Category: Robert Ellis

Cyprus – a litmus test for Turkey

Famagusta Gazette 9 April 2012

By Robert Ellis

Sweden’s Minister for International Cooperation Development, Gunilla Carlsson, has confirmed in a joint article together with Turkey’s Minister for EU Affairs, Egemen Bagis, Sweden’s full support for Turkey’s bid for EU membership.

This comes as no surprise, as four years ago Sweden’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carl Bildt, declared that “the AKP government is made up of profound European reformers”.

What was also predictable was Ms. Carlsson’s statement at the round table meeting with Mr. Bagis that it was unacceptable to stall Turkey’s accession negotiations because of bilateral issues that had nothing to do with the EU itself. This was evidently a reference to the unresolved Cyprus dispute.

When Sweden was term president of the EU in the second half of 2009, the draft of the General Affairs Council conclusions in November noted that “bilateral issues” should not hold up the accession process but needed to be resolved by the parties concerned “bearing in mind the overall EU interests”.

In effect, this relegated the Cyprus issue to the level of the border dispute between Croatia and Slovenia, but because of opposition from other EU member states the paragraph was dropped from the Council’s conclusions.

This attempt to sweep the issue under the carpet is reminiscent of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s reference to the Sudetenland conflict in 1938 as “a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing”.

What is notable is that Ms. Carlsson spoke of a struggle to embrace deeply owned common values, as this is precisely the issue that is at stake in Cyprus. In effect, Cyprus can be considered a litmus test as to whether it is possible for two ethnic communities to coexist inside the same national framework, and, on a larger scale, whether Turkey can fit into the European Union.

Prime Minister Erdogan has accused the European Union of being “a Christian club” but President Gül on his first official visit to Cyprus in September 2007 stated “There are two realities on Cyprus, two democracies, two states, two languages, two religions”, which are the same arguments advanced by opponents of Turkey’s EU membership.

Turkey’s invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974 cemented the division of the two communities but also opened a shameful chapter of Turkish history.

The European Commission of Human Rights in its 1976 report documented the conduct of the invasion forces and the Committee on Missing Persons is working to establish the fate of 502 Turkish Cypriots and 1,493 Greek Cypriots missing after the intercommunal fighting in 1963-4 and the Turkish invasion.

The US Helsinki Commission in its 2009 report on the destruction of cultural property in northern Cyprus documented that 500 Orthodox churches or chapels have been pillaged, demolished or vandalized and 15,000 paintings have disappeared.

Furthermore, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has in its 2012 report recommended that Turkey be designated a “country of particular concern” notwithstanding its importance as a strategic partner.

The USCIRF delegation found three main issues in northern Cyprus, including the inability of Orthodox Christians to hold services at their places of worship and the disrepair of churches and cemeteries as well as the preservation of religious heritage.

Egemen Bagis is surely disingenuous when he at the meeting with the Swedish minister criticized the EU for blocking most of Turkey’s accession talks. As he remarked, “They want us to do our homework without actually telling us what our homework is.”

Even to Mr Bagis, the solution must be apparent. In 2006 the EU Council froze negotiations on eight chapters because Turkey refused to honour its commitment according to the Additional Protocol and extend the customs union to the Republic of Cyprus. Consequently, a solution to the conflict would remove the main stumbling block to Turkey’s accession process and serve to heal the wounds of the past.

By virtue of its strategic position, and now because of the gas deposits in its Exclusive Economic Zone, Cyprus is a key player in the eastern Mediterranean, and therefore it was short-sighted of Turkey not to invite Cyprus to the Syria meeting in Istanbul on 1 April.

Once again, the European Parliament has called on Turkey to begin withdrawing its forces from Cyprus, to transfer Famagusta to the UN and for the port of Famagusta to be opened under EU supervision, but this call will no doubt fall on deaf ears. Turkey’s threat to boycott Cyprus’ EU Presidency is also counter-productive.

As the European Parliament concluded in its resolution on Turkey’s 2011 Progress Report, the interdependence between the European Union and Turkey can only produce positive results if it is framed in a context of mutual commitment.

(Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish and international press.)

via Cyprus – a litmus test for Turkey | EuropeNews.

April 14, 2012
Eastward Bound

This article first appeared at FrontPage Magazine.

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently blamed Europe for alienating Turkey from the West. On a visit to London last Wednesday, he stated, “If there’s anything to the notion that Turkey is moving eastwards, it is in no small part because it was pushed, and it was pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought.”

When Turkey was accepted as a European Union candidate at the Helsinki summit in 1999, the Ecevit government subsequently enacted two important constitutional reform packages and a revision to the Civil Code which established the principle of gender equality in the family. When the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002, it was with the promise of further reform, and seven more reform packages were passed.

Despite reservations about implementation, in October 2004 the European Commission found that Turkey had “sufficiently” fulfilled the political criteria for membership and recommended the start of accession talks. However, when these talks began the following year, the AKP government under Recep Tayyip Erdogan lost interest in the European perspective and concentrated on a domestic agenda with the main aim of securing its power base. This included a policy of kadrolaşma in state and local administration, which means filling leading positions with party supporters and fellow believers. Through “neighborhood pressure,” the government embarked on a process of social engineering to enforce conservative, Islamic standards throughout Turkish society.

High on the AKP government’s agenda was making it possible for graduates of religious high schools (the imam-hatip schools) to enter university on an equal footing with students from state high schools. However, because of secular opposition, these attempts have so far been unsuccessful.

The headscarf – that is, the tightly knotted Islamic headscarf and not the loosely worn village headscarf – is widely regarded as a symbol of political Islam, and Prime Minister Erdogan admitted as much at a meeting of the Alliance of Civilizations Forum in Madrid in 2008. However, the fact that the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban on the Islamic headscarf at Turkish universities was a setback that Mr. Erdogan was not prepared to accept.

As has been illustrated by Turkey’s vote in the UN Security Council against further sanctions on Iran, Turkey’s “multi-dimensional” foreign policy has been directed more towards cementing its relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors than advancing its cause in Europe. Particularly, after the Turkish government’s endorsement of the alleged aid flotilla and the stand-off with Israel, Turkey’s claim of being “the honest broker of the Middle East” rings hollow. This is all not to mention, of course, the Armenian issue, Turkey’s own Kurdish problem, and the fact that Turkey, for the last 36 years, has occupied a third of what is now an EU member state – Cyprus.

In a television interview in 2004, Libya’s leader, Muammar Gaddafi, let his views be known on Europe letting Turkey into the European Union, stating: ”The Islamic world, even the Islamic extremists, even bin Laden, rejoice for the entrance of Turkey in the European Union. This is their Trojan horse.” Last week, addressing a delegation of European Muslim leaders, Gaddafi supported Turkey’s membership, using the same argument.

If Robert Gates wants to blame anyone for the West losing Turkey, he should perhaps take a look closer to home – i.e. the U.S. State Department, which, as far as Turkey is concerned, has also been out of touch. For example, in May 2007, Condoleeza Rice stated that the AKP is “a government dedicated to pulling Turkey west toward Europe.” Seven months earlier, when President Sezer and the Turkish military warned about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, the U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Ross Wilson, described the debate as “cacophonic” and added: “There is nothing that I see imminently on the horizon that makes me particularly worried.”

The main stumbling block to the continuation of EU accession talks with Turkey is the Cyprus question. Here Ross Wilson’s successor, James Jeffrey, tops the bill when, in a February interview with the Turkish daily Sabah, he stated: “Geographically, Turkey is closer to the EU than Cyprus. Cyprus was still an EU member when I last checked. As a matter of fact, most of Turkey is closer to Berlin or Paris. Under these conditions, what keeps Turkey out of the EU?”

There is a further truth which has eluded Robert Gates. As the little-known Turkish philosopher from the 1950’s, Celal Yaliniz, once wrote: “Turkey is a ship heading for the East. Those aboard think they are heading for the West. In fact, they are just running westwards in a ship sailing eastwards.”

Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish and international press.

June 18, 2010
Erdogan’s Troubling Friends

This article first appeared at FrontPage Magazine.

In 1974, when Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan was president of the Istanbul youth group of the MSP (the Islamist National Salvation Party), he wrote, directed, and starred in a play called Mas-Kom-Ya, which addressed subversive elements in Turkish society: masons, communists and yahudi (Jews). This very same performer has managed to convince gullible Western politicians that Turkey is committed to EU membership. Equally convincingly, he has played to the Arab gallery since his AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002.

Erdogan’s tirade against Shimon Peres during a panel discussion at last year’s World Economic Forum in Davos – “you know very well how to kill” – earned plaudits all around the Arab world. The Lebanese daily Dar A-Hayatsuggested that Erdogan should restore the Ottoman Empire and be the Caliph of all Muslims. By some accounts, this has been identified as the driving force behind Turkey’s expansionist foreign policy, which has been dubbed “neo-Ottoman.”

This new course obviously played out in Turkey’s role in the Gaza flotilla incident. According to Debka (an open source intelligence website) the flotilla was personally sponsored by Erdogan, and according to the same source, he is even prepared to sail aboard the next flotilla himself. Some awareness of the consequences must have been know, as a week before the flotilla sailed, Ankara threatened Israel with reprisals if it was impeded.

The connection between the flotilla’s organizer, the Turkish-based IHH (Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief), and Hamas is well documented, and it created a stir when Hamas leader Khaled Mashal was officially invited to Ankara in 2006.

Ankara’s support for Iran’s nuclear program, ostensibly for peaceful purposes, is likewise a cause for concern in the Western world, and President Abdullah Gül has admitted in an interview with Forbes magazine that “it is their final aspiration to have a nuclear weapon in the end.”

Turkey and Syria have agreed on a long-term strategic partnership and Erdogan continues to defend Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir (who is on the International Criminal Court’s wanted list) with the claim that “a Muslim can never commit genocide.”

Also alarming is the secret meeting between Prime Minister Erdogan and a Sudanese financier, Dr. Fatih al-Hassanein, during an Arab League summit in Khartoum in 2006. Dr. al-Hassanein is believed to have ties with al-Qaeda and other Islamist movements (e.g. in Bosnia).

What has caused another stir is the friendship between Prime Minister Erdogan and a Saudi businessman, Yassin al-Qadi, who, according to the U.S. Treasury and the United Nations Security Council, is a major financier of Islamic terrorism. Erdogan’s advisor and co-founder of the AKP, Cüneyd Zapsu, was also al-Qadi’s partner.

Erdogan defended al-Qadi publicly on Turkish television, declaring: “I trust him the same way I trust my father.” And a case against al-Qadi was dropped when in 2006 the Chief Public Prosecutor decided: “Al-Qadi is a philanthropic businessman and no connection has been found between him and terrorist organizations.”

The truth is beginning to catch up with Erdogan. Last week, in an interview given to the Wall Street Journal, Fethullah Gülen, who, although a resident in the USA, is reckoned to be Turkey’s most influential religious leader, criticized the Gaza flotilla. He also commented: “.. some people in the United States consider Turkey as sitting at the epicenter of radicalism.”

It is now up to the hot-tempered Mr. Erdogan and his government to dispel this image — or to continue confirming it.

Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish and international press.

June 9, 2010
Demopoulos and others v. Turkey

This article was written by my good friend Robert Ellis and first appeared in the print edition of Hürriyet Daily News.

The non-admissibility decision a fortnight ago by the European Court of Human Rights was welcomed as “historic” by the Turkish press and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, but it might be premature to pop the champagne corks. In fact, it is probably former Turkish Ambassador Tulay Uluçevik who struck the right note when he described the Court’s ruling as “a Pyrrhic victory.”

Apart from the issue of security, that of property can be considered a major stumbling block for a solution to the Cyprus question, and the Annan Plan did little to assuage Greek Cypriot concerns. The right to restitution and return was effectively limited by a number of restrictions so that the majority of displaced Greek Cypriots were faced with compensation in the form of what Tassos Papadopoulos called “dubious paper.”

The Property Board that the Annan Plan envisaged, which would have settled claims from both sides, would for the most part have been funded by the Greek Cypriots, so it would have been the merchant from Kayseri who fed his donkey with its own tail all over again.

However, the Immovable Property Commission, or IPC, which the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) established in December 2005 to deal with Greek Cypriot property claims, will in effect be funded by Turkey, as the “TRNC” has the status of “a subordinate local administration” under Turkish jurisdiction.

The legal status of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, which was proclaimed in 1983, has been a bone of contention for previous property cases appearing before the European court, but it has been established in admissibility decisions (for example, Loizidou v. Turkey in 1995 and Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey in 2005) that Turkey is the respondent state.

In the latter case, an attempt was made to avoid a judgment against Turkey by establishing an “Immovable Property Determination, Evaluation and Compensation Commission” in July 2003, so as to provide a domestic remedy that should be exhausted. Nevertheless, this only provided for compensation but not restitution, and as there were doubts about the impartiality of the Commission, the remedy was found to be neither effective nor adequate.

So, seen in those terms, the IPC must be considered an improved model as its provisions provide for restitution, exchange or compensation in return for rights over the immovable property and compensation for loss of use if claimed. Furthermore, two of the IPC’s five to seven members are independent international members, and persons who occupy Greek-Cypriot property are expressly excluded.

Consequently, on the basis of the 85 cases concluded by last November, the Court found that the IPC provides an accessible and effective framework of redress for property issues “in the current situation of occupation that it is beyond this Court’s competence to resolve.”

In view of the redress offered by the Annan Plan, it must be a disappointment for Greek Cypriots that the Court maintains its view that “it must leave the choice of implementation of redress for breaches of property rights to Contracting States” and that, from a Convention perspective, “property is a material commodity which can be valued and compensated for in monetary terms.” In fact, in more than 70 cases claimants opted for compensation.

A further bone of contention in the current talks between Dimitris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat is whether it is the legal or the current owner of the property who should decide whether redress should be in the form of restitution, exchange or compensation.

On this issue, the Court states, “It is still necessary to ensure that the redress applied to those old injuries does not create disproportionate new wrongs.” Finally, the Court concludes that this decision is not to be interpreted as requiring that applicants make use of the IPC. They may choose not to do so and await a political settlement, but in the meantime the Court’s decision provides a legal basis.

Davutoğlu believes the Court’s decision has boosted the international legitimacy of the “TRNC”, in which case he has neglected to read the small print. “The Court maintains its opinion that allowing the respondent State to correct wrongs imputable to it does not amount to an indirect legitimization of a regime unlawful under international law.”

Furthermore, “Accepting the functional reality of remedies is not tantamount to holding that Turkey wields internationally-recognized sovereignty over northern Cyprus.” The European Parliament has, in a resolution, called on Turkey to immediately start to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and address the issue of the settlement of Turkish citizens as well as enable the return of the sealed-off section of Famagusta to its lawful inhabitants.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has indicated he is willing to withdraw Turkish troops in the event of a solution, but his chief EU negotiator, Egemen Bağış, has boasted that Turkey has not withdrawn a single soldier or given away territory.

Considering that not only the future of Cyprus but also Turkey’s prospects of EU membership hang in the balance, that kind of attitude is singularly unhelpful.

Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish and international press.

March 18, 2010
The Cypriot Stumbling Block

This analysis by Robert Ellis was first published at PoliGazette.

Like Ireland, Cyprus has been a victim of geography and both are today still divided. As the Arab geographer Muqaddasi wrote in 985: “The island of Qubrus is in the power of whichever nation is overlord in these seas”. And with its position 40 miles off the southern coast of Turkey and 70 miles from Syria it has been a strategic prize for centuries.

This outpost of Hellenic civilisation was conquered by the Crusaders in the twelfth century to secure their route to the Holy Land and later by Venice. When Famagusta fell to the Ottomans in 1571, the island’s fate was sealed. Therefore it is ironic that the British took over Cyprus with its mixed population in 1878 as a result of a deal with Turkey to protect the Ottoman Empire against the Russians, who have lurked in the background ever since.

The island’s Greek identity was emphasized in its support of the Greek revolt against Ottoman rule in 1821 and with the participation of both the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority in a legislative council under British rule. When other Greek islands under Turkish occupation such as Crete and the Dodecanese were united with Greece, the same demand grew in Cyprus. As a result, a plebiscite held among Greek Cypriots in 1950 showed a 96.5 percent support for enosis (union with Greece).

As the British were only prepared to give the Cypriots limited self determination, a terrorist organisation EOKA was formed, which in 1955 launched a campaign to force Britain to withdraw. But the campaign was counter-productive, as this was met by the formation of the Turkish Cypriot paramilitary TMT with a demand for taksim (partition).

However, as Britain depended on the Middle East for 70 percent of its oil imports, it was not prepared to give up control of the island. As Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden put it at the time: “No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It’s as simple as that.”

Consequently, Britain invited both Greece and Turkey to a conference in London to discuss questions concerning the Eastern Mediterranean. But as defence minister Selwyn Lloyd explained to the Cabinet before the conference: “Throughout the negotiations our aim would be to bring the Greeks up against the Turkish refusal to accept enosis and so condition them to accept a solution, which would leave sovereignty in our hands.”

Independence
The ruse was only partly successful, because under American pressure for guaranteed independence, a deal between was brokered between Greece and Turkey in 1959, which resulted in a power-sharing constitution and independence the following year. A Treaty of Establishment also provided for two permanent British bases, and a Treaty of Guarantee between the new Republic, Greece, Turkey and the UK, prohibited the union of Cyprus with any other state or partition.

Nevertheless, Greek Cypriot nationalists under the leadership of their new President, Archbishop Makarios, continued to strive for “Enosis and only enosis”. When Makarios three years later proposed a number of amendments to the Constitution, which reduced the status of the Turkish Cypriots to that of a minority, fighting broke out between the two communities. In March 1964 this resulted in a UN resolution to put in a peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, which has been in place for the last 45 years.

After an attack by the Greek Cypriot National Guard on Turkish Cypriot positions Turkey recciprocated with the bombing of Greek Cypriot villages and the situation was critical. Makarios, who had already joined the non-aligned movement, appealed to the Soviet Union for arms and support, and George Ball, the US Acting Secretary of State, told President Johnson they faced the most dangerous confrontation since the Cuban missile crisis.

With the additional risk of war between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, Johnson addressed a severe warning to Turkey against military intervention. Consequently, Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State, and Ball put forward a plan for the partition of Cyprus to solve what Johnson had called “one of the most complex problems on earth”.

Because of US preoccupation with the situation in Vietnam the plan was shelved but another outbreak of fighting in 1967 once again brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. By 1974 Makarios, “the Castro of the Mediterranean”, had succeeded in alienating the Greek junta, Turkey and the United States, who together brought about his downfall.

Partition
In July the same year the Greek junta instigated a coup to topple Makarios and five days later – when Britain failed to intervene – Turkey took matters in its own hands and invaded, dividing the island into two zones. The coup failed and Makarios was reinstated but a few months before he died in 1977 he came to the conclusion: “It is in the name of enosis Cyprus has been destroyed.”

Since 9/11 the strategic importance of the island has increased and a solution to the Cyprus question is the key to improved relations between EU and NATO. Turkey’s refusal to recognize the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, which became a member of the EU in 2004, is also a stumbling block to its own accession talks.

There have been numerous initiatives on the part of the UN to reunify Cyprus, latest the Annan Plan in 2004. This was, however, rejected by the Greek Cypriots, because it failed to provide for the complete withdrawal of Turkish troops and adequate restitution and compensation for the loss of Greek Cypriot property. There is also the fact that Turkey since the occupation has maintained a policy of colonisation and assimilation by mainland Turks.

In 1983 the Turkish Cypriots declared the northern part of the island to be an independent state, which has only been recognized by Turkey. This, or a confederation with the Greek Cypriot south, is the preferred Turkish solution but recently Turkey has struck an ominous note. In an echo of Germany’s “Heim ins Reich” (Back to the Reich) policy in 1938 Prime Minister Erdogan has indicated his patience is exhausted and Foreign Minister Davutoglu cannot say whether Turkey has reached its final borders as established by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.

Given Turkey’s strategic importance, it would be unfortunate if Europe faced a new Sudetenland crisis, which would put an end to Turkey’s prospects of EU membership. And to do as Neville Chamberlain and dismiss the Cyprus issue as “a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing” could be fatal.

Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in Denmark and from 2005-2008 was a frequent contributor to the Turkish Daily News.

October 17, 2009
A Firebell in the Night: The Prospect of Turkey’s Membership Sounds the Knell for the European Union

This column first appeared at PoliGazette.

A Firebell in the Night: The Prospect of Turkey’s Membership Sounds the Knell for the European Union
By Robert Ellis

Thomas Jefferson, in a memorable letter written in 1820, considered the issue of slavery “a firebell in the night” which would toll the knell of the Union. It is with the same sense of foreboding that some of us today consider the issue of Turkey’s membership of the European Union.

In the winter issue of the Middle East Quarterly, which deals with Turkey’s Islamist danger, Bassam Tibi concludes: “Western politicians, scholars, and opinion makers barely understand what is going on inTurkey”. This view is borne out by, for example, Condoleeza Rice’s statement in May 2007 that the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government is “a government dedicated to pulling Turkey west towardEurope” and last March the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, declared: “The AKP government is made up of profound European reformers”.

Turkey’s long road towards EU membership began with associate status in 1963 and it was not until the EU summit in Helsinki in 1999 that its candidacy was recognized. Beginning in 2001 under the premiership ofBülent Ecevit, Turkey embarked on a series of reforms to get the green light from the EU to start accession negotiations. These reforms included a revision of the civil and penal codes, a dilution of the role of the military and greater freedom to use Kurdish in the public sphere.

Despite the fact that these reforms for the most part existed on paper, in October 2004 the EU Commission found that Turkey had “sufficiently” fulfilled the political crtiteria for membership and recommended that negotiations be opened. In October 2005 negotiations were formally opened, after a great deal of wrangling over the recognition of (Greek) Cyprus, which became a member together with nine other states in May 2004.

However, in starting negotiations the EU left the back door open, concluding that “if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership, it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.” Since then, the enthusiasm forTurkey’s membership has waned considerably on both sides.

The UK, which played a major role in brokering the start of entry talks, has under US tutelage always been an active proponent of Turkish membership. So much so that when Turkey’s Constitutional Court last July decided not to ban the AKP, the British foreign secretary, David Miliband, declared it was “a cause for celebration”.

It is the same Miliband, who in´a keynote speech in Bruges in November 2007 outlined his vision forEurope in 2030. He is clearly delusional when he speaks of a European Union that would ultimately include the countries of the Mahgreb, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. In his own words: “The goal must be a multi-lateral free-trade zone around our periphery …. not as an alternative to membership but potentially as as step toward it.”

A community of values

Quite apart from the formal criteria for EU membership, it has been repeatedly stressed that the Union is a community of values. After the start of entry talks the British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, rejoiced: “It means we have a Europe based on values, not history”, and earlier Olli Rehn, the EU’s enlargement commissioner, explained that Europe was defined by values, not borders. However, in the light of Turkey’s development since the AKP came to power in 2002, it can be argued Turkey is no longer eligible.

A blueprint for dismantling the secular republic established by Mustafa Kemal in 1923 was put forward by Omer Dincer, Prime Minister Erdogan’s former undersecretary, at a symposium held in Sivas in 1995. Two years earlier 37 people, most of them participants in an Alevi cultural festival, were killed in a hotel fire, when the hotel was burned down by a raging mob of Islamic fundamentalists.

At the symposium Omer stated: “I believe that the republican regime in Turkey should be replaced by a more participatory one, and the principle of secularism should be replaced with integration with Islam. Therefore I believe that it’s time, and absolutely necessary, to replace all the fundamental principles outlined at the start of the Turkish Republic, such as secularism, republicanism and nationalism, with a structure that is more participatory, more decentralized and more Muslim.”

The same year Abdullah Gül, deputy leader of the Islamic Welfare Party (banned in 1998) and now Turkey’s president, was more succinct in an interview with The Guardian. “This is the end of the republican period,” he stated. “If 60 percent of Ankara’s´population is living in shacks, then the secular system has failed and we want to change it. “

And this is precisely what these “reformed post-Islamists” (Olli Rehn’s term) have set out to do, despite the fact that the preamble to the Turkish constitution stipulates: “there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics”.

Anti-secular activities

Last July Turkey’s Constitutional Court found by 10 votes to one that the AKP was “a focal point of anti-secular activities” but instead of closing the party decided to halve its Treasury funding. In its indictment the Court paid close attention to controversial statements made by party members, but there is ample evidence of the reorientation of Turkish society in the last six years.

Since coming to power, the AKP has made systematic and sustained efforts to replace the top echelons of the state administration, the education system and the judiciary with its own followers. Two years ago an attempt to appoint the general manager of Albaraka Turk, an Islamic bank, as governor of the central bank, was vetoed by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a staunch secularist, as “inappropriate” but the AKP has otherwise placed its own candidates in key positions.

The autonomy of independent administrative authorities such as the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK) and the Capital Markets Board (SPK) has also been eroded. For example, the EPDK awarded an oil refinery construction permit to the Calik Group, where Prime Minister Erdogan’s son-in-law is the general manager, and not a prior applicant, Petrol Ofisi. Petrol Ofisi is owned by Aydin Dogan, who is also the owner of the Dogan Media Group, the Prime Minister’s outspoken opponent.

The sale of the Sabah-ATV media group, Turkey’s second largest, also to the Calik Group, was facilitated by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), which is staffed by AKP appointees, and was for the most part financed by a loan from two state banks, also managed by AKP appointees.

The new head of the Higher Education Board (YÖK), Yusuf Ziya Özcan, was handpicked, which together with a pliable president makes it possible to overrule the universities’ own choice of candidate as rector.

Furthermore, the president of the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK), Zahid Akman, is embroiled in a scandal which could overwhelm the government. In September the three Turkish directors of a charitable foundation in Germany, Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse), were found guilty of siphoning off €14.5 million ($20.6 million) and transferring the funds to business associates in Turkey, including Kanal 7, the Islamist tv channel.

The operation is believed to have been directed from Turkey and Zahid Akman was named as a courier. However, although four months have elapsed, no steps have been taken to require the documents fromGermany and to launch an investigation in Turkey. In addition, a recent law requires the prime minister’s consent into any investigation into an RTÜK president.

The general elections of 2002 and 2007 provided for the establishment of the AKP’s political power but it was the Public Procurement Laws of 2003 and 2008 which have made possible a transfer of resources to the new elite. According to the first amendment energy, water, transportation and telecommunications contracts are exempt from the law and new amendments have made the awarding of public contracts even less opaque.

There have been a number of land and tender scandals involving members of the AKP, but as acerbic columnist Burak Bekdil has pointed out: “Corruption is an ideology-free disease.” For example, almost 100 municipal employees, including two district mayors from the CHP, the opposition party, were recently detained in a corruption and bribery operation in Izmir province.

Neighbourhood pressure

Two years ago Professor Serif Mardin, the eminent Turkish sociologist, coined the phrase “neighbourhood pressure” to explain the social pressure to conform to conservative religious norms. Last month a controversial study, “Being different in Turkey”, published by the Open Society Institute and BosphorusUniversity, in fact confirms that the non-devout and secularists in Turkey feel under pressure to confirm to the social norms and standards promoted by the AKP.

Among the examples given are pressure to attend Friday prayers and fast during Ramadan and to have their wives wear a headscarf in order to protect their businesses and their jobs. When Tayyip Erdogan was mayor of Istanbul 15 years ago alcohol was banned at municipal facilities but now in 56 of Turkey’s 81 provinces alcohol is not served in municipal or private restaurants or clubs. During Ramadan last September anAnkara shop owner was beaten by municipal police for selling alcohol.

In November 2005 the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf at Turkish universities and underlined: “Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a democratic society.” Prime Minister Erdogan contested this view and stated that it was only Islamic scholars (‘ulema’) who had the right to speak on this issue.

Egemen Bagis, AKP deputy for Istanbul and close associate of Tayyip Erdogan, has just been appointed chief EU negotiator in an attempt to revive Turkey’s flagging hopes of membership. It was this gentleman who in an op-ed piece in the LA Times, “My party is good for Turkey”, last March claimed: “We are only upgrading the country’s democratic standards.”

Unfortunately there are a number of European and American politicians and opinion makers who are prepared to indulge this Alice in Wonderland fantasy. Therefore it would be prudent to heed Bassam Tibi’s warning: “Through its support for institutional Islamism in Turkey, the West loses its true friends: liberal Muslims.”

Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish press and was also a frequent contributor to the Turkish Daily News.

January 17, 2009