Category: Authors

  • Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 82
    April 29, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 22, the Foreign Ministries of Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland issued a joint announcement saying that Ankara and Yerevan had agreed to work toward improving their relations within the framework of a roadmap under Swiss auspices. United States’ diplomats were also closely involved in the talks which preceded the deal. Although the decision appears as a breakthrough in resolving this long-term dispute, significant obstacles remain before the completion of the rapprochement.

    The joint statement read as follows:

    “The two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has been identified” (www.mfa.gov.tr, April 22).

    Subsequent statements from diplomatic sources clarified that no agreement has been signed and that the parties agreed to continue working toward fully normalizing their bilateral relations. Although the content of the ongoing talks were not disclosed officially, the deal is likely to include establishing diplomatic representations in their respective capitals, gradual re-opening of the border, Armenia’s recognition of Turkey’s international borders, and forming a joint committee of historians to examine the disputed events of 1915 (Sabah, April 24).

    Many observers believe that if the process can be concluded successfully, it will not only end the long-standing enmity within the South Caucasus, but it also will redefine the geopolitical map of the region -helping to connect Armenia with Western interests in the region. Therefore, the decision was welcomed by the international community as a constructive step toward reconciliation. A statement from the U.S. State Department commended these efforts and called on the parties to proceed with the talks without any preconditions and within a reasonable time frame.

    Initially this was anticipated against the background of the ongoing dialogue, which had accelerated over the past year. This was given a renewed impetus following Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s historic visit to Yerevan in September 2008. In addition to their various bilateral talks, the foreign ministers of both countries also met within the context of multilateral initiatives, raising expectations that a deal could be achieved. Earlier press reports speculated that the two capitals had agreed on a roadmap in late March, but they were debating the proper timing to announce this decision (EDM, March 27; Hurriyet Daily News, March 30). After Obama’s recent high profile trip to Turkey, Turkish-Armenian reconciliation was considered imminent.

    However, following Obama’s visit, Ankara stepped back from its commitment to find a solution in an effort to allay concerns in Baku. The Turkish Prime Minister and other officials declared publicly that they would avoid steps which might damage Azerbaijan’s interests, and Turkey would not re-open its border with Armenia unless the latter ended its occupation of Azerbaijani territories (EDM, April 17). These developments rendered an agreement less likely.

    The announcement that the parties had held secret talks and committed publicly to a roadmap represented a major breakthrough. Nonetheless, there have been conflicting accounts from each side as to whether concessions were made on preconditions to start the negotiations. The continued mystery surrounding the content of the talks may prove an obstacle to a final settlement. Nationalist forces and the opposition, both within Turkey and Armenia, remain opposed to the way in which the rapprochement is being conducted -in an absence of public scrutiny. Secret diplomacy is the key to achieving a breakthrough in such protracted disputes, and supporters of normalization on both sides insist that the governments should not bow to public pressure to abandon the process (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 26). Nonetheless, the widening gap between the governments’ rhetoric and reality risks undermining this controversial foreign policy.

    The Armenian government came under intense domestic criticism, and a minor coalition partner withdrew from the government. Similar problems within Turkey have further complicated these efforts. The AKP government proceeded with the normalization without first preparing public opinion for such a radical decision. It has also failed to keep the opposition informed. Turkish opposition parties are now calling on the government to stop conducting diplomacy behind closed doors, and inform parliament of the current standing of the talks (Ortadogu, April 28).

    Moreover, the Turkish government is criticized for failing to give clear answers as to how the Turkish-Armenian roadmap might impact on Azerbaijan. Apparently, Turkey proceeded with the rapprochement without ensuring Armenia’s response to Azerbaijan’s demands, and this stance contradicted Ankara’s earlier statements that it would protect Baku’s interests. For some Turkish observers, this is an indication that the government did not have a genuine desire for reconciliation with Armenia, but it agreed the roadmap only to remove the word “genocide” from Obama’s April 24 message (Sabah, April 27). For others, Ankara’s zigzagging shows that it is acting opportunistically, which undermines the trust of its partners (Hurriyet Daily News, April 24).

    President Gul ruled out any damage to relations with Baku due to the roadmap, and maintained that it will serve the interests of both Baku and Ankara. The Turkish government is attempting to convince Azeri politicians that its efforts toward resolving its problems with Yerevan also promote Azerbaijan’s interests within international forums (Zaman, April 24). Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s discomfort with these developments is well known.

    After noting that he was not in a position to tell Ankara how to handle its relations with Yerevan, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, said during a visit to Brussels, that Baku reserved the right to revise its policies according to the evolving realities in the region. Referring to the conflicting news about the content of the Turkish-Armenian roadmap deal, Aliyev added “The world, the region and the Azeris want to know whether the Karabakh issue was removed from the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. This is a simple question and has a simple answer” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28).

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-and-armenias-rapprochement-watched-carefully-by-azerbaijan/

  • Turkey Uneasy Over Obama’s Statement on Armenia

    Turkey Uneasy Over Obama’s Statement on Armenia

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 81
    April 28, 2009
    By Saban Kardas
    President Barack Obama’s long awaited statement on the Armenian Remembrance Day caused mixed reactions on both sides of the dispute. Although Obama refrained from referring to the killing of Armenians as “genocide,” which reflected well on Turkish diplomacy, his clear expression of support for the Armenian position caused anger in Turkey. In his statement, Obama said:

    “Ninety four years ago, one of the great atrocities of the twentieth century began. Each year, we pause to remember the 1.5 million Armenians who were subsequently massacred or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire. The ‘Meds Yeghern’ must live on in our memories, just as it lives on in the hearts of the Armenian people” (www.whitehouse.gov, April 24).

    Obama came under criticism by the supporters of the Armenian genocide claims for stopping short of using the word “genocide” to describe the events of 1915 -a pledge which he made during his election campaign. Like other presidents before him, Obama apparently prioritized realpolitik and did not want to harm the strategic relationship with Turkey by risking a negative Turkish reaction over the controversial issue. Moreover, there is a more immediate reason for him to avoid the term: Obama does not want to jeopardize the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. His carefully worded statement is yet another indication of his support for the bilateral talks, to which Turkey and Armenia responded positively by announcing a roadmap to work toward the normalization of their relations.

    Nonetheless, this prudent act on Obama’s part did not entirely satisfy Turkish expectations. Ankara focused on the aspects of Obama’s description of the events of 1915 which are regarded as unacceptable from the Turkish perspective. In spite of this, the phrases Obama chose to depict the Armenian suffering were a serious blow for Turkish diplomacy, which had done its utmost to exclude the word “genocide” from the White House statement. Despite backtracking from his campaign promise, Obama called the killing of Armenians a great atrocity and used the Armenian term “Meds Yeghern” (great disaster) to describe the events, as well as noting that his views on that period of history remained unchanged.

    Turkish officials and politicians uniformly criticized Obama’s statement, calling it one-sided and historically inaccurate. Turkish President Abdullah Gul said he disagreed with parts of Obama’s statement, adding that “in particular, there are hundreds of thousands of Turks and Muslims who lost their lives in 1915. Everyone’s suffering has to be shared.” A press statement released by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also maintained that some expressions in Obama’s statement combined with the interpretation of the events of 1915 were unacceptable from Turkey’s perspective (Anadolu Ajansi, April 25).

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was more pointed in his criticism: “the statement is far from satisfying. We cannot accept it as it is.” Erdogan questioned Obama’s attitude and argued that by giving credence to Armenian claims, Obama had bowed to short-term political considerations. “We are deeply saddened by politicians’ attempts to exploit the events of 1915 for electoral concerns,” Erdogan added. Reflecting a sense of “disappointment” with Obama, Erdogan maintained that Turkey is not a country that can be manipulated with empty promises (Hurriyet, April 27).

    Representatives of the opposition parties also criticized Obama’s statement. The leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party argued that he used only the Armenian side’s terminology. Whereas the leader of the Nationalist Action Party alleged that the statement taken in its entirety, supported unequivocally Armenian genocide claims. The opposition found Obama’s account of the 1915 events as distorting historical reality. Moreover, they capitalized on this incident to criticize the government’s foreign policy, maintaining that in order to prevent Obama from using the word “genocide” involved making concessions to Armenia in breach of Turkey’s national interests -which also alienated Azerbaijan. Characterizing Obama’s statement as the starkest proof yet of the government’s failed approach, they called for a reversal of such “submissive” policies, and backing away from the rapprochement with Yerevan (Anadolu Ajansi, ANKA, April 25).

    The strong reactions from both the government and the opposition raised questions as to how this development might damage Turkish-American relations. Since Obama’s inauguration, Turkey and the United States have revitalized their strategic partnership. Yet Ankara made it clear that a miscalculated American intervention in the Armenian issue might spoil Turkish-American relations.

    In its official responses so far, Turkey has not taken punitive measures to protest against Obama’s statement. Turkish diplomatic sources reported that U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, James Jeffrey, was invited to the Foreign Ministry to discuss the developments. Ankara’s concerns and uneasiness regarding the statement were relayed to him, but no official note of protest to Washington was presented (ANKA, April 27).

    For its part, Ankara must have realized that despite its intensive diplomacy, it has failed to influence Western public opinion in favor of its view of the events in 1915. This episode shows that the government cannot sustain its policy of denial, and should develop a new approach to explain its own version of events. Nonetheless, Turkey is unlikely to sever ties with the United States, though the controversy demonstrates how the politics of the Armenian “genocide” can potentially undermine Turkish-American relations. The periodic resurrection of this debate in American politics hijacks Turkish-American relations, perpetuating a crisis of trust. Nor does it further the interests of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, since American intervention threatens to derail any genuine desire to find a solution in Ankara. In the face of domestic opposition, no Turkish government can afford to proceed with a dialogue with Armenia or maintain friendly relations with the United States if Washington is perceived as taking sides.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-uneasy-over-obamas-statement-on-armenia/
  • Turkey – Only in a Tank!

    Turkey – Only in a Tank!

    vahan-hovhanissianThat was the retort from a leader of one of Armenia’s coalition parties, when in 2004 he was asked whether Armenia should resolve its differences with its western neighbor; the person who promised to release details of his 2004 Parliamentary Commission studies of grants, credits and humanitarian assistance, former Deputy Speaker of the Armenian National Assembly, Vahan Hovhanissian.

    In 2004, Vahan Hovhanissian’s Parliamentary Commission found corruption worth $200 million dollars, at a time when the total Armenian state budget had just increased from $400 million to 600 million dollars. But he reneged on his promise to release the details to the Armenian people, so his rating plummeted and the party’s reputation suffered another setback. The Dashnak Party had long been hanging on to Kocharian’s apron strings, so Hovhanissian was put up as Republican Party fodder in the 2008 Presidential election to allow the apron to be passed on to the Dashnaks arch enemy Serzh Sargsyan.

    Vahan has since parked his tank, and together with his fellow party leaders, for the past few months he has been sneaking toward the Turkish border, ‘Cap-in-Hand’, eagerly awaiting his pickings from the compensation package Sargsyan and Nalbandian have negotiated for their ‘No Pre-conditions’ capitulation with Turkey.

    That was until the 27th April, when Dashnak Party leaders eventually decided they could no longer stay in Armenia’s Government coalition, ostensibly betrayed by their leader, Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan.

    Vahan Hovhanissian, Armen Rostumian, Kiro Manukian, Hrai Karapetian, and other Dashnak Party leaders have long known of the deal their President and his MFA Nalbandian have been clandestinely negotiating for Turkey to open (or maybe not to open) the Armenian border. But they have been silently sitting back and waiting for the ‘No Pre-conditions Roadmap’ to be finalized. Public knowledge of a signed 22nd April ‘Genocide Sell-Out Memorandum’ was the straw which broke the Dashnaks party back in the Sargsyan coalition; they could no longer reasonably explain their collusion in such treachery, especially with such opposition outrage and probably under pressure from Genocide lobbying Dashnaks in the Diaspora.

    But with regard the signed memorandum, the Dashnaks should not blame their President Sargsyan, the blame for that has to go to America’s President. Assurances of a ‘warming relationship with Turkey’ would no longer hold water for the honest and well-intentioned Barac Obama, not even from the President of Armenia. Only a signed document would have sufficed for him to renege on his Genocide promise to the people of Armenia, so that is what he and his administration demanded – and got.

    The signed document came in the form of the Nalbandian – Babacan ‘No Pre-conditions Roadmap’, which officially remains under wraps. But snippets of the details can be found through Turkish, Russian or other international media, even Azerbaijan – but certainly not from Armenia.

    • First non pre-condition: Armenia will agree to Turkey’s commission, or a number of commissions, to study Turkish / Armenian affairs, not excluding Genocide.
    • Second non pre-condition: Armenia will ratify the Kars agreement of 1920, formally withdrawing claims to historic Armenian lands in the east of Turkey.
    • Third non pre-condition: Armenia will agree to Azerbaijani demands on Karabakh, including withdrawal of troops from the surrounding territories.
    • Fourth non pre-condition: Armenia will not have an embassy on Turkish territory, but diplomatic relations will be conducted through Tbilisi.
    • Fifth non pre-condition: Turkey will determine if and when the border will be opened, possibly starting with one day each month.

    The Nalbandian – Babacan ‘Roadmap’ will no doubt motor on unhindered by the Dashnak Party departure, and Armenia’s coalition will probably be more relieved than distraught by the Dashnak Party loss.

    But whilst the Dashnaks did little good in the coalition, they could well do considerable harm out of it. If the Dashnak Party effort goes towards regulating the out of control Sargsyan regime, then there may be the hope of a better future for Armenia. But if the Dashnak Party continues collaboration with its Kocharian / Sargsyan mentors, and its capabilities and influence are directed toward frustrating the efforts of Armenia’s only real opposition leader, Levon Ter-Petrossian, and his National Congress, then the Dashnak Party will seriously harm the chances of a more democratic future for the Republic and add yet another disgrace to its already badly tarnished reputation.

    Bruce Tasker
    Armenian Parliamentary Analyst

  • Armenia’s Dashnaktutsiun Party leaves Government coalition

    Armenia’s Dashnaktutsiun Party leaves Government coalition

    Dashnak flag

    Could it possibly be true that Armenia’s Dashnaktutsiun Party has decided to leave the Government coalition and join the opposition?

    PanArmenian reports that that was the only issue on the Dashnaktutsiun 25th April agenda, when the party apparently also resolved to resign from their ministerial positions. If so, this is a decided blow to Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan’s plans to continue along his ‘roadmap’ with Turkey, and could even mark the beginning of the end for his illegitimate regime.

    The Armenia / Turkey dispute must of course be resolved as should the Karabakh issue with Azerbaijan, but the clandestine manner in which the process has been conducted by the Armenian authorities to date has been absolutely unacceptable. If this article can be believed, it seems the Dashnaks could have decided enough is enough.

    PanArmenian is however an Armenian state-backed media organization, so this information could simply be the Republicans throwing a cat amongst Armenia’s already flighty opposition pigeons, to buy time whilst Sargsyan and Nalbandian crawl their ways out of the political ‘roadmap’ fallout. That could well be the case, as PanArmenian also released an article “ARFD to launch an internet protest campaign against Armenian-Turkish agreement”, which actually refers to a petition published, not by the Dashnaks, but by the highly popular Canadian Diaspora website ‘Keghart’.

  • Obama’s April 24 statement no comfort for Turks

    Obama’s April 24 statement no comfort for Turks

    by Ferruh Demirmen

    It is becoming almost an annual ritual for American presidents to issue commemorative declarations every year on April 24 to remember the Armenian “victims” of a tragic historic episode that took place almost 100 years ago. How many other foreign historic episodes nearly a century old do the American presidents commemorate every year? The answer: “zero.”

    And wherein lies the secret for such homage to Armenian people? Money, my friends, and lots of it in the form of campaign contributions.

    And the hapless Turks, ever watchful if the dreaded word “genocide” will be spelled out on such occasions, take a deep breath if that does not happen. They sit mostly on the sidelines, waiting for the events to unfold. Never mind that, the “g” word or no “g” word, they may be blamed for atrocities in history they did not commit.

    The Turk’s attitude is the poor man’s consolation for being spared a bigger affront.

    The litany

    Last year, referring to “human dignity” and “epic human tragedy,” President Bush issued a statement to “honor the memory of the victims of one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century, the mass killings and forced exile of as many as 1.5 million Armenians at the end of the Ottoman Empire.”

    Not a single word about the context, and the Moslem victims.

    It is a melodramatic soap opera that takes place every year, and this year it was no different.

    A few days ago President Obama, referring to “man’s inhumanity to man,” called the 1915 events “one of the great atrocities of the 20th century.” He remembered the “1.5 million Armenians who were subsequently massacred or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire.”

    So, Obama didn’t use the “g” word. Big deal! But he used the equivalent term in Armenian: “Medz Yeghern,” meaning Big Calamity. To the Turks, it is nearly as offensive as the “g” word. And Obama, a smart and perceptive man, should have known.

    Never believe the ANCA-type hypocrites who feigned disappointment in Obama’s choice of words because he didn’t use the “g” word. The Dashnakians must have relished Obama’s use of the term “Medz Yeghern.”

    It is the first time an American president pandered to the Freudian psyche of the Armenian lobby.

    The term “genocide” is a legal term, anyway, and notwithstanding the untoward motives of ANCA-swayed politicians, the UN and the International Court of Justice are the only legal entities empowered  to give credibility to that word.

    A matter of balance

    In all honesty, no one can blame Obama, or any other American president for that matter, to commemorate the tragic sufferings and deaths of Armenians during World War I. We must all condemn tragic events that befell humanity.

    But humanity also calls for a sense of balance, or justice. Where is the context, the faithfulness to historical truth, and remembrance of Turkish and Kurdish sufferings and casualties in such condemnations?

    Why is the number of Armenian casualties in these statements, which historical records show could not have exceeded half a million, boosted to 1.5 million?

    Why is there no mention of the betrayal of the Ottomans by the Armenian populace, who, by forming armed gangs, attacked the Ottoman civilians and Ottoman armies from behind during wartime when the country was under Russian, French and British occupation?

    More Moslems perished in the hands of terrorist Armenian gangs than the Armenians under Moslem backlash.

    Do the American presidents, or politicians of all stripes for that matter, have the right to be selective in condemning “man’s inhumanity to man?”

    Did the sufferings and deaths of Turks, Kurds, and even Jews in some cases, matter at all?

    As Obama-the-candidate was being indoctrinated by Dashnakians as to the events during World War I and learn diligently the words “Medz Yeghern,” he should have asked his hosts to teach him how to say “betrayal”or “treason” in Armenian. And cite that word in his April 24 statement.

    Those irresistible greenbacks

    President Obama is a clever man with a huge popularity at home and abroad. Unlike President Bush, who had a habit of bumbling through his unscripted speeches, Obama chooses his words carefully. His language in his April 24 statement is a testimony to the irresistible effectiveness of ANCA’s lobbying efforts. His perception of history was clouded by Armenian propaganda.

    The enthusiastic sponsorship that Obama received on ANCA’s website, through videos and webcasts, in apparent violation of ANCA’s tax-exempt status, is all too fresh in minds.  

    Obama didn’t stop with one-sided depiction of history. Adding insult to injury, he paid homage to Americans of Armenian descent for their contributions to the American society while ignoring Turkish Americans.

    Fair is fair. Does Obama think Turks are zombies of no redeemable value?

    Surely, the greenbacks, lots of them, must have done wonders for the Armenian propagandists in shaping Obama’s mind.

    Dubious diplomacy

    Will the Turks take notice of such indignity? We don’t know. But the higher-ups in the Turkish government in Ankara probably will not. They engaged in secret negotiations in Switzerland toward normalization of relations between Ankara and Yerevan, reporting the “progress” to the Obama administration but leaving the Turkish people – as well as the Azeri people – in the dark.

    Which begs the question: Did those high-flying Turkish diplomats in Switzerland think they were representing the Obama administration instead of the Turkish people?

    The Azeri have a very legitimate stake in the Turkish-Armenian talks because of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

    In the meanwhile the Azeri, being briefed about the Switzerland talks by the Russians, who in turn were briefed by the Armenians, became incensed at Turks’ audacity at conducting diplomacy behind their back. The Azeri showed their displeasure by starting energy-related talks with the Russian energy giant Gazprom. Turkey’s east-west Nabucco energy transit project, already suffering from a cold bout, has become shakier still. The Azeri gas is supposed to be the initial feed gas for the project. Ankara now has its hands full trying to placate a jittery Baku.

    The imponderables

    Setting all this aside, President Obama perhaps deserves credit for tempering his April 24 statement with some moderation. Even Vice President Joe Biden, the inveterate genocide hawk, softened his stance. Obama could have been harsher in his statement. The moderation, of course, stems from anticipation of a growing dialog between Turkey and Armenia that started in Switzerland. Whether that will materialize, is something else. Obama didn’t want to throw cold water on the process.

    But with his unmistakable pro-Armenian bias, most Turks will remain unimpressed with Obama’s stance.

    The outcome of the Turkish-Armenian talks so far is a “road map” of which details are kept under wraps. Apparently there are no pre-conditions to advance talks to the next level. But the road map has many roadblocks for both sides – as well, for the Azeri.

    In the meantime, the Turkish-American relations will become hostage to the outcome of diplomatic traffic between Ankara, Yerevan and Baku. With “Medz Yeghern” language in the background, it is not a reassuring thought. Turks are not comforted by Obama’s language.

    Separately, there is no guarantee that a Democratically controlled U.S. House of Representatives under the leadership of Nancy Pelosi will not pass a pro-genocide resolution soon.

    [email protected]

  • Turkey’s Veteran Islamist Erbakan Visits Iran

    Turkey’s Veteran Islamist Erbakan Visits Iran

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 76
    April 21, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Following the restoration of his political rights, veteran Islamist politician and former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, 83, returned to active politics, raising questions about the leadership of the Islamist Felicity Party (SP). Erbakan, the legendary leader of the National Outlook Movement (NOM) advocated a political Islamist platform in Turkish politics, and formed a succession of political parties since the 1970’s -training activists who became influential figures within Turkish political life. He skillfully mobilized the Turkish electorate behind his Welfare Party (RP) in the 1990’s and succeeded to rule the country in a coalition government between 1996 and 1997. His policies while in power irked Turkey’s powerful generals who perceived the RP as a direct threat to secularism and staged a campaign to force Erbakan out of power, known as the “February 28 process.” Erbakan was forced out of office, and subsequently the Constitutional Court closed down the RP in 1998, suspending political rights of Erbakan and other RP officials. The crackdown on Islamic social networks during the “February 28 process” led to a crisis within the Islamist movement, whereby the new generation questioned the platform and strategies of the NOM instilled by Erbakan. The split between the pro-Erbakan old-guard and the reformist wing became visible when the Constitutional Court shut down the WP’s successor Virtue Party (FP) on similar grounds in 2002. The two groups separated, with the reformists organizing themselves around the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power following a landslide election victory in 2002 and continues to rule Turkey. In contrast, the FP’s traditionalist offshoot, the SP, was defeated.

    Although he took over the SP leadership after his five-year ban came to an end in 2003, Erbakan faced political restrictions in another RP-related case. He was found guilty of forgery in the so-called “lost trillion case’ concerning the loss of more than one trillion Turkish Liras in Treasury grants to the RP. In addition to his political ban, he was sentenced to two years and four months, which he began serving under house arrest in May 2008. Citing Erbakan’s ailing health, in August 2008 President Abdullah Gul pardoned him, paving the way for the removal of his political restrictions (Today’s Zaman, April 6).

    Erbakan constantly expressed his opinions on political developments through his public appearances in the SP’s election rallies and other platforms. He acted as a vocal opponent of the governing AKP, criticizing it for following pro-Western policies and betraying the NOM spirit. After the restoration of his political rights in April, Erbakan’s press briefing in the SP headquarters was interpreted as marking his return to “active politics.” Despite his advanced age, he set himself an ambitious timescale for putting the SP on the political map, voicing the same anti-Western and confrontational discourse he had been advocating for decades (ANKA, April 10). Following his press briefing, Erbakan visited Iran, where he received a warm welcome from Iranian officials including President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. Erbakan and Iranian leaders vowed to continue their struggle against “Western imperialism and Zionism” and pursue the establishment of a pan-Islamic union (www.saadet.org.tr, April 19; Hurriyet, April 20).

    Erbakan’s return to politics has raised questions about the future leadership of the SP. Though his political socialization took place within the NOM tradition, the current party leader Numan Kurtulmus, a professor of economics, in many ways distinguished himself from traditionalists. Distancing himself from the doctrinaire outlook of the NOM cadres, Kurtulmus is known as a person who has embraced broader segments of society (www.cafesiyaset.com, December 16, 2008). He declined invitations from the governing AKP to join their ranks, and instead continued his political career within the SP, and eventually took on the challenging task of revitalizing the NOM tradition in Turkish politics. He overcame opposition from traditionalists and was elected as the new SP leader in October 2008 -succeeding Erbakan. He maintained his allegiance to Erbakan’s ideals but avoided being viewed as his caretaker (www.timeturk.com, October 22, 2008).

    Now that Erbakan has returned to the party, Kurtulmus’ position appears vulnerable. Kurtulmus was not present at the Erbakan press briefing, which triggered speculation that there might be an underlying leadership struggle within the party (www.habervitrini.com, April 11). Fuelling these rumors, Erbakan avoided telling reporters what his future role will be within the party. Kurtulmus ruled out such a contest, arguing that “we do not have a leadership problem. Mr. Erbakan does not harbor such goals… he has valuable views and we will continue to benefit from them” (Anadolu Ajansi, April 12).

    Alternatively, Erbakan might portray himself as an “intellectual guide” for the NOM, enabling him to exert influence over the SP. Though he may not assume the party chairmanship directly, given his personality, he is unlikely to disengage entirely from the SP and its policy making, not least for the purpose of consolidating his son’s position in the party. Since many analysts attributed the SP’s success in last month’s local elections to its new leader Kurtulmus, who was able to imbue a sense of dynamism through his moderate political discourse, the return of the old-guard Erbakan might damage the party’s future performance within Turkish politics.

     http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34886