Turkish Forum

Category: Saban Kardas

  • Turkey Is Drawn into Iraqi Affairs

    Turkey Is Drawn into Iraqi Affairs

    Turkey Is Drawn into Iraqi Affairs

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 84
    May 3, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    The developments in Iraqi domestic politics, coupled with their regional implications, continue to drag Turkey deeper into Middle Eastern affairs, while its involvement in the Syrian conflict already occupies a large part of Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. The ongoing power struggle between Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his opponents on the one hand, and the complicated relationship between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq on the other have taken an interesting turn, creating reverberations for Turkey’s regional policies.

    In the wake of the withdrawal of US forces, Maliki has moved to consolidate his power, threatening to undermine the delicate balance between various sectarian and ethnic groups. Maliki, who assumed his current post following a 2010 power sharing agreement, has failed to work toward national reconciliation. On the contrary, in this already fractured country, he has even undermined the governing coalition and also put Iraq on a collision course. His campaign against Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who took refuge in Northern Iraq fearing for his life, crystallized the power struggle. The dispute grew into an impasse, with the increasingly harsher tone of the parties, engulfing Turkey (EDM, January 18). After spending some time in Kurdistan, Hashemi visited Saudi Arabia and Doha and later came to Turkey, effectively beginning his days in “exile.” Calling openly for Ankara’s support, Hashimi also furthered its involvement in his country’s affairs (Anadolu Ajansi, April 10).

    A parallel process concerned Iraqi Kurds. The KRG’s relationship to Baghdad is complicated over the status of the disputed city of Kirkuk and the conflict over revenues from the exploration of natural resources in the North. In the ongoing standoff, the leader of KRG, Masoud Barzani, supports Hashimi and has used the leverage he gained to further bolster his position in Iraqi domestic politics. Last month, Barzani suggested he could hold a referendum to redefine ties to Baghdad. In a move that further accentuated this trend, during his trip to the US earlier this month, Barzani urged Washington to reconsider its backing of Maliki. Then, Barzani visited Turkey to meet with Hashimi and Turkish leaders (Anadolu Ajansi, April 20).

    Barzani’s visit also underscored the degree to which Turkey has readjusted its regional policies. After years of confrontation with the KRG, Turkey already moved to normalize its relations with the Northern Iraqi Kurdish leadership to solicit their backing for Ankara’s fight against the PKK. In the wake of the latest developments, Ankara has further moved toward Iraqi Kurds to cope with the challenges in Iraqi domestic politics.

    In the region, too, Turkey faces a similar fluid environment. With the unfolding of the Syrian uprising, Ankara’s partnerships in the region have gone through a new reshuffling. Faced with Tehran’s support for the Syrian regime and its backing of Iraq’s Maliki, Turkey’s coordination of its policies with the Syrian opposition, Iraqi opposition and the Gulf countries raise interesting questions about the patterns of Ankara’s alignment.

    These realignments lead some to suggest that Turkey has been drawn into sectarian groupings but the Turkish government rejects those claims. Ankara justified its support for the Syrian opposition on the principles of human rights and democracy, rather than any sectarian affiliation. In Iraq, Turkey again refrained from framing its support for the Sunni leader Hashimi in sectarian terms and instead underlined the divisive nature of Maliki’s policies.

    However, such statements from Turkish officials have far from convinced the Iraqi leadership. Maliki, already critical of Turkey’s policy on Syria, reacted harshly to recent developments and, in a press release, accused Turkey of interfering in Iraqi internal affairs and acting in a hostile manner (Milliyet, April 21). Reflecting the new regional realignment, Maliki then paid a two-day visit to Tehran on April 22-23, where he met with key Iranian leaders. In his first visit after his reelection, Maliki expressed solidarity with the Iranian leadership and vowed to work in tandem on regional issues (www.presstv.ir, April 23).

    Both Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan and Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a very strong reaction to Maliki’s remarks. On his way back from Doha, where he discussed Middle East issues with his regional counterparts, Erdogan called Maliki insincere and maintained that his oppressive policies threatened to divide Iraq. Suggesting that Maliki himself might have a sectarian agenda, Erdogan insisted that Ankara was in communication with all Iraqi groups including Shiite leaders (Sabah, April 22). The MFA’s statement also referred to Maliki’s attempts to monopolize power and exclude others as the basis of the current crisis in Iraq (www.mfa.gov.tr, April 21). Both countries summoned each other’s diplomats posted to the respective capitals over the developments.

    To Turkey’s credit, concerns over Maliki’s course are indeed shared by a larger number of Iraqi actors, including Shiite groups. Increasingly, the inability of Maliki to build up coalitions with other groups and the weakening of the ties between Baghdad and the provinces, most notably Northern Iraq, are criticized by major Iraqi actors. Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr also visited Northern Iraq for the first time, in an effort to establish bridges between the parties (Anadolu Ajansi, April 26).

    For years, Turkey has worked to ensure a smooth political transition in Iraq. Ankara’s policy was based on the understanding that if national reconciliation cannot be achieved, it could deepen the fragmentation and pave the way for an independent Kurdish state, not to mention other damaging repercussions for regional peace. It was for this reason that Ankara supported the Maliki-led government, although its initial preferences after the Iraqi elections had been different. With the ongoing political crisis and tensions in the region, Turkey has increasingly found itself on the same page as the KRG.

    For his part, Barzani apparently hopes to deepen his cooperation with Turkey to further consolidate his position in Iraq. This development inevitably raises speculations as to whether the Iraqi Kurds might press for independence or a greater degree of autonomy from Baghdad, which, ironically, will put Turkey in a difficult position. Given Ankara’s own concerns about an independent Kurdish state and the Kurds’ claims over Kirkuk, Turkey’s support for Barzani will be conditional and it will hardly be the midwife to an independent Kurdistan.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-is-drawn-into-iraqi-affairs/
  • Turkey Inches Closer to Nuclear Cooperation with China

    Turkey Inches Closer to Nuclear Cooperation with China

    Turkey Inches Closer to Nuclear Cooperation with China

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 77
    April 18, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, accompanied by members of his cabinet, paid an official visit to China on April 8-11. The first by a Turkish PM in 27 years, the trip was remarkable in many ways and underlined the parties’ continued determination to deepen their cooperation, despite political differences on some regional issues.

    The most spectacular part of the trip was Erdogan’s stopover in Urumchi, the capital of China’s Xinjiang autonomous region (Anadolu Ajansi, April 9). Since Erdogan’s vocal criticism of China over its brutal crackdown of the Uyghur demonstrations in the summer of 2009, Sino-Turkish relations have been transformed significantly. Turkey ceased to advocate the Uyghur issue in public forums, while the Chinese officials also allowed increasing interactions between Xinjiang and Turkey. In particular, China enables such interactions in order to give the message to Turkish public opinion that it respects the rights of the Uyghur people. Overall, the parties are careful to turn the Uyghur factor into an element of cooperation rather than a factor of tension in the bilateral relationship.

    Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to Turkey earlier this year underscored this mutual understanding to focus on areas of common interest (EDM, March 1). During his trip to Beijing and Shanghai, Erdogan held fruitful discussions with Chinese leaders to further cooperation in the economic and political realm, while also signing several agreements to enhance cultural exchanges. Granted, the relationship remains driven by economic interests.

    In previous conversations, the parties indicated their determination to improve economic ties. Especially the Turkish side is keen to have a serious discussion on this issue, as Ankara currently incurs a major foreign trade deficit to Beijing. As the parties aim to increase the current bilateral trade volume from $25 billion to $100 billion by 2020, it will be important for Turkey to manage this process in a healthy manner so that its domestic market is not flooded with Chinese consumer goods (haberturk.com, April 10).

    The two countries rank as the fastest growing economies in the world, further raising expectations that the parties should cooperate in the economic realm. In order to compensate for the liability caused by the trade imbalance, Turkey hopes to see a greater volume of Chinese investments flowing into its economy. During its trip to Shanghai, the Turkish delegation met with executives of Chinese investment companies to discuss the details of furthering economic cooperation (Anadolu Ajansi, April 11).

    Erdogan went to great lengths to explain the “success” of the Turkish economy in the midst of the global financial crisis and how Ankara introduced structural reforms to turn the country into a safe destination for investments. He also underlined Turkey’s proximity and access to the European markets as an additional incentive to lure Chinese investments. Reportedly, the cabinet ministers and businessmen accompanying Erdogan signed several agreements with their Chinese counterparts, especially investments in Turkey’s energy sector and infrastructure projects. The government has reportedly received positive news about Chinese interest in its major infrastructure projects. Especially, Turkey wants to see greater Chinese investment – both in terms of financing and undertaking construction work – as it seeks to construct a high-speed train railway throughout the country (Aksam, April 13).

    Indeed, the two countries also have been recognized as leading players in the worldwide construction sector. While China owns the largest number of international contracting firms, Turkey comes in second on the same list (Sabah, April 6). With the growing visibility of China in this field, concerns have been raised about competition between the two countries. Given China’s advantages, especially in terms of credit opportunities, Turkey is careful to avoid competition and instead works to woo China into cooperation.

    A tangible outcome of the trip was the signing of a declaration on cooperation in peaceful nuclear technology (Anadolu Ajansi, April 9). This agreement follows Turkey’s earlier cooperation efforts with Russia, Japan and South Korea in this field. Such an agreement usually is a segue into negotiations on the construction of a nuclear power plant. So far, Turkey granted a tender for its first-ever nuclear power plant to be built in the Mediterranean coastal town of Mersin-Akkuyu to Russia. The second plant is planned to be constructed in the Black Sea province of Sinop. Earlier, the talks Turkey launched with South Korea pertaining to the second plant failed, partly because Seoul was reluctant to give the state guarantees for the investments. As Turkey initiated negotiations with Japan on the same project, the Fukushima disaster again led to the interruption, with the Japanese side giving unclear signals as to their willingness to resume the talks.

    Following Erdogan’s trip, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz announced that Turkey would soon hold talks with Japan, South Korea and China on the construction of the country’s second nuclear power plant (Anadolu Ajansi, April 13). Ankara’s approach in nuclear talks is significant in many ways. On the one hand, it seems that Turkey might be hoping to benefit from competition between the three Asian powers and receive a better deal for the second plant. In his remarks, Yildiz clearly underlined that Ankara would pick up the best offer between the three countries. On the other hand, this development also indicates Turkey’s anxiousness to conclude a deal, after having invested political capital in the idea of constructing a second plant. Given its soaring energy needs in recent years, which are met largely by imported hydrocarbons, Turkey has attached a major value to nuclear power plants in its energy strategy.

    However, this rather hasty and pragmatic approach also raises questions. The first plant was contracted to Russia, although Moscow has a mixed international reputation. Now, the pursuit of an agreement with China, which has not established itself as a major international player in this field, makes one wonder about the coherence, sustainability and reliability of Turkey’s nuclear energy plans. Occasionally, the government comes under criticism over the safety of the plants to be constructed with this strategy (www.turkey.setimes.com, November 11, 2011). In an obvious attempt to allay such questions, Yildiz also maintained that the plants will be built in line with robust standards, set by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the EU. Even if this will be the case, it remains to be seen if Turkey can genuinely develop peaceful nuclear technology by building partnerships with different players.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-inches-closer-to-nuclear-cooperation-with-china/
  • Turkey Facilitates Talks with Iran, Following Bickering over Venues

    Turkey Facilitates Talks with Iran, Following Bickering over Venues

    Turkey Facilitates Talks with Iran, Following Bickering over Venues

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 74
    April 13, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    A new round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 group of countries (United States, France, United Kingdom, Russia, China and Germany) engaged in diplomatic efforts with the Islamic Republic is scheduled to be held in Istanbul this weekend. As the meeting comes against the background of other disputes involving the parties, the diplomacy surrounding it has been and remains extremely delicate, also putting the host, Turkey, in a difficult position.

    Ankara’s involvement in the Iranian nuclear issue has been one of the most troublesome items in its foreign policy agenda complicating not only its relations with Tehran but also the West. As the US sought to mobilize a broad-based coalition to stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities, on the grounds that it might have military objectives, Turkey stood against coercive approaches and argued for the utilization of diplomatic channels to address this issue. When the US pushed for a new round of sanctions in 2010, Turkey again raised similar objections and, in a joint initiative with Brazil, brokered a swap deal, resulting in the Tehran Declaration of 2010 (EDM, June 1, 2010).

    Though Turkey also vetoed the UN Security Council resolution authorizing sanctions, it eventually agreed to implement them, noting that they reflect the will of the international community. Turkey, however, underlined that it would not abide by the unilateral sanctions introduced by the US and its European allies.

    While the United States has continued to implement the sanctions to increase gradually pressure on Tehran, attempts to restart the dialogue between the two sides have been underway. Both parties expressed appreciation for Turkey’s readiness to facilitate this dialogue, which led to the talks held in January 2011 in Istanbul (EDM, January 25, 2011). The talks failed to produce any significant outcome. The efforts to resume the talks have been stalled, with Western powers asking Iran to come to the table with concrete proposals.

    Turkey continued to offer its mediation services in the middle of other diplomatic initiatives it has undertaken. These other Turkish initiatives include reaching out to Tehran and the West in regards to the Syrian crisis, and the situation in Iraq. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s meeting with US President Barack Obama in Seoul on the occasion of the nuclear summit and his subsequent visit to Tehran enabled first-hand discussions with both parties. Again, while Ankara strongly reiterated its commitment to Iran’s right to develop and use peaceful nuclear technology, it also underlined that all military activities should be under international inspection (Anadolu Ajansi, April 5).

    Expectations were raised that Turkey’s go-between role might be paying off and negotiations could soon be held in Istanbul on April 13-14. However, the controversial statements coming from some high-ranking Iranian officials clouded the air. Despite Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salihi’s depiction of a meeting in Istanbul as the best alternative, other officials called for holding the meeting in “friendly” countries such as Syria, Iraq or Lebanon. They criticized Turkey’s pro-Western policy in Syria and other regional problems, questioning Ankara’s neutrality (www.dunyabulteni.com, April 3).

    Having invested diplomatic credibility in this initiative, such statements were shocking for Turkish leaders. Erdogan reacted harshly, calling Iranian officials to act sincerely (Zaman, April 6). The escalating tensions could only be mitigated with direct communication between foreign ministers, and finally the Iranian side confirmed the meeting in Istanbul (www.presstv.ir, April 8).

    These verbal exchanges and Erdogan’s questioning of Iranian sincerity underscored the transformation of the bilateral relationship and Turkey’s involvement in the Iranian nuclear dispute since 2010. First, Turkey’s approach to the talks has changed. While in 2010 Turkey was actively mediating on the issue, it has retreated from that position. Already in the January 2011 meeting, Turkey underlined that it seeks to facilitate the talks, by providing a venue. However, at that time, Turkey still believed the Tehran Declaration provided a constructive framework to discuss further diplomatic initiatives, and emphasized readiness to assist the parties if they decided to address the issue along the lines contained in that declaration. Since then, however, Turkey seems to also have backtracked from that position as well, and the content of the talks have yet to be set by the parties.

    Moreover, Turkey’s relationship to both sides has been transformed to a great extent. Compared to 2010, while Turkey now enjoys more cooperative relations with the US, Ankara’s ties to Tehran have been severed over other developments in the intervening period. In 2010, Turkey was seen as largely uncritical of Tehran’s position, which even led to charges that it was pro-Iranian or providing shelter for Tehran. By the January 2011 meeting, the change in Ankara’s position was well underway. Turkey increasingly called on Iran to be more transparent and reassure the international community that its nuclear program had peaceful purposes. Turkey also moved in the direction of seeking a greater degree of protection against potential threats that might be posed by the Iranian nuclear program. Especially, Turkey’s decision to support NATO’s missile shield program and its agreement with the US for the installation of early warning radars on its soil in late 2011 were important indicators of this transformation.

    The changes in Turkey’s policy seem to have altered Tehran’s perceptions, which no longer views Ankara as a “neutral” actor. This was perhaps partly the reason why Iranian officials raised vocal objections to Istanbul as the venue for the talks. However, Iran is being negatively affected by the sanctions, which must have forced it to adopt a more conciliatory position to avoid completely losing Turkey in this dispute, hence Teheran’s agreement to hold talks in Istanbul.

    As the talks are fast approaching, there are conflicting signals about the prospects of achieving some progress. Earlier, Western officials underlined that in the talks they would seek to get Iran to suspend high-level enrichment and close down an underground nuclear facility near Qom. The Iranian officials rebuffed immediately any preconditions (www.presstv.ir, April 9). The head of Iran’s Supreme National Council, Saeed Jalili, stated that they would come to the table with a constructive approach and propose new initiatives (www.presstv.ir, April 11). Given Iran’s earlier track record, it remains to be seen if this is a sincere constructive approach or yet another delaying tactic. But in any case, it will be up to the parties to reach a common ground, not Turkey, whose sole involvement now is to facilitate this dialogue.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-facilitates-talks-with-iran-following-bickering-over-venues/
  • Supporters of Syria Take Significant Steps, but No Endgame in Sight

    Supporters of Syria Take Significant Steps, but No Endgame in Sight

    Supporters of Syria Take Significant Steps, but No Endgame in Sight

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 67
    April 4, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    On April 1, Turkey hosted the second meeting of the Friends of Syria group, which produced mixed results as to the future of the Syrian uprisings. While the meeting lent some legitimacy to the opposition organized around the Syrian National Council (SNC) and warned President Bashar al-Assad not to miss a final chance for a political solution, it fell short of authorizing decisive actions that would coerce him to end the violent military campaign against the uprising and, more importantly, step down from power (Anadolu Ajansi, April 1).

    Given its proximity and the close relationship it had forged with Damascus in the preceding years, Ankara has been actively involved in the resolution of the Syrian crisis since the beginning of the uprising. After the failure of its final efforts to reach out to Assad diplomatically in the summer of 2011, Turkey’s position changed drastically. Since then, Turkey, in coordination with the Arab League and its Western partners, has been at the forefront of the international initiatives to solve the crisis by removing Assad from power. It has extended shelter to both the Syrian refugees and the opposition groups and strived to push the UN Security Council to authorize stronger action to address the impending humanitarian catastrophe. The inability to involve the UN Security Council in the crisis due to the Russian and Chinese vetoes prompted Turkey to explore alternative avenues (EDM, February 7).

    Although at one point the Turkish government came under growing international pressure to lead a military intervention into Syria, it resisted such calls and instead continued to explore other means to first alleviate the suffering of civilians and later to ensure Syrian regime change. In an effort to generate broader international momentum around these objectives, Turkey was instrumental in the formation of the Friends of Syria group, bringing together likeminded states, which held its first meeting in Tunis a month ago. However, as it facilitated this coalition acting in close concert with the Washington, Ankara also risked fundamental disagreements with the supporters of the Syrian regime, especially Tehran, which added one more element to the already complicated bilateral relations.

    In the weeks preceding the meeting, Turkey also worked hard to ensure that it would produce substantial outcomes. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, attending the nuclear summit in South Korea, discussed this issue with US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, hoping to change Moscow’s position by sending the message that Assad’s days are numbered and those who stand behind him will be doomed to lose (Hurriyet, March 28). On his way back home, Erdogan visited Iran and met with Iranian leaders, including the religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (www.haberturk.com, March 29). Erdogan’s appeal to his Iranian counterparts was hardly successful, as they gave no indications of a change in their position. Turkey also maintained its coordination with the Arab League, but the internal divisions among the Arab countries increasingly became apparent. While the Gulf states largely supported the Syrian opposition, Iraq has cautioned against overbearing action against Damascus and expressed its discomfort with Turkey’s activism by not inviting it to the Arab League meeting only days before the Friends of Syria conference in Istanbul (Haberturk, March 29).

    The game changer ahead of the Friends’ meeting was the six-point plan prepared by the UN/ Arab League joint special envoy Kofi Annan. After his diplomatic tour, Annan submitted his plan to the UN Security Council. The Annan plan foresees a cessation of violence, delivery of humanitarian assistance, withdrawal of heavy weaponry out of civilian areas, and political dialogue, but falls short of meeting the opposition’s demand for outlining a program for the transfer of power. Following a Security Council presidential statement giving full support to the plan on March 21, the Syrian regime also agreed to accept it on March 27 (www.aljazeera.com, March 28). Though Annan emphasized that the implementation will be the key, Assad’s move right before the Istanbul conference apparently sought to open some cracks in the coalition and thwart a harsh response.

    This development put Turkey in a difficult position, as it still operated under the assumption that changing the regime would be needed to solve the crisis. Erdogan raised concerns about Assad’s sincerity, arguing that he had failed to keep his earlier reform promises (Vatan, March 28). More importantly, Turkey questioned the six-point plan because it lacked a clear time table and enforcement mechanism in case of noncompliance (Sabah, March 31).

    Turkey also took a major step in advance of the Friends conference by convening the Syrian opposition groups in Istanbul, which sought to consolidate the opposition under one structure. By then, the disunity of the opposition groups had prevented a more decisive international support to the SNC. Although they achieved major progress in the way of eliminating differences of opinion, outlining a plan of action for national unity and consolidating their leadership structure, the withdrawal of the Syrian Kurds indicated the remaining divisions (www.ntvmsnbc.com, March 28).

    The Istanbul conference produced mixed results. The participation of over 70 countries and several international organizations, despite the absence of Russia and China, was in itself a major success. In a lukewarm development, the participants recognized the SNC as a legitimate, though not the sole, representative of the Syrian people, and decided to treat it as an interlocutor in the conflict. Though the lack of a clear decision to arm the opposition or establish humanitarian corridors also fell short of the SNC’s expectations, the references to supporting the Syrian people’s legitimate right to defend themselves might open such a loophole. The participants still agreed to establish a fund, to be provided largely by the Gulf countries as well as some Western nations, to extend financial assistance to the Free Syrian Army and supply it with some communications equipment. Also important was a decision to establish a working group to monitor the arms embargo as well as to document violations of human rights, which might increase pressure on Assad and his backers. Though the meeting supported Annan’s plan, it also called on him to set a timeline for its implementation. Although Turkey and the Friends group assume that Assad’s end is inevitable, their progress in compelling Assad and his supporters to change their behavior has been far from impressive. It might be too early to tell the endgame in Syria.

    https://jamestown.org/program/supporters-of-syria-take-significant-steps-but-no-endgame-in-sight/
  • Turkey-Turkmenistan Ties Flourish in Economic Realm

    Turkey-Turkmenistan Ties Flourish in Economic Realm

    Turkey-Turkmenistan Ties Flourish in Economic Realm

    Turkey-Turkmenistan Ties Flourish in Economic Realm

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 50
    March 12, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedov’s visit to Turkey on February 28-March 1, highlighted the evolving nature of the two countries’ bilateral relations, built around flourishing economic ties. Berdimuhammedov’s first foreign trip since his reelection on February 12 also provided an opportunity to mark the 20th anniversary of the establishment of Turkish-Turkmen diplomatic ties since Turkmenistan’s gaining independence. With many cabinet members, officials and businessmen in his entourage, the visit also provided an opportunity to deepen the relations.

    Ankara’s official relations with Ashgabat have been largely carried out by President Abdullah Gul, who has paid four visits to Turkmenistan so far. His last official trip was in May 2011, during which he discussed ways to improve cooperation in energy, construction, transportation and communication. Berdimuhammedov also expressed his satisfaction with the accelerating pace of the bilateral ties and underscored that his country viewed Turkey as a strategic partner. For his part, Gul has been particularly interested in improving energy cooperation between the two countries (Anadolu Ajansi, May 31, 2011).

    During Berdimuhammedov’s visit, Gul showed the highest level of hospitality, underscoring the importance attached to developing bilateral ties. He decorated Berdimuhammedov with a state medal of honor, which crowned many agreements penned to bolster cooperation in trade, tourism, the fight against terrorism, training of diplomats, etc., in addition to various other business deals. Berdimuhammedov again reiterated that Ashgabat views its relationship with Ankara as strategically important, and Turkmenistan would welcome even a larger involvement of Turkish companies as his country works to rebuild its cities through numerous infrastructure investments. The Turkish-Turkmen Business Forum attended, by both leaders in Istanbul, allowed the parties to discuss specific projects (Anadolu Ajansi, February 29, March 1).

    Reflecting the high premium placed by Ankara on mutual economic relations, Turkey’s Economy Minister Zafer Caglayan has also frequented Ashgabat lately. Caglayan’s last visit was in January where he also attended the bilateral business forum and was received by Berdimuhammedov. During that visit, a protocol was signed within the context of the Turkish-Turkmen Intergovernmental Economic Committee, and the parties agreed to instruct their Central Banks to make necessary arrangements so that they could use their national currencies in bilateral commercial deals. Caglayan especially expressed his satisfaction with Turkmen officials’ welcoming attitude toward Turkish construction companies, adding that the latter won up to 90 percent of government construction tenders in Turkmenistan (www.haberturk.com, January 30, 2012).

    Nonetheless, although Turkey became a major trading partner for Turkmenistan, relations have yet to live up to the ambitious rhetoric. Turkey’s trade with Turkmenistan and Turkish-speaking countries, despite a two-fold increase in the last five years, still makes up only a small fraction of its overall trade. While the trade volume between these countries was $8.6 billion in 2011, it only accounted for three percent of Turkey’s overall trade volume. Turkmenistan ranked third after Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in Turkey’s overall trade with Turkic-speaking countries. While Turkey’s imports from Turkmenistan were worth $392.7 million, its exports totaled $1.5 billion (Anadolu Ajansi February 6).

    Turkey’s main economic activity with Turkmenistan and partly other Turkic-speaking countries has been in construction projects. Many of these countries have been working to rebuild, using the wealth generated by their energy riches. Turkmenistan has stood atop that list in recent years. For instance, in a development that marked the growing importance of Turkmenistan for Turkish contractors’ international operations, in 2010, Turkmenistan ranked number one on the list of tenders assumed by Turkish companies in around 50 countries. Of the total $20.3 billion in projects that Turkish firms undertook globally in 2010, they contracted on tenders worth $4.3 billion in Turkmenistan, followed by Libya, Iraq and Russia. To date, the total volume of projects undertaken by Turkish companies in Turkmenistan exceeded $23 billion, corresponding to about 10 percent of the Turkish firms’ operations worldwide (Anadolu Ajansi, March 19, 2011; July 25, 2011).

    With these statistics, Ankara has been Ashgabat’s chief trade partner, while Turkmenistan emerged as the main destination of Turkish investments in Central Asia. Most Turkish economic activity in Turkmenistan is carried out by small or medium scale enterprises. Established there by Turkish investors following Turkmenistan’s independence, some of these companies acted rather in an adventurous manner and took risks. While many of them lost their investments in the 1990s, the first comer’s advantage worked in favor of many others who later became important business actors.

    Granted, Turkish investors still encounter problems. One particular issue has been the difficulties in receiving payment for the projects they complete in Turkmenistan. In addition to inviting new investments to take advantage of attractive business opportunities in his country, Berdimuhammedov also promised to solve the payment problems. Representatives from some Turkish business associations raised questions about his sincerity, as similar promises in the past have not ended the controversy – current pending payments for completed projects are worth $1.3 billion (Hurriyet Daily News, March 2). However, other Turkish firms doing business in the country had been presenting a different picture about the causes of the dispute. A large group undertaking major infrastructure work to build 180 bridges in the country maintained that those that complete their project on time face no such problems (Cihan, February 14).

    Such high level contacts and flourishing economic ties highlighted the seamless political relations between Ankara and Ashgabad. Turkey was the first country to recognize Turkmenistan’s declaration of independence and also supported its decision to pursue neutrality in 1995. Following the euphoria of the early 1990s, the Turkish-Turkmen relationship was severely restricted during the later period of Saparmurat Niyazov’s (Turkmenbashi) reign (1991-2006). While his isolationist policy of neutrality was partly responsible for the deteriorating state of affairs, the negative experiences of some Turkish businessmen who went to the country early on also led to the cooling off of the relationship. With Berdimuhammedov’s policy of opening up, which also corresponded to a proactive foreign policy course pursued by the current Turkish government, there has been a visible increase in bilateral exchanges. With the latest trip, Berdimuhammedov has been to Turkey for a fifth time, and especially in the economic realm the progress has been remarkable. For its part, Turkey has been hoping to bolster ties with this energy-rich country, which provides a major avenue for Turkish business operations abroad, especially while the turmoil in the Middle East raises questions about the prospects of these markets.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-turkmenistan-ties-flourish-in-economic-realm/
  • China Eyes Greater Share of Turkey’s Rising Infrastructure Investments, Including Construction of a Nuclear Plant

    China Eyes Greater Share of Turkey’s Rising Infrastructure Investments, Including Construction of a Nuclear Plant

    China Eyes Greater Share of Turkey’s Rising Infrastructure Investments, Including Construction of a Nuclear Plant

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 43
    March 1, 2012
    By: Saban Kardas
    China’s Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to Turkey, where he held several meetings with Turkish leaders, has underlined the growing economic ties and diplomatic exchanges between the two countries, despite their failure to develop joint positions on political issues. Xi met Turkey’s president and prime minister, and participated in the Turkey-China Economic and Commercial Cooperation Forum.

    A large part of Xi’s contacts pertained to economic cooperation, which is understandable given that the two countries have been the most rapidly growing economies in the world in the wake of the global financial crisis. Their bilateral trade volume reached $24 billion in 2011, while it was only $1 billion at the beginning of the decade. However, the trade balance is tilted dis-proportionally in Turkey’s disfavor. One factor that helps correct this unhealthy picture is the growing Chinese interest in the Turkish economy. Chinese companies have been increasingly undertaking contracting services in Turkey, including plans for the construction of major railway networks. As Turkey plans to initiate other multi-billion dollar infrastructure projects, China is increasingly interested in getting a larger share of this pie. A delegation of businessmen accompanying Xi signed various agreements with their Turkish counterparts pertaining to Turkish exports, financial support by Chinese firms and energy investments, again reflecting the rising volume of Chinese investments in Turkey.

    During the visit, it was even mentioned by both parties to raise the bilateral trade volume to $100 billion over the next ten years or so (Anadolu Ajansi, February 23). While setting that target, however, the Turkish side complained about its inability to penetrate the Chinese market and called on China to take some measures that would help reduce the trade imbalance. One particular measure that was agreed upon during the visit would allow the central banks of the two countries to carry out a three-year currency swap agreement, worth $1.6 billion.

    Reportedly another item on the agenda was cooperation in peaceful nuclear technology. Following the business forum meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan said that Turkey’s Energy Ministry will start a dialogue with its Chinese counterpart on China’s construction of a nuclear power plant in Turkey (Anadolu Ajansi, February 22). In an effort to reduce its heavy dependence on hydrocarbons, as part of its energy strategy documents, Turkey has been planning to build up to three nuclear power plants. Short of possessing genuine technology, it has been seeking actively to develop partnerships with other countries in this field. Turkey has already signed an intergovernmental agreement with Russia pertaining to the first nuclear power plant, and the negotiations are under way with Japan and South Korea for the second one. China too has been very active in building many nuclear plants to meet its energy needs, which have increased due to its fast growing economy, and is now seeking to build power plants abroad.

    Though Turkey’s possible partnership with China in nuclear energy might make sense from a diversification point of view, awarding tenders to different countries also raises the question to what extent this will be an efficient strategy from the technology accumulation perspective. Granted, Turkish press maintained that China was ready to undertake the tender for the construction of the power plant through a $20 billion-worth foreign direct investment (Sabah, February 25). If this deal is realized, it will mark the largest single FDI flow into Turkish economy, which would also signify China’s trust in Turkey’s economic performance.

    However, the dynamics of Turkish-Chinese economic ties and their reflection in the political realm resemble very much Turkey’s somewhat problematic ties with Russia and Iran. At one level, Turkey’s economic relations with these three powers underscore the inherent shortcomings of Turkey’s growth model. While Turkey is running a huge trade deficit vis-à-vis Russia and Iran due to energy imports, its trade with China also has been similarly problematic, due to the import of consumer goods. Despite record growth rates in recent years, many experts warn that Turkey’s economic miracle is driven by domestic demand rather than exports, and its current account deficit poses a big vulnerability to an economic shock. As part of its commercial strategy of developing multi-dimensional partnerships with neighbors and other rising powers, Turkey has been quite intent on boosting the bilateral trade volume with various nations. However, short of a major restructuring of the underlying dynamics of Turkey’s economy so that it becomes more competitive and gains access to energy resources at reasonable costs, increasing the trade volume with other countries will not help Turkey become a major power house.

    At the political level, too, there are similarities between Turkish-Chinese relations and Ankara’s relations with Moscow and Tehran. The growth of its trade volume with Russia and Iran neither helped Ankara forge a common position with these countries on regional issues, nor could it gain from them a more receptive attitude toward its demands in some economic and political issues. With China, too, the expansion of economic ties was partly a product of Ankara’s refrain from raising the thorny issue of the East Turkestan and the plight of the Uighur people. Moreover, as was demonstrated in the case of Beijing’s position on the Syrian regime’s violent suppression of the popular uprising, Turkey and China have not converged politically. The obvious political differences have not prevented Ankara from pursuing cooperation and enhanced diplomatic exchanges with Beijing.

    After Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s harsh reaction to China’s policies in Xinjiang in 2009, which caused a political friction, Turkey increasingly watered down its criticism, which opened the way for bolstering bilateral relations. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s visit to China and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabo’s visit to Ankara in 2010 were such major occasions, and Erdogan is expected to visit China this year. The year 2012 is being celebrated as the Year of Turkey in China, while next year the Year of China will be celebrated in Turkey. It appears that Turkey is determined to maintain a high dose of pragmatism and commercially-driven thinking which have shaped its policy toward China, as well as other rising powers.

    https://jamestown.org/program/china-eyes-greater-share-of-turkeys-rising-infrastructure-investments-including-construction-of-a-nuclear-plant/