Category: Authors

  • Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 84
    May 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 27, Turkey and Syria launched their first joint military exercise on their border. The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to enhance joint training and interoperability, and are expected to be followed by similar exercises in the future. On the same day, during the 9th International Defense Industry Fair in Istanbul, both countries signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries (www.tsk.tr, April 26, Hurriyet, April 28). These developments once again strained Turkish-Israeli ties, re-opening the debate on Turkey’s commitment to its Western orientation.

    Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, called the exercises disturbing, though noting that Turkish-Israeli strategic relations will survive this challenge (www.ynetnews.com, April 27). Israel’s Ambassador to Turkey, Gabby Levy, told reporters that Tel Aviv was following the drill closely to understand its goal and content (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28). DEBKAfile reported that, to protest against this development Israel was preparing to “slash its military exchanges with Turkey to prevent the leakage of military secrets to an avowed Arab enemy” and it would “discontinue sales of its … drones and sharply reduce its military ties with Turkey” (DEBKAfile, April 27).

    Moreover, an Israeli strategic analyst Efraim Inbar, referring to unnamed Turkish military officers, maintained that the joint exercise not only raised questions over Turkey’s relationship to Israel, the United States and NATO, but also “the Turkish military is not happy about this. It does not like Syria, and views it as a problematic state” (Jerusalem Post, April 27).

    During his second press briefing within the past fortnight, Turkish Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug was asked to comment on Israel’s reaction to the Turkish-Syrian exercise. Basbug criticized the remarks of the Israeli sources by saying “Shall we ask for Israel’s approval? Israel’s reaction does not concern us. This is between Turkey and Syria” (www.cnnturk.com, April 29). Other Turkish military officers talking to the press reportedly held similar views (Star, April 30).

    In addition, though noting that it was only a small-scale exercise, Basbug described it as important because it was held for the first time. A Turkish military analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan, added that “Turkey has similar deals with more than 60 countries. Besides, the exercise involved at most a total of 60 men from both sides. If it is held only at platoon level as reported, then really it holds only a symbolic value aimed against smugglers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, operating along the border” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 29).

    Although the exercise might be inconsequential militarily, it has enormous political significance, which partly explains Israel’s reaction. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war ten years ago over the latter’s harboring of PKK militants, their new security cooperation heralds a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it highlights the changing alignments of Turkey within the region.

    One explanation for the flourishing of the so-called Turkish-Israeli alliance throughout the 1990’s, which led to the establishment of closer military cooperation, was the common threat perceptions concerning Syria. Turkey was so frustrated by Damascus supporting the PKK that in 1998 it had to amass its army along the border and threaten to use force unless Damascus ceased its support. Following the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in the late 1990’s diplomatic relations improved, reflecting Turkey’s new policy of normalizing relations with the Middle East. The real push came with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Fostering closer ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors became one of the cornerstones of the AKP’s new multi-dimensional foreign policy -which is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (EDM, March 25).

    Under the AKP, Ankara and Damascus have overcome their differences and promoted the growth of economic, social and cultural ties between the two countries, as expressed symbolically in the close personal ties between Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey resisted attempts to isolate Syria diplomatically, and has served as the conduit for opening Damascus to the outside world. Most significantly, it has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria by arranging indirect talks between the two countries.

    Diplomatic analysts had once discussed a Turkish-Israeli axis against Syria, while clearly the interests of Turkey and Syria are now converging, which permits the development of military cooperation. These alternating roles have naturally raised questions as to whether Turkey might be trading its strategic ties with Israel for a new partnership with Syria. Although many Western analysts argue that Turkey may be drifting away from the West under the AKP’s new foreign policy, the crucial support of the secular Turkish military must be considered before reaching any conclusion.

    Israeli and some Western sources criticize the AKP for following an ideological foreign policy agenda and seeking to decouple Turkey from its traditional transatlantic orientation, instead increasingly serving Islamist and Arab interests. The AKP, in contrast, presents its search for autonomy and normalization of its relations with its neighbors as reflecting geopolitical reality, and argues that this serves both Turkish and Western interests in the surrounding regions.

    The military leadership’s expression of support comes to the aid of the AKP as it pursues several controversial foreign policy initiatives. These include the rapprochement with Syria and criticism of Israel, notably during the Gaza crisis. This approach does not represent parochial “Islamist” concerns, but rather they enjoy the backing of broader segments of the Turkish political and military elite. Despite their occasional differences of opinion over domestic political issues, particularly on the question of secularism, the government and the military have managed to reach a consensus over foreign policy, which suggests that a simple distinction along Islamist versus secular might no longer be relevant to understand Turkish foreign policy.

  • New Progress is Turkish-Azerbaijani Union

    New Progress is Turkish-Azerbaijani Union

     

    Turkey feels influence of cold relation’s results with Azerbaijan. Turkish people should act to prevent non-relationship status like immature relational position of Middle Asian countries. Some assertions about Armenian border problem were about silent events among Caucasus states. Importants of them;

     

    – Different actions of Azerbaijan which could be created by Russia,

    – Azerbaijan didn’t recognize North Cyprus Turkish Republic,

    – Will Turkey stipulate Karabakh, ASALA and Kars Treaty points in new seazon with Armenia?

     

    We know Ahmet Davutoğlu’s doctrinaire position about foreign policy of Turkish government. Now he is new Foreign Affairs Minister of Turkey. But in that time, old formulation of Turkish foreign policy which is formulated as minimum problem and maximum cooperation with neighbors, shares us a neccessity to create new dimensions as dominant policies. Otherwise our initiatives will die before they are born. Example, hanging on New Ottoman mind can not improve without knowing issues of near abroad. There is an obligation to understand which balances are standing on Tbilisi government. And if Turkey learned explanation of Meds Yeghern as last country in the world, there is a vision of small Turkey.

     

    New evolutions of Turkey can not be responsibilities of only Turkish academians and politicians. Turkish media should explore value of East. The world is not covering only London and Paris; Baku, Bishkek, Moscow and New Delhi are other important geographical points.

     

    On this way, Turkey should analise Mackinder’s Heartland theory (who commands Eurasia, he commands all the world) and Stratfor’s “Turkey-Azerbaijan Union” opinion.(It must depend on only Turkish directives) If Turkey don’t know sensitives of other regional states, it will depend on mercies of great powers.

     

    As Turkey we should skillfully play Caucasus chess now. It means that effective situation on Caucasus region of Turkey. Common interests of one nation-two states can create unification above common national and moral values. After the Cold War, Russia had an advantage to use old heritage of Tsarist and Soviet Russian period as to create hegemony on Caucasus and Middle Asia. But it is a rotten activity as a mind of saving post Soviet lines. This state uses imperialistic ideas to create buffer regions because of geostrategically Russia has a dangerous situation as territorial integrity. There are some vital importances of Turkey to create union with other Turkish states:

     

    – Some religious groups which are called as radical Islamic groups by Russia and the USA, should be defined by Turkey as normal social organisations. It is important the thought of Turkey because of strong religious heritage of this geography. Also Turkey should support cultural, educational and scientific activities of these groups.

     

    – There must be useful activations which are referenced by historical background.

     

    – There should be strong works how to create unifications like other international organisations. Example, we see possible circumstances to create Turkish union like Arap League in the table of Bruce Russett.

     

    – Turkish educational stations, universities, trade activities and investors should be supported and given new directions by Turkish state. If Turkey had supported 90. anniversary of Baku’s independence, there would have been friendly commands about Armenian border problem from Azerbaijan.

     

    – Related to Armenia which is a gangrene region, Turkey should compose commisions about near history to finish accusations by Armenia. Turkish academians should investigate Tashnak archives in California and create contr-propagandas in different languages all around the world.

     

    Turkish foreign affairs evolutions are gaining with seeing last results of other states’ activations. We have some duties to create brain storm for having a strong progress.

     

    Mehmet Fatih ÖZTARSU

    Baku Qafqaz University

    International Relations

  • Levon Ter-Petrossian’s – Mayday, Mayday

    Levon Ter-Petrossian’s – Mayday, Mayday

    ltp-at-matedaran1May Day is a pagan ritual which marks the end of the colder winter half of the year in the Northern hemisphere, and it has traditionally been an occasion for popular and often raucous celebrations – ‘regardless of the locally prevalent political establishment’. But not for Levon Ter-Petrossian, his Mayday was more akin to the Mayday associated with the emergency code word used internationally as a distress signal by ships and airplanes in radio communications; derived from the French venez m’aider, meaning ‘Come Help Me’; the Mayday used to signal a life-threatening emergency by groups such as police forces, pilots, fire-fighters, and transportation organizations – and LTP.

    Yesterday, LTP’s Armenian national Congress (ANC) liner was visibly in distress, suffering relentless buffeting from an Armenian regime which terrorized and killed itself into office; which runs a state-imposed lawless society, holds democratic opposition supporters in prisons, and bullies and beats correspondents who try to tell the story. LTP has finally been trumped by the ‘Flying Ace’ which Kocharian has for years kept tucked up his sleeve and which Sargsyan now flaunts with his international partners-in-crime; the ace of capitulation – on Karabakh and on Genocide.

    Nevertheless, the regime had prepared well for a potentially massive turnout, which might have been the case. But, according to Levon Zurabyan, vehicles bringing LTP supporters to the meeting from outlying regions were turned back in traditional regime style by security services at the city limits brandishing automatic weapons. In contrast, outgoing vehicles were encouraged to take their Mayday holidaymakers to tend their plots of land in the countryside.

    So LTP had fewer passengers than for previous voyages, with the business class notable in its absence. They are distancing themselves from LTP and jumping off his democracy liner, now looking for a Sargsyan lifeboat, in the hope that after regime cronies have finished pillaging the multi-billion dollar [economic rescue] Genocide /Karabakh ‘Sell-Out’ package, the leftovers will help to rescue their small and medium business enterprises. The three thousand or so economy class passengers left on board were seeking cover in whatever sheltered place they could find, realizing they were doomed to go down with the ship and its captain. Riot police were on display in abundance as usual, with bus loads of reserves waiting in the surrounding streets, to make sure nobody jumps ship.

    The Turkish press was eager to quote the international AFP, which rushed to report on how LTP announced to his 3,500 supporters that he and his Armenian National Congress are “in favor of the soonest settlement of Armenian-Turkish relations and is ready to support all positive steps.” On this occasion, the Armenian press came to rescue, with Onnik Krikorian, one of Armenia’s last ‘independent’ photo-journalists, using his Global Voice to report the truth of the matter and including the following:

    “In a damning indictment of Armenia’s rapprochement with Turkey, opposition leader Levon Ter-Petrosian accused President Serzh Sarkisian on Friday of scuttling U.S. recognition of the Armenian Genocide and gaining nothing in return …… We are left to conclude without the slightest exaggeration, that for the sake of prolonging his rule, Serzh Sarkisian has literally ‘Sold Out’ the Genocide. “His next step will undoubtedly be a ‘Sell-Out’ of Karabakh, after which he will become the first Armenian to win the Nobel Prize.”

    Unfortunately there is now little hope for an LTP rescue effort, a multi-billion dollar carrot, backed by the power of the international propaganda machine, has succeeded with its ‘Weed Revolution’ for Armenia.

    The international community has happily fallen for the Kocharian / Sargsyan ‘Flying Ace’, hailing marvellous Sargsyan achievements with Turkish and Azerbaijani relations. The European Union started the bidding and gambled the virtues of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. But realizing that Sargsyan was not fooled by the bluff, it instructed PACE to throw in the hand, and they joined Sargsyan as co-conspirators.

    America then upped the anti with a billion plus dollar cash WB/IMF bet, a calculated bid to draw the ‘Flying Ace’ and knowing it had a win-win situation. Upping the stakes would either call the Sargsyan bluff, with the US collecting the pot, or US losses would be recouped by Obama reneging on his promise to recognise the Armenian Genocide on the 24th April.

    Moscow put in its half billion dollar bid in typically shrewd Russian style, reminding the Armenian party that in the event of losses, they would be covered by previous Russian / Armenian agreements. Turkey and Azerbaijan stayed in the bidding with promissory notes, watching the major players jockey for position. Then the US threw in its billion dollar hand and Obama reneged on his Genocide promise as planned.

    The players have been at the table for months on end, each ready to back out in return for resolving its problems in the Caucasus. The EU and the US were happy to cut and run to leave the three former Soviet players to finish the game, each hoping that Turkey, which has been picking up strong cards along the way, will not come up with a hand to trump them all.

    Armenia still has a better-than-even chance of raking in the entire multi-billion dollar pot; all it has to do is to call the Turkish Azerbaijani bluffs and pick the right time to throw down its Karabakh card. The Republic will then be endowed with an internationally installed bandit regime, which for many generations to come will dictate life in Armenia – and all for the sake of a treacherous Armenian capitulation on Karabakh, which unfortunately included an even more shameful ‘Sell-Out’ of the Armenian Genocide.

    In typical style, whilst Diaspora Armenians have been lobbying overseas, Armenians in the Republic have been subserviently watching on as this process moves into its final stage. The fifty or so thousand Karabakhis are up in arms, determined to defend their rights in the light of this Kocharian / Sargsyan ‘Sell-Out’. But there is little hope that they will be able to stop the capitulation roller-coaster, when Armenia’s regime unilaterally withdraws its troops from five of the surrounding territories, egged on by Bryza and his Minsk associates and rubber stamped by the EU.

    The tale goes that when the Azerbaijani Defense Minister asked his President if he was prepared to take Karabakh by force, Aliyev answered – “Are you crazy, there are fifty thousand of them”. The Defense Minister answered but we are a country of eight million and our army is several times larger in number than the entire Karabakh population and we have spent billions of dollars on the latest military equipment. Aliyev replied: “But two Karabakhis took over Armenia single-handed and now they own the Republic. Imagine what fifty thousand of them will do to us!”

    After the Sargsyan ‘Sell-Out’, Turkey and the rest of the international community will be pleased that that anecdote is now the reality. Unfortunately, it is the reality with which Armenia now has to live – and Armenia, you can blame absolutely nobody for it – except yourselves.

  • Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Turkish-Syrian Security Cooperation Testing Turkish Foreign Policy

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 84
    May 1, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On April 27, Turkey and Syria launched their first joint military exercise on their border. The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to enhance joint training and interoperability, and are expected to be followed by similar exercises in the future. On the same day, during the 9th International Defense Industry Fair in Istanbul, both countries signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries (www.tsk.tr, April 26, Hurriyet, April 28). These developments once again strained Turkish-Israeli ties, re-opening the debate on Turkey’s commitment to its Western orientation.

    Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, called the exercises disturbing, though noting that Turkish-Israeli strategic relations will survive this challenge (www.ynetnews.com, April 27). Israel’s Ambassador to Turkey, Gabby Levy, told reporters that Tel Aviv was following the drill closely to understand its goal and content (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28). DEBKAfile reported that, to protest against this development Israel was preparing to “slash its military exchanges with Turkey to prevent the leakage of military secrets to an avowed Arab enemy” and it would “discontinue sales of its … drones and sharply reduce its military ties with Turkey” (DEBKAfile, April 27).

    Moreover, an Israeli strategic analyst Efraim Inbar, referring to unnamed Turkish military officers, maintained that the joint exercise not only raised questions over Turkey’s relationship to Israel, the United States and NATO, but also “the Turkish military is not happy about this. It does not like Syria, and views it as a problematic state” (Jerusalem Post, April 27).

    During his second press briefing within the past fortnight, Turkish Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug was asked to comment on Israel’s reaction to the Turkish-Syrian exercise. Basbug criticized the remarks of the Israeli sources by saying “Shall we ask for Israel’s approval? Israel’s reaction does not concern us. This is between Turkey and Syria” (www.cnnturk.com, April 29). Other Turkish military officers talking to the press reportedly held similar views (Star, April 30).

    In addition, though noting that it was only a small-scale exercise, Basbug described it as important because it was held for the first time. A Turkish military analyst Nihat Ali Ozcan, added that “Turkey has similar deals with more than 60 countries. Besides, the exercise involved at most a total of 60 men from both sides. If it is held only at platoon level as reported, then really it holds only a symbolic value aimed against smugglers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, operating along the border” (Hurriyet Daily News, April 29).

    Although the exercise might be inconsequential militarily, it has enormous political significance, which partly explains Israel’s reaction. Turkey and Syria came to the brink of war ten years ago over the latter’s harboring of PKK militants, their new security cooperation heralds a significant transformation in Turkish foreign policy. More importantly, it highlights the changing alignments of Turkey within the region.

    One explanation for the flourishing of the so-called Turkish-Israeli alliance throughout the 1990’s, which led to the establishment of closer military cooperation, was the common threat perceptions concerning Syria. Turkey was so frustrated by Damascus supporting the PKK that in 1998 it had to amass its army along the border and threaten to use force unless Damascus ceased its support. Following the expulsion of the PKK from Syria in the late 1990’s diplomatic relations improved, reflecting Turkey’s new policy of normalizing relations with the Middle East. The real push came with the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Fostering closer ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors became one of the cornerstones of the AKP’s new multi-dimensional foreign policy -which is attributed to Ahmet Davutoglu, chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (EDM, March 25).

    Under the AKP, Ankara and Damascus have overcome their differences and promoted the growth of economic, social and cultural ties between the two countries, as expressed symbolically in the close personal ties between Erdogan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Turkey resisted attempts to isolate Syria diplomatically, and has served as the conduit for opening Damascus to the outside world. Most significantly, it has acted as a mediator between Israel and Syria by arranging indirect talks between the two countries.

    Diplomatic analysts had once discussed a Turkish-Israeli axis against Syria, while clearly the interests of Turkey and Syria are now converging, which permits the development of military cooperation. These alternating roles have naturally raised questions as to whether Turkey might be trading its strategic ties with Israel for a new partnership with Syria. Although many Western analysts argue that Turkey may be drifting away from the West under the AKP’s new foreign policy, the crucial support of the secular Turkish military must be considered before reaching any conclusion.

    Israeli and some Western sources criticize the AKP for following an ideological foreign policy agenda and seeking to decouple Turkey from its traditional transatlantic orientation, instead increasingly serving Islamist and Arab interests. The AKP, in contrast, presents its search for autonomy and normalization of its relations with its neighbors as reflecting geopolitical reality, and argues that this serves both Turkish and Western interests in the surrounding regions.

    The military leadership’s expression of support comes to the aid of the AKP as it pursues several controversial foreign policy initiatives. These include the rapprochement with Syria and criticism of Israel, notably during the Gaza crisis. This approach does not represent parochial “Islamist” concerns, but rather they enjoy the backing of broader segments of the Turkish political and military elite. Despite their occasional differences of opinion over domestic political issues, particularly on the question of secularism, the government and the military have managed to reach a consensus over foreign policy, which suggests that a simple distinction along Islamist versus secular might no longer be relevant to understand Turkish foreign policy.
    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-syrian-security-cooperation-testing-turkish-foreign-policy/

  • Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Turkey and Armenia’s Rapprochement Watched Carefully by Azerbaijan

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 82
    April 29, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On April 22, the Foreign Ministries of Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland issued a joint announcement saying that Ankara and Yerevan had agreed to work toward improving their relations within the framework of a roadmap under Swiss auspices. United States’ diplomats were also closely involved in the talks which preceded the deal. Although the decision appears as a breakthrough in resolving this long-term dispute, significant obstacles remain before the completion of the rapprochement.

    The joint statement read as follows:

    “The two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has been identified” (www.mfa.gov.tr, April 22).

    Subsequent statements from diplomatic sources clarified that no agreement has been signed and that the parties agreed to continue working toward fully normalizing their bilateral relations. Although the content of the ongoing talks were not disclosed officially, the deal is likely to include establishing diplomatic representations in their respective capitals, gradual re-opening of the border, Armenia’s recognition of Turkey’s international borders, and forming a joint committee of historians to examine the disputed events of 1915 (Sabah, April 24).

    Many observers believe that if the process can be concluded successfully, it will not only end the long-standing enmity within the South Caucasus, but it also will redefine the geopolitical map of the region -helping to connect Armenia with Western interests in the region. Therefore, the decision was welcomed by the international community as a constructive step toward reconciliation. A statement from the U.S. State Department commended these efforts and called on the parties to proceed with the talks without any preconditions and within a reasonable time frame.

    Initially this was anticipated against the background of the ongoing dialogue, which had accelerated over the past year. This was given a renewed impetus following Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s historic visit to Yerevan in September 2008. In addition to their various bilateral talks, the foreign ministers of both countries also met within the context of multilateral initiatives, raising expectations that a deal could be achieved. Earlier press reports speculated that the two capitals had agreed on a roadmap in late March, but they were debating the proper timing to announce this decision (EDM, March 27; Hurriyet Daily News, March 30). After Obama’s recent high profile trip to Turkey, Turkish-Armenian reconciliation was considered imminent.

    However, following Obama’s visit, Ankara stepped back from its commitment to find a solution in an effort to allay concerns in Baku. The Turkish Prime Minister and other officials declared publicly that they would avoid steps which might damage Azerbaijan’s interests, and Turkey would not re-open its border with Armenia unless the latter ended its occupation of Azerbaijani territories (EDM, April 17). These developments rendered an agreement less likely.

    The announcement that the parties had held secret talks and committed publicly to a roadmap represented a major breakthrough. Nonetheless, there have been conflicting accounts from each side as to whether concessions were made on preconditions to start the negotiations. The continued mystery surrounding the content of the talks may prove an obstacle to a final settlement. Nationalist forces and the opposition, both within Turkey and Armenia, remain opposed to the way in which the rapprochement is being conducted -in an absence of public scrutiny. Secret diplomacy is the key to achieving a breakthrough in such protracted disputes, and supporters of normalization on both sides insist that the governments should not bow to public pressure to abandon the process (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 26). Nonetheless, the widening gap between the governments’ rhetoric and reality risks undermining this controversial foreign policy.

    The Armenian government came under intense domestic criticism, and a minor coalition partner withdrew from the government. Similar problems within Turkey have further complicated these efforts. The AKP government proceeded with the normalization without first preparing public opinion for such a radical decision. It has also failed to keep the opposition informed. Turkish opposition parties are now calling on the government to stop conducting diplomacy behind closed doors, and inform parliament of the current standing of the talks (Ortadogu, April 28).

    Moreover, the Turkish government is criticized for failing to give clear answers as to how the Turkish-Armenian roadmap might impact on Azerbaijan. Apparently, Turkey proceeded with the rapprochement without ensuring Armenia’s response to Azerbaijan’s demands, and this stance contradicted Ankara’s earlier statements that it would protect Baku’s interests. For some Turkish observers, this is an indication that the government did not have a genuine desire for reconciliation with Armenia, but it agreed the roadmap only to remove the word “genocide” from Obama’s April 24 message (Sabah, April 27). For others, Ankara’s zigzagging shows that it is acting opportunistically, which undermines the trust of its partners (Hurriyet Daily News, April 24).

    President Gul ruled out any damage to relations with Baku due to the roadmap, and maintained that it will serve the interests of both Baku and Ankara. The Turkish government is attempting to convince Azeri politicians that its efforts toward resolving its problems with Yerevan also promote Azerbaijan’s interests within international forums (Zaman, April 24). Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s discomfort with these developments is well known.

    After noting that he was not in a position to tell Ankara how to handle its relations with Yerevan, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev, said during a visit to Brussels, that Baku reserved the right to revise its policies according to the evolving realities in the region. Referring to the conflicting news about the content of the Turkish-Armenian roadmap deal, Aliyev added “The world, the region and the Azeris want to know whether the Karabakh issue was removed from the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. This is a simple question and has a simple answer” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, April 28).

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-and-armenias-rapprochement-watched-carefully-by-azerbaijan/

  • Turkey Uneasy Over Obama’s Statement on Armenia

    Turkey Uneasy Over Obama’s Statement on Armenia

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 81
    April 28, 2009
    By Saban Kardas
    President Barack Obama’s long awaited statement on the Armenian Remembrance Day caused mixed reactions on both sides of the dispute. Although Obama refrained from referring to the killing of Armenians as “genocide,” which reflected well on Turkish diplomacy, his clear expression of support for the Armenian position caused anger in Turkey. In his statement, Obama said:

    “Ninety four years ago, one of the great atrocities of the twentieth century began. Each year, we pause to remember the 1.5 million Armenians who were subsequently massacred or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire. The ‘Meds Yeghern’ must live on in our memories, just as it lives on in the hearts of the Armenian people” (www.whitehouse.gov, April 24).

    Obama came under criticism by the supporters of the Armenian genocide claims for stopping short of using the word “genocide” to describe the events of 1915 -a pledge which he made during his election campaign. Like other presidents before him, Obama apparently prioritized realpolitik and did not want to harm the strategic relationship with Turkey by risking a negative Turkish reaction over the controversial issue. Moreover, there is a more immediate reason for him to avoid the term: Obama does not want to jeopardize the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. His carefully worded statement is yet another indication of his support for the bilateral talks, to which Turkey and Armenia responded positively by announcing a roadmap to work toward the normalization of their relations.

    Nonetheless, this prudent act on Obama’s part did not entirely satisfy Turkish expectations. Ankara focused on the aspects of Obama’s description of the events of 1915 which are regarded as unacceptable from the Turkish perspective. In spite of this, the phrases Obama chose to depict the Armenian suffering were a serious blow for Turkish diplomacy, which had done its utmost to exclude the word “genocide” from the White House statement. Despite backtracking from his campaign promise, Obama called the killing of Armenians a great atrocity and used the Armenian term “Meds Yeghern” (great disaster) to describe the events, as well as noting that his views on that period of history remained unchanged.

    Turkish officials and politicians uniformly criticized Obama’s statement, calling it one-sided and historically inaccurate. Turkish President Abdullah Gul said he disagreed with parts of Obama’s statement, adding that “in particular, there are hundreds of thousands of Turks and Muslims who lost their lives in 1915. Everyone’s suffering has to be shared.” A press statement released by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also maintained that some expressions in Obama’s statement combined with the interpretation of the events of 1915 were unacceptable from Turkey’s perspective (Anadolu Ajansi, April 25).

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was more pointed in his criticism: “the statement is far from satisfying. We cannot accept it as it is.” Erdogan questioned Obama’s attitude and argued that by giving credence to Armenian claims, Obama had bowed to short-term political considerations. “We are deeply saddened by politicians’ attempts to exploit the events of 1915 for electoral concerns,” Erdogan added. Reflecting a sense of “disappointment” with Obama, Erdogan maintained that Turkey is not a country that can be manipulated with empty promises (Hurriyet, April 27).

    Representatives of the opposition parties also criticized Obama’s statement. The leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party argued that he used only the Armenian side’s terminology. Whereas the leader of the Nationalist Action Party alleged that the statement taken in its entirety, supported unequivocally Armenian genocide claims. The opposition found Obama’s account of the 1915 events as distorting historical reality. Moreover, they capitalized on this incident to criticize the government’s foreign policy, maintaining that in order to prevent Obama from using the word “genocide” involved making concessions to Armenia in breach of Turkey’s national interests -which also alienated Azerbaijan. Characterizing Obama’s statement as the starkest proof yet of the government’s failed approach, they called for a reversal of such “submissive” policies, and backing away from the rapprochement with Yerevan (Anadolu Ajansi, ANKA, April 25).

    The strong reactions from both the government and the opposition raised questions as to how this development might damage Turkish-American relations. Since Obama’s inauguration, Turkey and the United States have revitalized their strategic partnership. Yet Ankara made it clear that a miscalculated American intervention in the Armenian issue might spoil Turkish-American relations.

    In its official responses so far, Turkey has not taken punitive measures to protest against Obama’s statement. Turkish diplomatic sources reported that U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, James Jeffrey, was invited to the Foreign Ministry to discuss the developments. Ankara’s concerns and uneasiness regarding the statement were relayed to him, but no official note of protest to Washington was presented (ANKA, April 27).

    For its part, Ankara must have realized that despite its intensive diplomacy, it has failed to influence Western public opinion in favor of its view of the events in 1915. This episode shows that the government cannot sustain its policy of denial, and should develop a new approach to explain its own version of events. Nonetheless, Turkey is unlikely to sever ties with the United States, though the controversy demonstrates how the politics of the Armenian “genocide” can potentially undermine Turkish-American relations. The periodic resurrection of this debate in American politics hijacks Turkish-American relations, perpetuating a crisis of trust. Nor does it further the interests of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, since American intervention threatens to derail any genuine desire to find a solution in Ankara. In the face of domestic opposition, no Turkish government can afford to proceed with a dialogue with Armenia or maintain friendly relations with the United States if Washington is perceived as taking sides.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-uneasy-over-obamas-statement-on-armenia/