Category: Authors

  • Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan

    Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan

    Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 87
    May 6, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The recent uncertainty surrounding Turkish-Azeri relations is giving way to a new period of optimism, ahead of high level diplomatic contacts. Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will meet Azeri officials in a bid to reassure Baku of Ankara’s intention to protect Azerbaijan’s interests during the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process.

    Turkey’s policy of conducting diplomacy within the South Caucasus in coordination with Azerbaijan, came under strain when it attempted to accelerate normalizing its relations with Armenia. Baku expressed its reservations over the rapid increase in diplomatic activity between Ankara -Yerevan which it perceived as “developing at the expense of Azerbaijan.” Azerbaijani officials tried to understand the content of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and how this might affect Turkish-Azeri relations (EDM, April 29, May 4). At the height of the discussions on President Obama’s April 24 address, the possibility that Ankara might ignore Baku’s sensitivities was often discussed within both countries. In addition to the reaction of Azerbaijani officials, such speculation added to public outrage toward the AKP government’s policies, both within Turkey and Azerbaijan. While delegations of Azeri parliamentarians and civil society organizations visited Turkey to garner political support for their plight, their Turkish counterparts also traveled to Azerbaijan in order to express solidarity with their Azeri brethren. Azeri deputies frequently appeared on live discussion programs on Turkish TV, seeking to mobilize public opinion, exerting additional pressure on the AKP government.

    Against this background, the Turkish government is now refocusing its attention on addressing those concerns. At the same time, the Turkish press reported that Baku has toned down its criticism of Ankara’s policies toward Armenia. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev wants to reinforce bilateral ties, ensuring that he is kept informed about the progress on Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and securing greater leverage over Ankara’s policies toward Yerevan. Toward that end, Aliyev has decided to send a special envoy to Turkey (Referans, May 2).

    Turkey’s first attempts to reach out to Baku came on May 4 when Azerbaijan’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Araz Azimov, visited Ankara and held talks with Turkey’s newly appointed Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Since it was Davutoglu’s first meeting after assuming office two days earlier, it had a symbolic meaning -demonstrating the value that Davutoglu attaches to Turkish-Azeri ties. In addition to exploring ways of improving bilateral relations through more frequent and high profile meetings between the leaders of the two countries, they also exchanged opinions on regional issues (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 4).

    As a further boost to Ankara’s policy to regain Baku’s confidence, Erdogan will visit Baku on May 12-13, and then meet Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on May 16 (Anadolu Ajansi, May 4). While commenting on his forthcoming trip, Erdogan sought to deflect recent criticism from Baku and domestic opposition parties. He maintained that his government did not deserve such heavy criticism, which he characterized as an unnecessary reaction to Turkey’s policy of rapprochement; especially concerning Ankara’s intention to re-open its border with Armenia. Erdogan also emphasized that some Azeri officials’ statements had hurt Ankara. He added that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations will also serve Baku’s interests and he will seek to remove any misunderstandings during his visit next week (ANKA, May 5).

    Moreover, Erdogan’s plan to meet Putin reflects Ankara’s belief that Russia remains a significant stakeholder in the resolution of Turkish-Armenian-Azeri problems and must act in concert with Russia, in order to advance its interests within the South Caucasus. Russia is one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group working to resolve the Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and has been mediating in talks between Baku and Yerevan.

    President Gul is taking additional steps toward addressing concerns over Ankara’s policies from Baku and domestic opposition parties. Gul met the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party Deniz Baykal, who had lambasted the recent moves towards rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, arguing that Erdogan had betrayed Baku. Gul briefed Baykal about the developments within the South Caucasus in an attempt to influence Turkish public opinion (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 5).

    Gul also plans to hold two separate meetings with Aliyev and the Armenia’s President Serzh Sarksyan during the Eastern Partnership and Southern Corridor meetings in Prague on May 7-8 under the sponsorship of the Czech Republic, which currently holds the EU presidency (Anadolu Ajansi, May 5). In addition to discussing issues including energy security, the Prague summit will provide an opportunity to consider the resolution of problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Baku and Yerevan frequently conduct part of their diplomatic negotiations on the sidelines of such multilateral forums. In preparation for the Prague summit the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, met the foreign ministers of both countries separately in Washington. Clinton expressed her support and encouragement for these bilateral talks ahead of the Prague summit (www.cnnturk.com, May 5).

    The Gul-Aliyev meeting might equally hold symbolic meaning, marking an improvement of ties between Ankara and Baku, after their recent tension. Previously, Aliyev had declined to participate in multilateral meetings where he might meet Gul, spurning Gul’s invitation to attend the Alliance of Civilizations platform in Istanbul (EDM, April 8) and later cancelling his participation in an energy summit in Sofia, attended by Gul (Takvim, April 23). The Turkish press speculated that Aliyev was deliberately avoiding these meetings to convey his discomfort over Ankara’s failure to consult him on the Turkish-Armenian talks. Gul consistently denied any such row, and even claimed that he kept Aliyev informed about developments by telephone (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 28). A face-to-face meeting between the two leaders might remove the basis for any future speculation, as well as mend strained Turkish-Azeri relations.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-prioritizing-its-relations-with-azerbaijan/
  • SOUTHERN CORRIDOR – EU signs deal on new gas pipeline

    SOUTHERN CORRIDOR – EU signs deal on new gas pipeline

    It is hoped that the piepline will start pumping gas to Europe by 2014 [EPA]

    The European Union has just signed an agreement with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Egypt in a bid to press ahead with a gas pipeline that would reduce its reliance on Russian energy. That shows the determination on the part of EU to end Europe’s energy dependence on Russia.

    Mirek Topolanek, the Czech prime minister, said the aim to open up a “southern corridor” for supplies was “not just a one-way street for pipelines…We envisage this as a new silk road where we’ll see the flow of information, goods, people and energy in both ways.” () (Aljazeera, MAY 08, 2009)

    “Two suppliers — Azerbaijan and Egypt — and two key transit states — Turkey and Georgia — agreed to give “the necessary political support,” and, where possible, “technical and financial assistance” to the construction of planned pipelines and transport routes needed to bring gas from the Caspian Basin region and the Middle East to the European market.”
    (RADIO FREE EUROPE, Antoine Blua, May 08, 2009)

    Here is the text of this important declaration ushering in a new age of energy diplomacy:

    ***

    DECLARATION: SOUTHERN CORRIDOR
    Prague Summit, May 8, 2009

    We, the Participants of the Southern Corridor Summit held in Prague on the 8th of May 2009;

    express our political support to the realization of the Southern Corridor as an important and mutually beneficial initiative, which will lead to the promotion of common prosperity, stability and security of all countries involved;

    understand the Southern Corridor as an area of mutual interest providing opportunities for cooperation of the various entities in our public and private sectors. The trigger but not the sole focus of this process of strengthening relations among the Southern Corridor countries will be enhancing our mutually beneficial energy cooperation, which has the potential to serve as a cornerstone for the overall cooperation among countries involved;

    acknowledge that infrastructure projects which interconnect the countries along the Southern Corridor will act as a catalyst for further co-operation in other areas. The successful cooperation in the field of energy will encourage investments also in transport area. The development of transport infrastructure, including for energy, will lead to an intensification of people-to-people contact, which is the fundamental prerequisite to further social, economic and political cooperation in the whole region;

    intend to overcome the main remaining commercial and non-commercial obstacles by coordinating on common progressive strategy, individual commitments of the countries concerned, namely energy producer, transit and consumer countries, and clear scheduling for the completion and functioning of concrete energy and transport projects to be realized and operated within the Southern Corridor, including the Trans-Caspian energy transportation projects;

    consider the Southern Corridor concept as a modern Silk Road interconnecting countries and people from different regions and establishing the adequate framework, necessary for encouraging trade, multidirectional exchange of know-how, technologies and experience.

    We consider

    The Southern Corridor concept as a synergy of the following documents:

    – the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements between the EU and Azerbaijan, the EU and Georgia, the EU and Kazakhstan, and the EU and Uzbekistan;
    – the Association Agreement between the EU and Turkey and the EU and Egypt;
    – the European Neighbourhood Policy, including the Action Plans, the Eastern Partnership, EU-Central Asia Strategy and the Black Sea Synergy;
    – the Memoranda of Understanding on strategic energy partnership between the EU and Egypt , EU and Kazakhstan, EU and Turkmenistan and EU and Azerbaijan;
    – the Declaration of the Budapest Nabucco Summit of 27 January 2009;
    – the Declaration of the Sofia Energy Summit of 24-25th April 2009;
    – The Baku Initiative and the Energy Road Map endorsed on the occasion of the Astana Ministerial Conference of 30 November 2006;
    – The Baku Energy Summit Declaration of 14th November 2008;
    – The Ministerial Statement on the Nabucco gas pipeline project of 26th June 2006;
    – Agreements on transportation of oil and gas through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum oil and gas pipelines of 1999 and 2001 respectively;

    – Agreement among the Republic of Turkey, the Hellenic Republic and Italian Republic concerning the development of the Turkey, Greece, Italy Transportation Corridor of 26 July 2007 in Rome;
    – the European Council Conclusions of 8-9 March 2007, 16 October 2008 and 20th March 2009;
    – the European Commission’s Second Strategic Energy Review of 13 November 2008;

    – Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning trans-European energy networks (TEN-E);

    – Commission Decision granting financial aid for an action of 2.12.2008 in the field of the trans-European energy networks (TEN-E);
    – the EU-financed INOGATE technical feasibility studies on the Trans-Caspian-Black Sea Gas Corridor as well as the feasibility study on the Caspian Development Corporation (CDC);
    – the European Commission’s Communication on the extension of the major trans-European transport axes to the neighbouring countries, of 31 January 2007;
    – the transport cooperation and initiatives involving the EU and the countries of the Southern Corridor ;
    – And bearing in mind international treaties and obligations, including those arising from the Energy Charter Treaty, the Energy Community Treaty as well as the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements fostering the development of projects of the Southern Corridor;

    We declare

    That the concept for the Southern Corridor is complementary to other existing energy and transport partnerships and projects of the EU and is open for the participation and contribution of third countries on a case-by-case basis in concrete projects, upon agreement of all the Parties to this declaration directly involved.

    That one of the basic prerequisites for developing the Southern Corridor is cooperation to establish interconnections starting with direct energy and transport links among the countries concerned as appropriate. We therefore agree to promote a common initiative to develop the conditions necessary for more effective transportation networks, including of energy resources, goods and people as well as an improved exchange of know-how and technologies within the Corridor with the participation of all the interested countries, international political conditions permitting. This should make the maximum use of the existing regional initiatives on energy and transport.

    On the basis of declared principles in the field of energy we,

    agree to give necessary political support and, where possible, technical and financial assistance to the construction of the Southern Corridor, including the Trans-Caspian energy transportation projects, in order to support the diversification of energy sources, markets and transport routes, which will not only enhance the energy security of the participating countries , but also will simultaneously constitute fair and profitable opportunities for energy producers, consumers and transit countries, while recognizing the need for this to be feasible, economically competitive, technically and environmentally sustainable and timely.

    welcome transparency, competitiveness, long term predictability and stable regulatory conditions to underpin the realization of concrete infrastructure projects in the framework of the Southern Corridor. This should include

    * firstly, the means to provide producers with reliable commitments of the consumers on their aggregate demand and the identification of non- committed natural gas and oil volumes by producer countries that can be dedicated specifically to the EU as well as the Corridor countries markets with a precise timetable for their availability on the basis of their commercial profitability;

    * secondly, the establishment of necessary and appropriate transit and environmental arrangements in line with the Parties’ international commitments;

    * thirdly, the need for companies to ensure direct, industry-standard commercial agreements between producers and consumers.

    envisage a mechanism for aggregating sufficient volumes to be transported through the Southern Corridor, and, take note of the feasibility study on the Caspian Development Corporation initiative that should lead to concrete proposals in this respect. In this context, eventually consider devoting, as appropriate, public and private financial resources necessary for the realization of the Southern Corridor, including encouraging the market-based participation of public and private companies.

    attain the energy security of all parties including consumer and transit states, such as Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the basis of commercial agreements that are in line with the Parties’ international commitments.

    welcome that the countries concerned will endeavor to:

    – implement a clear, transparent, cost-based, stable and non-discriminatory transportation regime for natural gas or oil across the territories of the Corridor countries to end consumer markets, in line with the Parties’ international commitments.

    – establish direct connections between both sides of the Caspian Sea as one of the main important elements of the effective energy cooperation and favour the interconnection of the Southern Corridor with the EU through strategic infrastructure projects necessary for carrying natural gas by pipelines or ships. In the gas sector, interconnection will be established among others through the Nabucco project and the ITGI project both of which are financially supported in the EU Recovery Plan endorsed by the European Council of March 2009 as well as other projects within the Corridor. In the oil sector, an extension of the already operating transportation system between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan could be developed in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions, taking into account the constrains of the Turkish straits.

    – promote the activities of public and private companies that are involved or willing to participate in the realization of the Trans-Caspian energy link.

    – achieve maximum energy efficiency and use of renewable energies as an important element for successful cooperation in the field of energy.

    Therefore, we express our readiness to share technologies, knowledge and know-how in order to reach efficient fuel use and further development of alternative energy sources to allow long-term and sustainable growth for all Corridor countries;

    – share technologies, knowledge and know-how for the development of energy resources, their transportation and technical upgrading within the Corridor.

    In the field of transport we endeavour,

    To support the promotion of regional and cooperative approaches to transport challenges in the Southern Corridor, which includes appropriate projects in the Mashreq, in particular Egypt and Iraq.

    To intensify cooperation in view of promoting the implementation of relevant infrastructure projects and of policy measures to facilitate exchanges, to support efforts to make transport projects within the Southern Corridor an effective and responsive instrument of cooperation and enhancing public-private partnerships and other ways of attracting investments.
    To implement the extension of transport trans European Networks to Turkey and South Caucasus and beyond to Central Asia along the Southern corridor, including connections to the Middle East.

    To encourage, with respect to high importance of railway transport in economies of Corridor countries, all parties involved to further develop the strategic railway networks and their interoperability. In this regard we support the railway and maritime corridor connecting the Caspian Sea Region with the EU, as well as a roll-on roll-off ferry connections between the EU and the relevant countries of the Southern Corridor, including Georgia.

    To share technologies, knowledge and know-how for technical upgrading of transport facilities within the Corridor in order to increase the transport efficiency.
    To harmonize technical norms and standards, ensure transparent and competitive tariffs, and to simplify custom procedures and border crossing in order to ensure fluent movement of all kinds of goods as a basic condition for deepening of trade among the involved countries.

    In the field of overall cooperation we agree,

    That strengthening of mutual relations must go hand in hand with following principles: transparency, non-discrimination , market economy and commercial profitability.
    To favour stable regulatory framework ensuring clear and predictable investment environment, which contributes to mutual trust necessary for successful realization of all strategic projects within the Southern Corridor.

    With respect to implementation and follow-up, we agree to strongly support the following steps:

    On energy:

    * The European Commission, together with the Council of the EU and the signatory partner countries, will monitor the implementation of this declaration and, in particular, work on developing an Action Plan seeking the implementation of the necessary conditions and the
    appropriate supporting measures for the Southern Corridor.

    * For the EU Member States concerned and Turkey to finish the negotiations of the intergovernmental agreement on Nabucco as quickly as possible, to sign it by the end of June 2009 in Turkey, and to continue to support the necessary steps for its implementation inter alia by identifying gas volumes available for marketing in the EU and Turkey.

    * For the EU Member States concerned and the relevant countries to progress further on the timely realisation of the ITGI project.

    * For the EU and the concerned countries to conclude the feasibility study on the Caspian Development Corporation initiative by the end of 2009 in view of the possible identification of relevant actions for the implementation.

    * For the EU and Iraq to sign an MoU on Energy as soon as possible, and for the EU and Egypt to cooperate and agree on specific projects in developing Egypt’s gas reserves and export potential for the EU, including via the Southern Corridor and encouraging energy investment, transfer of know-how for this purpose.

    On transport

    * To cooperate on the objective of promoting the extension of the trans-European transport networks to the countries of the Southern Corridor;

    * To work on developing an action plan on possible additional appropriate measures, including safety and security, to facilitate transport and transit flows along the Southern Corridor;

    * To work on a list of priority projects and policy measures for the development of the Southern corridor, and attract funds to implement them.

    Done and signed in Prague on 8th May 2009 in the presence of the representatives of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

    For the EU,
    H.E. Mirek Topolánek, President of the European Council

    H.E. Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission

    For the Republic of Azerbaijan,

    H.E. Ilham Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

    For the Republic of Georgia,
    H.E. Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia

    For the Republic of Turkey,

    H.E. Abdullah Gül, President of Turkey

    For the Arab Republic of Egypt,
    H.E. Sameh Fahmy, Minister of Petroleum of the Arab Republic of Egypt

    ***

    00000000000000000


    The European Union has signed an agreement with four countries in a bid to press ahead with a gas pipeline that would reduce its reliance on Russian energy.

    Azerbaijan and Egypt, which can both supply gas, and Turkey and Georgia, which are able to carry it, signed up to the Nabucco gas pipeline scheme on Friday at a meeting in Prague, capital of the Czech Republic.

    In return for their commitment to supply gas to Europe, the EU offered to provide more trade and stronger transport links to the gas producers and transit countries involved.

    Three key nations – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – refused to sign the text, diplomatic sources told the AFP news agency.

    ‘New silk road’

    Mirek Topolanek, the Czech prime minister, said the aim to open up a “southern corridor” for supplies was “not just a one-way street for pipelines.”

    He said: “We envisage this as a new silk road where we’ll see the flow of information, goods, people and energy in both ways.”

    Representatives from the United States, Russia and Ukraine also attended the summit as observers to the agreement.

    Dosya:Nabucco Gas Pipeline-tr.svg

    Iraq, which was also invited to the meeting, did not send any officials.

    The summit was called to help kick-start the Nabucco pipeline, which would link the EU to gas rich nations on and beyond the Caspian Sea, bypassing Russia and Ukraine.

    The pipeline, which once completed would stretch 3,300km from Turkey to Austria, could transport up to 31bn cubic metres of gas each year to western Europe.

    It is hoped that it will start pumping gas to Europe by 2014.

    The EU is keen to speed up the construction of the pipeline after a dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January over gas prices left large areas of Europe without  supplies of the resource for two weeks.

  • Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 84
    May 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 27, Turkey and Syria launched their first joint military exercise on their border. The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to enhance joint training and interoperability, and are expected to be followed by similar exercises in the future. On the same day, during the 9th International Defense Industry Fair in Istanbul, both countries signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries (www.tsk.tr, April 26, Hurriyet, April 28). These developments once again strained Turkish-Israeli ties, re-opening the debate on Turkey’s commitment to its Western orientation.

    Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, called the exercises disturbing, though noting that Turkish-Israeli strategic relations will survive this challenge (www.ynetnews.com, April 27). Israel’s Ambassador to Turkey, Gabby Levy, told reporters that Tel Aviv was following the drill closely to understand its goal and content (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28). DEBKAfile reported that, to protest against this development Israel was preparing to “slash its military exchanges with Turkey to prevent the leakage of military secrets to an avowed Arab enemy” and it would “discontinue sales of its … drones and sharply reduce its military ties with Turkey” (DEBKAfile, April 27).

    Moreover, an Israeli strategic analyst Efraim Inbar, referring to unnamed Turkish military officers, maintained that the joint exercise not only raised questions over Turkey’s relationship to Israel, the United States and NATO, but also “the Turkish military is not happy about this. It does not like Syria, and views it as a problematic state” (Jerusalem Post, April 27).

    During his second press briefing within the past fortnight, Turkish Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug was asked to comment on Israel’s reaction to the Turkish-Syrian exercise. Basbug criticized the remarks of the Israeli sources by saying “Shall we ask for Israel’s approval? Israel’s reaction does not concern us. This is between Turkey and Syria” (www.cnnturk.com, April 29). Other Turkish military officers talking to the press reportedly held similar views (Star, April 30).

    In addition, though noting that it was only a small-scale exercise, Basbug described it as important because it was held for the first time. A Turkish military analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan, added that “Turkey has similar deals with more than 60 countries. Besides, the exercise involved at most a total of 60 men from both sides. If it is held only at platoon level as reported, then really it holds only a symbolic value aimed against smugglers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, operating along the border” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 29).

    Although the exercise might be inconsequential militarily, it has enormous political significance, which partly explains Israel’s reaction. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war ten years ago over the latter’s harboring of PKK militants, their new security cooperation heralds a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it highlights the changing alignments of Turkey within the region.

    One explanation for the flourishing of the so-called Turkish-Israeli alliance throughout the 1990’s, which led to the establishment of closer military cooperation, was the common threat perceptions concerning Syria. Turkey was so frustrated by Damascus supporting the PKK that in 1998 it had to amass its army along the border and threaten to use force unless Damascus ceased its support. Following the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in the late 1990’s diplomatic relations improved, reflecting Turkey’s new policy of normalizing relations with the Middle East. The real push came with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Fostering closer ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors became one of the cornerstones of the AKP’s new multi-dimensional foreign policy -which is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (EDM, March 25).

    Under the AKP, Ankara and Damascus have overcome their differences and promoted the growth of economic, social and cultural ties between the two countries, as expressed symbolically in the close personal ties between Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey resisted attempts to isolate Syria diplomatically, and has served as the conduit for opening Damascus to the outside world. Most significantly, it has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria by arranging indirect talks between the two countries.

    Diplomatic analysts had once discussed a Turkish-Israeli axis against Syria, while clearly the interests of Turkey and Syria are now converging, which permits the development of military cooperation. These alternating roles have naturally raised questions as to whether Turkey might be trading its strategic ties with Israel for a new partnership with Syria. Although many Western analysts argue that Turkey may be drifting away from the West under the AKP’s new foreign policy, the crucial support of the secular Turkish military must be considered before reaching any conclusion.

    Israeli and some Western sources criticize the AKP for following an ideological foreign policy agenda and seeking to decouple Turkey from its traditional transatlantic orientation, instead increasingly serving Islamist and Arab interests. The AKP, in contrast, presents its search for autonomy and normalization of its relations with its neighbors as reflecting geopolitical reality, and argues that this serves both Turkish and Western interests in the surrounding regions.

    The military leadership’s expression of support comes to the aid of the AKP as it pursues several controversial foreign policy initiatives. These include the rapprochement with Syria and criticism of Israel, notably during the Gaza crisis. This approach does not represent parochial “Islamist” concerns, but rather they enjoy the backing of broader segments of the Turkish political and military elite. Despite their occasional differences of opinion over domestic political issues, particularly on the question of secularism, the government and the military have managed to reach a consensus over foreign policy, which suggests that a simple distinction along Islamist versus secular might no longer be relevant to understand Turkish foreign policy.

  • New Progress is Turkish-Azerbaijani Union

    New Progress is Turkish-Azerbaijani Union

     

    Turkey feels influence of cold relation’s results with Azerbaijan. Turkish people should act to prevent non-relationship status like immature relational position of Middle Asian countries. Some assertions about Armenian border problem were about silent events among Caucasus states. Importants of them;

     

    – Different actions of Azerbaijan which could be created by Russia,

    – Azerbaijan didn’t recognize North Cyprus Turkish Republic,

    – Will Turkey stipulate Karabakh, ASALA and Kars Treaty points in new seazon with Armenia?

     

    We know Ahmet Davutoğlu’s doctrinaire position about foreign policy of Turkish government. Now he is new Foreign Affairs Minister of Turkey. But in that time, old formulation of Turkish foreign policy which is formulated as minimum problem and maximum cooperation with neighbors, shares us a neccessity to create new dimensions as dominant policies. Otherwise our initiatives will die before they are born. Example, hanging on New Ottoman mind can not improve without knowing issues of near abroad. There is an obligation to understand which balances are standing on Tbilisi government. And if Turkey learned explanation of Meds Yeghern as last country in the world, there is a vision of small Turkey.

     

    New evolutions of Turkey can not be responsibilities of only Turkish academians and politicians. Turkish media should explore value of East. The world is not covering only London and Paris; Baku, Bishkek, Moscow and New Delhi are other important geographical points.

     

    On this way, Turkey should analise Mackinder’s Heartland theory (who commands Eurasia, he commands all the world) and Stratfor’s “Turkey-Azerbaijan Union” opinion.(It must depend on only Turkish directives) If Turkey don’t know sensitives of other regional states, it will depend on mercies of great powers.

     

    As Turkey we should skillfully play Caucasus chess now. It means that effective situation on Caucasus region of Turkey. Common interests of one nation-two states can create unification above common national and moral values. After the Cold War, Russia had an advantage to use old heritage of Tsarist and Soviet Russian period as to create hegemony on Caucasus and Middle Asia. But it is a rotten activity as a mind of saving post Soviet lines. This state uses imperialistic ideas to create buffer regions because of geostrategically Russia has a dangerous situation as territorial integrity. There are some vital importances of Turkey to create union with other Turkish states:

     

    – Some religious groups which are called as radical Islamic groups by Russia and the USA, should be defined by Turkey as normal social organisations. It is important the thought of Turkey because of strong religious heritage of this geography. Also Turkey should support cultural, educational and scientific activities of these groups.

     

    – There must be useful activations which are referenced by historical background.

     

    – There should be strong works how to create unifications like other international organisations. Example, we see possible circumstances to create Turkish union like Arap League in the table of Bruce Russett.

     

    – Turkish educational stations, universities, trade activities and investors should be supported and given new directions by Turkish state. If Turkey had supported 90. anniversary of Baku’s independence, there would have been friendly commands about Armenian border problem from Azerbaijan.

     

    – Related to Armenia which is a gangrene region, Turkey should compose commisions about near history to finish accusations by Armenia. Turkish academians should investigate Tashnak archives in California and create contr-propagandas in different languages all around the world.

     

    Turkish foreign affairs evolutions are gaining with seeing last results of other states’ activations. We have some duties to create brain storm for having a strong progress.

     

    Mehmet Fatih ÖZTARSU

    Baku Qafqaz University

    International Relations

  • Levon Ter-Petrossian’s – Mayday, Mayday

    Levon Ter-Petrossian’s – Mayday, Mayday

    ltp-at-matedaran1May Day is a pagan ritual which marks the end of the colder winter half of the year in the Northern hemisphere, and it has traditionally been an occasion for popular and often raucous celebrations – ‘regardless of the locally prevalent political establishment’. But not for Levon Ter-Petrossian, his Mayday was more akin to the Mayday associated with the emergency code word used internationally as a distress signal by ships and airplanes in radio communications; derived from the French venez m’aider, meaning ‘Come Help Me’; the Mayday used to signal a life-threatening emergency by groups such as police forces, pilots, fire-fighters, and transportation organizations – and LTP.

    Yesterday, LTP’s Armenian national Congress (ANC) liner was visibly in distress, suffering relentless buffeting from an Armenian regime which terrorized and killed itself into office; which runs a state-imposed lawless society, holds democratic opposition supporters in prisons, and bullies and beats correspondents who try to tell the story. LTP has finally been trumped by the ‘Flying Ace’ which Kocharian has for years kept tucked up his sleeve and which Sargsyan now flaunts with his international partners-in-crime; the ace of capitulation – on Karabakh and on Genocide.

    Nevertheless, the regime had prepared well for a potentially massive turnout, which might have been the case. But, according to Levon Zurabyan, vehicles bringing LTP supporters to the meeting from outlying regions were turned back in traditional regime style by security services at the city limits brandishing automatic weapons. In contrast, outgoing vehicles were encouraged to take their Mayday holidaymakers to tend their plots of land in the countryside.

    So LTP had fewer passengers than for previous voyages, with the business class notable in its absence. They are distancing themselves from LTP and jumping off his democracy liner, now looking for a Sargsyan lifeboat, in the hope that after regime cronies have finished pillaging the multi-billion dollar [economic rescue] Genocide /Karabakh ‘Sell-Out’ package, the leftovers will help to rescue their small and medium business enterprises. The three thousand or so economy class passengers left on board were seeking cover in whatever sheltered place they could find, realizing they were doomed to go down with the ship and its captain. Riot police were on display in abundance as usual, with bus loads of reserves waiting in the surrounding streets, to make sure nobody jumps ship.

    The Turkish press was eager to quote the international AFP, which rushed to report on how LTP announced to his 3,500 supporters that he and his Armenian National Congress are “in favor of the soonest settlement of Armenian-Turkish relations and is ready to support all positive steps.” On this occasion, the Armenian press came to rescue, with Onnik Krikorian, one of Armenia’s last ‘independent’ photo-journalists, using his Global Voice to report the truth of the matter and including the following:

    “In a damning indictment of Armenia’s rapprochement with Turkey, opposition leader Levon Ter-Petrosian accused President Serzh Sarkisian on Friday of scuttling U.S. recognition of the Armenian Genocide and gaining nothing in return …… We are left to conclude without the slightest exaggeration, that for the sake of prolonging his rule, Serzh Sarkisian has literally ‘Sold Out’ the Genocide. “His next step will undoubtedly be a ‘Sell-Out’ of Karabakh, after which he will become the first Armenian to win the Nobel Prize.”

    Unfortunately there is now little hope for an LTP rescue effort, a multi-billion dollar carrot, backed by the power of the international propaganda machine, has succeeded with its ‘Weed Revolution’ for Armenia.

    The international community has happily fallen for the Kocharian / Sargsyan ‘Flying Ace’, hailing marvellous Sargsyan achievements with Turkish and Azerbaijani relations. The European Union started the bidding and gambled the virtues of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. But realizing that Sargsyan was not fooled by the bluff, it instructed PACE to throw in the hand, and they joined Sargsyan as co-conspirators.

    America then upped the anti with a billion plus dollar cash WB/IMF bet, a calculated bid to draw the ‘Flying Ace’ and knowing it had a win-win situation. Upping the stakes would either call the Sargsyan bluff, with the US collecting the pot, or US losses would be recouped by Obama reneging on his promise to recognise the Armenian Genocide on the 24th April.

    Moscow put in its half billion dollar bid in typically shrewd Russian style, reminding the Armenian party that in the event of losses, they would be covered by previous Russian / Armenian agreements. Turkey and Azerbaijan stayed in the bidding with promissory notes, watching the major players jockey for position. Then the US threw in its billion dollar hand and Obama reneged on his Genocide promise as planned.

    The players have been at the table for months on end, each ready to back out in return for resolving its problems in the Caucasus. The EU and the US were happy to cut and run to leave the three former Soviet players to finish the game, each hoping that Turkey, which has been picking up strong cards along the way, will not come up with a hand to trump them all.

    Armenia still has a better-than-even chance of raking in the entire multi-billion dollar pot; all it has to do is to call the Turkish Azerbaijani bluffs and pick the right time to throw down its Karabakh card. The Republic will then be endowed with an internationally installed bandit regime, which for many generations to come will dictate life in Armenia – and all for the sake of a treacherous Armenian capitulation on Karabakh, which unfortunately included an even more shameful ‘Sell-Out’ of the Armenian Genocide.

    In typical style, whilst Diaspora Armenians have been lobbying overseas, Armenians in the Republic have been subserviently watching on as this process moves into its final stage. The fifty or so thousand Karabakhis are up in arms, determined to defend their rights in the light of this Kocharian / Sargsyan ‘Sell-Out’. But there is little hope that they will be able to stop the capitulation roller-coaster, when Armenia’s regime unilaterally withdraws its troops from five of the surrounding territories, egged on by Bryza and his Minsk associates and rubber stamped by the EU.

    The tale goes that when the Azerbaijani Defense Minister asked his President if he was prepared to take Karabakh by force, Aliyev answered – “Are you crazy, there are fifty thousand of them”. The Defense Minister answered but we are a country of eight million and our army is several times larger in number than the entire Karabakh population and we have spent billions of dollars on the latest military equipment. Aliyev replied: “But two Karabakhis took over Armenia single-handed and now they own the Republic. Imagine what fifty thousand of them will do to us!”

    After the Sargsyan ‘Sell-Out’, Turkey and the rest of the international community will be pleased that that anecdote is now the reality. Unfortunately, it is the reality with which Armenia now has to live – and Armenia, you can blame absolutely nobody for it – except yourselves.

  • Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 84
    May 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On April 27, Turkey and Syria launched their first joint military exercise on their border. The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to enhance joint training and interoperability, and are expected to be followed by similar exercises in the future. On the same day, during the 9th International Defense Industry Fair in Istanbul, both countries signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries (www.tsk.tr, April 26, Hurriyet, April 28). These developments once again strained Turkish-Israeli ties, re-opening the debate on Turkey’s commitment to its Western orientation.

    Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, called the exercises disturbing, though noting that Turkish-Israeli strategic relations will survive this challenge (www.ynetnews.com, April 27). Israel’s Ambassador to Turkey, Gabby Levy, told reporters that Tel Aviv was following the drill closely to understand its goal and content (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28). DEBKAfile reported that, to protest against this development Israel was preparing to “slash its military exchanges with Turkey to prevent the leakage of military secrets to an avowed Arab enemy” and it would “discontinue sales of its … drones and sharply reduce its military ties with Turkey” (DEBKAfile, April 27).

    Moreover, an Israeli strategic analyst Efraim Inbar, referring to unnamed Turkish military officers, maintained that the joint exercise not only raised questions over Turkey’s relationship to Israel, the United States and NATO, but also “the Turkish military is not happy about this. It does not like Syria, and views it as a problematic state” (Jerusalem Post, April 27).

    During his second press briefing within the past fortnight, Turkish Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug was asked to comment on Israel’s reaction to the Turkish-Syrian exercise. Basbug criticized the remarks of the Israeli sources by saying “Shall we ask for Israel’s approval? Israel’s reaction does not concern us. This is between Turkey and Syria” (www.cnnturk.com, April 29). Other Turkish military officers talking to the press reportedly held similar views (Star, April 30).

    In addition, though noting that it was only a small-scale exercise, Basbug described it as important because it was held for the first time. A Turkish military analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan, added that “Turkey has similar deals with more than 60 countries. Besides, the exercise involved at most a total of 60 men from both sides. If it is held only at platoon level as reported, then really it holds only a symbolic value aimed against smugglers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, operating along the border” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 29).

    Although the exercise might be inconsequential militarily, it has enormous political significance, which partly explains Israel’s reaction. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war ten years ago over the latter’s harboring of PKK militants, their new security cooperation heralds a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it highlights the changing alignments of Turkey within the region.

    One explanation for the flourishing of the so-called Turkish-Israeli alliance throughout the 1990’s, which led to the establishment of closer military cooperation, was the common threat perceptions concerning Syria. Turkey was so frustrated by Damascus supporting the PKK that in 1998 it had to amass its army along the border and threaten to use force unless Damascus ceased its support. Following the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in the late 1990’s diplomatic relations improved, reflecting Turkey’s new policy of normalizing relations with the Middle East. The real push came with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Fostering closer ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors became one of the cornerstones of the AKP’s new multi-dimensional foreign policy -which is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (EDM, March 25).

    Under the AKP, Ankara and Damascus have overcome their differences and promoted the growth of economic, social and cultural ties between the two countries, as expressed symbolically in the close personal ties between Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey resisted attempts to isolate Syria diplomatically, and has served as the conduit for opening Damascus to the outside world. Most significantly, it has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria by arranging indirect talks between the two countries.

    Diplomatic analysts had once discussed a Turkish-Israeli axis against Syria, while clearly the interests of Turkey and Syria are now converging, which permits the development of military cooperation. These alternating roles have naturally raised questions as to whether Turkey might be trading its strategic ties with Israel for a new partnership with Syria. Although many Western analysts argue that Turkey may be drifting away from the West under the AKP’s new foreign policy, the crucial support of the secular Turkish military must be considered before reaching any conclusion.

    Israeli and some Western sources criticize the AKP for following an ideological foreign policy agenda and seeking to decouple Turkey from its traditional transatlantic orientation, instead increasingly serving Islamist and Arab interests. The AKP, in contrast, presents its search for autonomy and normalization of its relations with its neighbors as reflecting geopolitical reality, and argues that this serves both Turkish and Western interests in the surrounding regions.

    The military leadership’s expression of support comes to the aid of the AKP as it pursues several controversial foreign policy initiatives. These include the rapprochement with Syria and criticism of Israel, notably during the Gaza crisis. This approach does not represent parochial “Islamist” concerns, but rather they enjoy the backing of broader segments of the Turkish political and military elite. Despite their occasional differences of opinion over domestic political issues, particularly on the question of secularism, the government and the military have managed to reach a consensus over foreign policy, which suggests that a simple distinction along Islamist versus secular might no longer be relevant to understand Turkish foreign policy.
    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-syrian-security-cooperation-testing-turkish-foreign-policy/