Category: Authors

  • Gul Denies Saying “Kurdistan” During Iraq Visit

    Gul Denies Saying “Kurdistan” During Iraq Visit

    Gul Denies Saying “Kurdistan” During Iraq Visit

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 60
    March 30, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Iraq might be regarded as a turning point in Turkey’s Kurdish issue, perhaps more than its implications for improving Turkish-Iraqi ties (EDM, March 24). On the plane to Baghdad, Gul reportedly used the word “Kurdistan” to describe the Kurdistan Regional Administration (KRG) in Northern Iraq, in stark contrast to Turkey’s past political discourse. Although Gul later denied these reports, the discussions they triggered confirmed Turkey’s more nuanced approach towards the Kurds, as well as revealing the remaining obstacles.

    Consistent with Turkey’s recent policy of combating PKK terrorism partly through rapprochement with Baghdad and the local authorities in northern Iraq, Gul met the KRG Prime Minister, Nechervan Barzani, who reiterated that his administration will not allow the PKK to use Iraqi Kurdistan to carry out attacks inside Turkey. Barzani called on the PKK to abandon its violent campaign, although it is unclear how viable this will prove, since the PKK was not consulted at the outset. The KRG initiative is a response to the new geopolitical reality of Washington’s decision to withdraw from Iraq and the revitalization of Turkish-U.S. cooperation. The Iraqi Kurds believe that their chances of rapidly gaining independence have diminished, and continued antagonism against Turkey by covert support for the PKK’s activities could undermine their goal of establishing a viable administration within the region. Moreover, they recognize that closer ties with Ankara might stimulate the regional economy and benefit both parties.

    Gul now recognizes that a confrontational policy towards the KRG is no longer sustainable. Since 1991, the KRG has gradually evolved within northern Iraq, first enjoying de facto autonomy, and later gaining official recognition under the new Iraqi constitution. Ankara attempted to prevent this embryonic administration from developing into an independent Kurdistan, fearing this might strengthen the independence movement amongst Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Although in the 1990s Turkey maintained ties with the Northern Iraqi Kurdish groups in order to conduct operations against the PKK, it refrained from actions that implied an official recognition of the KRG. In the late 1990s, Ankara’s ties with the KRG started to fragment, particularly after the U.S. invasion in 2003 as this became an open confrontation. Equally, Iraqi Kurds intensified their support for the PKK, further alienating Turkey. Ankara prioritized maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdistan as the “red lines” of its Iraq policy, which was perceived as bullying by the Iraqi Kurds.

    Since 2003, Ankara has acknowledged the shifts within regional politics, and readjusted its policies accordingly. For instance, despite its initial opposition to a federal Iraq, Turkey has accepted the new Iraqi constitution which established a federal structure and consequently legitimized the KRG. Most importantly, Turkey decided to abandon pursuing coercive measures, and instead used its political influence and economic power to pacify the Iraqi Kurds (Radikal, November 3, 2005). Although the first signs of rapprochement appeared in 2005, the PKK’s resumption of violence poisoned these relations, reigniting tension between Ankara and the Iraqi Kurds. When Turkey sought their cooperation against the PKK, Iraqi Kurds defied Ankara’s “pressures.” Iraq’s President Jalal Talabani, himself of Kurdish origin, challenged Ankara by saying “We would not hand over any Kurd to Turkey, even a Kurdish cat” (Sabah, October 22, 2007). This new situation further delayed normalizing relations, which only finally transpired in late 2008 (Terrorism Monitor, December 8, 2008).

    Gul’s groundbreaking visit to Baghdad overcame several historical taboos. He allegedly used the word “Kurdistan,” adding that this was the region’s official name in the Iraqi constitution. When this was reported, it made headlines in many Turkish newspapers (Radikal, March 24). Gul’s reference to the region as Kurdistan was interpreted as the strongest expression yet of the change in Turkey’s position on the Kurdish issue. Believing that it denotes a Kurdish desire for independence, Ankara has avoided using this term, and instead referred to the KRG as “the regional administration in the North of Iraq.” Gul’s remarks overshadowed his whole trip and invited criticism from domestic opposition parties claiming he had effectively renounced Turkey’s policy on the Kurdish issue, and undermined its fight against terrorism (Milliyet, March 25).

    On returning to Turkey, however, Gul denied these reports, and clarified his remarks by saying: “inside Iraq, according to their constitution, there is a regional Kurdish government in Iraq’s north. I also met their prime minister; these are very normal things” (Anadolu Ajansi, March 24). Journalists travelling with Gul were divided on whether he specifically used the term “Kurdistan,” though a majority claimed that he did (Hurriyet, March 26).

    It is difficult to substantiate what Gul said. He might have resorted to the use of official terminology within Turkey, in response to pressure from the nationalist opposition, or he could have been dissuaded by bureaucrats from using the controversial term. In any case, the incident illustrates domestic resistance to the new policy despite Ankara’s courageous diplomatic steps. Therefore, despite the optimistic mood that ensued after Gul’s trip to Baghdad, there are grounds to doubt that a solution of the Kurdish issue is imminent.

    https://jamestown.org/program/gul-denies-saying-kurdistan-during-iraq-visit/

  • CALIFORNIA: KREKORIAN INTRODUCES AB 961 IN SACRAMENTO PUNISHING THOSE DOING BUSINESS WITH TURKEY OR AZERBAIJAN !!!:

    CALIFORNIA: KREKORIAN INTRODUCES AB 961 IN SACRAMENTO PUNISHING THOSE DOING BUSINESS WITH TURKEY OR AZERBAIJAN !!!:

    Dostlar,

    Birgun donup dolasip gelecegi nokta buydu…

    Eger bu Ermeni yasasi Sacramento’da gecerse Turkiye ve Azerbaycan ile ticaret yapan firmalar suclu sayilacak ve ceza odeyecek. Buyurun bakalim.  Yillar suren sessizligimize, “Bana ne canim, baskalari yapsin” zihniyetine bicilen aci bir fiatdir bu.

    180px Sacramento Capitol

    Asagida Karahan Mete’nin yazdigi ilk ve tek mektup. Bu is birkac kisinin isi degil, butun toplumun isi.  Hatta, Turkiye’mizin de isi.

    Neye uzuluyorum en cok biliyor musunuz?

    Su satirlari yazdigim anda Kaliforniya’nin en buyuk Turk Festivali’nin acilisinin yapilmasina 3 gun kalmis. Costa Mesa’daki Orange County Fair alanina duzinelerce Turk marangoz, asci-sef, ve is adami gelmis. Kaliforniya otelleri Turk dolu.  Hepsi ticareti nasil patlatiriz diye umut ve heyecan dolu dolu gelmisler.  Halbuki Sacramento’daki bir Ermeni “kardesimiz” onlar icin, bizler icin, hepimiz icin daragaclarini hazirliyor, hem de benim kesemden verdigim vergilerimle!

    Bizim toplum ise masallah misil misil uykuya devam.

    Allah rahat uykular versin.

    Baska ne denir?

    Ergün KIRLIKOVALI

    TURKISH FORUM DANISMA KURULU UYESI

    BILL NUMBER: AB 961 INTRODUCED

    BILL TEXT

    INTRODUCED BY

    Assembly Member Krekorian

    FEBRUARY 26, 2009

    An act to add Article 14 (commencing with

    Section 10485) to

    Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division 2 of the Public

    Contract Code,

    relating to public contracts.

    LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S DIGEST

    AB 961, as introduced, Krekorian.

    Public contracts: state contract

    eligibility: genocidal regimes.

    Existing law authorizes contracting between state agencies and

    private contractors and sets forth requirements for the procurement

    of goods and services by state agencies and the various

    responsibilities of state agencies and the Department of General

    Services in implementing state contracting procedures and policies.

    Existing law prohibits a scrutinized company, as defined, that is

    involved in specified activities in Sudan, from entering into a

    contract with a state agency for goods or services, subject to

    specified requirements and exemptions.

    This bill would prohibit a scrutinized company, as defined, that

    was engaged in business with perpetrators of genocide, from entering

    into a contract with a state agency for goods or services. The bill

    also would require a prospective bidder for those state contracts,

    that currently or within the previous 3 years has had business

    activities or other operations outside of the United States, to

    certify that the company is not a scrutinized company and would

    impose civil penalties, as specified, for a company that provides a

    false certification.

    The bill would allow the Director of General Services, under specified

    conditions, to permit a scrutinized company to enter into state contracts

    for goods and services.

    Vote: majority. Appropriation: no.

    Fiscal committee: yes.

    State-mandated local program: no.

    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS:

    SECTION 1. Article 14 (commencing with Section 10485) is added to

    Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division 2 of the Public Contract Code, to

    read:

    Article 14. Prohibition on Contracts with Companies that Aided

    Genocidal Regimes 10485. For purposes of this article, the

    following definitions apply:

    (a) “Genocide” means any of the following events:

    (1) The atrocities committed by the Ottoman and

    Turkish governments against Armenians from 1915 to 1923,

    inclusive, which constituted the Armenian Genocide, and the

    massacres of Armenians committed by the Ottoman Empire from

    1894 to 1909, inclusive.

    (2) The Holocaust committed by Nazi Germany against Jews from 1938

    to 1945, inclusive, and the persecution and massacre of Roman,

    Slavic, Polish, Soviet, disabled people, homosexuals, and political

    and religious dissidents by the Nazi regime.

    (3) The oppression, forced labor, and murder of the Cambodian

    people by the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979, inclusive.

    (4) The aggression and ethnic cleansing committed by the Rwandan

    Hutu majority against minority Rwandan Tutsis that constituted the

    Rwandan genocide of 1994.

    (5) The aggression and ethnic cleansing committed by elements of

    the Bosnian Serb army against the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina

    from 1992 to 1995, inclusive.

    (b) “Scrutinized company” means a company, and any affiliates of

    that company, that was engaged in business with the perpetrators of

    genocide and that still holds looted or deposited assets of a victim

    of a genocide or his or her heirs.

    10485.5. (a) A scrutinized company is ineligible to, and shall

    not, bid on or submit a proposal for a contract with a state agency

    for goods or services.

    (b) (1) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the Director of General

    Services may permit a scrutinized company, on a case-by-case basis,

    to bid on or submit a proposal for a contract with a state agency for

    goods or services, if it is in the best interests of the state to

    permit the scrutinized company to bid on or submit a proposal for one

    or more contracts with a state agency for goods or services.

    (2) In making this determination, the Director of General Services

    may consider attempts by a scrutinized company to settle claims

    against it by a victim of genocide, or his or her heirs, or evidence

    refuting those claims presented by the scrutinized company.

    10486.

    (a) A state agency shall require a company that submits a

    bid or proposal with respect to a contract for goods or services,

    that currently or within the previous three years has had business

    activities or other operations outside of the United States, to

    certify that the company is not a scrutinized company.

    (b) A state agency shall not require a company that submits a bid

    or proposal with respect to a contract for goods and services to

    certify that the company is not a scrutinized company if the company

    has obtained permission to bid on or submit a proposal for a contract

    with a state agency pursuant to subdivision (b) of

    Section 10485.5.

    10486.5. (a) If the Department of General Services determines

    that a company has submitted a false certification under Section

    10486, the company shall be subject to all of the following:

    (1) The company is liable for a civil penalty in an amount that is

    equal to the greater of two hundred fifty thousand dollars

    ($250,000) or twice the amount of the contract for which a bid or

    proposal was submitted.

    (2) The state agency or the Department of General Services may

    terminate the contract with the company.

    (3) The company is ineligible to, and shall not, bid on a state

    contract for a period of not less than three years from the date the

    state agency determines that the company submitted the false

    certification.

    (b) The Department of General Services shall report to the

    Attorney General the name of the company that the Department of

    General Services determined had submitted a false certification under

    Section 10486, together with its information as to the false

    certification, and the Attorney General shall determine whether to

    bring a civil action against the company. The company shall pay all

    costs and fees the plaintiff incurred in a civil action, including

    costs incurred by the state agency and the Department of General

    Services for investigations that led to the finding of the false

    certification and all costs and fees incurred by the Attorney

    General.

    10487. (a) If any one or more provision, section, subdivision,

    paragraph, sentence, clause, phrase, or word of this act or the

    application thereof to any person or circumstance is found to be

    invalid, illegal, unenforceable, or unconstitutional, the same is

    hereby declared to be severable and the balance of this act shall

    remain effective and functional notwithstanding such invalidity,

    illegality, unenforceability, or unconstitutionality.

    (b) The Legislature hereby declares it would have passed this act,

    and each provision, section, subdivision, paragraph, sentence,

    clause, phrase or word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one

    or more provision, section, subdivision, paragraph, sentence,

    clause, phrase, or word be declared invalid, illegal, unenforceable,

    or unconstitutional.

    Letter sent by Karahan Mete, TP&J COM. IN CALIFORNIA:

    Turkish Peace and Justice Committee    California

    P. O. Box. 866 Sacramento, CA   95812–866 Tel: 530 297-1655 turkishpjc@gmail.com

    AB 961***

    California Assembly member Kerkorian introduced bill AB 961.

    Simple and plain evaluation for AB 961 is: the bill basically forbids the company for betting on California government contracts if they are doing business with countries that proved or assumed to be contributed to holocaust, genocide or atrocity. In his definition, every country in the world can be accused of contributed atrocity and be barred from California government contracts. His first line of the accused countries are Germany, Italy, Austria, France, Pollen, Russia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Serbia, Turkey etc.

    While United States is struggling with huge trade deficits that cannot be sustained for a long period of time, introducing such a very poorly prepared bill will be very destructive for the US economy.

    About the US / Turkish trade relation;

    • US have trade surplus with Turkey.
    • Turkey imports from US is twice as much its export in US
    • US is Turkey’s second largest trade partner after the EU
    • Turkey buys everything from US, from potato chips to computer chips.
    • From seeds to agricultural products.
    • Turkey imports large amounts of grain, rice, corn and others
    • Turkey imports machinery parts and buys engineering and consulting services.
    • Turkey buys almost all the military equipments and parts from US
    • Turkey buys commercial and military aircraft and parts from US.
    • Some of the large utility companies involved for building energy power-plant in Turkey
    • Tourism industries rapidly growing between two countries. US hotel chains are operating hotels and resorts in Turkey.
    • Some of the California satellite-launching companies are negotiating with Turkey for getting multimillion dollar contracts.

    All these companies and others that are doing profitable business with Turkey will be barred from California Government contracts according to AB 961. This same unethical policy will be applied to countries stated in this bill (Germany, Italy, Austria, France, Pollen, Russia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Serbia, Turkey etc.).

    AB 961 is written so poorly that it will scrutinize any business and it will create out-of-control lawsuits that might cost hundreds of millions of dollars from US Companies and strain their competitiveness. In addition, AB 961 will create massive bureaucracy and position state department to undertake imposable tasks.

    At a time when all the trade organizations, Federal and state agencies are working diligently trying to improve US trade, it is hard to understand a lawmaker to take such drastic and unnecessary steps to cause distress in US economy.

    While this bill is an insult to these countries, they can take their businesses somewhere else (another country or States). AB 961 does nothing on these countries stated in this bill but will instead harm the US and California economy. Eventually, this bill will widen US trade deficits and cost US taxpayer millions of dollars, cause job losses and increase unemployment….

    In addition, we all support human rights, democracy and justice, and this bill does not contribute to world human rights, democracy or justice. On the contrary, this bill creates an unjust state of affairs for our own US Companies to compete in the world market.

    Furthermore, the AB 961 subject matter is an international state of affair. State should not be interfering or passing laws that contradict United States international affairs.

    We respectfully ask you to take all the necessary steps to prevent this destructive act against US companies and prevent devastation in US and California economy.

    Respectfully yours,

    Karahan Mete

    Karahan.mete@gmail.com

    (530) 297-1655

  • MASSIVE ARMENIAN DEFEAT AT THE HIGHEST COURT IN EUROPE

    MASSIVE ARMENIAN DEFEAT AT THE HIGHEST COURT IN EUROPE


    (Kirlikovali’s note: I thank www.TurkishForum.com for letting me know about this fact.)

    ARMENIANS LOSE THE MAJOR COURT CASE AGAINST EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND BEAR THE COURT COSTS

    Case: Grégoire Krikorian and Others v European Parliament and Others

    Verdict:

    1. The action by Armenians against The European Parliament is dismissed.

    2. The applicants shall bear the costs. . .

    ——————————————————————————–

    C-18/04 Order of 13/09/2004, Krikorian and others (Unpublished)

    C-18/04 Order of 29/10/2004, Krikorian and others (Unpublished)

    C-19/04 Order of 13/09/2004, Krikorian and others (Unpublished)

    **************************

    IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE – The information on this site is subject to a. disclaimer and a copyright notice

    Notice for the OJ

    Order of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 29 October 2004 in Case C-18/04 P: Grégoire Krikorian and Others v European Parliament, Council of the European Union, Commission of the European Communities 1

    (Appeal – Non-contractual liability of the Community – Action for damages – Appeal in part manifestly inadmissible and in part unfounded)

    (Language of the case: French)

    In Case C-18/04 P: Grégoire Krikorian, residing in Bouc-Bel-Air (France), Suzanne Krikorian, née Tatoyan, residing in Bouc-Bel-Air (France), Euro-Arménie ASBL, established in Marseille (France), (avocat: P. Krikorian), the other parties to the proceedings being European Parliament (Agents: A. Baas and R. Passos), Council of the European Union, (Agents: S. Kyriakopoulou and G. Marhic), Commission of the European Communities (Agents: C. Ladenburger and F. Dintilhac) – APPEAL pursuant to Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, brought on 16 January 2004 – the Court (Fourth Chamber), composed of K. Lenaerts, President of the Chamber, N. Colneric (Rapporteur) and J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, Judges; M. Poiares Maduro, Advocate General; R. Grass, Registrar, made an order on 29 October 2004, the operative part of which is as follows:

    1. The appeal is dismissed.

    2. The appellants shall bear the costs of the appeal.

    ____________

    1 – OJ C 94, 17.4.2004.

    IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE – The information on this site is subject to a disclaimer and a copyright notice.

    Notice for the OJ

    Appeal brought on 16 January 2004 by Mr G. Krikorian, Mrs S. Krikorian (née Tatoyan) and the Euro-Armenia Association against the order made on 17 December 2003 by the First Chamber of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities in Case T-346/03 G. Krikorian and Others v Parliament, Council and Commission and against the order made on 17 December 2003 by the President of the Court of First Instance in Case T-346/03 R G. Krikorian and Others v Parliament, Council and Commission between G. Krikorian and Others and the Parliament, the Council and the Commission of the European Communities

    (Case C-18/04 P)

    An appeal against the order made on 17 December 2003 by the First Chamber of the Court of First Instance in Case T-346/03 (G. Krikorian and Others v Parliament, Council and Commission) and against the order made on 17 December 2003 by the President of the Court of First Instance in case T-346/03 R (G. Krikorian and Others v Parliament, Council and Commission) between G. Krikorian and Others and the Parliament, the Council and the Commission of the European Communities was brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities on 16 January 2004 by Mr G. Krikorian, Mrs S. Krikorian (née Tatoyan) and the Euro-Armenia Association.

    The appellants claim that the Court should:

    1. set aside in its entirety the order made on 17 December 2003 and notified by registered letter received on 6 January 2004, by which the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (First Chamber), in Case T-346/03 G. Krikorian and Others v Parliament, Council and Commission, dismissed, pursuant to Article 111 of its Rules of Procedure, the appellants’ action for damages on the ground that it was manifestly lacking any foundation in law;

    set aside in its entirety the order made on 17 December 2003 and notified by registered letter received on 6 January 2004, by which the President of the Court of First Instance, in Case T-346/03 G. Krikorian and Others v Parliament, Council and Commission, held that as a consequence there was no longer any need to adjudicate on the application for interim measures; allow all the forms of order claimed at first instance and, as a consequence:

    (a) declare that the Resolution of 18 June 1987 by which the European Parliament acknowledged the historic reality of the Armenian genocide – perpetrated by the “Young Turk” Government in 1915 against 1 500 000 innocent Armenian victims – and considered modern Turkey’s failure to acknowledge it an insurmountable obstacle to consideration of Turkey’s accession to the European Union, an act giving rise to legitimate expectations on the part of European citizens of Armenian origin and thus on the part of the appellants, has binding legal force with regard to the European Community;

    hold that by their complete failure to draw political and legal consequences from the abovementioned resolution, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities have committed a sufficiently serious infringement of Community law, which is to the detriment of the appellants;

    order the three abovementioned Community institutions jointly and severally liable to pay each of the appellants the sum of EUR 1 (one euro) by way of damages in respect of the non-pecuniary damage caused to them by that infringement of Community law, attributable to the Community institutions;

    In the alternative,

    Having set aside the two contested orders in their entirety:

    refer the case back to the Court of First Instance for adjudication;

    hold that the Court of First Instance will be bound as regards any points of law decided by the Court of Justice and, in particular, as regards the binding legal force, for the defendant institutions, of the European Parliament’s resolution of 18 June 1987, which gave rise to a legitimate expectation on the part of the appellants that the Community institutions would adhere to the terms of that resolution;

    In any event,

    order the Community institutions jointly and severally to pay the costs.

    Pleas in law and main arguments

    • Procedural irregularities which have prejudiced the appellants’ interests:

    in dismissing the appellants’ action for damages, the Court of First Instance infringed Article 111 of its Rules of Procedure;

    in ordering the appellants to pay the costs, the Court of First Instance infringed Article 87(3) of its Rules of Procedure, and its order is also vitiated by inadequate reasoning;

    consideration of the contested order further shows an infringement of Articles 6(1) and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 1 of the First Protocol thereto, as well as a breach of the principle of effective judicial protection;

    • Infringement of Community law: in making the contested order, the Court of First Instance infringed the principles of the protection of legitimate expectations, of legal certainty and of acquired rights.

    Notice for the OJ

    Order of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 29 October 2004 in Case C-18/04 P: Grégoire Krikorian and Others v European Parliament, Council of the European Union, Commission of the European Communities 1

    (Appeal – Non-contractual liability of the Community – Action for damages – Appeal in part manifestly inadmissible and in part unfounded)

    (Language of the case: French)

    In Case C-18/04 P: Grégoire Krikorian, residing in Bouc-Bel-Air (France), Suzanne Krikorian, née Tatoyan, residing in Bouc-Bel-Air (France), Euro-Arménie ASBL, established in Marseille (France), (avocat: P. Krikorian), the other parties to the proceedings being European Parliament (Agents: A. Baas and R. Passos), Council of the European Union, (Agents: S. Kyriakopoulou and G. Marhic), Commission of the European Communities (Agents: C. Ladenburger and F. Dintilhac) – APPEAL pursuant to Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, brought on 16 January 2004 – the Court (Fourth Chamber), composed of K. Lenaerts, President of the Chamber, N. Colneric (Rapporteur) and J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, Judges; M. Poiares Maduro, Advocate General; R. Grass, Registrar, made an order on 29 October 2004, the operative part of which is as follows:

    1. The appeal is dismissed.

    2. The appellants shall bear the costs of the appeal.

    Therefore the below Judgement from the Court of First Instance still Stands. However, I would like the Judges Reasoning FOR THE APPEAL which is in French ONLY to be translated to English and I would hope you being in Canada could arrange that. The only problem is the Appeal Decision Reasoning was not Published and I would assume you would need to get a hold of that from actual books or transcripts from the Court and not from the Web site. Therefore the below Judgement of the Court fo First Instance Still Stands

    ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

    17 December 2003 (1)

    (Non-contractual liability of the Community – Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law)

    In Case T-346/03,

    Grégoire Krikorian, residing in Bouc-Bel-Air (France),

    Suzanne Krikorian, residing in Bouc-Bel-Air,

    Euro-Arménie ASBL, established in Marseille (France),

    represented by P. Krikorian, lawyer, applicants,

    European Parliament, represented by R. Passos and A. Baas, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg,

    Council of the European Union, represented by S. Kyriakopoulou and G. Marhic, acting as Agents,

    and

    Commission of the European Communities, represented by F. Dintilhac and C. Ladenburger, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg,

    defendants,

    APPLICATION for compensation for the non-material damage suffered by the applicants on account of, inter alia, recognition of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the European Union,

    THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

    OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

    composed of: B. Vesterdorf, President, P. Mengozzi and M.E. Martins Ribeiro, Judges,

    Registrar: H. Jung,

    makes the following

    Order

    Facts and procedure

    1. By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 9 October 2003, the applicants brought this action for damages in which they seek compensation for the harm caused to them by, inter alia, recognition of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the European Union, although that State has refused to acknowledge the genocide perpetrated in 1915 against the Armenians living in Turkey.

    2. The applicants claim that the Court of First Instance should: – declare that the resolution of the European Parliament of 18 June 1987 on a political solution to the Armenian question (OJ 1987 C 190, p. 119) (the 1987 resolution) has binding legal force in respect of the European Community;

    – declare that the defendants are in serious breach of Community law to the prejudice of the applicants;

    – order the defendants to pay each of the applicants the sum of EUR 1 in damages;

    – order the defendant to pay the costs, assessed at EUR 30 000, plus interest.

    3. In a separate document, lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 9 October 2003, the applicants applied for interim measures seeking, in particular, suspension of the procedure for examining the Republic of Turkey’s candidature for accession to the European Union by the defendant institutions and asking that resumption of that procedure be made conditional on prior acknowledgement by that State of the abovementioned genocide.

    Law

    Arguments of the parties

    4. According to the applicants, the first element giving rise to the non-contractual liability of the Community is the fact that, at its meeting in Helsinki (Finland) on 10 and 11 December 1999, the European Council officially recognised the Republic of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the European Union, but did not make that accession conditional on the prior acknowledgement by that State of the abovementioned genocide. Moreover, they note that the Republic of Turkey enjoys an accession partnership, which provides in particular for significant assistance to enable that State to begin the irreversible process of accession. They refer in that connection to several documents, including Council Regulation (EC) No 390/2001 of 26 February 2001 on assistance to Turkey in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, and in particular on the establishment of an Accession Partnership (OJ 2001 L 58, p. 1), Council Regulation (EC) No 2500/2001 of 17 December 2001 concerning pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey and amending Regulations (EEC) No 3906/89, (EC) No 1267/1999, (EC) No 1268/1999 and (EC) No 555/2000 (OJ 2001 L 342, p. 1) and Council Decision 2001/235/EC of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey (OJ 2001 L 85, p. 13).

    5. The defendant institutions therefore blatantly failed to have regard to the 1987 resolution. In that resolution, the Parliament declared that the Turkish Government’s refusal to acknowledge that genocide constituted an insurmountable obstacle to the examination of the Republic of Turkey’s possible accession.

    6. According to the applicants, the 1987 resolution is a legal act which, in the same way as recommendations and opinions, can produce legal effects (Case C-322/88 Grimaldi [1989] ECR 4407. In this case, the 1987 resolution has or is intended to have legal effects going beyond the internal organisation of the Parliament’s work (Joined Cases T-222/99, T-327/99 and T-329/99 Martinez and Others v Parliament [2001] ECR II-2823). In that resolution the Parliament intended publicly to lay down a special condition for the Republic of Turkey’s accession, namely the prior acknowledgement by that State of the genocide in question. Moreover, the words used in the resolution leave no room for ambiguity as to the intention of that Community institution.

    7. The applicants note in that connection that, since the entry into force of the Single European Act on 1 July 1987, the Parliament had the power under Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, since repealed, to object to the Republic of Turkey’s accession; they state that the requirement of the assent of the Parliament is now laid down in Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union. They point out that the 1987 resolution was published – and therefore brought to their knowledge – after that date, namely on 20 July 1987.

    8. It follows that the 1987 resolution gave rise to a legitimate expectation on their part that the Parliament would, if necessary, exercise its right of veto on the Republic of Turkey’s accession or, more generally, that that institution would object to examination of the Republic of Turkey’s candidature as long as the latter had not acknowledged the genocide in question. The situation noted in paragraph 4 above constitutes an infringement of that legitimate expectation.

    9. The applicants therefore claim that, since the Community set itself an obligation of conduct and an obligation as to the result to be achieved, the mere fact that there has been a failure to have regard to the requirements of the 1987 resolution suffices to prove a sufficiently serious breach of Community law.

    10. The applicants also rely on an infringement of several fundamental rights, including the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to respect for private life, laid down in Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950.

    11. Finally, the applicants claim that, as members of the Armenian community and descendants of survivors of the genocide in question, they have suffered non-material damage.

    12. In that respect, they state that the conduct of the defendant institutions is an affront to their dignity, in view of the fact, as they claim, that the memory of the victims of that genocide and the concern for historical truth are an integral part of the dignity of all Armenians. Moreover, since that genocide is an integral part of the history and identity of the Armenian people, the identity of the applicants is itself irreparably affected by the conduct of the defendant institutions. Finally, calling into question the reality of the abovementioned genocide brings about marginalisation and a feeling of inferiority within the Armenian community. Thus the attitude of the Republic of Turkey has the effect of ostracising the applicants, since they are regarded as second-rate victims. Those circumstances result in the applicants’ harbouring feelings of deep injustice, which also prevents them from completing the mourning process satisfactorily.

    Findings of the Court

    13. Under Article 111 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, where an action is manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the Court of First Instance may, by reasoned order and without taking further steps in the proceedings, give a decision on the action. In the light of the application, the Court of First Instance considers that it is able to give a decision on the substance of the present action, without hearing the observations of the defendant institutions and without opening the oral procedure.

    14. It is settled case-law that, for the Community to incur non-contractual liability within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 288 EC a number of conditions must be satisfied, namely the illegality of the conduct alleged against the institutions, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between the alleged conduct and the damage complained of (Case 26/81 Oleifici Mediterranei v EEC [1982] ECR 3057, paragraph 16; Case T-175/94 International Procurement Services v Commission [1996] ECR II-729, paragraph 44; Case T-336/94 Efisol v Commission [1996] ECR II-1343, paragraph 30; and Case T-267/94 Oleifici Italiani v Commission [1997] ECR II-1239, paragraph 20).

    15. If any one of those conditions is not satisfied, the entire action must be dismissed and it is unnecessary to consider the other conditions for non-contractual liability on the part of the Community (Case C-104/97 P Atlanta v European Community [1999] ECR I-6983, paragraph 65).

    16. In this case, the applicants plead, essentially, two circumstances capable of giving rise to the non-contractual liability of the Community, namely recognition of the Republic of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the European Union by the European Council at Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999, and the fact that that State enjoys a European Union accession partnership.

    17. As regards recognition of the Republic of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the European Union, it must be stated that that is the result of an act of the European Council, which is not an institution of the Community within the meaning of Article 7 EC. As has been noted at paragraph 14 above, only the conduct of an institution of the Community can give rise to the non-contractual liability of the Community. In those circumstances, the argument that recognition of the Republic of Turkey’s status as a candidate for accession to the European Union gives rise to liability on the part of the Community must be rejected.

    18. As regards the fact that the Republic of Turkey enjoys a European Union accession partnership, the applicants rely on the argument that the conduct of the defendant institutions is unlawful because it is contrary to the 1987 resolution.

    19. It suffices to point out that the 1987 resolution is a document containing declarations of a purely political nature, which may be amended by the Parliament at any time. It cannot therefore have binding legal consequences for its author nor, a fortiori, for the other defendant institutions.

    20. That conclusion also suffices to dispose of the argument that the 1987 resolution could have given rise to a legitimate expectation, on the part of the applicants, that the institutions would comply with that resolution (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 87/77, 130/77, 22/83, 9/84 and 10/84 Salerno and Others v Commission and Council [1985] ECR 2523, paragraph 59, and Joined Cases C-213/88 and C-39/89 Luxembourg v Parliament [1991] ECR I-5643, paragraph 25).

    21. As regards the alleged breach of fundamental rights (see paragraph 10 above), it is sufficient to note that the applicants merely claim that such a breach took place, without explaining how that follows from the conduct of the defendant institutions complained of in this case.

    22. For the sake of completeness, it should be pointed out, first, that the applicants have manifestly not shown that the requirement of a causal connection is satisfied in this case.

    23. It is settled case-law that there must be a direct link of cause and effect between the fault allegedly committed by the institution concerned and the damage pleaded, the burden of proof of which rests on the applicant (Case T-220/96 EVO v Council and Commission [2002] ECR II-2265, paragraph 41, and the case-law cited). Moreover, the wrongful conduct of the institution concerned must be the direct and determining cause of that damage (orders of the Court of First Instance in Case T-614/97 Aduanas Pujol Rubio and Others v Council and Commission [2000] ECR II-2387, paragraph 19; Joined Cases T-611/97, T-619/97 to T-627/97 Transfluvia and Others v Council and Commission [2000] ECR II-2405, paragraph 17; and Case T-201/99 Royal Olympic Cruises and Others v Council and Commission [2000] ECR II-4005, paragraph 26, confirmed on appeal by order of the Court of Justice of 15 January 2002 in Case C-49/01 P Royal Olympic Cruises and Others v Council and Commission, not published in the ECR).

    24. In this case, it appears from the arguments put forward by the applicants that the alleged non-material damage is the result of the refusal by the Turkish Government to acknowledge the genocide in question rather than of the conduct of the defendant institutions complained of. In those circumstances, the applicants have not in any way shown that the conduct of the defendant institutions complained of is the direct and determining cause of the alleged damage.

    25. Secondly, as regards the requirement that the applicants must have suffered actual and certain damage, the applicants clearly confined themselves in their application to relying in general terms on non-material damage caused to the Armenian community, without giving the least indication as to the nature or extent of the damage which they consider they had suffered individually. Therefore the applicants have supplied no information that would enable the Court to find that the applicants in fact suffered actual and certain damage themselves (see, to that effect, Case T-99/98 Hameico Stuttgart and Others v Council and Commission [2003] ECR II-2195, paragraphs 68 and 69).

    26. In those circumstances, the applicants have manifestly not shown that the conditions under which the Community will incur non-contractual liability are satisfied.

    27. It follows from the foregoing that the claims for compensation are manifestly unfounded.

    Costs

    28. In accordance with Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

    29. However, in the present case, pursuant to Article 111 of the Rules of Procedure, the order is made before the defendants have lodged their defence and had the opportunity to apply for costs. It is therefore necessary to apply Article 87(3) of the Rules of Procedure, according to which the Court of First Instance may order the costs to be shared where the circumstances are exceptional.

    30. Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs.

    On those grounds,

    THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE,

    hereby orders:

    1. The action is dismissed.

    2. The applicants shall bear the costs.

    Luxembourg, 17 December 2003.

    H. Jung , Registrar

    B. Vesterdorf, President

  • PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    PJAK, Iran and the United States: Kurdish Militants Designated Terrorists by the United States

    Terrorism Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 7 March 26, 2009

    Category: Terrorism Monitor, Global Terrorism Analysis, Home Page, Turkey, Iran, Terrorism, Featured
    By: Saban Kardas, Nihat Ali Özcan
    The United States Treasury Department added the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (Parti bo Jiyani Azadi la Kurdistan – PJAK) to its list of designated terrorist groups on February 4. [1] Operating on the Iranian-Iraqi border under the umbrella of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan – PKK), PJAK has sought to create an autonomous Kurdish region within Iran since its formation in 2004, though the relationship between Iran and the PKK dates back to the creation of the Islamic State of Iran in 1979. This development also highlights unique dynamics of the relationship between a terrorist organization (the PKK) and a state sponsor (Iran).  

    The decision to designate PJAK as a terrorist group brought to the forefront the trajectory of Iran-PKK ties, which traditionally have oscillated between sponsorship and enmity. In this article, we will look at the ebb and flow of sponsorship-enmity dynamics between Iran and the PKK, and put this relationship into the context of regional developments.

    The PKK established contacts with Iranian Kurds who rebelled against Tehran following the Iranian revolution of 1979. Since then, the PKK’s relationship with the Islamic Republic has gone through several phases that can be analytically divided into five distinct periods. The first period (1980-1982) covers the immediate aftermath of the Islamic revolution. The establishment of the Iran-Syria alliance and Iran’s war with Iraq marked the second era (1982-1988), during which a sponsorship relationship gradually took root. During the third period (1988-1997), Iran and the PKK redefined the sponsorship relationship to adjust it to the new geopolitics brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fourth period (1997-2003) can best be described as controlled cooperation, during which the parties struggled to maintain a fragile partnership under the pressure of the rapidly shifting regional balances of power. During the fifth era (2003-2009), starting with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a rather adversarial relationship emerged between the parties, which occasionally turned into open confrontation.

    First period

    Initial encounters between the PKK and the Islamic Republic date back to the first years of the revolution. The Iranian Kurds, seeking to take advantage of the post-revolutionary turmoil and the onset of the Iran-Iraq war, initiated a rebellion against Tehran. Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, tasked some of his militants with establishing contacts with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, which was leading the rebellion against Tehran at the time. Ocalan was reportedly urged by Jalal al-Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), to engage Iranian Kurds. [2]

    The initial years of the PKK-Iran relationship were characterized by enmity, developing as they did under the shadow of the new Iranian regime’s Islamic credentials and the PKK’s Marxist agenda. Moreover, the possibility that the PKK might ignite a desire for independence among Iranian Kurds further exacerbated Iran’s suspicions of the PKK. However, subsequent developments replaced this short-lived period of ideological antagonism with a spirit of pragmatism dictated by changes in regional diplomacy that provided a fertile ground for the emergence of a sponsorship-alliance relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Marxist PKK.  

    Second period

    The emergence of the Iran-Syria strategic alliance in 1982 had direct repercussions for Iranian-PKK ties as well. In response to the geopolitical shifts brought about by the Islamic revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, including the deterioration of U.S.-Iranian relations, Tehran and Damascus were increasingly drawn towards each other. A shared interest of this new alliance was the undermining of two pro-Western countries in the region through subversive activities, namely Turkey and Israel. To do this, the Tehran-Damascus axis decided to support the PKK and Hezbollah. [3] Following this agreement, Iran dispatched its Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon through Syria to train Hezbollah fighters. The PKK froze its ties to al-Talabani and signed a partnership agreement with Barzani. [4] This agreement allowed the PKK to relocate its militants in Syria to northern Iraq through Iranian facilitation.

    From Iran’s perspective, it had many incentives to engage in such a relationship:

    • Tehran and Ankara were involved in an enduring rivalry.

    • The Islamic revolution increasingly pitted Tehran against the secular regime in Ankara, adding an ideological fervor to the competition.

    • The close ties between Ankara and Washington exacerbated Tehran’s fears of Ankara. As part of American plans to contain the Islamic regime, some airfields in Turkish territory close to the Iranian border were expanded (Cumhuriyet, November 16, 1982). Moreover, the United States relocated some of the listening stations it had to withdraw from Iran to eastern Turkey, raising Iranian concerns about Turkey.

    • Following the revolution, many supporters of the Shah’s regime, seeking to reach Western countries, first flew to Turkey. Revolutionary leaders were worried that these refugees, whose numbers were in the millions, could organize themselves in Turkey to undermine the new regime.

    • The Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline carrying Iraqi oil to world markets through Turkish territory brought extra revenue to Baghdad, helping it to finance its war against Iran.
     
    These pragmatic reasons led Iran to support the Marxist PKK in its efforts to undermine Turkey. Nonetheless, Iran always denied its support for the PKK, which was partly a reflection of the fact that Iran needed to maintain relations with Turkey (Cumhuriyet, May 3, 1987). For instance, it had to use Turkish territory to ensure a flow of logistical supplies to maintain its war against Iraq.
    Despite Tehran’s official denial of any support to the PKK, its sponsorship gradually increased towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war. As the senior partner, Iran exerted some limitations on the PKK. [5] The PKK could not attack Turkish targets within fifty kilometers of the Turkish-Iranian border and would refrain from operating among Iranian Kurds. It also agreed to share the intelligence it gathered about Turkey and American bases there with Tehran. In return, Iran provided the PKK with weapons, medical assistance and logistical facilities. Through entering this relationship, the PKK gained access to a wider area of operability and eventually expanded its influence into the Turkish interior.
     
    Third period

    Concerned about the growing influence of the PKK among Iranian Kurds after the Iran-Iraq war, Iran changed its attitude towards the PKK and arrested some of its militants. [6] Nonetheless, this situation soon changed. Although Iran’s Kurdish population posed a challenge, it was not a vital threat to Iran’s territorial integrity. Since the Sunni Kurds were a numerically small minority dwelling in the periphery of the Iranian political system, Iran regarded the problem as manageable. A more serious threat was presented by Azeri nationalism, especially after Azerbaijan emerged as an independent country. Turkey’s increasing profile in the Caucasus and Central Asia (backed by the United States) and the growth of Azeri nationalism within Iran became major issues of concern for Tehran, which found itself forced to restore its ties with the PKK. Indeed, a growing number of PKK activities during the 1990s took place mostly around Turkey’s northeastern and Caucasus borders. [7] In this way, Iran sought to hinder Turkey’s ties to the Caucasus and Central Asia and limit its influence in the region. One direct effect of this policy was that the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline had to be postponed for another nine to ten years. The intensification of PKK terrorist activities consumed much of Turkey’s energy, turning its attention inward.

    Fourth period

    In this stage, Iran gradually reduced its support to the PKK parallel to a declining threat perception. The Turkish-Iranian competition lost its intensity as Azerbaijan and Azeri nationalism were no longer perceived as major challenges. Similarly, Syria’s diminishing support of the PKK following the capture of Abdullah Ocalan resulted in Tehran reconsidering its ties to the PKK. Iran adopted a wait-and-see approach given that the regional balance of power was full of uncertainties. Last but not least, the 9/11 terror attacks and the Global War on Terrorism made Tehran more cautious as it sought to avoid being labeled as a sponsor of terrorism.

    Fifth period

    The Iran-PKK relationship, which started to deteriorate following the capture of Ocalan, turned into one of open confrontation in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The extensions of the PKK operating among the Iranian Kurds declared the founding of PJAK in 2004 (see Terrorism Monitor, June 15, 2006).  Drawing on its past networks, the PKK consolidated its power among Iranian Kurds within a short period. It capitalized on the legacy of Kurdish nationalism and resistance to Tehran introduced to the region before the local Kurdish movement was crushed by Iran, while building its own economic and political networks. To give PJAK a local character, some Iranian Kurds were recruited to its leadership cadres. Despite PJAK’s claim to the contrary, it operated under the PKK umbrella and sought refuge in the Kandil Mountain region. As an indication of these organic ties, militants recruited from Turkey were sometimes deployed in Iran, while militants of Iranian origin sometimes took part in PKK operations inside Turkey. [8]  

    The PKK’s growing visibility in Iran and an acquiescent American attitude towards the PKK presence in northern Iraq (which came to be perceived as a de facto rapprochement between Washington and the PKK) pitted Iran and the PKK against each other. PJAK has increasingly engaged Iranian military personnel since 2003 in a bid to gain media attention. In response, Iran has occasionally shelled PJAK positions in the Kandil Mountain region. There were also unconfirmed reports from Kurdish sources of cross-border operations by Iranian security forces in September, 2007 (Today’s Zaman, August 24, 2007; McClatchy, August 23, 2007). Like Turkey, Iran preferred to present PJAK as an extension of the PKK and lent support to Turkey’s fight against the PKK. In this way it sought to boost its own popularity among the Turkish public and to undercut Turkish-American ties.  

    Although the Bush administration added the PKK to the list of designated terrorist organizations, it was more tolerant toward PJAK, which led to allegations that America and Israel supported PJAK as a way to destabilize Iran. [9] Shortly after coming to power, the Obama administration designated PJAK as a terrorist organization controlled by the PKK. By this decision, Washington signaled that it would adopt a more principled approach in the fight against terrorism. This development also signifies a change in the American attitude towards the intricate relationships between Turkey, Iran and the PKK. Turkey welcomed the decision and saw it as the fruit of its new policy of building international coalitions to eradicate PKK terror, particularly through closer collaboration with the United States and northern Iraqi Kurdish authorities. A statement from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined Ankara’s satisfaction with the U.S. acknowledgment of PKK-PJAK ties (Anadolu Ajansi, February 6).

    The PKK, in contrast, increasingly feels that it is being encircled as a result of recent developments. PJAK officials condemned the U.S. designation and claimed that for over a year the United States already had a de facto policy of pleasing Turkey and Iran by intensifying pressure on PKK and PJAK. The organization noted that northern Iraqi authorities were also supportive of this new policy (Gundem Online, February 12; February 17). PJAK challenged the Obama administration, arguing that the terrorist designation would not deter their struggle.

    Conclusion

    Iran is carefully observing developments in Iraq and the evolution of Turkish-American relations. The next stage in the sponsorship-enmity cycle between Iran and the PKK will depend on Iran’s assessment of the changes in the regional balance of power and threats to its national security. To escape the pressures exerted by close coordination between Turkey, the United States and the Kurdistan Regional Government of northern Iraq, the PKK will have an incentive to redefine its relationship with Iran. Despite Iranian-PJAK border clashes, PKK leaders are already sending warm messages to Tehran (Gundem Online, February 24). Whereas playing the “Iran card” might increase the PKK’s bargaining power, Iran also has reasons to maintain the continued availability of the “PKK card.” Considering the ongoing uncertainty over the future of the region (especially northern Iraq) in the wake of a partial U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and discussions over the Iranian nuclear program, Iran might not want to see the PKK disappear from the game completely.

    Notes:

    1. www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg14.htm.
    2. Cemil Bayik, Parti Tarihi, Damascus, 1996, p.58.
    3. For the background of this relationship, see: Huccetulislam Hasimi Muhtesemi’s (former Iranian ambassador to Damascus) memoirs. Turkish translation: Dunya ve Islam, 1990, pp.53-64.
    4. Bayik, op.cit. pp.75,77.
    5. Abdullah Ocalan, Parti Tarihimiz Boyunca Disaridan Dayatilan Tasfiyecilik Uzerine (Damascus, 1991), p.17
    6. Bayik, op.cit. p.92.
    7. Reports submitted to PKK’s Fifth Congress, Damascus, 1995, p.283.
    8. For the personal records of PKK militants killed see: www.hpg-online.com/sehit/sehit_kunyeleri/2008_a.html .
    9. Seymour Hersh, “The Next Act,” The New Yorker, November 27, 2006. The U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Ross Wilson, denied those allegations; See www.cnnturk.com, June 30, 2008.  www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/12/AR2007091201133.html

     
    https://jamestown.org/program/pjak-iran-and-the-united-states-kurdish-militants-designated-terrorists-by-the-united-states/
  • Ankara Debates Rasmussen’s Candidacy

    Ankara Debates Rasmussen’s Candidacy

    Ankara Debates Rasmussen’s Candidacy for NATO Secretary-General

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 58
    March 26, 2009 05:36 PM
    By: Saban Kardas

    Discussions over the replacement of the current NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, scheduled to step down on July 31, has intensified, ahead of the Alliance’s April 3-4 Summit. Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, supported by key European allies, has emerged as the main contender for the post. After Washington decided to support Rasmussen, it was reported that Turkey might block Rasmussen’s bid, by using its veto power in NATO (Reuters, March 22). These discussions illustrate Turkey’s delicate position within NATO, and how the troubled course of Turkey’s European integration affects its position within the transatlantic alliance (EDM, February 9).

    During Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to NATO headquarters on March 10, speculation mounted concerning the post. Traditionally, the post of secretary-general has been held by a European, whereas the Alliance’s top military officer has been an American. In addition to Rasmussen, other possible candidates for the post are the Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski, Norway’s Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere, and former British Defense Secretary Des Browne. However, Bulgaria’s Foreign Minister Soloman Passy is currently the only official candidate.

    Western media sources presented an unclear view of the possible position of European NATO members on their preferred candidate for the post, which was also reflected within Turkey. An absence of any European consensus might influence Washington to switch its support to Canadian Defense Minister Peter MacKay. Germany, Britain and France, reportedly agreed privately to back Rasmussen who had been tipped as an ideal candidate, not least considering his commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq. In response, Biden left Washington’s options open, saying that the U.S. would continue to deliberate on possible candidates. International observers claimed that based on Turkey’s objections to Rasmussen, Washington might explore other alternatives (Washington Post, March 8; Der Spiegel, New York Times, March 10).

    The Turkish media interpreted these developments as implying that the U.S. had to distance itself from Rasmussen in response to Turkish opposition (Milliyet, March 11). Nonetheless, Washington apparently continued its dialogue with its European allies, and changed its position on Rasmussen. On March 21, NATO diplomats and a U.S. source confirmed Washington’s backing for Rasmussen, but these sources added that securing Turkey’s support would become the focal point in securing a consensus (Reuters, March 21). The next day, citing an anonymous Turkish official, Reuters claimed that Turkey could in fact veto the appointment of Rasmussen, suggesting he was “tainted” from Turkey’s perspective, though its position was not fixed, the official said “it may come to the veto… We will have to see” (Reuters, March 22).

    Misgivings in Ankara over Rasmussen’s candidacy include his opposition to the country’s future membership in the EU, Denmark’s alleged support for the activities of pro-PKK, in particular the militant Roj TV during his administration, and his government’s handling of “the cartoon crisis.” Speculation that such concerns might trigger Turkey’s objection to Rasmussen has long been known. Foreign Minister Ali Babacan recently defined Turkey’s ideal candidate for the post: “a person who understands and embraces the vision, common values and ideals of the organization well, who will be able to maintain [the Alliance’s] relations with all countries in good terms, and whom all member states could trust,” though he did not specify Ankara’s preferred candidate (Anadolu Ajansi, March 5).

    Against this background, Turkey’s media coverage of the controversy has contained a degree of exaggeration (Hurriyet, Sabah, Radikal, March 23). Vatan claimed that Washington’s statements indicate an ‘undeclared crisis’ between Turkey and the U.S. However, it was noted that U.S. backing for Rasmussen was announced only through an unidentified diplomatic source, and it was claimed that Ankara reciprocated by voicing its opinion in a similar manner (Vatan, March 23).

    It is unclear whether Ankara can veto Rasmussen. Many diplomatic observers believe that although Turkey would not be pleased to see him securing this post, it will ultimately accept the transatlantic consensus. Although at face value Turkey’s arguments appear motivated by only narrow concerns, its objections are in fact more principled and take account of NATO’s wider interests (Hurriyet Daily News, March 6). Regarding Turkey’s claim that the Danish government failed to act decisively over the PKK issue, there are also broader implications for the Alliance. Denmark’s attitude towards the activities of Roj TV in propagating the views of the PKK, recognized as a terrorist organization by NATO members, seems to contradict the Alliance’s counter-terrorist agenda. This, at the very least, reflects internal differences of opinion over a common definition of terrorism, which makes more difficult the presentation of a united stance on countering the threat.

    Additionally, Turkey’s assertion that the Danish government failed to act in a responsible manner to alleviate the worldwide concerns of Muslims after the publication of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad within the Danish media, equally has broader significance. Given that NATO treats Afghanistan as a crucial mission, and maintains close relations with other Muslim nations, a candidate with a controversial reputation might face problems in developing ties within the wider Islamic world. From Turkey’s perspective, with its image as a bridge between the Islamic and western worlds, airing the concerns of Muslims is an important part of Ankara’s new foreign policy.

    Considering these reasons, although Turkey might refrain from ultimately using its veto, it would not easily make concessions in response to European pressures to appoint Rasmussen. Since there is no need to name the next NATO Secretary-General at the April Summit, Turkey might force the Alliance to continue their deliberations on possible alternatives. In this case, the burden of forming a “winning coalition” around an alternative name would be placed on Turkey. This presents a real test for Turkish diplomacy: whether Ankara can switch from non-cooperative strategies in the form of threatening to use its veto, to instead achieve its objectives through more constructive diplomacy.

    https://jamestown.org/program/ankara-debates-rasmussens-candidacy-for-nato-secretary-general/

  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    WARNING !

    THE SELLERS  HAVE NOT STOPPED SELLINGS SO ONCE DEMAND DRIES UP MOST FINANCIAL MARKETS COULD SEE A SUDDEN DOWN DRAFT. BE VERY CAREFUL

    CHEERIO !