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 Last week, when Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev held a victory parade in Baku, he expressed his appreciation to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who attended the ceremonies. Tens of thousands of Azeris turned up in the streets singing the praises of Turkey and waving Turkish and Azeri flags. The two presidents uttered lavish words for one another and repeated their catchphrase, “one people, two states.”

Even though the Turkish military and its advanced drones played a decisive role in the recent Artsakh war, both Aliyev and Erdogan repeatedly lied about Turkey’s involvement in the war, just as they lied about the transfer of Syrian mercenaries to Azerbaijan to fight against the Armenian troops. The successful Azeri/Turkish/mercenary war cemented the influence of Turkey over Azerbaijan and its policies. Many commentators have described this situation as the occupation of Azerbaijan by Turkey. Since the Ottoman army seized Baku one hundred years ago, this is the first time that the Turkish military has reached the shores of the Caspian Sea. This reality is reinforced by the November 9, 2020 agreement signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia, which provides for a route across Armenia linking Azerbaijan proper with Nakhichevan, thereby allowing Turkey access to Azerbaijan and the chance of going beyond to connect with other Turkic republics, thus realizing the age-old dream of Pan-Turanism.

But the Azeri-Turkish relations have not always been this warm and jovial. In 2009, when Armenia and Turkey were negotiating the protocols to open their mutual border, Azerbaijan was furious that Turkey would consider making such an move with Armenia, while ignoring the interests of Azerbaijan.

Wikileaks revealed a “Secret” cable dispatched by the U.S. Embassy in Baku to the Department of State reporting on the over one-hour long meeting held on April 3, 2009, between Pres. Aliyev, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, Matthew Bryza, the U.S. co-chair of the Minsk Group of negotiators on the Artsakh conflict and Anne Derse, the U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan. The cable was titled, “Pres. Aliyev Reasonable on Nagorno-Karabagh Options, Still Furious with Turkey.”

In the summary paragraph, the cable stated that “Aliyev hid none of his outrage at Turkey’s apparent disregard for Azerbaijan’s interests, and the intensity of his display seemed calculated to underscore the seriousness of the repercussions for Turkey if Azerbaijan’s interests in NK [Nagorno Karabagh] are sacrificed for the sake of the Armenian accord.”

Under the subtitle, “Resentment at Ankara’s Betrayal,” the cable stated that “Aliyev responded with a lengthy and bitter indictment of Turkey as a ‘liar, cheat and betrayer’ of Azerbaijan. Noting that the consequences of the current volatile situation in the region are unpredictable, he complained that Azerbaijan had quietly supported the recent improvement in Turkish-Armenian relations, including President Sargsian’s ‘football diplomacy,’ never dreaming that Turkey ‘would cheat us’ by delinking progress on NK from that process. [Turkish] President Gul had promised that there would be no doors or borders opened for Armenia without progress on NK, Aliyev asserted. ‘He lied, I no longer trust him.’”

The cable then stated: “Aliyev noted that when he met Prime Minister Erdogan in Davos this January [2009], Erdogan had said nothing about the steps Turkey was contemplating with Armenia…. After Davos, Erdogan had sent Foreign Minister Babacan to Baku to explain what was occurring with Armenia with respect to re-establishing relations. ‘Babacan asked for my support, saying we should try to make progress ‘in parallel’ on NK,’ but without linkage, Aliyev said incredulously. Aliyev told Babacan Azerbaijan would not support Turkey’s steps with Armenia without progress on NK and outlined ‘all the possible consequences for Turkey and this region’ if Turkey pursued this course. The Turks asked that Aliyev keep the conversation confidential. Aliyev agreed, he said, but shortly thereafter, RFE/RL’s [Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty] Armenian Service reported that NK was ‘no longer an obstacle’ to improvement in Turkish-Armenian relations. This had sparked a press campaign in Azerbaijan which continues to this day, Aliyev added.”

According to the cable: “Aliyev said he had twice sent Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov to Turkey to outline for the Turks what they would win and what they would lose from normalization without resolution or progress on NK, and to propose a joint Turkish-Azerbaijani statement on the matter. Azimov returned without results, and Azerbaijan now confronts ‘the reality’ that Turkey will initial, sign and ratify an agreement with Armenia to open the border and establish diplomatic relations.”

The cable continued: “Azerbaijan also can no longer maintain its posture of ‘patient silence’ about the Turkish-Armenia process, Aliyev said.  He noted that given Erdogan’s political weakness going into the recent Turkish elections, Azerbaijan had refrained from public statements to avoid impact on the vote. But ‘silence was a sign of friendship the Turks do not deserve.’ Turkey is manipulating public opinion, portraying Azerbaijan as acquiescent in its process with Armenia, so Azerbaijan must now clarify, publicly, its position.”

Furthermore, “Turkey is about to commit ‘a serious historical mistake that will never be forgotten,’ Aliyev asserted. ‘Our relations will never be the same. We are not one nation and we never will be. Our relations will be damaged, it will be a disaster on all issues, security, economy, energy,’ Aliyev continued. ‘Turkey has to decide what it will gain and what it will lose. It will lose Azerbaijan, certainly; Central Asia as well, and end Turkic solidarity,’ he continued. There will be consequences for Georgia if Turkey and Azerbaijan split. Energy negotiations will end. ‘They did everything to ruin energy cooperation,’ Aliyev said heatedly. He added later that Turkey underestimates the degree to which Azerbaijan can influence its domestic politics. Azerbaijan has never interfered in Turkish internal politics before, ‘but this is a matter of national concern,’ he warned.” Aliyev added that he felt “personally betrayed” by Gul and Erdogan.

Aliyev concluded his remarks to the U.S. officials with a warning to Turkey, “noting that when the Azerbaijanis had asked the Turks point blank whether they had agreed to normalize with Armenia and open the border without progress on NK, the Turks ‘had not responded,’ Aliyev exploded. ‘Silence means yes…they did it! They will be on the black list always.’”

Following this meeting, Aliyev continued pressuring and threatening Erdogan and Turkey so it would not ratify the Armenia-Turkey protocols. Erdogan was forced to add a new condition to the protocols, seeking the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Artsakh which was unacceptable to Armenia. Eventually, the protocols fell apart as neither Armenia nor Turkey proceeded to ratify them by their respective parliaments.

Aliyev was successful in preventing a rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. Now that Aliyev and Turkey have solved most of the Artsakh issue militarily, they have resumed their love fest creating an existential threat to both Artsakh and Armenia.

One hopes that new unexpected developments could revive the old feud between Aliyev and Erdogan, undermining their current close relations.

Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan presented on his Facebook page on Nov. 18, 2020 his six-month roadmap of actions he plans to take after the devastating defeat Armenia suffered against Azerbaijan, Turkey and imported mercenary terrorists.

These are the steps Pashinyan intends to take, assuming he stays in power. He has rejected persistent popular demands for his resignation. These are his 15-point plans:

Pashinyan began by stating that “it is time to talk about the ways, methods and programs to overcome the current situation.” He admitted that he is “the main responsible for the current situation” and “responsible for overcoming the situation and establishing stability and security in the country.”

The Prime Minister stated that that his first priority is the “resumption of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process in the format of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, emphasizing the status of Artsakh and the priority of the return of the people of Artsakh to their places of residence.” By negotiating the ending of the Artsakh War with Russia, Pashinyan had left out the two other members of the Minsk Group of negotiators, France and the United States.

In his second point, Pashinyan repeated the importance of the return of the people of Artsakh to their homes. He added that their damaged houses, apartments and infrastructure should be restored. Thousands of refugees from Artsakh have already returned to their homes not occupied by Azerbaijan. The Armenian Government has paid a negligible amount of compensation to the returnees.

The third point: the “provision of social guarantees for the families of killed servicemen and citizens.”

The fourth point: “restoration of residential and public structures and infrastructure damaged during the war in the territory of the Republic of Armenia.”

The fifth point: “providing social guarantees, prosthetics and professional training for servicemen with disabilities.”

The sixth point: “soonest return of captured soldiers and civilians. Provision of social guarantees for their families. Quick clarification of the fate of the missing and provision of social guarantees for their families.” This should have been priority number one.

The seventh point: “formation of a system of psychological rehabilitation of the individuals who took part in the war and society in general.”

The eighth point: “approval of the Armed Forces Reform Program and launch of reforms.” I hope this includes the modernization of the military by providing it with the latest drones and missiles and establishing an “air shield” or “Iron Dome” over Armenia and Artsakh to protect them from Israeli and Turkish advanced drones acquired by Azerbaijan.

The ninth point: “overcoming the coronavirus pandemic and eliminating its consequences.”

The tenth point: “restoration of the environment for economic activity.”

The eleventh point: “revitalization of programs for solving demographic problems.” This probably refers to a plan to provide incentives for the growth of the population, something Armenia desperately needs, particularly after the sacrifice of thousands of its young men.

The twelfth point: “amendments to the Electoral Code and adoption of a new law on [political] parties.”

The thirteenth point: “introduction of the institute of professional judges as the first step in establishing an anti-corruption court. Implementation of the law on confiscation of illegal property.” This step has already been initiated.

The fourteenth point: “holding regular thematic consultations with representatives of the Armenian political community and civil society.” This step is desperately needed to unify the nation.

The fifteenth point: “conducting regular thematic consultations with Armenian organizations and individuals of the Diaspora. Involvement of Diaspora individuals and structures in the above-mentioned processes.” Regrettably, the Diaspora has been ignored for far too long except when it comes to fundraising. Besides consulting with the Diaspora, there is a need to establish an institutional structure to deal with the Diaspora in a comprehensive and inclusive manner.

In addition, Pashinyan mentioned that he will make changes in the structure of his government. Indeed, several Ministers have either quit or have been removed since this announcement. It is not likely that their removal is going to satisfy those have been calling for Pashinyan’s resignation.

In conclusion, Pashinyan stated that in six months, until June 2021, he will report to the nation about the implementation of these 15 points and “make a decision on what to do next, taking into account public opinion and reaction.” This could mean that Pashinyan is trying to buy himself time to stay in power and calm the public’s grief and frustration. It remains to be seen if he lasts that long and what the results of his plans will be.

I would like to mention now several important points that Pashinyan left out of his roadmap.

The first immediate priority should be the clarification of the vague provisions of the “Statement” that Pashinyan signed with Aliyev and Putin. This should be an opportunity to minimize the losses and eliminate some of the harshest concessions, such as permitting a road through Armenia’s South to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan.

The second priority should be to take all necessary steps to protect the independent status of Artsakh. Otherwise, we risk losing the remainder of Artsakh.

The third priority is the establishment of an investigative committee to review everything that went wrong in the war and to identify those responsible for the grave errors. There have been a lot of accusations of treason or desertion by Armenia’s political and military leaders. However, not a single individual has been charged with any wrongdoing. It is important than this committee or tribunal be composed of non-partisan and highly respected individuals to avoid any cover-up by the government. Due to national security secrets, it may not possible to invite impartial foreign investigators.

The fourth missing point is the elimination of the regrettable division of Armenians into “blacks” and “whites,” meaning pro-regime and opposition factions. The prevailing atmosphere of hatred and acrimony is tearing the Armenian society apart. All sides should condemn the use of hostile and vulgar language to describe fellow Armenians who disagree with them.

Finally, a provisional government of technocrats should be established to oversee some of the outlined points and others to return Armenian society to normalcy. Plans should also be made to disband the Parliament and schedule new parliamentary elections in six to 12 months. Before the election, however, a new constitution should be prepared and a referendum held to adopt its amended provisions which may include electing the President rather than appointing him by Parliament.

All of these steps should be undertaken in an atmosphere of peace and tolerance, regardless of our individual differences, respecting the rule of law and excluding the commitment of violence.

The “Statement” issued jointly by the Prime Minister of Armenia, and the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia on Nov. 9, 2020 was described by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan as merely a ceasefire document and not the final resolution of the Artsakh issue

While this agreement brought to an end the ongoing war, it was in reality much more than a ceasefire. It included the return to Azerbaijan most of the territories liberated by Armenians in the 1990’s. It also made other concessions to Azerbaijan which are unrelated to Artsakh. Therefore, this document signifies a capitulation on the part of Armenia.

This “Statement” is a loosely worded document which needs serious clarification, if not renegotiation, to make it more precise. I will comment on all nine points of this “Statement”:

The first unusual point in this “Statement” is that while the three leaders agreed to stop the fighting “in their current position” (point 1), the Armenian side is obligated to return territories that were not conquered by Azerbaijan. Most ceasefires indicate a stoppage at the point of contact and the differences between the sides are later settled at the negotiating table. This is why I call this agreement a capitulation, not a ceasefire.

My second observation is that the “Statement” calls for the return of the Aghdam District to Azerbaijan without referring to the Armenian side as the one returning this territory (point 2). However, in point 6, the “Statement” names the Republic of Armenia as the side obligated to return the Kelbajar and Lachin Districts to Azerbaijan. This is a serious error on the part of Armenia since the liberation of Artsakh and the surrounding territories have always been presented as the work of the Armenian forces of Artsakh, not Armenia. With this sentence in the “Statement,” Armenia accepts that it was the one that occupied these territories, thus assuming legal liability for any compensation to Azerbaijan ordered by an international court. The reference to the “Republic of Armenia” should be amended to “Armenian forces.”

Point 3 of the “Statement”: The number of Russian peacekeeping forces in Artsakh is stated as 1,960. However, there are reports that there are many more Russian troops there now and possibly even more would be coming in the future. This is a deviation from the “Statement,” which means that other changes can also be made to this agreement.

Point 4 of the “Statement”: The Russian peacekeepers are mandated to remain between the two sides for five years, unless Armenia or Azerbaijan asks them to depart six months prior to the five year period. While it is understood that no peacekeepers can remain forever, this provision should alarm Armenians because Pres. Aliyev has announced that Azerbaijan wants all of Artsakh back, not just a part of it. Therefore, Azerbaijan will most probably ask Russia to withdraw its troops in 4.5 years, opening the door for a complete Azeri takeover of Artsakh. Even worse, Russian troops could withdraw much earlier should a new war break between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Point 5 of the “Statement” mentions that a “peacekeeping center shall be established to oversee the ceasefire” without mentioning who will manage such a center. Several days after this “Statement” was signed, it was disclosed that Russian and Turkish troops will jointly manage this center to be located on Azerbaijan’s territory, outside of Artsakh. This was probably a concession by Pres. Putin to Turkey for not allowing its troops to join the Russian peacekeepers.

Point 6 of the “Statement” asked Armenia to return Kelbajar to Azerbaijan on Nov. 15, 2020. However, this date was later changed to Nov. 25. Once again, this indicates that it is possible to amend the terms of the “Statement.” Point 6 also calls for the construction of a new route “within the next three years,” to connect Artsakh with Armenia, bypassing Shushi which is now occupied by Azerbaijan.

Point 7 of the “Statement” provides that “internally displaced persons and refugees shall return to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas under the supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.” It is assumed that both Azeri and Armenian refugees will have the right to return to their homes in Artsakh and the surrounding territories. It is doubtful that Armenians would want to return to the territories under Azerbaijan’s control. It is not clearly stated if Azeri refugees have the right to return to the Armenian controlled part of Artsakh which could lead to clashes between the two communities.

Point 8 of the “Statement” calls for the “exchange [of] prisoners of war, hostages and other detained persons, and dead bodies.” However, there is no deadline specified for such an exchange. Since there are many more Armenian captives than Azeris, this has created a serious problem for the Armenian families of the captives who are subjected to barbaric treatment by Azerbaijan.

Point 9 of the “Statement” is the most critical one and the most dangerous for the future of Armenia. It calls for the establishment of a corridor between the main territory of Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan through the southern part of Armenia, near Iran’s border. This is a red line that no Armenian leader should have crossed. It endangers the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia. Such a corridor has been the dream of all Pan-Turanians to connect Turkey by land to Azerbaijan and beyond to the remaining Central Asian Turkic Republics. This is one point that Pashinyan should have adamantly refused to accept. I hope it is not too late to change this treacherous provision. One possibility is that should Azerbaijan violate any of the points of the “Statement,” Armenia would then declare point 9 of the agreement to be null and void. For example, if Azeri forces attack the currently Armenian inhabited part of Artsakh or shut down the new Lachin corridor, Armenia could then close down the Azeri corridor in the South of Armenia. Another opportunity could come in five years, if Azerbaijan asks the Russian peacekeepers to leave Artsakh. Armenia could then close the Azeri corridor crossing its territory, since the “Statement” requires that Russian troops guarantee the safety of this corridor. Pashinyan’s explanation, that this provision would allow Armenia to use the existing railroad through Nakhichevan and Azerbaijan to transport cargo to Russia, is a fantasy. No Armenian cargo will be allowed to cross through Nakhichevan or Azerbaijan. Furthermore, this corridor isolates Armenia from Iran, a critical border for Armenia. To make matters worse for Armenia and Iran, Azerbaijan plans to build a gas pipeline and a rail line through this corridor, thereby circumventing Iranian territory which would deprive Iran of lucrative revenues.

Most surprisingly, the ‘Statement’ makes no mention of the Jihadist mercenaries brought to Azerbaijan by Turkey. The presence of these terrorists is a violation of international law and poses a grave danger to Russia, Iran as well as Armenia. This is exactly what the French Foreign Minister pointed out during his recent visit to Armenia. This oversight must be corrected immediately by adding a new point to the ‘Statement,’ asking Azerbaijan to remove the Syrian mercenaries from its territory.

In addition to these specific points, the signed “Statement” should not be considered a legal document, since neither the Armenian Constitutional Court nor the Armenian Parliament has approved it. Pashinyan has no right to single-handedly sign a document on behalf of the Republic of Armenia without the consent of the appropriate bodies, as required by the Constitution.

Armenia now has at most five years to strengthen itself militarily by building or acquiring advanced weapon systems so it can repel a new attack by Azerbaijan and Turkey on Artsakh or Armenia. As mentioned before, Armenia should immediately recognize Artsakh either as an independent state or as part of the Republic of Armenia, thereby using this recognition as a bargaining card in negotiating a better agreement with Azerbaijan.

Pres. Vladimir Putin of Russia made several important comments in his response to journalists on Nov. 17, 2020, regarding the recent Artsakh War ceasefire that he brokered between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Russian leader started by providing the background of the Artsakh conflict: “It all started in the already remote year of 1988, when ethnic clashes took place in the Azerbaijani city of Sumgait. Armenian civilians fell victim to these events, and later it spread to Nagorno-Karabakh. And since Soviet Union’s leaders did not react duly to these events… let me say it again: these are sensitive issues, and I do not want to side with anyone or decide who was right or wrong. It is no longer possible to determine this now, but it was necessary to put things in order and protect civilians, and this was not done. At that point, the Armenians themselves took up arms, and this protracted conflict, a conflict building for many years broke out. Eventually, it led to a declaration of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance by Karabakh in 1991. The Bishkek agreements were signed in 1994 and this Bishkek memorandum stopped the hostilities at that time. What happened as a result? Karabakh declared independence, as I have said, and another seven adjacent regions came under the control of Armenians, that is, Armenia.”

In response to a journalist’s comment that “no one recognized Karabagh’s status,” Putin stated: “That is true: no one recognized it then or later. By the way, Armenia itself did not recognize it. …With regard to recognizing or not recognizing Karabakh as an independent state, there may be different approaches, but this undoubtedly was a significant factor, including in the course of the bloody conflict that I hope has ended. Because the very fact of the non-recognition of Karabakh, including by Armenia, has left a deep imprint on the course of events and the way it is perceived. To put it bluntly, after the former Georgian leaders’ undoubtedly criminal moves, I mean the attacks against our peacekeepers in South Ossetia, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We recognized the expression of the will of the people living in Crimea to reunite with Russia as just, and we met the people halfway, we did so openly. Some people may like it, others may not like it, but we did it in the interests of the people who live there and in the interests of Russia, and we are not ashamed to speak about it openly. This did not happen with Karabakh, and this, of course, has significantly influenced the developments there.” Later in the interview, Putin added: “Armenia did not recognize the independence and sovereignty of Nagorno-Karabakh. In terms of international law, it meant that Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjoining districts were an inalienable part of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”

This is an important declaration by Pres. Putin. Armenia has been reluctant to recognize Artsakh’s independence out of a concern of a backlash from the international community. It was feared that such a move would have disrupted the peaceful negotiations and could have possibly resulted in war or at least rejection and sanctions against Armenia by the United Nations.

Armenia’s leaders, up until Putin’s above comments, had no idea that not recognizing Artsakh’s independence was viewed by the Russian leader as a mistake, negatively affecting Russia’s support. During the past decades of negotiations with the Minsk Group of mediators, including Russia, one wonders if any of Armenia’s leaders ever asked Putin or his predecessors for their reaction to Armenia’s possible recognition of Artsakh. If Armenia’s leaders did not raise this issue, it was a major mistake. Had Armenia known that Russia would have welcomed its recognition of Artsakh, the subsequent events, including the recent war, would have turned out much different. Some Armenians had suggested that if Artsakh had been united with Armenia, that would have compelled Russia to defend Artsakh from any foreign attacks based on the mutual defense treaty between Russia and Armenia. As I suggested previously, maybe at this late stage, Armenia would finally listen to Putin’s advice and recognize Artsakh’s independence or unify it with Armenia in order to have a bargaining chip in the negotiations with Azerbaijan.

In response to another question regarding the status of Artsakh, Putin stated: “Yes, there is this problem since Karabakh’s final status has not been settled. We have agreed to maintain the status quo. What happens next will be decided eventually by future leaders and future participants in this process. I think if proper conditions are created for normal life and relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, between people in everyday life, especially in the conflict zone, are restored, it will create an environment for determining Karabakh’s status.” This response provides a ray of hope that with time, Artsakh may be able to attain its goal of securing an independent status. Interestingly, Pres. Putin left such a decision to “future leaders and future participants in this process.”

Another question was regarding the territories surrounding Artsakh and the status of Shushi prior to its occupation by Azerbaijan. Pres. Putin explained that the return of the territories surrounding Artsakh to Azerbaijan was first suggested by Russia in 2013 and supported by France and the United States. He said that this would have preserved Artsakh’s status quo “as an unrecognized state,” and its final status to be resolved in the future. Putin stated that there would have been no war if Armenia had agreed to the return of refugees of both sides to their previous homes.

Regarding the City of Shushi, Putin confirmed that its transfer to Azerbaijan was never raised. Putin recalled that 20 days before the end of the war, while Azerbaijan had only conquered “an insignificant part” of Artsakh, he had managed to convince Pres. Aliyev to end the hostilities on condition that Azeri refugees would be able to return to Shushi, under Armenian control in the presence of Russian peacekeepers. However, Prime Minister Pashinyan told Putin that this condition is unacceptable to Armenia and continued the fighting, resulting in the loss of Shushi. Pres. Putin added that there was no “treason” on the part of Pashinyan.

Pres. Putin also made several important deferential remarks regarding Turkey. The Russian leader acknowledged that “Azerbaijan is an independent sovereign state, and has every right to choose allies as it deems fit. Who can deny it this right? This is my first point. Second, as I have already mentioned, nobody has recognized Karabakh’s independence, [not] even Armenia. What does this mean in terms of international law? It means that Azerbaijan sought to recover territories which Azerbaijan and the entire international community view as Azerbaijani territory. In this context, it had the right to choose any ally who could assist it in this endeavor…. You can assess Turkey’s actions any way you want, but it can hardly be accused of violating international law.”

It is noteworthy that Putin did not mention Turkey’s violations of international law by recruiting terrorists from Northern Syria and transporting them to Azerbaijan to fight against Artsakh. Given Russia’s multiple interests in cooperating with Turkey, it is not surprising that he ignored Turkey’s crimes.

Pres. Putin gave an unexpected reason for blocking Turkish peacekeepers from joining Russians in Artsakh. He stated that it was because of “the bitter legacy of the past, the tragic and bloody events that took place during the First World War, the genocide. This is a factor that can be recognized or rejected; some people do and others don’t recognize it. This is not a problem for Russia; we have long recognized it. But why provoke the Armenian side by the presence of Turkish military personnel on the contact line? I believe that President Erdogan was and is fully aware of this.”

Finally, Pres. Putin justified Prime Minister Pashinyan’s agreement to cease the hostilities. He added that any rejection of the signed agreement would be “suicidal” for Armenia…. “It would be a huge mistake.” Putin also acknowledged that even though he had good relations with Armenia’s previous leaders, Russia’s relationship with Armenia did not change after Pashinyan came to power. This statement could be explained by the fact that since the Armenian opposition is critical of Pashinyan signing the ceasefire agreement, Putin is reluctant to criticize him because his opponents, should they come to power, would reject the agreement which could possibly restart the war with Azerbaijan.

Publisher,
The California Courier

The leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia signed an agreement, calling it a “Statement,” on November 9, 2020 to stop the 45-day war in Artsakh and return to Azerbaijan the territories previously belonging to Armenians.

This shocking announcement was made by Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan creating distress and despair among Armenians worldwide. There are four reasons why Armenians reacted with such pessimism and grief:

1) After 45 days of constantly hearing from Armenian officials that “We are winning,” all of a sudden we are told that we have in fact suffered a devastating defeat. Even the number of our dead soldiers was underreported, according to the latest announcement of the Armenian Health Ministry. Regrettably, the final toll is expected to be in the thousands.

2) This was probably the greatest loss since the Armenian Genocide of 105 years ago. Armenians are demoralized and deceived by their own leaders. It shook the very essence of their souls. This was a humiliating capitulation. The descendants of the Armenian Genocide, who still carry in their genes the transgenerational trauma of that greatest tragedy, are deeply affected by this enormous defeat, exposing their long unhealed wounds.

3) The thousands of young Armenian soldiers killed in the battle have deeply saddened all Armenians. Many are wondering if their sacrifice was in vain.

4) Armenians lost a large portion of their historic territories along with their homes, churches, monuments and cemeteries. Just like the effects of the Genocide a century ago are still raw in today’s generation, this latest disaster will have a lasting effect on the psyche of all Armenians.

A huge controversy has been raging in Armenia and the Diaspora after the release of this problematic “Statement.” The Armenian people, who were united like one person throughout the war, all of a sudden have been divided and at each other’s throats. There have been many ugly incidents in Yerevan which will hopefully not spill into the Diaspora. No Armenian should commit an act of violence against any other Armenian or destroy any property. Even though we have a very serious problem, attacking each other will not solve anything. At the same time, those who are engaged in peaceful protests in Yerevan should be allowed to do so without any harassment by the government. People’s right to free speech should be respected especially by a leader who came to power touting democratic rights and values.

The next controversy is identifying those responsible for this debacle. Here again we have two opposing camps. Prime Minister Pashinyan and his supporters acknowledge that he had no choice but to sign the tripartite “Statement” in order to avoid the loss of more territories to Azerbaijan and save thousands of Armenian soldiers who may have been captured or killed. Those supporting this point of view have blamed the previous presidents for enriching themselves at the expense of the nation and not strengthening the military. Pashinyan said that if he had refused to sign the “Statement,” the consequence would have been much worse for the Armenian nation. Azerbaijan would have taken over the rest of Artsakh.

Those opposed to Pashinyan’s position state that the Prime Minister is merely dumping responsibility for the defeat on his predecessors. They point out that Pashinyan made the decision to sign the “Statement” unilaterally, consulting only with the President of Artsakh and the military leaders. Pashinyan did not inform the President of Armenia, the Foreign Minister who just resigned or the Armenian Parliament. They all found out about this ill-fated announcement from the media. This was not expected from a Prime Minister who came to power as a defender of democracy and transparency. Not even France and the United States, the two other mediating members of the Minsk Group, were consulted. Pashinyan also did not respect the promise he had made on August 17, 2018, in front of the 300,000 people at the Republic Square, announcing that he “will not sign secretly any paper on Artsakh.” He added that “if there is such a situation, I will come and stand here, present to you all the details, and you will decide if we are going to accept that option or not.” Pashinyan now claims that this “Statement” is merely a ceasefire, not an agreement on the Artsakh conflict. Obviously, the signed “Statement” is much more than a ceasefire. It is the return of the seven regions in addition to giving up a large portion of Artsakh. As a result, Pashinyan’s opponents seek his resignation.

In my view, there is a much simpler explanation. Ever since the 1994 ceasefire, Armenians in and out of Armenia were totally opposed to returning the liberated territories to Azerbaijan, as were the leaders of Armenia and Artsakh. The only exception was Pres. Levon Ter-Petrosyan who wanted to make territorial concessions to Azerbaijan, as a result of which he was forced out of office. The subsequent Presidents of Armenia knew well that the Armenian people would not accept any kind of territorial concessions regarding Artsakh. Ever since the 1994 ceasefire, there have been dozens of fruitless meetings between the foreign ministers and heads of Armenia and Azerbaijan, mediated by the Minsk Group of France, Russia and the United States. The Armenian position was that we will consider returning some of the territories around Artsakh, if Azerbaijan recognized Artsakh’s independence. Armenians wanted a package deal rather than a step-by-step solution. The reason was that should Armenians give up the surrounding territories first, Azerbaijan would then be in a position to take over Artsakh itself.

In the meantime, Armenians and the rest of the world repeatedly stated that there is no military solution to the Artsakh conflict which should be resolved through peaceful negotiations. However, Pres. Aliyev kept threatening to use military force to recover the lost territories. Using its huge oil income, Azerbaijan bought billions of dollars of sophisticated weapons from Israel, Russia and others. Armenia also bought some weapons, but did not have the resources to match Azerbaijan’s military buildup. Armenians did not take Aliyev’s threats seriously. Finally, Azerbaijan secured the support and participation of the powerful Turkish military and recruited several thousand Islamist terrorist mercenaries to fight on its side. The highly technological war with remote control drones and missiles devastated the Armenian military and conquered what Armenia and Artsakh was not willing to give up, despite the heroic efforts of the Armenian soldiers.

Therefore, rather than asking who is to blame for this fiasco, Armenians need to acknowledge that we paid the price for being unable to counter the powerful weapons of Azerbaijan and Turkey which has the second most powerful military in NATO. As Prime Minister Pashinyan acknowledged, if he had conceded some of the territories around Artsakh earlier, there would not have been this capitulation. However, if we had given up these areas without an agreement on the final status of Artsakh, Azerbaijan would have then attacked and captured Artsakh itself.

There are two basic facts that we must all admit:

1) The powerful side always wins in a war, no matter how just the weaker side’s cause is. Armenians did not use the last 26 years to turn Artsakh into an impenetrable fortress. They should have had a defense system to shield Artsakh from drone attacks.

2) When you are weak and rely on others to save you, you would be disappointed and defeated. Armenians kept saying that we were left alone. This is not surprising. All countries make decisions based on their own national interests.

The “Statement” signed by Pashinyan is devastating. We need to find a way to minimize our losses. Besides losing the territories in and around Artsakh, we should not have agreed to provide a corridor through Armenia to Azerbaijan to connect with Nakhichevan. This would allow Turkey to cross Armenia by land and link with Azerbaijan and beyond to other Turkic republics. This is the realization of Turkey’s Pan-Turanian dream which we should not permit at all cost.

Finally, the text of the “Statement”, which is the equivalent of a treaty according to Armenia’s constitution, should be submitted to Armenia’s Constitutional Court and the Parliament for ratification. Otherwise, it would have no legal value. Armenia should also involve France and the United States, the other two Minsk Group of mediators, in the negotiation process to get a better deal.

Even though Pashinyan acknowledged that as Commander-in-Chief he is responsible for Armenia’s defeat, he refuses to resign. Therefore, a referendum should be held to see if the Armenian public approves or rejects the “Statement.” If they reject it, Pashinyan would have no choice but to resign. The elected new leader, hopefully not one from the discredited previous regimes, would then try to negotiate a revised agreement considering the one signed by the ousted Pashinyan to be null and void. This option, however, carries the risk of a fresh attack on Artsakh by Azerbaijan.

I hope Armenia’s new leaders will go through this traumatic experience with sound judgment and concentrate their energies on building a powerful military so they can counter any future attacks by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Finally, this is the right time for Armenia to recognize Artsakh’s independence or its unification with Armenia, thereby introducing an unexpected new factor in the negotiations with Azerbaijan.