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  • Erdogan Avoids Confrontation with the Military over Alleged Plot

    Erdogan Avoids Confrontation with the Military over Alleged Plot

    Erdogan Avoids Confrontation with the Military over Alleged Plot

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 118
    June 19, 2009 02:58 PM
    By: Saban Kardas
    Since the publication of a document, allegedly prepared by Colonel, Dursun Cicek, outlining a plan to undermine the governing AKP and the Gulen movement last week, Turkish domestic politics has focused on the future of civil-military relations (EDM, June 15). Nonetheless, fears over a split between the government and the military did not transpire, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has avoided such a dangerous confrontation. Instead of pursuing punitive action against the military authorities, Erdogan has demonstrated restraint and instead referred the matter to the courts.

    On June 15, the chief military prosecutor said that the allegations were being investigated. Based on a preliminary study of evidence, the prosecutor reached an opinion that the document was not prepared by any unit within the headquarters of the General Staff. If the authenticity of the document could be established, all personnel involved will be brought to justice, the statement added (Anadolu Ajansi, June 16).

    The office of the General Staff also released a press statement that criticized “the written and verbal comments and declarations targeting the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), both openly and implicitly, on the assumption that the allegations are true.” It called on everyone to refrain from reaching any premature conclusion on the allegations before the legal inquiry has reached its judgment (www.tsk.tr, June 15).

    Pro-government and pro-Gulen media outlets labeled the action plan as a blatant attempt by the military to interfere with the jurisdiction of civil politics. They did not find the military authorities’ claims about the authenticity of the document credible, and questioned how the prosecutor might have formed an “opinion” on a document without having seen it. More importantly, in their view, despite the steps taken toward democratization, the existence of such a plan within the military was a grave development. They maintained that unless the government acts decisively against this threat, its democratization efforts will be damaged. They believe, if necessary, the government should ask for the resignation of the either the chief of the General Staff or his deputy who oversee the department that allegedly prepared the report (Yeni Safak, Zaman, June 16).

    The Chief of the General Staff General Ilker Basbug gave an interview to Hurriyet in which he responded to the growing criticism of the Turkish military. He reiterated that the military prosecutor was working on the case and his headquarters’ additional investigation had revealed that there was no concrete evidence linking the military to the document. When asked “was such an order [for the preparation of the document] issued by the military command?” Basbug responded “I even consider this question an insult. Such an order was never given.” He said he will take all measures necessary, if the alleged source of the document is proven, but added that he opposed referring the case to the civil courts (Hurriyet, June 16).

    In this context, curiously the AKP’s reaction was expected. When the allegations first emerged, Erdogan promised to defend democracy and take any necessary legal action. On June 16, he met Basbug to discuss these developments. Recently, both leaders had agreed to form a new consultation mechanism and hold weekly meetings every Thursday (Radikal, January 22). No statement was issued following this meeting, but during his address to the AKP’s parliamentary group later the same day, Erdogan insisted that the state institutions had acted in close coordination. He praised the handling of the case by the General Staff, saying that it acted “in a responsible and sensitive manner.” He called on the military and civil courts to conclude their investigations promptly (Anadolu Ajansi, June 16).

    The AKP filed a criminal complaint against the plan with the Ankara Public Prosecutor’s Office. The lawsuit defined those involved in alleged plots against the AKP and the government, as engaging in illegal activities. The AKP described such activities as unacceptable, and requested an immediate investigation (Cihan, June 16).

    The AKP’s lawsuit appears to be based on the assumption that the document is genuine, and consequently the discussions have focused on the forensic investigation into its authenticity. However, reports in the Turkish media demonstrate how deeply politically divisive the issue has become. Newspaper headlines on June 17 illustrated the extent of these divisions. Star, which is supportive of the government, insisted that the document was uncovered as part of the Ergenekon investigation and was true, while Haberturk, which is more critical of the government, questioned its authenticity.

    The Gendarmerie criminal investigation unit has allegedly completed its examination of the document, which hinges on whether the signature belongs to Colonel Cicek. Although the forensic report was not released, newspapers speculate over its possible content. Whereas Haberturk claimed that it is “99 percent certain” that the document was forged, Yeni Safak and Star maintained that according to a preliminary investigation there is “90 percent certainty” that the signature belonged to the Turkish colonel. Other papers alleged that he might have used different signatures, which could further complicate the investigation (Sabah, Aksam, June 19).

    The Zaman daily, close to the Gulen movement, questions this narrow focus on the authenticity of the document, and maintains that it cannot address public concern surrounding the accusations. Zaman was especially critical of efforts to transfer the investigation to the military courts. Citing similar instances in the past, Zaman claims that it might be used to promote a military cover up. It called for a more comprehensive parliamentary investigation into the allegations (Zaman, June 19).

    Nonetheless, Erdogan has refused to turn this case into an open confrontation with the military, and he remains committed to avoiding such conflict. Turkish domestic politics is increasingly conducted around controversial legal cases. Yet, in a political system as divided as Turkey’s, trust in the court system is lacking -and far from clarifying the allegations, the court might perpetuate existing divisions.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-avoids-confrontation-with-the-military-over-alleged-plot/
  • MANY SCHOLARS CHALLENGE THE ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE

    MANY SCHOLARS CHALLENGE THE ALLEGATIONS OF GENOCIDE

    Part I

    I find it important to mirror this work here to help truth-seekers gain one more access the information which is denied them by aggressive Armenian falsifiers, their usually anti-Turkish sympathizers, and other thinly veiled Turk-haters. Hate-based-propaganda and intimidation should not be allowed to replace honest scholarship and reasoned debate.

    Nothing less than the freedom of speech of those who hold contra-genocide views are at stake. Tools most used to advance censorship of contra-genocide views are hearsay, forgeries, harassment, political resolutions, editorial freedom, and consensus, among others. The key to resolving this controversy is more knowledge as in more honest research, more truthful education, and more freedom to debate… not less.

    Those scholars who take Armenian claims at face value urgently need to ponder these simple questions:

    1) How can one study a country’s history without reseraching that country’s archives? Can one study China’s history without using Chinese archives? Or Russia’s past without using Russian documents? Or America’s history without researching American records? Or Ottoman Empire’s past without using Ottoman archives? Why were the Ottoman archives almost never used in Armenian arguments and claims? Are language barriers, bureaucratic hurdles, cost, or others convincing enough excuses in scholarly studies that span a over decades or even centuries? Or is it instant gratification that these (genocide) scholars who ignore Turkihs archives really seek, not the whole truth?

    2) How can one study a controversy by confining one’s views to one side? Can you argue that only one side of say, the abortion issue, is absolutely correct, flalwless, and worthy of knowing, and that the other side should be totally ignored and even censored? How about gun control? And immigration? taxes? Iraq War? Gay rights? and many other controversial issues? Can one be confined, or asked to confine, to only one side of the debate and categorically dismiss forever the other side? Can this ever be made into a policy as it is attempted in the Turkish-Armenian conflcit and controversy? Where does the freedom of speech come into play here? If I, as an individual who holds a contra-genocide view, am slandered, intimidated, harrassed and even threatened for my views by some “opinion thugs” and often censored by “consensus mobs”, then is not this a blatant attack and destrcution of my constitutional right to freedom of speech? Does consensus make it truthful? Does (political) might make right?

    3) Why do those genocide scholars who love to get on their high horses and preach good morals to others, fail to scream murder in the face of that terrible human tragedy in Azerbaijan that victimized a million Azeri women and children in Karabagh and western Azerbaijan? Is it because the perpetrator of this inhumanity is Armenia, their client state? And the Armenians, their paymasters?

    4) If the study of genocide is designed to teach humans how to recognize, avoid, and fight back against new genocides, then why do these genocide scholars not take their client, Armenian and Armenians, to task about the genocide in Khodjaly on 19 February 1992? Since a genocide verdict by a competent tribunal (as the 1948 UN Convention requires) does not exist, yet, for consistency, let me call it man’s inhumanity to man and pogrom. The question is why did all the genocide study fail to stop Armenia from committing one between 1992-1994? Can you see the heart wrenching irony here?

    Here is what honest scholars and historians say about the bogus Armenian genocide:

    ***

    “ Ottoman Armenian tragedy is a genuine historic controversy. Many reputable scholars challenge the conventional, one-sided anti-Turkish narrative and / or refrain from alleging the crime of genocide. These Are Their Words ( https://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2009/06/2889-ottoman-armenian-tragedy-is.html )

    BACKGROUND – WAR AND IMPERIAL COLLAPSE

    The collapse of the Ottoman Empire dramatically rearranged the map of a vast region. What was once a sprawling, multi-ethnic empire splintered into more than two-dozen new nations, from the Balkans to the Caucasus to the Arabian peninsula. Across the surface of these lands unfolded a profound human tragedy. Nearly incessant war crippled the Ottoman economy. It left towns devoid of men to care for households or to tend crops. Military requisitions drained the countryside of livestock and many of the labor-saving implements of daily life. Disease ran rampant and famine struck many.

    VAST POPULATION MOVEMENTS

    As new states coalesced, large population masses streamed across the landscape, some fleeing the path of war, some seeking new lives among ethnic brethren or co-religionists, some having suffered expulsion, and some obeying negotiated population exchanges. Two such major movements were (a) the flight of Muslim refugees from newly-established Christian states in Balkans and the Caucasus into what would become modern Turkey during the period roughly between 1821 and 1922, and (b) the relocation of much of the Ottoman Armenian population from the war zone of eastern Anatolia into Ottoman domains in Syria, mainly in 1915-16.

    A GENUINE HISTORIC CONTROVERSY

    History records the enormous human suffering from both of these events: Perhaps 5.5 million Muslims, mostly Turks, died as refugees or were killed in the years immediately preceding and during World War I, as well as through the formative years of the Republic of Turkey. And certainly hundreds of thousands of Armenians died during the Armenian Revolt and the relocations consequently ordered by the Ottoman government. Scholars on the Ottoman Empire continue to examine the details and causes of these twin tragedies. What they have uncovered is not a singular tale of Christian woe, but rather a complex story that, if presented as evidence, would make it highly unlikely that a genocide charge could be sustained against the Ottoman government or its successor before a neutral arbiter. Thus, whether the tragic suffering of the Ottoman Armenians meets the definition of the crime of genocide as provided by the United Nations Genocide Convention (see appendix 1) remains a genuine historic controversy. Moreover, the notion that the one-sided Armenian narrative is settled history must be utterly rejected so that researchers will feel free to delve into the details of these contested events.

    QUESTIONS CONSIDERED

    Among the work of the scholars below, many of whom are Ottoman history experts, are considerations of the following questions:

    * Is the genocide label, which is so vigorously promoted by Armenian advocacy organizations appropriate?

    * Did the Ottoman government during World War I possess the requisite intent described by the U.N. Genocide Convention, to destroy the Armenians?

    * What was the Armenian Revolt (see appendix 2) and how did it impact the Ottoman government’s decision to relocate Armenian civilians from eastern Anatolia?

    * What was the ultimate toll upon the Armenian population? And how many deaths could be attributed to the various causes: inter-communal warfare, starvation, exposure, massacre, disease, etc.?

    * What was the ultimate toll upon the Ottoman Muslim population embroiled in these same events? And how many deaths can be attributed to the same causes?

    Their work establishes a better basis upon which to address historic grievances than the one-sided narrative most often provided in media accounts and by Armenian lobbyists and their advocates. In effect, these scholars provide the oft-ignored historical context, which is critical to any explanation of the shared past of the Turkish and Armenian peoples.

    At a minimum, the list below demonstrates that in fact, there exists no common agreement that the genocide label is appropriate and that, contrary to assertions made by Armenian lobby groups, the details of the historic narrative remain open to further study and interpretation.

    THE IMPACT OF PHYSICAL AND ACADEMIC INTIMIDATION

    Sadly, this list likely under-represents the number of scholars who would challenge the conventional wisdom on the Armenian tragedy. Those who write from a contra-genocide perspective have had to do so under extraordinary risk. Merely because of something he wrote, the home Prof. Stanford Shaw of U.C.L.A. was firebombed. Death threats have been received by Justin McCarthy and his family.

    The university press that published Guenter Lewy’s latest work was harassed by two Armenian scholars. (see appendix 3.)

    The University of Southern California in 2006 buckled to the vociferous protest of an Armenian pressure group and canceled a symposium by two former Turkish diplomats.

    Meanwhile, foreign nations such as France and Switzerland have rendered it against the law even to hold the contra-genocide viewpoint. Princeton University’s Bernard Lewis was famously fined by a French court in 1995 for such an “offense.”

    And, the Armenian terrorist organizations ASALA and JCAG carried out no fewer than 73 acts of terrorism in North America alone, killing 16 people. Around the world, Armenian terrorists killed at least 50 more people, mostly Turkish diplomat murdered in planned assassinations and injured over 500, all in the name of “genocide recognition.”

    In short, the chilling effect this has had on free discussion and open debate on the history of the late Ottoman Empire has been genuine and severe, lowering a curtain of fear over the consideration of this important era of world history.

    ADDITIONS AND SUBTRACTIONS

    Our aim is to evaluate as closely as possible each name on the list based on the published statements or writings of each scholar that are readily available. We welcome visitor suggestions for additions to the list. And likewise, if you believe that a particular name ought not be on the list, please let us know. Our goal is to continue to openly discuss and debate the details of history and the genocide allegation. For feedback, please contact info at tc-america.org.

    Whether the tragic suffering of the Ottoman Armenians meets the definition of the crime of genocide as provided by the United Nations Genocide Convention [web] remains a genuine historic controversy. The notion that the one-sided Armenian narrative is settled history does not reflect the truth and must be utterly rejected.

    The work of the following scholars demonstrates that there exists no common agreement that the genocide label is appropriate and that, contrary to assertions made by Armenian lobby groups, the historic narrative of this painful period in Ottoman-Armenian relations remains open to further study and interpretation. Furthermore, the work by the leading historians on the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East provides the oft-ignored historical context without which any explanation of the shared past of the Turkish and Armenian peoples is simply impossible.

    Our aim is to evaluate as closely as possible each name on the list based on the published statements or writings of each scholar that are readily available. Our goal is to continue to openly discuss and debate the details of history and the genocide allegation. For feedback, please contact info at tc-america.org

    ***

    SCHOLARS

    * Arend Jan Boekestijn
    * Mary Schaeffer Conroy
    * Youssef Courbage
    * Paul Dumont
    * Bertil Duner
    * Gwynne Dyer
    * Edward J. Erickson
    * Philippe Fargues
    * Michael M. Gunter
    * Paul Henze
    * Eberhard Jäckel
    * Firuz Kazemzadeh
    * Yitzchak Kerem
    * William L. Langer
    * Bernard Lewis
    * Guenter Lewy
    * Heath W. Lowry
    * Andrew Mango
    * Robert Mantran
    * Michael E. Meeker
    * Justin McCarthy
    * Hikmet Ozdemir
    * Stephen Pope
    * Michael Radu
    * Jeremy Salt
    * Stanford Shaw
    * Norman Stone
    * Hew Strachan
    * Elizabeth-Anne Wheal
    * Brian G. Williams
    * Gilles Veinstein
    * Malcolm Yapp
    * Thierry Zarcone
    * Robert F. Zeidner

    ***

    * AREND JAN BOEKESTIJN
    Lecturer in history of international relations, History Department at Utrecht University, Netherlands.

    Major Publications

    * Economic integration and the preservation of post-war consensus in the Benelux countries, (1993) * Other articles (not in English) Source: Excerpted from Turkey, the World and the Armenian Question (see appendix 4)

    “Citizens and politicians living in Western Europe tend to take the high moral ground on issues where they are not themselves directly involved. This is a strategy that runs the risk of applying double standards. It is all very nice to condemn the so-called Armenian genocide by the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the last century; but what about the national sins of one’s own country? In addition to the holocaust, Germany committed genocide against the Herero tribe in then Southwest Africa; France slaughtered 200.000 Muslims in Algeria during 1954-1962, and what about King Leopold’s Ghost in the Belgian Congo? The list is much longer. Turks do not have a monopoly on human deficit.”

    “A number of governments and national parliaments ask Turkey that it recognize Armenia’s claims of genocide. These governments include France, Belgium, Russia, Lebanon, Uruguay, Switzerland, Greece, and Canada. The European Parliament and a number of U.S. states have also recognized the slaughtering of Ottoman Armenians as stemming from a systematic policy of extermination. Turkey fears that the U.S. Congress may soon follow. Recently, the German Parliament adopted a resolution in which the word genocide was not used but still called on the Turks to confront their past.”

    “Did the Ottoman Turks really commit genocide? And, is the Turkish government handling this sensitive issue well?

    In article 2 of the present United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948); genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group:

    (a) Killing members of the group;
    (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
    (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
    (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
    (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

    The problem in identifying whether genocide was committed is the clause: in whole or in part. In part, implies that most wars involve an element of genocide. Genocide only has real meaning if a government intends to destroy an entire group of human beings. The Armenian side claims that the Ottoman government at the highest level had the intention to kill Armenians. So far, there is no such proof in the Ottoman Archives.”

    “Today, the German Holocaust of the Jewish population is widely compared to that of the Armenian massacre. However there are important differences between the two.

    First, Jews had done nothing wrong. They were just there and formed the basis of Hitler’s blatant racism. There is little doubt that the Turks overreacted to the Armenian challenge, but some Armenians did collaborate with the Russian enemy and some of them were involved in guerrilla like activities behind Ottoman defensive lines. This does not justify the Turkish position, but it is wrong to portray the Armenians as completely innocent.

    Second, in Hitler’s Germany, those in power knew what the Nazi’s were doing with the Jews. Most of them chose to support his policies. In Turkey, not all the members of the Turkish government were aware that some of them were using the deportations as an instrument of ethnic cleansing. When they discovered this, they tried to punish the perpetrators. Unfortunately, some of the perpetrators remained in power or acquired even higher positions.

    Third, there was no pre-planned genocide in Turkey, as in the case with the holocaust. No pre-1914 Ottoman government could have had foreknowledge of the outbreak of the First World War or the circumstances under which the deportations would be accomplished. Mainstream Ottoman politics included normal Armenian participation until war began. There is not only no evidence that the CUP government deliberately planned for genocide before 1914, it is also highly unlikely. It would suggest that it intended to carry out the mass murder of an ethnic group something for which there was no precedent in modern history. Moreover, if there had been plans and these were leaked out, intense international opposition possibly leading to an invasion of the Ottoman Empire by other European Powers would have been the result. Viewed in this light, it seems most implausible that the genocide of the Armenians was preplanned.

    Fourth, the historians who question the intention of the Turks to commit genocide are often excellent historians like Bernard Lewis and Gilles Veinstein with some documentary evidence on their side. They are not mendacious anti-Semitic crackpots who enunciate Holocaust denial.

    And lastly, the CUP never adopted an all-embracing secular, universalistic, quasi-messianic ideology in the style of Nazism and Communism. It remained rooted in traditional (although modernizing) nationalism and a vision of an Islamified Turkey. The events can be read as a botched, wartime panic, overreaction, with premeditation most unlikely and the scale of killings arguably exaggerated.

    Let us try to put these qualifications into perspective. Even if the Armenian massacre cannot be compared to the German Holocaust, even if not all members of the CUP government knew that some of their colleagues were bent on solving the Eastern question once and for all, the fact remains that between 600.000 and 900.000 Armenians died of murder, starvation, and exhaustion.”

    ***

    MARY SCHAEFFER CONROY
    Professor of Russian history at Colorado University, Denver (since 1995).

    Major Publications

    * Peter Arkad’evich Stolypin: Practical Politics in Late Tsarist Russia, Boulder: Westview Press, 1977.

    * Women Pharmacists in Late Imperial Russia. in Linda Edmondson, ed. , Women & Society in Russia & The Soviet Union, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 48-76.

    * In Health & In Sickness: Pharmacy, Pharmacists & the Pharmaceutical Industry in Late Imperial, Early Soviet Russia, Dist. Columbia University Press, 1994.

    * Emerging Democracy in Late Imperial Russia, Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 1998 (edition).

    * The Russian Pharmaceutical Industry in the Late Imperial-Early Soviet Period,” in Politics and Society Under the Bolsheviks, Kevin McDermott and John Morison, eds., Basingstoke: MacMillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999, pp. 13-36.

    * The Soviet Pharmaceutical Business during Its First Two Decades (1917–1937), New York: Peter Lang, 2006.

    * Medicines for the Soviet Masses during World War II, University Press of America, 2008.

    Relevant Publications

    * Review of Vahakn N. Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict, The Social Science Journal, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 481-483. Source: Review of Vahakn N. Dadrian, Warrant for Genocide: Key Elements of Turko-Armenian Conflict, The Social Science Journal, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 481-483

    “Dadrian claims that Armenians were more oppressed than these groups because they were not allowed to bear arms and had no outside protectors. Furthermore, the Ottoman government allowed Kurds and Islamic migrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus to harass Armenians. His argument, however, is marred by inconsistency and ambiguity. He notes, for instance, the appointment of Armenians to central and local government posts in 1876, periodically refers to the Armenian diaspora, and admits that Armenian merchants, upper echelons of the Armenian clergy and ‘conservative’ Armenians preferred Ottoman rule to Russian (Russia ruled a slice of Armenia following the 1827-1828 Russo-Turkish War) because they believed this would better preserve Armenian identity.

    Indeed, Armenian deputies in the Ottoman Parliament spoke out against Russia. The author tells us nothing, however, about the conditions within the Ottoman Empire which produced the Armenian elites, nor does he elaborate on these issues. Similarly, Dadrian mentions Armenian revolutionaries, the Huntchaks and the Dashnaks, some of whom engaged in raids on the Ottoman Bank in the mid-1890s, and he concedes that their numbers were small and that the bulk of Armenians repudiated them. However, he does not develop the impact these revolutionaries may have had on Ottoman government policies, particularly the reluctance to let Armenians bear arms. Further, Dadrian does not identify the Huntchaks as Marxists nor the Dashnaks as extreme nationalists. In chapter 10, Dadrian informs us that several thousand Armenians fought for Turkey in World War I but, again, does not develop this theme.” P. 482.

    “Although Dadrian appears fluent in Turkish and cites certain Turkish sources — dissident Ittihadist reports, memoirs of a few Turkish leaders, and statements from a post-World War I war-crimes tribunal — almost no information on Turkish government policies regarding Armenians and nothing on the decision to annihilate them comes from Turkish archival sources. Dadrian relies mainly on British Foreign Office and German, Austrian, and French reports. When discussing how the Turks unleashed Kurds to attack Armenians in the mid-1890s, Dadrian even quotes a U.S. senator’s castigation of this event as supporting evidence. Similarly, he cites the Russian newspaper Golos moskvy (incorrectly transliterated ‘Kolos Moskoy’) as one of the sources for a ‘secret Turko-German plan for the massive deportation of the Armenians of eastern Turkey’ along with a Western historian’s ruminations on how important cultural homogeneity was to the Turks, as proof of the Armenian massacres of 1915. Dadrian’s excuse for not documenting Turkish policies with internal governmental sources is that the policies were secret. However, since much evidence exists in Russian archives about secret policies, one cannot but be skeptical about this explanation.

    A few typos and small factual errors, such as the implication that Russian-Ottoman relations were always adversarial in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mar the book. However, the most egregious flaws in this book are its polemical tone, its sketchiness, and its failure to use Turkish archival sources. Therefore, while the book delivers intriguing insights into Ottoman-Kurdish relations and the views of individual Turkish statesmen regarding Armenians, and while it suggests convincing theories for Turkish massacres of Armenians, it does not convincingly document these theories. It is thus unsatisfying as a whole. This book is more a work of journalism than solid history and is not recommended.” P. 483.

    ***

    (To be Continued)

  • Turkey Considers Procuring American or Russian Attack Helicopters

    Turkey Considers Procuring American or Russian Attack Helicopters

    Turkey Considers Procuring American or Russian Attack Helicopters

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 116
    June 17, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Undersecretary of Defense Industries Murad Bayar told reporters that he is optimistic about the purchase of Super Cobra helicopters from the U.S. Navy, amidst reports that a Turkish delegation is visiting Moscow to discuss the procurement of Russian MI-28 helicopters. In a stalled bid, the Turkish military has been eyeing additional strike helicopters as a stop-gap measure to meet its needs until its own national attack helicopter project becomes operational.

    Attack helicopters have been on Turkey’s defense procurement agenda since the 1990’s. In order to increase the army’s effectiveness in combating the PKK, Ankara designated attack helicopters as an urgent requirement, and developed multi-million dollar programs to meet the army’s needs. Following the purchase of several Cobra class platforms, the subsequent tenders Turkey opened were cancelled due to price disputes, licenses and technology transfers and the changing political climate. Consistent with Turkish military procurement policy after 2004, it initiated a national helicopter gunship program.

    However, due to the stringent regulations on local participation and technology transfers, American firms could not participate in tenders, and Turkey eventually awarded the contract for the production of its national attack/tactical-reconnaissance helicopters to the Italian AgustaWestland. Under the $3 billion project, the Turkish army will acquire 50 T129 helicopters, a modified version of the Italian Mangusta-A129. The deliveries were expected to start in 2013, but some sources claim that this date be pushed back to 2015 (EDM, June 27, 2008).

    Criticism surrounding Turkey’s military modernization program has continued unabated. According to its critics, Turkey’s handling of the helicopter project since the outset reveals poor planning and the lack of direction within the defense industry. Many ambitious weapons systems including main battle tanks, assault helicopters and UAV’s are to be produced domestically, but their design and prototypes will not be ready before 2012. Critics claim that “if the development of those projects was not followed closely, the Turkish defense industry might face a serious crisis in 2012 after falling short of meeting the real needs of the Turkish armed forces” (EDM, January 6).

    Meanwhile, the Turkish army reported deficiencies in combating the PKK caused by the delays in the helicopter program, especially after the escalation of the PKK’s terrorist campaign in recent years. The helicopters within the Turkish military inventory, mostly Cobra class, are aging and fall short of the army’s operational meets. This situation lends credibility to the critics’ arguments, since although an attack helicopter project was considered as urgent in the 1990’s, it remains unfinished -and it will take several years before the army will acquire the quantities it needs.

    Realizing that even under the most optimistic estimates national attack helicopters will not be delivered before 2013-2015, as a short term measure Turkey approached the United States in late 2007 to purchase up to 12 Cobra class helicopters already in use by the U.S. navy. U.S. sources said that they were in short supply. Since operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have overstretched U.S. military resources, Washington declined the Turkish requests (Turkish Daily News, March 28, 2008). Instead it offered Turkey AH-64 Apaches, but Ankara did not want them since having operated Cobras for almost two decades, the Turkish army lacked the infrastructure and personnel to operate Apaches. The Italian AgustaWestland offered its Mangusta-A129 helicopters, but the Turkish armed forces declined, arguing that the A129’s engine was insufficient to meet its needs (Aksam, March 28, 2008).

    The issue resurfaced several times, but the American side did not change their stance. Diplomatic observers maintained that although shortages were cited as the official justification, Washington refused to sell used Cobras to Turkey to punish Ankara’s inflexibility over the attack helicopter tender. It was also claimed that Turkey’s refusal to send additional troops to Afghanistan was behind Washington’s reluctance to sell the Cobras to Ankara (Today’s Zaman, April 14, 2008; Aksam, March 28, 2008).

    Turkey then reportedly turned to Russia in late 2008. Turkish and Russian media reports claimed that, after being turned down by the United States, Ankara planned to procure 32 MI-28 Night Hunters, an all-weather day-night attack helicopter, in a deal worth $1 billion. However, Russian defense officials denied these claims and said that Turkey did not officially submit such a request (Cihan Haber Ajansi, December 22, 2008).

    Nonetheless, Turkish interest in pursuing the Russian option has continued, reportedly negotiating the purchase of at least 12 MI-28 choppers (Taraf, June 10). Russian defense industry officials attending the IDEF 2009 arms fair in Istanbul in late April maintained that Turkey showed interest in buying Russian air defense systems and combat helicopters (RIA Novosti, April 27). According to recent reports, a delegation from the Turkish defense ministry traveled to Moscow in order to explore the possible acquisition of between 12 and 32 helicopters within the next two or three years (RIA Novosti, June 15).

    In response to a question about the visit of a Turkish delegation to Moscow, Bayar told reporters “I am very hopeful about the purchase of Cobra W class [AH-1W-Supercobra] helicopters… I believe we will acquire them. The U.S. navy is considering the acquisition of the Z series, and they will not need the Cobra W class.” He added that during his visit to the United States, the Turkish Chief of the General Staff General Ilker Basbug also raised this issue with his American counterparts (Radikal, June 14).

    Given the feasibility concerns, the Turkish government is likely to reach a decision after comparing the Russian and American platforms. In addition to technical and economic factors, political considerations will also play a key role in Ankara’s decision. Given the recent rapprochement between Turkey and the United States, it might indeed acquire the Cobras as a temporary measure. Turkish plans to make a greater contribution to Afghanistan following Basbug and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s contacts (EDM, June 16) might help remove the objections of the U.S. army to Turkey’s requests.

    Nonetheless, these developments demonstrate how Ankara treads carefully between Moscow and Washington to maximize its leverage. In line with its recent foreign policy orientation, Turkey also appears equally determined to keep its options open in its defense procurement policies.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-considers-procuring-american-or-russian-attack-helicopters/
  • P00R RICHARD’S REPORT

    P00R RICHARD’S REPORT

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    My Mission: God has uniquely designed me to seek, write, and speak the truth as I see it. Preservation of one’s wealth while providing needful income is my primary goal in these unsettled times. I have been given the ability to evaluate, study, and interpret world and national events and their influence on future of the financial markets. This gift allows me to meet the needs of individual and institution clients. I evaluate situations first on a fundamental basis then try to confirm on a technical basis. In the past it has been fairly successful.

    How to make Wall Street Safer

    I am writing this in the hopes that some of you have contacts with influential members of Congress.
    These ideas are simple to implement and will have positive effects.
    These letters will be short and right to the point.

    Have all firms that do transactions in securities on exchanges in the United States be PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS.
    If the partners are putting up their own money they will think twice about doing a sub prime deal. It will not be how big is the commission, but how big the risk will be to their own pocketbook.
    Cheerio!!!

    Richard C De Graff
    256 Ashford Road
    RER Eastford Ct 06242
    860-522-7171 Main Office
    800-821-6665 Watts
    860-315-7413 Home/Office
    rdegraff@coburnfinancial.com

    This report has been prepared from original sources and data which we believe reliable but we make no representation to its accuracy or completeness. Coburn & Meredith Inc. its subsidiaries and or officers may from time to time acquire, hold, sell a position discussed in this publications, and we may act as principal for our own account or as agent for both the buyer and seller.

    Over 300,000 readers
    My Mission: God has uniquely designed me to seek, write, and speak the truth as I see it. Preservation of one’s wealth while providing needful income is my primary goal in these unsettled times. I have been given the ability to evaluate, study, and interpret world and national events and their influence on future of the financial markets. This gift allows me to meet the needs of individual and institution clients. I evaluate situations first on a fundamental basis then try to confirm on a technical basis. In the past it has been fairly successful.

    How to make Wall Street Safer

    I am writing this in the hopes that some of you have contacts with influential members of Congress.
    These ideas are simple to implement and will have positive effects.
    These letters will be short and right to the point.

    Have all firms that do transactions in securities on exchanges in the United States be PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS.
    If the partners are putting up their own money they will think twice about doing a sub prime deal. It will not be how big is the commission, but how big the risk will be to their own pocketbook.
    Cheerio!!!

    Richard C De Graff
    256 Ashford Road
    RER Eastford Ct 06242
    860-522-7171 Main Office
    800-821-6665 Watts
    860-315-7413 Home/Office
    rdegraff@coburnfinancial.com

    This report has been prepared from original sources and data which we believe reliable but we make no representation to its accuracy or completeness. Coburn & Meredith Inc. its subsidiaries and or officers may from time to time acquire, hold, sell a position discussed in this publications, and we may act as principal for our own account or as agent for both the buyer and seller.

  • Turkish General Staff Accused of Seeking to Undermine the Government

    Turkish General Staff Accused of Seeking to Undermine the Government

    Turkish General Staff Accused of Seeking to Undermine the Government

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 114
    June 15, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On June 12, the liberal left Taraf daily triggered a political crisis in Ankara. Taraf claimed to have uncovered a four-page unclassified document, detailing an alleged action plan for the military to combat the “reactionary activities” against secularism. It was allegedly prepared by a colonel from the operations department at the headquarters of the chief of the general staff. This signals a new confrontation between the Turkish military and the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP).

    “The Action Plan against Reactionaries (Irtica),” allegedly prepared in April, was seized during a police search in the offices of Serdar Ozturk, the lawyer representing retired Colonel Levent Goktas -both arrested as part of the Ergenekon investigation. The document defines the AKP and the Gulen movement as threats to the secular order in Turkey, and accuses them of seeking to establish an Islamic state. The plan also criticizes the Ergenekon investigation, describing it as an attempt by Islamic groups to undermine the state and defame military personnel. The action plan proposed various measures aimed at “revealing the hidden agenda” of the AKP and Gulen movement, and undermining their public support. It also contemplates a psychological warfare campaign to promote widespread suspicion against these groups -even amongst pious Muslims- and exaggerate the threat they pose. Moreover, the plan suggests psychological operations against members of the Turkish armed forces suspected of being affiliated to Islamic groups. Furthermore, such propaganda seeks to discredit the Ergenekon investigation and mobilize public support for any military personnel implicated (Taraf, June 12).

    Taraf’s story has proven to be controversial in Ankara. The office of the chief of the general staff announced that the military court had banned any further media coverage of the story. The statement described the alleged action plan as related to national security, public order and public security, and banned any publication of its contents. The military prosecutor launched an investigation into the source of the leak and the dissemination of the document. When questioned about these developments during his weekly press briefing, the military’s spokesman Metin Gurak said that the military prosecutor will investigate all aspects of the story. Nonetheless, he declined to explain whether the investigation would be launched against “the existence of such a document or how it was leaked” (Anadolu Ajansi, June 12).

    Despite the military’s ban on publicizing the document, several media outlets close to the Gulen movement and the AKP government chose to ignore it. The Zaman daily ran a counter campaign against the military’s attempts to ban media coverage. Zaman and its sister daily Today’s Zaman, covered the development intensively, and portrayed the document as representing a serious threat to Turkish democracy and supplying more evidence of the ongoing influence of the military within the political system. They used this incident to make two related points. First, it sought to mobilize the government to revitalize its stalled domestic reforms aimed at boosting democratization and civilian control over the armed forces. Second, it called on the military leadership, particularly the Chief of the General Staff General Ilker Basbug, to demonstrate commitment to democracy by acting decisively over this issue. Equally, it demanded clarification on whether the military as an institution or its commissioned officers are implicated in such activities against the civil authority (Zaman, Today’s Zaman, June 13, 14, 15).

    Liberal columnists in other newspapers emphasized similar arguments, noting that Turkey faces ongoing challenges in order to curtail the military’s political influence (Milliyet, Radikal, June 13). Others largely restricted their reporting to the military’s ban on the Taraf story. Hurriyet quoted Serdar Ozturk’s lawyer, who claimed that the document was placed in his client’s office by the pro-Gulen movement clique within the Turkish police. He said they would press charges against the police and the prosecutors for leaking the document (Hurriyet, June 13).

    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reacted angrily to the document. On June 13, while addressing a party congress in Kars, he emphasized his determination to protect democracy and maintained that the AKP is the main guarantor of Turkey’s constitutional order (Anadolu Ajansi, June 13). Speaking at another party congress on June 14 in Sanliurfa, he reiterated this commitment, and promised to combat any plots against democracy. Erdogan contextualized the document, however, as part of other efforts to weaken the AKP, and argued that “in a democratic environment we cannot remain a spectator to this illegal process against the AKP. We are investigating [the plots against the AKP] and will take legal action if necessary” (www.haberturk.com, June 14).

    Taraf has run controversial stories by publishing unclassified military documents, since it was first published by a group of liberal journalists in 2007 -exposing either the activities of groups within the military seeking to topple the government, or the flaws in the Turkish army’s campaign against the PKK (EDM, July 18, 2008; Terrorism Focus, October 30, 2008). Basbug has publicly accused Taraf in the past of conducting a defamation campaign against the military. Erdogan also joined Basbug in lambasting Taraf, but this did not change its publication policy (www.haber7.com, October 17, 2008).

    If the latest revelation in Taraf proves to be true, it is likely to have significant repercussions for the current balance of power in Ankara. Erdogan and Basbug apparently reached a common understanding on major political issues, such as the Ergenekon investigation and the management of the Kurdish question. They have established close communication channels to exchange opinions. Erdogan did not object to Basbug’s controversial efforts to reassert a role for the military within Turkish politics (EDM, April 15), while Basbug permitted the trial of military officers in the Ergenekon case. Their management of the claims that the military headquarters might be involved in a conspiracy against the government could force them to redefine their working relationship, with significant implications for the future of Turkish civil-military affairs.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-general-staff-accused-of-seeking-to-undermine-the-government/
  • Turkey Reports Signs of Economic Recovery

    Turkey Reports Signs of Economic Recovery

    Turkey Reports Signs of Economic Recovery

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 112
    June 11, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Data recently released by the Turkish Statistics Institute (TurkStat) has raised expectations that the economy might be on its way to recovery. According to TurkStat, the capacity utilization rate within the Turkish manufacturing sector increased for the third consecutive month in May (www.tuik.gov.tr, June 10). Although the improvement is attributed largely to the AKP government’s economic stimulus packages, it remains uncertain whether domestic demand alone can sustain economic development.

    Starting in the second half of 2008, the Turkish economy felt the impact of the global financial crisis: industrial production output, exports, economic growth and industrial capacity utilization rates dropped dramatically, while unemployment soared (EDM, February 18). In January and February, the industrial capacity utilization rate dropped to 63.8 percent and hit a record low in the last two decades, presenting the starkest evidence of the contraction within the Turkish economy. In an attempt to prevent a deeper recession, the Central Bank gradually cut its interest rates. In addition, the AKP government, which was under fire for failing to take effective precautions, adopted several economic packages. In March, temporary tax cuts were introduced in major sectors including automotive, housing and household appliances in order to stimulate domestic demand (EDM, March 16).

    Recent economic trends indicate that these precautions slowed the pace of the downturn. In March, the capacity utilization rate increased for the first time since September 2008 and has continued to climb; it moved from 63.8 percent in February to 64.7 in March, and to 66.8 in April and 70.4 percent in May.

    While confirming this trend, TurkStat’s report highlighted low domestic and foreign demand as the major factors negatively affecting the capacity utilization. Although in May the capacity utilization rate indicated a 12 percent decline compared to the previous year, demonstrating the extent of the economic downturn, the report provided other signs of recovery. The production volume in May increased by 7.6 percent compared to April, which is estimated to continue growing by 6.7 percent in June. The sales volume increased by 6.4 percent in May and this is forecast to continue in June (www.tuik.gov.tr, June 10).

    The recent figures were interpreted by government officials as a sign that Turkey might be able to mitigate the full impact of the crisis. The Minister of Trade and Industry Nihat Ergun attributed the growth in the capacity utilization to the production triggered by the government’s earlier economic packages. He argued that a slow recovery was now under way. Nonetheless, he avoided drawing an overly optimistic picture, and added that without the complementary expansion in foreign demand, the recovery might be short-lived (www.cnnturk.com, June 10).

    Indeed, following the introduction of the latest economic package, several companies that were considering halting their production dropped these plans. Likewise, many companies that had applied for the government sponsored short term pay compensation, in order not to lay off their employees stopped receiving those benefits and began paying full salaries (Zaman, April 13). Moreover, a report published by an Ankara-based think-tank found that a majority of the automotive sales were financed by consumer savings and seller credits, rather than bank loans. The report suggested that this might prove an important indicator, signaling the growing consumer confidence in the market -a key factor for economic recovery (www.tepav.org.tr, June 4).

    The stimulus package has provided temporary relief, but it is uncertain what will occur after the tax incentives expire this month. Since the global economy is unlikely to recover in the short term, foreign demand cannot serve as the main stimulant for the Turkish economy. Therefore, the key question might be whether Turkey’s domestic demand can sustain its economic growth. Some experts maintain that with improved economic coordination and more intensive public involvement in the functioning of the economy, Turkey can stimulate domestic demand and maintain its economic growth (www.tepav.org.tr, May 27). However, other analysts expect that, short of any major surge in foreign demand, it will be difficult to sustain such economic growth in the second half of 2009. On the contrary, they forecast that the automotive sector is likely to face “renewed sharp contraction in the second half of 2009 and a slow recovery beyond that” (Hurriyet Daily News, May 29).

    Since the automotive sector is one of the engines of Turkish economic development, the government needs to implement additional measures to redress the deficit caused by this contraction. With such considerations in mind, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the fifth economic incentives package on June 4. The package seeks to enhance the economy’s competitive power and eliminate regional discrepancies through region, sector and project specific incentives and investments. Businesses investing in poorer regions such as in eastern Turkey will be entitled to free land, tax breaks on corporate taxation, and government assistance for employees’ social security premiums, etc. An additional package aims to reduce unemployment by funding various seasonal public works, such as repairing schools and hospitals and planting trees, as well as providing vocational training. With this new package, the total cost of the stimulus packages for 2009 and 2010 is expected to reach 60 billion TL ($38.7 billion) (www.32gunhaber.com, June 4).

    The government’s economic policy is driven by the need to reduce the impact of the crisis on households to prevent the erosion of its political popularity. In this context, it has elongated the negotiations with the IMF to sign a loan deal, which might have imposed tighter budgetary rules on public spending. Recent reports suggest that in response to the signs of recovery, the treasury has an alternative plan to continue the economic program without a stand-by agreement with the IMF (Referans, May 20). The government has managed to slow the downturn and escape a deep recession, but it is still too early to determine when the Turkish economy will experience a permanent recovery. Moreover, if the global crisis continues beyond 2009 the heavy financial burden of the stimulus packages on the budget might return to haunt the Turkish economy, and possibly damage the government’s popularity.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-reports-signs-of-economic-recovery/