Category: Saban Kardas

  • Turks Growing More Confident over Turkey’s International Role

    Turks Growing More Confident over Turkey’s International Role

    Turks Growing More Confident over Turkey’s International Role

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 158
    August 17, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    An Ankara-based think-tank, Uluslararasi Stratejik Arastirmalar Kurumu (USAK), announced the findings of its 2009 public opinion poll on Turkish perceptions of foreign policy (www.usak.org.tr, August 14). The survey shows that the Turkish people prioritize national interests over global causes, and a visible increase in their self-confidence can be identified. Moreover, Turks continue to support E.U. accession, while the United States is still perceived as the major risk to Turkey’s security.

    The survey indicated popular support for the government’s foreign policy. 49 percent of the 1,100 respondents believe that “Turkish foreign policy is successful,” while 27 percent evaluate it as unsuccessful, and 20 percent find it fair. The level of support for Turkish foreign policy has increased by 7 percent since the last survey in 2005.

    These results might be attributed to the effect of the government’s recent foreign policy initiatives. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s pro-Palestinian policies earlier this year bolstered his popularity at home. Moreover, the government has used energy deals with the European Union and Russia as a public relations tool domestically to argue that the country has been emerging as a major energy hub and will become a global power. Such campaigns by the government might also have boosted its support.

    There is growing self-confidence among the Turkish public about the country’s international standing. In response to the question: “Do you believe many countries are contemplating dividing Turkey?” 54 percent said yes. This is a rather high figure and it largely reflects Turkish negative perceptions of foreign powers and fears of territorial dismemberment. Nonetheless, it represents a significant decline from 72 percent in 2005 and 64 percent in 2004. The resolution of Turkey’s problems with its neighbors, and the diminishing threat from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) might explain this trend toward a more confident and less skeptical perception of the outside world.

    The question: “What should be the priority of Turkish foreign policy?” produced revealing answers. A combination of military and economic security concerns proved most popular: prevention of terror attacks (13 percent), protection of Turkey’s economic interests (12 percent), preparing defense against foreign armies (10 percent), and boosting Turkish investments abroad (8 percent). These responses show that Turkish people still prioritize the advancement of “national interests” over the promotion of “global” issues. Dealing with environmental issues was at the bottom of the list. Likewise, the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad, assisting oppressed countries, or supporting Islamic causes received low levels of support (www.usak.org.tr, August 14).

    In another significant reflection of the nationalist tendencies within Turkish society, 72 percent of the respondents defined the “identity of Turkey in international affairs” as “Turkish.” 13 percent regarded Turkey as a European state, 6 percent as Muslim and 5 percent as Middle Eastern.

    On the question: “What country threatens Turkey the most?” the United States maintained its place at the top of the list (25 percent), followed by Israel (15 percent) and France (12 percent). Although the proportion of those who perceive the U.S. as the main threat has declined compared to 29 percent in 2005 and 28 percent in 2004, its place at the top of the list is revealing. Despite the rejuvenation of Turkish-American relations under the Obama administration, and their sympathy for him, the results suggest ongoing reservations toward American “policies,” and that more concrete measures might be needed to enhance these relations. Likewise, 32 of the respondents believe the United States is the country that poses the biggest threat to world peace.

    Interestingly, these results are corroborated by the conclusions of the recent Pew Global Attitudes Survey. Although the election of Obama improved the U.S. image around the world, in Turkey along with other Muslim nations, U.S. favorability ratings still remain low (PEW, July 23).

    Nonetheless, the United States climbed to fourth place on the friendly countries list, behind Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkmenistan. In 2005, the United States ranked twelfth on the same list. Moreover, on a related question, “what country would come to Turkey’s rescue, if it was confronted a major problem such as war, civil conflict or natural disaster?” most Turks expected the United States (25 percent) to assist, followed by Azerbaijan (10 percent). Although Turks feel threatened by the policies of the United States, they essentially view it as an indispensable partner capable of providing security at difficult times, unlike other “friendly” countries that are either distant or too weak to offer any meaningful help.

    One remarkable trend among the list of “threatening countries” concerns France. Whereas those who perceived France as a source of threat accounted for only 0.69 percent in 2003, that figure rose to 2.5 in 2004, and 12.9 percent in 2009. This negative attitude toward an E.U. member is indicative of Turkish people’s reactions to recent French policies. Apparently the French support for the Armenian theses, and Paris’s vocal opposition to Turkey’s E.U. accession are resented by not only the Turkish government, but also within the society (www.usak.org.tr, August 14).

    Similarly, attitudes toward the other outspoken critic of Turkey inside the EU, Germany, also support similar conclusions. Whereas, Germany was not perceived as threatening in 2005, 1.82 percent of the respondents in 2009 said Germany threatens Turkey. Conversely, on the list of friendly countries, only 0.64 percent sees Germany as a friend, which indicates a dramatic decline from 8.2 percent in 2004.

    Together, the negative reactions to France and Germany’s attempts to block Turkish accession suggest that Turks still value the E.U. membership process and the E.U. ideal. Indeed, in response to the question “where does Turkey’s future lie?” 56 percent chose the E.U., while those who preferred the Turkish or the Islamic world remained at 23.64 and 10 percent respectively. Nonetheless, Turks believe that their country’s rejection by the E.U. is due to religious and cultural differences and historical prejudices toward Turkey.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turks-growing-more-confident-over-turkeys-international-role/
  • Turkey Seeks Closer Economic and Political Integration with Iraq

    Turkey Seeks Closer Economic and Political Integration with Iraq

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 155
    August 12, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, accompanied by Zafer Caglayan, the state minister responsible for foreign trade, visited Iraq on August 11, as part of an emerging strategic dialogue between Ankara and Baghdad. Prior to departing for Baghdad, Davutoglu held a lengthy press briefing and outlined the contours of the country’s Iraq policy. He said that Iraq is going through a dynamic process and is on the verge of an important transition, and added that Turkey is willing to play a constructive role in this process. He summarized the major goal of his trip as “conveying [to the Iraqis] the principled attitude Turkey has been pursuing on Iraq’s security, peace and future, and reiterating that Turkey stands with the Iraqi people regarding any development affecting the future of Iraq” (Anadolu Ajansi, August 11).

    In Iraq, he met his counterpart Hosyar Zebari and other Iraqi officials. During the joint press briefing with Zebari, he repeated his views about Iraq and the future of the region. He emphasized that Turkey’s relations with Iraq are based on four key principles: a common security area, high-level political dialogue, economic interdependence and peaceful coexistence on the basis of their common culture. He maintained that through unhindered cooperation in various areas, the two countries will shape the future of the region together.

    Davutoglu said that as a reflection of this shared understanding, Turkey will assist Iraq regarding the provision of sufficient water from its dams on the Euphrates to meet the needs of Iraqi farmers. Zebari reiterated Iraq’s support for Turkey’s fight against terrorism. Turkey and Iraq, with the participation of the United States, have initiated a trilateral mechanism to coordinate measures against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The latest meeting in this process took place in Ankara last month (EDM, July 29). Zebari, an ethnic Kurd, pledged that the Baghdad government and the Kurdish regional administration in Northern Iraq will implement the findings of the trilateral mechanism.

    Davutoglu’s visit occurred within the context of the recently launched “High Level Strategic Cooperation Council” (HLSCC). This concept builds on the intensive diplomatic traffic, which began with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Baghdad in July 2008, and continued with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s visit to Turkey in March, and Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Baghdad in the same month and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s visit to Ankara in July.

    The HLSCC is conceived as an inter-governmental forum to be co-chaired by prime ministers. As part of this process, eight ministers responsible for different fields (foreign affairs, interior, transportation, foreign trade, energy, development, health, and environment and forestry) will maintain communication at bilateral level to develop joint projects. The ministers will meet at least three times annually, while technical delegations will meet quarterly to develop joint action plans to be finalized by the annual prime-ministerial summits (www.orsam.org.tr, August 11). During his meetings in Iraq, Davutoglu also discussed preparations for the next HLSCC, expected to be held during Erdogan’s Baghdad visit in October.

    Davutoglu believes that the flourishing ties between Turkey and Iraq under this format represent a new partnership model. The importance he places on this process reflects his view of Iraq as not only a friend and neighboring country with which Turkey shares a common destiny, but also an important strategic partner. Davutoglu explicitly acknowledges that through such channels of mutual cooperation, Ankara hopes to integrate the economies of Iraq and Turkey and create a common area of security (Anadolu Ajansi, August 11).

    Meanwhile, the Turkish government also hopes to initiate a similar process with Syria (Cihan, July 23) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (EDM, July 13), as well as promoting a larger role for the Organization of Islamic Countries in the region (EDM, May 28). Through such cooperation schemes, Davutoglu wants to bolster relations among regional countries at governmental and societal levels, starting with Iraq and Syria, and turn Mesopotamia into a prosperous region. In this regard, Davutoglu confirmed in Baghdad that Turkey plans to institutionalize a trilateral mechanism between Ankara, Baghdad and Damascus based on its earlier meetings.

    Ankara’s motivation in initiating the Turkish-Iraqi strategic dialogue process is varied, yet the most immediate concern appears to be related to the security situation in Iraq. Ankara realizes that the uncertainty surrounding the future of Iraq beyond the planned withdrawal of American forces might undermine regional stability, hence eventually posing a serious threat to Turkey’s security. The Iraqi national political system still remains fragile and if the various Iraqi groups cannot manage to form a workable political system, there is a risk that Iraq might descend into civil war. Turkey is one of the first countries that would be affected by any instability in Iraq, as demonstrated by its experiences of the aftermath of the first Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. Therefore, Davutoglu wants to engage the Iraqi factions to facilitate the formation of national institutions and ease the pain of the transition period, which, if mishandled, could destabilize the country and the entire region. Ankara’s ultimate objective in Iraq is to ensure that the country’s territorial integrity and political unity can be preserved during the transition period, so that regional peace will be maintained (EDM, July 27).

    Moreover, Turkey also has important commercial interests in Iraq, which again depend on preserving Iraq’s political stability. As Caglayan stressed, Iraq is Turkey’s fifth largest export market, and this year the bilateral trade volume is expected to reach $7 billion, making a 58 percent increase on the previous year. Turkey expects to boost the bilateral trade volume to $20 billion by 2011. Turkish firms are involved in various infrastructure projects and Iraq is a popular destination for Turkish consumer goods. Turkish contractors have already secured several multi-billion dollar projects in Iraq (Cihan, August 11). Partnership in energy is also another engine of mutual cooperation, as reflected in Maliki’s attendance at the Nabucco Summit in Ankara last month. If Iraq can successfully manage the post-invasion challenges and embark on a steady path towards economic recovery (thanks to its oil and gas revenues), it might emerge as a major market for Turkish businesses, perhaps also aiding Turkey’s own economic recovery.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-seeks-closer-economic-and-political-integration-with-iraq/
  • Turkish Economy Moves out of Freefall: Recovery Requires More Time

    Turkish Economy Moves out of Freefall: Recovery Requires More Time

    Turkish Economy Moves out of Freefall: Recovery Requires More Time

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 154
    August 11, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) released its June figures on the industrial production index, which gave mixed signals concerning the influence of the economic crisis on the Turkish economy (www.turkstat.gov.tr, Press Release, August 10). The figures show that although industrial output is still down from last year’s levels, industrial production is moving upward. The Turkish economy is no longer in the free fall, but a permanent economic recovery might not materialize soon.

    Industrial production dropped by 9.7 percent in June 2009 on a year-on-year basis, maintaining a continuous decline since the second half of 2008. After industrial production contracted by a record 23.8 percent in February, the decline in industrial output started to slow down in March, and this process has continued (EDM, June 11). As a sign of this partial recovery, in June the contraction rate dropped to single digits for the first time since November 2008. Moreover, in June industrial output increased by 7.3 percent compared to May (www.turkstat.gov.tr, August 10). This trend follows on the previous month. In May, TurkStat announced that industrial output increased by 0.8 percent compared to April (www.cnnturk.com, July 31).

    According to the main industrial groupings (MIG’s) classification, the highest decline in June compared with the previous year was in capital goods -by 29.7 percent. Production declined by 10.6 percent in manufacturing industry, 7.9 percent in mining, and 7 percent in energy.

    Economists suggest that the slowing of the decline over four consecutive months and the rise in output on a month-on-month basis has bolstered expectations that the contraction might be bottoming out. Tanil Kucuk, the Chairman of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ISO), said that although 9.7 percent is a very high rate of decline under normal conditions, “looking at the economic situation for the past year, we consider this development the lesser of two evils and find it promising” (Hurriyet Daily News, August 10).

    Experts believe that there is a visible upturn in the Turkish economy. Recently released economic figures also lend partial support to this optimistic outlook. Data released by the Central Bank showed that the current account deficit dropped 65 percent in June on a year-on-year basis. In the first half of 2009, the current account deficit was also down 75.7 percent compared to the same period last year (www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 10). According to the projections of TurkStat based on the figures from the first half of 2008, Turkey’s foreign trade deficit is likely to decrease by the end of the year and will drop to $27.2 billion (Referans, August 11). At the end of 2008, Turkey’s foreign trade balance recorded a $69.8 billion deficit (Milliyet, January 30). The exponentially growing foreign account deficit and foreign trade deficit were major concerns for the Turkish economy prior to the global financial crisis. The slowdown brought about by the crisis had a positive effect by curbing Turkey’s imports. Although exports also declined, as a result of the shrinking global economy, the Central Bank estimates that Turkey’s export volume will grow as the global economy starts to recover.

    The improvement is attributed largely to the economic recovery plans which the government launched in the first half of the year. Through several stimulus packages, the government introduced temporary tax cuts on automobiles, home appliances and housing in order to generate domestic demand and reduce the impact of the crisis on the country (EDM, March 16). The effect of the economic packages in this recovery is evident, especially in household appliances production, where there is a clear increase. The production of durable consumer goods increased by 7.2 percent and perishable consumer goods increased by 1.8 percent. However, the production decline within the automotive sector has continued (www.turkstat.gov.tr, August 10).

    Nonetheless, experts estimate that the effect of the domestic demand generated by the stimulus packages might wane after August. Therefore, they expect the contraction in the economy to persist in the third quarter of 2009, and perhaps beyond (www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 10). Therefore, though finding the recent figures promising, the representatives of industrialists had expected more than “hope” and called on the government to take additional precautions to get the country out of recession (Anadolu Ajansi, August 10).

    However, given the heavy costs of the previous packages on the treasury, the government is unlikely to pass a large-scale stimulus package. Due to the public spending ahead of the March local elections and the declining state revenues as a result of the crisis, the budget deficit has already surpassed the estimates at the beginning of the year. While the deficit is expected to reach TL 70 billion at the end of the year, the government is trying to keep it within the range of TL 60 billion. Toward this end, it has already raised some taxes and announced cuts in spending, including healthcare. Therefore, rather than introducing new packages to stimulate demand, the government is working on new measures to narrow the budget deficit (Radikal, July 23). Although tax hikes and limitations on government spending might narrow the gap, they may also curb demand and negatively affect growth.

    The Turkish economy may no longer be in free fall, but it is unclear how sustainable the recovery might prove. Since the effect of the domestic stimulus packages appears to be short-lived and the government is unlikely to initiate any new stimulus packages, the Turkish economy’s sustainable recovery depends on external demand, and hence developments within the global economy.

    Fortunately, the upward trend in the Turkish economy is accompanied by the recent news coming from the world markets. American, Chinese and other large economies also reported the positive effect of economic packages in preventing the deepening of the global recession. While signs of recovery have raised hopes that the global economic downturn might be coming to an end, it is too early to expect an expanding external demand to stimulate the Turkish economy. Therefore, it might take more time before Turkey can move out of the recession.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-economy-moves-out-of-freefall-recovery-requires-more-time/
  • Progress in Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices and Transit

    Progress in Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices and Transit

    Progress in Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices and Transit

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 153
    August 10, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Following the signing of energy cooperation agreements between Turkey and Russia, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz continued his “energy diplomacy,” by visiting Azerbaijan. Prior to departing for the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, the Azerbaijani enclave between Turkey and Armenia, on August 8 Yildiz stressed that his trip followed the agreements Turkey recently signed on both the Nabucco project and South Stream. He also added that as part of intensive energy diplomacy, he will travel to Syria this week to sign an agreement for the construction of a pipeline that will connect the Arab gas pipeline with the Turkish grid (Anadolu Ajansi, August 8).

    In Nakhchivan, Yildiz met with the President of Nakhchivan Vasif Talibov and the head of the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR, Rovnag Abdullayev. Turkey and Nakhchivan signed a memorandum of understanding on laying a pipeline from the East Anatolian city of Igdir to Nakhchivan, which will carry half a billion cubic meters (bcm) of Azeri gas annually to Nakhchivan (Cihan, August 8).

    Another major part of Yildiz’s agenda were talks between Turkey and Azerbaijan concerning the gas trade and transportation. Although the negotiations have been under way for some time, Ankara and Baku have been unable to reach an agreement on three inter-related issues: re-pricing the gas Turkey imports from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz I reserves, setting the price and volume for Turkey’s imports from the Shah Deniz II, and developing a regime for the transit of the gas through the Turkish territory (www.cnnturk.com, August 8).

    These issues have implications beyond bilateral relations between Ankara and Baku. In the context of the discussions concerning the construction of alternative pipelines carrying Caspian basin gas to European markets, there is growing interest in tapping into Azerbaijan’s resources, particularly the Shah Deniz II field, which is expected to be operational by 2016. Whereas the European companies are interested in purchasing Azeri gas to feed Nabucco, Russia has been trying to lock in the same resources through a long-term contract to supply its alternative South Stream project and to pre-empt Nabucco. Baku is looking to secure the best deal from this competition, and diversify its export routes as much as possible, which led it to export a symbolic volume of gas to Russia through a non-binding agreement in June, which seems to have paid some tactical dividends (EDM, July 17).

    Azerbaijan’s decision is considered as a “flexible tactical move” on Baku’s part (EDM, July 2). The agreement demonstrated to Ankara and its Nabucco partners that Azerbaijan was not short of options for the sale and transport of its gas. Indeed, the urgency induced by the agreement served as a wake-up call for Turkey and other European countries, which helped convince Ankara to end its stalling and open the way to sign the Nabucco inter-governmental agreement (EDM, July 6).

    Nonetheless, a second tactical goal of the Azeri-Russian agreement has yet to bear concrete results: “the $350 price offer [which Russia will pay for the Azeri gas] has set a benchmark that other importers of Azerbaijani gas may have to bid against” (EDM, July 2). Indeed, Baku’s sudden move surprised many in Ankara at the time, leading to speculation that Turkey might have to pay higher prices. Nonetheless, when asked about the impact of the Azeri-Russian deal on the Turkish-Azeri talks on re-pricing, Yildiz preferred to decouple the two processes from each other. “How much does the [Azeri-Russian agreement] affect the price? This question should be directed to Abdullayev. We had submitted our offer before the agreement with Russia, and we are still at the same position. Because, [we believe] our price offer takes into account both sides’ interests, and ensures that the project remains feasible” (www.haberturk.com, July 10).

    Ankara claimed that it offered a “fair” price to Baku, and it expected this to be accepted (EDM, June 4). Apparently Turkey proved unable to satisfy the expectations of the Azeri side, and Yildiz and Abdullayev have held several meetings to discuss this issue. Ankara’s reluctance to revise the price for Azeri gas raises suspicions that, using its geographic position as leverage, Ankara is resorting to “tactics of extortion” to maximize its benefits at Azerbaijan’s expense, which might eventually undermine the prospects for Nabucco (EDM, July 2).

    Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s ongoing talks with Turkey demonstrate its willingness to export its gas to European markets independent of Russian-controlled pipelines and its treatment of Nabucco as an overriding national interest. However, the conditions that Ankara will attach to the use of its territory for exports, including transit fees and re-export rights, are a major factor influencing Baku’s decision, which raises a larger question about the Turkish government’s position on pipeline diplomacy.

    After signing agreements on both Nabucco and South Stream, Ankara maintains that the two projects are not necessarily exclusive. Moreover, in response to charges that Turkey’s agreement with Russia, which granted South Stream the right to conduct seismic feasibility studies in the Turkish zone of the Black Sea, was a serious blow to Nabucco, Turkish officials maintain that “Turkey is not a partner in the South Stream project and only allowed the use of its territorial waters in the Black Sea, while the country is a partner state in Nabucco.” They also added that Turkey still considers Nabucco as a strategic priority (Hurriyet Daily News, August 7).

    If Turkey indeed treats Nabucco as a priority project, one area where it could tilt the balance in favor of Nabucco is to facilitate the westward flow of Azeri gas. In this way, it could cement its ties to Baku and reassure its Western partners of its commitment to Nabucco. No agreement was signed during Yildiz’s meeting, but the statements by Azeri officials signaled a promising future. Abdullayev said that, “we came close to concluding Turkey-Azerbaijan gas agreements. We can soon finalize the issue of transit prices. Gas from Shah Deniz will also come to Turkey, and will flow to Europe through Turkey. This will support the two sister nations” (www.ntvturk.com, August 8).

    https://jamestown.org/program/progress-in-turkish-azeri-talks-on-gas-prices-and-transit/
  • Turkish-Russian Grand Bargain in Energy Cooperation

    Turkish-Russian Grand Bargain in Energy Cooperation

    Turkish-Russian Grand Bargain in Energy Cooperation

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 152
    August 7, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s August 6 visit to Ankara marked a new era for “enhanced multi-dimensional partnership,” between Ankara and Moscow. Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan signed some twenty agreements covering energy, trade and other fields. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi also attended part of the talks between Erdogan and Putin, considering the involvement of Italian companies in some of these projects. The most remarkable dimension of the various joint projects concerns energy cooperation, most notably Turkey’s expression of support for Russia’s South Stream project (Anadolu Ajansi, www.cnnturk.com, www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 6).

    In oil transportation, Russia committed to participate in the planned Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline (SCP), connecting the Turkish Black Sea city of Samsun to the Mediterranean terminal Ceyhan. Turkey has solicited Russian participation in the SCP, which will bypass the congested Turkish Straits. Moscow has proven reluctant, and has instead promoted another bypass option through Burgas-Alexandroupolis between Bulgaria and Greece. Meanwhile, Turkey took further steps to make the SCP attractive for the Russian side, by linking this project with the Turkish-Israeli-Indian energy partnership (EDM, November 25, 2008).

    Erdogan expressed his pleasure with the Russian decision to commit its crude. Ankara can consider this development as its greatest success in this grand bargain, given that Turkey has worked to convert Ceyhan, where the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline also terminates, into a global energy hub. However, Putin did not rule out interest in Burgas-Alexandroupolis, and instead emphasized that the two pipelines might be complementary in meeting the growing demand for export routes. This statement raises questions about how committed Russia will be to the SCP, given that Russian companies own the majority of shares in the other Burgas-Alexandroupolis option.

    In terms of gas cooperation, Turkey will allow Russia to conduct explorations and feasibility studies in the Turkish exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, as part of Russian plans to construct South Stream. Since this move comes against the background of Turkey’s decision to sign the rival Nabucco pipeline agreement last month, it raises many questions, as to how it will affect Nabucco, which Turkey considers a “strategic priority,” as well as European energy security issues. Despite the questions surrounding its feasibility and high costs, as well as its negative implications for Nabucco, Erdogan maintained that both projects contribute to diversification efforts.

    It appears that the “grand bargain” was between the SCP and Blue Stream. Ahead of the meeting, Yuri Ushakov, the Deputy Head of the Russian Government Staff said that “Turkey made concessions in South Stream and we made concessions in SCP,” but added that he had doubts over the SCP’s feasibility (Anadolu Ajansi, August 5). A statement from Berlusconi’s office also claimed that he had helped broker a rapprochement between both countries on these two issues (Hurriyet Daily News, August 6). However, domestically, there are concerns that in this “exchange” of concessions, Turkey did not gain much. The SCP’s importance was inflated, because it was developed by business interests close to the government (www.turksam.org.tr, August 7). Another gas deal concerned Ankara’s request to renew the contract under which it purchases Russian gas through the Western pipeline via the Balkans. Erdogan announced that the contract (which expires in 2011) will be renewed for 20 years. Turkey had complained about the high prices and the leave-or-pay conditions in its gas deals with Russia. Putin said it was renewed on favorable terms to Turkey, but the contract’s details are unclear.

    Erdogan also said that they discussed the extension of Blue Stream II to transport Russian gas to Israel, Lebanon and even Cyprus. Blue Stream, running underneath the Black Sea, is the second route carrying Russian gas to Turkey. Moscow previously raised the possibility that it could use Blue Stream II in order to transport gas to Europe, but this option was rejected, since it contradicted Nabucco and Russia sought to use Turkey only as a transportation route. Now, Ankara wants to revive it as part of a North-South corridor. Based on the leaders’ statements, it appears that the existing capacity of Blue Stream might be improved and gas could be transferred to the Mediterranean through this pipeline.

    However, although Erdogan praised this development as another major success, there is no guarantee that Russia will grant “re-export rights,” which indicates that if Blue Stream II is implemented, Moscow will continue to view Turkish territory as a mere conduit for its gas, which raises the question: how will Turkey benefit from the agreement? Russian priorities also involve Turkey’s first nuclear power plant tender, which was awarded to a Russian-Turkish consortium. As the original price was too high, the tender has long awaited cabinet approval (EDM, January 26). Meanwhile, the Russian side lowered the price, and offered a compromise. Prior to Putin’s visit, it was expected that with further “bargaining,” a final deal might be reached, but apparently it failed. Nevertheless, Ankara and Moscow signed protocols regarding energy cooperation, including the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, early notification of accidents, exchange of information on facilities, and to continue talks on the nuclear tender.

    The most controversial development is perhaps Ankara’s support for South Stream. Erdogan reiterated his belief that Nabucco and South Stream are complementary, yet turned a blind eye to several Russian officials’ (including Putin) statements to the contrary. It is assumed in Ankara that growing European energy demand will accommodate both projects; but this ignores the competition between both projects over the same downstream markets. Moreover, the Turkish side fails to appreciate the challenges Russia is facing in investing in its domestic gas industry, and acts on the assumption that “Russia has enormous reserves,” while failing to realize that Russia is also planning to tap into the same upstream producers, namely Central Asian and Caspian gas, just as the Nabucco project envisages (www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 6).

    Putin also added that a consensus was reached on Russia building gas storage facilities in the Salt Lake. Taken together with the announced joint investments between Turkish and Russian firms, including Gazprom, it is unclear whether the Turkish government recognizes the consequences of these decisions. Russia has effectively used the practice of co-opting the gas infrastructure of transport and consumer countries, as part of its efforts to monopolize downstream markets. It is unclear how this penetration into the Turkish grid might affect Ankara’s future energy policies.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-russian-grand-bargain-in-energy-cooperation/
  • Davutoglu Promotes Stability in Lebanon

    Davutoglu Promotes Stability in Lebanon

    Davutoglu Promotes Stability in Lebanon

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 149
    August 4, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On July 30-31, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Lebanon, where he met the country’s leading politicians, and visited the Turkish contingent serving as part of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the local Turkish-speaking communities. Davutoglu’s agenda highlighted the contours of his new diplomacy, which utilizes Turkish cultural identity and seeks to reconnect with the “external Turks.”

    Before his departure for Lebanon, Davutoglu stated that the main purpose of his trip was to make a contribution to the stalled efforts to form a coalition government, by drawing on the close contacts Turkey enjoys with all political groups (Cihan, July 30).

    Ankara has proven eager to facilitate talks on a coalition government between the two blocs led by the prime minister designate, Saad Hariri, and an opposing group including Hezbollah. In addition to the disagreements between the two groups over a power-sharing arrangement, the meddling of other regional states prevented the formation of a government since the elections in June. Ahead of Davutoglu’s visit, it was announced that the parties had agreed on a government arrangement including the distribution of seats and would work out the technical details and distribution of portfolios (Daily Star, July 30).

    Davutoglu held talks with the Lebanese president, prime minister and other officials as well as the representatives of political parties. Afterwards he highlighted Lebanon’s key role in promoting regional stability, and Turkey’s deep interest in regional peace. He expressed his satisfaction with the “positive progress” achieved in coalition talks. “We support all efforts and plans that could bring peace to the region,” Davutoglu added (Anadolu Ajansi, July 31).

    As part of its policy of creating a peaceful neighborhood, the Turkish government has become actively involved in the resolution of regional issues. In those endeavors, the “cultural identity” of the governing Justice and Development Party has been an important asset, helping it connect with regional leaders. Already during his tenure as the chief foreign advisor to the prime minister, Davutoglu visited the region in order to facilitate talks between various groups and governments, and established an extensive network of personal and professional contacts. In Lebanon, he can claim credit for being able to talk to all groups, including the pro-Western factions and the Iranian-backed Hezbollah.

    More importantly, Davutoglu possesses an asset, perhaps unlike any previous Turkish foreign minister: he can connect with his counterparts and the people of the region by speaking their shared cultural language. One journalist accompanying him, Abdulhamit Bilici, noted: “At times [Davutoglu], when speaking to Lebanese leaders, explains a situation to them through using verses from the holy Quran as well as the Hadith. When necessary he recalls moments in Islamic history, in which his addressees are well versed” (Today’s Zaman, August 1).

    However, it remains to be seen as to whether this will assist in Ankara’s efforts to resolve the perennial conflicts in the region, where many other mediation efforts have failed. The trip also revealed another element in Davutoglu’s recent diplomacy: in his trips abroad, Davutoglu has visited Ottoman-Turkish cultural sites, and met the Turkish-speaking communities in an effort to reconnect with the once-forgotten “external Turks.”

    For instance, during his recent trip to Serbia and Montenegro, Davutoglu visited the Sandzak, a region populated by Bosnians, Serbians, Montenegrins and other groups, including Turks. Davutoglu was the first Turkish minister to visit the region after the Ottoman Empire lost it in 1912. He received a very warm welcome in the city of Novi Pazar, and sought to mediate a feud between two local Bosnian politicians who had not talked to each other for several years. Similarly, he attempted to bridge differences between two muftis (religious leaders), by attending Friday prayers in two different mosques (Milliyet, July 26).

    In Lebanon, Davutoglu visited a centuries-old Mevlevi lodge, currently undergoing restoration at Ankara’s expense, and attended a performance by whirling dervishes. He also visited a Turkmen village near Tripoli which was practically unheard of in Turkey, where he was welcomed cheerfully by the villagers. In another village he attended the opening ceremony of a Turkish-built hospital with a capacity to serve as many as 20,000 patients annually (Radikal, August 1).

    Such policies aimed at reaching out to those communities resonate well with Turkey’s policy of regaining political influence in areas once controlled by various Turkish states in Eurasia, as they can act as important bridges between Turkey and the host countries. However, in some cases, these communities are small and exert no sizeable influence in the national politics of the host nation. Therefore, these efforts play a largely symbolic role: they serve to identify with Turkey’s cultural hinterland, which is one of the pillars of Davutoglu’s foreign policy thinking.

    The Turkish-speaking communities living beyond the borders of modern Turkey were practically forgotten. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Anatolian Turks rediscovered their brethren in Eurasia, which led to closer ties between Ankara and the new nations in the post-Soviet space. Davutoglu appears determined to fulfill a “historic responsibility” by reconnecting to these smaller communities. Toward this end, Ankara increased the funds of the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), originally established in 1992 to coordinate Turkish aid programs in Eurasia, and expanded its geographical coverage. Turkey has initiated several projects to build schools, hospitals and other infrastructure serving the Turkish and host communities, which has served as an important diplomatic tool (www.tika.gov.tr).

    While “external Turks” make a positive contribution to Turkey’s foreign policy, however, they might also become a liability depending on the development of relations between the host nations and the Turkish communities. Although President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Xinjiang during his China trip was greeted positively, it did not prevent the ensuing developments in the region, when China’s violent repression of ethnic violence damaged Ankara’s diplomatic and trade relations with Beijing (EDM, July 8, 15).

    https://jamestown.org/program/davutoglu-promotes-stability-in-lebanon/