Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations

    Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations

    Moscow Market Crackdown Strains Turkish-Russian Trade Relations

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 144
    July 28, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    As Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin prepares to visit Turkey in early August, new items are being added to his agenda. In addition to energy projects, bilateral trade issues, caused by recent problems encountered by Turkish exporters, will occupy a large part of his itinerary. The Russian government’s crackdown on the Cherkizovsky market in Moscow in early June added a new dimension to Turkish-Russian trade issues.

    Russian anti-smuggling teams raided the Cherkizovsky market, confiscating thousands of containers for further examination, and shut it down. The charges against the traders included violations of consumer safety and sanitation codes as well as immigration rules. The incident cost countless jobs, many of whom are foreigners including Chinese, Vietnamese and Turkish traders, and created tension between Russia and China where most of the goods originated (www.russiatoday.ru, June 29; Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    Why the Russian government decided to close the Cherkizovsky market, after allowing it to flourish for twenty years, remains unclear. Prior to the crackdown on the market, Putin complained about the failure of the anti-smuggling mechanism, and signaled his readiness to strengthen the fight against smuggling (Cihan, June 29).

    The Turkish press speculated that Putin used these allegations as a pretext to punish the owner of the market, the business mogul Telman Ismailov, for his recent investments in Turkey. In May, Ismailov opened a luxurious hotel in the Turkish city of Antalya, a frequent destination for Russian tourists, which is estimated to yield $1.4 billion annually for the local economy. Putin was reportedly angered by the lavish opening party in the context of the global financial crisis. Moreover, the Turkish press suggested that Ismailov’s decision to invest in Antalya was in defiance of Russian authorities’ advice to open the hotel in Sochi, which had further upset Putin (Radikal, June 10; Yeni Safak, July 13).

    In an interview to the Turkish press, Ismailov even expressed his desire to obtain Turkish citizenship (Yeni Safak, May 25), which also negatively affected his reputation in Russia. He did not officially file an application, but changes to the Turkish citizenship code around the same time eased the conditions for citizenship on exceptional grounds, such as for foreigners investing in Turkey (Hurriyet, June 11).

    However, the Turkish press initially preferred to present the market crackdown as a measure against Ismailov, downplaying the broader context of the developments in Russia. Last week, its coverage of the crisis took a new turn. Several reports highlighted the “plight” of Turkish businessmen who were affected in the midst of this crisis caused by Russia’s internal competition. Hundreds of Turkish firms are believed to sell textile, leather and other goods, by registering them and paying the necessary fees at this market first, before they are further distributed within Russia. Turkish businessmen claimed that, due to the ongoing Russian anti-smuggling investigation, they cannot retrieve their goods from storage facilities. Many criticized Russia’s treatment of the Turkish businessmen as unfair, and compared it to the “customs crisis” between Ankara and Moscow, which has continued for more than one year (Cihan, July 25). Some Turkish businessmen, however, support these Russian actions and maintain that this was long overdue. In their view, the smugglers in the market were creating unfair competition for the traders who were operating legally (www.turkrus.com, July 27).

    The growing protests from the Turkish business community exerted pressure on the Turkish government to protest officially to Russia. Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz, who is also the co-chair of the Russian-Turkish joint economic council, described this development as an internal Russian affair, and stressed that this issue was not raised in bilateral contacts with Russia (Cihan, July 27). His Russian counterpart, Igor Sechin visited Turkey last week to hold talks with Yildiz and the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan ahead of Putin’s visit to Turkey in early August.

    Nonetheless, the State Minister responsible for Foreign Trade Zafer Caglayan issued a written statement, which described Russia as a major trading partner and noted that the under-secretariat for foreign trade had formed a commission to investigate the claims of Turkish businessmen and explore new marketplaces in Moscow. Although Caglayan recognized that the decision of the Russian authorities did not directly target Turkey, given the volume of Turkish goods in the market, he stressed that this did indirectly affect the country. However, the figures released by Caglayan contradicted those which appeared in earlier press reports. Whereas the Turkish press maintained that as many as 5,000 businesses were affected by the market crackdown, Caglayan said that only 200 were owned by Turks. Moreover, Caglayan noted that only 10 percent of the total goods sold in the market were of Turkish origin (www.ihlassondakika.com, July 27).

    Caglayan also signaled that he might raise this issue with Russian officials in order to protect the rights of the Turkish businessmen in accordance with the Russian and international rules. Moreover, he added that these problems and the “customs issue” will be on the agenda when Putin visits Turkey next month.

    A highly busy schedule awaits Putin in Turkey, most importantly over future cooperation in energy projects. Despite Ankara’s signing of the Nabucco treaty, Turkey is still pursuing joint investments with Russia in nuclear power, and other gas transportation projects. Turkish exports to Russia were damaged by the new customs regulations imposed by Russia prior to the Georgian war in August 2008. Russia and Turkey reached a deal in September 2008 to simplify customs procedures for Turkish goods, but Ankara claimed that Moscow has not complied with the agreement. The problem was not resolved during President Abdullah Gul’s and Yildiz’s visits to Moscow earlier this year. Although Russia was confirmed as Turkey’s main trading partner, its reluctance to resolve such issues remains a constant source of tension between both countries. More importantly, the timing of those “commercial” crises provides justification over the speculation that Russia is exploiting Turkey’s economic and energy dependence to punish Ankara for its political decisions.

    https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-market-crackdown-strains-turkish-russian-trade-relations/
  • Ankara’s Facilitator Role Reflects Turkey’s Broader Objectives in Iraq

    Ankara’s Facilitator Role Reflects Turkey’s Broader Objectives in Iraq

    Ankara’s Facilitator Role Reflects Turkey’s Broader Objectives in Iraq

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 143
    July 27, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Commenting on the recent controversial contacts between American diplomats and Iraqi Sunni insurgents in Turkey, Turkish government sources have confirmed that Ankara facilitated high-level talks, and maintains that the government in Baghdad was kept informed of these developments (Taraf, July 26). This highlights the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government’s earlier efforts to act as a peace broker between the conflicting parties to promote a comprehensive peace, and use its leverage in the region as an asset in its relations with the United States.

    A representative from the political council for the Iraqi resistance told al-Jazeera that they held talks with American officials in Istanbul in March and May and signed a protocol on future talks. Although the spokesperson noted that these talks did not produce any practical results, he claimed that this document showed the acknowledgement of their legitimacy by the United States. The Iraqi government issued a written statement, describing the protocol as interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, and asking for a clear explanation from Washington and Ankara (New York Times, July 23). The State Department spokesperson acknowledged the meetings were part of American efforts to bolster political reconciliation, yet added that they took place with the knowledge of Iraqi officials. CNN also quoted an anonymous administration official who recognized the signing of “a protocol document with the group about logistics for the third round of talks” (www.cnn.com, July 24).

    Although Iraqi government sources recognized such talks between American officials and Iraqi insurgents in the past, they were apparently troubled by the reported signing of a protocol. During Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s visit to the United States, this development occupied a major part of his agenda. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari expressed his disappointment over this development. “How do you expect allies and friends of the government and the political process to meet and negotiate with parties that are accused of terrorism?” he asked. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that she was informed about the talks only recently and argued that the State Department did not authorize the signing of a protocol. She gave assurances that Baghdad would be informed of such meetings in the future. In return, Maliki expressed his satisfaction with these guarantees (www.aljazeera.net, July 25).

    As it later transpired, there was indeed a protocol, which was leaked to Iraqi Shiite newspapers (www.worldbulletin.net, July 24; Vatan, July 25). The protocol was signed anonymously by representatives from the American delegation, Iraqi resistance, and the Turkish delegation. Both sides recognized Turkey’s mediation efforts in future rounds of talks in the form of facilitating communication between the American delegation and the insurgents.

    Speaking anonymously to the press, Turkish foreign ministry officials confirmed the talks had occurred, but emphasized that Turkey was playing a facilitator role and the initiative was undertaken by the American side. They expressed their surprise at the Iraqi government’s claim that they were not informed about the talks, noting that Maliki was aware of these developments before his trip to Washington (Taraf, July 26).

    Indeed, Ankara has actively worked to integrate different Iraqi factions into the legitimate political processes in order to create a viable national system. As part of this policy, Turkey has had long-running relations with the Iraqi Sunni groups. Through its diplomatic initiatives, Turkey was instrumental in convincing the Sunni groups to participate in the December 2005 legislative elections in Iraq (Bugun, December 6, 2005). Likewise, Turkey is believed to have played a key role in convincing the Sunni groups not affiliated with al-Qaeda and former Baathist elements to resolve their differences and oppose al-Qaeda’s terrorist activities (ANKA, July 19, 2007).

    Turkey’s connections with Sunni Arabs reportedly created anxiety among Shiite and Kurdish groups (Hurriyet, December 24, 2006). In the past two years, following a redefinition of Turkey’s Iraq policy, Ankara developed comprehensive ties with all Iraqi groups and formations in order to promote Turkey’s economic, energy and strategic interests in the country. The declarations issued following the meetings in February and April 2008 of the Turkish National Security Council laid the foundations of this new policy. Subsequently, Ankara first resumed dialogue with the Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq in an attempt to resolve its own problems with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) (Terrorism Monitor, December 8, 2008). Moreover, Turkey also intensified its efforts to open dialogue with Shiite groups. Turkish diplomats and government officials met with Iraqi Shiite leaders and politicians, which culminated in the visit of the Iraqi radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to Istanbul in May of this year (EDM, May 5).

    Turkey’s facilitation of these talks builds on the AKP government’s efforts to maintain dialogue with all Iraqi groups and encourage them to resolve their differences, as well as insisting on the need for the United States to communicate with all groups in Iraq. In that sense, this policy complements Ankara’s earlier initiatives to facilitate dialogue between Syria and the United States and Israel and its Arab neighbors.

    Such efforts reflect Ankara’s perceptions of Iraq, which it views as a future partner, and a gateway to the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey has developed deeper commercial and strategic ties with Iraq, as reflected in its desire to bring Baghdad into the Nabucco project. However, Ankara fears that if political reconciliation cannot be accomplished, especially in the wake of the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, the country might descend into chaos and instability, with potentially serious consequences for its own security. Therefore, Ankara wants to ensure a stable transformation of the country through a comprehensive dialogue among the various groups. As the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has expressed on numerous occasions, the key to stability in Iraq depends on strengthening the capacity of its national institutions. In Davutoglu’s view, national institutions such as the army cannot be based on factions, but need to be built on a national identity, which requires a comprehensive national reconciliation (www.dunyabulteni.net, September 22, 2008).

    https://jamestown.org/program/ankaras-facilitator-role-reflects-turkeys-broader-objectives-in-iraq/

  • Erdogan Offers Turkish Mediation in Israeli-Syrian Talks

    Erdogan Offers Turkish Mediation in Israeli-Syrian Talks

    Erdogan Offers Turkish Mediation in Israeli-Syrian Talks

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 141
    July 23, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a one-day visit to Syria, which involved discussions on Turkey’s mediator role between Israel and Syria. Erdogan and the Syrian President Bashar Assad discussed bilateral relations, regional developments and Turkey’s peacemaking role in the region. Assad requested Turkey’s mediating services and Erdogan announced Ankara’s readiness to facilitate the Israeli-Syrian talks. They also agreed to initiate a “high-level strategic council” to bolster economic, political and cultural ties. Moreover, Erdogan addressed a large audience at the University of Aleppo, where he was warmly received. He praised the normalization of ties between Ankara and Damascus and argued that there is a need to address other problems in the region. He called for the re-launching of Israeli-Syrian talks on the basis of the restoration of Syria’s rights (www.cnnturk.com, July 22).Turkish diplomats facilitated indirect talks between Syrian and Israeli delegations, which appeared to be the most viable effort in recent years. Following Israel’s offensive against Gaza in late December, its relations with both Syria and Turkey became more strained. Syria suspended talks with Israel to protest against Israel’s military action. Ankara’s growing criticism toward Tel Aviv and the severing of their bilateral ties also led to questions over Turkey’s role, as Israel’s government had reportedly lost trust in Ankara and questioned its future as an impartial peace broker (EDM, January 30). As a result, these indirect talks moderated by Turkey came to a premature end.

    Erdogan’s visit came against the background of renewed international efforts to refocus on the stalled peace process in the Middle East. The United States and European countries have intensified their work recently to bring Israel and Syria to the negotiating table, but substantial differences remain between both parties. Syria wants to start negotiations on the precondition that the Golan Heights will be returned. Assad earlier maintained that the former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was willing to return the Golan Heights in full. “Only when he declared this to Erdogan did we start the indirect talks,” Assad added. However, he blamed the breakdown in the talks on Israel’s unwillingness to commit to an agreement on the definition of borders. He also expressed his willingness to see a more proactive U.S. involvement in the issue (www.ynetnews.com, March 25).

    U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East George Mitchell visited Israel and Syria in an effort to resume peace talks. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offered to start the talks without preconditions, meaning he would not “commit in advance to a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights.” Mitchell relayed this message to Assad, who rejected it and emphasized that the talks should start from the point at which they were suspended. Asad underlined that an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights would be the basis of any future talks. Whereas Assad conveyed to Mitchell his willingness to resume indirect talks under Turkish mediation, Netanyahu reportedly opposed this proposal by pointing to Ankara’s position during the Gaza crisis (Haaretz, June 21).

    In contrast to Syria, Israel wants to avoid opening any talks based on the precondition of withdrawal. Moreover, the Israeli side constantly emphasizes that as long as Damascus does not end its support for Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel will have difficulties in commencing negotiations with Syria (Jerusalem Post, July 20).

    Fred Hof, an adviser to Mitchell, also held talks in the region last week, but reportedly he could not convince the two parties to change their positions (Hurriyet Daily News, July 22). Since that trip came on the eve of Erdogan’s visit, the Turkish press speculated that Hof was gauging the parties’ interest in Turkish mediation (Sabah, July 20). Mitchell is also scheduled to visit the region later this week (www.state.gov, July 20).

    It is difficult to establish whether Erdogan’s visit was indeed planned in accordance with American diplomatic contacts, but there is a growing convergence between Turkish and American initiatives. Since Mitchell’s visit to Turkey (EDM, March 2), the need for coordinated action between Ankara and Washington toward the Middle East has been emphasized by both sides. During his visit to Turkey, President Barack Obama also acknowledged Ankara’s role in the region and heralded a new era of cooperation between the two countries, which he called a “model partnership” (EDM, April 7).

    However, such abstract titles require more concrete definition, and Ankara perceives its mediator role as a means to revitalize its relations with Washington and give substance to the new era of partnership. Through its new openings in the Middle East, Ankara has developed important diplomatic assets to address the challenging issues in the region. As one Turkish scholar, Bulent Aras, points out, through its constructive role in the Palestine and Syria issues, Turkey can not only facilitate a solution but also make the “model partnership” a reality (Sabah, May 27).

    For Ankara, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, among other factors, depends on the resolution of Israel’s twin problems with the Palestinians and Syria, and the integration of Damascus within the international community. In Ankara’s view, given Damascus’s deep rooted connections and leverage in the region, Syria holds a key role for developing stability in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. For instance, in Ankara’s view, without resolving Israeli-Syrian relations in a manner that is agreeable to all parties, and ending the diplomatic isolation of Damascus, it will not be easy to limit the perceived influence of Iran over Damascus.

    How Israel will respond to Turkey’s renewed mediation offer remains to be seen, particularly considering that Erdogan appeared to support Damascus’s position on the restoration of Syrian sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Since his appointment as Obama’s special envoy to the region, Mitchell has held talks with Turkish officials and heard Ankara’s perspective and concerns on this issue. It will be interesting to observe if he will now exert pressure on Tel Aviv to give the Turkish mediation efforts another chance.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-offers-turkish-mediation-in-israeli-syrian-talks/
    ================================
    ONE MINUTE’E RAGMEN TURKIYE’NIN KAPISINDA
    Thursday, 23 July 2009 08:30
    ISRAIL’DEN TURKIYE’YE YENI RICA
    El Vatan Gazetesi, Turk Diplomatlarina Dayanarak “Israil’in Turkiye’den Suriye ile Gorusmelerinde Araci Rolunu Yeniden Ustlenmesini Istedigini” Yazdi.
    Israil’in Turkiye’den Suriye ile gorusmelerde araci rolunu yeniden ustlenmesini istedigi one suruldu.
    Katar’da yayimlanan El Vatan gazetesi, Turk diplomatlarina dayanarak Israil’in, Turkiye’den Suriye ile gorusmelerinde yeniden araci olmasini istedigini” yazdi.
    El Vatan, Turk diplomatik kaynaklarina dayandirdigi haberinde Basbakan Recep Tayyip Erdogan’in, Suriye-Israil gorusmelerinde yeniden aracilik yapmaya baslamasi yonunde aldigi taleplerin Kudus’ten kaynakladigini belirtti.
    Israil basinina da yansitilan haberde Erdogan’in Suriye ziyareti sirasinda Devlet Baskani Besar Esad’a Turkiye’nin yeniden aracilik yapmasi icin talepler aldigini anlattigi belirtilirken, Erdogan’in Esad’a bu yondeki mesajlarin icerigi konusunda bilgi verdigi kaydedildi.
    Bu arada ayni kaynaklarin, Erdogan’in Turkiye’nin, Gazze operasyonunun ardindan Israil ile iliskilerinde ortaya cikan krizi asmayi basardigini, Suriye ve Israil’in Ankara’nin araciligina guvenmeyi surdurdugunu soylediklerine de dikkat cekildi.
    Turk diplomatik kaynaklarinin, barisin saglanmasinin Suriye, Israil, ABD’nin yanisina Turkiye icin bir ihtiyac haline geldigini ifade ettiklerine isaret edilen haberde Ankara’nin, dort turu yapilan, Israil ile Suriye arasinda dolayli gorusmelerde dogrudan muzakerelere gecilmesi icin gerekli temeller atildigi, bu nedenle Kudus ile Sam arasinda barisa daha kolayca varilabilecegine inandigi da ifade edildi.
    Cabalarin yeniden baslanmak istemesinde diger bir faktorun de Suriye’de faaliyet gosteren buyuk Turk sirketlerinin kalici istikrara olan ihtiyaclarinin da oldugu one suruldu.
  • Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

    Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

    Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 139
    July 21, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev met his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sarksyan in Moscow on July 17 in their latest round of reconciliation talks. Turkey has closely followed the talks between the two presidents, facilitated by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, hoping that the resolution of the Karabakh issue might also facilitate Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

    The meeting was the sixth between Aliyev and Sarksyan since their first meeting in June 2008. As one of the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group, Russia accelerated its peacemaking efforts toward finding a solution to the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Medvedev hosted the two presidents in Moscow for a second time in November 2008, and since then the two leaders have met in Zurich, Prague and St. Petersburg (Trend News, July 17).

    The meeting came in the context of growing international interest. Other major actors had also expressed their support for this mechanism, hoping that it might facilitate a solution. The presidents of Russia, France and the United States issued a statement during the G8 summit in Italy the previous week, and urged all sides to step up their work toward the resolution of the remaining differences on Karabakh, on the basis of the principles outlined in the 2007 Madrid agreement (www.osce.org, July 10).

    Representatives from the other two co-chairs of the Minsk group and the OSCE representatives were also in Moscow. On July 17, the Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and his Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandyan met with the Minsk group co-chairmen Yuri Merzlyakov (Russia), Bernard Fassier (France) and Matthew Bryza (United States), as well as the OSCE Chairman’s Special Envoy Andzey Kasprzyk. The Azeri and Armenian presidents also held bilateral talks, and later the ministers as well as the co-chairs joined them. The following day, the leaders held trilateral talks with the participation of Medvedev.

    No documents were signed at the meeting and no official statement was issued. Medvedev’s spokesperson told reporters that the parties had a chance to discuss in detail the remaining issues. He added that he is optimistic that “it will be possible to settle the Karabakh conflict in the foreseeable future.” According to Armenian diplomatic sources, the presidents instructed their foreign ministers to work in close cooperation with the Minsk group co-chairs to organize a high-level meeting on Karabakh in the fall. The co-chairs of the Minsk group reiterated their support for the ongoing talks. They added that they would continue their contacts in the region. The two presidents might meet again in September, they added (Trend News, ITAR-TASS, www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 18).

    On July 20, Mammadyarov said that some progress was achieved in Moscow. He added that the parties agreed on some principles of a possible solution, but that further work was required on the precise details. He maintained that both sides were working toward a schedule for withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied Azeri territories. Once this is achieved, it will be possible to discuss other issues such as the repatriation of refugees, the rebuilding of the region and determining the status of Karabakh. However, he ruled out independence for Karabakh by saying “whatever its status, Karabakh will remain part of Azerbaijan” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 20).

    Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the head of the E.U. troika delegation visiting the region, said in Yerevan that the E.U. supported the Minsk group’s activities and was ready to assist in the implementation of an agreement. However, in implicit defiance of Mammadyarov’s statements, Nalbandyan said that the “return of any territories to Azerbaijan was not discussed in Moscow.” He also added that Armenia did not officially endorse the Madrid principles (ANKA, July 20; Trend News, July 21).

    Despite the contradictory accounts from Yerevan and Baku, it appears that the removal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azeri territories has been on the agenda for some time. Prior to the meeting in Moscow, Aliyev had explained the details of the plan to a Russian TV station (www.cnnturk.com, July 8). According to the Turkish press, the two presidents in fact discussed the specifics of Armenian withdrawal from the occupied Azeri territories, even including the deployment of international forces. Whereas, the Armenian side insisted on Russian forces, the Azeris requested Turkish troops. Turkey reportedly expressed its readiness to send troops, if the parties agreed on such a solution (Zaman, July 19). However, no official Turkish diplomatic source has corroborated this proposal.

    Turkey has been supportive of the process led by the Minsk group and Russian initiatives. Ankara reportedly plans to contribute to the initiatives of the Minsk group through a new round of contacts with Baku and Yerevan. Nonetheless, currently the earliest direct talks between Yerevan and Ankara to discuss Turkish-Armenian normalization are scheduled in September at the U.N. General Assembly (Sabah, July 20).

    After intensive diplomatic traffic between Turkey and Armenia, which resulted in the announcement of a roadmap for normalization in April, Ankara had to slow down the process to satisfy concerns in Baku. During his visit to Baku in May, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan underlined clearly that Ankara would not proceed with its Turkish-Armenian rapprochement before a solution over the Karabakh issue could be achieved. Although Ankara came under criticism for stalling its dialogue with Yerevan, diplomatic sources maintain that secret talks between the two countries are continuing (EDM, June 30).

    Commenting on these recent developments, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu denied that Turkish-Armenian normalization was stalled. He said that “[Turkish-Armenian and Azeri-Armenian] processes would affect each other positively.” Though declining to set a date on the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, he expressed his hope that positive developments might take place before the end of the year (Hurriyet Daily News, July 20).

    Erdogan took a very clear position, saying that he will maintain his support for Azerbaijan over the Karabakh dispute. It would be difficult for him to step back from this, given the enormous costs of such a move to his popularity at home and in Baku. Therefore, before taking any steps to revitalize its relations with Yerevan, Ankara hopes that the recent initiatives could produce at least partial progress between Baku and Yerevan.

    https://jamestown.org/program/aliyev-and-sarksyan-meet-in-moscow/
  • Palestinian President Abbas visits Ankara

    Palestinian President Abbas visits Ankara

    Palestinian President Abbas visits Ankara

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 138
    July 20, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On July 16-17, the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visited Turkey to hold talks on Middle East peace initiatives and discuss bilateral relations with Turkey. Abbas met President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. This came amidst speculation that he had supported the Greek Cypriot position on the Cyprus issue. On July 8-9, Abbas met the Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias. The two leaders supported each other’s stance on international issues. Citing Greek media sources, the Turkish press maintained that Abbas had expressed his support for the Greek Cypriot position on the Cyprus issue (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 9). Some Turkish media outlets interpreted this attitude as a betrayal and disrespect for Turkey’s earlier support for the Palestinian cause. “Abbas stabbed [Turkey] in the back,” one nationalist newspaper claimed (Yeni Cag, July 10).

    The Turkish foreign ministry summoned the Palestinian Ambassador, Nabil Maarouf, following such news coverage on the issue. Maarouf told Turkish officials that he had investigated the reports by contacting Abbas’ spokesperson and other Palestinian officials. Maarouf said that “Abbas did not make those statements. As a matter of fact, this issue was not even on the agenda. [Palestinians] were never involved in the Cyprus issue and will maintain this attitude” (www.mfa.gov.tr, July 10). On the same day, Maarouf issued a separate statement in which “he reiterated his remarks at the ministry, [and added that] Abbas’ visit to Cyprus was planned one year ago” (Today’s Zaman, July 13). Nonetheless, a statement issued by Christofias after meeting Abbas read: “I wish to warmly thank President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority for their firm and consistent stance in supporting the struggle of the people of Cyprus and the position of the Republic of Cyprus both within the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Arab world in general, as well as internationally” (www.mfa.gov.cy, July 9).

    Nationalist media outlets continued their criticism of Abbas, ahead of his visit (Yeni Cag, July 14). Abbas therefore tried hard to diffuse tensions in Ankara. During his joint press conference with Gul, Abbas firmly denied these claims, and described the media reports as groundless. He also responded to another allegation about himself, which was raised by Fatah sources last week. A Fatah official claimed that Abbas was involved in a conspiracy with Mossad and the CIA, which resulted in the killing of Yasser Arafat (www.israelnationalnews.com, July 14). These reports also led to an intensive debate in the Turkish media, ahead of the visit by Abbas (Milli Gazete, July 16). He reiterated his rejection of those accusations in Ankara, arguing that the document that allegedly supported those claims was circulating on Israeli websites (Hurriyet, July 18).

    Gul emphasized Turkey’s official position that the two-state solution should be the basis of the efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue. He reiterated Ankara’s support for an independent Palestinian state, which would have East Jerusalem as its capital. He called on Israel to stop building new settlements and lift the blockade to allow for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and the flow of humanitarian aid (www.tccb.gov.tr, July 17).

    In response to one question, Gul expressed Turkey’s objection to a plan suggested earlier by the E.U.’s Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana. Solana maintained that if both sides could not reach a solution within a designated period, the U.N. Security Council should endorse the two-state solution and open the way for the recognition of Palestine by the international community (Jerusalem Post, July 12). Gul noted that Turkey would not support efforts for the resolution of the problem which were not approved by all sides. Gul maintained that imposing a non-consensual solution would not prove beneficial and might be harmful. Turkey is ready to support a roadmap toward a Palestinian state, provided that it comes as a result of consensus, Gul added (www.tccb.gov.tr, July 17).

    Abbas also exchanged opinions with Davutoglu on the Middle East. They discussed specific areas in which Turkey could help the Palestinian administration. It was announced that Turkey will release part of the $150 million aid which it had pledged at the Paris conference to relieve the financial burden of the cash-strapped Palestinian authority. Abbas solicited Turkey’s help for building Palestinian state institutions and constructing infrastructure for education and health services as well as creating jobs. Toward this end, Turkey pledged to build a university hospital, a new industrial zone and a conference hall. Moreover, Turkey will help with the infrastructure of Palestinian television and support the foundation of a diplomatic academy in Palestine (Anadolu Ajansi, July 17).

    Davutoglu also emphasized another important pillar of Turkey’s policy toward the Palestine issue: a permanent and sustainable solution to the problem can only emerge as a result of a consensus between the Palestinian factions. He asked Abbas to conclude the talks on the formation of a national unity government soon, and confirmed Ankara’s support for the dialogue between Palestinian groups mediated by Egypt. Turkey and the Palestinian authority also reportedly agreed to form a joint committee to discuss developments within the peace process (www.cnnturk.com, July 18). In a related development, Egyptian diplomatic sources mediating the talks between Hamas and Fatah reportedly asked the parties to reach a consensus on a unity government by August 25. Since the talks reached deadlock because of the parties’ refusal of an earlier proposal, the Egyptian side suspended their mediation efforts (Cihan, July 19).

    Turkish officials managed to put the unpleasant news stories aside and “talk business” with Abbas, in an effort to make a contribution to achieving peace in the Middle East. Official statements demonstrated once again the underlying principles of Turkey’s approach to the Palestinian issue. In Ankara’s view, third parties should only play a facilitator role and refrain from excluding the major stakeholders. It is for these reasons that Turkey seeks to interject itself as peace broker between the Israelis and Palestinians on the one hand, and among the Palestinians on the other. Although those policies frequently lead to the criticism that Turkey is following a pro-Hamas position, Ankara appears determined to maintain dialogue with all parties and refuse any call to exclude Hamas.

    https://jamestown.org/program/palestinian-president-abbas-visits-ankara/

  • Turkey Widens its Relations with Developing Nations

    Turkey Widens its Relations with Developing Nations

    Turkey Widens its Relations with Developing Nations

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 136
    July 16, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On July 15, the Turkish President Abdullah Gul attended the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as the special guest of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, which was held in Sharm al-Sheikh. Gul became the first Turkish president to attend the NAM summit, demonstrating Turkey’s growing involvement with the developing nations as part of its multi-dimensional foreign policy approach.

    Prior to his departure for Sharm al-Sheikh, Gul told reporters that this high-level participation builds on earlier representations at the deputy prime minister and ministerial levels in recent years. Gul reiterated the founding mission of the NAM, which was to chart out an independent course of action between the opposing blocs during the Cold War. He emphasized that despite the end of the bipolar system, the movement has maintained its role in international politics by redefining its goals and undertaking new functions. Gul justified Turkey’s engagement with the NAM by referring to the new activism in Ankara’s foreign policy.

    Moreover, he highlighted Turkey’s new role as peace broker to facilitate the resolution of regional and global disputes through constructive diplomacy, which underpins Ankara’s desire to pursue such international initiatives. Gul also referred to a complementary process in Turkish foreign policy: the idea that the country should diversify its partnerships and develop new cooperative relationships in different continents, overcoming geographical barriers. He stressed that given that the NAM consists of almost 120 countries, Turkey follows its activities closely, and values its ties with this movement. In addition, he maintained that during its drive for a non-permanent U.N. Security Council seat, Turkey developed important experience in working together with diverse countries and wanted to further strengthen these ties (www.cankaya.gov.tr, July 15).

    The current global financial crisis dominated the discussions during the first day of the summit. Cuba’s President Raul Castro maintained that the crisis was caused by rich countries and that poor nations are being forced to share a heavy burden. He called for a new and just global economic system. Mubarak also said that the world faces one of the largest crises, and there is a need for a new economic and commercial order that takes into account the interests of developing nations. The U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged that developing countries are disproportionately affected by the global crisis and drew attention to the challenges posed by growing economic nationalism. He emphasized the importance of the role played by free trade to facilitate recovery. The Sudanese President Omar al Bashir (for whom the international criminal court has issued an arrest warrant) and the Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi were among the leaders who spoke at the summit. Qaddafi called for the NAM to receive a seat in the United Nations (Cihan Haber Ajansi, July 15).

    During his contacts at the NAM summit, Gul also held bilateral talks with various statesmen including Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, and his counterpart in Montenegro Filip Vujanovic, the Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Musa and the Bahrain’s Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamed Halife. Gul said that he was particularly pleased to see how Turkey was held in high esteem by other countries. The active and constructive role the country plays in the resolution of global problems explains this interest, Gul added (Cihan Haber Ajansi, June 15).

    Although it joined NATO in 1952, Turkey initially had connections with the NAM in its formative years when the movement emerged in the mid-1950’s. Turkey attended the Bandung conference in 1955, where it sided with the countries arguing against following a non-alignment policy. It came under criticism because of its pro-Western policies and in subsequent years Ankara increasingly departed from the agenda of the NAM leaders. Instead, Ankara solidified its place in the Western camp during the Cold War as the best way to ensure its own security against what it perceived as the major threat to its survival, stemming from communism. Later, when the same nations worked to create a new economic order, Turkey again sought to integrate its economy into Western institutions.

    Consequently, it has encountered several differences with the NAM in its foreign policy issues during the Cold War, especially in regard to the Cyprus issue. When these nations gained a majority in the U.N. General Assembly, they voted against Turkey, given the high profile of Cyprus within the movement. Although this approach was not pursued as aggressively by the NAM in the post-Cold War, even as late as 2003, the year before joining the E.U. and ceasing its membership of the NAM, the Greek Cypriots were able to mobilize the NAM to issue a declaration criticizing Turkey. However, Turkey’s constructive diplomacy in Cyprus in support of the Annan plan and its subsequent international diplomatic initiatives demonstrate the extent to which Turkey has been able to remove traditional sources of tension in its foreign relations and build new partnerships.