Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Patriot Missile Procurement Option Sparks Controversy in Turkey

    Patriot Missile Procurement Option Sparks Controversy in Turkey

    Patriot Missile Procurement Option Sparks Controversy in Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 170September 17, 2009

    By: Saban Kardas

    The Turkish government’s possible purchase of missile defense systems from the United States, as part of an ongoing tender, has sparked a new debate on Ankara’s new regional policies and its domestic arms procurement projects. On September 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified the U.S. Congress of a possible sale to Turkey of 13 Patriot fire units, various Patriot missiles including the advanced capability (PAC-3) missiles, and other related support equipment. Raytheon Corporation and Lockheed-Martin are the principal contractors and if they are awarded the tender, the project is estimated to cost $7.8 billion. The statement described Turkey as the major U.S. ally in the region and added that by acquiring these systems Turkey will “improve its missile defense capability, strengthen its homeland defense, and deter regional threats” (www.dsca.mil, September 9).

    Although this notice is a legal requirement for an ongoing tender, and did not mean a sale was concluded, the Turkish press widely covered this development and labeled it as one of the largest arms sales agreements in the country’s history. The extensive coverage of the story led to an impression that Ankara had already “decided to purchase” the Patriot systems.

    The Turkish media maintained that Turkey wants Patriot platforms to defend itself against Iran and linked this decision to U.S. plans to build a missile shield. Others, by contrast, claimed that the U.S. decision was sparked by a concern to thwart Turkey’s negotiations with Russia over the purchase of the new generation S-400 platforms. Moreover, the Turkish press also highlighted that the country would be returning as a major customer of U.S. weapons systems, after having granted several multi-billion projects to other countries (Turkiye, Vatan, Hurriyet, September 13; Radikal, September 14).

    To defuse such speculation, the Turkish defense ministry released a statement in which it said that the notice was part of Turkey’s ongoing international tender to acquire long-range air and missile-defense systems. Under this program, which was launched in June 2006, the under secretariat for the defense industry (SSM) issued a request for a proposal in April 2009 for the direct purchase of missile systems. The statement also underscored that in addition to the U.S. companies Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, requests for proposals were also sent to China’s Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) and Russia’s Rosoboronexport. Moreover, since possible U.S. exports will take place under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits, a separate letter of request was also sent to the U.S. administration (ANKA, September 14).

    The statement, however, did not end the debate. Critics raised two questions: from whom Turkey plans to purchase these systems and whether this multi-billion dollar project is justified given the huge financial burden involved.

    Several Turkish and international observers quoted by the Turkish press maintained that the project was developed to quell threats from Iran. They believe that despite its flourishing ties with Iran, Turkey still perceives a threat from Iran’s nuclear program. Through the missile defense system, allegedly, Turkey seeks to enhance its defensive capabilities against Iran’s medium-range Scud missiles or long-range Sahab missile program. To substantiate their arguments, they referred to a report submitted to the U.S. Congress in February 2008, (Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East), in which it was stated that the United States should acknowledge Turkey’s concerns and contribute to its development of a missile defense capability (www.superonline.com, September 13; Vatan, September 15).

    The congressional report concluded that considering Iran’s ballistic missile program has a range to strike any part of Turkish territory, combined with the prospect of eventual Iranian nuclear weapons capability, Turkey had concerns about the balance of power shifting in Iran’s favor. The report warned that if Turkey’s legitimate missile defense concerns were not met, it might opt for the development of a “Turkish bomb.” Since the U.S. plan for any future ballistic missile defense shield in Europe would not include Turkey, the report proposed that “the U.S. government should remove unnecessary obstacles to the speedy development of a missile defense system that addresses Turkey’s needs” (www.gpo.gov, February 27, 2008).

    Several Turkish experts, however, criticized the plans for the purchase of this weapons system and the designation of Iran as a source of threat. Some speculated that this project is not driven by Turkey’s real needs. Rather, it is promoted by the “weapons lobby,” which is trying to make profits by sowing seeds of distrust between Turkey and its neighbors, Iran and Russia. They add that the media reports about Turkey’s perception of Iran as a threat are merely the manipulations of these weapons lobbies. Others maintain that “if this purchase ever takes place, it will be inflammatory, especially while Turkey is trying to be a peacemaker in the region” (Today’s Zaman; www.usak.org.tr, September 15).

    Asked about how the purchase of these systems can be reconciled with the government’s policy of normalization with its neighbors, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu ruled out any specified target. “[Developing projects to meet our security needs] is not an alternative to [Turkey’s regional policies]. It does not mean that we perceive threats from any neighbors. Our policy of ‘zero problem with our neighbors’ is still intact” Davutoglu said (Cihan; ANKA, September 15).

    The second line of criticism emphasizes the financial burden of the project. Some maintain that given the economic difficulties the country is experiencing and in light of the soaring budget deficit, such spending on expensive weapons systems, which in their view does not correspond to Turkey’s real security needs, cannot be justified. The critics call for redesigning Turkey’s defense procurement policies and significant cuts on arms expenditures (Taraf, September 14; Yeni Asya, September 16). Others emphasize that this development underscores an underlying problem: the lack of democratic and parliamentary scrutiny over Turkey’s arms procurement policy, which creates an imbalance between the country’s improving relations with its neighbors and the priorities of the military establishment (Taraf, September 16).

    While improving relations with its neighbors, Turkey is also intent on hedging against future threats, reflecting the volatile nature of the region. Although as a member of the transatlantic alliance, it is a part of NATO’s security umbrella, Turkey realizes that in the past, there were problems in the activation of NATO security guarantees. Most notably, the dispatch of Patriot systems during the Gulf War (1991) and Iraq War (2003) were delayed due to intra-NATO disagreements, which fostered a legacy of developing national capabilities. Despite the domestic criticisms, the Turkish defense industry is unlikely to drop its plans to acquire missile defense systems any time soon.

    https://jamestown.org/program/patriot-missile-procurement-option-sparks-controversy-in-turkey/

  • Turkish Opposition Remains Skeptical of Government’s “Armenian Opening”

    Turkish Opposition Remains Skeptical of Government’s “Armenian Opening”

    Turkish Opposition Remains Skeptical of Government’s “Armenian Opening”

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 169

    September 16, 2009

    By: Saban Kardas

    Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met the leaders of opposition parties as part of his attempt to brief them about recent developments in Turkish foreign policy, and solicit their support for the government’s “Armenian opening.” On August 31, Turkey and Armenia announced the details of a roadmap for the normalization of bilateral relations. The parties initialed two protocols regulating the steps to be taken toward the resolution of contentious issues. To allay concerns among domestic opposition parties and in Azerbaijan, the Turkish government emphasized that the final decision would rest with parliament and that Baku’s views would be taken into account during the parliamentary approval process (EDM, September 8).

    Since accomplishing the objectives of normalization would require bold steps and political determination on the part of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, this new initiative is denoted as the “Armenian opening,” echoing the recent Kurdish opening. Given the necessity of parliamentary approval, the focus of the policy on Armenia has shifted to the domestic political processes.

    Davutoglu, at the urging of Prime Minister of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has taken time out from his heavy international diplomatic agenda to win over the opposition parties for the normalization policy. Davutoglu met Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the leaders of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Felicity Party (SP) Numan Kurtulmus and Masum Turker respectively. However, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli, who has been the most outspoken critic of the Armenian opening, refused to meet him. Earlier, Davutoglu met Parliamentary Speaker Mehmet Ali Sahin, and he is scheduled to have additional meetings with the leaders of parties that received at least 1 percent of the popular vote in the July 2007 parliamentary elections. He also met the opposition leaders in May, following his appointment as foreign minister (Today’s Zaman, September 16).

    One common theme emerging from Davutoglu’s contacts is that the opposition leaders unequivocally state that any progress in Turkish-Armenian relations needs to be contingent upon the protection of Azerbaijan’s concerns over Karabakh. In response, Davutoglu sought to reassure them that normalization with Armenia would not come at the expense of harming ties with Azerbaijan, and that Baku was being informed about the progress of Turkish-Armenian talks (Anadolu Ajansi, September 15).

    Another common theme is the skepticism of the opposition parties toward the contents and the form of the Armenian opening, especially the involvement of foreign actors. They continue to view the opening as an agenda imposed upon Turkey by external forces, and believe that the main benefactor of the process will be Armenia.

    For instance, SP’s Kurtulmus maintained that according to popular perceptions, the process seemed to be driven by Armenia, and that Turkey appeared to be only a passive player. He asked Davutoglu to correct this image. He also expressed his reservations about the committee of historians, and maintained that the committee would be unlikely to reach a decision disproving Armenian genocide claims. Kurtulmus also criticized the government’s recognition of Switzerland as the mediator between Turkey and Armenia, arguing that as a country that punishes the denial of the “Armenian genocide” claims, Switzerland could not be considered as impartial in this issue. DSP’s Turker, also shared similar concerns (Cihan, September 15).

    The main opposition leader Baykal raised the most vocal criticisms. During the joint press brief after meeting with Davutoglu, Baykal noted that the CHP considered foreign policy issues as “state policies” that require a national consensus. He added that his party’s decision to meet Davutoglu was meant to make a contribution to state policy, and should not be interpreted as representing “support” for the government’s agenda. He stated his disappointment with the government’s overall approach to this issue, and reiterated his earlier position that the normalization agenda is imposed upon Turkey. “There is a process and a roadmap underway which is beyond the knowledge of the opposition parties. Now, through these contacts, the government is not asking ‘Let us discuss Turkey’s interests, and formulate [the policies] together.’ The government is saying to us. ‘We are given a roadmap. We decided to implement it; come, help us realize this roadmap.’ This is not an effort to formulate a policy. This is an effort to find support for a program that is already formed,” Baykal objected (ANKA, September 15).

    Baykal also characterized the two protocols as “traps.” He argued that although the protocols satisfy Armenian concerns by laying out the details of Turkey’s re-opening of the border, they fall short of meeting Turkish demands regarding Armenia’s recognition of the Kars Treaty on defining the Turkish-Armenian border, or the renunciation of its policy of having its genocide claims recognized worldwide, and ending its occupation of Karabakh. He expressed concern that the protocols offered no safeguards against the possibility that after Turkey opens the border, Armenia might later renege on its promises. Therefore, he demanded that the government must refuse to sign the protocols. Baykal also speculated that the government would sign the protocols with Armenia on October 13 (Hurriyet, September 16).

    Both the Turkish and Armenian governments have to tackle domestic opposition, in addition to the dilemmas of overcoming differences of opinion and building trust in the bilateral talks. Indeed, the Turkish-Armenian declarations recognize the challenges of obtaining broad-based social and political support, and give the parties six weeks to engage in domestic discussions before the protocols are forwarded to parliaments for final ratification.

    Given the strength of nationalistic sentiments in Turkey, one challenge for the AKP government has been to present the Armenian opening as a “national” policy, rather than a parochial agenda promoted by the AKP, or a project externally imposed upon Turkey. The six-week deadline has provided an impetus for each government to stimulate debate on the issue, but as the Turkish case suggests this deadline is too unrealistic to facilitate any meaningful and genuine democratic deliberation on a dispute mired in historical memories and current geopolitical conflicts. Davutoglu’s meetings further show that a new conflict is looming over the AKP’s foreign policy when the Armenian opening comes before parliament.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-opposition-remains-skeptical-of-governments-armenian-opening/

  • Davutoglu’s Visit to Iran Highlights Ankara’s Regional Diplomacy

    Davutoglu’s Visit to Iran Highlights Ankara’s Regional Diplomacy

    Davutoglu’s Visit to Iran Highlights Ankara’s Regional Diplomacy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 167
    September 14, 2009 04:19 PM Age: 1 days
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu paid an official visit to Iran on September 12-13. He met the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani and the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. Following his meeting with Mottaki, Davutoglu and his counterpart stressed the importance they attach to bilateral relations, as well as regional cooperation. Davutoglu noted that the two countries shared deep-rooted historical ties and their neighborly relations are based on the principle of refraining from interfering in each other’s affairs. He outlined many areas where they explored boosting bilateral relations, ranging from economic cooperation to security. Referring to this multi-dimensional partnership, Mottaki described Turkish-Iranian relations as “strategic” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, Anadolu Ajansi, September 12).

    The foreign ministers emphasized that given the centrality of the threat of terrorism facing both countries, they will continue their collaboration in combating this phenomenon, referring to their joint efforts against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK). Davutoglu also highlighted the flourishing economic activity between the two countries, noting that the bilateral trade volume has reached $11 billion annually, despite the global economic crisis. In addition to discussing cooperation in various areas, the two main items on Davutoglu’s agenda were the nuclear issue and energy cooperation. Davutoglu’s meeting came in the wake of the announcement by Washington that it will consider holding talks with Tehran, despite the latter’s reluctance to discuss its nuclear program. Iran forwarded a proposal to the major powers expressing its readiness to discuss global nuclear disarmament, as well as other international issues. Although the White House did not find Iran’s proposals as responsive to its concerns about its nuclear program, it nonetheless showed interest in holding direct talks with Iran (Today’s Zaman, September 14).

    Davutoglu reiterated Turkey’s position that the resolution of the nuclear problem should be based on mutual respect. He also conveyed to Jalili Turkey’s readiness to host negotiations between Iran and Western countries (Anadolu Ajansi, September 13). However, this is not the first time that Turkey has proposed to mediate between Iran and the West, and its previous offers failed to produce any practical results. Reportedly, both Washington and Tehran were reluctant to see Ankara play such a role (EDM, March 10). Following the press briefing with Davutoglu, Mottaki thanked his Turkish counterpart for Turkey’s support for Iran’s right to obtain nuclear energy (Anadolu Ajansi, September 12). Although Ankara remains eager to act as a mediator, what leverage it may hold to convince Tehran to compromise on the Western demands remains to be seen.

    Energy was the other key issue on the agenda. Turkey has a major incentive to help solve the diplomatic problems bedeviling Iran’s relations with the West and bring Iran into the orbit of the European energy security discussions, a policy which is also supported by many European countries.

    Turkey seeks to deepen its energy partnership with Iran, especially considering its efforts to become a major energy hub. Indeed, one of the biggest obstacles before the Nabucco project, which Turkey considers as a strategic priority, is finding suppliers, Iran is the most likely alternative, since it possesses the second largest gas reserves in the world. Turkey indeed has been eager to act as a bridge connecting Iranian gas to the European grid through Nabucco. Although Ankara signed a major energy cooperation deal with Iran in 2007, it had to suspend those plans due to American objections. U.S. sanctions toward Iran prevent the development of the Iranian gas sector and the export of its gas to Western markets. Since its fields are underdeveloped and it needs immense transportation infrastructure, Iran has not emerged as a major player in gas markets, and even has been forced to import gas from Turkmenistan to meet its domestic demand. Prior to the signing of the Nabucco inter-governmental agreement in Ankara, Turkish officials, including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan emphasized their willingness to tap into Iranian gas, but U.S. officials reiterated their objection to the Iranian option (EDM, July 14). However, Davutoglu said that Turkey would work to help Iran export its gas to European markets.

    Turkey’s Iran policy resonates well with the recent course of its regional diplomacy. Ankara has fostered closer regional dialogue with Iraq, Syria and other Arab countries in order to create a peaceful neighborhood and develop closer economic partnerships, including energy projects (EDM, August 12). Bringing Iran into the same circle is definitely a prime motive driving Ankara’s policies toward Tehran.

    Davutoglu, as the architect of this policy, appreciates the central role that Iran plays in the region and expresses his aversion to any instability that might be caused by the ongoing diplomatic problems, as well as the developments in Iranian domestic politics. This concern, however, results in a status quo policy of supporting the Iranian government. As reflected in Ankara’s acquiescent attitude during the Iranian regime’s harsh crackdown on the protestors following the disputed presidential elections, Turkey was criticized for not being sensitive to domestic developments in Iranian politics (EDM, June 18).

    Another underlying problem in Turkey’s Iran policy concerns the differing interpretations both parties attach to “regional cooperation.” Iran views regional cooperation as a way to limit the involvement of the West and the United States in regional affairs, as well as to exclude Israel. Turkey, in contrast, values its ties to the West and defines its regional policies in complementary terms. Indeed, such differences of opinion were apparent in Ahmadinejad’s statements following his meeting with Davutoglu, which contained strong anti-Western rhetoric. Ahmadinejad claimed that the improvement of Turkish-Iranian relations is an obligation “in a process whereby great and oppressor powers are in decline” (Anadolu Ajansi, September 12).

    A major test for Turkey’s regional diplomacy might perhaps stem from its ability to foster closer cooperation among its neighbors, while also ensuring that it does not present an anti-Western platform.

    https://jamestown.org/program/davutoglus-visit-to-iran-highlights-ankaras-regional-diplomacy/
  • Turkish-Abkhazia Ties Test Turkey’s Strategic Partnership with Georgia

    Turkish-Abkhazia Ties Test Turkey’s Strategic Partnership with Georgia

    Turkish-Abkhazia Ties Test Turkey’s Strategic Partnership with Georgia

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 164

    September 9, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The plight of the Turkish captain of a tanker intercepted by Georgian authorities while carrying goods en route to Abkhazia highlighted the dilemmas of Turkey’s position on the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

    Since the war last August, Georgia has blockaded the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has intercepted various ships carrying Turkish goods. In the latest incident, a vessel transporting fuel to Abkhazia was captured by the Georgian coastguard on August 17. Following the seizure, the Georgian authorities took the captains, one Turkish and the other Azeri, into custody. On August 31, a Georgian court sentenced them to 24 years in prison. The ship was confiscated and brought to Batumi port to be sold in an auction (Today’s Zaman, September 6).

    Growing concerns over the fate of the Turkish captain generated domestic pressure on the government to free him, which prompted the involvement of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. The Turkish foreign ministry announced that Davutoglu would visit Tbilisi and that the government would do everything possible to secure the release of the captain. Meanwhile, on September 4, the shipping company paid a fee, and it was announced that an appeals court would reconsider the case. Davutoglu visited Tbilisi on September 7-8, and a Georgian court released the Turkish captain on September 8 (Anadolu Ajansi, September 8).

    The case highlighted tensions caused by similar practices by the Georgian authorities. Georgia has been seizing Turkish ships destined for Abkhazia, and in the past decade over sixty ships have been captured. Even prior to the latest crisis, representatives of Turkish exporters and Caucasian diaspora groups in Turkey raised concerns that the Turkish government was too complicit toward the “bullying” of the Georgian authorities.

    Ahmet Hamdi Gurdogan, the head of the exporters association in the Black Sea region, advanced several criticisms of Tbilisi (www.tekilhaber.com, August 25). First, he maintained that although Georgia claims to block all the trade routes to Abkhazia, Georgian coastal patrols cannot do anything against vessels carrying the Russian flag en route to Abkhazia. In a related charge, he argued that the Georgian patrol boats captured the Turkish ships in international waters, even in some cases immediately after they leave Turkish territorial waters. Therefore, Turkish exporters expect the government to flex its muscles, yet considering that Turkey supports Georgia’s territorial integrity and the Georgian embargo in place, the government might do little to stop the interception of Turkish ships in Georgian waters. Nonetheless, during his press briefing on the recent case, a spokesman for the foreign ministry expressed Ankara’s concern that some of the seizures might have taken place in international waters, and Georgia’s actions may violate international maritime laws (www.denizhaber.com, September 2).

    Turkish exporters also complain that the Georgians have turned such practices into an undeclared “piracy” in the Black Sea, since the Georgian authorities allegedly sell the vessels in auctions and demand large sums of money to release the crew of the captured ships. They also claim that in some cases, ships carrying humanitarian goods are also intercepted.

    The representatives of the Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey, also utilize similar arguments, and urge the Turkish government to lift its embargo. Turkey still supports the economic sanctions imposed against Abkhazia by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Irfan Argun the Speaker of Caucasus-Abkhazia Solidarity Committee, for instance, maintained that the sanctions are creating a major humanitarian crisis in Abkhazia and that Turkey should end its policy of supporting the Georgian embargo and play a larger role in the resolution of the issue of Abkhazia (www.ajanskafkas.com, August 22). Around 500,000 Turkish citizens consider themselves to be of Abkhazian origin.

    At a more fundamental level, this crisis reflects the underlying dilemmas in Turkish policy on the Georgian-Abkhazian dispute. In an analysis published by the Ankara-based think tank close to the foreign ministry, the Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies, it was maintained that Ankara could no longer ignore the new reality in the region and act on the presumption that there was no problem relating to Abkhazia (www.orsam.org.tr, September 1). This line of thinking suggests that Ankara might need to redefine its policies toward the region. It justifies a redefinition with reference to the fact that if the present Georgian embargo continues, it might result in a situation whereby Abkhazia is forced to integrate itself into the Russian orbit both politically and economically. The best way to reverse such a trend, according to this view, would be to end the blockade of Abkhazia.

    Reflecting the demands of the Abkhazian diaspora, deputies from Republican People’s Party submitted a question to parliament. They lambasted the government’s silence and requested that the prime minister explain why the government still insisted on implementing the embargo (www.kafkasfederasyonu.org, August 22).

    Meanwhile, the Georgian attempts to implement the blockade have raised tension in the Black Sea region. The Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh described the activities of Georgian ships in “Abkhazian waters” as piracy, and threatened to destroy them if Georgia did not cease its military activities (Anadolu Ajansi, September 2). A Russian foreign ministry spokesman warned Georgia about its practice of seizing commercial vessels, and said “attempts to enforce a sea blockade on Abkhazia could lead to a serious armed incident” (Anadolu Ajansi, September 3).

    Against this background, Davutoglu visited Tbilisi, where he met his Georgian counterpart Nikoloz Gilauri and President Mikheil Saakashvili. He held a lengthy meeting with Saakashvili about the release of the captain. Davutoglu described Georgia as a “strategic partner,” and reiterated Turkey’s support for its territorial integrity, and for Tbilisi’s NATO membership bid. Davutoglu said “We know very well that without ensuring Georgia’s peace and stability, it will be difficult to meet these goals in the South Caucasus” (Cihan, September 7).

    In addition to the necessity of responding to the demands made by domestic pressure groups, the risk of Georgian-Abkhazian tensions escalating into a destabilizing regional conflict energizes Ankara to address Georgian-Abkhazian problems. The Turkish government values its partnership with Georgia, but it is also under pressure to realign its policies in light of the geopolitical transformations in the region. It will represent a major challenge for Turkish diplomacy in the days ahead to engage Abkhazia without severing ties with Tbilisi.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-abkhazia-ties-test-turkeys-strategic-partnership-with-georgia/
  • Turkish Press Reacts to Turkish-Armenian Normalization

    Turkish Press Reacts to Turkish-Armenian Normalization

    Turkish Press Reacts to Turkish-Armenian Normalization

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 163
    September 8, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
     
    On August 31 a joint statement issued by Turkey and Armenia announced that both had agreed to start talks on the establishment of diplomatic ties and the development of bilateral relations. The parties initialed two protocols to regulate these issues, and the consultations on these will be finalized within six weeks before being forwarded to their national parliaments for ratification (www.mfa.gov.tr, August 31). The announcement generated a heated debate on the future of Turkish-Armenian relations as well as its implications for Azerbaijan and the involvement of other international actors.

    The content of the protocols show that the parties built on the progress they had achieved by April, which was interrupted by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s intervention to allay the concerns of Azerbaijan. Following intense bilateral contacts, secret diplomacy and pressure from the United States and European countries, Turkey and Armenia announced a roadmap for normalization in April, the contents of which remained undisclosed. Due to mounting domestic opposition and protests from Azerbaijan, Erdogan reiterated unequivocally that the progress of Turkish-Armenian relations would be contingent upon Armenia’s constructive attitude in its dispute with Azerbaijan. To relieve Azeri concerns, Erdogan emphasized that Turkey would not proceed with normalization, without an end to the Armenian occupation of Karabakh (EDM, May 14). Although there were concerns that the normalization process might have come to a premature end, the parties maintained their secret dialogue facilitated by Switzerland (EDM, June 30).

    By reiterating their commitment to the peaceful resolution of regional disputes, the parties implicitly recognize the Karabakh issue, but the protocols make no mention of it, nor set it as a precondition for opening the Turkish-Armenian border. In taking this step despite this “missing element,” the Turkish government again raised concerns as to whether it might accelerate the rapprochement with Armenia by decoupling it from the Karabakh issue. Consequently, opposition both domestically and in Azerbaijan expressed discomfort with these developments. In response, Erdogan reconnected the two processes politically, by arguing that the ratification of the protocols would depend on the resolution of Karabakh issue, reflecting Ankara’s concern to keep Baku on board (Vatan, September 2).

    The leverage Azerbaijan exerts over Turkish foreign policy led to different interpretations from the Turkish press. The nationalist media continued to express their unconditional support for Azerbaijan’s position and criticized the government’s recent initiatives (Ortadogu, September 3)

    Many mainstream commentators, however, maintain that returning to the status quo ante might be difficult, and that instead of seeking to restore Karabakh through military means, Baku should focus on diplomatic measures to free the occupied Azeri territories, and in return grant greater autonomy to the area and open a corridor between Armenia and Karabakh (Milliyet, September 3). Although Erdogan might ideally prefer a maximalist position on the return of Karabakh, other actors within the Turkish government also seem to be ready to settle for such an arrangement recognizing the new reality in the region. In fact, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and President Abdullah Gul are interested in seeing the process through and opening the border by the end of the year (Radikal, September 2), despite Erdogan’s occasional nationalistic outbursts.

    Other commentators view the rapprochement as a partly American project and believe that both Turkey and Azerbaijan are urged, if not pressured, by the Obama administration to solve their problems with Armenia. They even suggest that the mediation services provided by Swiss diplomats might only represent a cover for American facilitation between the Turkish and Armenian delegations, which is partly shared by the opposition parties, mainly the Republican People’s Party (Milliyet, September 4; Hurriyet, September 2). The pro-government press, in contrast, challenges these arguments and maintains that searching for foreign actors behind such initiatives reflects a problematic attitude on the part of the Turkish opposition. It presents these recent developments as an achievement of the AKP government and treats them as affirmation of Turkey’s expanding role in regional diplomacy (Star, September 4).

    Explaining the normalization with reference to the involvement of outside actors inevitably raises questions about the motivations of “outsiders.” At this juncture, the role of energy issues is emphasized by the Turkish media. There is a perception that the process is promoted by the West as part of its energy policies. They speculate that Turkish-Armenian normalization is promoted in order that Armenia might emerge as an alternative route to Georgia for the future transportation of Caspian basin resources (Milliyet, September 3).

    Such analyses inevitably ignore the issue of the Russian position. There is already a process underway between Azerbaijan and Armenia toward the resolution of the Karabakh dispute, facilitated by Russia and supported by the United States. Although the Russian side claims that it is playing a constructive role, the Turkish media maintains some skepticism toward Moscow’s intentions. There are media reports maintaining that Russian intelligence found out about the secret talks between Ankara and Yerevan and passed this information to Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, which led him to distance himself from Turkey in April (Milliyet, September 3). If such reports are correct, they might indicate Russian efforts to sow seeds of distrust between Baku and Ankara, and undermine policies to integrate Yerevan into a Western orbit.

    It is unclear whether Aliyev was aware in advance of the signing of the recent protocols, but Ankara apparently made efforts to inform Baku. Indeed, it has been a growing concern for Ankara to comfort Baku about the secret talks with Yerevan, and regain Azeri confidence since the bitter episode in April. A few days before the recent announcement to sign the protocols, Erdogan spoke to Aliyev on the telephone and sent two special envoys to Baku to brief him on the progress in Turkish-Armenian talks (Zaman, August 28). Azerbaijan’s Ambassador in Ankara Zakir Hashimov said that Davutoglu reassured his Azeri counterpart that the border would not be opened before the resolution of the Karabakh issue (Hurriyet Daily News, September 6).

    In the days ahead, a new domestic and foreign policy challenge will confront the AKP government, as it seeks to refine the details of the normalization with Armenia. A breakthrough in Azeri-Armenian talks might untie the knot, but it remains to be seen whether the international and regional pressures on Baku and Yerevan will produce such an outcome.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-press-reacts-to-turkish-armenian-normalization/
  • Turkey Seeks Closer Energy Partnership and LNG Contract with Qatar

    Turkey Seeks Closer Energy Partnership and LNG Contract with Qatar

    Turkey Seeks Closer Energy Partnership and LNG Contract with Qatar

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 158
    August 18, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, paid a two day visit to Turkey on August 17-18, as the guest of Turkish President Abdullah Gul. They both signed several agreements aimed at improving bilateral relations, including promoting closer cooperation on energy issues.

    On August 17, Gul and al-Thani met in Istanbul. The Turkish and Qatari delegations held working meetings during the day, discussing regional issues as well as bilateral cooperation. The first bilateral agreement signed involved a protocol concerning regulating labor issues between the two countries. The second agreement was inked between Turkish Radio and Television Corporation and Qatar’s State Television to enhance broadcasting cooperation. The parties also signed a memorandum of understanding on waiving visa requirements for their citizens (Cihan, August 17).

    During the press briefing, Gul emphasized that the high-level delegation accompanying al-Thani indicated the importance that Qatar attaches to Turkey. He noted that economic cooperation was the most important aspect of bilateral ties and highlighted Qatar’s help in facilitating Turkey’s relations with other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Gul also referred to Qatar’s constructive role in regional affairs and praised his counterpart’s efforts to mediate over regional problems. He reiterated that Turkey and Qatar held similar positions on many issues, and that they had worked together to promote regional peace. Al-Thani also highlighted their growing bilateral ties and expressed his determination to further develop this relationship. Moreover, he acknowledged Turkey’s role in regional policies, and his gratitude toward Ankara for its position on the Palestinian issue (www.tcbb.gov.tr, August 17).

    The annual trade volume between both countries remains low at $1.5 billion. However, Qatar is an important destination for Turkish contractors and its companies have undertaken multi-billion dollar projects there. Realizing the great potential created by Qatar’s infrastructure investments and its expanding economy, the Turkish private sector wants to further penetrate this market. The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO) recently announced that as part of their “Gulf Expansion” project, they will hold a major Turkish export fair in Qatar in September (Hurriyet Daily News, July 26). Turkey is also eager to attract investments from Qatar to boost its own economic development, as part of its broader attempt to turn the country into a major destination for Persian Gulf capital (EDM, February 5).

    Reflecting these interests, on the second day of his trip Gul and al-Thani attended a working breakfast of the Turkish-Qatar Business Council, hosted by Turkey’s Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK). Gul and the AKP government have proven instrumental in developing closer ties with Qatar and have promoted the flow of Qatari capital in Turkey, thanks partly to their personal ties. However, some of these business transactions were the subject of domestic political discussions. The joint-ventures between Qatari firms and businessmen close to the Turkish government continue to be a major source of criticism (Milliyet, May 1, 2008).

    The parties announced that they will set up a Turkey-Qatar Joint Energy Working Group. Gul said that they discussed the feasibility of gas pipelines, storage facilities and refineries, as well as meeting Turkey’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) needs. Gul invited Qatar to invest in the storage facilities in Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, which is the terminus of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the planned Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline. Ankara has actively promoted Ceyhan as a global energy terminal, and al-Thani responded to this offer with great enthusiasm (Vatan, August 18).

    Al-Thani also added that he hopes to see a “pipeline” running from Qatar to Turkey, and that the feasibility work on that project will continue. It was unclear, however, whether it would be a natural gas or crude pipeline, and what route it would follow.

    Prior to the visit, Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz had publicized the “natural gas” dimension of the bilateral meeting. Yildiz said that talks were underway with Qatar concerning importing LNG. Yildiz noted that his contacts with Qatar are part of a broader Turkish effort to diversify its energy suppliers and supply routes. He said that if the parties could reach a consensus, Turkey might import around 4 billion cubic meters (bcm) of LNG annually from Qatar (Anadolu Ajansi, August 16). He also added that he hoped to sign a declaration on LNG imports during the visit of the Qatari delegation, yet following the meetings no official announcement was made to that effect.

    Qatar is believed to possess the third largest gas reserves in the world, behind Russia and Iran. It is also a leading supplier of LNG and Turkey wants to develop cooperation with Qatar in natural gas projects. In July Qatar was represented during the signing ceremony of the E.U.-backed Nabucco pipeline and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan maintained that Nabucco might tap into Qatar’s gas in the future (EDM, July 14).

    Ankara has attempted to import Qatari LNG for its domestic needs for some time. During Gul’s February 2008 and Erdogan’s April 2008 visits to Qatar, energy was an important item on their agendas. They raised the issue of LNG imports, and the negotiations on this have continued since (Hurriyet, February 5, 2008; ANKA, April 15, 2008).

    As a country heavily dependent on importing natural gas, Turkey meets its needs primarily through pipelines from Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan. It also has contracts with Algeria and Nigeria to import 4 bcm and 1.2 bcm of LNG annually, respectively. However, during the heavier winters, or when there are supply disruptions caused by the problems mainly encountered with Iran, Turkey is forced to buy LNG on spot markets. Since it lacks major natural gas storage facilities, such seasonal fluctuations result in the payment of higher sums for energy bills (Radikal, August 17). Therefore, Ankara is considering expanding the country’s storage capacity and importing larger amounts of LNG through long-term contracts, which might help it avoid such problems in the future.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-seeks-closer-energy-partnership-and-lng-contract-with-qatar/