Greece reportedly threatened to veto the presidency conclusions, if the European Council did not specify Turkey, along with Libya, as a key country of origin and transit. Although Turkey was not mentioned in the draft document, following last-minute changes, the final communiqué made reference to it (www.abhaber.com, June 19).

    Athens claims that a great majority of illegal immigrants arriving in Greece transit Turkey and it expects Ankara to be more cooperative in the readmission of those immigrants. Ankara claims that since the final destination of those immigrants are E.U. countries, Turkey cannot be expected to bear the heavy financial burden of readmitting them, which would cost over 1.2 million Euros and demands fairer burden-sharing (Hurriyet, June 20).

    The declared justification for Erdogan’s cancellation of his trip is perhaps true; yet, the very fact that it resulted in such speculation indicates the level of tension between the two countries. Athens has long blocked the progress of Turkish-E.U. relations, and the two neighbors even came to the brink of war over the Aegean issues in the 1990’s. In the post-1999 period, when the Turkish-E.U. talks were revitalized following the Helsinki Summit, bilateral relations entered a new phase. The resulting normalization of the relationship produced concrete results; in addition to launching diplomatic talks to discuss a resolution to the bilateral issues, Athens removed its objections to Ankara’s entry into the European Union. During the rapid wave of domestic reforms following the AKP’s accession to power in 2002, which resulted in the launch of membership talks in 2005, Erdogan developed a close working relationship with his Greek counterpart and visited Athens twice in 2004. However, parallel to the stalling of Turkey’s E.U. accession process since 2005, Turkish-Greek relations also experienced a downturn, which largely resulted from Turkey’s inability to resolve its differences with Greek Cypriots. If he is serious about his claim to revive Turkey’s E.U. bid, Erdogan must talk to his Greek counterpart and reach a consensus on bilateral and E.U. related issues. In this context, he might soon visit Athens.

    https://jamestown.org/program/health-reasons-force-erdogan-to-cancel-athens-visit/
  • Erdogan Avoids Confrontation with the Military over Alleged Plot

    Erdogan Avoids Confrontation with the Military over Alleged Plot

    Erdogan Avoids Confrontation with the Military over Alleged Plot

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 118
    June 19, 2009 02:58 PM
    By: Saban Kardas
    Since the publication of a document, allegedly prepared by Colonel, Dursun Cicek, outlining a plan to undermine the governing AKP and the Gulen movement last week, Turkish domestic politics has focused on the future of civil-military relations (EDM, June 15). Nonetheless, fears over a split between the government and the military did not transpire, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has avoided such a dangerous confrontation. Instead of pursuing punitive action against the military authorities, Erdogan has demonstrated restraint and instead referred the matter to the courts.

    On June 15, the chief military prosecutor said that the allegations were being investigated. Based on a preliminary study of evidence, the prosecutor reached an opinion that the document was not prepared by any unit within the headquarters of the General Staff. If the authenticity of the document could be established, all personnel involved will be brought to justice, the statement added (Anadolu Ajansi, June 16).

    The office of the General Staff also released a press statement that criticized “the written and verbal comments and declarations targeting the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), both openly and implicitly, on the assumption that the allegations are true.” It called on everyone to refrain from reaching any premature conclusion on the allegations before the legal inquiry has reached its judgment (www.tsk.tr, June 15).

    Pro-government and pro-Gulen media outlets labeled the action plan as a blatant attempt by the military to interfere with the jurisdiction of civil politics. They did not find the military authorities’ claims about the authenticity of the document credible, and questioned how the prosecutor might have formed an “opinion” on a document without having seen it. More importantly, in their view, despite the steps taken toward democratization, the existence of such a plan within the military was a grave development. They maintained that unless the government acts decisively against this threat, its democratization efforts will be damaged. They believe, if necessary, the government should ask for the resignation of the either the chief of the General Staff or his deputy who oversee the department that allegedly prepared the report (Yeni Safak, Zaman, June 16).

    The Chief of the General Staff General Ilker Basbug gave an interview to Hurriyet in which he responded to the growing criticism of the Turkish military. He reiterated that the military prosecutor was working on the case and his headquarters’ additional investigation had revealed that there was no concrete evidence linking the military to the document. When asked “was such an order [for the preparation of the document] issued by the military command?” Basbug responded “I even consider this question an insult. Such an order was never given.” He said he will take all measures necessary, if the alleged source of the document is proven, but added that he opposed referring the case to the civil courts (Hurriyet, June 16).

    In this context, curiously the AKP’s reaction was expected. When the allegations first emerged, Erdogan promised to defend democracy and take any necessary legal action. On June 16, he met Basbug to discuss these developments. Recently, both leaders had agreed to form a new consultation mechanism and hold weekly meetings every Thursday (Radikal, January 22). No statement was issued following this meeting, but during his address to the AKP’s parliamentary group later the same day, Erdogan insisted that the state institutions had acted in close coordination. He praised the handling of the case by the General Staff, saying that it acted “in a responsible and sensitive manner.” He called on the military and civil courts to conclude their investigations promptly (Anadolu Ajansi, June 16).

    The AKP filed a criminal complaint against the plan with the Ankara Public Prosecutor’s Office. The lawsuit defined those involved in alleged plots against the AKP and the government, as engaging in illegal activities. The AKP described such activities as unacceptable, and requested an immediate investigation (Cihan, June 16).

    The AKP’s lawsuit appears to be based on the assumption that the document is genuine, and consequently the discussions have focused on the forensic investigation into its authenticity. However, reports in the Turkish media demonstrate how deeply politically divisive the issue has become. Newspaper headlines on June 17 illustrated the extent of these divisions. Star, which is supportive of the government, insisted that the document was uncovered as part of the Ergenekon investigation and was true, while Haberturk, which is more critical of the government, questioned its authenticity.

    The Gendarmerie criminal investigation unit has allegedly completed its examination of the document, which hinges on whether the signature belongs to Colonel Cicek. Although the forensic report was not released, newspapers speculate over its possible content. Whereas Haberturk claimed that it is “99 percent certain” that the document was forged, Yeni Safak and Star maintained that according to a preliminary investigation there is “90 percent certainty” that the signature belonged to the Turkish colonel. Other papers alleged that he might have used different signatures, which could further complicate the investigation (Sabah, Aksam, June 19).

    The Zaman daily, close to the Gulen movement, questions this narrow focus on the authenticity of the document, and maintains that it cannot address public concern surrounding the accusations. Zaman was especially critical of efforts to transfer the investigation to the military courts. Citing similar instances in the past, Zaman claims that it might be used to promote a military cover up. It called for a more comprehensive parliamentary investigation into the allegations (Zaman, June 19).

    Nonetheless, Erdogan has refused to turn this case into an open confrontation with the military, and he remains committed to avoiding such conflict. Turkish domestic politics is increasingly conducted around controversial legal cases. Yet, in a political system as divided as Turkey’s, trust in the court system is lacking -and far from clarifying the allegations, the court might perpetuate existing divisions.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-avoids-confrontation-with-the-military-over-alleged-plot/
  • Turkey Considers Procuring American or Russian Attack Helicopters

    Turkey Considers Procuring American or Russian Attack Helicopters

    Turkey Considers Procuring American or Russian Attack Helicopters

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 116
    June 17, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Undersecretary of Defense Industries Murad Bayar told reporters that he is optimistic about the purchase of Super Cobra helicopters from the U.S. Navy, amidst reports that a Turkish delegation is visiting Moscow to discuss the procurement of Russian MI-28 helicopters. In a stalled bid, the Turkish military has been eyeing additional strike helicopters as a stop-gap measure to meet its needs until its own national attack helicopter project becomes operational.

    Attack helicopters have been on Turkey’s defense procurement agenda since the 1990’s. In order to increase the army’s effectiveness in combating the PKK, Ankara designated attack helicopters as an urgent requirement, and developed multi-million dollar programs to meet the army’s needs. Following the purchase of several Cobra class platforms, the subsequent tenders Turkey opened were cancelled due to price disputes, licenses and technology transfers and the changing political climate. Consistent with Turkish military procurement policy after 2004, it initiated a national helicopter gunship program.

    However, due to the stringent regulations on local participation and technology transfers, American firms could not participate in tenders, and Turkey eventually awarded the contract for the production of its national attack/tactical-reconnaissance helicopters to the Italian AgustaWestland. Under the $3 billion project, the Turkish army will acquire 50 T129 helicopters, a modified version of the Italian Mangusta-A129. The deliveries were expected to start in 2013, but some sources claim that this date be pushed back to 2015 (EDM, June 27, 2008).

    Criticism surrounding Turkey’s military modernization program has continued unabated. According to its critics, Turkey’s handling of the helicopter project since the outset reveals poor planning and the lack of direction within the defense industry. Many ambitious weapons systems including main battle tanks, assault helicopters and UAV’s are to be produced domestically, but their design and prototypes will not be ready before 2012. Critics claim that “if the development of those projects was not followed closely, the Turkish defense industry might face a serious crisis in 2012 after falling short of meeting the real needs of the Turkish armed forces” (EDM, January 6).

    Meanwhile, the Turkish army reported deficiencies in combating the PKK caused by the delays in the helicopter program, especially after the escalation of the PKK’s terrorist campaign in recent years. The helicopters within the Turkish military inventory, mostly Cobra class, are aging and fall short of the army’s operational meets. This situation lends credibility to the critics’ arguments, since although an attack helicopter project was considered as urgent in the 1990’s, it remains unfinished -and it will take several years before the army will acquire the quantities it needs.

    Realizing that even under the most optimistic estimates national attack helicopters will not be delivered before 2013-2015, as a short term measure Turkey approached the United States in late 2007 to purchase up to 12 Cobra class helicopters already in use by the U.S. navy. U.S. sources said that they were in short supply. Since operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have overstretched U.S. military resources, Washington declined the Turkish requests (Turkish Daily News, March 28, 2008). Instead it offered Turkey AH-64 Apaches, but Ankara did not want them since having operated Cobras for almost two decades, the Turkish army lacked the infrastructure and personnel to operate Apaches. The Italian AgustaWestland offered its Mangusta-A129 helicopters, but the Turkish armed forces declined, arguing that the A129’s engine was insufficient to meet its needs (Aksam, March 28, 2008).

    The issue resurfaced several times, but the American side did not change their stance. Diplomatic observers maintained that although shortages were cited as the official justification, Washington refused to sell used Cobras to Turkey to punish Ankara’s inflexibility over the attack helicopter tender. It was also claimed that Turkey’s refusal to send additional troops to Afghanistan was behind Washington’s reluctance to sell the Cobras to Ankara (Today’s Zaman, April 14, 2008; Aksam, March 28, 2008).

    Turkey then reportedly turned to Russia in late 2008. Turkish and Russian media reports claimed that, after being turned down by the United States, Ankara planned to procure 32 MI-28 Night Hunters, an all-weather day-night attack helicopter, in a deal worth $1 billion. However, Russian defense officials denied these claims and said that Turkey did not officially submit such a request (Cihan Haber Ajansi, December 22, 2008).

    Nonetheless, Turkish interest in pursuing the Russian option has continued, reportedly negotiating the purchase of at least 12 MI-28 choppers (Taraf, June 10). Russian defense industry officials attending the IDEF 2009 arms fair in Istanbul in late April maintained that Turkey showed interest in buying Russian air defense systems and combat helicopters (RIA Novosti, April 27). According to recent reports, a delegation from the Turkish defense ministry traveled to Moscow in order to explore the possible acquisition of between 12 and 32 helicopters within the next two or three years (RIA Novosti, June 15).

    In response to a question about the visit of a Turkish delegation to Moscow, Bayar told reporters “I am very hopeful about the purchase of Cobra W class [AH-1W-Supercobra] helicopters… I believe we will acquire them. The U.S. navy is considering the acquisition of the Z series, and they will not need the Cobra W class.” He added that during his visit to the United States, the Turkish Chief of the General Staff General Ilker Basbug also raised this issue with his American counterparts (Radikal, June 14).

    Given the feasibility concerns, the Turkish government is likely to reach a decision after comparing the Russian and American platforms. In addition to technical and economic factors, political considerations will also play a key role in Ankara’s decision. Given the recent rapprochement between Turkey and the United States, it might indeed acquire the Cobras as a temporary measure. Turkish plans to make a greater contribution to Afghanistan following Basbug and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s contacts (EDM, June 16) might help remove the objections of the U.S. army to Turkey’s requests.

    Nonetheless, these developments demonstrate how Ankara treads carefully between Moscow and Washington to maximize its leverage. In line with its recent foreign policy orientation, Turkey also appears equally determined to keep its options open in its defense procurement policies.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-considers-procuring-american-or-russian-attack-helicopters/
  • Turkish General Staff Accused of Seeking to Undermine the Government

    Turkish General Staff Accused of Seeking to Undermine the Government

    Turkish General Staff Accused of Seeking to Undermine the Government

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 114
    June 15, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 12, the liberal left Taraf daily triggered a political crisis in Ankara. Taraf claimed to have uncovered a four-page unclassified document, detailing an alleged action plan for the military to combat the “reactionary activities” against secularism. It was allegedly prepared by a colonel from the operations department at the headquarters of the chief of the general staff. This signals a new confrontation between the Turkish military and the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP).

    “The Action Plan against Reactionaries (Irtica),” allegedly prepared in April, was seized during a police search in the offices of Serdar Ozturk, the lawyer representing retired Colonel Levent Goktas -both arrested as part of the Ergenekon investigation. The document defines the AKP and the Gulen movement as threats to the secular order in Turkey, and accuses them of seeking to establish an Islamic state. The plan also criticizes the Ergenekon investigation, describing it as an attempt by Islamic groups to undermine the state and defame military personnel. The action plan proposed various measures aimed at “revealing the hidden agenda” of the AKP and Gulen movement, and undermining their public support. It also contemplates a psychological warfare campaign to promote widespread suspicion against these groups -even amongst pious Muslims- and exaggerate the threat they pose. Moreover, the plan suggests psychological operations against members of the Turkish armed forces suspected of being affiliated to Islamic groups. Furthermore, such propaganda seeks to discredit the Ergenekon investigation and mobilize public support for any military personnel implicated (Taraf, June 12).

    Taraf’s story has proven to be controversial in Ankara. The office of the chief of the general staff announced that the military court had banned any further media coverage of the story. The statement described the alleged action plan as related to national security, public order and public security, and banned any publication of its contents. The military prosecutor launched an investigation into the source of the leak and the dissemination of the document. When questioned about these developments during his weekly press briefing, the military’s spokesman Metin Gurak said that the military prosecutor will investigate all aspects of the story. Nonetheless, he declined to explain whether the investigation would be launched against “the existence of such a document or how it was leaked” (Anadolu Ajansi, June 12).

    Despite the military’s ban on publicizing the document, several media outlets close to the Gulen movement and the AKP government chose to ignore it. The Zaman daily ran a counter campaign against the military’s attempts to ban media coverage. Zaman and its sister daily Today’s Zaman, covered the development intensively, and portrayed the document as representing a serious threat to Turkish democracy and supplying more evidence of the ongoing influence of the military within the political system. They used this incident to make two related points. First, it sought to mobilize the government to revitalize its stalled domestic reforms aimed at boosting democratization and civilian control over the armed forces. Second, it called on the military leadership, particularly the Chief of the General Staff General Ilker Basbug, to demonstrate commitment to democracy by acting decisively over this issue. Equally, it demanded clarification on whether the military as an institution or its commissioned officers are implicated in such activities against the civil authority (Zaman, Today’s Zaman, June 13, 14, 15).

    Liberal columnists in other newspapers emphasized similar arguments, noting that Turkey faces ongoing challenges in order to curtail the military’s political influence (Milliyet, Radikal, June 13). Others largely restricted their reporting to the military’s ban on the Taraf story. Hurriyet quoted Serdar Ozturk’s lawyer, who claimed that the document was placed in his client’s office by the pro-Gulen movement clique within the Turkish police. He said they would press charges against the police and the prosecutors for leaking the document (Hurriyet, June 13).

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reacted angrily to the document. On June 13, while addressing a party congress in Kars, he emphasized his determination to protect democracy and maintained that the AKP is the main guarantor of Turkey’s constitutional order (Anadolu Ajansi, June 13). Speaking at another party congress on June 14 in Sanliurfa, he reiterated this commitment, and promised to combat any plots against democracy. Erdogan contextualized the document, however, as part of other efforts to weaken the AKP, and argued that “in a democratic environment we cannot remain a spectator to this illegal process against the AKP. We are investigating [the plots against the AKP] and will take legal action if necessary” (www.haberturk.com, June 14).

    Taraf has run controversial stories by publishing unclassified military documents, since it was first published by a group of liberal journalists in 2007 -exposing either the activities of groups within the military seeking to topple the government, or the flaws in the Turkish army’s campaign against the PKK (EDM, July 18, 2008; Terrorism Focus, October 30, 2008). Basbug has publicly accused Taraf in the past of conducting a defamation campaign against the military. Erdogan also joined Basbug in lambasting Taraf, but this did not change its publication policy (www.haber7.com, October 17, 2008).

    If the latest revelation in Taraf proves to be true, it is likely to have significant repercussions for the current balance of power in Ankara. Erdogan and Basbug apparently reached a common understanding on major political issues, such as the Ergenekon investigation and the management of the Kurdish question. They have established close communication channels to exchange opinions. Erdogan did not object to Basbug’s controversial efforts to reassert a role for the military within Turkish politics (EDM, April 15), while Basbug permitted the trial of military officers in the Ergenekon case. Their management of the claims that the military headquarters might be involved in a conspiracy against the government could force them to redefine their working relationship, with significant implications for the future of Turkish civil-military affairs.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-general-staff-accused-of-seeking-to-undermine-the-government/