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  • Erdogan Offers Turkish Mediation in Israeli-Syrian Talks

    Erdogan Offers Turkish Mediation in Israeli-Syrian Talks

    Erdogan Offers Turkish Mediation in Israeli-Syrian Talks

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 141
    July 23, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a one-day visit to Syria, which involved discussions on Turkey’s mediator role between Israel and Syria. Erdogan and the Syrian President Bashar Assad discussed bilateral relations, regional developments and Turkey’s peacemaking role in the region. Assad requested Turkey’s mediating services and Erdogan announced Ankara’s readiness to facilitate the Israeli-Syrian talks. They also agreed to initiate a “high-level strategic council” to bolster economic, political and cultural ties. Moreover, Erdogan addressed a large audience at the University of Aleppo, where he was warmly received. He praised the normalization of ties between Ankara and Damascus and argued that there is a need to address other problems in the region. He called for the re-launching of Israeli-Syrian talks on the basis of the restoration of Syria’s rights (www.cnnturk.com, July 22).Turkish diplomats facilitated indirect talks between Syrian and Israeli delegations, which appeared to be the most viable effort in recent years. Following Israel’s offensive against Gaza in late December, its relations with both Syria and Turkey became more strained. Syria suspended talks with Israel to protest against Israel’s military action. Ankara’s growing criticism toward Tel Aviv and the severing of their bilateral ties also led to questions over Turkey’s role, as Israel’s government had reportedly lost trust in Ankara and questioned its future as an impartial peace broker (EDM, January 30). As a result, these indirect talks moderated by Turkey came to a premature end.

    Erdogan’s visit came against the background of renewed international efforts to refocus on the stalled peace process in the Middle East. The United States and European countries have intensified their work recently to bring Israel and Syria to the negotiating table, but substantial differences remain between both parties. Syria wants to start negotiations on the precondition that the Golan Heights will be returned. Assad earlier maintained that the former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was willing to return the Golan Heights in full. “Only when he declared this to Erdogan did we start the indirect talks,” Assad added. However, he blamed the breakdown in the talks on Israel’s unwillingness to commit to an agreement on the definition of borders. He also expressed his willingness to see a more proactive U.S. involvement in the issue (www.ynetnews.com, March 25).

    U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East George Mitchell visited Israel and Syria in an effort to resume peace talks. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offered to start the talks without preconditions, meaning he would not “commit in advance to a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights.” Mitchell relayed this message to Assad, who rejected it and emphasized that the talks should start from the point at which they were suspended. Asad underlined that an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights would be the basis of any future talks. Whereas Assad conveyed to Mitchell his willingness to resume indirect talks under Turkish mediation, Netanyahu reportedly opposed this proposal by pointing to Ankara’s position during the Gaza crisis (Haaretz, June 21).

    In contrast to Syria, Israel wants to avoid opening any talks based on the precondition of withdrawal. Moreover, the Israeli side constantly emphasizes that as long as Damascus does not end its support for Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah, Israel will have difficulties in commencing negotiations with Syria (Jerusalem Post, July 20).

    Fred Hof, an adviser to Mitchell, also held talks in the region last week, but reportedly he could not convince the two parties to change their positions (Hurriyet Daily News, July 22). Since that trip came on the eve of Erdogan’s visit, the Turkish press speculated that Hof was gauging the parties’ interest in Turkish mediation (Sabah, July 20). Mitchell is also scheduled to visit the region later this week (www.state.gov, July 20).

    It is difficult to establish whether Erdogan’s visit was indeed planned in accordance with American diplomatic contacts, but there is a growing convergence between Turkish and American initiatives. Since Mitchell’s visit to Turkey (EDM, March 2), the need for coordinated action between Ankara and Washington toward the Middle East has been emphasized by both sides. During his visit to Turkey, President Barack Obama also acknowledged Ankara’s role in the region and heralded a new era of cooperation between the two countries, which he called a “model partnership” (EDM, April 7).

    However, such abstract titles require more concrete definition, and Ankara perceives its mediator role as a means to revitalize its relations with Washington and give substance to the new era of partnership. Through its new openings in the Middle East, Ankara has developed important diplomatic assets to address the challenging issues in the region. As one Turkish scholar, Bulent Aras, points out, through its constructive role in the Palestine and Syria issues, Turkey can not only facilitate a solution but also make the “model partnership” a reality (Sabah, May 27).

    For Ankara, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, among other factors, depends on the resolution of Israel’s twin problems with the Palestinians and Syria, and the integration of Damascus within the international community. In Ankara’s view, given Damascus’s deep rooted connections and leverage in the region, Syria holds a key role for developing stability in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. For instance, in Ankara’s view, without resolving Israeli-Syrian relations in a manner that is agreeable to all parties, and ending the diplomatic isolation of Damascus, it will not be easy to limit the perceived influence of Iran over Damascus.

    How Israel will respond to Turkey’s renewed mediation offer remains to be seen, particularly considering that Erdogan appeared to support Damascus’s position on the restoration of Syrian sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Since his appointment as Obama’s special envoy to the region, Mitchell has held talks with Turkish officials and heard Ankara’s perspective and concerns on this issue. It will be interesting to observe if he will now exert pressure on Tel Aviv to give the Turkish mediation efforts another chance.

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogan-offers-turkish-mediation-in-israeli-syrian-talks/
    ================================
    ONE MINUTE’E RAGMEN TURKIYE’NIN KAPISINDA
    Thursday, 23 July 2009 08:30
    ISRAIL’DEN TURKIYE’YE YENI RICA
    El Vatan Gazetesi, Turk Diplomatlarina Dayanarak “Israil’in Turkiye’den Suriye ile Gorusmelerinde Araci Rolunu Yeniden Ustlenmesini Istedigini” Yazdi.
    Israil’in Turkiye’den Suriye ile gorusmelerde araci rolunu yeniden ustlenmesini istedigi one suruldu.
    Katar’da yayimlanan El Vatan gazetesi, Turk diplomatlarina dayanarak Israil’in, Turkiye’den Suriye ile gorusmelerinde yeniden araci olmasini istedigini” yazdi.
    El Vatan, Turk diplomatik kaynaklarina dayandirdigi haberinde Basbakan Recep Tayyip Erdogan’in, Suriye-Israil gorusmelerinde yeniden aracilik yapmaya baslamasi yonunde aldigi taleplerin Kudus’ten kaynakladigini belirtti.
    Israil basinina da yansitilan haberde Erdogan’in Suriye ziyareti sirasinda Devlet Baskani Besar Esad’a Turkiye’nin yeniden aracilik yapmasi icin talepler aldigini anlattigi belirtilirken, Erdogan’in Esad’a bu yondeki mesajlarin icerigi konusunda bilgi verdigi kaydedildi.
    Bu arada ayni kaynaklarin, Erdogan’in Turkiye’nin, Gazze operasyonunun ardindan Israil ile iliskilerinde ortaya cikan krizi asmayi basardigini, Suriye ve Israil’in Ankara’nin araciligina guvenmeyi surdurdugunu soylediklerine de dikkat cekildi.
    Turk diplomatik kaynaklarinin, barisin saglanmasinin Suriye, Israil, ABD’nin yanisina Turkiye icin bir ihtiyac haline geldigini ifade ettiklerine isaret edilen haberde Ankara’nin, dort turu yapilan, Israil ile Suriye arasinda dolayli gorusmelerde dogrudan muzakerelere gecilmesi icin gerekli temeller atildigi, bu nedenle Kudus ile Sam arasinda barisa daha kolayca varilabilecegine inandigi da ifade edildi.
    Cabalarin yeniden baslanmak istemesinde diger bir faktorun de Suriye’de faaliyet gosteren buyuk Turk sirketlerinin kalici istikrara olan ihtiyaclarinin da oldugu one suruldu.
  • Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

    Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

    Aliyev and Sarksyan Meet in Moscow

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 139
    July 21, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev met his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sarksyan in Moscow on July 17 in their latest round of reconciliation talks. Turkey has closely followed the talks between the two presidents, facilitated by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, hoping that the resolution of the Karabakh issue might also facilitate Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

    The meeting was the sixth between Aliyev and Sarksyan since their first meeting in June 2008. As one of the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group, Russia accelerated its peacemaking efforts toward finding a solution to the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Medvedev hosted the two presidents in Moscow for a second time in November 2008, and since then the two leaders have met in Zurich, Prague and St. Petersburg (Trend News, July 17).

    The meeting came in the context of growing international interest. Other major actors had also expressed their support for this mechanism, hoping that it might facilitate a solution. The presidents of Russia, France and the United States issued a statement during the G8 summit in Italy the previous week, and urged all sides to step up their work toward the resolution of the remaining differences on Karabakh, on the basis of the principles outlined in the 2007 Madrid agreement (www.osce.org, July 10).

    Representatives from the other two co-chairs of the Minsk group and the OSCE representatives were also in Moscow. On July 17, the Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and his Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandyan met with the Minsk group co-chairmen Yuri Merzlyakov (Russia), Bernard Fassier (France) and Matthew Bryza (United States), as well as the OSCE Chairman’s Special Envoy Andzey Kasprzyk. The Azeri and Armenian presidents also held bilateral talks, and later the ministers as well as the co-chairs joined them. The following day, the leaders held trilateral talks with the participation of Medvedev.

    No documents were signed at the meeting and no official statement was issued. Medvedev’s spokesperson told reporters that the parties had a chance to discuss in detail the remaining issues. He added that he is optimistic that “it will be possible to settle the Karabakh conflict in the foreseeable future.” According to Armenian diplomatic sources, the presidents instructed their foreign ministers to work in close cooperation with the Minsk group co-chairs to organize a high-level meeting on Karabakh in the fall. The co-chairs of the Minsk group reiterated their support for the ongoing talks. They added that they would continue their contacts in the region. The two presidents might meet again in September, they added (Trend News, ITAR-TASS, www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 18).

    On July 20, Mammadyarov said that some progress was achieved in Moscow. He added that the parties agreed on some principles of a possible solution, but that further work was required on the precise details. He maintained that both sides were working toward a schedule for withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the occupied Azeri territories. Once this is achieved, it will be possible to discuss other issues such as the repatriation of refugees, the rebuilding of the region and determining the status of Karabakh. However, he ruled out independence for Karabakh by saying “whatever its status, Karabakh will remain part of Azerbaijan” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 20).

    Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the head of the E.U. troika delegation visiting the region, said in Yerevan that the E.U. supported the Minsk group’s activities and was ready to assist in the implementation of an agreement. However, in implicit defiance of Mammadyarov’s statements, Nalbandyan said that the “return of any territories to Azerbaijan was not discussed in Moscow.” He also added that Armenia did not officially endorse the Madrid principles (ANKA, July 20; Trend News, July 21).

    Despite the contradictory accounts from Yerevan and Baku, it appears that the removal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azeri territories has been on the agenda for some time. Prior to the meeting in Moscow, Aliyev had explained the details of the plan to a Russian TV station (www.cnnturk.com, July 8). According to the Turkish press, the two presidents in fact discussed the specifics of Armenian withdrawal from the occupied Azeri territories, even including the deployment of international forces. Whereas, the Armenian side insisted on Russian forces, the Azeris requested Turkish troops. Turkey reportedly expressed its readiness to send troops, if the parties agreed on such a solution (Zaman, July 19). However, no official Turkish diplomatic source has corroborated this proposal.

    Turkey has been supportive of the process led by the Minsk group and Russian initiatives. Ankara reportedly plans to contribute to the initiatives of the Minsk group through a new round of contacts with Baku and Yerevan. Nonetheless, currently the earliest direct talks between Yerevan and Ankara to discuss Turkish-Armenian normalization are scheduled in September at the U.N. General Assembly (Sabah, July 20).

    After intensive diplomatic traffic between Turkey and Armenia, which resulted in the announcement of a roadmap for normalization in April, Ankara had to slow down the process to satisfy concerns in Baku. During his visit to Baku in May, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan underlined clearly that Ankara would not proceed with its Turkish-Armenian rapprochement before a solution over the Karabakh issue could be achieved. Although Ankara came under criticism for stalling its dialogue with Yerevan, diplomatic sources maintain that secret talks between the two countries are continuing (EDM, June 30).

    Commenting on these recent developments, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu denied that Turkish-Armenian normalization was stalled. He said that “[Turkish-Armenian and Azeri-Armenian] processes would affect each other positively.” Though declining to set a date on the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, he expressed his hope that positive developments might take place before the end of the year (Hurriyet Daily News, July 20).

    Erdogan took a very clear position, saying that he will maintain his support for Azerbaijan over the Karabakh dispute. It would be difficult for him to step back from this, given the enormous costs of such a move to his popularity at home and in Baku. Therefore, before taking any steps to revitalize its relations with Yerevan, Ankara hopes that the recent initiatives could produce at least partial progress between Baku and Yerevan.

    https://jamestown.org/program/aliyev-and-sarksyan-meet-in-moscow/
  • Palestinian President Abbas visits Ankara

    Palestinian President Abbas visits Ankara

    Palestinian President Abbas visits Ankara

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 138
    July 20, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas

    On July 16-17, the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visited Turkey to hold talks on Middle East peace initiatives and discuss bilateral relations with Turkey. Abbas met President Abdullah Gul, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. This came amidst speculation that he had supported the Greek Cypriot position on the Cyprus issue. On July 8-9, Abbas met the Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias. The two leaders supported each other’s stance on international issues. Citing Greek media sources, the Turkish press maintained that Abbas had expressed his support for the Greek Cypriot position on the Cyprus issue (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 9). Some Turkish media outlets interpreted this attitude as a betrayal and disrespect for Turkey’s earlier support for the Palestinian cause. “Abbas stabbed [Turkey] in the back,” one nationalist newspaper claimed (Yeni Cag, July 10).

    The Turkish foreign ministry summoned the Palestinian Ambassador, Nabil Maarouf, following such news coverage on the issue. Maarouf told Turkish officials that he had investigated the reports by contacting Abbas’ spokesperson and other Palestinian officials. Maarouf said that “Abbas did not make those statements. As a matter of fact, this issue was not even on the agenda. [Palestinians] were never involved in the Cyprus issue and will maintain this attitude” (www.mfa.gov.tr, July 10). On the same day, Maarouf issued a separate statement in which “he reiterated his remarks at the ministry, [and added that] Abbas’ visit to Cyprus was planned one year ago” (Today’s Zaman, July 13). Nonetheless, a statement issued by Christofias after meeting Abbas read: “I wish to warmly thank President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority for their firm and consistent stance in supporting the struggle of the people of Cyprus and the position of the Republic of Cyprus both within the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Arab world in general, as well as internationally” (www.mfa.gov.cy, July 9).

    Nationalist media outlets continued their criticism of Abbas, ahead of his visit (Yeni Cag, July 14). Abbas therefore tried hard to diffuse tensions in Ankara. During his joint press conference with Gul, Abbas firmly denied these claims, and described the media reports as groundless. He also responded to another allegation about himself, which was raised by Fatah sources last week. A Fatah official claimed that Abbas was involved in a conspiracy with Mossad and the CIA, which resulted in the killing of Yasser Arafat (www.israelnationalnews.com, July 14). These reports also led to an intensive debate in the Turkish media, ahead of the visit by Abbas (Milli Gazete, July 16). He reiterated his rejection of those accusations in Ankara, arguing that the document that allegedly supported those claims was circulating on Israeli websites (Hurriyet, July 18).

    Gul emphasized Turkey’s official position that the two-state solution should be the basis of the efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue. He reiterated Ankara’s support for an independent Palestinian state, which would have East Jerusalem as its capital. He called on Israel to stop building new settlements and lift the blockade to allow for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip and the flow of humanitarian aid (www.tccb.gov.tr, July 17).

    In response to one question, Gul expressed Turkey’s objection to a plan suggested earlier by the E.U.’s Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana. Solana maintained that if both sides could not reach a solution within a designated period, the U.N. Security Council should endorse the two-state solution and open the way for the recognition of Palestine by the international community (Jerusalem Post, July 12). Gul noted that Turkey would not support efforts for the resolution of the problem which were not approved by all sides. Gul maintained that imposing a non-consensual solution would not prove beneficial and might be harmful. Turkey is ready to support a roadmap toward a Palestinian state, provided that it comes as a result of consensus, Gul added (www.tccb.gov.tr, July 17).

    Abbas also exchanged opinions with Davutoglu on the Middle East. They discussed specific areas in which Turkey could help the Palestinian administration. It was announced that Turkey will release part of the $150 million aid which it had pledged at the Paris conference to relieve the financial burden of the cash-strapped Palestinian authority. Abbas solicited Turkey’s help for building Palestinian state institutions and constructing infrastructure for education and health services as well as creating jobs. Toward this end, Turkey pledged to build a university hospital, a new industrial zone and a conference hall. Moreover, Turkey will help with the infrastructure of Palestinian television and support the foundation of a diplomatic academy in Palestine (Anadolu Ajansi, July 17).

    Davutoglu also emphasized another important pillar of Turkey’s policy toward the Palestine issue: a permanent and sustainable solution to the problem can only emerge as a result of a consensus between the Palestinian factions. He asked Abbas to conclude the talks on the formation of a national unity government soon, and confirmed Ankara’s support for the dialogue between Palestinian groups mediated by Egypt. Turkey and the Palestinian authority also reportedly agreed to form a joint committee to discuss developments within the peace process (www.cnnturk.com, July 18). In a related development, Egyptian diplomatic sources mediating the talks between Hamas and Fatah reportedly asked the parties to reach a consensus on a unity government by August 25. Since the talks reached deadlock because of the parties’ refusal of an earlier proposal, the Egyptian side suspended their mediation efforts (Cihan, July 19).

    Turkish officials managed to put the unpleasant news stories aside and “talk business” with Abbas, in an effort to make a contribution to achieving peace in the Middle East. Official statements demonstrated once again the underlying principles of Turkey’s approach to the Palestinian issue. In Ankara’s view, third parties should only play a facilitator role and refrain from excluding the major stakeholders. It is for these reasons that Turkey seeks to interject itself as peace broker between the Israelis and Palestinians on the one hand, and among the Palestinians on the other. Although those policies frequently lead to the criticism that Turkey is following a pro-Hamas position, Ankara appears determined to maintain dialogue with all parties and refuse any call to exclude Hamas.

    https://jamestown.org/program/palestinian-president-abbas-visits-ankara/

  • Turkey Widens its Relations with Developing Nations

    Turkey Widens its Relations with Developing Nations

    Turkey Widens its Relations with Developing Nations

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 136
    July 16, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On July 15, the Turkish President Abdullah Gul attended the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as the special guest of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, which was held in Sharm al-Sheikh. Gul became the first Turkish president to attend the NAM summit, demonstrating Turkey’s growing involvement with the developing nations as part of its multi-dimensional foreign policy approach.

    Prior to his departure for Sharm al-Sheikh, Gul told reporters that this high-level participation builds on earlier representations at the deputy prime minister and ministerial levels in recent years. Gul reiterated the founding mission of the NAM, which was to chart out an independent course of action between the opposing blocs during the Cold War. He emphasized that despite the end of the bipolar system, the movement has maintained its role in international politics by redefining its goals and undertaking new functions. Gul justified Turkey’s engagement with the NAM by referring to the new activism in Ankara’s foreign policy.

    Moreover, he highlighted Turkey’s new role as peace broker to facilitate the resolution of regional and global disputes through constructive diplomacy, which underpins Ankara’s desire to pursue such international initiatives. Gul also referred to a complementary process in Turkish foreign policy: the idea that the country should diversify its partnerships and develop new cooperative relationships in different continents, overcoming geographical barriers. He stressed that given that the NAM consists of almost 120 countries, Turkey follows its activities closely, and values its ties with this movement. In addition, he maintained that during its drive for a non-permanent U.N. Security Council seat, Turkey developed important experience in working together with diverse countries and wanted to further strengthen these ties (www.cankaya.gov.tr, July 15).

    The current global financial crisis dominated the discussions during the first day of the summit. Cuba’s President Raul Castro maintained that the crisis was caused by rich countries and that poor nations are being forced to share a heavy burden. He called for a new and just global economic system. Mubarak also said that the world faces one of the largest crises, and there is a need for a new economic and commercial order that takes into account the interests of developing nations. The U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged that developing countries are disproportionately affected by the global crisis and drew attention to the challenges posed by growing economic nationalism. He emphasized the importance of the role played by free trade to facilitate recovery. The Sudanese President Omar al Bashir (for whom the international criminal court has issued an arrest warrant) and the Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi were among the leaders who spoke at the summit. Qaddafi called for the NAM to receive a seat in the United Nations (Cihan Haber Ajansi, July 15).

    During his contacts at the NAM summit, Gul also held bilateral talks with various statesmen including Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, and his counterpart in Montenegro Filip Vujanovic, the Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Musa and the Bahrain’s Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamed Halife. Gul said that he was particularly pleased to see how Turkey was held in high esteem by other countries. The active and constructive role the country plays in the resolution of global problems explains this interest, Gul added (Cihan Haber Ajansi, June 15).

    Although it joined NATO in 1952, Turkey initially had connections with the NAM in its formative years when the movement emerged in the mid-1950’s. Turkey attended the Bandung conference in 1955, where it sided with the countries arguing against following a non-alignment policy. It came under criticism because of its pro-Western policies and in subsequent years Ankara increasingly departed from the agenda of the NAM leaders. Instead, Ankara solidified its place in the Western camp during the Cold War as the best way to ensure its own security against what it perceived as the major threat to its survival, stemming from communism. Later, when the same nations worked to create a new economic order, Turkey again sought to integrate its economy into Western institutions.

    Consequently, it has encountered several differences with the NAM in its foreign policy issues during the Cold War, especially in regard to the Cyprus issue. When these nations gained a majority in the U.N. General Assembly, they voted against Turkey, given the high profile of Cyprus within the movement. Although this approach was not pursued as aggressively by the NAM in the post-Cold War, even as late as 2003, the year before joining the E.U. and ceasing its membership of the NAM, the Greek Cypriots were able to mobilize the NAM to issue a declaration criticizing Turkey. However, Turkey’s constructive diplomacy in Cyprus in support of the Annan plan and its subsequent international diplomatic initiatives demonstrate the extent to which Turkey has been able to remove traditional sources of tension in its foreign relations and build new partnerships.

  • Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement Signed in Ankara

    Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement Signed in Ankara

    Nabucco Intergovernmental Agreement Signed in Ankara

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 134
    July 14, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    On July 13 the Nabucco transit countries removed an important obstacle for the strategic pipeline project. Attending a high profile meeting hosted by Turkey, the prime ministers of Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey inked the Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA). The ceremony was also attended by several government officials and representatives of international organizations including the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, the E.U. Commission’s President Jose Manuel Barroso, E.U. Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs and the U.S. special envoy for Eurasian energy Richard Morningstar (Anadolu Ajansi, July 13).

    In the next step toward the completion of the legal framework, the Nabucco consortium will sign separate project support agreements with the five participating countries within the next six months. Construction work is expected to start by 2011 and the pipeline will be operational in 2014. The consortium will also open discussions with banks to raise the necessary capital and explore the marketing of transportation capacities. The project is valued at 7.9 billion Euros ($11 billion) and in its full capacity it will pump 31 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually to European markets (www.nabucco-pipeline.com).

    According to the Nabucco consortium, the “IGA will lay out a stable legal framework for the next 50 years and … 50 percent of the pipeline’s capacity will be reserved for the shareholders and the remaining 50 percent offered to third-party shippers.” Moreover, the IGA will develop a standard tariff methodology. The legal framework set by the IGA will remain in force for 25 years after the pipeline becomes operational so that it provides “strong comfort to the potential gas supply countries who are considering selling gas to the shippers of Nabucco” (www.nabucco-pipeline.com, July 13).

    The partners do not expect financing to become a major issue. The meeting signaled a possible imminent resolution over the uncertainty about securing gas to feed the Nabucco pipeline. Thus far, Azerbaijan is the only producer to commit gas to the project and it has promoted Nabucco as a strategic priority. Ahead of the signing ceremony, the head of SOCAR, Rovnag Abdullayev, reiterated support for Nabucco and maintained that Azerbaijan has enough reserves to supply alternative projects (Anadolu Ajansi, July 11).

    Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov expressed his readiness to export gas through Nabucco (Zaman, July 12). Representatives from Iraq, Egypt and Syria also attended the signing ceremony and pledged to pump their gas through the Nabucco once it is completed. Al-Maliki said that Iraq could start supplying 17 bcm annually to Europe by 2017 (Today’s Zaman, July 14).

    Turkish officials continuously emphasized that the project is open to other potential suppliers if they wish to join. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated Turkey’s position that Nabucco does not necessarily exclude Russia and Iran, and maintained that Qatar might also join the project.

    Although Turkey has consistently expressed its interest in integrating Iran into the project, given recent political developments, this alternative currently appears unlikely. Matthew Bryza, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs, did not rule out possible Russian participation in the project, but he expressed the Obama administration’s uneasiness over any effort to include Iran (Hurriyet Daily News, July 13). Nonetheless, given Moscow’s objections to Nabucco and the lack of Russian participation in the IGA ceremony, it remains to be seen how feasible that alternative will be.

    Reinhard Mitschek, Nabucco CEO, said that in the first phase, the main suppliers will be Azerbaijan and Iraq and that Turkmen gas will be accessed in the second phase. He maintained that the market prognoses showed a greater demand from buyers than initially expected (Anadolu Ajansi, July 13).

    Turkey expects to receive many benefits from the project. The transit countries will not raise fees, but will share the tax revenues proportionate to the length of the pipeline passing through their territories. Ankara projects obtaining 60 percent of the tax revenues, amounting to 450 million Euros ($630 million) annually. Moreover, the project will bring infrastructure investments to Turkey and create new jobs (Radikal, July 11). Most importantly, Turkey hailed the project as a significant development, which reaffirms its strategic value to the West. Through closer cooperation in energy security, Ankara hopes to cement its ties with the E.U. and remove the remaining obstacles to membership. Speaking at the ceremony, Erdogan and Barroso defined this new cooperation as a strategic bond and expressed their desire to see Nabucco further bolstering Turkey-E.U. ties.

    Nonetheless, although Turkey previously sought to link the Nabucco project to E.U. accession and implied that progress might be conditional on the E.U. opening the energy chapter, this remains unresolved. Another potential area of uncertainty relates to whether Turkey secured its request for a 15 percent lift-off. The international press reported that Turkey might have dropped this demand. Asked about this ahead of the ceremony, the Energy Minister Taner Yildiz gave only vague answers. Yildiz said that Ankara was granted other guarantees to ensure its supply security. He indicated that Turkey might bid for the 50 percent of the gas allocated for the transport countries and added that talks with other governments and corporations on this subject will continue.

    Moreover, he suggested that the pipeline will be built to enable the transportation of gas in both directions between east and west, in order that Turkey can cope with any unexpected winter shortages through swapping gas (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 12). While Yildiz implicitly acknowledged that Turkey might have retreated from its position on the 15 percent issue, the head of the state-run gas company, BOTAS, ruled out that Turkey had abandoned its claim. “When the project support agreement is signed such details will be discussed there… This issue is still on the table: there is no sacrifice involved,” Saltuk Duzyol added (ANKA, July 13).

    The signing of the IGA marks a major step forward. However, such remarks, as well as the ongoing standoff in Turkish-Azeri price renegotiation talks, are indicative of the heavy bargaining that lies ahead.

    https://jamestown.org/program/nabucco-intergovernmental-agreement-signed-in-ankara/

  • Ankara Promotes Closer Regional Integration in the Middle East

    Ankara Promotes Closer Regional Integration in the Middle East

    Ankara Promotes Closer Regional Integration in the Middle East

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 133
    July 13, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
     
    On July 8, Istanbul hosted the first joint ministerial meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-Turkey strategic dialogue, which served to highlight the growing multi-dimensional ties between the country and the Middle East. Ankara has increased the frequency of bilateral meetings with the regional states, reflecting the intensification of its diplomatic activity in the Middle East, this has also witnessed the use of multilateral forums including the Arab League, GCC and the Organization of the Islamic Countries.

    Several high level meetings between Turkey and the GCC aimed at addressing regional issues or deepening economic cooperation facilitated this dialogue. The first step toward institutionalizing a multi-dimensional approach came in September 2008. After his meeting with the GCC ministers in Jeddah, the then Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan said that both sides signed a memorandum of understanding to institutionalize their relations by launching the strategic dialogue process. “The establishment of the strategic dialogue is the first regular consultation process the GCC holds with third parties… [which will] bolster the deep-rooted friendship and brotherhood ties between us. We plan to advance our cooperation in the fields of politics, economics, defense, security and culture through regular high level consultations,” Babacan said. He justified the deepening Turkish involvement in the Persian Gulf region by stating that “Turkey is one of the first countries to be directly affected if instability erupts in the gulf region” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, September 3, 2008).

    The dialogue continued by holding the GCC-Turkey senior officials’ meeting in Istanbul on February 9-10, which prepared the groundwork for the latest meeting. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu co-chaired the meeting with his counterpart from Oman and the current president of the GCC ministerial council Yusuf bin Alawai bin Abdullah. The Secretary-General of the GCC Abdurrahman al Atiyyah as well as the other GCC foreign ministers also attended the forum. The visiting delegation met President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Anadolu Ajansi, July 8).

    The joint declaration issued after the meeting emphasized the parties’ determination “to anchor cooperation between them on a solid institutional basis,” evaluated the state of mutual cooperation in various areas and outlined future goals (www.mfa.gov.tr, July 8). In the economic sphere, the declaration noted that a framework agreement on cooperation was ratified and they would further explore, “the prospects of cooperation in the field of energy, including oil, gas, renewable energy and mineral resources.”

    The framework agreement was first signed in 2005 by the then foreign minister Gul (www.haber7.com, July 8). During his tenure as prime minister and earlier as foreign minister, Gul used his personal connections in the region skilfully, and played a key role in deepening Turkish cooperation with the region.

    After stressing the progress achieved in the Turkey-GCC free trade area negotiations, the declaration expressed the parties’ willingness to accelerate the process. In security affairs, both sides agreed to maintain dialogue in order to enhance military cooperation in areas of common concern, and emphasized the importance of maintaining their common position against terrorism and combating international piracy.

    A main element in the declaration focused on regional and international issues. Both sides emphasized that “all relations in the region should be based on full respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the countries of the region and the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, and friendly neighborly relations.” They exchanged opinions on regional challenges, including Iraq, the Iranian nuclear issue and Lebanon.

    Other items addressed by the declaration revealed the extent to which both sides are exploiting the platform to garner support to resolve bilateral issues. Ankara accepted the inclusion of the dispute over the three islands between Iran and the UAE. In return, the GCC supported Turkey in its effort to secure E.U. accession, as well as Ankara’s stance over the Cyprus question, the Xinjiang crisis and the Alliance of Civilizations initiative.

    The GCC countries recognize Turkey’s growing leverage in Middle Eastern politics and seek to achieve consensus with Ankara. The GCC members sympathize with Turkey’s policy of charting an independent foreign policy, and maintaining a balanced approach between Western policies in the region and the concerns of local countries on controversial issues. Indeed, Turkey and the GCC member states sought to coordinate their position on the diplomatic standoff over Iran’s nuclear program, developments within Lebanese domestic politics, the future of Iraq in the light of the American withdrawal and Palestine-Israel relations. Ankara values these ties in order to promote diplomatic support from the GCC countries in its bilateral issues and multilateral initiatives. For instance, during Turkey’s drive for U.N. Security Council membership, such connections worked to the country’s advantage.

    For its part, in addition to such shared political and strategic motivations, Turkey’s policies toward the Middle East are driven by substantial economic interests. Turkey wants to attract capital to boost its economic development. Moreover, Ankara has actively promoted forming a free trade area with the GCC, which it hopes will be accelerated through this dialogue.

    Ankara considers these flourishing ties as consistent with its new foreign policy doctrine, which emphasizes avoiding disputes with its neighbors and maintaining balanced relations with all stakeholders through multi-dimensional partnerships. Hence, Ankara wants to maintain dialogue with all the regional actors without antagonizing others. Although some had claimed that both sides might be an attempt to contain Iranian influence, Turkey and the GCC have carefully avoided giving any impression that their strategic dialogue represents an anti-Iranian axis in the region (www.asam.org.tr, September 9, 2008). Addressing this concern, Davutoglu emphasized during his press conference that this initiative was not “a new bloc or counter-bloc in the region. Rather it is a step toward deepening regional integration.” Al Atiyyah agreed saying, “the term ‘strategic’ should not irritate anyone. This strategic dialogue is a peaceful strategy to achieve further development and economic progress” (Star, July 8).
    https://jamestown.org/program/ankara-promotes-closer-regional-integration-in-the-middle-east/