Category: Authors

  • APPEL DE BLOIS    (THE BLOIS APPEAL)

    APPEL DE BLOIS (THE BLOIS APPEAL)

    APPEL DE BLOIS  (THE BLOIS APPEAL)

    (Columnist’s note:  Those who read this column regularly know that I always supported the view that  history cannot be legislated.  I believe that the historical controversies can be resolved only by mustering all the available evidence, allowing peers to honestly review and scrutinize it, and permitting free and open debates to take place, without the intimidation by partisan fanatic groups of citizens and/or politicians.   Armenians for years tried very hard to stifle debate by pressuring  politicians into legislating the Turkish-Armenian conflict into law as genocide, totally ignoring Armenian complicity, Armenian war crimes, Armenian hate crimes and the resulting Turkish victims.   They have almost succeeded it in France.  I am saying “almost”, because French scholars, historians and other intellectuals, fed up with nagging Armenian demands destroying history scholarship, finally rose up against such travesty  and with the appeal below, they turned the tables on vocal groups (mostly Armenians) dictating certain historiographies on the unsuspecting public.  “Memory laws” in Europe are signs of double standards and disrespect for freedom of expression. I hope that the same mistake will not be repeated in the United States.  Otherwise, you will have zealots, armed with only one side of the story allowed by legislation, attacking and demonizing scholars and citizens with differing views as “genocide deniers”, not unlike those KKK lynch mobs.  I am delighted to note the following developments in France regarding the de-legalization of the alleged Armenian genocide.  I signed “The Blois Appeal” immediately and congratulate here the French intellectuals who showed the civil courage to also sign it.  Let’s read the “Appel De Blois” : )

    ***

    ( Note by the authors of the “Blois Appeal”;  Pierre NORA, Chairman, LIBERTÉ POUR L’HISTOIRE:  If you wish to approve the “Appel de Blois”, send an e-mail to contact@lph-asso.fr;  give your first and last names; and write “read and approved”. Everyone is entitled to give his/her signature.  Academics should add their university and others their residency.

    Since 2005 Liberté pour l’Histoire has fought against the initiatives of legislative authorities to criminalize the past, thus putting more and more obstacles in the way of historical research.   In April 2007, a framework decision of the European Council of Ministers has given an international dimension to a problem that had until then been exclusively French.  In the name of the indisputable and necessary suppression of racism and anti-Semitism, this decision established throughout the European Union new crimes that threaten to place on historians prohibitions that are incompatible with their profession. In the context of the Historical Encounters of Blois in 2008 dedicated to “The Europeans”, Liberté pour l’Histoire invites the approval of the following resolution .)

    ***


    Concerned about the retrospective moralization of history and intellectual censure, we call for the mobilization of European historians and for the wisdom of politicians.

    History must not be a slave to contemporary politics nor can it be written on the command of competing memories.  In a free state, no political authority has the right to define historical truth and to restrain the freedom of the historian with the threat of penal sanctions.

    We call on historians to marshal their forces within each of their countries and to create structures similar to our own, and, for the time being, to individually sign the present appeal, to put a stop to this movement toward laws aimed at controlling history memory.

    We ask government authorities to recognize that, while they are responsible for the maintenance of the collective memory, they must not establish, by law and for the past, an official truth whose legal application can carry serious consequences for the profession of history and for intellectual liberty in general.

    In a democracy, liberty for history is liberty for all.

    Pierre NORA, chairman of Liberté pour l’Histoire

    First signatories :

    AABELVIK Hanne-Guro, Oslo (SE) · ABAJO VEGA Noemi, Barcelone (ES) · ABBATTISTA Guido, Trieste (IT) · ABBÈS Anne (FR) · ABBOTT Steve (GB) · ABEL Burkhard, Osthofen (DE) · ACCORNERO Cristina, Turin (IT) · AGBAZAHOU Christel, Blagnac (FR) · AGRIANTONI Christine, Volos (GR) · AGULHON Maurice, Villeneuve-les-Avignon (FR) · AKGÜRBÜZ Cemal Engin, L’Horme (FR) · ALARY Éric, La Croix-en-Touraine (FR) · ALBERTI Elisabetta, Massagno (CH) · ALDEBERT Jacques, Vanves (FR) · ALDERMAN Geoffrey, Buckingham (GB) · ALEXANDRE Françoise, Paris (FR) · ALLAIN Jean-Claude, Paris (FR) · ALLAIRE Jean-Marie, Rennes (FR) · ALLCOCK Matthew (GB) · ALLEN Andrew, San Francisco (US) · ALLIES Paul, Montpellier (FR) · ALPTEKIN K. Ekim, Ankara (TR) · ALVAREZ DO BARRIO Manuel, Alicante (ES) · ÁLVAREZ JIMÉNEZ David, Madrid (ES) · AMIEL Pierrette, Pantin (FR) · AMORETTI Francesco, Salerne (IT) · ANDERSON Gordon, Glasgow (GB) · ANDREAU Jean, Paris (FR) · ANDREUX Jean-Émile, Jérusalem (IL) · ANGRÉMY Jean-Pierre, Paris (FR) · ANGUSTURES Anne, Paris (FR) · APPETECCHIA Ilaria, Rome (IT) · ARMAROLI Andrea, Modène (IT) · ARNAUD Patrice, Paris (FR) · ARREDONDO Jaime, Houston (US) · ASSERETO Giovanni, Gênes (IT) · ASSMANN Aleida, Constance (DE) · ASSMANN Jan, Heidelberg (DE) · ATAUZ Devrim, Houston (US) · AUDOUSSET Sophie, Paris (FR) · AURELL Martin, Poitiers (FR) · AYA Ukru, Istanbul (TR) · AYGEN Zeyno, Rockville (US) · AZÉMA Jean-Pierre, Paris (FR) · BABÈS Leïla, Lille (FR) · BACCON Suzanne, Vendôme (FR) · BACKERRA Manfred, Hambourg (DE) · BADINTER Élisabeth, Paris (FR) · BÄHRE Klaas, Hanovre (DE) · BAIADA Luca, Rome (IT) · BARACCA Pierre, Lille (FR) · BARBERON Martine et Michel, Tours (FR) · BARBIER Elsa, Chatou (FR) · BARBLAN Marc Antonio, Genève (CH) · BARDOT Christian, Sceaux (FR) · BARNAVI Élie, Tel Aviv (IL) · BARRET Christophe, Paris (FR) · BARROCHE Julien, Paris (FR) · BARROS Oscar, Santander (ES) · BARTHÉLEMY Dominique, Paris (FR) · BASKERVILLE Geoffrey (GB) · BASSETS Lluc, Llagostera (ES) · BASTOGY Gilles, Paris (FR) · BATTLE Max, Oxford (GB) · BAUMLER Alan, Keith (US) · BAUR Georges, Bruxelles (BE) · BEAUFORT Reynald, Reims (FR) · BECKER David, Sumy (UA) · BECKER Jean-Jacques, Paris (FR) · BEGOT Danielle, Fort-de-France (FR) · BÈGUE Michelle, Montpellier (FR) · BELALA Monika, Paris (FR) · BEN M’BAREK Khaled, Besançon (FR) · BENAITEAU Michèle, Naples (IT) · BEN-AMOS Avner, Omer (IL) · BENDER Ryszard, Lublin (PL) · BENNASAR Bartolomé, Toulouse (FR) · BENTLEY Jerry H., Honolulu (US) · BERELOWITCH Wladimir, Paris (FR) · BERGER Gérard, Saint-Étienne (FR) · BERGÈS Michel, Bordeaux (FR) · BERGVELT Ellinoor, Amsterdam (NL) · BERKTAY Halil, Istanbul (TR) · BERMAN Franklin (GB) · BERTHOD Laurent, Villeurbanne (FR) · BERTIN Cécile, Nantes (FR) · BERTIN Sandrine, Bruxelles (BE) · BERTON Mathias, La Roche-sur-Yon (FR) · BERTRAM Günter, Hambourg (DE) · BERTRAND Christiane, Blois (FR) · BERTRAND Jean-Marie, Paris (FR) · BERTRAND Mickaël, Dijon (FR) · BESSON Hugo, Aubervilliers (FR) · BEYLAU Pierre, Paris (FR) · BEZIAS Jean-Rémy, Nice (FR) · BÉZIAU Loïc, Béziers (FR) · BIANCO Lucien, Dauphin (FR) · BIAO Yang, Shanghai (CN) · BIGOTTE Samuel, Issy-les-Moulineaux (FR) · BILE Federico, Annunziata (IT) · BILLARD Hugo, Meaux (FR) · BIMBENET Jérôme, Le Raincy (FR) · BIZRI Hala, Beyrouth (LB) · BLACHÈRE Camille, Lyon (FR) · BLACK John, Londres (GB) · BLANCHARD Pascal, Marseille (FR) · BLOCKMANS Wim, Wassenaar (NL) · BLOFELD Piers, Londres (GB) · BLOM Philipp, Vienne (AT) · BLUSSÉ Leonard, Leyde (NL) · BOGAERT Brenda (GB) · BOISSEL Isabelle, Taverny (FR) · BOISSELLIER Stéphane, Blois (FR) · BOLOGNE Jean-Claude, Paris (FR) · BOMPRESSI Ovidio, Massa (IT) · BONNET Jean-pierre, Poitiers (FR) · BORDES François, Paris (FR) · BORRELLI Antonio, Venise (IT) · BØRRESEN Jacob (NO) · BOSSHART Ruedi, Zurich (CH) · BOSSIS Mireille et Philippe, Paris (FR) · BOTZ Gerhard, Vienne (AT) · BOULIGAUD Françoise, Roanne (FR) · BOURDELAIS Patrice, Paris (FR) · BOURGON Jérôme, Lyon (FR) · BOUSQUET-LABOUÉRIE Christine, Tours (FR) · BOWERS Anthony, Huddersfield (GB) · BOYER Michel, Lussas (FR) · BRACHET Jean-Paul, Paris (FR) · BRADDELL Jocelyn, Dublin (IE) · BRANCACCIO Maria Teresa, Amsterdam (NL) · BRAUMAN Rony, Paris (FR) · BRAZZODURO Andrea, Rome (IT) · BRICE Catherine, Paris (FR) · BRIQUEL CHATONNET Françoise, Paris (FR) · BRIZAY François, Angers (FR) · BRÖMER Rainer, Mayence (DE) · BROUGH Douglas, Ashford (GB) · BROWN Martin D., Londres (GB) · BROWN Sheryl J., Liberty (US) · BRUHIERE Monique, Saint-Rémy (FR) · BRUHNS Hinnerk, Paris (FR) · BRÜLL Christoph, Eupen (BE) · BRUMONT Francis, Magnan (FR) · BRUN Jean-François, Saint-Étienne (FR) · BRUNI Lorenzo, Pérouse (IT) · BRUNNER Rainer, Villejuif (FR) · BUR Michel, Nancy (FR) · BURGER Michael, Columbus (US) · BURNHAM Jennifer, Londres (GB) · BYFORD Grenville (GB) · BYNUM Caroline W., Princeton (US) · CACHIN Françoise, Paris (FR) · CAJANI Luigi, Rome (IT) · CALDWELL Peter, Athènes (GR) · CALLAND Napoléon, Rambouillet (FR) · CALLINAN Brian, Melbourne (AU) · CAMARGO Paola, Bogotá (CO) · CAMPBELL David, Portsmouth (GB) · CANAVAGGIO Perrine, Paris (FR) · CANDIDO Giuseppe, Cessaniti (IT) · CANNADINE David, Londres (GB) · CARRÉ DE MALBERG Nathalie, Paris (FR) · CARRÈRE D’ENCAUSSE Hélène, Paris (FR) · CARRION Rodolfo (ES) · CARSENAT Danièle, Chavenay (FR) · CASANOVA Jean-Claude, Paris (FR) · CASSET Marie, Lorient (FR) · CASTA Michel, Amiens (FR) · CASTELLÓN VALDÉZ Luz Mary, Benito Juárez (MX) · CATTOIR Édouard, Saint-Jean-d’Arvey (FR) · CAUSARANO Pietro, Florence (IT) · CERINO Christophe, Ploemeur (FR) · CHADWIN Alastair (GB) · CHAGNON Louis, Courbevoie (FR) · CHALLET Vincent, Montpellier (FR) · CHALUPECKÝ Ivan, Levoča (SK) · CHAMBERS Colin, Kingston (GB) · CHANDERNAGOR Françoise, Paris (FR) · CHAPPUIT Jean-François, Meudon (FR) · CHAR Marie-Claude, Paris (FR) · CHARNAY Christine, Lyon (FR) · CHASTELAND Jean-François, Grenoble (FR) · CHAUVIN Raphaël, Villeurbanne (FR) · CHAVAND Marie-Claude, Soisy-sur-Seine (FR) · CHEMTOV Nathalie, Aix-en-Provence (FR) · CHENILLE Vincent, Paris (FR) · CHIAPPONI Gemma, Gênes (IT) · CHISHOLM R. J. (GB) · CIUTI Francesco, Pise (IT) · CLAIR Jean, Paris (FR) · CLARKE Georgia, Londres (GB) · CLASTRES Patrick, Orléans (FR) · CODIGNOLA-BO Luca, Gênes (IT) · COISSON Fabrizio, Rome (IT) · COJA Ion, Bucarest (RO) · COLELLA Radames, Avellino (IT) · COLLEC Odile et Yves (FR) · COLLEY Linda, Princeton (US) · COLMAN Steven, Sydney (AU) · COLWILL Richard (GB) · CORAM Geoff, Shrewsbury (GB) · ÇORBACI Ertunç, Istanbul (TR) · CORNER Paul, Sienne (IT) · CORTIAL Marie-Claude, Chaise-Dieu-du-Theil (FR) · COUDRY Marianne, Mulhouse (FR) · COUGNARD Jean, Thaon (FR) · COURCHINOUX Martine, Bordeaux (FR) · COURLY Éric, Mireval (FR) · COURTOIS Stéphane, Paris (FR) · CRAIG Jennifer, Londres (GB) · CRISTOFFANINI Giorgio, Gênes (IT) · CRONIN James E., Boston (US) · CROUBOIS Claude, Tours (FR) · CSESZNEKY de MILVÁNY Miklós, Spalding (GB) · CUESTA MACIAS Ana, Barcelone (ES) · CUROTTO Ivo, Rome (IT) · CURRLIN Wolfgang, Friedrichshafen (DE) · CURTOSI Filippo, Cessaniti (IT) · CZOUZ-TORNARE Alain-Jacques, Marsens (CH) · D’ABOVILLE-CRAVERI Benedetto, Paris (FR) · DAIX Pierre, Paris (FR) · DALVIT Matteo, Milan (IT) · DAMAYE Joëlle, Paris (FR) · DANIEL Ute, Braunschweig (DE) · DAURIAC Éric, Isle (FR) · DAVELU Myriam, Ousse (FR) · DAVIES Dorothy (GB) · DE ARCOS Manuel, Salamanque (ES) · DE CARLO Nerio, Milan (IT) · DE CRISENOY Chantal, Saint-Cyprien (FR) · DE FARAMOND Julie, Paris (FR) · DE LUCA Giuseppe, Modène (IT) · DE PAOLI Cesare, Modène (IT) · DE ROOIJ Piet, Haarlem (NL) · DE ZAYAS Alfred, Genève (CH) · DECAUX Alain, Paris (FR) · DEHEE Yannick, Paris (FR) · DEL COL Andrea, Trieste (IT) · DELARUE Frédéric, Tours (FR) · DELARUELLE Jason, Paris (FR) · DELLE DONNE Giorgio, Bolzano (IT) · DELORME Philippe, Versailles (FR) · DELPORTE Christian, Paris (FR) · DELROT Jacqueline, Tournai (BE) · DELUMEAU Jean, Cesson-Sévigné (FR) · DEMM Eberhard, Koszalin (PL) · DEN BOER Pim, Amsterdam (NL) · DEN HOET Michael, Hambourg (DE) · DEQUEKER Édouard, Paris (FR) · DESCAMPS Cyr, Gorée (SN) · DESREUMAUX Alain, Paris (FR) · DETTI Tommaso, Sienne (IT) · DEYERMOND Alan (GB) · DI CUONZO Luigi, Barletta (IT) · DI NUNZIO Max, Rome (IT) · DI RIENZO Eugenio, Rome (IT) · DÍAZ HERNÁNDEZ Ramón, Las Palmas (ES) · DIAZ SANCHEZ Pilar, Madrid (ES) · DICKINSON Olly (GB) · DOLADILLE Nicolas, Nîmes (FR) · DOLAT André, Jeugny (FR) · DOMANGE Gérard, Dugny-sur-Meuse (FR) · DORVILLE A., Melun (FR) · DOSSE François, Paris (FR) · DRAPER Karl (GB) · DRAPER Matthew E., New York (US) · DRESNER Jonathan, Pittsburg (US) · DUBOIS J.-C. (FR) · DUMONT Jacques, Fouillole (FR) · DUNSKUS Thomas, Faleyras (FR) · DURÁN LAGUNA Jorge, Tervuren (BE) · DURAND Cécile, Chanteloup-les-Vignes (FR) · DURAND Yves, La Celle-sous-Gouzon (FR) · ECKERT Jean-Philippe, Metz (FR) · EDMONDS Adrian, Ramat Yishay (IL) · EDWARDS Ruth Dudley (GB) · EISMANN Gaël, Caen (FR) · ELIE Marc, Moscou (RU) · EMMER Pieter C., Leyde (NL) · ENGEL Lidia et Robert, Gdynia (PL) · ERSANLI Büşra, Istanbul (TR) · ESCANDE Jean-Paul, Paris (FR) · ETEMAD Bouda, Genève (CH) · EVANS Richard J., Cambridge (GB) · EVJU Stein, Oslo (SE) · FABBRI Michele, Forli (IT) · FATYGA Barbara, Varsovie (PL) · FAUCHOIS Yann, Paris (FR) · FAUDE Ekkehard, Lengwil (CH) · FAULKNER Simon, Manchester (GB) · FERRO Marc, Paris (FR) · FICHANT Michel, Paris (FR) · FICKESS Ralph, Oklahoma (US) · FIELDHOUSE Roger, Exeter (GB) · FINZSCH Norbert, Cologne (DE) · FIRER Jean-François, Bourg-en-Bresse (FR) · FLORES Marcello, Sienne (IT) · FOCARDI Filippo, Padoue (IT) · FORLIN Olivier, Grenoble (FR) · FORNEROD Nicolas , Genève (CH) · FOSCARI Giuseppe, Salerne (IT) · FOURCAUT Annie, Paris (FR) · FRAGNITO Gigliola, Parme (IT) · FRANÇOIS Étienne, Berlin (DE) · FRAY Jean-luc, Clermont-Ferrand (FR) · FREÁN HERNÁNDEZ Oscar, Besançon (FR) · FREDA Flavio, Monza (IT) · FREEDMAN Paul, New Haven (US) · FREI Norbert, Iéna (DE) · FRIGAU Céline, Paris (FR) · FRIJHOFF Willem, Amsterdam (NL) · FRITSCHY W., Amsterdam (NL) · FRITZ Gerhard, Schwäbisch Gmünd (DE) · FUMAROLI Marc, Paris (FR) · GAETANO Buccheri, Niscemi (IT) · GAILING André, Coulommiers (FR) · GALASSO Giuseppe, Naples (IT) · GALLO Max, Paris (FR) · GALWAY Neil, Belfast (GB) · GARANDEAU Jacques, Niort (FR) · GARAUD Marie-France, Paris (FR) · GARCIA Charles, Poitiers (FR) · GARCIA Patrick, Paris (FR) · GARCÍA GALINDO Juan Antonio, Malaga (ES) · GARDI Andrea, Udine (IT) · GARRONI Susanna, Naples (IT) · GARTON ASH Timothy, Oxford (GB) · GASPARINI Matteo, Trévise (IT) · GAUCHET Marcel, Paris (FR) · GAUTIER Alban, Dunkerque (FR) · GAY NAVARRO Raúl (ES) · GAZEAU Véronique, Vanves (FR) · GEAL Alan, Bristol (GB) · GEARY Patrick, Los Angeles (US) · GEMPP Théodore, Saint-Denis (FR) · GEORGIADIS Sokratis, Stuttgart (DE) · GIARDINA Andrea, Florence (IT) · GIGLI Marzia, Bologne (IT) · GILBERT Brian (GB) · GILLES Michel, Claix (FR) · GINZBURG Carlo, Bologne (IT) · GIVEN Anne, Belfast (GB) · GLOFF Richard, Taos (US) · GOEGEBEUR Werner, Bruxelles (BE) · GÓMEZ PUYUELO José Luis, Madrid (ES) · GÓMEZ RODRÍGUEZ Enrique, Bilbao (ES) · GOODEY Thomas (GB) · GORZIGLIA ACHILLINI Maurizio, Pieve Ligure (IT) · GOTOVITCH José, Bruxelles (BE) · GOULD Graham, Londres (GB) · GRAHAM Tony (rev.), Crawley (GB) · GRANERO CHULBI Rafael, Barcelone (ES) · GRANIER Thomas, Montpellier (FR) · GRAY Russell A., Sunderland (GB) · GREVER Maria, Rotterdam (NL) · GRIMES Declan, Conwy (GB) · GROSE Peter, Saint-Pierre-d’Oléron (FR) · GRYNBERG Anne, Paris (FR) · GUAIANA Yuri, Milan (IT) · GUÉNAIRE Michel, Paris (FR) · GUENIFFEY Patrice, Paris (FR) · GUERIN Mathieu (FR) · GUETTARD Hervé, Blois (FR) · GUIMONNET Christine, Laon (FR) · GUIOMAR Jean-Yves, Paris (FR) · GUIOT Gwenaëlle, La Vieille-Lyre (FR) · GUSTAFSSON Harald, Lund (SE) · HAJMRLE Karel, Alberta (CA) · HALÉVI Ran, Paris (FR) · HAMBY Alonzo L., Athens (US) · HANNIN Valérie, Paris (FR) · HANSEN Randulf Johan, Oslo (NO) · HARKIN Jacqueline, Londres (GB) · HARLEY Graham D. (GB) · HARRIS Keiren (GB) · HARRISON Noel (GB) · HARTOG François, Paris (FR) · HASENOHR Geneviève, Paris (FR) · HAUREZ Rosemonde, Paris (FR) · HAYAERT Valérie, Tunis (TN) · HAYAT Jeannine, Paris (FR) · HAYDN JONES Chris et Jan (GB) · HAYNES John Earl, Kensington (US) · HECHT Carmen Rebecca (DE) · HEINTZ Robert, Vincennes (FR) · HENNE Thomas, Tokyo (JP) · HENRY Maryvonne, Boulogne-Billancourt (FR) · HERMAN Jacques, Pully (CH) · HERUCOVA Angelika, Bratislava (SK) · HIERONIMUS Marc, Amiens (FR) · HIGGINS Ronald, Hereford (FR) · HOBSBAWM Eric, Londres (GB) · HÖCHST Michael, Hambourg (DE) · HOCQ Christian, Bullion (FR) · HÖRNLA Christian, Dorsten (DE) · HUBBARD William H., Haugesund (NO) · HUIBAN Patrice, Saint-Germain-en-Laye (FR) · HUIJSMAN Ronald, Delft (NL) · HUNT Lynn, Los Angeles (US) · HUSSON Benoît, Rosny-sous-Bois (FR) · IACHELLO Enrico, Catane (IT) · IDRISSI Mostafa Hassani, Rabat (MA) · IEVA Frédéric, Turin (IT) · IOGNA-PRAT Dominique, Paris (FR) · IPSEN Gabriele, Stuttgart (DE) · JACQMIN Claire, Tokyo (JP) · JACQUIN Christian, Nevers (FR) · JAMIN DE CAPUA Barbara, Levallois-Perret (FR) · JANSON Henrik, Göteborg (SE) · JASKOWIAK Alexis, Valenciennes (FR) · JAUME Lucien, Pantin (FR) · JEAN-MARIE Laurence, Caen (FR) · JEANNENEY Jean-Noël, Paris (FR) · JESTAZ Étienne, Mandelieu-La-Napoule (FR) · JEWSIEWICKI Bogumil, Québec (CA) · JIMENES Rémi, Tours (FR) · JOBBINS Bob (GB) · JOHANNSEN Joerg, Flensburg (DE) · JONAS David G. (GB) · JONES Steve (GB) · JORIOT Philippe, Gap (FR) · JOUVE Dominique, Rouziers-de-Touraine (FR) · JULLIARD Jacques, Paris (FR) · JUNYENT SÁNCHEZ Emili, Lérida (ES) · JUPEAU REQUILLARD Françoise, Vincennes (FR) · KAESS Élisabeth, Strasbourg (FR) · KALINDE Antoinette, Genève (CH) · KALUS Ludvik, Paris (FR) · KARTHÄUSER Michael, Recht (BE) · KAUFFMANN Grégoire, Paris (FR) · KAZANCIGIL Ali, Paris (FR) · KERR Charles J., Independence (US) · KESSEL (van) Tamara, Amsterdam (NL) · KESSLER Christian, Tokyo (JP) · KHAPAEVA Dina R., Saint-Pétersbourg (RU) · KIMBER Richard A., Saint Andrews (GB) · KIMOURTZIS Panayotis, Rhodes (GR) · KINDO Yann, Privas (FR) · KINKELIN Konrad, Villeurbanne (FR) · KIWITT Eckhardt, Munich (DE) · KLEIN Jean-François, Paris (FR) · KLINKHAMMER Svein, Trondheim (NO) · KNÖRIG Rüdiger, Berlin (DE) · KOCHANEK Joseph (FR) · KOESSLER Thierry, Reims (FR) · KOKKINOS Georges, Rhodes (GR) · KOPOSSOV Nikolaï, Saint-Pétersbourg (RU) · KOSOWSKI Therese, Wiesbaden (DE) · KOULOURI Christina, Corinthe (GR) · KRAKOVITCH Odile, Garches (FR) · KREIS Georg, Bâle (CH) · KRIEG-PLANQUE Alice, Paris (FR) · KUBLER Anne, Paris (FR) · KUNNAS Tarmo, Helsinki (FI) · LABORIE Pierre, Paris (FR) · LACHAISE Bernard, Talence (FR) · LAHIRE Bernard, Lyon (FR) · LALANDE Nicolas, Pau (FR) · LAMAZOU-DUPLAN Véronique, Pau (FR) · LAMBIN Jean-Michel, Genech (FR) · LAMOTHE Mathilde, Pau (FR) · LANCEL Juliette, Cachan (FR) · LANDRY-DERON Isabelle, Paris (FR) · LANDSMANN Ingo, Münster (DE) · LASPOUGEAS Jean, Troarn (FR) · LATOSI Didier, La Terrasse (FR) · LAURENT Élisabeth, Foix (FR) · LAVILLE Christian, Québec (CA) · LAVIN Marie, Nogent-sur-Marne (FR) · LAVOISY Pierre, Rumegies (FR) · LE FUR Yannick, Versailles (FR) · LE GALVIC Patrick, Saint-Denis (FR) · LE GOFF Jacques, Paris (FR) · LE GOFF Jean-Pierre, Chatou (FR) · LE POURHIET Anne-Marie, Paris (FR) · LE QUANG Grégoire, Lyon (FR) · LE RU Laetitia, Perrigny (FR) · LEBOE Jason P., Winnipeg (CA) · LEBRETON Jean-Claude, Cellettes (FR) · LECAILLON Jean-François, Paris (FR) · LECLANT Jean, Paris (FR) · LECLERE T. (FR) · LECUIR Jean, Toulouse (FR) · LEDDA Michele, Leeds (GB) · LEFEUVRE Daniel, Saint-Denis (FR) · LEGENNE Guillemette, Marseille (FR) · LEHERISSEL François, Saint-Maur (FR) · LELEUX Marie-claude, Sèvres (FR) · LEMAIRE André, Paris (FR) · LEMONDE-SANTAMARIA Anne, Saint-Vincent-de-Mercuze (FR) · LEMONIDOU Elli, Rhodes (GR) · LENA Mathieu, Lorient (FR) · LERCH Dominique, Vincennes (FR) · LERESCU Nick, Glenwood (US) · LESAGE Sylvain, Guyancourt (FR) · LETERRIER Sophie, Arras (FR) · LEWIS Brian, Montréal (CA) · LEWY Guenter, Washington (US) · LEYMARIE Michel, Lille (FR) · L’HÉRITIER Michel, Besançon (FR) · LIAKOS Antonis, Athènes (GR) · LIÉBERT Georges, Paris (FR) · LIEVEN Anatol, Washington (US) · LINDEPERG Sylvie, Paris (FR) · LINDLEY Clive, Monmouth (GB) · LINNEBANK Geert, Londres (GB) · LØKHOLM Sigurd, Haslum (NO) · LOSONCZY Anne-Marie, Paris (FR) · LOUBET DEL BAYLE Jean-louis, Colomiers (FR) · LUCIANO Persico, Crémone (IT) · LÜDEMANN Gerd, Göttingen (DE) · LUIS Jean-Philippe, Clermont-Ferrand (FR) · LUKOWSKI Jerzy, Birmingham (GB) · LYTTELTON Adrian, Bologne (IT) · MADSEN Roar, Trondheim (NO) · MÄGER Mart (EE) · MAIER Charles S., Cambridge (US) · MAILLARD Christophe, Besançon (FR) · MAIRE Catherine, Paris (FR) · MAJOR Peter, Budapest (HU) · MALANIMA Paolo, Naples (IT) · MALOSSE Pierre-Louis, Mauguio (FR) · MANDIL François, Pontarlier (FR) · MANEUVRIER Christophe, Caen (FR) · MANTERO Rafael Sánchez, Séville (ES) · MARAVAL Pierre, Paris (FR) · MARCO Jorge, Madrid (ES) · MARCONIS Robert, Ramonville-Saint-Agne (FR) · MARESCALCHI Maria Laura, Bologne (IT) · MARINA Sellia, Cessaniti (IT) · MARMO Marcella, Naples (IT) · MARRUS Michael R., Toronto (CA) · MARTIN Michèle, Montreuil (FR) · MARTINA Giancarlo L., Udine (IT) · MARTÍNEZ GONZALO Pilar (ES) · MARTÍNEZ MORENO Vicente (ES) · MARTOIRE Jeanne-Laure, Lyon (FR) · MARTZ Jean-Patrick, Villeurbanne (FR) · MARUEJOL Florence, Paris (FR) · MASON Simon, Petersfield (GB) · MASTROGREGORI Massimo, Rome (IT) · MATEOS Abdón, Barcelone (ES) · MATHER Charles (rev.), Gloucester (GB) · MATHIEU Amélie, Lyon (FR) · MAURICIO IGLESIAS Miguel, Montpellier (FR) · MAURO Manno, Rome (IT) · MAURY François, Orléans (FR) · MAYALL J. B. L., Cambridge (GB) · MAZEL Florian, Rennes (FR) · MAZOYER Camille, Sante Fe de Bogota (CO) · MAZZINI Elena, Pise (IT) · MCCAIG Donald, Williamsville (US) · MCINTYRE Andrew (GB) · MCKAY Bob, Séoul (KR) · MÉDARD Madeleine, Autun (FR) · MEDRI Guido, Bologne (IT) · MELANDRI Pierre, Paris (FR) · MENESES CASTAÑEDA Zenobia, Santa Cruz de Tenerife (ES) · MERIGGI Maria Grazia, Bergame (IT) · MERSI Stefano, Genève (CH) · MESSICK Melissa, Cadix (ES) · MESSNER Claudius, Lecce (IT) · MIAS Claude, Paris (FR) · MICCOLI Luisa et Giovanni, Trieste (IT) · MICHAUX Madeleine, Nevers (FR) · MIDDELL Matthias, Leipzig (DE) · MIGONI Riccardo, Capoterra (IT) · MIKULSKI Krzysztof, Torun (PL) · MILDT (de) Dick, Amsterdam (NL · MILLER Scott C., Boulder (US) · MILLIGAN Don, Manchester (GB) · MILLOT Jean-Paul, Nevers (FR) · MILZA Pierre, Paris (FR) · MINK Georges, Nanterre (FR) · MINNITI Fortunato, Rome (IT) · MIRANDA Cándido, Ponte Vedra (ES) · MISTRAL Madeleine, Grand-Saconnex (CH) · MITTEAU Anne (FR) · MODZELEWSKI Karol, Varsovie (PL) · MOISL Hermann, Newcastle (GB) · MOMBELLI Mirella, Rome (IT) · MONIOT Henri, Paris (FR) · MONNERAT Sandrine, Berne (CH) · MONTCHALIN (de) Véronique, Chartres (FR) · MOORE Edwin, Glasgow (GB) · MORAT Daniel, Berlin (DE) · MOREAU Mickaël, Bonneville (FR) · MORENO CHÁVEZ José Alberto, Mexico City (MX) · MORO Francesco, Cuneo (IT) · MOSTARDINI Andrea, Rome (IT) · MOTIKA Raoul, Hambourg (DE) · MOUGIN Françoise, Paris (FR) · MOUHOT Jean-Francois, Birmingham (GB) · MOUT Nicolette, Leyde (NL) · MUHAJIR Umair Ahmed (GB) · MÜLLER Klaus-Jürgen, Hambourg (DE) · MUNS Maarten, Diemen (DE) · MURDOCH Iain, Warwickshire (GB) · MURGESCU Mirela Luminiţa, Bucarest (RO) · MURRAY Peter, Maynooth (IE) · MUSALLAM Adnan, Bethléem (Cis-JO) · NANICHE Claudette, Igny (FR) · NASRA Mostefa, Échirolles (FR) · NAVEH Eyal, Tel Aviv (IL) · NEANDER Joachim, Cracovie (PL) · NERSESSIAN Vrej, Londres (GB) · NEVEU Valérie, Angers (FR) · NICHOLLS A. J., Oxford (GB) · NIEUWOUDT Egbert, Stellenbosch (ZA) · NIHAT Ali, Oxford (GB) · NIJHUIS Ton, Amsterdam (NL) · NIKEL Séverine, Paris (FR) · NILSSON Sara Ellis, Göteborg (SE) · NORA Pierre, Paris (FR) · NOTARI Matteo, Neggio (CH) · NOYON Joël, Mâcon (FR) · OLIVA Vincenzo, Rome (IT) · OLOFSSON Magnus, Lund (SE) · ORAN Baskin, Ankara (TR) · ORAN-MARTZ Sirma, Villeurbanne (FR) · ORY Pascal, Chartres (FR) · OUSTLANT Jean-luc, Plaisir (FR) · OVREVIK Bjorn Oystein, Horten (NO) · OWENS Dr. (GB) · OZOUF Mona, Paris (FR) · ÖZTÜRK Erkan Can, Levallois-Perret (FR) · PAGANO Emanuele (FR) · PAILLETTE Céline, Paris (FR) · PAINTING Brian, Reading (GB) · PALM Lennart Andersson, Göteborg (SE) · PARCOLLET Dominique, Paris (FR) · PARKS Michael, Los Angeles (US) · PARRAD Sylvie, Essômes-sur-Marne (FR) · PARVÉRIE Marc, Saint-Augustin (FR) · PASCHEN Joachim, Hambourg (DE) · PAUL Jean-Louis, Dinan (FR) · PÉAN Pierre, Bouffémont (FR) · PEARCE Martin (GB) · PECHA-SOULEZ Michel, Chanzeaux (FR) · PEIRANI Nicolas (IT) · PELAT Mathieu, La Réunion (FR) · PÉRARD Alain, Draveil (FR) · PÉREZ Joseph, Bordeaux (FR) · PERIN-DUREAU Michel-Philippe, Châteauneuf-sur-Isère (FR) · PERRIER Éléonore, Grenoble (FR) · PERRIN Pascale, Bruxelles (BE) · PERROT Jean-Claude, Paris (FR) · PERVILLÉ Guy, Toulouse (FR) · PETOT Françoise, Antony (FR) · PÉTRÉ-GRENOUILLEAU Olivier, Paris (FR) · PETROVIC Vladimir, Skopje (MK) · PEUSCH Marc, Wasserbillig (LU) · PEZZI Teresitta, Ravenne (IT) · PEZZINO Paolo, Pise (IT) · PFEIL Ulrich, Paris (FR) · PFUETZNER Andreas, Salzburg (AT) · PHAM Karine, La Corogne (ES) · PICARD Christophe, Paris (FR) · PIKETTY Guillaume, Bourg-la-Reine (FR) · PISA Michele, Hamilton (CA) · POLLMANN Judith, Leyde (NL) · POMIAN Krzysztof, Paris (FR) · PONDARD Aude, Paris (FR) · PORTEVIN Jacques, Levallois-Perret (FR) · POTEKHIN Dmytro (FR) · POUILLON François, Paris (FR) · PRAT André (FR) · PRAUSER Steffen, Birmingham (GB) · PREVEDEL Michael, Centennial (US) · PRODI Paolo, Bologne (IT) · PROST Antoine, Paris (FR) · PUENTE RUBIO Dimas, Guadalajara (ES) · PUISEUX Hélène, Paris (FR) · PUISSANT Jean, Bruxelles (BE) · PULT Anna Maria, Pise (IT) · PURSEIGLE Pierre, Birmingham (GB) · QUENTIN Bernadette, Évreux (FR) · QUINSAT Françoise, Lille (FR) · QUINTANA-PAZ Miguel Angel (ES) · RACHET Sylvie, Paris (FR) · RAPOPORT Michel, Paris (FR) · RAYTCHEVA Lilia, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines (FR) · READ Piers Paul, Londres (GB) · REDIGOLO Stefano, Venise (IT) · REGOURD François, Massy (FR) · REID David (FR) · REISINGER Craig M. (GB) · REMY Sylvie, Paris (FR) · RENDERS Hans, Amsterdam (NL) · RENE-BAZIN Paule, Meudon (FR) · RENONCIAT Annie, Paris (FR) · REPOUSSI Maria, Thessalonique (GR) · REVEL Jacques, Paris (FR) · RICHARD Gilles, Tours (FR) · RINDONE Elio, Rome (IT) · RIVARD Robert Leon, Amherst (US) · ROBIN Jacques (FR) · RODOLPHE François, Jouy-en-Josas (FR) · RODRIGO Javier, Saragosse (ES) · ROGER Liliane, Loudéac (FR) · ROMAN Alain, Saint-Malo (FR) · ROMANO Sergio, Milan (IT) · RONCUZZI Giovanni, Ravenne (IT) · ROSE Jonathan, Madison (US) · ROSSELLÓ Alex Homar, Barcelone (ES) · ROSSI Paolo, Florence (IT) · ROUAULT Rémi, Caen (FR) · ROUDINESCO Élisabeth, Paris (FR) · ROUGIER Hélène, Lyon (FR) · ROUSSEAU Paul, Paris (FR) · ROUSSELIN Paul, Caen (FR) · ROUSSO Henry, Paris (FR) · ROUVEURE Adine, Lyon (FR) · ROUX Jean-Pierre, Grenoble (FR) · RUIZ-MANJÓN Octavio, Madrid (ES) · RUMBLE Greville, Nutley (GB) · RUMIN Fanch, Saint-Nazaire (FR) · SABINE Mark, Nottingham (GB) · SABY Pierre, Lyon (FR) · SAGER Alain, Nogent-sur-Oise (FR) · SAGNER Pavel (CZ) · SAINT-ROBERT (de) Philippe, Paris (FR) · SALACHAS Jasmine, Paris (FR) · SALAMITO Jean-Marie, Paris (FR) · SALOMONI Antonella, Bologne (IT) · SALVATORI Olivier, Paris (FR) · SALVUCCI Richard, San Antonio (US) · SANTAMARIA Yves, Grenoble (FR) · SANTIN Nathalie, Caen (FR) · SANTOMAURO Michael (GB) · SÁPI Géza, Francfort-sur-l’Oder (DE) · SARAGAT Maria Pia, Rimini (IT) · SARRAZIN Franck, Paris (FR) · SARTRE Maurice, Chambray-lès-Tours (FR) · SAURÍ MERCADER Francisco Manuel (ES) · SAUTEREAU Manuelle, Le Havre (FR) · SAYAG Yves, Montalcino (IT) · SCHEBEN Thomas, Francfort-sur-le-Main (DE) · SCHILLER Ben, East Anglia (GB) · SCHILLING Robert, Montpellier (FR) · SCHMIDT Dieter, Berlin (DE) · SCHOETTLER Peter, Paris (FR) · SCHWARCK Christian, Oxon (GB) · SCHWARTZ Annie, Bailly (FR) · SÉCAIL Claire, Paris (GB) · SELLIER Geneviève, Paris (FR) · SELVA Anne, Salon-de-Provence (FR) · SENARD-BLOCH Catherine, Gif-sur-Yvette (FR) · SÉRANDOUR Arnaud, Paris (FR) · SERRIER Thomas, Francfort-sur-l’Oder (DE) · SHELDON Richard, Bristol (GB) · SHEPPARD Gordon J., Londres (GB) · SINEUX Pierre, Caen (FR) · SLOSS Colin (GB) · SMITH Richard (GB) · SOCRATE Francesca, Rome (IT) · SORENSEN Oystein, Oslo (NO) · SOTINEL Claire, Paris (FR) · SOUBBOTNIK Michael A., Paris (FR) · SOULEZ-LARIVIERE Daniel, Paris (FR) · SOURICE François-Xavier, Franqueville-Saint-Pierre (FR) · SOUYRI Pierre-François, Genève (CH) · SPAGNOLO Carlo, Bari (IT) · SPRENGER Scott, Provo (US) · STALLMAN Richard M., Cambridge (US) · STANO Vito, Bari (IT) · STEINBERG Thomas Immanuel, Hambourg (DE) · STENHOLM Markku, Kotka (FI) · STILES Dean, Douvres (GB) · STOLS Eddy, Herent (BE) · STOLZ Peter, Berlin (DE) · STONE Roger (FR) · STORA Frank, Paris (FR) · STOUDER Paul, Grosrouvre (FR) · STOUFFS Nadia et Jacques (CH) · STRAZZA Michele (IT) · STROUMSA Guy G., Jérusalem (IL) · SUMPTION Jonathan, Londres (GB) · SUSSEL Philippe, Paris (FR) · TAMAS Gergely, Budapest (HU) · TEGÜN Bülent, Istanbul (TR) · TEULINGS Jasper, Amsterdam (NL) · TEYSSÈDRE-JULLIAN Emily, Le Monastère (FR) · THESEN Rainer, Nuremberg (DE) · THEVENET Anne-Marie, Niort (FR) · THOMAS David, Londres (GB) · THOMPSON Peter, Wahroonga (AU) · THONGNAM Somchai, Bangkok (TH) · TIBERTO Franca, Lugano (CH) · TILLMAN Christian, Leamington Spa (GB) · TINTORÉ Natalia, Paris (FR) · TISON Hubert, Paris (FR) · TORRI Michelguglielmo, Turin (IT) · TOUREAUX Guy, Sarzeau (FR) · TOURNÈS Ludovic, Cachan (FR) · TOURON Émilie, Labastide-Cézéracq (FR) · TOUZALIN Marie-Hélène, Paris (FR) · TRAVERSO Enzo, Paris (FR) · TROISI SPAGNOLI Giovanna, Paris (FR) · TRYZNA Nicolas, Thiais (FR) · TÜRKOĞLU Didem, Istanbul (TR) · TURREL Denise, Paris (FR) · TUTIAUX-GUILLON Nicole, Arras (FR) · VAAGLAND Odd (NO) · VABRE Sylvie, Toulouse (FR) · VAÏSSE Maurice, Paris (FR) · VALAT Bruno, Albi (FR) · VALGE Jaak, Viljandi (EE) · VALLEJO Luisa, Madrid (ES) · VALLS MONTÉS Rafael, Valence (ES) · VAN BOXTEL Carla, Rotterdam (NL) · VAN DER LEEUW-ROORD Joke, La Haye (NL) · VAN TORHOUDT Éric, Saint-Pierre-sur-Dives (FR) · VANKOVSKA Biljana, Skopje (MK) · VATTA Antonio, Gênes (IT) · VEINSTEIN Gilles, Paris (FR) · VELDE Henk te, Leyde (NL) · VELLUT Jean-Luc, Louvain-la-Neuve (BE) · VERCLYTTE Thomas, Nîmes (FR) · VERDES-LEROUX Jeannine, Paris (FR) · VERGE-FRANCESCHI Michel, Tours (FR) · VERGEZ-CHAIGNON Bénédicte, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines (FR) · VERGNON Gilles, Valence (FR) · VERLEY Patrick, Genève (CH) · VERSINI Alain, Paris (FR) · VEYNE Paul, Bédoin (FR) · VIAL Éric, Paris (FR) · VICENTINI Claudio, Naples (IT) · VIENNOT Anne-Catherine, Le Havre (FR) · VIGNAUX Michèle, Paris (FR) · VILLAPADIERNA Ramiro, Berlin (DE) · VILLE Sébastien, Budapest (HU) · VINATIER Jean, Paris (FR) · VINCENT Catherine, Paris (FR) · VIOLLET Christian, Orléans (FR) · VIRET Jérôme, Caen (FR) · VODISEK David, Volmerange (FR) · VOGT Michael, Elbingen (DE) · VOIRON Philippe, Châtenay-Malabry (FR) · VOLPATO Sébastien, Nogentel (FR) · VUILLEMIN Alain, Vincennes (FR) · WALKER Roger, Paris (FR) · WALKER Syd, Kuranda (AU) · WALLACE Edward (US) · WALRAND Gilles Marie, Jouars-Pontchartrain (FR) · WALSHE Robert, Aix-en-Provence (FR) · WASSEF Pierre, Paris (FR) · WEBER Jacques, Nantes (FR) · WESSELING Henri, La Haye (NL) · WESTSTEIJN Arthur, Florence (IT) · WHEATCROFT Andrew, Moffat (GB) · WIDMANN Andreas, Hanovre (DE) · WIESENAECKER Philipp, Niedernhausen (DE) · WIEVIORKA Annette, Paris (FR) · WILLEMARCK Frederik, Londres (GB) · WILLEMART Philippe, Sao Paulo (BR) · WINKLER Heinrich August, Berlin (DE) · WINOCK Michel, Paris (FR) · WINTERHALTER Cecilia, Rome (IT) · WIRZINGER Heidrun, Neustadt (DE) · WOOLF Linda (GB) · WRIGHT Nicholas, Norfolk (GB) · YOUNG Alistair, Fife (GB) · YOUNG Emily, Londres (GB) · YUEN John, Hong Kong (CN) · YVOREL Jean-Jacques, Juvisy-sur-Orge (FR) · ZANNI ROSIELLO Isabella (IT) · ZARCONE Thierry, Paris (FR) · ZARROW Peter, Taipei (TW) · ZATON Monique, Cornebarrieu (FR) · ZELIS Guy, Louvain-la-Neuve (BE) · ZELLER Pierre-Marc, Prissé (FR) · ZEN Stefano, Naples (IT) · ZIVOJNOVIC Sanja (NL) · ZOELLNER Reinhard, Berlin (DE) · ZUNZ Olivier, Charlottesville (US).

    ***

    THE CIVIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF HISTORIANS

    Jean-Noël Jeanneney, Conférence Pronconcée à l’Université de Melbourne , 29 April 2008

    ( Jean-Noël Jeanneney is a French historian and politician associated with LIBERTÉ POUR L’HISTOIRE,  23-25 rue Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 75001 Paris, France.  Here are some excerpts from his address at the University of Melbourne  🙂

    “… (T)he subject I want to explore with you, which is the responsibility of historians as they exercise their intellectual and professional activity, charged by the collectivity to which they belong to organise shared memory, to cast light on the common past, and to reflect on the traces it has left. In doing so, they may choose to cut themselves carefully off from contemporary politics, and moreover, while we can identify moments where historians intervene directly in domestic or international political life, we can also find moments of withdrawal or mistrust. This happened for instance in the 1920s in Europe, which saw academic historians withdrawing from the political struggles as a reaction against the orgy of nationalism, even though … most of them had been participants in it during the Great War.

    It remains the case that historians, however prudently they set themselves up to appear, can never completely escape the problem of their civic responsibility, because their entire intellectual activity is affected by it. They cannot ever get away from the possibility that their work will have major political consequences, by virtue of the fact that they are working on the past, and that the presence of that past … always weighs heavily … in the debates and sensitivities that weave the life of a democracy.

    Consequently, their responsibility is a great one – unless they choose to limit themselves to the superficial satisfaction of anecdotal history. I see the management of this responsibility as requiring three lines of approach. Firstly, historians must contribute to the truth about humankind – what it has been, and hence what it is. Secondly, there is the need to clarify ideas, in the service of those who engage in action. And finally they must serve the identity of the nation to which they belong. This third role, as we shall see, is the most ambiguous.

    The truth about humankind? Now that, assuredly, is rather daunting… Obviously the society of historians cannot claim any monopoly in bringing the truth to light, based on some professional know-how. That would be ridiculous. But it seems to me that there would be cause for guilt if historians did not, in such circumstances, contribute to the separation of truth and falsehood.

    Personally, I consider that historians would be failing in their duty if they refused this task of bringing the truth to light when the public interest especially demands it. Clearly, it is also the responsibility of the justice system to draw out truth: does this mean there is competition when a judgment has a historical dimension? I think it’s probably possible to draw a line distinguishing the respective duties: if there is a crime or misdemeanor concerning the norms and laws of the national community, the historian can help define the responsibility of those implicated; but only the judges can reach conclusions in respect to possible punishment.

    This notion of historical ‘expertise’ is difficult to handle. But it becomes clear if we consider that it can and must help the moral, civic and legal judgment process to better understand and, potentially, to reach better conclusions. It can do this firstly by scrutinising the freedom of action of the protagonists, so that the diversity of possibilities they have faced can be reconstructed moment by moment. I think the very heart of our mission is in fact this constant effort, against the temptations of anachronism, to reconstruct what, at each successive moment, has been the freedom of those involved.

    The second mission of historians in a democracy, as I see it, is to help clarify the thought of those engaged in political action. As a stimulus, we can return to the severity of Paul Valéry, who in the text I quoted earlier, affirmed that the work of historians made nations ‘bitter, arrogant and vain.’

    At the risk of appearing paradoxical, I would claim that the task of historians is precisely to warn political agents against the fascination of repetition, by reminding them that nothing ever begins again in the same way, and that what follows is always new. ..

    Prudence and irony are needed to deal with the use that politicians can make of the large reservoir of situations and diverse positions that the past offers: we know how readily they can isolate a given fragment of an event that could easily be refuted by another, if only they should care to mention it.

    It is certainly not up to the historian to be the obliging furnisher of this arsenal of arguments that bring comfort and dynamism to politicians. But conversely, historians have to know that the history they write can and must play an essential role in enlightening these same political actors in the exercise of their power. ..

    In all democracies, we can see that the politicians who most clearly leave their mark are those with historical ballast, and that those who are not are almost always, like boats without keels, condemned to float on the surface of events without really influencing them.

    This responsibility of historians obviously has to be extended beyond leaders to the entire body of citizens, citizens who are educated to history through books, the press, the audio-visual media, and first of all through school.

    History as civic education… Certainly it is not a question of dropping some kind of revealed truth on our compatriots from on high. Rather, our task is to help sharpen their perception, by teaching the diversity of choices, the chains of events, the rhythms of duration in time.

    In the midst of the avalanche of information that modern media technology has intensified for all of us, the most effective citizens of tomorrow, the wisest, will be those who have learned – thanks first and foremost to history (what a responsibility!) – how better to classify, order and organise the complexity of the world which will be fashioned by their choices, their behaviour and their votes.

    They will learn that collective life does not operate in straight lines and that it is constructed according to complex rhythms – some slow and profound, some developing over the middle term, others again rapid and superficial; they will learn that it is all these rhythms together that, at any given moment, delineate the field of each person’s individual freedom within the life of the collectivity. This can readily be applied, in any nation, to all sorts of questions that thrown up by current events: for instance, among others, the sacrifices that each individual must make for the national defence, or the policy of solidarity towards the most needy, or the relations between society and religions, or the role of justice and the nature of punishment, or the tax system, and – in a more enduring way – the balance between the State and the market.

    I have one last area to consider, which is perhaps the most important, namely the links between our profession and the question of national identity. ..

    In the first decades of the Third Republic in France, all of historiography was influenced by a kind of secular pope, a ‘national school-master’ called Emest Lavisse. For a long time, Lavisse dominated the teaching of future citizens, through his hefty university-level History of France, right down to the primary school textbooks that, under his name, were distributed by the millions. This teaching was based entirely on the tenet that historical judgment had the right to sort the events of the past in a simple and peremptory fashion: the good was what favored national unity; the bad was what got in its way or threatened it.

    A tension with universal values results from this attitude, because of the risk that history is putting itself in the service not of patriotism but of patriotism’s degraded caricature, nationalism. I already mentioned this tension, from another angle, in relation to the Dreyfus Affair. In relation to the First World War, in our countries given over to the barbarous folly of a European civil war – and I’m not forgetting the price paid by Australia –, we could put together a very sad anthology of the excesses of historians carried away by their patriotism. It applied to both camps, and sometimes involved the most unreasonable attitudes, to the point of dishonouring the intelligence of the authors.

    I have read that you knew something of this phenomenon here at the same period, and that without going to those extremes, your great Ernest Scott, celebrated in this university, put his academic reputation at risk in his service to the Australian cause. In the other direction, we need to salute the efforts of those historians on both sides of the Rhine, who in the 1920s and 1950s, sought to bring convergence to the French and German textbooks, thanks to a dialogue undertaken in a spirit not of forgetting but of peace.

    From another angle, a nation is also the history of its conflicts and in some cases of its collective crimes – in other words of the way memory is worked over by history. I only know about your ‘history wars’ from the outside, and you won’t be surprised if I use the example of the historians of Germany and their grappling with the issue of the collective responsibility of the entire people in the flowering and perpetuation of nazism and its criminal barbarities. But I’ll also point to a situation that is closer to yours, namely the controversies in the United States and Canada that for several decades now have sprung up around the intervention of historians in the legal confrontations over the rights claimed by the descendants of the Indians who signed particular treaties with their conquerors. In their eyes, these treaties confer special rights that fall outside the common regulations – hunting and fishing rights, for example.

    In North America things are further complicated, in civic and moral terms, because many of our colleagues have accepted to be paid by one side or the other to defend their respective thesis. I remember rejecting, a few years ago, an offer made by lawyers for cigarette manufacturers in anticipation of future trials. They were asking me to certify, from documents that they would give me, that in the 1950s smokers were already perfectly aware of the risks they were running, and that consequently, no responsibility could be imputed to the firms concerned. You can see how slippery the ground is, from the point of view both of the ethics of the profession and of the public interest.

    Along this line, and more broadly, it is illuminating to consider those special moments that constitute commemorations – when a nation crystalises chronological chance to reflect on itself, and, in the best of cases, to cast light on the deep forces that have slowly created a state of ‘wanting-to-live-together’.

    I hope you’ll forgive me for taking a French example once again. I was charged by President Mitterrand, in 1989, to organise the commemoration of the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. It was a privileged occasion for reflecting on the situation of historians, on their role, and their responsibility in such circumstances.

    At the time, I felt that a comparison with the two earlier commemorations, in 1889 and 1939, would be instructive. In 1889, Alphonse Aulard (the Revolution historian I mentioned earlier), stated explicitly:  ‘I wanted at once to teach and practice the French Revolution by serving knowledge and serving the Republic.’ The whole question was to know if at certain moments, given the dramas and passions of the past, there wouldn’t be a contradiction between those two goals. In truth, during that first Centenary, the historians’ action was characterised by sufficient fervour for them not to feel any contradiction or discomfort. The University was on the radical left, with a neo-Kantian orientation, and honoring the memory of the Revolution was a way of honoring the Republic, which was seen as the balanced, peaceful and ultimately successful incarnation of the generous ideals of 1789.

    In 1939, at the time of the hundred and fiftieth anniversary, instead of agreement and fervour, what dominated was rather awkwardness and discord, because of the weaknesses of the European democracies, which were beginning to doubt themselves in the face of the totalitarian ideologies. The attempt was made to mobilise historians to celebrate the so-called ‘translatlantic revolutions’ and to emphasise the links between the United States and France at the end of the 18th century (in an effort to attract the sympathy and support of Roosevelt’s America). But this provoked a lot of reticence, not because of sympathy for fascism (though there were some exceptions), but because the (history) profession did not feel carried by a sufficiently strong wave of collective determination to set aside their academic scruples and to descend into the arena.

    As for the 1989 Bicentenary, I was too involved in it to have the necessary critical distance. But it seems to me that, helped by the precedents, we managed to achieve a good balance between historical research and the civic implications of the event. The Mission I headed imposed a careful and strict separation between the scientific historiographical work – which the State kept its nose out of, even though it provided subsidies – and, on the other hand, the explicitly political task of crystalising deep hopes for the benefit of a certain idea of the French nation as a unique and universal entity in the real world.

    What I have been able to read, at the time and since, about the way Australia organised the celebration of the two hundredth anniversary of the birth of the nation, suggests to me that, notwithstanding the specificities of our two countries, you must have confronted problems somewhat similar to ours – especially in the light of your memorial debates about the relations between colonists and the indigenous populations.

    The issue goes beyond commemorations. In France, there have recently been sharp reactions to a law voted by the right-wing majority in the context of a much-needed and belated renewal of the historiography of French colonisation. This law imposed on the teachers in our junior and senior high schools the obligation to teach ¬ and I quote – the ‘positive aspects’ of colonisation. Quite a number of us responded that it was certainly not through a law that historians could be forced to have a balanced approach and that this text, therefore, was nothing more than a party-political injunction. I must say that when I saw that your former Prime Minister, Mr Howard, had sought in 1999 to introduce into the preamble of your constitution the statement that ‘Australians are free to be proud of their country and heritage’, I had a reaction bordering on the incredulous.

    In France, a great controversy has developed around what we call ‘memorial laws’ – laws that seek to shape the national memory. Whether they are passed by the Right or the Left, they claim to tell the truth about historical facts in the name and interest of the French nation. One of them has recognised the Armenian genocide, another has defined as a crime against humanity slavery and black slave trading (the western practice, rather than the Arab practice). The critique of the historians has moreover reached back as far as a 1990 law, the so-called Gayssot law which punished negationism, the negation of the gas chambers under the Nazis. Against these ‘memorial’ laws, we created an association called ‘Liberty for History’, under the presidency of the great René Rémond, who was my master. After his death, Pierre Nora became president. Neither of these men can be accused of being carried away by excessive emotion.

    Our conviction is that it is not the place of lawmakers to regulate the work of history in this way. You should not see this as self-protection by the profession. One does not need a university label to write good history. Negationism is ignominious. But if it has faded, it is because of the work of courageous colleagues, not because of laws, and moreover, before that law, we had plenty of legal means of punishing antisemitism. For us, it is absolutely unacceptable from a civic point of view, that successive and possibly contradictory parliamentary majorities should make determinations of threat sort about the interpretation of the past, relying on some transient and chance notion of the national interest. It is not only an offence to that intellectual freedom that the Republic must guarantee. It is also a peril to the dignity of a democracy in relation to its past. Patriotism, in truth, while a precious value, should take up its abode elsewhere.

    By way of conclusion, I would like to give the final word to another great historian, Gabriel Monod, who founded the Revue historique in 1876. Monod was a strict Protestant, and as such was more than most preoccupied with the ethical and civic foundations of his discipline. In an article on the progress of the science of history since the 16th century, he set about formulating a synthesis of the different duties I have outlined :

    “Without proposing any goal, any purpose other than the benefit to truth, history, in a mysterious and sure way, works towards the greatness of the nation and at the same time towards the progress of humanity.”

    No doubt, like him and like me, a century and a half later, you can feel how difficult the conciliation of these two objectives will always be. But in the end, it is perhaps that challenging task that gives our profession its savour, its scope, and, in the best of cases, when we succeed in fulfilling it, its virtue.

    Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your kind attention.

    ***

    THE FREEDOM OF HISTORICAL DEBATE IS UNDER ATTACK BY THE MEMORY POLICE

    Timothy Garton Ash, contact@lph-asso.fr <br>

    Guardian, October 16 2008

    Well-intentioned laws that prescribe how we remember terrible events are foolish, unworkable and counter-productive.

    Among the ways in which freedom is being chipped away in Europe, one of the less obvious is the legislation of memory. More and more countries have laws saying you must remember and describe this or that historical event in a certain way, sometimes on pain of criminal prosecution if you give the wrong answer. What the wrong answer is depends on where you are. In Switzerland, you get prosecuted for saying that the terrible thing that happened to the Armenians in the last years of the Ottoman empire was not a genocide. In Turkey, you get prosecuted for saying it was. What is state-ordained truth in the Alps is state-ordained falsehood in Anatolia.

    This week a group of historians and writers, of whom I am one, has pushed back against this dangerous nonsense. In what is being called the “Appel de Blois”, published in Le Monde last weekend, we maintain that in a free country “it is not the business of any political authority to define historical truth and to restrict the liberty of the historian by penal sanctions”. And we argue against the accumulation of so-called “memory laws”. First signatories include historians such as Eric Hobsbawm, Jacques Le Goff and Heinrich Aug u st Winkler. It’s no accident that this appeal originated in France, which has the most intense and tortuous recent experience with memory laws and prosecutions. It began uncontroversially in 1990, when denial of the Nazi Holocaust of the European Jews, along with other crimes against humanity defined by the 1945 Nuremberg tribunal, was made punishable by law in France – as it is in several other European countries. In 1995, the historian Bernard Lewis was convicted by a French court for arguing that, on the available evidence, what happened to the Armenians might not correctly be described as genocide according to the definition in international law.

    A further law, passed in 2001, says the French Republic recognises slavery as a crime against humanity, and this must be given its “consequential place” in teaching and research. A group representing some overseas French citizens subsequently brought a case against the author of a study of the African slave trade, Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau, on the charge of “denial of a crime against humanity”. Meanwhile, yet another law was passed, from a very different point of view, prescribing that school curricula should recognise the “positive role” played by the French presence overseas, “especially in North Africa”.

    Fortunately, at this point a wave of indignation gave birth to a movement called Liberty for History (lph-asso.fr), led by the French historian Pierre Nora, which i s also behind=3D2 0the Appel de Blois. The case against Pétré-Grenouilleau was dropped, and the “positive role” clause nullified. But it remains incredible that such a proposal ever made it to the statute book in one of the world’s great democracies and homelands of historical scholarship.

    This kind of nonsense is all the more dangerous when it comes wearing the mask of virtue. A perfect example is the recent attempt to enforce limits to the interpretation of history across the whole EU in the name of “combating racism and xenophobia”. A proposed “framework decision” of the justice and home affairs council of the EU, initiated by the German justice minister Brigitte Zypries, suggests that in all EU member states “publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivialising crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes” should be “punishable by criminal penalties of a maximum of at least between one and three years imprisonment”.

    Who will decide what historical events count as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, and what constitutes “grossly trivialising” them?

    International humanitarian law indicates some criteria, but exactly what events qualify is a matter of often heated dispute. The only cast-iron way to ensure EU-wide uniformity of treatment would be for the EU to agree a list – call it the Zypries List – of qualifying horrors. You can imagine the horse-trading behind closed doors in Brussels . (Polish official to French counterpart: “OK, we’ll give you the Armenian genocide if you give us the Ukrainian famine.”) Pure Gogol.

    Since some countries with a strong free-speech tradition, including Britain, objected to Zypries’ original draft, the proposed agreement now also says: “Member states may choose to punish only conduct which is either carried out in a manner likely to disturb public order or which is threatening, abusive or insulting.” So in practice, individual countries will continue to do things their own way.

    Despite its manifold flaws, this framework decision was approved by the European Parliament in November 2007, but it has not been brought back to the justice and home affairs council for final approval. I emailed the relevant representative of the current French presidency of the EU to ask why, and just received this cryptic but encouraging reply: “The FD ‘Racism and xenophobia’ is not ready for adoption, as it is suspended to some outstanding parliamentary reservations.” Merci, madame liberté: that will do till the end of this year. Then let the Czech presidency of the EU, which covers the first half of next year, strike it down for good – with a dose of the Good Soldier Svejk’s common sense about history.

    Let me be clear. I believe it is very important that nations, states, peoples and other groups (not to mention individuals) should face up, solemnly and publicly, to the bad things d one by them or in their name. The West German leader Willy Brandt falling silently to his knees in Warsaw before a monument to the victims and heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto is, for me, one of the noblest images of postwar European history. For people to face up to these things, they have to know about them in the first place. So these subjects must be taught in schools as well as publicly commemorated. But before they are taught, they must be researched. The evidence must be uncovered, checked and sifted, and various possible interpretations tested against it.

    It’s this process of historical research and debate that requires complete freedom – subject only to tightly drawn laws of libel and slander, designed to protect living persons but not governments, states or national pride (as in the notorious article 301 of the Turkish penal code). The historian’s equivalent of a natural scientist’s experiment is to test the evidence against all possible hypotheses, however extreme, and then submit what seems to him or her the most convincing interpretation for criticism by professional colleagues and for public debate. This is how we get as near as one ever can to truth about the past.

    How, for example, do you refute the absurd conspiracy theory, which apparently still has some currency in parts of the Arab world, that “the Jews” were behind the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on New York? By forbidding anyone from saying that, on pain of imprisonment? No. You refute it by=3D2 0refuting it. By mustering all the available evidence, in free and open debate. This is not just the best way to get at the facts; ultimately, it’s the best way to combat racism and xenophobia too. So join us, please, to see off the nanny state and its memory police.

    ***

    STATEMENTS OF LIBERTÉ POUR L’HISTOIRE,

    Pierre Nora, President <br>

    January, 12, 2009


    Dear Colleagues and Friends,

    I do not want the end of January, 2009, to pass without communicating to you an assessment of our activities in the past year. On the whole it is positive.

    As you have possibly learned from articles in the press, the mobilization of Liberté pour l’Histoire, today across Europe (cf. Le Monde November 28, 2008) and our Appel de Blois (October 11, 2008), have allowed us to score the following decisive points:

    1. The Parliamentary Mission of Information on Memorial Questions which had listened to numerous historians and jurists, among them our vice president, Françoise Chandernagor, and myself, decided that the National Assembly should cease enacting laws that designated as “genocide” and “crimes against humanity” (modern terms) events that took place in the past. The Mission, presided over by the President of the National Assembly himself, unanimously (thirty deputies representing all of the parties) reaffirmed that it was not the role of Parliament to write history. From now on, when members of Parliament wish to express their regrets or their compassion concerning an historical event it is recommended that they do so by “resolutions” which do not have the constraining power of law and that cannot result in judicial action. (See the Rapport of the Mission « Rassembler la Nation autour d’une mémoire partagée » www.assemblee-nationale.fr.)

    2. The government has decided against sending to the Senate the second proposal of the law concerning the “Armenian Genocide” voted at the end of 2006 by the National Assembly. In light of the arguments presented by our association and the conclusions of the Parliamentary Mission, the government no longer seeks to apply to the law on the “Armenian Genocide” of 1915 the penal sanctions envisioned by the “loi Gayssot” of 1990 concerning the nazi’s crimes. The law of 2001 on Armenia is retained, but it does not forbid debate.

    3. Before the menace of a European framework-decision concerning the “fight against certain forms of racism by means of penal law,” Liberté pour l’Histoire, on the occasion of the Rendez-vous de l’Histoire de Blois, October 10-11, launched an appeal published by Le Monde and echoed by the major European newspapers. As of today, we have received more than 1,100 signatures representing the collectivity of historians. We have published the list in the form of a full-page advertisement in Le Monde on November 28. On the same day this framework-decision was signed in Brussels. However, France has opted for a minimalist approach suggested by Liberté pour L’Histoire: the new crime, very general, established by this framework-decision (crime of “banalization” and of “complicity in banalization” of all war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocides”) only concerns those crimes previously qualified as such by an international tribunal. This allows, in practice:

    a) To reserve the application of this new charge to contemporary crimes, the only ones susceptible, in fact, to being adjudicated either by an ad hoc international tribunal or by the new International Criminal Court.

    b) To avoid retroactive and automatic penalization of all “historical laws” already adopted by our Parliament.

    Certainly it would have been even more preferable, both for scholars of the contemporary period and for future historians, to avoid any further criminalization of opinions or in the canonization of any judgement, but this framework-decision, proposed by the French government since 2001, had already been adopted by the Counsel of Ministers of the European Union and voted by the Parliament of Strasbourg when we became aware of it. At least, by prompting them to make the issues more precise, we have avoided the worst case scenario, that a historian, for example, could be brought before a court for having “minimized” and “contextualized” the massacre of the Angevins in the Sicilian Vespers of 1282…

    4. Concerning the intervention of Parliament in educational programs, a public exchange of letters took place between Xavier Darcos, Minister of National Education, and myself (see the letter on the Web site of Liberté pour l’Histoire.) The report of the Accoyer Parliamentary Mission clearly confirmed the decision that had been taken by the Constitutional Council on January 31, 2006, removing article 4 of the law of February 23, 2005 concerning the recognition by educational programs of the positive role of the French Presence in the Outre-mer. “It must be clear for all,” the Accoyer report affirmed, “that the Parliament must not exceed the realm of law by prescribing the content of history syllabi.”

    Not withstanding these successes we must remain vigilant:

    — First, because we must carefully follow the elaboration of future texts (the European framework-decision must be “transposed” by our Parliament within two years) as well as the evolution of the jurisprudence of courts.

    — Next, because nothing prevents our Parliament, which has for the moment returned to its senses, to come back at any time to its earlier errors.

    — Finally, because, in light of the recent reform of the Constitution, the Constitutional Council might have to pronounce, in the months to come, on the memorial laws that have already been enacted.

    Liberté pour l’Histoire must, more than ever, remain an active interlocutor with the public authorities. In this spirit a meeting has already been set for January with Claude Guéant, (General Secretary of the Elysée), Henri Guaino (Special Counselor for the President of the Republic) and Jean-Louis Debré (President of the Constitutional Counsel).

    We urge you thus to join, to rejoin, and to encourage others to join.

    For our international friends who belong to the European Union

    France established that, for the framework-decision adopted November 28, 2008 concerning the “fight against certain forms of racism and xenophobia” the option deadline offered to title 1 paragraph 4 remains, contrary to the project of the initial text, open for two years.

    This certainly means that the 27 countries of the European Union that are signatories to the framework-decision are already obligated to have in their laws the equivalent to our “loi Gayssot” of 1990 concerning nazi’s crimes (or of the similar German law), and even a bit more: penal sanctions extended to three years in prison for all attempts at “banalization” or “complicity in banalization” of war crimes and crimes against humanity adjudicated up to 1945 by the Nuremberg Tribunal (article one, paragraph one, line d).

    On the other hand, it remains possible, thanks to the option, to limit, for all other collective crimes committed in the course of history, penal sanctions incurred by possible commentators to only those “war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocides” recognized as such by an international criminal court (in other words, “contemporary crimes”).

    It is necessary and sufficient that a government requires to exercise the option envisioned by article 1, paragraph 4, of the framework-decision, an option that the French government, alerted by Liberté pour l’Histoire, has exercised at our request and that, as of the present, is the only government to have so acted.

    Since this option remains open to all states until November, 2010, it would be good if you would encourage your government (Minister of Foreign or European affairs and Parliament) to exercise this option with the Brussels authorities. The option is exercised in the form of a declaration, the text of which is as follows: “[this country] declares, in conformity with article 1, paragraph 4, that it will not make punishable the negation or gross banalization of the crimes addressed in paragraph 1, points c) and d) unless these crimes have been established by a definitive decision issued by a national court and an international court.”

    It is true that the “residual” penalization which remains, even after the exercise of the option, may trouble future historians, who will not be allowed to criticize either judgments of various international ad hoc tribunals created during the past fifty years or those of the International Criminal Court that has recently been established. Any reconsideration of the facts that these courts have considered as proven could result in the criminal sanctions envisioned by the European text. However, contemporary historians will not be hindered in the pursuit of their research and in the expression of their opinions on the more distant past (the Crusades, for example): this is the lesser evil.

    The future will require great vigilance because if the framework-decision which has just been adopted only concerns the “banalization” of collective crimes committed for reasons of racism, xenophobia, or religion (when these latter are focused on an ethnic minority), certain states of the European Union have again requested similar legislation condemning the “banalization” of collective crimes committed for political reasons by totalitarian regimes; in particular this is aimed at crimes of communist regimes in certain countries of the Union (especially the Baltic states). The Council of European Ministers has already invited the Commission to hold public hearings on these crimes and to examine, within two years, the possibility of the adoption of a second framework-decision.

    In the intermediate term one cannot thus exclude:

    — On the one hand, an extension of the European law to crimes committed for religious reasons without any “ethnic” connotation (the European wars of religion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries or the Irish problems could be included).

    — On the other hand, an extension to political crimes committed in the past (without statute of limitations) by a totalitarian regime.

    If one is not careful, what margin of discussion and evaluation will remain to the historian who will soon be accused, concerning any crime that our contemporary society condemns, of “relativism,” “contextualization,” “comparativism,” or “complicity in banalization”?

    In the name of the Association Liberté pour l’Histoire, I send you my best wishes for the new year.

    Pierre Nora, President of Liberté pour l’Histoire, January 12, 2009.

  • A Firebell in the Night: The Prospect of Turkey’s Membership Sounds the Knell for the European Union

    A Firebell in the Night: The Prospect of Turkey’s Membership Sounds the Knell for the European Union

    This column first appeared at PoliGazette.

    A Firebell in the Night: The Prospect of Turkey’s Membership Sounds the Knell for the European Union
    By Robert Ellis

    Thomas Jefferson, in a memorable letter written in 1820, considered the issue of slavery “a firebell in the night” which would toll the knell of the Union. It is with the same sense of foreboding that some of us today consider the issue of Turkey’s membership of the European Union.

    In the winter issue of the Middle East Quarterly, which deals with Turkey’s Islamist danger, Bassam Tibi concludes: “Western politicians, scholars, and opinion makers barely understand what is going on inTurkey”. This view is borne out by, for example, Condoleeza Rice’s statement in May 2007 that the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government is “a government dedicated to pulling Turkey west towardEurope” and last March the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, declared: “The AKP government is made up of profound European reformers”.

    Turkey’s long road towards EU membership began with associate status in 1963 and it was not until the EU summit in Helsinki in 1999 that its candidacy was recognized. Beginning in 2001 under the premiership ofBülent Ecevit, Turkey embarked on a series of reforms to get the green light from the EU to start accession negotiations. These reforms included a revision of the civil and penal codes, a dilution of the role of the military and greater freedom to use Kurdish in the public sphere.

    Despite the fact that these reforms for the most part existed on paper, in October 2004 the EU Commission found that Turkey had “sufficiently” fulfilled the political crtiteria for membership and recommended that negotiations be opened. In October 2005 negotiations were formally opened, after a great deal of wrangling over the recognition of (Greek) Cyprus, which became a member together with nine other states in May 2004.

    However, in starting negotiations the EU left the back door open, concluding that “if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership, it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.” Since then, the enthusiasm forTurkey’s membership has waned considerably on both sides.

    The UK, which played a major role in brokering the start of entry talks, has under US tutelage always been an active proponent of Turkish membership. So much so that when Turkey’s Constitutional Court last July decided not to ban the AKP, the British foreign secretary, David Miliband, declared it was “a cause for celebration”.

    It is the same Miliband, who in´a keynote speech in Bruges in November 2007 outlined his vision forEurope in 2030. He is clearly delusional when he speaks of a European Union that would ultimately include the countries of the Mahgreb, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. In his own words: “The goal must be a multi-lateral free-trade zone around our periphery …. not as an alternative to membership but potentially as as step toward it.”

    A community of values

    Quite apart from the formal criteria for EU membership, it has been repeatedly stressed that the Union is a community of values. After the start of entry talks the British foreign secretary, Jack Straw, rejoiced: “It means we have a Europe based on values, not history”, and earlier Olli Rehn, the EU’s enlargement commissioner, explained that Europe was defined by values, not borders. However, in the light of Turkey’s development since the AKP came to power in 2002, it can be argued Turkey is no longer eligible.

    A blueprint for dismantling the secular republic established by Mustafa Kemal in 1923 was put forward by Omer Dincer, Prime Minister Erdogan’s former undersecretary, at a symposium held in Sivas in 1995. Two years earlier 37 people, most of them participants in an Alevi cultural festival, were killed in a hotel fire, when the hotel was burned down by a raging mob of Islamic fundamentalists.

    At the symposium Omer stated: “I believe that the republican regime in Turkey should be replaced by a more participatory one, and the principle of secularism should be replaced with integration with Islam. Therefore I believe that it’s time, and absolutely necessary, to replace all the fundamental principles outlined at the start of the Turkish Republic, such as secularism, republicanism and nationalism, with a structure that is more participatory, more decentralized and more Muslim.”

    The same year Abdullah Gül, deputy leader of the Islamic Welfare Party (banned in 1998) and now Turkey’s president, was more succinct in an interview with The Guardian. “This is the end of the republican period,” he stated. “If 60 percent of Ankara’s´population is living in shacks, then the secular system has failed and we want to change it. “

    And this is precisely what these “reformed post-Islamists” (Olli Rehn’s term) have set out to do, despite the fact that the preamble to the Turkish constitution stipulates: “there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious feelings in state affairs and politics”.

    Anti-secular activities

    Last July Turkey’s Constitutional Court found by 10 votes to one that the AKP was “a focal point of anti-secular activities” but instead of closing the party decided to halve its Treasury funding. In its indictment the Court paid close attention to controversial statements made by party members, but there is ample evidence of the reorientation of Turkish society in the last six years.

    Since coming to power, the AKP has made systematic and sustained efforts to replace the top echelons of the state administration, the education system and the judiciary with its own followers. Two years ago an attempt to appoint the general manager of  Albaraka Turk, an Islamic bank, as governor of the central bank, was vetoed by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a staunch secularist, as “inappropriate” but the AKP has otherwise placed its own candidates in key positions.

    The autonomy of independent administrative authorities such as the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EPDK) and the Capital Markets Board (SPK) has also been eroded. For example, the EPDK awarded an oil refinery construction permit to the Calik Group, where Prime Minister Erdogan’s son-in-law is the general manager, and not a prior applicant, Petrol Ofisi. Petrol Ofisi is owned by Aydin Dogan, who is also the owner of the Dogan Media Group, the Prime Minister’s outspoken opponent.

    The sale of the Sabah-ATV media group, Turkey’s second largest, also to the Calik Group, was facilitated by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), which is staffed by AKP appointees, and was for the most part financed by a loan from two state banks, also managed by AKP appointees.

    The new head of the Higher Education Board (YÖK), Yusuf Ziya Özcan, was handpicked, which together with a pliable president makes it possible to overrule the universities’ own choice of candidate as rector.

    Furthermore, the president of the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK), Zahid Akman, is embroiled in a scandal which could overwhelm the government. In September the three Turkish directors of a charitable foundation in Germany, Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse), were found guilty of siphoning off €14.5 million ($20.6 million) and transferring the funds to business associates in Turkey, including Kanal 7, the Islamist tv channel.

    The operation is believed to have been directed from Turkey and Zahid Akman was named as a courier. However, although four months have elapsed, no steps have been taken to require the documents fromGermany and to launch an investigation in Turkey. In addition, a recent law requires the prime minister’s consent into any investigation into an RTÜK president.

    The general elections of 2002 and 2007 provided for the establishment of the AKP’s political power but it was the Public Procurement Laws of 2003 and 2008 which have made possible a transfer of resources to the new elite. According to the first amendment energy, water, transportation and telecommunications contracts are exempt from the law and new amendments have made the awarding of public contracts even less opaque.

    There have been a number of land and tender scandals involving members of the AKP, but as acerbic columnist Burak Bekdil has pointed out: “Corruption is an ideology-free disease.” For example, almost 100 municipal employees, including two district mayors from the CHP, the opposition party, were recently detained in a corruption and bribery operation in Izmir province.

    Neighbourhood pressure

    Two years ago Professor Serif Mardin, the eminent Turkish sociologist, coined the phrase “neighbourhood pressure” to explain the social pressure to conform to conservative religious norms. Last month a controversial study, “Being different in Turkey”, published by the Open Society Institute and BosphorusUniversity, in fact confirms that the non-devout and secularists in Turkey feel under pressure to confirm to the social norms and standards promoted by the AKP.

    Among the examples given are pressure to attend Friday prayers and fast during Ramadan and to have their wives wear a headscarf in order to protect their businesses and their jobs. When Tayyip Erdogan was mayor of Istanbul 15 years ago alcohol was banned at municipal facilities but now in 56 of Turkey’s 81 provinces alcohol is not served in municipal or private restaurants or clubs. During Ramadan last September anAnkara shop owner was beaten by municipal police for selling alcohol.

    In November 2005 the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban on the wearing of the Islamic headscarf at Turkish universities and underlined: “Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a democratic society.” Prime Minister Erdogan contested this view and stated that it was only Islamic scholars (‘ulema’) who had the right to speak on this issue.

    Egemen Bagis, AKP deputy for Istanbul and close associate of Tayyip Erdogan, has just been appointed chief EU negotiator in an attempt to revive Turkey’s flagging hopes of membership. It was this gentleman who in an op-ed piece in the LA Times, “My party is good for Turkey”, last March claimed: “We are only upgrading the country’s democratic standards.”

    Unfortunately there are a number of European and American politicians and opinion makers who are prepared to indulge this Alice in Wonderland fantasy. Therefore it would be prudent to heed Bassam Tibi’s warning: “Through its support for institutional Islamism in Turkey, the West loses its true friends: liberal Muslims.”

    Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish press and was also a frequent contributor to the Turkish Daily News.

  • Turkey Is Optimistic About Nabucco as Budapest Summit Approaches

    Turkey Is Optimistic About Nabucco as Budapest Summit Approaches

    Turkey Is Optimistic About Nabucco as Budapest Summit Approaches

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 10
    January 16, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    In the midst of the gas transit row between Russia and Ukraine and discussions on diversifying the continent’s energy supplies, Turkey is pleased to see an opportunity for itself.

    Turkey is seeking a mediating role in the diplomatic standoff between Russia and Ukraine. Following his visit to Moscow, Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler told reporters that Turkey’s talks with the two parties were continuing and it was ready to mediate, if necessary by hosting a meeting in Turkey. Noting that some Balkan countries that were hit by the crisis, such as Bulgaria, were demanding gas from Turkey, he announced that Ankara was holding talks for building alternative supply routes to them. It will be similar to Turkey’s exports to Greece and might help these countries weather future energy interruptions. Guler also was content that the importance of the Nabucco project for diversifying Europe’s energy supplies was appreciated. He told reporters that Turkey was determined to realize this project, and concrete steps to make it operational would be taken soon (Anadolu Ajansi, January 15).

    Ahead of the Nabucco summit to be hosted by Hungary this month, it appears that Turkey’s hand has been strengthened. Despite calls for prioritizing energy security following a similar crisis in 2006, the EU has failed to reduce energy dependence, which has raised questions about the effectiveness of the EU’s energy policy (Hurriyet, January 15). The latest Russian-Ukrainian crisis prompted a debate on diversifying both sources and gas transportation routes through alternative pipelines. The EU and Russia now have incentives to support projects that bypass Ukraine. Gazprom’s Nord Stream and South Stream projects, under the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, respectively, are in progress. Since South Stream is a rival to the Nabucco project and European countries have differing preferences, it will be interesting to observe how pipeline politics develop.

    The Nabucco project, originally projected to open in 2013, will carry gas from the Caspian basin, the Middle East, and Egypt to Europe by routes stretching through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary and terminating at the Baumgarten hub in Austria. The 3,300-km (1,980-mile) project is expected to cost approximately €7.9 billion ($10.5 billion) (www.nabucco-pipeline.com).

    Nabucco has gained increasing favor because of efforts to open European access to the resources of the Caspian (EDM, January 6). The Czech Republic, which currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency, is intent on speeding up the preparations for Nabucco. Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek proposed that the EU make the realization of the project a top priority (www.trt.net.tr, January 14). Nonetheless, other EU members such as Italy back South Stream (EDM, June 25, 2007).

    One major obstacle to the project has been whether the consortium can secure enough gas to make the project feasible. Turkey, hoping to project itself as a major player in gas markets through Nabucco, has worked hard to find sufficient gas resources. Its efforts to bring Turkmenistan on board did not produce any results in mid-2008 (www.asam.org.tr, May 2, 2008), because of Turkmenistan’s contracts with Russia, and concerns about transporting the gas across the Caspian Sea. A trilateral summit between the presidents of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey in late November 2008, however, was interpreted as “quiet support” for the Nabucco project (EDM, December 1). Since then, European leaders have also been encouraging Turkmenistan to join the project. Recently it was suggested that the prospects for realizing the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) had increased, particularly following the Russian-Ukrainian dispute. Although “the route and means for Turkmenistan’s gas to cross the Caspian Sea has not yet been decided,” it is claimed that the TCGP could be integrated into Nabucco (www.isn.ethz.ch, January 15). Nonetheless, Turkmenistan has yet to commit gas exports to Europe through Nabucco.

    Currently, the only supplier that is committed to Nabucco is Azerbaijan. Turkey has been pushing for including Iranian gas in the project, but the diplomatic standoff between Iran and the West over the Iranian nuclear issue raises questions about the likelihood of connecting Iranian Tabriz-Erzurum gas pipeline to Nabucco. Moreover, the reliability of Iran is also unclear, given the problems Turkey has encountered in its imports from Iran in the past. Turkey also hopes to connect gas from Iraq and Egypt to the Nabucco line.

    Turkey had even raised the possibility of Russia joining the Nabucco project. During his visit to Moscow in February 2008, Foreign Minister Ali Babacan invited his Russian counterpart to join the project (Turkish Daily News, February 21, 2008; EDM, February 28, 2008). Later, Guler argued that the South Stream and Nabucco projects could be combined (Today’s Zaman, March 21, 2008). Nonetheless, Russian officials continued to scorn Nabucco for being infeasible.

    Another concern is whether this ambitious project could be completed, given the global economic crisis. Reinhard Mitschek, Managing Director of Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH, maintained that “the actual situation of the markets is more or less a benefit for projects like Nabucco.” As positive developments, he referred to falling steel prices and the willingness of banks to support long-term infrastructure projects in times of crisis (www.nabucco-pipeline.com, January 9).

    Turkey’s demands from other shareholders (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Germany, and Austria), particularly those relating to the pricing mechanism, have been considered another obstacle by experts (EDM, December 12). Speaking after a working meeting in Istanbul on January 13, Mitschek maintained that the parties were close to signing the intergovernmental agreement, emphasizing consensus among countries involved in the construction project about how to “share the benefits and risks of the project equally, each owning a 16.6 percent stake in the project.” Mitschek argued that its flexibility in receiving gas from many sources and being open to different partners and commercial models was what gave Nabucco a competitive advantage over its rivals. He also counted the many benefits of the project to Turkey but said that “we should not mix the two issues. Our consortium is about the transmission of the gas, not about the trading of gas” (Today’s Zaman, Hurriyet Daily News, Milliyet, January 14).

    Guler told reporters that Turkey had submitted its own draft of the intergovernmental agreement to its partners and was awaiting their response (Cihan Haber Ajansi, January 15). Nonetheless, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has not confirmed that he will take part in the Budapest summit. Disagreements over Turkey’s demands, as well intra-EU bargaining, are likely to continue until the leaders meet on January 27.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-is-optimistic-about-nabucco-as-budapest-summit-approaches/

  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Turkey: Attempts To Revive EU Membership Bid
    January 16, 2009Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will visit Brussels on Jan. 18 to renew Turkey’s bid for membership in the European Union, EU Observer reported Jan. 16. Ergodan is scheduled to meet with European Union Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and the European Union’s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, to discuss Turkey’s membership bid and other regional issues. Turkey’s first EU negotiator, Egemen Bagis, will also travel with Erdogan to Brussels.

  • Can Egemen Bagis Revive Turkey’s Stalled EU Accession Process?

    Can Egemen Bagis Revive Turkey’s Stalled EU Accession Process?

    Can Egemen Bagis Revive Turkey’s Stalled EU Accession Process?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 6
    January 12, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan selected Istanbul parliamentary deputy Egemen Bagis as the new chief negotiator for Turkey’s membership negotiations with the European Union. Erdogan also moved the Secretariat General for EU Affairs (ABGS) from the Foreign Ministry to the Prime Minister’s office under Bagis, who was promoted to the rank of state minister (www.cnnturk.com, January 9, 10). The move came amid criticism that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government had stalled the EU accession process.

    The post of chief negotiator was previously held by the current Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, who had filled that position at the same time as his other ministerial appointments in the successive AKP governments. Since the beginning of the memberships talks with the EU in 2005, Babacan acted as the chief negotiator parallel to his positions as economics minister and later foreign minister. The government’s reluctance to appoint a “full-time” negotiator had been a constant source of criticism and was taken by the pro-reform circles as a sign of the low priority that the government attached to the EU project. Especially since Babacan’s assumption of the post of foreign minister, it has been clear that this double assignment was unsustainable, as it became increasingly difficult for Babacan to fulfill his responsibilities as chief negotiator. At the beginning of 2008, Babacan said “2008 will be the year of the EU; you will be surprised [by our reforms]” (Sabah, February 3, 2008). As 2008 closed, however, Turkish-EU relations hit a low point, with no major reform recorded on critical issues. For reformists, 2008 was a lost year (Taraf, December 31, 2008).

    Indeed, myriad international crises taking place in Turkey’s neighborhood engulfed Babacan’s agenda. Turkey’s policy of asserting itself as a major actor in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus coincided with its new role as a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Leading Turkish experts interpreted this growing foreign policy activism as essentially detrimental to the EU project.

    Having identified a trend among Turkey’s political elite of declining enthusiasm for “full membership” and a growing preference for “privileged partnership,” Ziya Onis, a professor of international relations, argued that “The counterpart of this in the foreign policy realm is an approach based on ‘soft Euro-Asianism’ in which … an attempt is made to develop a friendly relationship with all neighboring countries but without the EU providing the main axis or the reference point for foreign policy” (“Recent Foreign Policy Attitudes in Turkey,” DIIS Brief, November 2008).

    In a December 2008 Report, the International Crisis Group maintained that 2009 would be the “make or break” year. The report expected both sides’ attitude at this critical threshold to determine the future direction of Turkey’s European Union vacation, and presented two alternative paths: a breakthrough or a collapse of membership talks. Though recognizing the EU’s own mistakes, the report put the blame for the poor status of relations on the Turkish government’s failure to keep up with the EU’s reform expectations (“Turkey and Europe: The Decisive Year Ahead,” International Crisis Group, Report No: 197, December 15, 2008, www.crisisgroup.org).

    The urgency placed on the year 2009 stems from the fact that the EU will review Turkey’s progress on the issue of ports this year, which is viewed by some as a de facto ultimatum. In 2006 the EU suspended negotiations on eight chapters, because Turkey refused to open its air and sea ports to Greek Cypriot vessels. Babacan had earlier played down the EU pressure and rejected treating this review as an ultimatum. He instead pointed his finger at the EU for stalling in the accession process (Zaman, December 19).

    The appointment of a state minister whose sole responsibility it is to lead membership negotiations, along with the new institutional arrangement, is taken as an indicator of the government’s decision to refocus its attention on the EU project. EU representatives welcomed Bagis’s appointment. Erdogan is scheduled to visit Brussels on January 19, the first such trip in four years (Milliyet, January 10).

    It remains to be seen, however, whether the resumption of the EU project will be geared toward full membership or whether Turkey will settle for some sort of “privileged partnership.” Erdogan’s appointment of the chief negotiator from the AKP’s own ranks, instead of a bureaucrat, and bringing the ABGS under his authority indicate his determination to maintain full control over the membership talks and proceed at the AKP’s own pace. Some observers are critical of this decision: “independent of Mr. Bagis’s appointment, [the danger] is that the government was trying to politicize its relationship with Europe and move the process away from the bureaucracy to its own appointees,” Today’s Zaman wrote (January 11).

    Since it is no secret that Euro-skeptic arguments enjoy popularity within Erdogan’s own cabinet, Bagis will have to bargain with other ministers to revitalize the accession process. One advantage he will have in this battle will be his close association with Erdogan. Since joining party before the 2002 elections, Bagis, 38, had been a member of parliament and served in the party and government in many capacities. Most importantly, he was renowned as one of Erdogan’s top advisors in foreign relations. Since the 2007 elections, he also has been the AKP’s deputy chairman for foreign affairs. With his fluency in English, Bagis has taken part in negotiations on many international problems. He received his education in American schools and worked in the United States prior to joining the party. Given this experience, he has played a major role in the conduct of Turkish-American relations. Bagis has been one of the staunchest advocates of Erdogan and has commanded his respect and support. Although Erdogan has occasionally replaced his other top aides because of political disagreements or public pressure, Bagis has managed to maintain his place in Erdogan’s close circle (Hurriyet Daily News, January 10).

    The future of Turkish-EU relations might depend on what role Bagis foresees for himself and whether he will cave in to the growing anti-EU sentiment. If he can chart an independent role as the chief negotiator and develop an assertive portfolio to revitalize the membership talks, he might be the new hero of liberal-reformists. In this case, he could use his ties to Erdogan as leverage to overcome intra-cabinet obstacles. He might as well continue to act as Erdogan’s man, in which case he is more likely to maintain the same populist attitude, continuing to blame the EU for the shortcomings in the process and avoiding major reforms.

    https://jamestown.org/program/can-egemen-bagis-revive-turkeys-stalled-eu-accession-process/

  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    GUTTING SECURITY: O’S DANGEROUS ANTI-TERROR PICKS

    By DICK MORRIS & EILEEN MCGANN

    Published in the New York Post on January 8, 2009

    President-elect Barack Obama’s appointments to Homeland Security, the Justice Department and now the CIA indicate a virtual abandonment of the War on Terror.

    As Homeland Security chief, he’s named a governor whose only experience has been with the US-Mexican border. His attorney general pick, meanwhile, took the lead in pardoning FALN terrorists. Now he has rounded out his national-security and Justice Department teams by naming ultraliberals.

    Leon Panetta, his choice for CIA chief, is as liberal as they come. Though originally a pro-Nixon congressman, he long ago embraced the left with the fervor of a convert and brings these values to the CIA.

    As President Bill Clinton’s chief of staff (a tenure that coincided with my own work with Clinton), he was a dedicated liberal, opposing accommodation with the Republicans who ran Congress and battling hard against a balanced-budget deal. After winning re-election, Clinton jettisoned Panetta for the more moderate Erskine Bowles in order to reach a deal with the GOP.

    Plus, Panetta was a prime mover in the 1995 appointment of John Deutch to head CIA, replacing hardliner Jim Woolsey. Deutch eventually needed a presidential pardon after being caught committing a massive security breach by taking home his laptop, laden with secret files.

    Choosing Panetta to head the CIA culminates liberals’ 35-year crusade to take over the agency, humble its operatives and rein in its operations. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter named liberal JFK adviser Ted Sorenson to head CIA, only to have the nomination killed. In 1997, Clinton tried to name his ultraleftist National Security Adviser Tony Lake (who had quit Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s staff over Vietnam), only to have that nomination rejected as well.

    Each time, the intelligence community acted to protect its own and curbed the liberal president’s inclinations. But now, under Obama, the Democrats will finally have their way and appoint a liberal zealot to head the agency.

    Panetta will, presumably, curb such practices as waterboarding, rendition and warrantless wiretapping. So we won’t gather much intelligence – but our spies will dot all the i’s and cross all the t’s.

    Over at Justice, Obama is naming four liberals to staff the agency, each determined to rein in effective intelligence-gathering.

    Professor Dawn Johnsen of Indiana University Law School is to head the Office of Legal Counsel. She distinguished herself by writing a law-review article taking issue with President Bush’s efforts to keep us safe. It was titled, “What’s a President To Do: Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of the Bush Administration Abuses.” Presumably, she’ll bring back the days of the wall between criminal and intelligence investigations, which led to our failure to examine the computer of “20th hijacker” Zacharias Moussaoui, which contained wire-fund-transfer information on the other hijackers.

    No less an authority than Harvard Law professor Laurence Tribe, who taught Elena Kagan, the new solicitor general, predicted that she and Johnsen would “freshly re-examine some of the positions the previous administration has taken.”

    Obama’s other Justice appointments, David Ogden as deputy attorney general and Thomas Perrelli as associate AG, bring back Clinton/Reno Justice Department retreads. Both participated eagerly in the constraints on intelligence-gathering that left us so vulnerable on 9/11.

    Bush’s legacy shows one clear achievement: He kept us safe after 9/11. Now his successor’s policies are about to eradicate that singular achievement. The liberals will, of course, all cheer these appointments and the policies they’ll pursue once in office, but these appointments make it frighteningly more likely that we will, indeed, be hit again.

    Go to DickMorris.com to read all of Dick’s columns!
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