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  • Turkey Adopts a More Cooperative Position on Nabucco

    Turkey Adopts a More Cooperative Position on Nabucco

    Turkey Adopts a More Cooperative Position on Nabucco

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 94
    May 15, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    According to a senior EU official a new deal has been struck between Turkey and the EU paving the way to sign the intergovernmental agreement for the Nabucco project in Ankara on June 25. The breakthrough was reportedly made possible by Turkey dropping its uncompromising negotiating position and offering an unconditional acceptance of the EU’s terms. In particular, Turkey relinquished its demand to purchase 15 percent of the gas transit at discounted prices (The Guardian, May 11). Although positive statements emerged from the EU summit in Prague last week, lending credibility to this report, the Turkish side has rebuffed claims that a concrete deal has been reached.

    In response to questions about the story in the U.K. newspaper the Guardian, the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz, ruled out such a deal: “We should not interpret this [story] as yes or no… Negotiations are still under way.” Yildiz added that President Abdullah Gul was in charge of conducting the negotiations for the intergovernmental agreement, and he was not aware of any date being set on signing the agreement (Referans, May 12).

    One Turkish daily cited an unnamed BOTAS official who refuted the claim that Turkey had abandoned its demand for 15 percent. The same source claimed that Turkey’s demand does not directly relate to the consortium building the Nabucco pipeline, and the negotiations on Nabucco would continue in May (Yeni Safak, May 13). Before departing for Baku, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reacted to these reports, and added that the process remains ongoing (www.aktifhaber.com, May 13).

    Although it remains unclear whether a finalized deal on the negotiations is imminent, it is certain that positive developments in the Nabucco project have occurred. Senior Turkish officials familiar with the negotiations, speaking on the condition of anonymity, confirmed that groundbreaking progress had been achieved -though denying reports that all the conditions or a date had been agreed. In particular, Turkey wants a clause inserted into the intergovernmental agreement to allay its concerns and protect its energy security. “The Turkish side is hopeful that the issue will be solved at the end of the two rounds of discussions before the end of May, leaving enough time for preparations for the signing ceremony” (Hurriyet Daily News, May 13).

    Technical developments appear to be equally positive. Following the Prague summit, the Nabucco consortium announced that engineering teams from the partner countries have launched detailed engineering work on the pipeline route (Milliyet, May 13). A more promising sign is the recent change in the management of Turkey’s energy policies, following the Cabinet reshuffle earlier this month. This has raised expectations that stronger political leadership will ensure avoiding earlier mistakes. Turkey’s hard bargaining position and its misguided policies were considered to be an effort to stall or delay the conclusion of the Nabucco project (EDM, April 24, 27). Inside Turkey, this problematic policy is now increasingly attributed to Turkey’s former energy minister Hilmi Guler, whose insistence on making Turkey an energy hub created a stalemate in the negotiations with the Nabucco partners (Sabah, May 14).

    In addition to the appointment of a new energy minister, Taner Yildiz, who is considered more competent on energy policy, recent developments indicate that President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan are paying closer attention to Turkey’s energy policies. Moreover, it is argued that since the foreign ministry has increasingly become part of the negotiations, a more realistic stance has been adopted in Turkey’s energy policies (Hurriyet Daily News, May 13). Erdogan and Gul’s political leadership and their high profile involvement might boost Turkey’s credibility and facilitate the conclusion of the Nabucco process.

    Gul represented Turkey at the EU energy summit in Prague last week, which followed his attendance at an earlier summit in Sofia in April. In Prague, he tried to reassure the Nabucco partners of Turkey’s reliability by emphasizing how much Ankara was aware of its responsibilities in the transportation of Caspian and Middle Eastern hydrocarbon resources to Europe. Noting that Turkey acted responsibly in the management of other pipelines on its territory Gul added, “we will demonstrate the same sense of responsibility, even more, in the case of the Southern Gas Corridor and Nabucco, which are of higher strategic importance. Turkey has the highest level of determination and political will to realize the Nabucco project.” Gul noted that Turkey’s energy policy is based on harmonizing its own search for diversifying its suppliers and transportation routes with the EU’s attempts to ensure energy security (Hurriyet, May 9).

    Erdogan is actively complementing the perspective outlined by Gul. Energy related issues constituted a major part of Erdogan’s portfolio during his recent trip to Baku (EDM, May 14). Yildiz said that Ankara and Baku will continue their negotiations on prices for Azeri gas flowing through Turkey (Milliyet, May 15). Erdogan then visited Poland where he delivered an important message on Turkey’s position over energy transportation. He said that “Turkey is a transit and consumer country… As a transit country, we will always be ready to render our help available to Nabucco: there is no doubt on that. The route and diversification of supplies are very important. Turkey is pursuing a cooperative approach on all of these issues” (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 14).

    Gul and Erdogan’s recent statements suggest that Turkey might be revising its policy of asserting itself as an energy hub at the expense of producer countries and end users. Instead, it is using its position as a transit country as leverage to request additional concessions. Thus, the Turkish leadership is sending signals that it has adopted a more realistic role in Nabucco, which might provide a solid basis to achieve a common position between Turkey and the EU in energy cooperation. Though they continue to emphasize Turkey’s search for security as part of its new energy policy, they are being more careful not to exaggerate their demands.
    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-adopts-a-more-cooperative-position-on-nabucco/

  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Over 300,000 readers
    My Mission: God has uniquely designed me to seek, write, and speak the truth as I see it. Preservation of one’s wealth while providing needful income is my primary goal in these unsettled times. I have been given the ability to evaluate, study, and interpret world and national events and their influence on the future of the financial markets. This gift allows me to meet the needs of individual and institution clients.

    A CASE FOR GOLD
    Hi:
    I have been trying to write this market letter for over a week now. My problem is that I want to keep it simple and right to the point without causing a panic or looking foolish. Tough Job!
    So here goes my fourth and hopefully my last try.
    We have been experimenting with fiat currency since August 15, 1971 when President Nixon took us off the gold standard. This allowed politicians and financiers to create all sorts of funds without any solid backing except the US Dollar. So, four decades later the world economies are awash in dollar debts that have become tainted to say the least. We are in a horse race that has come up lame. The problem is that some of the other thoroughbreds play by their own rules.
    The major players have suffered huge losses that they have not been accustomed to for a very long time. It is the major players that carry monstrous debt and it has trickled down to you and me. The whole world is tapped out as far as standing in a banking line for credit.
    Cadbury (The British Chocolate Company) came to the bond market the same time the British government did. Cadbury got the better rate. Microsoft (NASDAQ –MSFT) will probably do better than the US Government Bond offerings since MSFT is a true AAA rated security. When corporations can borrow money at a cheaper rate than their governments something is very wrong.
    We are in a worldwide recession, which means business is slow and unemployment is rising. This also means people’s spending habits are changing.
    We are in, I believe, a topping out process of a major bear market rally. The second leg down could bring blood in the streets. It could start as a major corporation fails to pay its interest on a semi annual debt payment. When business slows down this could hurt their debt coverage and put it in jeopardy because their interest payments estimates might have been based upon higher sales and earnings.
    There are as few as five corporations that have debt rated AAA (Highest, or best rating). This fact means that with a slow economy, many corporations will not be able to pay their debt payments. Wall Street watches dividends, I watch bonds. Bonds come first, then Preferred stock followed by common stock. Bonds are considered safer than common stocks, so when a bond defaults it could send shock waves throughout the world.
    This could cause a collapse of stocks as mutual funds will just sell- hit the bid- and currencies falter and precious metals rise. Especially gold.
    I have noticed that when the dollar weakens gold rises. I believe that central bankers sell our debt and then convert our dollars into gold bullion.
    Going back to some form of the gold standard will put a break on government spending by any government. Too much spending will make that currency worthless. Either way it is a tough choice.
    UBS (a Swiss Bank) estimates that if the US went back on the gold standard, gold would go to $6,000 an ounce. Add in China and Japan and we are looking at $9,000 and ounce. Gold is presently selling at a little under $900.
    We can buy the Spider Gold Trust (NYSE-GLD-$90) that trades at 1/10 the price of gold. It trades dollar for dollar with the price of regular gold. If gold trades down GLD will trade down. If gold trades up the GLD will trade up. All you pay is NYSE commission. No fancy management fees and all that garbage. You can sell anytime and receive a check in three days after the sale. This can be your personal hedge. You do not need a lot of money for personal protection. Buying too much would be a speculation, which could sink you, if it happens. There are no sure things in this world, as we sure are learning now, so don’t be foolish.
    If you have any problems, please do not hesitate to get in touch with me.

    Richard C De Graff
    256 Ashford Road
    RER Eastford Ct 06242
    860-522-7171 Main Office
    800-821-6665 Watts
    860-315-7413 Home/Office
    rdegraff@coburnfinancial.com

    This report has been prepared from original sources and data which we believe reliable but we make no representation to its accuracy or completeness. Coburn & Meredith Inc. its subsidiaries and or officers may from time to time acquire, hold, sell a position discussed in this publications, and we may act as principal for our own account or as agent for both the buyer and seller.

  • Merkel and Sarkozy Call for Privileged Partnership Angers Turkey

    Merkel and Sarkozy Call for Privileged Partnership Angers Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 92
    May 13, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy reignited the debate on Turkey’s place within Europe by questioning the wisdom of Turkey seeking full membership of the European Union. Attending a meeting in Berlin, the two leaders emphasized their objection to the EU’s enlargement to include Turkey, arguing that any misguided expansion might endanger its operational effectiveness, and that it should stop making empty promises to Turkey. They instead reiterated their support for “privileged partnership” as an alternative framework to regulate Turkish-EU relations (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 10).

    Sarkozy is known for his frequent objections to Turkey’s membership. Before his election in 2007, he spoke against the country’s accession and instead proposed an alternative partnership through his Mediterranean Union project. Due to objections from Turkey and other EU member states most notably the UK, Sarkozy dropped the idea, which enabled the creation of the Mediterranean Union as a separate organization -which Turkey also joined (EDM, July 15, 2008).

    Although he has since softened his rhetoric and avoided blocking Turkish-EU accession negotiations during the French presidency of the European Union, Sarkozy has remained Turkey’s most vocal opponent. For instance, when President Obama tried to promote Turkish-EU accession talks during his recent European trip, Sarkozy immediately dismissed these comments as an unwarranted intervention in European affairs, and led other likeminded states to mobilize resistance against Turkey (Hurriyet, April 7).

    Merkel shares similar views on Turkish-EU relations. Nonetheless, her policies have been tempered by the coalition partnership with the Social Democrats, who hold more positive views on the issue. However, Merkel uses electoral considerations and her conservative grassroots’ discomfort with Turkey to justify her objections. Referring to the upcoming European elections in June, Merkel said: “It is right that we say to people [during the campaign]… our common position is: a privileged partnership for Turkey, but no full membership” (Hurriyet Daily News, May 11).

    Sarkozy does not hide the role electoral politics play in shaping his position on Turkey. Indeed, he has accelerated his objections to Turkish accession ahead of the European election campaign. He is advocating that the EU considers the creation of a common platform with Turkey, perhaps including Russia, to regulate economic and security relations (Hurriyet Daily News, May 6).

    Inside the EU, the Franco-German position is countered by the member states more sympathetic to Turkey and the representatives of the EU institutions. Portugal’s President Anibal Cavaco Silva, while currently visiting Turkey reiterated his country’s support for Turkish accession, noting the many benefits it would bring to the EU (Anadolu Ajansi, May 12). Last week, Finland’s Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, also ruled out a privileged partnership, and reaffirmed Helsinki’s commitment to bring Turkey into the EU as a full member (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 8). A statement from the office of the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn, responded swiftly to the statements by Sarkozy and Merkel, saying that the decisive factor from the commission’s perspective was Turkey’s fulfilment of the membership criteria (ANKA, May 11).

    Although Merkel and Sarkozy’s views on Turkey were well known, their recent statements surprised many within Turkish domestic politics. Some Turkish dailies labeled this development, particularly Merkel’s remarks, as “shocking” (Milliyet, May 11). Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition party, called their statements “rude, harsh and negative” and argued that since they were made during the ongoing membership talks, they should be taken as a sign of disrespect toward Turkey. Baykal also criticized the government’s failure to take action to protest more forcefully against this development (Anadolu Ajansi, May 12).

    In reacting to calls to downgrade the Turkish-EU relationship, officials in Ankara have highlighted three points. They have restated Turkey’s position that privileged partnership is unacceptable, and maintain that since the EU has initiated membership talks, it must honor this commitment. Shortly after assuming his post last week, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stressed this argument. Noting that he would revitalize the stalled membership process, Davutoglu expressed his discomfort over speculation on privileged partnership. Offering Turkey other alternatives short of full membership would betray Turkey and also undermine the EU’s own values, Davutoglu contended (Yeni Safak, May 9). In his reaction to the Merkel-Sarkozy statement, President Abdullah Gul also echoed Davutoglu, arguing that European leaders had agreed on membership negotiations with a unanimous decision, which still legally binds all member states (www.cnnturk.com, May 12).

    Turkish officials maintain that European politicians are using the debate about its future membership as a tool calculated to achieve domestic political gains. Gul suggested that the Merkel-Sarkozy remarks reflected “short-term thinking,” caused by a lack of strategic vision on the part of some European leaders (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 12).

    Turkish leaders emphasize their commitment to the membership process, and say they will do more to conclude the negotiations successfully. Following a cabinet meeting, the state minister and government spokesman Cemil Cicek, told reporters that the government will take further steps to implement domestic reforms. This will involve preparing a new constitutional amendment package in consultation with the opposition. Cicek added that the government will shortly forward a draft law to parliament, which will reorganize the under-secretariat for the European Union in order to streamline reforms (www.cnnturk.com, May 12).

    The Turkish government seeks to counteract objections to membership by reminding the EU of its commitments to the accession process, and by downplaying those objections -attributing them to short-term calculations. The government implicitly believes that if the discussions on Turkey are conducted on the basis of the contractual framework of the accession process, it may de-legitimize European objections to Turkey. However, it fails to appreciate that its track record on domestic reforms is far from satisfactory. Despite promises to revitalize the membership process in 2009, little has been accomplished (EDM, January 12, 20). Although it might be justified in calling on its EU partners to fulfil their promises, the Turkish government must acknowledge that it is time to deliver on domestic reforms.

    https://jamestown.org/program/merkel-and-sarkozy-call-for-privileged-partnership-angers-turkey/

  • Turkey Debates the Village Guard System

    Turkey Debates the Village Guard System

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 90
    May 11, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    In last week’s bloodbath at an engagement party, masked gunmen armed with assault rifles killed 44 people including the bride and the groom in a small village in Turkey’s southeastern province Mardin. As the country debated the causes of this carnage, attention shifted to an evaluation of the village guard system. Since some of the victims and alleged assailants were members of the system, calls for its dissolution or reform have been raised by the opponents of Turkey’s counter-terrorist policy. The security bureaucracy and nationalist forces have reacted quickly to defend this institution.

    Turkey first developed the village guard system to quell the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Local men were recruited as a paramilitary force to both protect themselves and aid the security forces fighting PKK militants in south-eastern Turkey. Village guards’ familiarity with the terrain, as well as the local language and dialects were important assets, and this helped to enhance the operational capability of the Turkish security forces. Moreover, by putting tens of thousands of tribesmen on the government’s payroll, the Turkish state sought to co-opt these and create revenues to address the root causes of joining the PKK (Terrorism Focus, October 1, 2008).

    Village guards, numbering around 90,000 at the height of the PKK’s campaign, are currently around 58,000-strong. Although the system began as a temporary measure, it has become an integral part of Turkey’s security apparatus. The guards, however, have frequently been criticized for their alleged involvement in criminal activities or human rights abuses. According to Interior Ministry records, village guards were the target of over 5,200 criminal investigations and as a result 853 guards were arrested for various crimes (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 8). A recent report released by the Human Rights Association revealed that between January 1992 and March 2009 village guards committed various human rights violations, including forced evacuation, burning villages, kidnapping and rape. In the last seven years guards have killed 51 people and wounded 83 (ANKA, May 9).

    The Mardin incident occupied Turkey’s agenda last week, reigniting the debate over the village guards. So far, around 10 suspects including some village guards have been arrested, but the exact motivation behind the attack is still unknown. Explanations range from a feud between the families involved, to the social structure in the region which is based on feudal relations and the dominance of religious orders. In this context, the decayed village guard system has been advanced as a possible cause of the incident (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 8).

    The Interior Minister Besir Atalay raised expectations that the government might consider reform. After noting that some village guards were among both the victims and assailants, while the weapons used in the attacks belonged to the guards, Atalay told reporters that the ministry was saddened by their involvement and was evaluating the situation (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 6). President Abdullah Gul also noted that if the shortcomings of the village guard system caused the attacks, then the government would take the necessary steps (Hurriyet Daily News, May 7).

    The main opposition party Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) called for a parliamentary investigation into the killings in Mardin. The Parliament’s Human Rights Investigation Commission formed a sub-commission, scheduled to visit the region later this week to conduct an investigation into the incident (Anadolu Ajansi, May 7).

    The pro-Kurdish DTP put a large part of the blame on the village guard system, arguing that had the state not armed these people, the carnage would not have occurred. As part of its overall opposition to Turkey’s policies on the Kurdish question, the DTP was an ardent critic of this system, demanding its dissolution. DTP deputies are campaigning for a parliamentary inquiry into this system, alleging that the village guards have become a criminalized network, and have undermined the social fabric and individuals’ psychological health in the region (ANKA, May 6).

    However, the defenders of the system are against any attempt to reduce the causes of the Mardin attack to the weaknesses of the village guard system. A representative from the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) argued that the village guard system had served important functions in combating terrorism and it should be preserved (Anadolu Ajansi, May 6).

    A spokesman for the Turkish military, Brigadier-General Metin Gurak defended the village guards during his weekly press briefing. He said that it would be unwise to hold the entire institution responsible (Milliyet, May 8). Interior Minister Atalay supported this view and defended the village guards. Though noting that the government will take into account the criticism of the guards, Atalay added that the dissolution of this institution was not on the agenda (www.cnnturk.com, May 9).

    The deputy prime minister and government spokesman Cemil Cicek, also supported the system, arguing that it had emerged out of necessity and these conditions remained. Cicek added: “It is necessary to avoid hasty conclusions. If some of them are involved in wrongdoing, then necessary action will be undertaken… It is wrong to attack the entire institution, because of the recent incident” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, May 10).

    The debate on the village guard system is likely to continue and the opponents of Turkey’s anti-terrorism policy will repeat their demands for its dissolution. However, many security experts regard it as a necessary counter-terrorist tool and argue that Turkey will need this institution as long as the PKK remains active. Since the government and the Turkish military appear to share this view, and PKK terrorism is unlikely to end soon, a partial reform of this system may be more realistic rather than its complete dissolution.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-debates-the-village-guard-system/

  • Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan

    Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan

    Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 87
    May 6, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The recent uncertainty surrounding Turkish-Azeri relations is giving way to a new period of optimism, ahead of high level diplomatic contacts. Turkish President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will meet Azeri officials in a bid to reassure Baku of Ankara’s intention to protect Azerbaijan’s interests during the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process.

    Turkey’s policy of conducting diplomacy within the South Caucasus in coordination with Azerbaijan, came under strain when it attempted to accelerate normalizing its relations with Armenia. Baku expressed its reservations over the rapid increase in diplomatic activity between Ankara -Yerevan which it perceived as “developing at the expense of Azerbaijan.” Azerbaijani officials tried to understand the content of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and how this might affect Turkish-Azeri relations (EDM, April 29, May 4). At the height of the discussions on President Obama’s April 24 address, the possibility that Ankara might ignore Baku’s sensitivities was often discussed within both countries. In addition to the reaction of Azerbaijani officials, such speculation added to public outrage toward the AKP government’s policies, both within Turkey and Azerbaijan. While delegations of Azeri parliamentarians and civil society organizations visited Turkey to garner political support for their plight, their Turkish counterparts also traveled to Azerbaijan in order to express solidarity with their Azeri brethren. Azeri deputies frequently appeared on live discussion programs on Turkish TV, seeking to mobilize public opinion, exerting additional pressure on the AKP government.

    Against this background, the Turkish government is now refocusing its attention on addressing those concerns. At the same time, the Turkish press reported that Baku has toned down its criticism of Ankara’s policies toward Armenia. Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev wants to reinforce bilateral ties, ensuring that he is kept informed about the progress on Turkish-Armenian rapprochement and securing greater leverage over Ankara’s policies toward Yerevan. Toward that end, Aliyev has decided to send a special envoy to Turkey (Referans, May 2).

    Turkey’s first attempts to reach out to Baku came on May 4 when Azerbaijan’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Araz Azimov, visited Ankara and held talks with Turkey’s newly appointed Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Since it was Davutoglu’s first meeting after assuming office two days earlier, it had a symbolic meaning -demonstrating the value that Davutoglu attaches to Turkish-Azeri ties. In addition to exploring ways of improving bilateral relations through more frequent and high profile meetings between the leaders of the two countries, they also exchanged opinions on regional issues (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 4).

    As a further boost to Ankara’s policy to regain Baku’s confidence, Erdogan will visit Baku on May 12-13, and then meet Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on May 16 (Anadolu Ajansi, May 4). While commenting on his forthcoming trip, Erdogan sought to deflect recent criticism from Baku and domestic opposition parties. He maintained that his government did not deserve such heavy criticism, which he characterized as an unnecessary reaction to Turkey’s policy of rapprochement; especially concerning Ankara’s intention to re-open its border with Armenia. Erdogan also emphasized that some Azeri officials’ statements had hurt Ankara. He added that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations will also serve Baku’s interests and he will seek to remove any misunderstandings during his visit next week (ANKA, May 5).

    Moreover, Erdogan’s plan to meet Putin reflects Ankara’s belief that Russia remains a significant stakeholder in the resolution of Turkish-Armenian-Azeri problems and must act in concert with Russia, in order to advance its interests within the South Caucasus. Russia is one of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group working to resolve the Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and has been mediating in talks between Baku and Yerevan.

    President Gul is taking additional steps toward addressing concerns over Ankara’s policies from Baku and domestic opposition parties. Gul met the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party Deniz Baykal, who had lambasted the recent moves towards rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, arguing that Erdogan had betrayed Baku. Gul briefed Baykal about the developments within the South Caucasus in an attempt to influence Turkish public opinion (Cihan Haber Ajansi, May 5).

    Gul also plans to hold two separate meetings with Aliyev and the Armenia’s President Serzh Sarksyan during the Eastern Partnership and Southern Corridor meetings in Prague on May 7-8 under the sponsorship of the Czech Republic, which currently holds the EU presidency (Anadolu Ajansi, May 5). In addition to discussing issues including energy security, the Prague summit will provide an opportunity to consider the resolution of problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Baku and Yerevan frequently conduct part of their diplomatic negotiations on the sidelines of such multilateral forums. In preparation for the Prague summit the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, met the foreign ministers of both countries separately in Washington. Clinton expressed her support and encouragement for these bilateral talks ahead of the Prague summit (www.cnnturk.com, May 5).

    The Gul-Aliyev meeting might equally hold symbolic meaning, marking an improvement of ties between Ankara and Baku, after their recent tension. Previously, Aliyev had declined to participate in multilateral meetings where he might meet Gul, spurning Gul’s invitation to attend the Alliance of Civilizations platform in Istanbul (EDM, April 8) and later cancelling his participation in an energy summit in Sofia, attended by Gul (Takvim, April 23). The Turkish press speculated that Aliyev was deliberately avoiding these meetings to convey his discomfort over Ankara’s failure to consult him on the Turkish-Armenian talks. Gul consistently denied any such row, and even claimed that he kept Aliyev informed about developments by telephone (www.ntvmsnbc.com, April 28). A face-to-face meeting between the two leaders might remove the basis for any future speculation, as well as mend strained Turkish-Azeri relations.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-prioritizing-its-relations-with-azerbaijan/
  • SOUTHERN CORRIDOR – EU signs deal on new gas pipeline

    SOUTHERN CORRIDOR – EU signs deal on new gas pipeline

    It is hoped that the piepline will start pumping gas to Europe by 2014 [EPA]

    The European Union has just signed an agreement with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Egypt in a bid to press ahead with a gas pipeline that would reduce its reliance on Russian energy. That shows the determination on the part of EU to end Europe’s energy dependence on Russia.

    Mirek Topolanek, the Czech prime minister, said the aim to open up a “southern corridor” for supplies was “not just a one-way street for pipelines…We envisage this as a new silk road where we’ll see the flow of information, goods, people and energy in both ways.” () (Aljazeera, MAY 08, 2009)

    “Two suppliers — Azerbaijan and Egypt — and two key transit states — Turkey and Georgia — agreed to give “the necessary political support,” and, where possible, “technical and financial assistance” to the construction of planned pipelines and transport routes needed to bring gas from the Caspian Basin region and the Middle East to the European market.”
    (RADIO FREE EUROPE, Antoine Blua, May 08, 2009)

    Here is the text of this important declaration ushering in a new age of energy diplomacy:

    ***

    DECLARATION: SOUTHERN CORRIDOR
    Prague Summit, May 8, 2009

    We, the Participants of the Southern Corridor Summit held in Prague on the 8th of May 2009;

    express our political support to the realization of the Southern Corridor as an important and mutually beneficial initiative, which will lead to the promotion of common prosperity, stability and security of all countries involved;

    understand the Southern Corridor as an area of mutual interest providing opportunities for cooperation of the various entities in our public and private sectors. The trigger but not the sole focus of this process of strengthening relations among the Southern Corridor countries will be enhancing our mutually beneficial energy cooperation, which has the potential to serve as a cornerstone for the overall cooperation among countries involved;

    acknowledge that infrastructure projects which interconnect the countries along the Southern Corridor will act as a catalyst for further co-operation in other areas. The successful cooperation in the field of energy will encourage investments also in transport area. The development of transport infrastructure, including for energy, will lead to an intensification of people-to-people contact, which is the fundamental prerequisite to further social, economic and political cooperation in the whole region;

    intend to overcome the main remaining commercial and non-commercial obstacles by coordinating on common progressive strategy, individual commitments of the countries concerned, namely energy producer, transit and consumer countries, and clear scheduling for the completion and functioning of concrete energy and transport projects to be realized and operated within the Southern Corridor, including the Trans-Caspian energy transportation projects;

    consider the Southern Corridor concept as a modern Silk Road interconnecting countries and people from different regions and establishing the adequate framework, necessary for encouraging trade, multidirectional exchange of know-how, technologies and experience.

    We consider

    The Southern Corridor concept as a synergy of the following documents:

    – the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements between the EU and Azerbaijan, the EU and Georgia, the EU and Kazakhstan, and the EU and Uzbekistan;
    – the Association Agreement between the EU and Turkey and the EU and Egypt;
    – the European Neighbourhood Policy, including the Action Plans, the Eastern Partnership, EU-Central Asia Strategy and the Black Sea Synergy;
    – the Memoranda of Understanding on strategic energy partnership between the EU and Egypt , EU and Kazakhstan, EU and Turkmenistan and EU and Azerbaijan;
    – the Declaration of the Budapest Nabucco Summit of 27 January 2009;
    – the Declaration of the Sofia Energy Summit of 24-25th April 2009;
    – The Baku Initiative and the Energy Road Map endorsed on the occasion of the Astana Ministerial Conference of 30 November 2006;
    – The Baku Energy Summit Declaration of 14th November 2008;
    – The Ministerial Statement on the Nabucco gas pipeline project of 26th June 2006;
    – Agreements on transportation of oil and gas through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum oil and gas pipelines of 1999 and 2001 respectively;

    – Agreement among the Republic of Turkey, the Hellenic Republic and Italian Republic concerning the development of the Turkey, Greece, Italy Transportation Corridor of 26 July 2007 in Rome;
    – the European Council Conclusions of 8-9 March 2007, 16 October 2008 and 20th March 2009;
    – the European Commission’s Second Strategic Energy Review of 13 November 2008;

    – Decision No 1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning trans-European energy networks (TEN-E);

    – Commission Decision granting financial aid for an action of 2.12.2008 in the field of the trans-European energy networks (TEN-E);
    – the EU-financed INOGATE technical feasibility studies on the Trans-Caspian-Black Sea Gas Corridor as well as the feasibility study on the Caspian Development Corporation (CDC);
    – the European Commission’s Communication on the extension of the major trans-European transport axes to the neighbouring countries, of 31 January 2007;
    – the transport cooperation and initiatives involving the EU and the countries of the Southern Corridor ;
    – And bearing in mind international treaties and obligations, including those arising from the Energy Charter Treaty, the Energy Community Treaty as well as the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements fostering the development of projects of the Southern Corridor;

    We declare

    That the concept for the Southern Corridor is complementary to other existing energy and transport partnerships and projects of the EU and is open for the participation and contribution of third countries on a case-by-case basis in concrete projects, upon agreement of all the Parties to this declaration directly involved.

    That one of the basic prerequisites for developing the Southern Corridor is cooperation to establish interconnections starting with direct energy and transport links among the countries concerned as appropriate. We therefore agree to promote a common initiative to develop the conditions necessary for more effective transportation networks, including of energy resources, goods and people as well as an improved exchange of know-how and technologies within the Corridor with the participation of all the interested countries, international political conditions permitting. This should make the maximum use of the existing regional initiatives on energy and transport.

    On the basis of declared principles in the field of energy we,

    agree to give necessary political support and, where possible, technical and financial assistance to the construction of the Southern Corridor, including the Trans-Caspian energy transportation projects, in order to support the diversification of energy sources, markets and transport routes, which will not only enhance the energy security of the participating countries , but also will simultaneously constitute fair and profitable opportunities for energy producers, consumers and transit countries, while recognizing the need for this to be feasible, economically competitive, technically and environmentally sustainable and timely.

    welcome transparency, competitiveness, long term predictability and stable regulatory conditions to underpin the realization of concrete infrastructure projects in the framework of the Southern Corridor. This should include

    * firstly, the means to provide producers with reliable commitments of the consumers on their aggregate demand and the identification of non- committed natural gas and oil volumes by producer countries that can be dedicated specifically to the EU as well as the Corridor countries markets with a precise timetable for their availability on the basis of their commercial profitability;

    * secondly, the establishment of necessary and appropriate transit and environmental arrangements in line with the Parties’ international commitments;

    * thirdly, the need for companies to ensure direct, industry-standard commercial agreements between producers and consumers.

    envisage a mechanism for aggregating sufficient volumes to be transported through the Southern Corridor, and, take note of the feasibility study on the Caspian Development Corporation initiative that should lead to concrete proposals in this respect. In this context, eventually consider devoting, as appropriate, public and private financial resources necessary for the realization of the Southern Corridor, including encouraging the market-based participation of public and private companies.

    attain the energy security of all parties including consumer and transit states, such as Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the basis of commercial agreements that are in line with the Parties’ international commitments.

    welcome that the countries concerned will endeavor to:

    – implement a clear, transparent, cost-based, stable and non-discriminatory transportation regime for natural gas or oil across the territories of the Corridor countries to end consumer markets, in line with the Parties’ international commitments.

    – establish direct connections between both sides of the Caspian Sea as one of the main important elements of the effective energy cooperation and favour the interconnection of the Southern Corridor with the EU through strategic infrastructure projects necessary for carrying natural gas by pipelines or ships. In the gas sector, interconnection will be established among others through the Nabucco project and the ITGI project both of which are financially supported in the EU Recovery Plan endorsed by the European Council of March 2009 as well as other projects within the Corridor. In the oil sector, an extension of the already operating transportation system between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan could be developed in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regions, taking into account the constrains of the Turkish straits.

    – promote the activities of public and private companies that are involved or willing to participate in the realization of the Trans-Caspian energy link.

    – achieve maximum energy efficiency and use of renewable energies as an important element for successful cooperation in the field of energy.

    Therefore, we express our readiness to share technologies, knowledge and know-how in order to reach efficient fuel use and further development of alternative energy sources to allow long-term and sustainable growth for all Corridor countries;

    – share technologies, knowledge and know-how for the development of energy resources, their transportation and technical upgrading within the Corridor.

    In the field of transport we endeavour,

    To support the promotion of regional and cooperative approaches to transport challenges in the Southern Corridor, which includes appropriate projects in the Mashreq, in particular Egypt and Iraq.

    To intensify cooperation in view of promoting the implementation of relevant infrastructure projects and of policy measures to facilitate exchanges, to support efforts to make transport projects within the Southern Corridor an effective and responsive instrument of cooperation and enhancing public-private partnerships and other ways of attracting investments.
    To implement the extension of transport trans European Networks to Turkey and South Caucasus and beyond to Central Asia along the Southern corridor, including connections to the Middle East.

    To encourage, with respect to high importance of railway transport in economies of Corridor countries, all parties involved to further develop the strategic railway networks and their interoperability. In this regard we support the railway and maritime corridor connecting the Caspian Sea Region with the EU, as well as a roll-on roll-off ferry connections between the EU and the relevant countries of the Southern Corridor, including Georgia.

    To share technologies, knowledge and know-how for technical upgrading of transport facilities within the Corridor in order to increase the transport efficiency.
    To harmonize technical norms and standards, ensure transparent and competitive tariffs, and to simplify custom procedures and border crossing in order to ensure fluent movement of all kinds of goods as a basic condition for deepening of trade among the involved countries.

    In the field of overall cooperation we agree,

    That strengthening of mutual relations must go hand in hand with following principles: transparency, non-discrimination , market economy and commercial profitability.
    To favour stable regulatory framework ensuring clear and predictable investment environment, which contributes to mutual trust necessary for successful realization of all strategic projects within the Southern Corridor.

    With respect to implementation and follow-up, we agree to strongly support the following steps:

    On energy:

    * The European Commission, together with the Council of the EU and the signatory partner countries, will monitor the implementation of this declaration and, in particular, work on developing an Action Plan seeking the implementation of the necessary conditions and the
    appropriate supporting measures for the Southern Corridor.

    * For the EU Member States concerned and Turkey to finish the negotiations of the intergovernmental agreement on Nabucco as quickly as possible, to sign it by the end of June 2009 in Turkey, and to continue to support the necessary steps for its implementation inter alia by identifying gas volumes available for marketing in the EU and Turkey.

    * For the EU Member States concerned and the relevant countries to progress further on the timely realisation of the ITGI project.

    * For the EU and the concerned countries to conclude the feasibility study on the Caspian Development Corporation initiative by the end of 2009 in view of the possible identification of relevant actions for the implementation.

    * For the EU and Iraq to sign an MoU on Energy as soon as possible, and for the EU and Egypt to cooperate and agree on specific projects in developing Egypt’s gas reserves and export potential for the EU, including via the Southern Corridor and encouraging energy investment, transfer of know-how for this purpose.

    On transport

    * To cooperate on the objective of promoting the extension of the trans-European transport networks to the countries of the Southern Corridor;

    * To work on developing an action plan on possible additional appropriate measures, including safety and security, to facilitate transport and transit flows along the Southern Corridor;

    * To work on a list of priority projects and policy measures for the development of the Southern corridor, and attract funds to implement them.

    Done and signed in Prague on 8th May 2009 in the presence of the representatives of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

    For the EU,
    H.E. Mirek Topolánek, President of the European Council

    H.E. Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission

    For the Republic of Azerbaijan,

    H.E. Ilham Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

    For the Republic of Georgia,
    H.E. Mikheil Saakashvili, President of Georgia

    For the Republic of Turkey,

    H.E. Abdullah Gül, President of Turkey

    For the Arab Republic of Egypt,
    H.E. Sameh Fahmy, Minister of Petroleum of the Arab Republic of Egypt

    ***

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    The European Union has signed an agreement with four countries in a bid to press ahead with a gas pipeline that would reduce its reliance on Russian energy.

    Azerbaijan and Egypt, which can both supply gas, and Turkey and Georgia, which are able to carry it, signed up to the Nabucco gas pipeline scheme on Friday at a meeting in Prague, capital of the Czech Republic.

    In return for their commitment to supply gas to Europe, the EU offered to provide more trade and stronger transport links to the gas producers and transit countries involved.

    Three key nations – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – refused to sign the text, diplomatic sources told the AFP news agency.

    ‘New silk road’

    Mirek Topolanek, the Czech prime minister, said the aim to open up a “southern corridor” for supplies was “not just a one-way street for pipelines.”

    He said: “We envisage this as a new silk road where we’ll see the flow of information, goods, people and energy in both ways.”

    Representatives from the United States, Russia and Ukraine also attended the summit as observers to the agreement.

    Dosya:Nabucco Gas Pipeline-tr.svg

    Iraq, which was also invited to the meeting, did not send any officials.

    The summit was called to help kick-start the Nabucco pipeline, which would link the EU to gas rich nations on and beyond the Caspian Sea, bypassing Russia and Ukraine.

    The pipeline, which once completed would stretch 3,300km from Turkey to Austria, could transport up to 31bn cubic metres of gas each year to western Europe.

    It is hoped that it will start pumping gas to Europe by 2014.

    The EU is keen to speed up the construction of the pipeline after a dispute between Russia and Ukraine in January over gas prices left large areas of Europe without  supplies of the resource for two weeks.