Category: Authors

  • LETTER TO BARACK OBAMA

    LETTER TO BARACK OBAMA

    It is a letter from SSA to Obama, answering ANCA…

    ssaya

    ———————————————————————

    The Honorable Barack Obama
    President of the United States
    The White House
    1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
    Washington, D.C. 20500

    Dear Mr. President:

    As soon as I read the rude, accusatory, and outright disrespectful letter written to you by Kenneth V. Hachikian, Chairman of ANCA-a shady group currently under investigation by federal agencies for alleged campaign finance and lobbying violations-I felt compelled to write to you.

    The letter,  quite short of accustomed courtesy and respect when addressing the White House, was urging you to reject the recent ruling of a three judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the case of Movsesian v. Versicherung A.G. (No. 07-56722, August 20, 2009), which struck down a California special-interest law providing remedies to ethnic Armenians for alleged wrongs during an alleged genocide.

    Apparently, no one taught these Armenians about the separation of powers in America and that it is un-American for the executive branch to contravene the judicial branch (or legislative branch.)  Such a practice may be all right in Armenia, a land-locked, poverty-stricken, corrupt, aggressive, and violent Armenia, but it is frowned upon in America.

    The disrespectful Armenian letter writer also seemed ignorant of the federal supremacy law which basically says state laws cannot replace, void, or overrule federal laws.  The wily and tricky Armenian lobby thought they found the short-cut:  apply local political pressure to get a tailor-made state law to bypass all federal laws.  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals saw to it that those Armenian falsifiers got a good lesson on American government.

    The insolent Armenian letter writer, in asking the White House to interfere with the decision of U.S. Court of Appeals or evaluate a California State Law interpretation as superior to Federal Laws and U.S. Constitution, in effect, was forcing the U.S. Government to violate written bilateral agreements with the sovereign Republic of Turkey.  Thus, the deceptive and tiny Armenian lobby was indirectly attempting  to manipulate American  foreign policy.  This is more than the  tail wagging the dog; this must be “tip of the tail” wagging the dog.

    The expression such as “Genocide era wrongs” is not based on any acceptable judicial decision, but on a set of “hearsay and forgeries” promoted deceptively by biased persons or organizations.

    Armenians also fail to understand that campaign pledges and responsibility of an office after election are two vastly different, and sometimes diametrically opposing things.  American interests always trump Armenian demands.

    That said, a responsible, truth-defending President, is expected to investigate deeper any pledges made during election campaigns and refrain from unrealistic, untrue, or  unethical pledges.

    The “Armenian Genocide” allegations are not supported by the verdict of any “competent tribunal” as set forth by the 1948 U.N. Convention.  Such terminology, therefore, is not more than a political statement based on hearsay, forgeries, falsifications, fabrications, distortions, and outright lies.  Not every killing or suffering is genocide.  Not every war crime or hate crime is genocide.  Not every photo, tall tale, documentary, film, book is genocide.  Genocide verdict can only be  given at a competent tribunal after due process where all sides are given a fair chance to tell its side of the story and cross examine the evidence and witnesses.  This was never done in the case of Turkish-Armenian conflict. Armenians are trying to bypass legislation by applying political pressure.  But it will not work!

    On the contrary, the U.S. records in archives bear plenty evidence that the exact opposite is true, or that brutalities were mutual and mostly inflicted by the ancestors of the claimants.

    Armenian propaganda organizations such as ANCA  should be aware of the fact that the new Turkish Republic had agreed with U.S.A. on Dec. 24, 1923 to study all claims and compensate for the actual losses suffered by the U.S. Citizens, until that date.

    ANCA should also be aware that a joint Committee had been empowered with another agreement dated October 25, 1934 and all U.S. citizens or claimants had been given a deadline to submit their claims and evidences. The claims that had been submitted were meticulously verified.  A further agreement of “Adjustment of Payment” No.168 dated Sept.8, 1937 had been concluded with Turkey.  U.S.A. had confirmed with letter No.93, 1937 to the Republic of Turkey, that  “…when the agreed amount is paid, Turkey will be fully discharged of the obligations previously agreed…:

    Turkey had fulfilled the agreement; claimants had been accordingly paid and USA has no longer any lawful rights to request , 72 years later, additional indemnities for cases studied and settled in 1937!

    Accusing U.S. Governments for “complicity on genocide denial” is an insult to USA and Turkey, as long as the humiliation of  “genocide” stands as a word in the air, never decided by a competent tribunal.

    ANCA organization does not have the immunity to call other parties “criminal”, unless the “crime is proven and the judicial verdict is at hand”.   Declarations by some Parliaments or other legally irrelevant and/or unauthorized groups are political and have no judicial merit.  They may stroke Armenian egos, but are, otherwise, worthless gestures of bias and bigotry.

    Vague expressions and accusations such as “race extermination or over 1.5 million Armenians lost their lives” stands much short of truths and the U.S. state archives refute them openly because:

    a- “American Military Mission to Armenia” (General Harbord) Report 1920 and Annex Report Nat. Archives 184.021/175  does not mention any “race extermination” but refers to “refinements of cruelty by Armenians to Muslims”.

    b-  Joint US-Congress Resolution no. 192, April 22, 1922 relative to the activities of Near East Relief ending 31.12.1921, has unanimously resolved that a total of 1,414,000 Armenians were alive.  Moreover, (George Montgomery) a member of the US delegation at the Paris Conference had presented a detailed tabulation in 1919, with a total of 1,104,000 Armenians alive apart from those who had already immigrated to other countries.

    c- Reliable sources show that THE TOTAL ARMENIAN POPULATION in the Ottoman Empire was less than 1.3 MILLION ( or up to a maximum of 1.5 millions) and hence it would be ANCA’s liability to “defy and annul these official U.S. State Records”.

    ANCA is charging the Obama administration of “blocking legal redress of U.S. citizens” without minimal proof.  ANCA should be aware of the fact that the Obama administration is responsible for protecting the rights and interests of all true citizens, that is after they have been naturalized.  In other words, the Obama administration cannot be held responsible for the loss of life, property, or inheritance by those in other countries from where they immigrated to the U.S.. Such cases were settled by former USA Administrations at that time. This does not limit the “U.S. citizens from pursuing their personal claims individually in other countries” under their own liabilities. USA cannot disregard or deviate from her written obligations in international agreements under any ethnic pressure, such as by ANCA.

    If  ANCA lobby organization is disappointed because Obama treats American citizens of Armenian ethnicity equally with all other American citizens and cannot extend special privileges to ANCA, then I am afraid,  ANCA is giving priority to ANCA leaders’ private interests over the interests of American citizens over all.

    There is no place for any prejudice or antagonism in USA’s relations with other countries. It is hard to understand or justify why Armenian community is so fearful of “any type of investigation” (by historical commission or others) unless, of course, there are facts that Armenians do not wish to be brought into the light.

    Obama Administration has taken an oath to serve all American citizens, equally, and to protect their overall interests.  A U.S. president cannot support  unproven allegations or hearsay that may tarnish American values like justice, fairness, openness, honesty, equality, and compassion for all.   Obama administration, I hope, will never be part of “any prejudice or antagonism” against any ethnicity, nation, race, or faith.

    I welcome ANCA’s offer to discuss “these matters personally in greater detail” when Armenian falsifiers would support my desire to hear what “other American citizens” may have to say equally in a friendly, civilized, and fair conference !

    Sukru Server Aya

    Author of “Genocide of Lies”

    Istanbul

    Turkiye

    =========================

    Subject: Letter FROM  ANCA to President Obama

    The Honorable Barack Obama
    President of the United States
    The White House
    1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
    Washington, D.C. 20500

    Dear Mr. President:

    I am writing to urge you to take immediate steps to publicly reject the flawed ruling of a three judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the case of Movsesian v. Versicherung A.G. (No. 07-56722, August 20, 2009), that struck down a California law providing remedies for Armenian Genocide-era wrongs, and argued that state level recognition of this crime contradicts “express federal policy” and is therefore unconstitutional.

    – The accusation tone of the letter is short of accustomed politeness, when addressing the White House!

    – The White House is asked to interfere with the decision of U.S. Court of Appeals or evaluate a California State Law interpretation as superior to Federal Laws and U.S. Constitution or force the U.S. Government to deflect from written bilateral agreements with the sovereign Republic of Turkey.

    – The expression such as “Genocide era wrongs” is not based on any acceptable judicial decision, other than being a “rumor” circulated by biased persons or organizations.

    You bear direct responsibility, Mr. President, by virtue of your failure to keep your repeated, crystal clear pledges to recognize the Armenian Genocide, for the Court’s judgment that it is the official policy of the Executive Branch of the United States government to actively oppose proper recognition of this crime and, upon this basis, to thus prohibit states from passing laws to help Armenian Genocide-era victims seek to reclaim lost or stolen property. The Court’s interpretation of your broken promise marks an unmistakable and historic low in our government’s long complicity in Turkey’s campaign of genocide denial.

    A responsible-truth defending President, is expected to investigate deeper any pledges done during election campaigns and refrain from acting unconstitutional or unethical, just for a hasty pledge. The “Armenian Genocide” terminology is not supported by the verdict of any internationally recognized and authorized court, and legally stands no more than an allegation, hearsay, rumor and alike. The allegation of “crime” is not evidenced. On the contrary, the U.S. records in archives bear plenty evidence that the very opposite is true, or that brutalities were bilateral and mostly inflicted by the ancestors of the claimants.

    – Your organization should be aware of the fact that the new Turkish Republic agreed with U.S.A. on Dec. 24, 1923 to study and compensate the actual losses suffered by the U.S. Citizens, until that date. You should also be aware that a joint Committee was empowered with another agreement dated Oct.25, 1934 and all U.S. citizens or claimants have been given a date line to submit their claims and evidences. The claims that have been verified have been enlisted and a further agreement of “Adjustment of Payment” No.168 dated Sept.8, 1937 was concluded with Turkey. U.S.A. has confirmed with letter No.93, 1937 to the Republic of Turkey, that when the agreed amount is paid, Turkey will be “fully discharged of the obligations previously agreed”. Turkey has fulfilled the agreement, claimants have been accordingly paid and USA does not have any lawful rights to request (almost a century later) additional indemnities for cases studied and settled at that time!

    – Accusing U.S. Governments for “complicity on genocide denial” is an insult to USA and Turkey, as long as the humiliation of “genocide” stands as a word in the air, never argued or approved by an authorized tribunal. Your organization does not have the immunity to call other parties “criminal”, unless the “crime is proven and the judicial verdict is at hand”. Declarations by some Parliaments or other legally unauthorized groups are political and have no judicial merit!

    As you know, over 1.5 million Armenians lost their lives and, of course, many more were deprived of their property as a result of the Ottoman Turkish government’s systematic and deliberate campaign of race extermination. It is particularly tragic, given the thorough understanding that you have articulated regarding the moral, historical, and political meaning of this crime, that, it is under your leadership that the United States government is today not only engaged in complicity in genocide denial, but also, according to a judicial ruling, actively working to ensure that the remaining survivors and their families are denied avenues to seek to reclaim property lost during these massacres.

    – Vague expressions and accusations such as “race extermination or over 1.5 million Armenians lost their lives” stands much short of truths and the U.S. state archives because:

    a- “American Military Mission to Armenia” (General Harbord) Report 1920 and Annex Report Nat. Archives 184.021/175

    does not mention any “race extermination” but refers to “refinements of cruelty by Armenians to Muslims”.

    b- Joint US-Congress Resolution no. 192, April 22, 1922 relative to the activities of Near East Relief ending 31.12.1921, has unanimously resolved that a total of 1.414.000 Armenians were alive. Moreover, (George Montgomery) a member of the US delegation at the Paris Conference had presented a detailed tabulation in 1919, with a total of 1.104.000 Armenians alive apart from those who had already immigrated to other countries.

    c- Reliable sources show that the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire was less than 1.3 million ( or max. 1.5 millions) and hence it would be your liability to “defy and annul these official U.S. State Records”.

    Your Administration’s policies, as understood and affirmed by the Court, in addition to blocking legal redress for U.S. citizens, have now opened the door—in unprecedented and profoundly dangerous ways—for interests aligned with the Turkish government to seek to roll back several generations of American civil society efforts to mark this tragedy, including through formal recognition by 42 U.S. states. As such, we once again urge you to publicly reject the Court’s interpretation of your Administration’s position and call upon you to honor your covenant with American voters to properly recognize the Armenian Genocide.

    – Your organization is charging the Administration of “blocking legal redress of U.S. citizens” without minimal proof.

    Your organization should be aware of the fact that the Administration is responsible to protect the rights and interests of all her citizens, but after they have been naturalized. In other words, the Administration is not responsible for the loss of properties or inheritance of her citizens in the past or in the countries from where they immigrated. Such cases were settled by USA Administration at that time. This does not limit the “U.S. citizens from pursuing their personal claims individually in other countries” under their own liabilities. USA cannot deviate from her written agreements under any pressure.

    In closing, I would like to stress to you, once again, how broadly and profoundly disappointing your failure to honor your many commitments on issues of special concern to Armenian American citizens has been for the ANCA, a grassroots organization that, based upon your track record and series of publicly stated commitments, enthusiastically endorsed your candidacy and successfully mobilized an unprecedented community drive to help secure your election. In the wake of your many broken campaign commitments, your silence in the face of this profoundly misguided judicial action would compound the Armenian American community’s sense of betrayal regarding your Administration’s behind the scenes efforts to block adoption of the Armenian Genocide Resolution, your White House’s use of Turkey’s cynically-inspired “roadmap” to defer U.S. recognition, and your State Department’s shameless pressure on Armenia to accept the artificial “historical commission” that Ankara has long advanced to prevent the proper recognition of this crime.

    We remain ready, as we have shared with you on a number of past occasions, to meet with you to discuss these matters personally and in greater detail.

    [signed]
    Kenneth V. Hachikian
    Chairman

    – If your organization is disappointed because I treat American citizens of Armenian ethnicity equally with all other American citizens and cannot extend special treat for ANCA for my (secret vote) candidacy, I am afraid that your influence (if any) on your community has given priority to your personal interests and not to the interests of American citizens over all.

    There is no place for any prejudice or antagonism in USA’s relations with all other countries. It is hard to understand or justify why your community is afraid of “any type of investigation” (historical commission or others) unless there are facts that you do not wish to be brought into the light.

    My Administration has taken an oath to serve all American citizens equally and to protect their overall interests and cannot support unproven allegations or hearsays that may tarnish our commitment to “justice – openness – equality – compassion” for all parties. My administration will never be part of “any prejudice or antagonism” against any ethnicity, nation, race or faith!

    I welcome your offer to discuss “these matters personally in greater detail” when you would support my desire to hear what “other American citizens” may have to say equally in a friendly open– hearted meeting!

    (For the WHITE HOUSE !)

  • Turkey Seeks Closer Energy Partnership and LNG Contract with Qatar

    Turkey Seeks Closer Energy Partnership and LNG Contract with Qatar

    Turkey Seeks Closer Energy Partnership and LNG Contract with Qatar

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 158
    August 18, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, paid a two day visit to Turkey on August 17-18, as the guest of Turkish President Abdullah Gul. They both signed several agreements aimed at improving bilateral relations, including promoting closer cooperation on energy issues.

    On August 17, Gul and al-Thani met in Istanbul. The Turkish and Qatari delegations held working meetings during the day, discussing regional issues as well as bilateral cooperation. The first bilateral agreement signed involved a protocol concerning regulating labor issues between the two countries. The second agreement was inked between Turkish Radio and Television Corporation and Qatar’s State Television to enhance broadcasting cooperation. The parties also signed a memorandum of understanding on waiving visa requirements for their citizens (Cihan, August 17).

    During the press briefing, Gul emphasized that the high-level delegation accompanying al-Thani indicated the importance that Qatar attaches to Turkey. He noted that economic cooperation was the most important aspect of bilateral ties and highlighted Qatar’s help in facilitating Turkey’s relations with other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Gul also referred to Qatar’s constructive role in regional affairs and praised his counterpart’s efforts to mediate over regional problems. He reiterated that Turkey and Qatar held similar positions on many issues, and that they had worked together to promote regional peace. Al-Thani also highlighted their growing bilateral ties and expressed his determination to further develop this relationship. Moreover, he acknowledged Turkey’s role in regional policies, and his gratitude toward Ankara for its position on the Palestinian issue (www.tcbb.gov.tr, August 17).

    The annual trade volume between both countries remains low at $1.5 billion. However, Qatar is an important destination for Turkish contractors and its companies have undertaken multi-billion dollar projects there. Realizing the great potential created by Qatar’s infrastructure investments and its expanding economy, the Turkish private sector wants to further penetrate this market. The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO) recently announced that as part of their “Gulf Expansion” project, they will hold a major Turkish export fair in Qatar in September (Hurriyet Daily News, July 26). Turkey is also eager to attract investments from Qatar to boost its own economic development, as part of its broader attempt to turn the country into a major destination for Persian Gulf capital (EDM, February 5).

    Reflecting these interests, on the second day of his trip Gul and al-Thani attended a working breakfast of the Turkish-Qatar Business Council, hosted by Turkey’s Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK). Gul and the AKP government have proven instrumental in developing closer ties with Qatar and have promoted the flow of Qatari capital in Turkey, thanks partly to their personal ties. However, some of these business transactions were the subject of domestic political discussions. The joint-ventures between Qatari firms and businessmen close to the Turkish government continue to be a major source of criticism (Milliyet, May 1, 2008).

    The parties announced that they will set up a Turkey-Qatar Joint Energy Working Group. Gul said that they discussed the feasibility of gas pipelines, storage facilities and refineries, as well as meeting Turkey’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) needs. Gul invited Qatar to invest in the storage facilities in Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, which is the terminus of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the planned Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline. Ankara has actively promoted Ceyhan as a global energy terminal, and al-Thani responded to this offer with great enthusiasm (Vatan, August 18).

    Al-Thani also added that he hopes to see a “pipeline” running from Qatar to Turkey, and that the feasibility work on that project will continue. It was unclear, however, whether it would be a natural gas or crude pipeline, and what route it would follow.

    Prior to the visit, Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz had publicized the “natural gas” dimension of the bilateral meeting. Yildiz said that talks were underway with Qatar concerning importing LNG. Yildiz noted that his contacts with Qatar are part of a broader Turkish effort to diversify its energy suppliers and supply routes. He said that if the parties could reach a consensus, Turkey might import around 4 billion cubic meters (bcm) of LNG annually from Qatar (Anadolu Ajansi, August 16). He also added that he hoped to sign a declaration on LNG imports during the visit of the Qatari delegation, yet following the meetings no official announcement was made to that effect.

    Qatar is believed to possess the third largest gas reserves in the world, behind Russia and Iran. It is also a leading supplier of LNG and Turkey wants to develop cooperation with Qatar in natural gas projects. In July Qatar was represented during the signing ceremony of the E.U.-backed Nabucco pipeline and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan maintained that Nabucco might tap into Qatar’s gas in the future (EDM, July 14).

    Ankara has attempted to import Qatari LNG for its domestic needs for some time. During Gul’s February 2008 and Erdogan’s April 2008 visits to Qatar, energy was an important item on their agendas. They raised the issue of LNG imports, and the negotiations on this have continued since (Hurriyet, February 5, 2008; ANKA, April 15, 2008).

    As a country heavily dependent on importing natural gas, Turkey meets its needs primarily through pipelines from Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan. It also has contracts with Algeria and Nigeria to import 4 bcm and 1.2 bcm of LNG annually, respectively. However, during the heavier winters, or when there are supply disruptions caused by the problems mainly encountered with Iran, Turkey is forced to buy LNG on spot markets. Since it lacks major natural gas storage facilities, such seasonal fluctuations result in the payment of higher sums for energy bills (Radikal, August 17). Therefore, Ankara is considering expanding the country’s storage capacity and importing larger amounts of LNG through long-term contracts, which might help it avoid such problems in the future.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-seeks-closer-energy-partnership-and-lng-contract-with-qatar/
  • Turks Growing More Confident over Turkey’s International Role

    Turks Growing More Confident over Turkey’s International Role

    Turks Growing More Confident over Turkey’s International Role

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 158
    August 17, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    An Ankara-based think-tank, Uluslararasi Stratejik Arastirmalar Kurumu (USAK), announced the findings of its 2009 public opinion poll on Turkish perceptions of foreign policy (www.usak.org.tr, August 14). The survey shows that the Turkish people prioritize national interests over global causes, and a visible increase in their self-confidence can be identified. Moreover, Turks continue to support E.U. accession, while the United States is still perceived as the major risk to Turkey’s security.

    The survey indicated popular support for the government’s foreign policy. 49 percent of the 1,100 respondents believe that “Turkish foreign policy is successful,” while 27 percent evaluate it as unsuccessful, and 20 percent find it fair. The level of support for Turkish foreign policy has increased by 7 percent since the last survey in 2005.

    These results might be attributed to the effect of the government’s recent foreign policy initiatives. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s pro-Palestinian policies earlier this year bolstered his popularity at home. Moreover, the government has used energy deals with the European Union and Russia as a public relations tool domestically to argue that the country has been emerging as a major energy hub and will become a global power. Such campaigns by the government might also have boosted its support.

    There is growing self-confidence among the Turkish public about the country’s international standing. In response to the question: “Do you believe many countries are contemplating dividing Turkey?” 54 percent said yes. This is a rather high figure and it largely reflects Turkish negative perceptions of foreign powers and fears of territorial dismemberment. Nonetheless, it represents a significant decline from 72 percent in 2005 and 64 percent in 2004. The resolution of Turkey’s problems with its neighbors, and the diminishing threat from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) might explain this trend toward a more confident and less skeptical perception of the outside world.

    The question: “What should be the priority of Turkish foreign policy?” produced revealing answers. A combination of military and economic security concerns proved most popular: prevention of terror attacks (13 percent), protection of Turkey’s economic interests (12 percent), preparing defense against foreign armies (10 percent), and boosting Turkish investments abroad (8 percent). These responses show that Turkish people still prioritize the advancement of “national interests” over the promotion of “global” issues. Dealing with environmental issues was at the bottom of the list. Likewise, the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad, assisting oppressed countries, or supporting Islamic causes received low levels of support (www.usak.org.tr, August 14).

    In another significant reflection of the nationalist tendencies within Turkish society, 72 percent of the respondents defined the “identity of Turkey in international affairs” as “Turkish.” 13 percent regarded Turkey as a European state, 6 percent as Muslim and 5 percent as Middle Eastern.

    On the question: “What country threatens Turkey the most?” the United States maintained its place at the top of the list (25 percent), followed by Israel (15 percent) and France (12 percent). Although the proportion of those who perceive the U.S. as the main threat has declined compared to 29 percent in 2005 and 28 percent in 2004, its place at the top of the list is revealing. Despite the rejuvenation of Turkish-American relations under the Obama administration, and their sympathy for him, the results suggest ongoing reservations toward American “policies,” and that more concrete measures might be needed to enhance these relations. Likewise, 32 of the respondents believe the United States is the country that poses the biggest threat to world peace.

    Interestingly, these results are corroborated by the conclusions of the recent Pew Global Attitudes Survey. Although the election of Obama improved the U.S. image around the world, in Turkey along with other Muslim nations, U.S. favorability ratings still remain low (PEW, July 23).

    Nonetheless, the United States climbed to fourth place on the friendly countries list, behind Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkmenistan. In 2005, the United States ranked twelfth on the same list. Moreover, on a related question, “what country would come to Turkey’s rescue, if it was confronted a major problem such as war, civil conflict or natural disaster?” most Turks expected the United States (25 percent) to assist, followed by Azerbaijan (10 percent). Although Turks feel threatened by the policies of the United States, they essentially view it as an indispensable partner capable of providing security at difficult times, unlike other “friendly” countries that are either distant or too weak to offer any meaningful help.

    One remarkable trend among the list of “threatening countries” concerns France. Whereas those who perceived France as a source of threat accounted for only 0.69 percent in 2003, that figure rose to 2.5 in 2004, and 12.9 percent in 2009. This negative attitude toward an E.U. member is indicative of Turkish people’s reactions to recent French policies. Apparently the French support for the Armenian theses, and Paris’s vocal opposition to Turkey’s E.U. accession are resented by not only the Turkish government, but also within the society (www.usak.org.tr, August 14).

    Similarly, attitudes toward the other outspoken critic of Turkey inside the EU, Germany, also support similar conclusions. Whereas, Germany was not perceived as threatening in 2005, 1.82 percent of the respondents in 2009 said Germany threatens Turkey. Conversely, on the list of friendly countries, only 0.64 percent sees Germany as a friend, which indicates a dramatic decline from 8.2 percent in 2004.

    Together, the negative reactions to France and Germany’s attempts to block Turkish accession suggest that Turks still value the E.U. membership process and the E.U. ideal. Indeed, in response to the question “where does Turkey’s future lie?” 56 percent chose the E.U., while those who preferred the Turkish or the Islamic world remained at 23.64 and 10 percent respectively. Nonetheless, Turks believe that their country’s rejection by the E.U. is due to religious and cultural differences and historical prejudices toward Turkey.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turks-growing-more-confident-over-turkeys-international-role/
  • Turkey Seeks Closer Economic and Political Integration with Iraq

    Turkey Seeks Closer Economic and Political Integration with Iraq

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 155
    August 12, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, accompanied by Zafer Caglayan, the state minister responsible for foreign trade, visited Iraq on August 11, as part of an emerging strategic dialogue between Ankara and Baghdad. Prior to departing for Baghdad, Davutoglu held a lengthy press briefing and outlined the contours of the country’s Iraq policy. He said that Iraq is going through a dynamic process and is on the verge of an important transition, and added that Turkey is willing to play a constructive role in this process. He summarized the major goal of his trip as “conveying [to the Iraqis] the principled attitude Turkey has been pursuing on Iraq’s security, peace and future, and reiterating that Turkey stands with the Iraqi people regarding any development affecting the future of Iraq” (Anadolu Ajansi, August 11).

    In Iraq, he met his counterpart Hosyar Zebari and other Iraqi officials. During the joint press briefing with Zebari, he repeated his views about Iraq and the future of the region. He emphasized that Turkey’s relations with Iraq are based on four key principles: a common security area, high-level political dialogue, economic interdependence and peaceful coexistence on the basis of their common culture. He maintained that through unhindered cooperation in various areas, the two countries will shape the future of the region together.

    Davutoglu said that as a reflection of this shared understanding, Turkey will assist Iraq regarding the provision of sufficient water from its dams on the Euphrates to meet the needs of Iraqi farmers. Zebari reiterated Iraq’s support for Turkey’s fight against terrorism. Turkey and Iraq, with the participation of the United States, have initiated a trilateral mechanism to coordinate measures against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The latest meeting in this process took place in Ankara last month (EDM, July 29). Zebari, an ethnic Kurd, pledged that the Baghdad government and the Kurdish regional administration in Northern Iraq will implement the findings of the trilateral mechanism.

    Davutoglu’s visit occurred within the context of the recently launched “High Level Strategic Cooperation Council” (HLSCC). This concept builds on the intensive diplomatic traffic, which began with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Baghdad in July 2008, and continued with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani’s visit to Turkey in March, and Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Baghdad in the same month and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s visit to Ankara in July.

    The HLSCC is conceived as an inter-governmental forum to be co-chaired by prime ministers. As part of this process, eight ministers responsible for different fields (foreign affairs, interior, transportation, foreign trade, energy, development, health, and environment and forestry) will maintain communication at bilateral level to develop joint projects. The ministers will meet at least three times annually, while technical delegations will meet quarterly to develop joint action plans to be finalized by the annual prime-ministerial summits (www.orsam.org.tr, August 11). During his meetings in Iraq, Davutoglu also discussed preparations for the next HLSCC, expected to be held during Erdogan’s Baghdad visit in October.

    Davutoglu believes that the flourishing ties between Turkey and Iraq under this format represent a new partnership model. The importance he places on this process reflects his view of Iraq as not only a friend and neighboring country with which Turkey shares a common destiny, but also an important strategic partner. Davutoglu explicitly acknowledges that through such channels of mutual cooperation, Ankara hopes to integrate the economies of Iraq and Turkey and create a common area of security (Anadolu Ajansi, August 11).

    Meanwhile, the Turkish government also hopes to initiate a similar process with Syria (Cihan, July 23) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (EDM, July 13), as well as promoting a larger role for the Organization of Islamic Countries in the region (EDM, May 28). Through such cooperation schemes, Davutoglu wants to bolster relations among regional countries at governmental and societal levels, starting with Iraq and Syria, and turn Mesopotamia into a prosperous region. In this regard, Davutoglu confirmed in Baghdad that Turkey plans to institutionalize a trilateral mechanism between Ankara, Baghdad and Damascus based on its earlier meetings.

    Ankara’s motivation in initiating the Turkish-Iraqi strategic dialogue process is varied, yet the most immediate concern appears to be related to the security situation in Iraq. Ankara realizes that the uncertainty surrounding the future of Iraq beyond the planned withdrawal of American forces might undermine regional stability, hence eventually posing a serious threat to Turkey’s security. The Iraqi national political system still remains fragile and if the various Iraqi groups cannot manage to form a workable political system, there is a risk that Iraq might descend into civil war. Turkey is one of the first countries that would be affected by any instability in Iraq, as demonstrated by its experiences of the aftermath of the first Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War. Therefore, Davutoglu wants to engage the Iraqi factions to facilitate the formation of national institutions and ease the pain of the transition period, which, if mishandled, could destabilize the country and the entire region. Ankara’s ultimate objective in Iraq is to ensure that the country’s territorial integrity and political unity can be preserved during the transition period, so that regional peace will be maintained (EDM, July 27).

    Moreover, Turkey also has important commercial interests in Iraq, which again depend on preserving Iraq’s political stability. As Caglayan stressed, Iraq is Turkey’s fifth largest export market, and this year the bilateral trade volume is expected to reach $7 billion, making a 58 percent increase on the previous year. Turkey expects to boost the bilateral trade volume to $20 billion by 2011. Turkish firms are involved in various infrastructure projects and Iraq is a popular destination for Turkish consumer goods. Turkish contractors have already secured several multi-billion dollar projects in Iraq (Cihan, August 11). Partnership in energy is also another engine of mutual cooperation, as reflected in Maliki’s attendance at the Nabucco Summit in Ankara last month. If Iraq can successfully manage the post-invasion challenges and embark on a steady path towards economic recovery (thanks to its oil and gas revenues), it might emerge as a major market for Turkish businesses, perhaps also aiding Turkey’s own economic recovery.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-seeks-closer-economic-and-political-integration-with-iraq/
  • Turkish Economy Moves out of Freefall: Recovery Requires More Time

    Turkish Economy Moves out of Freefall: Recovery Requires More Time

    Turkish Economy Moves out of Freefall: Recovery Requires More Time

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 154
    August 11, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    The Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) released its June figures on the industrial production index, which gave mixed signals concerning the influence of the economic crisis on the Turkish economy (www.turkstat.gov.tr, Press Release, August 10). The figures show that although industrial output is still down from last year’s levels, industrial production is moving upward. The Turkish economy is no longer in the free fall, but a permanent economic recovery might not materialize soon.

    Industrial production dropped by 9.7 percent in June 2009 on a year-on-year basis, maintaining a continuous decline since the second half of 2008. After industrial production contracted by a record 23.8 percent in February, the decline in industrial output started to slow down in March, and this process has continued (EDM, June 11). As a sign of this partial recovery, in June the contraction rate dropped to single digits for the first time since November 2008. Moreover, in June industrial output increased by 7.3 percent compared to May (www.turkstat.gov.tr, August 10). This trend follows on the previous month. In May, TurkStat announced that industrial output increased by 0.8 percent compared to April (www.cnnturk.com, July 31).

    According to the main industrial groupings (MIG’s) classification, the highest decline in June compared with the previous year was in capital goods -by 29.7 percent. Production declined by 10.6 percent in manufacturing industry, 7.9 percent in mining, and 7 percent in energy.

    Economists suggest that the slowing of the decline over four consecutive months and the rise in output on a month-on-month basis has bolstered expectations that the contraction might be bottoming out. Tanil Kucuk, the Chairman of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ISO), said that although 9.7 percent is a very high rate of decline under normal conditions, “looking at the economic situation for the past year, we consider this development the lesser of two evils and find it promising” (Hurriyet Daily News, August 10).

    Experts believe that there is a visible upturn in the Turkish economy. Recently released economic figures also lend partial support to this optimistic outlook. Data released by the Central Bank showed that the current account deficit dropped 65 percent in June on a year-on-year basis. In the first half of 2009, the current account deficit was also down 75.7 percent compared to the same period last year (www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 10). According to the projections of TurkStat based on the figures from the first half of 2008, Turkey’s foreign trade deficit is likely to decrease by the end of the year and will drop to $27.2 billion (Referans, August 11). At the end of 2008, Turkey’s foreign trade balance recorded a $69.8 billion deficit (Milliyet, January 30). The exponentially growing foreign account deficit and foreign trade deficit were major concerns for the Turkish economy prior to the global financial crisis. The slowdown brought about by the crisis had a positive effect by curbing Turkey’s imports. Although exports also declined, as a result of the shrinking global economy, the Central Bank estimates that Turkey’s export volume will grow as the global economy starts to recover.

    The improvement is attributed largely to the economic recovery plans which the government launched in the first half of the year. Through several stimulus packages, the government introduced temporary tax cuts on automobiles, home appliances and housing in order to generate domestic demand and reduce the impact of the crisis on the country (EDM, March 16). The effect of the economic packages in this recovery is evident, especially in household appliances production, where there is a clear increase. The production of durable consumer goods increased by 7.2 percent and perishable consumer goods increased by 1.8 percent. However, the production decline within the automotive sector has continued (www.turkstat.gov.tr, August 10).

    Nonetheless, experts estimate that the effect of the domestic demand generated by the stimulus packages might wane after August. Therefore, they expect the contraction in the economy to persist in the third quarter of 2009, and perhaps beyond (www.ntvmsnbc.com, August 10). Therefore, though finding the recent figures promising, the representatives of industrialists had expected more than “hope” and called on the government to take additional precautions to get the country out of recession (Anadolu Ajansi, August 10).

    However, given the heavy costs of the previous packages on the treasury, the government is unlikely to pass a large-scale stimulus package. Due to the public spending ahead of the March local elections and the declining state revenues as a result of the crisis, the budget deficit has already surpassed the estimates at the beginning of the year. While the deficit is expected to reach TL 70 billion at the end of the year, the government is trying to keep it within the range of TL 60 billion. Toward this end, it has already raised some taxes and announced cuts in spending, including healthcare. Therefore, rather than introducing new packages to stimulate demand, the government is working on new measures to narrow the budget deficit (Radikal, July 23). Although tax hikes and limitations on government spending might narrow the gap, they may also curb demand and negatively affect growth.

    The Turkish economy may no longer be in free fall, but it is unclear how sustainable the recovery might prove. Since the effect of the domestic stimulus packages appears to be short-lived and the government is unlikely to initiate any new stimulus packages, the Turkish economy’s sustainable recovery depends on external demand, and hence developments within the global economy.

    Fortunately, the upward trend in the Turkish economy is accompanied by the recent news coming from the world markets. American, Chinese and other large economies also reported the positive effect of economic packages in preventing the deepening of the global recession. While signs of recovery have raised hopes that the global economic downturn might be coming to an end, it is too early to expect an expanding external demand to stimulate the Turkish economy. Therefore, it might take more time before Turkey can move out of the recession.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-economy-moves-out-of-freefall-recovery-requires-more-time/
  • Progress in Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices and Transit

    Progress in Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices and Transit

    Progress in Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices and Transit

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 153
    August 10, 2009
    By: Saban Kardas
    Following the signing of energy cooperation agreements between Turkey and Russia, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz continued his “energy diplomacy,” by visiting Azerbaijan. Prior to departing for the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, the Azerbaijani enclave between Turkey and Armenia, on August 8 Yildiz stressed that his trip followed the agreements Turkey recently signed on both the Nabucco project and South Stream. He also added that as part of intensive energy diplomacy, he will travel to Syria this week to sign an agreement for the construction of a pipeline that will connect the Arab gas pipeline with the Turkish grid (Anadolu Ajansi, August 8).

    In Nakhchivan, Yildiz met with the President of Nakhchivan Vasif Talibov and the head of the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR, Rovnag Abdullayev. Turkey and Nakhchivan signed a memorandum of understanding on laying a pipeline from the East Anatolian city of Igdir to Nakhchivan, which will carry half a billion cubic meters (bcm) of Azeri gas annually to Nakhchivan (Cihan, August 8).

    Another major part of Yildiz’s agenda were talks between Turkey and Azerbaijan concerning the gas trade and transportation. Although the negotiations have been under way for some time, Ankara and Baku have been unable to reach an agreement on three inter-related issues: re-pricing the gas Turkey imports from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz I reserves, setting the price and volume for Turkey’s imports from the Shah Deniz II, and developing a regime for the transit of the gas through the Turkish territory (www.cnnturk.com, August 8).

    These issues have implications beyond bilateral relations between Ankara and Baku. In the context of the discussions concerning the construction of alternative pipelines carrying Caspian basin gas to European markets, there is growing interest in tapping into Azerbaijan’s resources, particularly the Shah Deniz II field, which is expected to be operational by 2016. Whereas the European companies are interested in purchasing Azeri gas to feed Nabucco, Russia has been trying to lock in the same resources through a long-term contract to supply its alternative South Stream project and to pre-empt Nabucco. Baku is looking to secure the best deal from this competition, and diversify its export routes as much as possible, which led it to export a symbolic volume of gas to Russia through a non-binding agreement in June, which seems to have paid some tactical dividends (EDM, July 17).

    Azerbaijan’s decision is considered as a “flexible tactical move” on Baku’s part (EDM, July 2). The agreement demonstrated to Ankara and its Nabucco partners that Azerbaijan was not short of options for the sale and transport of its gas. Indeed, the urgency induced by the agreement served as a wake-up call for Turkey and other European countries, which helped convince Ankara to end its stalling and open the way to sign the Nabucco inter-governmental agreement (EDM, July 6).

    Nonetheless, a second tactical goal of the Azeri-Russian agreement has yet to bear concrete results: “the $350 price offer [which Russia will pay for the Azeri gas] has set a benchmark that other importers of Azerbaijani gas may have to bid against” (EDM, July 2). Indeed, Baku’s sudden move surprised many in Ankara at the time, leading to speculation that Turkey might have to pay higher prices. Nonetheless, when asked about the impact of the Azeri-Russian deal on the Turkish-Azeri talks on re-pricing, Yildiz preferred to decouple the two processes from each other. “How much does the [Azeri-Russian agreement] affect the price? This question should be directed to Abdullayev. We had submitted our offer before the agreement with Russia, and we are still at the same position. Because, [we believe] our price offer takes into account both sides’ interests, and ensures that the project remains feasible” (www.haberturk.com, July 10).

    Ankara claimed that it offered a “fair” price to Baku, and it expected this to be accepted (EDM, June 4). Apparently Turkey proved unable to satisfy the expectations of the Azeri side, and Yildiz and Abdullayev have held several meetings to discuss this issue. Ankara’s reluctance to revise the price for Azeri gas raises suspicions that, using its geographic position as leverage, Ankara is resorting to “tactics of extortion” to maximize its benefits at Azerbaijan’s expense, which might eventually undermine the prospects for Nabucco (EDM, July 2).

    Nonetheless, Azerbaijan’s ongoing talks with Turkey demonstrate its willingness to export its gas to European markets independent of Russian-controlled pipelines and its treatment of Nabucco as an overriding national interest. However, the conditions that Ankara will attach to the use of its territory for exports, including transit fees and re-export rights, are a major factor influencing Baku’s decision, which raises a larger question about the Turkish government’s position on pipeline diplomacy.

    After signing agreements on both Nabucco and South Stream, Ankara maintains that the two projects are not necessarily exclusive. Moreover, in response to charges that Turkey’s agreement with Russia, which granted South Stream the right to conduct seismic feasibility studies in the Turkish zone of the Black Sea, was a serious blow to Nabucco, Turkish officials maintain that “Turkey is not a partner in the South Stream project and only allowed the use of its territorial waters in the Black Sea, while the country is a partner state in Nabucco.” They also added that Turkey still considers Nabucco as a strategic priority (Hurriyet Daily News, August 7).

    If Turkey indeed treats Nabucco as a priority project, one area where it could tilt the balance in favor of Nabucco is to facilitate the westward flow of Azeri gas. In this way, it could cement its ties to Baku and reassure its Western partners of its commitment to Nabucco. No agreement was signed during Yildiz’s meeting, but the statements by Azeri officials signaled a promising future. Abdullayev said that, “we came close to concluding Turkey-Azerbaijan gas agreements. We can soon finalize the issue of transit prices. Gas from Shah Deniz will also come to Turkey, and will flow to Europe through Turkey. This will support the two sister nations” (www.ntvturk.com, August 8).

    https://jamestown.org/program/progress-in-turkish-azeri-talks-on-gas-prices-and-transit/