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  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Geopolitical Diary: The Turkish and Iranian Balance of Power
    February 27, 2009Turkish President Abdullah Gul announced on Thursday that he will make a one-day trip to Iran on March 10 to attend the Economic Cooperation Organization summit. While the summit aims to improve economic and commercial relations among the member states, the leaders will also discuss bilateral relations and regional issues. Of the two items on Gul’s agenda, his bilateral meetings with the Iranians hold far more interest for STRATFOR than anything that the summit will generate.

    Both Turkey and Iran are on the rise. Until relatively recent times, both have been contained by various forces, most notably Iraq and the Soviet Union. Between the end of the Cold War and American defeat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, however, many restrictions on the power of both states evaporated. Both Turkey and Iran are looking for wider roles in their region. Both have grand imperial pasts. Both have ambitions. And both are somewhat oddballs in the world of geopolitics.

    Most nations are oriented around a piece of flat, core territory where the nationality was not just born, but has entrenched itself. For France, Germany and Poland, that core is their respective portions of the Northern European Plain. The core territory of the United States is the coastal Atlantic strip east of the Appalachians. Argentina is centered on the bountiful flatlands around Buenos Aires. The defining territory of China comprises the fertile regions between the Yellow and Yangtze rivers.

    Such flatness is critical to the development of a nation because the lack of internal geographic barriers allows the dominant culture to assimilate or eliminate groups that would dilute or challenge its power. Additionally, plains regions tend to boast river systems that allow thriving agricultural, transportation and trade opportunities that mountainous regions lack. Very few states count mountains as their core simply because mountains are difficult to pacify. It is very easy for dissident or minority groups to root themselves in such regions, and the writ of the state is often weak. Consequently, most mountainous states are defined not by success but by failure. Lebanon, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Laos come to mind.

    Turkey and Iran are different. Their core lands are mountainous regions — the Anatolian Peninsula for Asia Minor and the Zagros Mountains of Persia. Even though the Turks are not original descendants of their their Anatolian power base, they were able to secure their central lands when they swept in as conquerors a millennium ago and have since destroyed or assimilated most of the natives. The Persians ruled through a dizzyingly complex system of interconnected elites that succeeded in instilling a common Persian culture that extended somewhat beyond mere ethnicity, all while keeping the base of power in the Persians’ hands.

    But that is where the similarities end. As these two states both return to prominence, it is almost inevitable that Turkey that will fare better than Iran, simply because the Turks enjoy the advantage of geography. Anatolia is a plateau surrounded by water on three sides and enjoys the blessing of the Golden Horn, which transforms the well-positioned city of Istanbul into one of the world’s best — and certainly most strategically located — ports. Turkey straddles Europe and Asia, the Balkans and the Islamic world, the former Soviet Union and the Mediterranean Basin. The result is a culture not only incredibly aware of international events, but one steeped in trade whether via its land connections or —by virtue of being a peninsula — maritime trade. Unsurprisingly, for a good chunk of the past 2,000 years, Anatolia — whether under the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines or most recently under the Turks themselves — has been at or nea r the center of human development.

    By comparison, Iran got shortchanged. Although Iran has water on two sides, it has a minimal maritime tradition. Its plateau is a salt desert. The Caspian Sea is landlocked and boasts no major population centers aside from Baku — the capital of another country with a hostile ethnic group. The Persian Gulf coast of Iran is not only lightly populated, but it is easy for powers on the gulf’s southern coast to block Iranian water access to the wider world. While Anatolia has a number of regions that are well watered — even though it does not have many rivers — Persia is predominately an arid region.

    The Turks also enjoy demographic advantages. Only one-fifth of Turkey’s population is non-Turkish, while roughly half of Iran is non-Persian. Iran requires a large army simply to maintain rule at home, while Turkey has the relative freedom to expend resources on power projection tools such as an air force and navy. The difference shines through in their respective economies as well. Despite having nearly identical populations in terms of size, Iran’s economy is only two-fifths the size of Turkey’s. Even in the battle of ideologies, Turkey retains the advantage. The Arab majority in the region prefer Turkey — a fellow Sunni power — to take the lead in managing regional affairs, whereas Shiite Persian Iran is the historical rival of the Arab world.

    Iran may be junior to Turkey in a geopolitical contest, but Iran is still a power that Turkey has to take into consideration. In a major historical reversal, the Iranians have regained influence over Iraq with the rise of a Shia-dominated government that they had lost to the Turks in the mid-1550s, bringing the two powers closer into contact. When two expansionary powers interact closely — as Turkey and Iran are now — they can be either driven to conflict or come to an understanding regarding their respective spheres of influence. In the present day, there are probably more causes for cooperation than conflict between Ankara and Tehran. Iran’s westward expansion gives Turkey and Iran good reasons to cooperate in order to contain Iraq’s Kurdish population in the north. Moreover, Turkey’s bid to become a major energy transit state would improve significantly through a better relationship with Iran.

    Given this dynamic, Gul’s upcoming trip to Iran is likely to be the first of many. The Turks and the Persians have much to sort out on the bilateral level as each seeks to expand their geopolitical influence.

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  • Religious Freedom Still Tenuous in Turkey

    Religious Freedom Still Tenuous in Turkey

    Religious Freedom Still Tenuous in Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 38
    February 26, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    A Turkish court ruled in favor of an Alevi family requesting exemption for their daughter from attending religious lessons in primary school. The ruling highlights the state of religious freedom, as well as the demands of the Alevi community, in Turkey (Anadolu Ajansi, February 24).

    The lawsuit by the girl’s family argued that the religious instruction was against their will and contradicted their religious and philosophical convictions. The plaintiff claimed that by insisting on compulsory religious education, the authorities violated Article 24 of the Turkish constitution regulating freedom of religion and compulsory religious education. The lawsuit also maintained that the student had experienced inner conflicts in this class and faced the risk of failing her classes.

    The defendant, the Muratpasa District governorship, repeated Turkey’s position. Based on a 1990 decision, Turkish authorities claim that exemption from compulsory religious education applies only to Christian and Jewish students. Since Alevism is considered a branch of Islam, Alevi students cannot request the exemption.

    The court based its ruling on Article 24 of the constitution, and Article 9 of the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It ruled that those laws protected everyone’s religious freedom. The court also noted that Turkish regulations had granted exemptions to non-Muslim groups and those families that do not subscribe to any religious beliefs. The court ruled that “irrespective of whether they [the parents] subscribe to any religion, their request for exemption of their child from compulsory religious instruction needs to be considered under the freedom of religious beliefs… [and] since the continuation of the current practice will cause irrevocable harm [to the child], a moratorium is being issued unanimously.”

    The family lawyer claimed that “the ruling establishes a precedent” for other families seeking similar exemptions. Alevi groups pressing for the abolishment of compulsory religious education also welcomed the decision (www.cnnturk.com, February 24). Turkish courts had previously ruled in favor of parents seeking an exemption for their children from compulsory religious education in about eight cases. In a 2007 verdict the European Court of Human Rights ruled against Turkey in a similar case and found that the existing exemption procedures did not provide protection to parents (www.alevihaberajansi.com, September 10, 2007). The Turkish authorities objected to those decisions and denied that they established a precedent (Radikal, October 11, 2007). The Ministry of Education is reportedly preparing to challenge the Antalya court decision (Takvim, February 25).

    The latest case highlights the contradictions in Turkey’s practice of religious freedom. Although Turkey does not have an official religion, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and the Ministry of Education follow Sunni Islam, particularly the Hanefi branch, in religious services and education in schools. Given their differences from and historical problems with Turkey’s Sunni majority, the Alevis have been among the main critics of the religious establishment in Turkey.

    For decades their demands have fallen on deaf ears, and despite the governing Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) initiatives to reach out to the Alevi communities and improve their conditions, most Alevis believe that their demands are not being met. Partly out of frustration and partly because of the inner divisions within the Alevi community, leading Alevi groups organized a “Grand Alevi Rally” in November. Their demands included the abolishment of compulsory religious classes in high schools; the recognition of Alevi praying houses (Cemevleri) as places of worship; turning the Madimak Hotel, where 37 Alevis lost their lives during a Sunni protest in 1993, into a museum; and the abolishment of the Diyanet (EDM, November 17).

    Since that rally, partial progress has been achieved only with regard to the Madimak hotel issue. Although the hotel has not been converted to a memorial museum, the kebab house there has now been vacated and the Culture Ministry will open a facility in the same place, in which the victims will be remembered (Radikal, February 13). Alevis’ demands for the abolishment of the Diyanet will possibly never be realized, as the Turkish establishment views the Diyanet, which has become a major part of the state bureaucracy, as a barrier against any sort of religious extremism. Although some Alevi groups would prefer a reorganization of the Diyanet or Alevi representation within the body, these demands are also unlikely to be fulfilled. Alevis eventually may have Cemevleri recognized as houses of worship, but that will not come easily. The AKP government prefers to view the Alevis as a cultural group and is worried that giving them separate representation in the Diyanet or recognizing Cemevleri might create a perception that Alevism is distinct from Islam. Instead, the AKP claims to be converting the Diyanet into an institution independent of all mezheps (schools of Islamic law), which the government feels should satisfy the Alevis (Yeni Safak, December 29).

    The reaction of Turkish authorities to the recent ruling also indicates that overcoming the compulsory religious education requirement will be a struggle for the Alevi community. Another major education-related demand concerns the information about Alevism in Turkish schoolbooks. Alevis used to claim that their role in Turkish history was only partially mentioned in textbooks and that in some cases the books contained stereotypical information about their beliefs. Despite some revisions in recent years and the inclusion of Alevism in religious instruction books as a mystical interpretation of Islam (tasavvuf), Alevi associations are unsatisfied with the progress (Aksam, September 16, 2007; Sabah, October 2).

    This case highlights one of the ironies of religious freedom in the Turkish Republic, which professes to be secular. On the one hand, the government seeks to control religious activities in the country through the Diyanet and enforce compulsory religious instruction, to the discomfort mainly of the Alevi community. On the other hand, it uses the principle of secularism to suppress expressions of religious demands from the Sunni community, as in the case of the headscarf ban. Although it claims to be working to expand everyone’s religious freedom, the AKP government has failed so far to satisfy the demands of either group. It might be time to consider the two groups in the same light.

    https://jamestown.org/program/religious-freedom-still-tenuous-in-turkey/

  • Will it Strengthen U.S.-Turkish Relations?

    Will it Strengthen U.S.-Turkish Relations?

    Will the Closure of Manas Airbase Strengthen U.S.-Turkish Relations?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 35
    February 23, 2009
    Saban Kardas

    The Kyrgyz parliament’s vote to close down Manas Airbase puts at risk supply routes for international forces operating in Afghanistan shortly after the U.S. decision to bolster the American military presence in Afghanistan (EDM, February 20). The attempts to find alternative routes in the wake of this controversial decision highlight the strategic cooperation between Turkey and the United States and the role Turkey could play in maintaining a supply route for U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

    Referring to some Russian and American experts, the Turkish press has speculated that the United States may try to find another base in Central Asia to compensate for the loss of Manas. Given the growing Russian influence in the region and the declining credibility of the United States following the Russo-Georgian war in the summer of 2008, however, they claim that the United States would have a hard time securing a new base agreement. If the Americans fail to convince Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to accept U.S. requests, according to the Turkish press, the United States then would request a military base in Turkey’s Black Sea town of Trabzon (Hurriyet, February 19; Evrensel, February 20; Yeni Safak, February 20).

    As the speculation mounted, the question of whether the United States had indeed knocked on Turkey’s door was raised to Metin Gurak, the spokesman of the Turkish military, during his weekly press briefing on Friday, February 20. Gurak stressed that as of the briefing Turkey had received no such request (Ihlas Haber Ajansi, February 20).

    The same day, U.S. military sources announced that they had been able to secure the cooperation of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to allow transportation of non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan through their territories (AFP, Friday 20). In a development that apparently lends support to the Turkish press reports, Retired Air Force General and chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers, told 6 News, a private Turkish news station, that although the decision of the Kyrgyz parliament would not disrupt U.S. operations, it would make maintaining the supply routes more inconvenient and possibly more expensive. Noting that Manas was used mainly for refueling purposes, he emphasized that other bases in the Middle East, including in Turkey, could also host refueling tankers but with more operational costs involved. Myers said that the United States was seeking its NATO allies’ support and emphasized his belief that Turkey and the United States would maintain their constructive cooperation in Afghanistan (Star, February 20).

    Indeed, since the beginning of military operations in Afghanistan following September 11 and the subsequent launch of international stability operations, Turkey has provided military assistance to the U.S.-led coalition, in both the context of the transatlantic alliance and Turkish-American strategic ties. During the initial operations leading to the fall of the Taliban regime, the United States used Turkish airspace and Incirlik Airbase for the campaign, although Turkey did not deploy combat troops. Turkey has also actively participated in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and commanded this NATO mission for two terms.

    Can Turkey offer Trabzon? Analysts maintain that Trabzon offers many advantages in terms of its key location, which allows access to Middle Eastern, Central Asian, and Caucasus theaters; and therefore it is reportedly of interest to U.S. military planners. However, Turkey has previously declined American requests for setting up a base in Trabzon. Following the fall of Manas, the U.S. may press with a renewed proposal, but it is unlikely that the Turkish government would make such a politically risky decision. Also, Trabzon is one of the Anatolian cities where nationalist feelings and anti-Americanism run high; and, short of drastic U.S. actions to restore the deteriorating American image in Turkey, stationing U.S. personnel in the area might be a politically bad decision.

    Therefore, claims about possible requests concerning an airbase in Trabzon might be exaggerated. Nonetheless, it is the case that as Afghanistan emerges as a major issue on the agendas of NATO and the Obama administration, Turkey is coming under pressure about its role in Afghanistan. Diplomatic sources believe that during his conversations with the Turkish prime minister and president, President Obama might have requested his counterparts to commit more Turkish troops or other forms of military contributions to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (EDM, February 19).

    Subsequent developments support such a conjecture. NATO defense ministers met in Poland in an informal meeting on February 19 and 20 to discuss the agenda for the next summit in April. They welcomed the U.S. decision to raise troop levels but underscored the need for civilian contributions to be boosted as well (www.nato.int, February 20). Upon his return to Turkey from the meeting, Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul told reporters that he had had a chance to discuss Turkey’s contributions with its alliance partners. Noting that Turkey’s direct aid to Afghanistan amounted to $200 million, he said that Turkey assisted in the training of the Afghan military and police. Gonul also said that he had met separately with the Afghan and American defense ministers and discussed ways in which Turkey’s contributions might be increased (www.trt.net.tr, February 21).

    In addition to Turkey’s possibly increased role in Afghanistan, Turkey is one of the major exit routes for U.S. planes withdrawing troops from Iraq (Hurriyet Daily News, February 23). These developments have an element of irony. The Turkish Parliament’s refusal to allow American forces to use Turkish territory to launch the northern front against the Iraqi Army in 2003 led many to claim that the Turkish-American relationship would go south. Soon after the fall of Baghdad and in a mood of triumph, some even speculated that the United States might punish Turkey by closing down the Incirlik base as part of its plans to relocate military bases worldwide. Only a few years after the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns began, the United States had to abandon many of its positions in its new-found allies and might be requesting the use of Turkish territory.

    The Kyrgyz parliament’s decision highlights both the importance of having a long-term and reliable ally in an area of strategic importance to U.S. interests and the mutual dependence between Turkey and the United States.

    https://jamestown.org/program/will-the-closure-of-manas-airbase-strengthen-u-s-turkish-relations/

  • AKP’s Confrontation with the Dogan Group

    AKP’s Confrontation with the Dogan Group

    A New Episode in the AKP’s Confrontation with the Dogan Group

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 34
    February 20, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Dogan media group (DMG), a conglomerate of various media companies owned by Dogan Holding, was fined on February 18 for tax evasion and accounting irregularities for the period from 2003 through 2006. DMG has been ordered to pay a total of TL 826.2 million ($484.3 million)—132.9 million in overdue taxes, 693.2 million ($407 million) in penalties, and a special irregularity fee of TL 165,000 ($97,000). DMG has 30 days to pay the fine or appeal the decision (Anadolu Ajansi, ANKA, February 19; Today’s Zaman, February 20).

    Soon after receiving the notice, DMG group announced that the fine “will be noted in Turkish finance history as the greatest injustice imposed on a company.” DMG maintains that the alleged unpaid taxes concerned the sale of some of its shares of the company to the German Alex Springer group in 2007. Negotiations for the sale began in 2006 and ended in early 2007. According to the DMG, under the Turkish Commercial Code the sale was finalized in 2007 and it acted in conformity with Turkish regulations and paid the taxes as of 2007. DMG claims that the tax authorities decided that “the sale took place in 2006 and that the resulting tax had to be paid the same year.” Since DMG believes that this is illegal, it will challenge the allegations in court. “We are committed to unmasking the true intentions and vindictiveness that rests behind this illegal and unconscionable fine,” according to the company (Hurriyet Daily News, February 19).

    The incident immediately sparked a nation-wide controversy. Supported by the main opposition party, the Dogan group launched a campaign to present this decision as a form of political punishment by the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), while Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan claimed that the DMG-controlled media was using freedom of the press to advance their bosses’ commercial interests. Since this is not the first public confrontation between the Dogan group and the AKP government, the harsh statements coming from both sides on February 19 might presage a new war of words in the Turkish political scene.

    In early September the group confronted the government over allegations of fraud raised by German prosecutors against a charity organization established by conservative Turks living in Europe. Deniz Feneri e.V. allegedly channeled donations to private corporations in Turkey, most notably to the Kanal 7 TV network, which is owned by close allies of the AKP. The media outlets critical of the government featured the German indictment in their headlines. DMG newspapers and TV stations led this campaign, which questioned the involvement of Erdogan’s associates and the government’s silence about this and other accusations of corruption. Erdogan took on the fight, warning the DMG publicly about the consequences of its coverage, and claimed that the Dogan group was trying to take revenge for the government’s earlier refusal to help its business interests (EDM, September 11).

    The Dogan group denied the allegations and accused the government of suppressing freedom of the press. Statements by Erdogan that he could reveal some documents proving inappropriate requests made by the Dogan group were interpreted by the DMG as blackmail to quash any allegations about AKP politicians and pro-AKP businesses and media outlets (Radikal, September 9).

    Following a war of words, including personal attacks, between Erdogan and Aydin Dogan, chairman of the Dogan group, a de facto truce was thought to have been reached when the two met at a wedding reception (www.habervitrini.com, October 25). Meanwhile, the investigation of various Dogan group companies, which predated the confrontation in September, continued; and the current showdown over alleged tax fraud has reheated this controversy. Both sides have returned to their entrenched positions, leveling more or less the same accusations against each other.

    Startled by the DMG’s charges, the Ministry of Finance released a statement defending its decision and arguing that the penalties levied on Dogan were based on careful investigation. The statement also criticized the DMG’s attempts to misrepresent the case and said that the Ministry would seek legal recourse for the DMG’s defamation campaign (Anadolu Ajansi, February 19). A statement from the AKP also noted that the investigation had started long before the conflict between Erdogan and Dogan and that Erdogan had not requested this tax examination. Noting that some AKP deputies were also being investigated on different charges, the statement claimed that the DMG was not being discriminated against (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, February 19).

    In its response to these statements, however, the Dogan group questioned the sincerity of the other investigations and maintained that by constantly scrutinizing various companies in the group over a long period of time, the government was seeking to intimidate the group’s independent reporting (Cihan Haber Ajansi, February 19).

    Regardless of the final ruling on the fraud allegations, this incident is likely to deepen political divisions. The critics will continue to view Erdogan’s aggressive attitude as yet another indication of his authoritarian leadership style and disrespect for democracy. Moreover, it will strengthen their belief that the AKP is intent on using state power to silence opposing views and consolidate the position of his own cronies in business and the media. Government circles will continue to present it as yet another victory against vested business interests, which have traditionally acquired their wealth through political influence.

    As an earlier EDM report concluded, however, this episode once again shows “the continuing paucity of impartial news coverage that has not been filtered through, and frequently distorted by, Turkish media owners’ political preferences and perceived business interests.” It is an example of how public attention can be diverted away from more pressing economic and social issues (EDM, September 11).

    https://jamestown.org/program/a-new-episode-in-the-akps-confrontation-with-the-dogan-group/

  • Turkey’s New Regional Role

    Turkey’s New Regional Role

    Two Calls, Many Scenarios: How Will Washington Readjust to Turkey’s New Regional Role?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 33
    February 19, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    President Barack Obama telephoned President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip separately on Monday. In his first official contact with the Turkish leaders since his inauguration, Obama discussed cooperation between the two countries over a wide spectrum of issues of common concern. Earlier this month, Vice President Joe Biden met Foreign Minister Ali Babacan at the security conference in Munich. Obama might have a face-to-face meeting with Gul during the NATO summit in April, celebrating the Atlantic alliance’s 60th anniversary.

    The statement released by the White House said “President Obama had warm and productive phone conversations with Turkish President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan… The President emphasized the importance of the United States’ alliance with Turkey and said he looks forward to working with both President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan on a broad agenda of mutual strategic interest.” Obama stressed the need to strengthen the U.S.-Turkish relationship and work together toward meeting the challenges of the 21st century (www.whitehouse.gov, February 16).

    The Turkish President’s office also issued a statement saying that “President Obama emphasized the importance he attaches to Turkish-U.S. relations and expressed his appreciation for [Turkey’s] leadership role in regional issues.” It was noted that the two sides had reiterated their determination to work together (www.tcbb.gov.tr, February 16).

    In its report, the Turkish Prime Minister’s office highlighted President Obama’s positive remarks about the Turkish-American strategic partnership and Turkey’s role for regional peace. The statement said that Erdogan had “expressed [to Obama] Turkey’s sensitivities in Armenia and the Middle East and emphasized the importance of a fair and impartial American attitude in order not to hurt bilateral relations [between Turkey and the United States].” The statement also quoted Obama as saying, “I would like to affirm the vital role played by your leadership in the Middle East peace process. America has always appreciated Turkey’s sensitivities” (www.bbm.gov.tr, January 16).

    Figuring out the reasons behind the timing of Obama’s calls has been a guessing game. Most observers focus on the issues raised during the talks as a key to understanding the content of the conversations and how Turkish-American relations may evolve in the days to come. According to official statements and various news stories, the issues discussed during both conversations included cooperation in NATO, U.S. support for Turkish-Iraqi rapprochement, the need for collaboration in Middle-East peace efforts, developments in Turkish-Armenian relations, Turkish-EU relations, and the United States’ policies toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.

    Statements from the Turkish leaders preferred to highlight Obama’s praise of Turkey’s strategic role, especially its policies in the Middle East. Following Turkey’s vocal criticism of Israel during the Gaza invasion, concerns had arisen about the future of Turkish-American relations. Pro-AKP media outlets maintained that Obama’s expression of U.S. readiness to cooperate with Turkey was a positive sign that tension between Turkey and Israel would not undermine Turkey’s place in the United States’ Middle East policies. They go so far as to claim that despite the urging by some pro-Israel lobbyists for Washington to punish Ankara for the Davos incident, the warm phone conversations show that Ankara has successfully managed to keep its relations with Tel Aviv and Washington in separate baskets (Yeni Safak, February 18).

    Other reports claimed that Obama solicited Turkey’s contributions for his administration’s plans for a new peace initiative in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Turkish side was reportedly assured by Obama that legislation recognizing the Armenian claims of genocide would not be brought before Congress (Radikal, February 17; Ihlas Haber Ajansi, February 17). According to a Turkish expert evaluating the phone conversations, it is unlikely that Obama will use the word “genocide” in his Armenian Remembrance Day statement on April 24 (Zaman, February 18). Erdogan said that he had had a detailed conversation with Obama about the Armenian claims, but he declined to give any details (Milliyet, February 19).

    Turkish media outlets critical of the government, however, noted that the White House statement had departed from the issues highlighted by Ankara, instead putting emphasis on Turkey’s NATO membership and changes in the U.S. policies toward Pakistan and Afghanistan. They also pointed out that Obama’s office did not even mention the Armenian issue in the list of topics being discussed. According to these sources, some Washington-based analysts maintain that the reference to NATO was meant to remind Turkey of its responsibilities under the Atlantic alliance and warn Ankara about its “independent initiatives” (www.cnnturk.com, February 17; Cumhuriyet, February 17).

    Indeed, Turkey has opted to develop special missions for itself outside the alliance framework—its role as peace broker in the Middle East, for example—and has occasionally deviated from the transatlantic community on issues such as how to deal with Russia, Sudan, and Iran. In Ankara’s view, this new activism could be complementary to Western efforts to promote peace and stability in troubled regions; but according to critics of the government, Turkey’s attempts to carve an autonomous international profile might strain Turkish-American relations.

    Many Turkish analysts also agree that the mention of Afghanistan by the White House was significant in light of Washington’s recently announced plans to bolster U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan. About 800 Turkish troops are currently serving in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), and Turkey has held the ISAF command for two terms in the past. Given the difficulties NATO has encountered in carrying out its mission in Afghanistan and the Obama administration’s determination to refocus its attention there, Ankara, along with other NATO allies, might be coming under pressure to increase its contributions to the ISAF and remove the obstacles it sets to EU-NATO coordination (Today’s Zaman, February 18, Hurriyet Daily News, February 18; EDM, February 9). When this issue was brought up in the past, Turkey declined to commit additional troops, but it remains to be seen how Ankara will respond to such requests in the run-up to the NATO Summit in April.

    Discussions following Obama’s two telephone calls show that Turkish-American relations in the Obama administration are still in uncharted waters. By calling Gul and Erdogan separately, Obama showed that he was aware of who wielded power in Ankara; but how Washington will readjust itself to Ankara’s more assertive role in regional politics is a question that still begs for an answer. Developments ahead of the NATO summit and Obama’s handling of the Armenian claims will give more concrete indications of whether and how the parties will find common ground beyond rhetoric.

    https://jamestown.org/program/two-calls-many-scenarios-how-will-washington-readjust-to-turkeys-new-regional-role/

  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Israel: Apology Issued To Turkish General
    February 19, 2009Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi issued an apology to his Turkish counterpart for critical comments made by an IDF commander about Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, The Jerusalem Post reported Feb. 19. IDF Maj. Gen. Avi Mizrachi said in a lecture the week of Feb. 8 that Erdogan, who has criticized Israel’s Operation Cast Lead offensive in the Gaza Strip, should first look in the mirror. Ashkenazi told Turkish Gen. Ilker Basburg that Mizrachi’s comment was not the IDF’s official position, and that Israel valued its strategic relationship with Turkey.

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