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  • Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High Level Visit to Moscow

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 128
    July 6, 2009 12:48 PM Age: 4 hrs
    Category: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Home Page, Turkey, Energy, Foreign Policy, Economics, Featured
    By: Saban Kardas
    Ankara has reportedly finally given the green light to the Nabucco project, and the intergovernmental agreement might be signed on July 13. When the news broke on the Russian deal with Azerbaijan (EDM, July 2), the Turkish media initially suggested it represented a lethal blow to Nabucco. Partly as a result of the Russian media’s manipulation, it was interpreted as a negative development to undermine the viability of Nabucco (www.nethaber.com, June 30).

    On July 1-2, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Moscow to meet his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov. Before his departure, Davutoglu said that Turkey was unconcerned about the gas deal between Moscow and Baku, and supported enhanced cooperation between its neighbors. Davutoglu maintained that growing regional cooperation, especially in energy, will benefit everyone in the region, (Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    Energy Minister Taner Yildiz made a similar point, arguing that the different projects are not alternatives and choosing one does not necessarily mean foregoing another. Yildiz added that the Russian-Azeri agreement would not affect Turkish-Azeri talks on the re-negotiation of the price for Turkey’s gas imports from Shah Deniz-I, and the country’s future imports from Shah Deniz-II (www.iha.com.tr, July 1).

    In Moscow, Davutoglu held talks on bilateral relations as well as regional security issues. During their joint press briefing, Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey and Russia have developed close economic, commercial, cultural and political ties, while both countries could solve their differences through dialogue. Davutoglu told reporters that, though the date was not set, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin would visit Turkey in the near future. Lavrov also underlined that the approaches of the two countries toward regional and global problems overlap.

    Asked about the possibility of Turkey’s cooperation with Russia in the South Stream project, Davutoglu said: “There are no limitations and barriers on Russian-Turkish cooperation. We decided to consider all projects, including alternative energy projects. Therefore, I want to express our readiness to collaborate with Russia on South Stream or other projects in a transparent manner.” Responding to the same question, Lavrov said that if Turkey decided to join the project, the Russian side would prepare the necessary groundwork. He added that the Turkish energy minister will discuss the details with the Russian officials (Anadolu Ajansi, July 2).

    Indeed, Yildiz also visited Moscow at the same time, at the invitation of the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin. As the co-chairs of the joint Turkish-Russian economic council, Yildiz and Sechin discussed bilateral economic relations. Yildiz raised issues relating to Turkish investors operating in Russia, particularly the “customs crisis.” Cooperation in energy issues occupied a large part of Yildiz’s itinerary. Energy related topics included the Russian offer to build Blue Stream II beneath the Black Sea, the current status of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant tender which was awarded to a Russian consortium, preliminary negotiations for additional gas purchases from Russia, and the South Stream project (Milliyet, July 1).

    Sechin told Yildiz that Moscow has studied the feasibility of various possible projects to diversify energy supplies to Europe. He claimed that South Stream outperforms Nabucco in terms of its efficiency and economic feasibility, and invited Turkey to join the project. In particular, he claimed that Russia has enough proven gas reserves to feed South Stream. Nonetheless, the Russian delegation did not elaborate any specific role envisaged for Turkey in South Stream, which in its current form would not cross Turkish territory.

    Yildiz repeated Ankara’s frequent argument that Nabucco and South Stream are not necessarily competitors: “This is a strategic package. It includes important projects that concern the two countries, our regions and our neighbors.” The Turkish government will evaluate all offers on the table, and choose the project that satisfies both countries’ interests, Yildiz added (Cihan, July 2).

    These developments led to speculation that Nabucco was in crisis (www.cnnturk.com, July 2). On his return to Turkey, Yildiz dismissed Russian media reports that Moscow asked Ankara to withdraw from Nabucco. Moreover, Yildiz said that the negotiations on Nabucco were well advanced and the parties were close to signing a deal, though avoiding specifying a date. He added that the talks were being carried out by the foreign ministry and prime minister’s office (Hurriyet, July 3).

    On the same day, European Commission officials announced that Turkey extended an invitation to its Nabucco partners to attend a ceremony in Ankara to sign the long-delayed intergovernmental agreement on July 13 (Anadolu Ajansi, July 3). The commission spokesman and Nabucco officials provided no further details as to whether Turkish demands were met to ensure its supply security, especially the controversial 15 percent clause, which had been stalling the negotiations (www.euobserver.com, July 3).

    Davutoglu flew from Moscow to Bucharest at the invitation of his Romanian counterpart Cristian Diaconescu, where he met the Romanian president and other officials. He discussed bilateral partnerships and regional cooperation in the Black Sea. After emphasizing the flourishing ties between the two countries, Davutoglu praised their cooperation in the context of the Nabucco project. Though he noted that Nabucco and South Stream were not mutually exclusive, Davutoglu maintained “Nabucco is a strategic project for us. This will continue to remain our main priority” (Cihan, July 3).

    Both Davutoglu and Yildiz declined to set a date but affirmed that the intergovernmental agreement will be signed soon. Sources close to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s office, however, reportedly confirmed that the government plans to hold a ceremony on July 13. If the schedule of the heads of state from the other Nabucco partners, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria and Hungary permits, then the agreement will be signed in Ankara (Hurriyet, July 4).

    What led to this turnaround in Turkey’s position and whether it secured concessions from its partners will be clarified if Ankara hosts the intergovernmental agreement next week. However, last week’s heavy diplomatic traffic, combined with Erdogan’s earlier contacts in Brussels, shows the extent to which Turkey wants to maximize its political and commercial gains by pitting the rival pipeline projects against each other.

    https://jamestown.org/program/ankara-approves-nabucco-following-high-level-visit-to-moscow/
  • Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation

    Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation

    Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 125
    June 30, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu attended the informal meeting of OSCE foreign ministers on the Greek island of Corfu on June 27-28. In addition to presenting Ankara’s views on the future of the European security architecture, Davutoglu also discussed Turkey’s bilateral relations on the sidelines of the meeting. The OSCE foreign ministers initiated the “Corfu Process” to discuss concrete steps that might be taken to manage European security challenges, and prepare the way for the next ministerial meeting in December. OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyanni, outlined the new security challenges facing the members. She said that in addition to traditional security issues, new threats and challenges continuously emerge. She added that the participants “concurred that the OSCE is a natural forum to anchor [an open, sustained, wide-ranging and inclusive dialogue on security], because it is the only regional organization bringing together all states from Vancouver to Vladivostok on an equal basis” (www.osce.org, June 28).

    These declarations for improving security cooperation aside, in concrete terms, the meeting served as an important test for whether the divisions created following the Russo-Georgian war could be overcome. The NATO-Russia dialogue received a serious blow due to increased tension after the war. Since then, Russia has expected the West to accept the “new realities” in the region, particularly the independence of the breakaway Georgian regions. Moreover, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has called for a treaty to launch a new Europe-wide security structure.

    Although NATO-Russia relations thawed gradually after Obama’s election, formal military cooperation remained suspended. The NATO-Russia Council met on the margins of the OSCE’s Corfu meeting, which marked the highest level contact since the Georgian war. The outgoing NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that the parties agreed to resume military cooperation, but noted that “fundamental differences of opinion” over Georgia remained. He added that the details of the cooperation will be fleshed out through further meetings. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, however, stressed that Moscow’s decision to recognize Georgia’s two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after the war is “irreversible” (www.rferl.org, June 27; www.greeknews.com, June 29).

    Davutoglu attended the OSCE discussions, and held several bilateral meetings with his counterparts and E.U. officials. Davutoglu expressed Turkey’s satisfaction with the resumption of NATO-Russia dialogue and the OSCE’s decision to develop mechanisms to deal with future security threats. He added that maintaining institutional ties is needed for the promotion of effective security cooperation (Cihan, June 29).

    Turkey’s bilateral relations with Armenia and Greece were also on Davutoglu’s agenda. Diplomatic observers speculated on whether Davutoglu would meet the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan. Although former Foreign Minister Ali Babacan met Nalbandyan several times during such multilateral meetings, Davutoglu has not held an official meeting with him since being appointed. He told reporters that he talked briefly with Nalbandyan, but his busy schedule did not allow time for an official meeting. Nonetheless, the Turkish-Armenian normalization process occupied an important part of Davutoglu’s agenda during his other contacts. He met the Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy Rey who is moderating the secret talks between Ankara and Yerevan, which resulted in the announcement of a roadmap for normalization (EDM, April 29). Rey also held a separate meeting with Nalbandyan. Since the announcement of the roadmap, however, Ankara has come under criticism for stalling the process in order to allay Baku’s concerns, and no concrete steps have since been taken towards normalization. Although this long silence raised fears that the dialogue might have prematurely ended, Swiss diplomatic sources reportedly told the Turkish daily Zaman that the parties had reached consensus, and the details of the roadmap might be announced soon (Zaman, June 29).

    Davutoglu also met his Greek counterpart Bakoyanni. Following the meeting, Davutoglu said that they had a very fruitful conversation and that the two sides agreed to “change Turkish-Greek relations from an area of risk into pursuing mutual interests through high-level contacts.” However, he added that differences of opinion between both countries remain deep rooted and cannot be resolved overnight. “It is essential that the parties appreciate each other’s positions and concerns,” he added (www.cnnturk.com, June 28). Greek media interpreted his attitude as maintaining Ankara’s stubborn position, and claimed that no common ground could be reached (Milliyet, June 29). Indeed, despite their ability to break the decades-old security dilemma, several issues continue to bedevil relations between Ankara and Athens, such as the Aegean disputes, Cyprus, concerns over illegal immigrants and the condition of minorities (EDM, June 22).

    Given its policy during the Russia-Georgia war and its flourishing ties with Russia, one might argue that Turkey is one of the few countries that wholeheartedly welcomed the resumption of NATO-Russia cooperation. Though disturbed by the Russian aggression last year, Turkey expressed openly its opposition to punitive NATO measures against Russia, and instead charted an independent course to balance its ties between the West and Moscow. This foreign policy approach even led to charges that Turkey might be drifting away from its traditional alliance commitments, which it vehemently refuted (EDM, August 27, 2008). Moreover, Turkey initiated the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform to bring a permanent solution to regional problems (EDM, September 2, 2008). Now that Russia and Turkey are seeking to mend fences, this new development removes an important source of tension in Ankara’s relations with the West.

    Moreover, in retrospect, Ankara might claim credit for its own policy of balancing and prioritizing its multidimensional security cooperation, during and in the aftermath of the Georgian crisis. Ankara’s new foreign policy approach prioritizes cooperative security to respond to traditional and non-conventional threats to regional and national security, an approach which is also shared by its military leadership (EDM, June 25). However, as the persistence of some disputes with its neighbors illustrate, it provides no magic bullet for the resolution of all disputes.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-welcomes-nato-russia-military-cooperation/
  • Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Poor Richard’s Report

    Over 300,001 readers
    My Mission: God has uniquely designed me to seek, write, and speak the truth as I see it. Preservation of one’s wealth while providing needful income is my primary goal in these unsettled times. I have been given the ability to evaluate, study, and interpret world and national events and their influence on the future of the financial markets. This gift allows me to meet the needs of individual and institution clients. I evaluate situations first on a fundamental basis then try to confirm on a technical basis. In the past it has been fairly successful.

    Sir Winston Churchill- Hansard, November 11, 1947
    “Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

    How true!
    My long time readers know that I have been upset over the policies going on in Washington. I was euphoric over Republican victories. That would soon turn to utter betrayal as if I had personally been violated. These self serving idiots increased their benefits while ours decreased. Greedy lobbyists stuffed their pockets with ill begotten gains from unsavory laws that protected rapacious players from botched derivatives that could be spawned world wide.
    Fear not, dear reader, for during panics leaders assume the mantel of justice. The fluff is out of the economy and it is now working at lower and more sustainable levels. It is onward and upward from here…slowly. The problem is that we are now riding in a WWII jeep and they can turn over quickly. Others, however, will slosh through the swamps and come out winners.
    The problem is that OP&R (Obama Pelosi & Reid) gave the stimulus money to the bureaucrats in Washington to spend, instead of to us.
    The stock market has a few years to go before it resumes its upward trend. However, don’t despair my friends, because on the bottom there are several “submarines” that in time will surface to become mighty aircraft carriers.
    Why am I becoming positive when every one else is finally so upset?
    This is a democracy- no matter who is President. Politicians are afraid of losing their power. Not money, but power. No bribes can forestall the loss of power. We could have an entirely new congress in 2010 made up of “independent” thinkers that could take control away from the President. Though, it would have to be veto proof. Now that would be a real positive change!
    I watched Dr. Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Fed, spar with various congressmen over the Bank of America and the Merrill Lynch deal. Everyone, except for a few on each side, was trying to get the other to say Ken Lewis (Chair of B of A) was a nincompoop (and a liar). It has become rather obvious to me, and to others, that Mr. Lewis was way in over his head and tried to get so big that he became “too big to fail”. This will be a continuing saga for the business journals and the “bad boy” image. I foresee many so-called prominent businessmen going to prison while others commit suicide. You might even find a congressman or two with them as the cracks in the floorboards open wider.
    Listening to Dr. Bernanke, I realized how many checks and balances there are in our government. Dr. Ben was giving straightforward, honest answers in clear sentences. Usually it was a simple yes or no. I loved it.
    The next positive event for me was reading an article in Bloomberg quoting Louis Gerstner, the worthwhile former Chairman of IBM.
    One of his positive comments was to combine the 16,000 or so school districts into 70 or 80. He says, “I could not have run IBM with 16,000 profit centers.”
    The next idea was the one that stirred all the fine memories of yesteryear. He proposed putting a CAPITAL GAINS TAX of 80% on short term trades. After six months it would drop to 60%. Securities held for 5 years would have no tax. This would stop all the greed and speculation that is going on today. Derivatives and sub prime would become dead meat and most of the discount brokerage houses would fall by the wayside.
    When it comes to finances we must have the strictest laws in the world with an easy way to enforce them. Easy money attracts slothful guttersnipes.
    So you see we have a lot of winners out there that will be heard. Some of them are just hot air, but I believe men like Mr. Gerstner are raising “trial Balloons” and must be taken seriously. It took the Congress almost 10 years to enact the laws and this time around I believe it could be done in 5 to 7 years. That depends on how fast the Congress is turned out and in.
    Today you do not need a lot of services throwing junk at you to become a successful long term investor. You don’t need a chart either, unless you can get hold of the point and figure chart that Dorsey Wright does.
    What you do need is common sense. Look around you. What are the necessary items for everyday use? What is the price of the stock? Selling below $15? Dividends?
    There was a man who, in 1937, bought 300 shares of Standard Oil of NJ for seven dollars. At the end of the year the broker suggested he take a profit at $21.00. He did. If he had held on to it he would have been a multi-millionaire. He would have owned thousands of shares of EXXON. That is why I am not a multimillionaire today. Looking back at it; if dad had sold just 100 shares he would have had his investment back, and he would still be wealthy even today.
    Another true story is about a wise lady, who when she received enough of her dividends to make an investment, she would first visit her banker and ask him what stock he liked. Then she would visit her broker and asked him what stock he liked. When they agreed she bought. The only one she did not buy was IBM. Her heirs are wealth even today.
    Then there is Sir John Templeton. The story about him is that after the Battle of Midway he walked into a brokerage house and plunked down $100,000 cash. (Today the cops would come.) He Told his broker to buy 100 shares of every stock on the American Stock Exchange that is selling at $5.00 or under and do not touch them until he gets back when the war is over. He amassed a small fortune that would soon become the Templeton Fund.
    I have hundreds of good stories like this that came out of the depression. Some successes were common sense while others were good investigative situations. None of these individuals invested to become rich overnight, but believed in the capital system of long term growth without any gimmicks or “funny money”.
    So when the investment waters become very muddy- it is time to explore the bottom to find those US Naval submarines that have the potential of becoming tomorrows super nuclear powered aircraft carriers. These should be considered INVESTMENTS not bets.

    Internet Tip:
    When you have a problem and you’re told to “call this number”. When the phone rings, the first thing you hear is that this conversation may be recorded for training purposes & Press one for English ……

    Well here is the tip- DO NOTHING. After a minute an operator will come on the line and take care of your problem – Cheerio!!!

    Richard C De Graff
    256 Ashford Road
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    This report has been prepared from original sources and data which we believe reliable but we make no representation to its accuracy or completeness. Coburn & Meredith Inc. its subsidiaries and or officers may from time to time acquire, hold, sell a position discussed in this publications, and we may act as principal for our own account or as agent for both the buyer and seller.

  • Can Erdogan Break the Stalemate in Turkish-E.U. Relations?

    Can Erdogan Break the Stalemate in Turkish-E.U. Relations?

    Can Erdogan Break the Stalemate in Turkish-E.U. Relations?

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 124
    June 29, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 25-26, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Brussels where he was presented an award for his contribution to peace. Reflecting on his efforts to revitalize Turkey’s European Union membership project, Erdogan delivered a speech on the issue and met E.U officials. He was accompanied by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and the chief negotiator for E.U. talks Egemen Bagis. The statements from both sides reflected the fundamental differences between Ankara and Brussels, in terms of their approaches to the causes of the stalemate in Turkish-E.U. relations and how to proceed.

    The Turkish government was severely criticized for backtracking on E.U-related domestic reforms after Brussels decided to launch the negotiations with Turkey in 2005. Last year, concerns grew that unless Ankara took drastic steps, Turkish-E.U. relations might reach deadlock. Amidst speculation that 2009 will be the “make or break” year, Erdogan sent strong signals that he was determined to accelerate the membership process. To this end, he appointed Bagis as the new chief negotiator (EDM, January 12), and visited Brussels (EDM, January 20).

    Despite various declarations of intent and high level contacts between Turkish and E.U. officials, so far, no major progress has been accomplished. On the contrary, the prospects of Turkey joining the E.U. appear to be diminishing, while the discussion is gaining ground on giving the country a special status that falls short of full membership.

    This stalemate has several related causes. On the European front, the leaders of France and Germany adopted a clear stand against Turkey’s full membership, and instead argued that it should be offered a more realistic alternative, such as a “privileged partnership” (EDM, May 13). Furthermore, during the recent European elections, representatives were elected to the European Parliament from the conservative and center-right parties. Many observers believe that, given these parties’ opposition to Turkey, the political environment in Europe has further turned against Turkey (EDM, June 10).

    In Ankara, however, the government has been preoccupied with domestic politics, as well as by pursuing controversial foreign policy initiatives. In the first quarter of the year the municipal elections and the discussions on how to tackle the global financial crisis diverted attention from the European agenda. Although the government has strived to refocus on constitutional change and accelerate the E.U. membership process, it failed largely as a result of its inability to build consensus with the opposition parties (EDM, April 1). The latest discussions on an alleged military document concerning plans to illegally change the government had significant repercussions for the E.U. membership process. It demonstrated the shortcomings of Turkish democracy, and generated an added impetus for the AKP to revitalize the E.U. reform agenda to normalize civil-military relations (EDM, June 23).

    Nonetheless, Erdogan’s statements during his recent trip show that his views on Europe remain unchanged. In that sense, the overall dynamics of this visit followed the pattern set in January. He preferred to criticize the Europeans for their mishandling of the accession process, while the latter reiterated their argument that Turkey had to reform its political system in order to comply with European norms.

    Erdogan openly criticized some member states’ efforts to stall the accession talks and questioned the sincerity of the Greek Cypriots over finding a lasting solution on the island. Commenting on the European elections, he raised his concerns about the growing populism within Europe. He expressed uneasiness with European politicians’ questioning Turkey’s future membership for short-term political gains. “We want Europeans to resist such inconsistent policies [i.e., openly questioning Turkey’s full membership]. These fluctuating [views] curb Turkey’s enthusiasm to join the E.U. We expect Europe to fulfill its promises to us. The rules cannot be changed in the middle of the game.” Erdogan also maintained that “Europe cannot keep pace with Turkey’s reform performance. We expect the E.U. to accelerate the process [i.e., more chapters should opened be for negotiation]” (Cihan, June 26).

    After his meeting with the E.U. Commissioner for Enlargement Oli Rehn, Davutoglu emphasized that the growing number of high-level visits reflected Ankara’s eagerness for membership, and that Turkey will accelerate the process. “We are aware of our responsibilities and requirements in terms of the reforms,” Davutoglu added. Rehn, however, ruled out any delay in membership talks being caused by the E.U.’s own shortcomings, and stressed that Turkey has to take “concrete” steps and maintain its commitment to reform (Hurriyet, June 26).

    The fate of the Turkish-E.U. process appears to hinge on whether the two sides can allay each other’s concerns. For Brussels two issues remain of vital importance: whether the Turkish government will implement constitution reforms and if Ankara will change its attitude toward the Greek Cypriots. Ankara’s major concerns are its perceptions that it is being treated unfairly due to some E.U. member states’ overtly anti-Turkish position, and that its achievements are unacknowledged as a result. Moreover, the slow pace of the accession talks and the growing salience of the “privileged partnership” discussions undermine Turkey’s trust in the E.U.

    However justified he might be in his criticism of the Europeans, eventually it will be up to Erdogan to break this stalemate. If he is serious about revitalizing the E.U. membership process, he needs to acknowledge that its current impasse is his own making, whether knowingly or not. He must abandon his complacency and act decisively on the Cyprus issue, similar to his revisionist foreign policy vision prior to 2005. Erdogan has to “talk to” the opposition parties and build domestic consensus to facilitate political reform. Then, he might satisfy both the E.U.’s expectations and strengthen the hands of pro-Turkey groups within the E.U, thus mitigating the intra-E.U. opposition to Turkey.

    https://jamestown.org/program/can-erdogan-break-the-stalemate-in-turkish-e-u-relations/

  • Turkish Army holds Seminar for NATO Members and Partners

    Turkish Army holds Seminar for NATO Members and Partners

    Turkish Army holds Seminar for NATO Members and Partners

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 122
    June 25, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 22-23, the Turkish army organized the tenth Silk Road General/Admiral seminar in Istanbul, which brought together around 119 military officers from NATO countries, Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, and the members of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The theme of this year’s seminar was cooperation between NATO and its partners. However, the Turkish media preferred to highlight the Chief of the Staff General Ilker Basbug’s remarks in its coverage of the event, which provided important clues concerning the military’s perceptions of the country’s security policies and its efforts to eliminate the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

    As an active member of the transatlantic Alliance, Turkey has played a leading role in NATO’s post-cold war transformation. Through the PfP training center in Ankara, established in 1998 -one of the first examples of its kind- Turkey has organized several training programs and seminars for officers from NATO and its partner countries. These activities played a major role in the integration of several Eurasian, Balkan and Mediterranean nations into the broader transatlantic security architecture. Launched in 2000, the “Silk Road Flag Officers Seminars” is one of those initiatives, whose purpose is “to familiarize participants with NATO’s global missions and developing role in collective security and the European security architecture” (www.bioem.tsk.tr).

    In his opening address, Basbug laid out Turkey’s views on the Alliance. He described NATO as a “dynamic and operational organization” and maintained that it performs three vital functions: ensuring the collective security of its members, reinforcing the transatlantic link, and providing a security umbrella so that members can focus their attention on common security challenges. He stressed that Turkey wants to see NATO as the primary political and military institution in the transatlantic community, and considers it as a key pillar of Turkish security policy. Basbug contended that “Turkey is not only a country that contributes to NATO. But it has also provided vital leadership, [through its lead role in NATO operations]” (Anadolu Ajansi, June 22).

    Basbug discussed the transformation of the global security environment and its implications for NATO. He argued that “in today’s chaotic world, risks and threats cannot be handled with military instruments alone. In order to eradicate such threats, it is of utmost importance that the international community utilize the elements of both military and civilian power,” and develop instruments for conflict prevention. He maintained that, in addition to performing its existing strategic and operational tasks, NATO is under pressure to take on new missions and responsibilities in order to respond to newly emerging threats. He identified two challenges before the transatlantic community: NATO’s internal transformation and its enlargement. First, Basbug noted that Turkey supports NATO’s efforts for restructuring itself to adjust to new conditions. He expressed his hope that comprehensive security cooperation could be developed between NATO and other international organizations, non-NATO countries and NGO’s.

    In addition, Basbug discussed Turkey’s views on NATO enlargement. He reiterated Ankara’s position that NATO membership should be open to all European democracies that can fulfill the requirements, and added that Turkey will continue to support NATO’s open door policy because it contributes to the realization of “the idea of a free and united Europe.” He emphasized that Macedonia should also be given an opportunity to gain membership. Given its historical ties, Turkey considers this Balkan country as its ally, and supports its bid for joining NATO.

    The Deputy Chief of the General Staff Hasan Igsiz also addressed the closing session of the seminar. He emphasized the need to develop joint positions against common threats to global security and expressed Turkey’s support for NATO’s open door policy. Igsiz also called on the transatlantic community to resolve the differences of interpretation encountered in the existing agreements on NATO-E.U. cooperation (Anadolu Ajansi, June 23). Given its unique position as a non-E.U. NATO member, and the troubled course of Turkish-E.U. relations, Turkey occasionally comes under criticism for using its position in NATO as a bargaining chip and complicating NATO-E.U. coordination (EDM, February 9).

    Basbug devoted the rest of his speech to terrorism, which he described as the most serious asymmetric threat affecting the international community. He stressed that a proper counter-terrorism strategy should employ both military and non-military instruments. Above all, it should be human-oriented and be based on “winning hearts and minds.” These views are similar to what he has advocated in domestic politics for some time (EDM, April 15).

    Moreover, he maintained that, at the international level, this threat can only be addressed through the collective efforts of all nations. Basbug called on NATO members to “minimize the differences in their positions and policies, and take a common stance in this struggle.” Here, Basbug was implicitly voicing Turkey’s complaint that some NATO members were not sensitive to Turkey’s struggle against the PKK. Ankara argues that the complacency of some European countries toward the activities of the PKK in Europe undermines the spirit of solidarity within the Alliance. Therefore, Basbug sent a warning by saying: “There is no guarantee that those countries unaffected by terrorism today will not be targeted tomorrow.”

    Basbug recalled Turkey’s decades old struggle against the PKK, and maintained that the country will pursue a comprehensive approach in its own fight that considers all aspects of the issue. Nonetheless, he added that “it is futile to think that economic and socio-cultural measures alone might end terrorism, while terrorist groups remain armed. Therefore, we are determined to fight against the terrorist group [the PKK] until it is completely disbanded and [the terrorists] lay down their arms” (www.tgrthaber.com, June 22).

    These remarks received widespread attention within the Turkish media. President Abdullah Gul has been pushing for a new process to address the Kurdish issue through dialogue, and possibly a general amnesty for PKK militants (EDM, May 7, 19). Gul had argued that a consensus had emerged among the state institutions and he raised expectations for a breakthrough. Basbug’s remarks, however, show that the Turkish political and security elite are far from sharing a common position, and it may not be realistic to expect the “historic solution” as advocated by Gul.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-army-holds-seminar-for-nato-members-and-partners/
  • Turkish Government and Opposition Remain Divided over Foreign Policy

    Turkish Government and Opposition Remain Divided over Foreign Policy

    Turkish Government and Opposition Remain Divided over Foreign Policy

     

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 121
    June 24, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 23, the Turkish Parliament approved a motion that will authorize the government to renew the term of the Turkish peacekeeping force contributing to the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), for one more year, effective from September 5. The parliamentary discussions preceding the vote demonstrate that differences remain between the governing AKP and the opposition parties in regards to their approaches to foreign policy.

    Reflecting its growing involvement in Middle Eastern politics, Turkey played an active role during the 2006 summer war between Israel and Hezbollah. To pacify Lebanon following the Israeli military strikes, the U.N. Security Council enhanced the mandate of UNIFIL in August 2006 to undertake additional tasks, including monitoring the cessation of hostilities and helping the Lebanese armed forces to expand its authority in the south (www.unifil.unmissions.org).

    European nations expressed an interest in fielding a peacekeeping force to prevent the destabilization of the entire region. Given the Turkish army’s experience in peacekeeping operations, and Turkey’s ties to both Israel and Arab nations, there emerged an expectation that Turkey could play a central role in this initiative. The participation of Turkey as a Muslim nation was seen as necessary in order to prevent the impression that the international force was seeking to impose a “Western” plan. It was even suggested that Turkey could lead the international force, on its own or jointly with France. Although Israel reportedly favored this idea, Hezbollah sources did not welcome it (Yeni Safak, June 25, 2006).

    Moreover, Turkish public opinion was strongly opposed to the participation of Turkish soldiers in such a controversial mission. Since this international force was perceived as a measure to contain Hezbollah, there were concerns that the Turkish forces might be forced to engage in armed conflict with Hezbollah militants, which might have complicated Turkey’s friendly relations with Arab states. Given the growing anti-American sentiments within Turkish society, this force was portrayed as an occupation force acting on behalf of Israel (Yeni Asya, August 14, 2006). Despite this domestic opposition, the government preferred to cooperate with the international community. It conducted a careful risk analysis, and the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul consulted other regional actors and the major political factions in Lebanon to gauge their reactions to any military deployment (Zaman, August 15, 2006; Aksam, September 3, 2006).

    As a compromise solution, Ankara agreed to contribute to the UNIFIL with non-combat units, and stressed that it would not participate in the demilitarization of Hezbollah. The Turkish Parliament approved the deployment in September 2006, following intense discussions. The opposition parties voted against the motion, but given its parliamentary majority, the AKP was able to obtain the necessary authorization (Turkiye, September 6, 2006). The Turkish contingent was deployed to Lebanon in October 2006 (Sabah, October 12, 2006), and the mandate of the force was renewed in 2007 and 2008. The Turkish armed forces have contributed patrol boats to the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force and a military engineering company to assist the reconstruction efforts in Lebanon (www.tsk.tr; www.unifil.unmissions.org).

    As the mandate of the Turkish contingent expires in September, the government forwarded a motion to the parliament seeking an extension. Since the AKP’s recent foreign policy initiatives have encountered strong resistance from opposition parties, the fate of the motion was unclear. In another recent parliamentary debate, the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), supported by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), literally waged a “war of attrition” to prevent the passage of a bill concerning mine clearance on the Turkish-Syrian border. The bill eventually passed after these delays, only after the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan pressured the deputies from his party (EDM, May 21, 29, June 5).

    No major discussions emerged over the governmental motion extending the mandate of the Turkish contingent, which might be related to its forces not encountering any serious issues thus far. The CHP continued to approach the UNIFIL from a skeptical perspective. The CHP speaker maintained that the UNIFIL’s mission is not limited to the provision of humanitarian services and ensuring regional stability alone. Rather, its purpose is to provide conditions for a future military operation to “eliminate Hezbollah and… act as a shield to protect Israel in the event of such an operation.” He also maintained that despite U.S. President Barack Obama’s rhetoric on mending fences with Turkey, he has not been sensitive to Turkey’s interests in the Middle East, most importantly regarding the PKK issue. The MHP speaker praised the achievements of the Turkish force, but restated his criticism of the policies pursued by other international actors toward the Middle East. The opposition parties failed to oppose the government’s motion, but demanded that it act more assertively to protect Turkish interests vis-à-vis international actors -in particular the United States. In his address to parliament, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey’s contributions to Lebanon has to be discussed in the context of its new strategy of contributing to global and regional peace. Davutoglu maintained that, both through its soft power and military capabilities, “Turkey is playing an order instituting role” in its region (www.tbmm.gov.tr, June 23).

    Nonetheless, the parliamentary discussions highlighted the underlying divisions between the AKP and the opposition parties, over their positions on how to harmonize Turkey’s regional policies with those of other global actors. The opposition maintains a deep-rooted skepticism toward the agendas of international actors in the Middle East. In contrast, the AKP considers Turkey’s cooperation with the international institutions and Western nations as complementary to its own regional policies. As the AKP strives to promote the country’s regional power status, it triggers suspicions among some circles in the West that view this new policy as a departure from Turkey’s Western orientation. However, on the domestic front, the AKP’s concern not to challenge the interests of international actors, exposes it to criticism for failing to adequately protect its national interests. How Davutoglu manages this “double-challenge,” might prove a major test of his skills as a geostrategist.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-government-and-opposition-remain-divided-over-foreign-policy/