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  • Turkish-Iraqi-American Trilateral Security Mechanism Focuses on PKK Terrorism

    Turkish-Iraqi-American Trilateral Security Mechanism Focuses on PKK Terrorism

    Turkish-Iraqi-American Trilateral Security Mechanism Focuses on PKK Terrorism

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 70
    April 13, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The trilateral commission established between Turkey, the United States and Iraq to facilitate security cooperation against the activities of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Northern Iraq continues to operate. However it remains uncertain if it will produce tangible results that satisfy Turkey’s expectations to eliminate the PKK threat. Last week, two Turkish soldiers died in a clash with PKK militants, in which seven terrorists were killed, and this could signal an escalation of the PKK’s militants’ activities ahead of summer. This incident increases the pressure on the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) to take urgent military measures.

    On April 11 Turkey’s Minister of Interior Besir Atalay travelled to Baghdad for a ministerial level meeting of the trilateral commission where he met the Iraqi National Security Minister Shirwan al-Waili and the Charges d’Affairs of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Patricia Butenis (Anadolu Ajansi, April 11, Hurriyet Daily News, April 12). A five-point declaration was subsequently issued, denouncing the PKK as a terrorist organization which endangers the security of all parties. The statement also added that Baghdad will ban the activities of the PKK and its proxy organization in Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party. The commission reviewed its progress, and reaffirmed their determination to continue working on limiting the political, military and media activities of the PKK.

    The trilateral mechanism was initiated in November 2008, following a change in Turkey’s anti-terrorist policy against the PKK (Terrorism Monitor, December 8, 2008). Iraqi Kurds, who for a long time had refused to cooperate with Turkey on the issue, also changed their position and joined the process as part of the Iraqi delegation. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has taken a stronger line since then and promised to curb the activities of the PKK. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that a branch of the trilateral mechanism will be established in the Northern Iraqi city of Arbil, which highlighted the thawing in Turkey’s relations with the KRG (Today’s Zaman, February 24).

    From Ankara’s perspective, the conclusions of last weekend’s meeting will test the commitment of the Iraqi Kurds to the “joint fight against the PKK.” During President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Iraq in March, KRG officials expressed their support and offered a plan to disarm the PKK militants in the areas under their control (EDM, March 24, 29). As a further expression of their determination, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, himself a Kurd, gave Gul a warm welcome and threatened the PKK during their joint press briefing: “either lay down arms, or leave Iraq” (www.cnnturk.com, March 24). The Turkish side interpreted Talabani’s statement as a successful sign for Turkey’s new policies in general and Gul’s visit in particular.

    Soon after Gul’s return to Turkey, however, Talabani’s subsequent remarks raised questions about the sincerity of the Iraqi Kurds’ to cooperate. Talabani, who is also the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, visited Northern Iraq, where he met Mesud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, who had been travelling in Europe during Gul’s visit. The two leaders discussed relations between the Kurdish groups, as well as the KRG’s ties with the central government in Baghdad. Talabani also briefed Barzani about his contacts with Turkey. Referring to the local Kurdish media, the Turkish press reported that Talabani retracted his earlier position and denied having called on the PKK to “lay down arms or leave Iraq.” Talabani argued he was misunderstood and clarified his position by saying that the disarmament of the PKK was Turkey’s proposal and he was simply referring to it (Dogan Haber Ajansi, April 1).

    Familiar with the Iraqi Kurdish politicians’ reneging on their promises in the past, the Turkish media covered this development extensively, and the opposition parties criticized the government’s reliance on the Northern Iraqi Kurdish groups to handle the PKK threat (www.haber7.com, April 7). In response to a question on the subject, Gul stated “I would like to believe what Talabani said during the joint press briefing” (Anadolu Ajansi, April 3). Gul later hardened his tone against Baghdad, and in an interview on Iraqi TV he called on the government to keep its promises. Noting that Turkey respected Iraq’s territorial integrity, Gul added “if Baghdad cannot solve this problem, we can… If some of the areas used by [the PKK] are not under the control of the central administration, leave it to us and we will take care of it” (Milliyet, April 11).

    Before leaving for Iraq to attend the meeting of the trilateral commission, Atalay said that Turkey expected concrete steps from Baghdad and the Northern Iraqi authorities. According to the Turkish press, the declaration issued after the meeting reaffirmed Talabani’s earlier warning to the PKK, and Atalay emphasized Turkey’s satisfaction with the process, especially his partners’ willingness to continue joint efforts against the PKK presence in Northern Iraq (www.cnnturk.com, April 12).

    The dynamics of the recent developments between Ankara-Baghdad-Arbil illustrate the continuity of the AKP’s Kurdish policy and the fight against terrorism. The decline in the AKP’s electoral support within the southeastern provinces in last month’s local elections was interpreted as a failure of the “domestic” pillar of the government’s Kurdish policy (EDM, March 31). If Turkey cannot ensure the compliance of Baghdad and the KRG to deliver on their promises, it will come to be viewed as a serious blow to the “external” pillar of the government’s anti-terrorist policy. Obviously, this situation makes Ankara anxious to secure tangible results from the trilateral process, but uncertainty remains as to whether the declarations will be translated into effective action. What also adds to Ankara’s sense of urgency is the fear that the advent of spring will witness an increase in militant attacks on Turkish military targets, and raise pressure on the government to immediately address the threat posed by the PKK.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-iraqi-american-trilateral-security-mechanism-focuses-on-pkk-terrorism/
  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Turkey: Assurances For Azerbaijan Over Armenia Thaw
    April 9, 2009Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the diplomatic thaw with Armenia will be difficult without addressing Azerbaijan’s concerns on Nagorno-Karabakh, Hurriyet reported April 9. Armenia has occupied the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh since 1994, and
    Turkey: Assurances For Azerbaijan Over Armenia Thaw
    April 9, 2009Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the diplomatic thaw with Armenia will be difficult without addressing Azerbaijan’s concerns on Nagorno-Karabakh, Hurriyet reported April 9. Armenia has occupied the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh since 1994, and

  • The Alliance of Civilizations Forum: A Major Test for Turkish Diplomacy

    The Alliance of Civilizations Forum: A Major Test for Turkish Diplomacy

    The Alliance of Civilizations Forum: A Major Test for Turkish Diplomacy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 67
    April 8, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 6-7, Istanbul hosted the second United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) forum, co-chaired by Turkey and Spain under the auspices of the UN to foster international dialogue and cooperation. The forum was attended by five heads of state, 26 foreign ministers, 11 ministers and high-level officials from 12 international and regional organizations, providing an opportunity for Ankara to discuss bilateral relations with its neighbors and showcase Turkey’s growing international profile (Anadolu Ajansi, April 7).

    The UNAOC began in 2004 following the Madrid bombings, as part of Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luiz Rodriguez Zapatero’s aim of building closer links between the Western and Islamic worlds, and combating terrorism through dialogue rather than force. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan supported this idea, which became a joint Spanish-Turkish initiative. In addition to several working meetings, its first forum was hosted by Spain in January 2008 and around 100 countries have joined the organization (www.aocistanbul.org; www.unaoc.org).

    The second UNAOC forum reflected the high value placed on resolving common problems through dialogue. In their addresses, world leaders also emphasized the promotion of mutual respect, tolerance and diversity, to overcome conflict and achieve peaceful coexistence (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 7). UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon highlighted the possible conflict prevention role of the platform: “All too often, the United Nations must deal with fires after they break out. Through the UNAOC, we can stamp out the sparks before they catch” (Today’s Zaman, April 7).

    Participants submitted their national plans and regional strategies for joint projects and agreed on developing programs to increase communication among the young and facilitate greater access to information technology to promote intercultural understanding. Additional programs will support academic research, organize workshops to study the challenges of doing business in a multicultural environment, and develop joint media educational programs (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 7).

    Moreover, the UNAOC plays a major part in the foreign policy agenda of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and his governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has supported the initiative since its inception. The project has been used by the AKP to advance its political vision, emphasizing dialogue and consensus in conducting Turkey’s foreign relations. This is an extension of their own transformation from a more doctrinaire, anti-Western Islamic movement to a pro-EU, moderate conservative party. Fostering international dialogue is regarded as vindication of the AKP’s image as a movement which synthesizes Western and Islamic values. Most importantly, Turkey’s leading role in this new forum is valuable for the AKP’s leadership, offering a high profile opportunity to represent the Muslim world, which they view as a core mission (Radikal, November 12, 2006).

    The AKP government has recently undertaken several initiatives reflecting their belief that Turkey could serve as a bridge between East and West, and advocate the rights of the Islamic world. For instance, Turkey’s policy during the Gaza crisis, or its position over appointing the new Secretary-General of NATO was driven by such considerations. Critics allege that Turkey might be drifting away from the transatlantic community and becoming more Middle Eastern. Nonetheless, the AKP has insisted that the party remains committed to the country’s Western orientation, and these new openings within the Islamic world should be interpreted as complementary to Western interests in the strategically vital regions surrounding Turkey. The AKP also highlights its successful foreign policy by pointing to the praise Turkey has received from the international community, including the EU and the United States, for its contributions to global and regional peace through such projects.

    These high-level gatherings serve Turkish diplomacy in other ways. On the sidelines of the forum, several bilateral and multilateral talks took place, which enabled Turkish leaders to discuss controversial foreign policy issues. President Barack Obama made a brief appearance at the UNAOC reception on the first day, expressing U.S. backing for Turkey’s efforts. He reiterated his support for rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, urging the foreign ministers of both countries to finalize the normalization process. Foreign Minister Ali Babacan, in addition to meeting his Armenian counterpart, held separate talks with the Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis, to discuss ways to resolve the Cyprus issue (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 7).

    The forum, however, also demonstrated Ankara’s current dilemma as it seeks to improve its relations with Armenia. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev declined an invitation from President Abdullah Gul to attend the UNAOC, preferring instead to send his daughter to represent the country. The Turkish media claimed that Aliyev was boycotting the UNAOC forum “in reaction to Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, prior to a breakthrough on the problem of Karabakh” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 6). Although Babacan denied this during his press briefing, arguing that Turkey and Azerbaijan were still “one nation, two states,” Ankara’s inability to ensure higher level representation from Baku coupled with Aliyev’s recent statements, reflect underlying divisions between the two countries. As Turkey builds bridges across cultures and normalizes relations with its neighbors, it risks damaging its traditionally closer relationship with Azerbaijan.

  • Turkey Reaches Compromise Over New Head of NATO

    Turkey Reaches Compromise Over New Head of NATO

    Turkey Reaches Compromise Over New Head of NATO

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 65
    April 6, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    NATO members took important decisions during the April 3-4 summit, celebrating the Alliance’s 60th anniversary. Following intense negotiations to ameliorate Turkey’s reservations, on April 4 NATO leaders named Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Ramussen as their new Secretary-General. Turkey’s agreement sparked controversy in Turkey as to whether Ankara had used the threat of veto prior to the summit as an effective bargaining chip.

    Turkey had signaled that it might veto Rasmussen’s appointment, based on its misgivings in his handling of the “cartoon crisis,” and his government’s refusal to address Turkey’s concerns regarding the activities of the pro-PKK Roj TV in Denmark (EDM, March 26).

    Turkey maintained its objections during the summit as President Abdullah Gul resisted pressure from European leaders, and reiterated Turkey’s concerns, which raised tensions and threatened to publicly expose the lack of consensus amongst the allies. The deadlock was finally broken only minutes before the conclusion of the summit. Announcing Rasmussen’s appointment, the current Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told a news conference: “there has been discussion over the past 36 hours but the fact that we are standing here next to each other means a solution has been found also for the concerns expressed by Turkey, and we all very much agree and are unanimous” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 5).

    President Barack Obama’s intervention apparently played a crucial role in securing the deal. Gul explained that he held a long and fruitful meeting with Obama, which was later joined by Rasmussen, during which Turkey’s concerns were alleviated. Gul added that “if we had not been convinced, we would not have hesitated to use our natural right,” implying that Ankara was prepared to veto Rasmussen (www.gazeteport.com.tr, April 4).

    Obama was not alone in approaching Turkey’s leaders to convince them to drop their objections to the EU-backed candidate Rasmussen. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi telephoned his Turkish counterpart and close friend Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Berlusconi was so occupied in a lengthy last-minute cell-phone conversation with Erdogan, that he could not join the other heads of state during the closing ceremonies, including the group photo.

    According to Erdogan, what changed Ankara’s position was Obama’s personal assurances to Gul that he would be the guarantor of the deal. The Turkish press reported that the package offered to Turkey included the following points: NATO’s deputy secretary-general, deputy assistant secretary-general for arms control, and special envoy for Afghanistan would be drawn from Turkish diplomats, and Turkish officers would receive command positions in the alliance’s military structures. Moreover, Rasmussen himself agreed that he would issue an apology to the Muslim world for the infamous cartoon crisis, and the Danish government would take steps to close the Roj TV (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 4).

    It is unclear whether the episode was a success for Turkish diplomacy. It might be considered a failure, because, as many diplomatic observers had previously expected, Turkey could not risk undermining transatlantic consensus and ultimately had to lift its threat of veto. Conversely, it might be seen as success, because, Turkey held its ground until the last moment, and received concessions which appeared to satisfy its demands.

    On April 5, the headlines in Turkish newspapers included: “Turkey shaped NATO” (Yeni Safak), “Turkey won arm wrestling” (Sabah), “He will apologize in Istanbul” (Star). Commentators from the pro-government press compared Turkey’s attitude towards NATO to Prime Minister Erdogan’s Gaza policy and his high profile walkout in Davos. They argued that, unlike past governments which were submissive to western pressures, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government successfully defended the country’s national interests, and advocated Turkey’s preferences within an international organization. A commentary in Zaman on April 5 argued that through tough bargaining, Turkey had achieved its strongest position to date within the Alliance’s command structures. While the Islamist Vakit asserted that Turkey was no longer a country which would grant concessions without receiving anything in return.

    However, newspapers more critical of the government, represented Turkey’s “conditional approval” as a major defeat. On April 5 one Cumhuriyet columnist maintained that after weeks of bullying, Erdogan simply bowed to a Western imposition, only receiving minor concessions in return. Vatan maintained that Ankara failed to stand firm, and had to accept an insulting attitude from its European allies, while Erdogan did more harm than good by raising tensions ahead of the summit. They added that after Turkey perpetuated the image of Rasmussen as “the enemy of Islam,” a face saving compromise became more difficult to achieve. Hurriyet‘s editorial highlighted the contradictory pre-summit statements of both Erdogan and Gul; whereas Erdogan had argued uncompromisingly that Turkey was opposed to Rasmussen, Gul said that Turkey would not object to any name in principle. This discrepancy at the apex of the state, combined with drawing back from the veto threat had harmed the country’s national interests (Hurriyet, April 5).

    Although the compromise preserved the Alliance’s unity, its implications for Turkish diplomacy will be uncertain until Rasmussen takes office in August. After failing to convince its European allies to significantly increase their troop deployments to Afghanistan, Obama’s ability to foster consensus over appointing the next Secretary-General of NATO can be considered as a partial success for his leadership. For their part, Turkish leaders did not disappoint Obama, demonstrating the high premium they place on rejuvenating Turkish-U.S. relations. Obama must now deliver his side of the deal, and enforce its terms on Denmark and other European allies in order to help his Turkish counterpart claim success for this controversial decision.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-reaches-compromise-over-new-head-of-nato/

  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    NATO: Turkey Given Concessions Over Rasmussen
    April 4, 2009Turkey accepted Denmark’s Anders Fogh Ramumssen’s appointment as NATO secretary-general after U.S. President Barack Obama promised that one of Rasmussen’s deputies would be a Turk, Reuters reported April 4. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Obama also guaranteed that Turkish commanders would be in the NATO command. Turkey was promised at least two NATO posts, including a deputy to the deputy secretary-general, and progress on two blocked chapters of its European Union accession agreement, The New York Times reported. Also, Rasmussen allegedly will publicly address the Muslim world’s concerns about his response to cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed.

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  • Erdogan Refuses to Negotiate IMF Deal for Turkey

    Erdogan Refuses to Negotiate IMF Deal for Turkey

    Erdogan Refuses to Negotiate IMF Deal for Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 63
    April 2, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Official data released after the local elections in Turkey shows that the global financial crisis has affected the economy more severely than the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has acknowledged. Turkey’s economic growth dropped sharply in the last quarter of 2008, and its exports declined by around 35 percent last month. These developments have increased the pressure on the government to conclude a prompt loan deal with the IMF, but Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan remains unconvinced.

    Many analysts attribute the decline in the AKP’s electoral fortunes in the local elections to the government’s failure to either acknowledge or take action over the economic crisis. Many economic indicators, including unemployment reaching its highest level in recent years, have undermined the government’s claims that the crisis was not affecting Turkey as badly as other developing economies. Indeed, the AKP’s loss of votes within major industrial centers such as Denizli, Kayseri, Bursa and Gaziantep was caused by soaring local unemployment rates, and if the government fails to redress these trends, it could face a rapid collapse in its popular support.

    Turkey’s official statistics agency (TUIK) announced on March 31 that GDP fell by 6.2 percent in the last quarter of 2008, while the annual rate of growth dropped to 1.1 percent (www.tuik.gov.tr, March 31). This sharply contrasts with the Turkish economy’s average 7 percent annual growth rate, and marks the first contraction of the economy since the AKP came to power in 2002. These figures also indicate that private investments shrank significantly, while government spending increased ahead of local elections. Although the government introduced various small-scale stimulus packages to help support public investments and prevent a sharper decline in GDP, this also increased the current account deficit.

    Additional evidence of the impact of the economic crisis on Turkey appeared in the unofficial export figures released by the Association of Turkish Exporters (TIM) on March 30 (Anadolu Ajansi, April 1). According to the TIM, Turkey’s exports fell in March by 34.92 percent to $7.1 billion compared with last year. Official statistics released by TUIK also confirmed that in February, the country’s exports declined by 24.9 percent to $8.3 billion, whereas imports fell by 47.6 percent (www.tuik.gov.tr, March 31). Exports in the automotive industry, Turkey’s flagship export, continued to drop during the past six months, plunging by 53.8 percent in the first quarter of 2009, according to the local exporters association in Bursa (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 1).

    A comparison of Turkey’s economic downturn with other developing economies reveals it is among the most rapidly shrinking economies in the world. Noting that other countries have managed to grow, or contract at lower rates despite the global crisis, Turkey’s economic slowdown may have started even before the present crisis, and the government should admit its own failures and take urgent measures (www.cnnturk.com, April 1). Indeed, given the shrinking domestic demand and declining exports, some forecast that the annual growth rate will continue to drop, and fall behind the government’s projected growth rate of 4 percent in the 2009 budget. The budget deficit is expected to widen in response to lower industrial output and falling tax revenues. In the first quarter of 2009, the government reached its budget deficit estimates for the entire year (Hurriyet Daily News, April 1).

    Representatives of the working class and the businessmen are now repeating their criticisms of the government’s economic policies. They believe that the election results should be viewed as a warning sign for the AKP, consequently forcing it to prioritize the economy. The government is facing growing pressure to revise its spending plans and modify the 2009 budget in order to resume talks with the IMF, which were suspended over disputes relating to financial regulations and the government’s spending and tax policies. The head of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association, Arzuhan Dogan Yalcindag, called on the government to revise the budget so that it realistically reflects the conditions of the Turkish economy (www.haber7.com, April 1). Many observers expected the government to conclude an agreement with the IMF after the elections, because IMF loans might ease Turkey’s fiscal problems and stimulate the economy. Last month, the IMF forwarded revised proposals to Turkey aimed at addressing Erdogan’s concerns about the contents of the standby agreement (EDM, March 16).

    Before his departure for the G20 summit in London, Erdogan said that he objected to an IMF condition that Turkey should adopt strict tax auditing measures requiring a comparison of individuals’ wealth and their spending. These measures were most likely intended to prevent tax evasion and increase state revenues. However, fearing that such measures might reduce cash flows to the markets, Erdogan challenged the IMF by saying “we will not sign such a thing” (www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr, April 1). Erdogan and his economic minister might be meeting IMF officials in London, but there is still no indication as to whether Turkey will resume direct talks. Although the AKP is expected to be more cooperative towards the IMF, especially following the outcome of the local elections, Erdogan appears determined to maintain his populist pre-election rhetoric, adding to the uncertainty about the future of the Turkish economy.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-refuses-to-negotiate-imf-deal-for-turkey/