Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement Signed in Ankara

    Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement Signed in Ankara

    Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement Signed in Ankara

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 134
    July 14, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On July 13 the Nabucco transit countries removed an important obstacle for the strategic pipeline project. Attending a high profile meeting hosted by Turkey, the prime ministers of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey inked the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA). The ceremony was also attended by several government officials and representatives of international organizations including the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, the E.U. Commission’s President Jose Manuel Barroso, E.U. Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs and the U.S. special envoy for Eurasian energy Richard Morningstar (Anadolu Ajansi, July 13).

    In the next step toward the completion of the legal framework, the Nabucco consortium will sign separate project support agreements with the five participating countries within the next six months. Construction work is expected to start by 2011 and the pipeline will be operational in 2014. The consortium will also open discussions with banks to raise the necessary capital and explore the marketing of transportation capacities. The project is valued at 7.9 billion Euros ($11 billion) and in its full capacity it will pump 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually to European markets (www.nabucco-pipeline.com).

    According to the Nabucco consortium, the “IGA will lay out a stable legal framework for the next 50 years and … 50 percent of the pipeline’s capacity will be reserved for the shareholders and the remaining 50 percent offered to third-party shippers.” Moreover, the IGA will develop a standard tariff methodology. The legal framework set by the IGA will remain in force for 25 years after the pipeline becomes operational so that it provides “strong comfort to the potential gas supply countries who are considering selling gas to the shippers of Nabucco” (www.nabucco-pipeline.com, July 13).

    The partners do not expect financing to become a major issue. The meeting signaled a possible imminent resolution over the uncertainty about securing gas to feed the Nabucco pipeline. Thus far, Azerbaijan is the only producer to commit gas to the project and it has promoted Nabucco as a strategic priority. Ahead of the signing ceremony, the head of SOCAR, Rovnag Abdullayev, reiterated support for Nabucco and maintained that Azerbaijan has enough reserves to supply alternative projects (Anadolu Ajansi, July 11).

    Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov expressed his readiness to export gas through Nabucco (Zaman, July 12). Representatives from Iraq, Egypt and Syria also attended the signing ceremony and pledged to pump their gas through the Nabucco once it is completed. Al-Maliki said that Iraq could start supplying 17 bcm annually to Europe by 2017 (Today’s Zaman, July 14).

    Turkish officials continuously emphasized that the project is open to other potential suppliers if they wish to join. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated Turkey’s position that Nabucco does not necessarily exclude Russia and Iran, and maintained that Qatar might also join the project.

    Although Turkey has consistently expressed its interest in integrating Iran into the project, given recent political developments, this alternative currently appears unlikely. Matthew Bryza, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, did not rule out possible Russian participation in the project, but he expressed the Obama administration’s uneasiness over any effort to include Iran (Hurriyet Daily News, July 13). Nonetheless, given Moscow’s objections to Nabucco and the lack of Russian participation in the IGA ceremony, it remains to be seen how feasible that alternative will be.

    Reinhard Mitschek, Nabucco CEO, said that in the first phase, the main suppliers will be Azerbaijan and Iraq and that Turkmen gas will be accessed in the second phase. He maintained that the market prognoses showed a greater demand from buyers than initially expected (Anadolu Ajansi, July 13).

    Turkey expects to receive many benefits from the project. The transit countries will not raise fees, but will share the tax revenues proportionate to the length of the pipeline passing through their territories. Ankara projects obtaining 60 percent of the tax revenues, amounting to 450 million Euros ($630 million) annually. Moreover, the project will bring infrastructure investments to Turkey and create new jobs (Radikal, July 11). Most importantly, Turkey hailed the project as a significant development, which reaffirms its strategic value to the West. Through closer cooperation in energy security, Ankara hopes to cement its ties with the E.U. and remove the remaining obstacles to membership. Speaking at the ceremony, Erdogan and Barroso defined this new cooperation as a strategic bond and expressed their desire to see Nabucco further bolstering Turkey-E.U. ties.

    Nonetheless, although Turkey previously sought to link the Nabucco project to E.U. accession and implied that progress might be conditional on the E.U. opening the energy chapter, this remains unresolved. Another potential area of uncertainty relates to whether Turkey secured its request for a 15 percent lift-off. The international press reported that Turkey might have dropped this demand. Asked about this ahead of the ceremony, the Energy Minister Taner Yildiz gave only vague answers. Yildiz said that Ankara was granted other guarantees to ensure its supply security. He indicated that Turkey might bid for the 50 percent of the gas allocated for the transport countries and added that talks with other governments and corporations on this subject will continue.

    Moreover, he suggested that the pipeline will be built to enable the transportation of gas in both directions between east and west, in order that Turkey can cope with any unexpected winter shortages through swapping gas (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 12). While Yildiz implicitly acknowledged that Turkey might have retreated from its position on the 15 percent issue, the head of the state-run gas company, BOTAS, ruled out that Turkey had abandoned its claim. “When the project support agreement is signed such details will be discussed there… This issue is still on the table: there is no sacrifice involved,” Saltuk Duzyol added (ANKA, July 13).

    The signing of the IGA marks a major step forward. However, such remarks, as well as the ongoing standoff in Turkish-Azeri price renegotiation talks, are indicative of the heavy bargaining that lies ahead.

    https://jamestown.org/program/nabucco-intergovernmental-agreement-signed-in-ankara/

  • Ankara Promotes Closer Regional Integration in the Middle East

    Ankara Promotes Closer Regional Integration in the Middle East

    Ankara Promotes Closer Regional Integration in the Middle East

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 133
    July 13, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
     
    On July 8, Istanbul hosted the first joint ministerial meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-Turkey strategic dialogue, which served to highlight the growing multi-dimensional ties between the country and the Middle East. Ankara has increased the frequency of bilateral meetings with the regional states, reflecting the intensification of its diplomatic activity in the Middle East, this has also witnessed the use of multilateral forums including the Arab League, GCC and the Organization of the Islamic Countries.

    Several high level meetings between Turkey and the GCC aimed at addressing regional issues or deepening economic cooperation facilitated this dialogue. The first step toward institutionalizing a multi-dimensional approach came in September 2008. After his meeting with the GCC ministers in Jeddah, the then Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said that both sides signed a memorandum of understanding to institutionalize their relations by launching the strategic dialogue process. “The establishment of the strategic dialogue is the first regular consultation process the GCC holds with third parties… [which will] bolster the deep-rooted friendship and brotherhood ties between us. We plan to advance our cooperation in the fields of politics, economics, defense, security and culture through regular high level consultations,” Babacan said. He justified the deepening Turkish involvement in the Persian Gulf region by stating that “Turkey is one of the first countries to be directly affected if instability erupts in the gulf region” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, September 3, 2008).

    The dialogue continued by holding the GCC-Turkey senior officials’ meeting in Istanbul on February 9-10, which prepared the groundwork for the latest meeting. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu co-chaired the meeting with his counterpart from Oman and the current president of the GCC ministerial council Yusuf bin Alawai bin Abdullah. The Secretary-General of the GCC Abdurrahman al Atiyyah as well as the other GCC foreign ministers also attended the forum. The visiting delegation met President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Anadolu Ajansi, July 8).

    The joint declaration issued after the meeting emphasized the parties’ determination “to anchor cooperation between them on a solid institutional basis,” evaluated the state of mutual cooperation in various areas and outlined future goals (www.mfa.gov.tr, July 8). In the economic sphere, the declaration noted that a framework agreement on cooperation was ratified and they would further explore, “the prospects of cooperation in the field of energy, including oil, gas, renewable energy and mineral resources.”

    The framework agreement was first signed in 2005 by the then foreign minister Gul (www.haber7.com, July 8). During his tenure as prime minister and earlier as foreign minister, Gul used his personal connections in the region skilfully, and played a key role in deepening Turkish cooperation with the region.

    After stressing the progress achieved in the Turkey-GCC free trade area negotiations, the declaration expressed the parties’ willingness to accelerate the process. In security affairs, both sides agreed to maintain dialogue in order to enhance military cooperation in areas of common concern, and emphasized the importance of maintaining their common position against terrorism and combating international piracy.

    A main element in the declaration focused on regional and international issues. Both sides emphasized that “all relations in the region should be based on full respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the countries of the region and the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, and friendly neighborly relations.” They exchanged opinions on regional challenges, including Iraq, the Iranian nuclear issue and Lebanon.

    Other items addressed by the declaration revealed the extent to which both sides are exploiting the platform to garner support to resolve bilateral issues. Ankara accepted the inclusion of the dispute over the three islands between Iran and the UAE. In return, the GCC supported Turkey in its effort to secure E.U. accession, as well as Ankara’s stance over the Cyprus question, the Xinjiang crisis and the Alliance of Civilizations initiative.

    The GCC countries recognize Turkey’s growing leverage in Middle Eastern politics and seek to achieve consensus with Ankara. The GCC members sympathize with Turkey’s policy of charting an independent foreign policy, and maintaining a balanced approach between Western policies in the region and the concerns of local countries on controversial issues. Indeed, Turkey and the GCC member states sought to coordinate their position on the diplomatic standoff over Iran’s nuclear program, developments within Lebanese domestic politics, the future of Iraq in the light of the American withdrawal and Palestine-Israel relations. Ankara values these ties in order to promote diplomatic support from the GCC countries in its bilateral issues and multilateral initiatives. For instance, during Turkey’s drive for U.N. Security Council membership, such connections worked to the country’s advantage.

    For its part, in addition to such shared political and strategic motivations, Turkey’s policies toward the Middle East are driven by substantial economic interests. Turkey wants to attract capital to boost its economic development. Moreover, Ankara has actively promoted forming a free trade area with the GCC, which it hopes will be accelerated through this dialogue.

    Ankara considers these flourishing ties as consistent with its new foreign policy doctrine, which emphasizes avoiding disputes with its neighbors and maintaining balanced relations with all stakeholders through multi-dimensional partnerships. Hence, Ankara wants to maintain dialogue with all the regional actors without antagonizing others. Although some had claimed that both sides might be an attempt to contain Iranian influence, Turkey and the GCC have carefully avoided giving any impression that their strategic dialogue represents an anti-Iranian axis in the region (www.asam.org.tr, September 9, 2008). Addressing this concern, Davutoglu emphasized during his press conference that this initiative was not “a new bloc or counter-bloc in the region. Rather it is a step toward deepening regional integration.” Al Atiyyah agreed saying, “the term ‘strategic’ should not irritate anyone. This strategic dialogue is a peaceful strategy to achieve further development and economic progress” (Star, July 8).
    https://jamestown.org/program/ankara-promotes-closer-regional-integration-in-the-middle-east/

  • Turkish Defense Procurement Agency Launches Modernization Programs

    Turkish Defense Procurement Agency Launches Modernization Programs

    Turkish Defense Procurement Agency Launches Modernization Programs

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 129
    July 7, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On July 1, the Defense Industry Executive Committee (SSIK) took important decisions on new investments for the modernization of the Turkish military through greater domestic participation. Defying expectations, however, the SSIK postponed a decision on the multi-billion dollar general-purpose helicopter tender, for which an intense competition had developed between the U.S. Sikorsky and Italian AgustaWestland.

    Composed of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul and the Chief of the General Staff General Ilker Basbug, the SSIK is tasked with shaping Turkey’s defense procurement policies in line with the country’s overall strategic goals. Its decisions are executed by the under-secretariat for defense industries (SSM), headed by Murad Bayar (www.ssm.gov.tr).

    Following the three-hour long SSIK meeting on July 1, Gonul released a press statement outlining the agreement on various modernization projects (www.ssm.gov.tr, July 1). He also held a meeting with the press in which he said that the projects were worth around $700 million. He stressed that almost all the projects were tendered to local contractors. He maintained that this development was a strong vindication of Turkey’s growing domestic capability to meet its military needs. “We had to buy most of those systems from abroad five or ten years ago. We should be proud of procuring such high-tech systems from domestic firms,” Gonul added (Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    The SSIK authorized SSM to launch talks with the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) as the main contractor for the avionic modernization of 165 F-16 fighters. Under the tender, estimated at around $135 million, block-40 and block-50 generation F-16’s will be upgraded to block-52 versions, while the older generation block-30 fighters will not be included in the modernization program (Radikal, July 2).

    The SSIK also decided to initiate negotiations with the Russian Oboronprom United Industrial Corporation for the depot level maintenance work for the 16 Mi-17 Russian helicopters in Turkey’s inventory and their spare parts. Turkey acquired 19 Mi-17 general purpose helicopters in the mid-1990’s which were used by the Turkish Gendarmerie forces. In a controversial decision in 2002, Ankara awarded the tender for the depot level maintenance to the Russian firm JSC Kazan. Turkey shipped the first group of helicopters to Russia in 2004, but the contractor failed to deliver the helicopters since it allegedly filed for bankruptcy. As Ankara tried to recover these helicopters and the advance payments through legal action against JSC Kazan and its subcontractors, the whole project was subsequently stalled (Bugun, March 31, 2008). Meanwhile, 3 Mi-17’s crashed due to technical problems and the remaining helicopters in the Turkish military inventory were taken out of service, after being left to decay in their hangars (Zaman, September 21, 2007). The Turkish press reported that Oboronprom also promised to return the four missing helicopters (Radikal, July 2).

    SSM will also commence talks on implementing a variety of defense projects, such as three-dimensional search radars for frigates, self-propelled guns for low altitude air defense weapons systems, and F-16 simulators (Today’s Zaman, July 3).

    SSIK was widely expected to reach a decision on this long delayed multi-billion dollar project. On December 05, 2007, the SSIK cancelled an ongoing tender for general-purpose helicopters, and “decided to start negotiations with Sikorsky and AgustaWestland on a production model based on long term cooperation” (www.ssm.gov.tr, January 10, 2008). Since then, Sikorsky’s T-70 Black Hawk and AgustaWestland’s TUHP-149 competed for the contract to acquire an initial batch of 109 multi-purpose helicopters. These were earmarked for the Turkish armed forces, national police, coast guard and the forestry ministry. This model will also be used to replace Turkey’s aging fleet of helicopters, and the winner is expected to have access to a lucrative market. In the long-run, experts estimate that the project might involve the production of up to 400 additional helicopters (Hurriyet, June 14).

    Ahead of the SSIK meeting, therefore, the competition between both contenders had markedly heightened. In order to bolster their chances, they had “proposed vast joint production opportunities favoring the indigenous Turkish industry” (Hurriyet Daily News, June 29). Since technology transfers and local participation are a major requirement of Turkey’s defense contracts, the Italian company was believed to be better placed, given the stringent U.S. regulations on exports. Indeed, such considerations had led Ankara to award the national attack helicopter project to the Italian firm last year (EDM, June 27, 2008).

    Nonetheless, Sikorsky intensified its campaign in a bid to increase the competitiveness of its offer. The Turkish press suggested that Sikorsky officials tried to reassure Ankara that the U.S. department of defense supported this project and license transfers would not become a major obstacle. Moreover, they promised to “make Turkey a service and education center [for their products] in the region” (www.cnnturk.com, June 29). During a defense fair in Istanbul in April, Steve Estill, the Vice President for Sikorsky, also made various lucrative offers to win Ankara’s favor. “If we are awarded the contract, we will guarantee to buy 200 pieces from the jointly-produced helicopters. In 20 years’ time, the project will generate $8 billion worth in industrial participation [for the Turkish economy],” Estill added (Hurriyet, April 28).

    AgustaWestland officials continuously emphasized that Turkey will have full export licenses for the general-purpose helicopters. The AgustaWestland CEO Giuseppe Orsi said: “We are not approaching Turkey to sell helicopters. We are proposing the joint design, development and sale of a line of helicopters that has a bright future… By acquiring the most advanced helicopter in its class, Turkey will be one of the pioneers in a global market that amounts to $16 billion” (Cihan, June 16).

    When asked whether any decision was made on this project, Gonul told reporters that this tender will be discussed in a separate future meeting, but declined to specify a date. As in Turkey’s other ambitious military procurement programs, as much as the economic and technical issues, political calculations are likely to play a major role in Ankara’s final decision.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-defense-procurement-agency-launches-modernization-programs/
  • Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 128
    July 6, 2009 12:48 PM Age: 4 hrs
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Turkey, Energy, Foreign Policy, Economics, Featured
    By: Saban Kardas
    Ankara has reportedly finally given the green light to the Nabucco project, and the intergovernmental agreement might be signed on July 13. When the news broke on the Russian deal with Azerbaijan (EDM, July 2), the Turkish media initially suggested it represented a lethal blow to Nabucco. Partly as a result of the Russian media’s manipulation, it was interpreted as a negative development to undermine the viability of Nabucco (www.nethaber.com, June 30).

    On July 1-2, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Moscow to meet his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. Before his departure, Davutoglu said that Turkey was unconcerned about the gas deal between Moscow and Baku, and supported enhanced cooperation between its neighbors. Davutoglu maintained that growing regional cooperation, especially in energy, will benefit everyone in the region, (Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    Energy Minister Taner Yildiz made a similar point, arguing that the different projects are not alternatives and choosing one does not necessarily mean foregoing another. Yildiz added that the Russian-Azeri agreement would not affect Turkish-Azeri talks on the re-negotiation of the price for Turkey’s gas imports from Shah Deniz-I, and the country’s future imports from Shah Deniz-II (www.iha.com.tr, July 1).

    In Moscow, Davutoglu held talks on bilateral relations as well as regional security issues. During their joint press briefing, Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey and Russia have developed close economic, commercial, cultural and political ties, while both countries could solve their differences through dialogue. Davutoglu told reporters that, though the date was not set, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin would visit Turkey in the near future. Lavrov also underlined that the approaches of the two countries toward regional and global problems overlap.

    Asked about the possibility of Turkey’s cooperation with Russia in the South Stream project, Davutoglu said: “There are no limitations and barriers on Russian-Turkish cooperation. We decided to consider all projects, including alternative energy projects. Therefore, I want to express our readiness to collaborate with Russia on South Stream or other projects in a transparent manner.” Responding to the same question, Lavrov said that if Turkey decided to join the project, the Russian side would prepare the necessary groundwork. He added that the Turkish energy minister will discuss the details with the Russian officials (Anadolu Ajansi, July 2).

    Indeed, Yildiz also visited Moscow at the same time, at the invitation of the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. As the co-chairs of the joint Turkish-Russian economic council, Yildiz and Sechin discussed bilateral economic relations. Yildiz raised issues relating to Turkish investors operating in Russia, particularly the “customs crisis.” Cooperation in energy issues occupied a large part of Yildiz’s itinerary. Energy related topics included the Russian offer to build Blue Stream II beneath the Black Sea, the current status of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant tender which was awarded to a Russian consortium, preliminary negotiations for additional gas purchases from Russia, and the South Stream project (Milliyet, July 1).

    Sechin told Yildiz that Moscow has studied the feasibility of various possible projects to diversify energy supplies to Europe. He claimed that South Stream outperforms Nabucco in terms of its efficiency and economic feasibility, and invited Turkey to join the project. In particular, he claimed that Russia has enough proven gas reserves to feed South Stream. Nonetheless, the Russian delegation did not elaborate any specific role envisaged for Turkey in South Stream, which in its current form would not cross Turkish territory.

    Yildiz repeated Ankara’s frequent argument that Nabucco and South Stream are not necessarily competitors: “This is a strategic package. It includes important projects that concern the two countries, our regions and our neighbors.” The Turkish government will evaluate all offers on the table, and choose the project that satisfies both countries’ interests, Yildiz added (Cihan, July 2).

    These developments led to speculation that Nabucco was in crisis (www.cnnturk.com, July 2). On his return to Turkey, Yildiz dismissed Russian media reports that Moscow asked Ankara to withdraw from Nabucco. Moreover, Yildiz said that the negotiations on Nabucco were well advanced and the parties were close to signing a deal, though avoiding specifying a date. He added that the talks were being carried out by the foreign ministry and prime minister’s office (Hurriyet, July 3).

    On the same day, European Commission officials announced that Turkey extended an invitation to its Nabucco partners to attend a ceremony in Ankara to sign the long-delayed intergovernmental agreement on July 13 (Anadolu Ajansi, July 3). The commission spokesman and Nabucco officials provided no further details as to whether Turkish demands were met to ensure its supply security, especially the controversial 15 percent clause, which had been stalling the negotiations (www.euobserver.com, July 3).

    Davutoglu flew from Moscow to Bucharest at the invitation of his Romanian counterpart Cristian Diaconescu, where he met the Romanian president and other officials. He discussed bilateral partnerships and regional cooperation in the Black Sea. After emphasizing the flourishing ties between the two countries, Davutoglu praised their cooperation in the context of the Nabucco project. Though he noted that Nabucco and South Stream were not mutually exclusive, Davutoglu maintained “Nabucco is a strategic project for us. This will continue to remain our main priority” (Cihan, July 3).

    Both Davutoglu and Yildiz declined to set a date but affirmed that the intergovernmental agreement will be signed soon. Sources close to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s office, however, reportedly confirmed that the government plans to hold a ceremony on July 13. If the schedule of the heads of state from the other Nabucco partners, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria and Hungary permits, then the agreement will be signed in Ankara (Hurriyet, July 4).

    What led to this turnaround in Turkey’s position and whether it secured concessions from its partners will be clarified if Ankara hosts the intergovernmental agreement next week. However, last week’s heavy diplomatic traffic, combined with Erdogan’s earlier contacts in Brussels, shows the extent to which Turkey wants to maximize its political and commercial gains by pitting the rival pipeline projects against each other.

    https://jamestown.org/program/ankara-approves-nabucco-following-high-level-visit-to-moscow/
  • Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation

    Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation

    Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 125
    June 30, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu attended the informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers on the Greek island of Corfu on June 27-28. In addition to presenting Ankara’s views on the future of the European security architecture, Davutoglu also discussed Turkey’s bilateral relations on the sidelines of the meeting. The OSCE foreign ministers initiated the “Corfu Process” to discuss concrete steps that might be taken to manage European security challenges, and prepare the way for the next ministerial meeting in December. OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyanni, outlined the new security challenges facing the members. She said that in addition to traditional security issues, new threats and challenges continuously emerge. She added that the participants “concurred that the OSCE is a natural forum to anchor [an open, sustained, wide-ranging and inclusive dialogue on security], because it is the only regional organization bringing together all states from Vancouver to Vladivostok on an equal basis” (www.osce.org, June 28).

    These declarations for improving security cooperation aside, in concrete terms, the meeting served as an important test for whether the divisions created following the Russo-Georgian war could be overcome. The NATO-Russia dialogue received a serious blow due to increased tension after the war. Since then, Russia has expected the West to accept the “new realities” in the region, particularly the independence of the breakaway Georgian regions. Moreover, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has called for a treaty to launch a new Europe-wide security structure.

    Although NATO-Russia relations thawed gradually after Obama’s election, formal military cooperation remained suspended. The NATO-Russia Council met on the margins of the OSCE’s Corfu meeting, which marked the highest level contact since the Georgian war. The outgoing NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that the parties agreed to resume military cooperation, but noted that “fundamental differences of opinion” over Georgia remained. He added that the details of the cooperation will be fleshed out through further meetings. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, however, stressed that Moscow’s decision to recognize Georgia’s two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the war is “irreversible” (www.rferl.org, June 27; www.greeknews.com, June 29).

    Davutoglu attended the OSCE discussions, and held several bilateral meetings with his counterparts and E.U. officials. Davutoglu expressed Turkey’s satisfaction with the resumption of NATO-Russia dialogue and the OSCE’s decision to develop mechanisms to deal with future security threats. He added that maintaining institutional ties is needed for the promotion of effective security cooperation (Cihan, June 29).

    Turkey’s bilateral relations with Armenia and Greece were also on Davutoglu’s agenda. Diplomatic observers speculated on whether Davutoglu would meet the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan. Although former Foreign Minister Ali Babacan met Nalbandyan several times during such multilateral meetings, Davutoglu has not held an official meeting with him since being appointed. He told reporters that he talked briefly with Nalbandyan, but his busy schedule did not allow time for an official meeting. Nonetheless, the Turkish-Armenian normalization process occupied an important part of Davutoglu’s agenda during his other contacts. He met the Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy Rey who is moderating the secret talks between Ankara and Yerevan, which resulted in the announcement of a roadmap for normalization (EDM, April 29). Rey also held a separate meeting with Nalbandyan. Since the announcement of the roadmap, however, Ankara has come under criticism for stalling the process in order to allay Baku’s concerns, and no concrete steps have since been taken towards normalization. Although this long silence raised fears that the dialogue might have prematurely ended, Swiss diplomatic sources reportedly told the Turkish daily Zaman that the parties had reached consensus, and the details of the roadmap might be announced soon (Zaman, June 29).

    Davutoglu also met his Greek counterpart Bakoyanni. Following the meeting, Davutoglu said that they had a very fruitful conversation and that the two sides agreed to “change Turkish-Greek relations from an area of risk into pursuing mutual interests through high-level contacts.” However, he added that differences of opinion between both countries remain deep rooted and cannot be resolved overnight. “It is essential that the parties appreciate each other’s positions and concerns,” he added (www.cnnturk.com, June 28). Greek media interpreted his attitude as maintaining Ankara’s stubborn position, and claimed that no common ground could be reached (Milliyet, June 29). Indeed, despite their ability to break the decades-old security dilemma, several issues continue to bedevil relations between Ankara and Athens, such as the Aegean disputes, Cyprus, concerns over illegal immigrants and the condition of minorities (EDM, June 22).

    Given its policy during the Russia-Georgia war and its flourishing ties with Russia, one might argue that Turkey is one of the few countries that wholeheartedly welcomed the resumption of NATO-Russia cooperation. Though disturbed by the Russian aggression last year, Turkey expressed openly its opposition to punitive NATO measures against Russia, and instead charted an independent course to balance its ties between the West and Moscow. This foreign policy approach even led to charges that Turkey might be drifting away from its traditional alliance commitments, which it vehemently refuted (EDM, August 27, 2008). Moreover, Turkey initiated the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform to bring a permanent solution to regional problems (EDM, September 2, 2008). Now that Russia and Turkey are seeking to mend fences, this new development removes an important source of tension in Ankara’s relations with the West.

    Moreover, in retrospect, Ankara might claim credit for its own policy of balancing and prioritizing its multidimensional security cooperation, during and in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis. Ankara’s new foreign policy approach prioritizes cooperative security to respond to traditional and non-conventional threats to regional and national security, an approach which is also shared by its military leadership (EDM, June 25). However, as the persistence of some disputes with its neighbors illustrate, it provides no magic bullet for the resolution of all disputes.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-welcomes-nato-russia-military-cooperation/
  • Can Erdogan Break the Stalemate in Turkish-E.U. Relations?

    Can Erdogan Break the Stalemate in Turkish-E.U. Relations?

    Can Erdogan Break the Stalemate in Turkish-E.U. Relations?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 124
    June 29, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 25-26, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Brussels where he was presented an award for his contribution to peace. Reflecting on his efforts to revitalize Turkey’s European Union membership project, Erdogan delivered a speech on the issue and met E.U officials. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and the chief negotiator for E.U. talks Egemen Bagis. The statements from both sides reflected the fundamental differences between Ankara and Brussels, in terms of their approaches to the causes of the stalemate in Turkish-E.U. relations and how to proceed.

    The Turkish government was severely criticized for backtracking on E.U-related domestic reforms after Brussels decided to launch the negotiations with Turkey in 2005. Last year, concerns grew that unless Ankara took drastic steps, Turkish-E.U. relations might reach deadlock. Amidst speculation that 2009 will be the “make or break” year, Erdogan sent strong signals that he was determined to accelerate the membership process. To this end, he appointed Bagis as the new chief negotiator (EDM, January 12), and visited Brussels (EDM, January 20).

    Despite various declarations of intent and high level contacts between Turkish and E.U. officials, so far, no major progress has been accomplished. On the contrary, the prospects of Turkey joining the E.U. appear to be diminishing, while the discussion is gaining ground on giving the country a special status that falls short of full membership.

    This stalemate has several related causes. On the European front, the leaders of France and Germany adopted a clear stand against Turkey’s full membership, and instead argued that it should be offered a more realistic alternative, such as a “privileged partnership” (EDM, May 13). Furthermore, during the recent European elections, representatives were elected to the European Parliament from the conservative and center-right parties. Many observers believe that, given these parties’ opposition to Turkey, the political environment in Europe has further turned against Turkey (EDM, June 10).

    In Ankara, however, the government has been preoccupied with domestic politics, as well as by pursuing controversial foreign policy initiatives. In the first quarter of the year the municipal elections and the discussions on how to tackle the global financial crisis diverted attention from the European agenda. Although the government has strived to refocus on constitutional change and accelerate the E.U. membership process, it failed largely as a result of its inability to build consensus with the opposition parties (EDM, April 1). The latest discussions on an alleged military document concerning plans to illegally change the government had significant repercussions for the E.U. membership process. It demonstrated the shortcomings of Turkish democracy, and generated an added impetus for the AKP to revitalize the E.U. reform agenda to normalize civil-military relations (EDM, June 23).

    Nonetheless, Erdogan’s statements during his recent trip show that his views on Europe remain unchanged. In that sense, the overall dynamics of this visit followed the pattern set in January. He preferred to criticize the Europeans for their mishandling of the accession process, while the latter reiterated their argument that Turkey had to reform its political system in order to comply with European norms.

    Erdogan openly criticized some member states’ efforts to stall the accession talks and questioned the sincerity of the Greek Cypriots over finding a lasting solution on the island. Commenting on the European elections, he raised his concerns about the growing populism within Europe. He expressed uneasiness with European politicians’ questioning Turkey’s future membership for short-term political gains. “We want Europeans to resist such inconsistent policies [i.e., openly questioning Turkey’s full membership]. These fluctuating [views] curb Turkey’s enthusiasm to join the E.U. We expect Europe to fulfill its promises to us. The rules cannot be changed in the middle of the game.” Erdogan also maintained that “Europe cannot keep pace with Turkey’s reform performance. We expect the E.U. to accelerate the process [i.e., more chapters should opened be for negotiation]” (Cihan, June 26).

    After his meeting with the E.U. Commissioner for Enlargement Oli Rehn, Davutoglu emphasized that the growing number of high-level visits reflected Ankara’s eagerness for membership, and that Turkey will accelerate the process. “We are aware of our responsibilities and requirements in terms of the reforms,” Davutoglu added. Rehn, however, ruled out any delay in membership talks being caused by the E.U.’s own shortcomings, and stressed that Turkey has to take “concrete” steps and maintain its commitment to reform (Hurriyet, June 26).

    The fate of the Turkish-E.U. process appears to hinge on whether the two sides can allay each other’s concerns. For Brussels two issues remain of vital importance: whether the Turkish government will implement constitution reforms and if Ankara will change its attitude toward the Greek Cypriots. Ankara’s major concerns are its perceptions that it is being treated unfairly due to some E.U. member states’ overtly anti-Turkish position, and that its achievements are unacknowledged as a result. Moreover, the slow pace of the accession talks and the growing salience of the “privileged partnership” discussions undermine Turkey’s trust in the E.U.

    However justified he might be in his criticism of the Europeans, eventually it will be up to Erdogan to break this stalemate. If he is serious about revitalizing the E.U. membership process, he needs to acknowledge that its current impasse is his own making, whether knowingly or not. He must abandon his complacency and act decisively on the Cyprus issue, similar to his revisionist foreign policy vision prior to 2005. Erdogan has to “talk to” the opposition parties and build domestic consensus to facilitate political reform. Then, he might satisfy both the E.U.’s expectations and strengthen the hands of pro-Turkey groups within the E.U, thus mitigating the intra-E.U. opposition to Turkey.

    https://jamestown.org/program/can-erdogan-break-the-stalemate-in-turkish-e-u-relations/