Turkish Forum

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  • Turkish General Staff Accused of Seeking to Undermine the Government

    Turkish General Staff Accused of Seeking to Undermine the Government

    Turkish General Staff Accused of Seeking to Undermine the Government

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 114
    June 15, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 12, the liberal left Taraf daily triggered a political crisis in Ankara. Taraf claimed to have uncovered a four-page unclassified document, detailing an alleged action plan for the military to combat the “reactionary activities” against secularism. It was allegedly prepared by a colonel from the operations department at the headquarters of the chief of the general staff. This signals a new confrontation between the Turkish military and the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP).

    “The Action Plan against Reactionaries (Irtica),” allegedly prepared in April, was seized during a police search in the offices of Serdar Ozturk, the lawyer representing retired Colonel Levent Goktas -both arrested as part of the Ergenekon investigation. The document defines the AKP and the Gulen movement as threats to the secular order in Turkey, and accuses them of seeking to establish an Islamic state. The plan also criticizes the Ergenekon investigation, describing it as an attempt by Islamic groups to undermine the state and defame military personnel. The action plan proposed various measures aimed at “revealing the hidden agenda” of the AKP and Gulen movement, and undermining their public support. It also contemplates a psychological warfare campaign to promote widespread suspicion against these groups -even amongst pious Muslims- and exaggerate the threat they pose. Moreover, the plan suggests psychological operations against members of the Turkish armed forces suspected of being affiliated to Islamic groups. Furthermore, such propaganda seeks to discredit the Ergenekon investigation and mobilize public support for any military personnel implicated (Taraf, June 12).

    Taraf’s story has proven to be controversial in Ankara. The office of the chief of the general staff announced that the military court had banned any further media coverage of the story. The statement described the alleged action plan as related to national security, public order and public security, and banned any publication of its contents. The military prosecutor launched an investigation into the source of the leak and the dissemination of the document. When questioned about these developments during his weekly press briefing, the military’s spokesman Metin Gurak said that the military prosecutor will investigate all aspects of the story. Nonetheless, he declined to explain whether the investigation would be launched against “the existence of such a document or how it was leaked” (Anadolu Ajansi, June 12).

    Despite the military’s ban on publicizing the document, several media outlets close to the Gulen movement and the AKP government chose to ignore it. The Zaman daily ran a counter campaign against the military’s attempts to ban media coverage. Zaman and its sister daily Today’s Zaman, covered the development intensively, and portrayed the document as representing a serious threat to Turkish democracy and supplying more evidence of the ongoing influence of the military within the political system. They used this incident to make two related points. First, it sought to mobilize the government to revitalize its stalled domestic reforms aimed at boosting democratization and civilian control over the armed forces. Second, it called on the military leadership, particularly the Chief of the General Staff General Ilker Basbug, to demonstrate commitment to democracy by acting decisively over this issue. Equally, it demanded clarification on whether the military as an institution or its commissioned officers are implicated in such activities against the civil authority (Zaman, Today’s Zaman, June 13, 14, 15).

    Liberal columnists in other newspapers emphasized similar arguments, noting that Turkey faces ongoing challenges in order to curtail the military’s political influence (Milliyet, Radikal, June 13). Others largely restricted their reporting to the military’s ban on the Taraf story. Hurriyet quoted Serdar Ozturk’s lawyer, who claimed that the document was placed in his client’s office by the pro-Gulen movement clique within the Turkish police. He said they would press charges against the police and the prosecutors for leaking the document (Hurriyet, June 13).

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reacted angrily to the document. On June 13, while addressing a party congress in Kars, he emphasized his determination to protect democracy and maintained that the AKP is the main guarantor of Turkey’s constitutional order (Anadolu Ajansi, June 13). Speaking at another party congress on June 14 in Sanliurfa, he reiterated this commitment, and promised to combat any plots against democracy. Erdogan contextualized the document, however, as part of other efforts to weaken the AKP, and argued that “in a democratic environment we cannot remain a spectator to this illegal process against the AKP. We are investigating [the plots against the AKP] and will take legal action if necessary” (www.haberturk.com, June 14).

    Taraf has run controversial stories by publishing unclassified military documents, since it was first published by a group of liberal journalists in 2007 -exposing either the activities of groups within the military seeking to topple the government, or the flaws in the Turkish army’s campaign against the PKK (EDM, July 18, 2008; Terrorism Focus, October 30, 2008). Basbug has publicly accused Taraf in the past of conducting a defamation campaign against the military. Erdogan also joined Basbug in lambasting Taraf, but this did not change its publication policy (www.haber7.com, October 17, 2008).

    If the latest revelation in Taraf proves to be true, it is likely to have significant repercussions for the current balance of power in Ankara. Erdogan and Basbug apparently reached a common understanding on major political issues, such as the Ergenekon investigation and the management of the Kurdish question. They have established close communication channels to exchange opinions. Erdogan did not object to Basbug’s controversial efforts to reassert a role for the military within Turkish politics (EDM, April 15), while Basbug permitted the trial of military officers in the Ergenekon case. Their management of the claims that the military headquarters might be involved in a conspiracy against the government could force them to redefine their working relationship, with significant implications for the future of Turkish civil-military affairs.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-general-staff-accused-of-seeking-to-undermine-the-government/
  • Turkey Reports Signs of Economic Recovery

    Turkey Reports Signs of Economic Recovery

    Turkey Reports Signs of Economic Recovery

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 112
    June 11, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Data recently released by the Turkish Statistics Institute (TurkStat) has raised expectations that the economy might be on its way to recovery. According to TurkStat, the capacity utilization rate within the Turkish manufacturing sector increased for the third consecutive month in May (www.tuik.gov.tr, June 10). Although the improvement is attributed largely to the AKP government’s economic stimulus packages, it remains uncertain whether domestic demand alone can sustain economic development.

    Starting in the second half of 2008, the Turkish economy felt the impact of the global financial crisis: industrial production output, exports, economic growth and industrial capacity utilization rates dropped dramatically, while unemployment soared (EDM, February 18). In January and February, the industrial capacity utilization rate dropped to 63.8 percent and hit a record low in the last two decades, presenting the starkest evidence of the contraction within the Turkish economy. In an attempt to prevent a deeper recession, the Central Bank gradually cut its interest rates. In addition, the AKP government, which was under fire for failing to take effective precautions, adopted several economic packages. In March, temporary tax cuts were introduced in major sectors including automotive, housing and household appliances in order to stimulate domestic demand (EDM, March 16).

    Recent economic trends indicate that these precautions slowed the pace of the downturn. In March, the capacity utilization rate increased for the first time since September 2008 and has continued to climb; it moved from 63.8 percent in February to 64.7 in March, and to 66.8 in April and 70.4 percent in May.

    While confirming this trend, TurkStat’s report highlighted low domestic and foreign demand as the major factors negatively affecting the capacity utilization. Although in May the capacity utilization rate indicated a 12 percent decline compared to the previous year, demonstrating the extent of the economic downturn, the report provided other signs of recovery. The production volume in May increased by 7.6 percent compared to April, which is estimated to continue growing by 6.7 percent in June. The sales volume increased by 6.4 percent in May and this is forecast to continue in June (www.tuik.gov.tr, June 10).

    The recent figures were interpreted by government officials as a sign that Turkey might be able to mitigate the full impact of the crisis. The Minister of Trade and Industry Nihat Ergun attributed the growth in the capacity utilization to the production triggered by the government’s earlier economic packages. He argued that a slow recovery was now under way. Nonetheless, he avoided drawing an overly optimistic picture, and added that without the complementary expansion in foreign demand, the recovery might be short-lived (www.cnnturk.com, June 10).

    Indeed, following the introduction of the latest economic package, several companies that were considering halting their production dropped these plans. Likewise, many companies that had applied for the government sponsored short term pay compensation, in order not to lay off their employees stopped receiving those benefits and began paying full salaries (Zaman, April 13). Moreover, a report published by an Ankara-based think-tank found that a majority of the automotive sales were financed by consumer savings and seller credits, rather than bank loans. The report suggested that this might prove an important indicator, signaling the growing consumer confidence in the market -a key factor for economic recovery (www.tepav.org.tr, June 4).

    The stimulus package has provided temporary relief, but it is uncertain what will occur after the tax incentives expire this month. Since the global economy is unlikely to recover in the short term, foreign demand cannot serve as the main stimulant for the Turkish economy. Therefore, the key question might be whether Turkey’s domestic demand can sustain its economic growth. Some experts maintain that with improved economic coordination and more intensive public involvement in the functioning of the economy, Turkey can stimulate domestic demand and maintain its economic growth (www.tepav.org.tr, May 27). However, other analysts expect that, short of any major surge in foreign demand, it will be difficult to sustain such economic growth in the second half of 2009. On the contrary, they forecast that the automotive sector is likely to face “renewed sharp contraction in the second half of 2009 and a slow recovery beyond that” (Hurriyet Daily News, May 29).

    Since the automotive sector is one of the engines of Turkish economic development, the government needs to implement additional measures to redress the deficit caused by this contraction. With such considerations in mind, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the fifth economic incentives package on June 4. The package seeks to enhance the economy’s competitive power and eliminate regional discrepancies through region, sector and project specific incentives and investments. Businesses investing in poorer regions such as in eastern Turkey will be entitled to free land, tax breaks on corporate taxation, and government assistance for employees’ social security premiums, etc. An additional package aims to reduce unemployment by funding various seasonal public works, such as repairing schools and hospitals and planting trees, as well as providing vocational training. With this new package, the total cost of the stimulus packages for 2009 and 2010 is expected to reach 60 billion TL ($38.7 billion) (www.32gunhaber.com, June 4).

    The government’s economic policy is driven by the need to reduce the impact of the crisis on households to prevent the erosion of its political popularity. In this context, it has elongated the negotiations with the IMF to sign a loan deal, which might have imposed tighter budgetary rules on public spending. Recent reports suggest that in response to the signs of recovery, the treasury has an alternative plan to continue the economic program without a stand-by agreement with the IMF (Referans, May 20). The government has managed to slow the downturn and escape a deep recession, but it is still too early to determine when the Turkish economy will experience a permanent recovery. Moreover, if the global crisis continues beyond 2009 the heavy financial burden of the stimulus packages on the budget might return to haunt the Turkish economy, and possibly damage the government’s popularity.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-reports-signs-of-economic-recovery/
  • Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through “Soccer Diplomacy”

    Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through “Soccer Diplomacy”

    Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through “Soccer Diplomacy”

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 107
    June 4, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz discussed energy issues with Azeri officials on the sidelines of a recent soccer game. Following his talks, Yildiz commented on the status of the Turkish-Azeri talks on pricing gas imports and Turkey’s position on the Nabucco project. The incident echoes what was referred to as the “soccer diplomacy” conducted last year between Turkey and Armenia.

    The Turkish and Azeri national soccer teams played a friendly game in Turkey’s central Anatolian city of Kayseri on June 2. There was huge public interest and over 30,000 spectators decorated the stadium with the Turkish and Azeri flags. They carried placards and chanted slogans reflecting the sense of solidarity between the two nations: “We are all Azeris,” “Karabakh belongs to Turks,” “We cannot be divided” (www.nethaber.com, www.tumspor.com, June 2).

    The sporting fixture also provided an additional venue to discuss contentious bilateral issues. The president of the Azerbaijani state petroleum company (SOCAR) Rovnag Abdullayev (also the head of the Azeri soccer federation), was in the audience. He watched the game alongside the head of the Turkish soccer federation and Yildiz. On the periphery of this event, Yildiz and Abdullayev continued their talks on pricing Turkey’s gas imports from Azerbaijan. Abdullayev flew back to Baku together with the Turkish ambassador to Azerbaijan in the same private jet (Hurriyet, June 3).

    Yildiz told reporters that both sides shared their views as well as new proposals on pricing. He added that the Azeri side will respond after further evaluating the Turkish proposals. Although Yildiz found Azerbaijan’s request for further deliberation quite natural as part of the negotiation process, he also stressed his hope that it might be accelerated. “It will be in both countries’ interest to reach a solution as soon as possible. Over the next week, technical delegations will continue their work on the [mutual] proposals. My opinion is that without losing further time, an agreement on Shahdeniz-I and Shahdeniz-II should be reached. Our Azeri brothers said they would help us on this issue” (Anadolu Ajansi, June 3).

    Abdullayev offered reassurance that no difficult issues existed between the two countries, but he said that there was no reason to rush into the project. He added “a thirty-year agreement and other issues cannot be resolved in one or two days. The game provided an opportunity to discuss these, but commercial matters cannot be concluded in haste… We received Turkey’s proposals on oil and gas and we will study them” (Milliyet, June 4).

    Currently there are two major elements on the agenda of the Turkish-Azeri gas talks. Azerbaijan expects Turkey to revise gas import prices. Moreover, anxious to transport its gas to European markets, Baku wants Ankara to adopt a more cooperative position on the Nabucco project.

    Under the terms of an agreement in 2001, Turkey annually imports 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from Azerbaijan’s Shahdeniz-I site at a price of $120 per thousand cubic meters, which is far below current global energy prices. Turkey also plans to purchase 8 bcm of gas from the Shahdeniz-II for its domestic consumption. Since the 2001 agreement ended in April 2008, Turkey has continued to import Azeri gas at the old price. In recent months, Baku has demanded the revision of the price to reflect the current market value, although Ankara has reportedly been unenthusiastic (EDM, May 1).

    During his trip to Azerbaijan in May, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan promised that a new and “fair” price will be found (EDM, May 14). Yildiz, who accompanied Erdogan to Baku, later said that “the price [offered] was as fair as possible… I cannot give a figure. But it is not as high as [the price for] the Russian gas. We are trying to agree on a price that is not completely disconnected from world markets and one that will satisfy both us and our Azeri brothers” (Hurriyet, May 16). However, the fact that a final decision has not been reached, shows that Turkey’s price offer did not necessarily satisfy the Azeri side, and they preferred to continue the talks until a “fair” price is agreed.

    During his contacts in Kayseri earlier the same day, Yildiz commented on the future of the Nabucco project. Turkey has been viewed as the main obstacle to the conclusion of the intergovernmental transit agreement for the Nabucco pipeline, yet recent remarks emerging from Ankara has raised hopes for ending the stalemate (EDM, May 15, June 1). Yildiz reiterated Erdogan’s earlier optimism for signing the intergovernmental agreement in June, but added that the continuation of the negotiations indicated that a consensus on the exact date had not been reached (www.ntvmsnbc.com, June 3).

    Yildiz was asked about the Nabucco Managing Director Reinhard Mitschek’s earlier comments that Turkey’s demand for “the 15 percent out-take is not on the table” (Reuters, May 29). In response, Yildiz insisted that Turkey’s demand was still under consideration. After noting that lively bargaining was occurring, he maintained that the Europeans appreciated Turkish concerns. “They are not completely indifferent to 15 percent. The real problem is about its modality… It might be possible to exclude it from the intergovernmental agreement, and then regulate it under another agreement” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, June 3).

    This is not the first time that European and Turkish officials have issued contradictory statements on the Turkish position on the 15 percent issue (EDM, April 20). Ankara appears determined to get the best deal out of the Nabucco negotiations, even at the risk of further stalling the project and perhaps undermining Azerbaijan’s interests. For its own part, Baku also shows that it does not want the “brotherhood” to eclipse the country’s commercial interests, and will continue negotiations until a “fair” deal is finally secured.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-azeri-talks-on-gas-prices-continue-through-soccer-diplomacy/
  • Arinc Demands the Resignation of Turkey’s Media Watchdog

    Arinc Demands the Resignation of Turkey’s Media Watchdog

    Arinc Demands the Resignation of Turkey’s Media Watchdog

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 110
    June 9, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey continues to debate the implications of an ongoing controversial fraud case in the German courts involving, among others, individuals close to the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). After the Turkish courts launched this case, the Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc added a new dimension to the debate. Arinc has publicly called on the head of the top media watchdog, the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTUK), Zahid Akman, who was implicated in the case, to resign from his post, which has reignited tension between the government and the opposition.
    German prosecutors initiated legal proceedings against a charity established by Turks living in Europe. Deniz Feneri e.V. (Lighthouse e.V.) allegedly channeled donations made in Germany to private corporations in Turkey owned by close allies of the AKP. When these reports first emerged, it triggered controversy, since media outlets in the Dogan Media Group questioned the involvement of AKP supporters and the government’s silence over allegations of corruption (EDM, September 11, 2008; February 20).

    The German court requested judicial assistance from the Turkish authorities concerning several individuals, including Akman, for their involvement in the case. The German investigation identified Akman “as the shareholder and executive of three companies in Germany. The German authorities also documented that Akman was the executive of a German-based cooperative, into which another investigation was launched because of fraudulent activities” (Hurriyet Daily News, June 8).

    The opposition and other critics of the AKP accused the government of stalling the investigation into the Turkish side of the Lighthouse case, by using various delaying tactics. They speculated that there might be evidence contained within the dossier sent by the German court establishing links between the Lighthouse case and officials close to Erdogan. If the money transferred to Turkey was used to finance the AKP’s activities, it might have serious political repercussions within the country. Since the Turkish constitution prohibits political parties from receiving funds from foreign countries or organizations, such links might result in another closure case being instigated against the governing AKP (Hurriyet, May 14; Hurriyet Daily News, June 3).

    Although Akman has been the subject of a parliamentary inquiry, and a court case was filed to overthrow him, he has remained defiant (ANKA, May 12). Finally, Arinc said that he had asked Akman to resign during a private meeting, in order to avoid any damage to the RTUK. He added that Akman had agreed (www.haberturk.com, May 21). Arinc is one of the leading figures within the AKP and is known for his strong stance against corruption. Since he was appointed as the deputy prime minister during the last cabinet reshuffle, he has stressed his commitment to pursuing an ethical approach to politics. As the state minister, Arinc also oversees the RTUK.

    Arinc’s statements were welcomed by other members of the AKP government as well as the speaker of the Turkish parliament Koksal Toptan (www.cnnturk.com 22 May). The cabinet speaker Cemil Cicek even implied that Akman could have been asked to resign by the prime minister -prior to Arinc’s request (www.haberturk.com, May 25).

    After one week of silence, Akman spoke to Haberturk in an effort to clear his name. He said he was not asked by Arinc to resign; Arinc only inquired as to “whether he was considering resigning.” Akman refused saying that stepping down would have been perceived as an acknowledgement of guilt. He maintained that the allegations are being used to weaken the RTUK’s reputation. He added that he will remain in his post until his tenure ends on July 14, and he will not seek any extension. Finally, he challenged those “who were seeking to undermine his reputation” and said that “at the right moment,” he will respond to these allegations (www.haberturk.com, May 30).

    Although Haberturk reported that Akman claimed he enjoyed the firm backing of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, his lawyer denied this (Anadolu Ajansi, May 29). In the meantime, as part of the Turkish investigation, an Ankara court issued precautionary measures against the properties of Akman and other individuals. Responding to a question on these developments, Erdogan said that he was not in a position to defend Akman. “He has continued to defend himself very well and will continue to do so,” Erdogan added (Anadolu Ajansi, June 6).

    On June 6 Arinc repeated his call for Akman’s resignation. He added that he had no authority to remove the RTUK chief because he is appointed by parliament -nor can he be removed by Erdogan. He also emphasized that no AKP member was implicated in the fraud case. Later, Erdogan reacted harshly to speculation that the money from Lighthouse was funneled to the AKP (Anadolu Ajansi, June 6 and June 9).

    The opposition parties, however, did not find the government’s arguments convincing. They believe that the government has failed to adequately address the issue. One CHP representative, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, known for previously publicizing corruption cases involving AKP members, asked Arinc to resign, arguing that it was shameful that a minister was unable to command a bureaucrat under his authority (Anadolu Ajansi, June 1). Moreover, the CHP leader Deniz Baykal, accused the government of failing to force Akman to resign, and argued that the government’s delay had provided an opportunity for Akman to conceal evidence (Taraf, June 8).

    Depending on the progress of the current case, tensions within Turkish politics might increase. The opposition parties will continue to press the government to take action against Akman and the corruption allegations, since such high profile cases allows them to weaken the AKP’s popularity. As Akman struggles to clear his name and leave office with an unblemished record, the AKP will have to protect its image as a corruption-free party -perhaps ultimately by sacrificing Akman.

    https://jamestown.org/program/arinc-demands-the-resignation-of-turkeys-media-watchdog/
  • INTOLERANCE TO REASONED, SCHOLARLY DEBATE

    INTOLERANCE TO REASONED, SCHOLARLY DEBATE

    June 3, 2009

    To: Sheldon Levy, President and Vice-Chancellor, [email protected]

    Cc: Kanizehn Wadia, Executive Secretary to the President, [email protected]
    Erin McGinn, Director, Office of the President, [email protected]
    Carrie-Ann Bissonnette, Special Assistant, Events & Special Projects, [email protected]
    Alan Shepard, Provost and Vice President Academic – [email protected]
    Dr. Heather Lane Vetere, Vice Provost, Students – [email protected]
    Terry Gillin, Dean of sociology, [email protected]
    Mustafa Koc, Professor, Sociology Department, [email protected]
    Re: Intolerance at Canada’s Ryerson University to reasoned, scholarly debate

    Dear President Levy:
    I am responding to the apology you issued to the Armenian students for the scholarly seminar organized by the Turkish students at Ryerson University on February 18, 2009, featuring Professor Turkkaya Ataov, a researcher who authored of more than 80 books. I found your apology biased, unfair, and unscholarly. Here are my reasons and thoughts:

    BIAS IN THE TERM “ARMENIAN GENOCIDE”

    If one cherishes values like fairness, objectivity, truth, and honesty, then one should really use the term “Turkish-Armenian conflict”. Reducing this complex human tragedy that affected all the people of the area down to “Do you accept or deny Armenian Genocide” simply shows one’s anti-Turkish bias. The question should be re-phrased “What is your stand on the Turkish-Armenian conflict?”

    Turks document it clearly that it was an inter communal warfare mostly fought by Turkish and Armenian irregulars, a civil war which is engineered, provoked, and waged by the Armenian revolutionaries, with active support from Russia, England, France, and other countries, as well as Western media and missionaries, all interested in the vast resources of the collapsing Ottoman Empire for different reasons and to varying degrees, against a backdrop of a raging world war.

    Armenians, on the other hand, ignoring Armenian agitation, raids, rebellions, terrorism, treason, territorial demands, and Turkish victims killed by Armenians, claim that it was a one way genocide, a claim never tested at a court of law but mostly based on hearsay and forgeries.

    GENOCIDE ALLEGATIONS IGNORE “THE SIX T’S OF THE TURKISH-ARMENIAN CONFLICT”

    While some in unsuspecting public may be forgiven for taking the blatant and ceaseless Armenian propaganda at face value and believing Armenian falsifications merely because they are repeated so often, it is difficult and painful for someone like me, the son of Turkish survivors on both maternal and paternal sides, whose story is hardly ever heard due to censorship induced by Armenian pressure groups.

    Those seemingly endless “War years” of 1912-1922 brought three separate but consecutive wars on Ottoman soil (The Balkans, WWI, and the Independence Wars) and wide-spread death and destruction on to all Ottoman citizens. No Turkish family was left touched, mine certainly included. Those nameless, faceless Turkish victims are killed for a second time today with politically motivated and baseless charges of Armenian genocide. Those wars were brought onto Turks, not vice-versa, fought on Turkish soil, not in England, France, or Russia, and Turks were only defending their home, not out for conquest.

    ALLEGATIONS OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE ARE RACIST AND DISHONEST HISTORY

    They are racist because they ignore the Turkish dead: about 3 million during WWI; more than half a million of them at the hands of Armenian nationalists.

    And the allegations of Armenian genocide are dishonest because they simply dismiss

    THE SIX T’S OF THE TURKISH-ARMENIAN CONFLICT:

    1) TUMULT (as in numerous Armenian armed uprisings, 1878-1921)

    2) TERRORISM (by well-armed Armenian nationalists and militias victimizing Ottoman-Muslims, 1882-1922)

    3) TREASON (Armenians joining the invading enemy armies, 1914-1921)

    4) TERRITORIAL DEMANDS (where Armenians were a minority, not a majority, attempting to establish Greater Armenia, the would-be first apartheid of the 20th Century with a Christian minority ruling over a Muslim majority, 1878- present )

    5) TURKISH SUFFERING AND LOSSES (i.e. those caused by the Armenian nationalists: 524,000 Muslims, mostly Turks, met their tragic end at the hands of Armenian revolutionaries during WWI, documented by the Turkish Historical Society. This figure is not to be confused with about 2.5 million Muslim dead who lost their lives due to non-Armenian causes during WWI.)

    6) TERESET (temporary resettlement) triggered by the first five T’s above and amply documented as such; not to be equated to the Armenian misrepresentations as genocide.)

    VERDICT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS AMOUNTS TO LYNCHING

    Those who take the Armenian “allegations” of genocide at face value seem to also ignore the following:

    1- Genocide is a legal, technical term precisely defined by the U.N. 1948 convention (Like all proper laws, it is not retroactive to 1915.)

    2- Genocide verdict can only be given by a “competent court” after “due process” where both sides are properly represented and evidence mutually cross examined.

    3- For a genocide verdict, the accusers must prove “intent” at a competent court and after due process. This could never be done by the Armenians whose evidence mostly fall into five major categories: hearsay, mis-representations, exaggerations, forgeries, and “other”.

    4- Such a “competent court” was never convened in the case of Turkish-Armenian conflict and a genocide verdict does not exist (save a Kangaroo court in occupied Istanbul in 1920 where partisanship, vendettas, and revenge motives left no room for due process.)

    5- Genocide claim is political, not historical or factual. It reflects bias against Turks. Therefore, the term genocide must be used with the qualifier “alleged”, for scholarly objectivity and truth.

    POLITICAL LYNCHING OF THE TURKS BY ARMENIANS TODAY

    Recognizing Armenian claim as genocide, therefore, will deeply insult Turkish-Canadians and Turks around the globe and poison the otherwise excellent relations currently enjoyed between the Canada and Turkey. It will, no doubt, please Armenians but disappoint, insult, and outrage Turkey, one of Canada’s closest allies and a partner in NATO. Turks stood shoulder to shoulder with Canadians in Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and more. Genocide charge, unproven and unjustified, is the worst insult that can be dished out to an entire nation and a democracy respecting human rights, not to mention a close friend, an staunch ally , and a reliable partner in a troubled part of the world.

    History is not a matter of ” gut feelings, thoughts, beliefs, conviction, consensus, political resolutions, or propaganda.” History is a matter of unbiased research, honest peer review, thoughtful debate, and meticulous scholarship. Even historians, by the U.N. definition, cannot decide on a genocide verdict, which is a special task reserved for a “competent court” with its legal expertise and due process.

    What we witness today amounts to lynching of the Turks by Armenians to satisfy the age old Armenian hate, bias, and bigotry. Values like fairness, presumption of innocence until proven guilty, objectivity, balance, honesty, and freedom of speech are stumped under the fanatic Armenian feet.

    Those who claim genocide verdict today, based on the much discredited Armenian evidence, are actually engaging in “conviction and execution without due process”. Last time I checked with the dictionary, that was the definition of “lynching”.

    Isn’t it about time to stop fighting the First World War after almost a century and give peace a real chance?

    Perhaps an even better question is, isn’t it time to allow the historians, researchers, and scholars to take over this debate?

    The capability to explore and discuss contentious issues in a rational, scholarly manner is one of the trademarks that makes a University community a stimulating and exciting place. Your apology to Armenian students, implying that the Turkish-Armenian controversy should be represented like settled history in line with untested, unproven Armenian allegations, deals a blow to academic freedom and freedom of speech, thus vibrancy of a university.

    After all, what good is a university if reasoned, scholarly debate is not allowed?

    Peace,

    ERGUN KIRLIKOVALI

    Son of Turkish Survivors from Both Maternal & Paternal Side

    www.turkla.com
    www.ethocide.com

    ***

  • The Kurdistan Regional Government Launches Oil Exports through Turkey

    The Kurdistan Regional Government Launches Oil Exports through Turkey

    The Kurdistan Regional Government Launches Oil Exports through Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 105
    June 2, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has started to export its oil to European markets, under partnerships with Turkish and other international energy companies. Following a new consensus on the distribution of revenues between the central administration in Baghdad and the KRG, oil from the Tawke and Taq Taq fields will be transported via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline to the Turkish port of Ceyhan in the Mediterranean.

    A crucial aspect of the project has been the entry of international companies into the flourishing regional economy. The KRG has tried to attract foreign investment as a means to generate wealth and consolidate its authority within northern Iraq. Having successfully attracted foreign capital, the KRG signed independent contracts for the development of the oil fields, which caused a dispute with the central Iraqi government. In May, KRG officials announced that they received Baghdad’s approval to export oil through Iraqi pipelines (www.krg.org, May 10). Although it allowed these exports, “the central government still refuses to recognize the production-sharing agreements Kurdish authorities have signed with oil firms.” This situation created uncertainty regarding the payment of foreign investors’ revenues, but the statements from KRG officials indicate that this will not become a major issue (Today’s Zaman, June 2).

    A joint venture between the Turkish company Genel Enerji, a subsidiary of the Cukurova group, and the Canadian-Swiss Addax Petroleum will run the operations in the Taq Taq field in Erbil. Their joint investments are valued at over $350 million. The Norwegian DNO operates the Tawke field in Dohuk, where the Genel Elektrik also holds a 25 percent stake (Hurriyet Daily News, June 2). The investors designate Taq Taq as “a potentially world class oil field” (www.addaxpetroleum.com). KRG sources also claim that the oil from this region is high quality and expect the new production to “improve on the overall quality of the present Kirkuk oil mix.” Oil from the Tawke field will be directly transferred to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik through an auxiliary pipeline. As a temporary measure, the crude from the Taq Taq will first be transported by road to the existing local pipeline networks – and from there it will connect to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik export pipeline (www.krg.org, May 8).

    Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Company (SOMO) will market the exported oil from both fields and the revenues will be deposited in the federal account. Under the Taq Taq deal, Baghdad will receive 88 percent of the revenues, 17 percent of which will go to the KRG. Foreign investors will receive a 12 percent share. The Tawke deal reportedly has similar stipulations (www.krg.org, May 8; www.alarabiya.net, June 1).

    Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, KRG President Masoud Barzani, KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, as well as other dignitaries from the KRG and representatives of the investors participated in a ceremony held in Erbil to celebrate the export deal. Talabani described this development as a “historic step” and contended that it signified how the Iraqis can work together for the prosperity of the country. In a move to allay concerns over the legality of the contracts, Talabani said “these contracts are legal, constitutional and legitimate and they are in the interests of the Iraqi people” (www.alarabiya.net, June 1).

    Earlier, one KRG representative, Halid Salih, also emphasized that they were acting within the boundaries set by the Iraqi constitution. He noted that they entered into agreements with foreign companies according to the constitution, which granted greater autonomy to regional governments to explore oil following its revisions in 2005 (Cihan Haber Ajansi, June 1).

    Echoing similar sentiments, Nechirvan Barzani described this project as a gift of the KRG to the Iraqi people. He emphasized the KRG’s respect for the central administration, but stressed how hard they worked to secure a fair share of the region’s revenues. Barzani explained that:

        “Fortunately, we possess abundant natural resources … We must use these resources … for the benefit of all the people of Iraq… We signed contracts with international oil companies in order to bring capital, technology, know-how and experience to our region and to the entire country… We are proud to contribute to Iraq’s increased production and revenues. In reality, revenue-sharing will bind us together more than any political slogan” (www.krg.org, June 1).

    Oil exports will begin at an initial rate of around 100,000 barrels per day. 60,000 barrels will be pumped from the Tawke field, while the remaining 40,000 of the light crude will come from the Taq Taq field. Havrami said the crude exports from both fields are expected to reach 250,000 barrels per day within one year, 450,000 barrels per day by the end of 2010 and 1 million barrels per day by 2013. According to current price estimates, within four years, the annual revenues from exports might reach $20 billion (www.tempo24.com.tr, June 2).

    This agreement highlights the prospect for mutually beneficial economic cooperation, if internal political disagreements are set aside. Since the country urgently needs revenues to recover from the effects of a devastating war, the wealth brought by the oil exports might offer further incentives for political reconciliation, and help heal the feud between the KRG and the central administration. Nonetheless, it remains unclear how other political actors within the Iraqi political scene will react. Other than President Talabani, himself a Kurd, non-Kurdish members of the Shiite Arab dominated Iraqi central government did not attend the ceremony, which might indicate some enduring disagreement. Similarly, Iraq’s Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani also reportedly questioned the legality of the KRG’s deal.

    In any case, such joint projects have the potential to boost not only ties between the KRG and the central administration, but also Ankara’s relations with both the KRG and Baghdad. Economic collaboration serves as a major driving force to sustain the existing security cooperation partnership within the region (EDM, April 13).

    https://jamestown.org/program/the-kurdistan-regional-government-launches-oil-exports-through-turkey/