Category: Authors

THESE OUTRAGES

Behold Turkey! The land where the innocent go to jail and the criminals go to parliament. A land wracked by poverty and unemployment, a land whose young people seethe with hopelessness. A land ransacked, divided, destroyed by craven politicians who have pandered to American interests for generations. A nation represented by mannerless embarrassments boundless in their oblivion. Behold all this and weep. Then ask…

WHY DO WE GENUINE OWNERS OF ATATÜRK’S NATION ACCEPT THESE OUTRAGES?

Cem Ryan, Ph.D. Istanbul, Turkey

September 29, 2009
Turkey Proceeds with its Economic Recovery Plans

Turkey Proceeds with its Economic Recovery Plans

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 174September 23, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

On September 16, Turkey’s Economy Minister Ali Babacan revealed the government’s medium term economic plan for 2010-2012, prepared by the state planning agency. Babacan acknowledged that the contraction in growth by the end of the year may reach 6 percent, rather than the previous estimate of 3.6 percent. According to his forecasts, the economy will experience growth rates of 3.5 percent in 2010, 4 percent in 2011 and 5 percent in 2012. The government also expects the budget deficit to reach 62.8 billion TL ($42.9 billion), then starting to fall to 50 billion TL ($33.8 billion) in 2010 and 45.1 billion TL ($30.5 billion) in 2011, and 39.1 billion TL ($26.4 billion) in 2012. Similarly, the current account deficit is also forecast to reach $18 billion. Babacan acknowledged that despite a modest recovery, unemployment is set to remain at around its current rate of 14 percent in 2010, which is well above the pre-crisis rate of 10.8 percent (www.cnnturk.com, www.ntvmsnbc.com, September 16).

The global financial crisis was a serious blow to the Turkish economy, which led to a drastic decline in production and employment in sectors heavily dependent on exports. Although the government initiated several economic stimulus packages, their effectiveness has proven limited. They slowed the contraction of the economy, but are far from stimulating a sustainable economic recovery. The soaring budget deficit due to the economic crisis has been a growing concern among economists (EDM, August 11).

Therefore, economists expected the government to focus on taking precautions to address the budget deficit in 2010-2012. In contrast to initial speculation that the government might have set unrealistic targets in terms of growth and fiscal balances, experts evaluating the middle term economic plan argued that it is based on a realistic prognosis of the economic conditions and a pragmatic outlook to address the problems. Rather than expecting an ambitious short term recovery, the government prefers a gradual approach aimed at improving economic conditions (Anadolu Ajansi, Today’s Zaman, September 17).

Following the announcement of the plan, international credit rating agencies also responded positively. Standard & Poor raised Turkey’s credit rating outlook from negative to stable, while Moody’s upgraded the outlook on Turkey’s Ba3 bond rating from stable to positive (www.ntvmsnbc.com, September 18).

On the implementation side, one factor that makes economists believe that the plan is realistic is the decision to introduce a “fiscal rule” into public administration starting from 2011. Once it is in place, it is expected to contribute to long term fiscal stability, by setting limitations on public spending. This rule was required by the IMF as part of the loan negotiations with Ankara (EDM, January 29).

However, the role of the IMF in the implementation of the plan has proven controversial. Ankara was engaged in protracted negotiations for over a year with the IMF in order to secure a loan. Despite the recent announcement of progress in these talks, it remains unclear whether Turkey will eventually sign a stand-by deal. The critics of the AKP’s economic policies argue that an agreement with the IMF is necessary to inject credibility into its economic policies and boost confidence in the market, contributing to a more sustainable recovery.

However, some analysts believe that the medium term plan indicates that the government might implement the precautions without the IMF, while others speculate that the IMF could remain an option. Babacan also added to the sense of confusion. On the one hand, he said that Turkey will discuss the new medium term plan with the IMF. If both sides achieve consensus, Ankara will prefer to sign a stand-by deal. On the other hand, he maintained that although an IMF loan would help the Turkish economy, the IMF financing was not necessary for the implementation of the plan. He added that the plan was prepared on the assumption that in case an agreement was reached with the IMF, the extra resources would be channeled into the domestic market directly, in order that the banking sector could distribute money for private consumption and investment (www.cnnturk.com, September 16).

The IMF welcomed the plan and found it realistic, reflecting the impact of the global financial crisis on Turkey. In addition to the fiscal rule, the announcement supported Ankara’s plan to cut the ratio of public debt to GDP. It called on Turkey to adopt supporting policies and structural reforms, including measures to address areas that create spending pressures, so that Ankara might achieve its goal of controlling public debt (www.cnnturk.com, September 17).

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey had survived the crisis without IMF loans. It could continue its path without IMF assistance and would not accept IMF requirements concerning taxes and spending. Therefore, the future of an IMF deal remains uncertain (Hurriyet Daily News, September 18).

Another major aspect of the plan is that it does not foresee any major hikes in corporate, income and value-added taxes, which equally motivates the government to restrict IMF involvement. Although there were widespread expectations that the government might opt for tax increases to reduce the budget deficit burden, it refrained from pursuing this policy. This decision partly reflects the government’s desire to limit the effect of the economic recovery plan on consumers and the markets, by avoiding policies that might curb economic activity. The government believes that the Turkish economy could recover quickly based on its own dynamics, as long as it is kept vibrant, once the global economic environment starts to improve.

One factor that boosts the government’s self-confidence is the condition of the Turkish banking sector. Babacan, therefore, argued that unlike other Western economies where the collapse of the financial institutions triggered the economic crisis, the Turkish banking system remained intact and was in good condition. Consequently, he expects a rather smooth economic recovery, centered on the private sector (www.cnnturk.com, September 16).

Despite the government’s positive outlook on the Turkish economy’s vibrancy, the implementation of the plan and a sustainable economic recovery will also depend upon developments in the global economy. Moreover, the government’s ability to withstand the spending pressures to be generated by the next general election slated for 2011 will be a major test of its determination to reduce public debt, a core element of Turkey’s medium-term economic plan.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-proceeds-with-its-economic-recovery-plans/

September 24, 2009
Turkey Boosts its Ties with Syria and the Middle East

Turkey Boosts its Ties with Syria and the Middle East

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 171September 18, 2009 05

By: Saban Kardas

The Syrian President Bashar al-Assad visited Turkey on September 16-17 as the special guest of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, during which the two countries signed landmark agreements to deepen their bilateral relations. Assad attended a Ramadan fast-breaking dinner on September 16, held in his honor by the Justice and Development Party (AKP). He expressed Syrian support for Turkey’s recent Kurdish opening. Both leaders emphasized their desire to end the terrorist problem in Turkey through democratic initiatives and transform the Middle East into an area of peace and stability. Assad also praised Turkey’s role as peacemaker in the Syrian-Israeli indirect peace talks, which he described as “reliable.” He said that they still needed Turkey’s impartial mediatory role in the peace process (Anadolu Ajansi, September 16).

The first visible achievement of Assad’s trip was the lifting of visa requirements between the countries. In a related development, they also agreed to remove taxes on trailer trucks operating between both countries. Given the flourishing of bilateral trade, these developments were welcomed by many Turks, especially those living in provinces on the border, where trade with Syria constitutes a major source of economic activity. Representatives of the business community expect the trade volume to double following the agreement on these new regulations (Yeni Safak, September 18).

In a related decision a High-level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) was established between the two countries. Turkey has followed a similar pattern in its efforts to deepen its multi-dimensional political, economic and cultural ties with Iraq. The format of the Turkish-Syrian council will resemble the model used between Turkey and Iraq (EDM, August 12).

During his joint press briefing with his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu, the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mualem said that “this is the biggest demonstration of cooperation, solidarity and mutual trust.” Davutoglu concurred by saying that this decision moved the brotherhood between the two nations to a political level (Anadolu Ajansi, September 17).

Meanwhile, the first ministerial meeting of the Turkey-Iraq HLSCC also took place in Istanbul on September 17. Speaking at this meeting, Davutoglu said that the two governments are willing to shape their countries’ future in line with the model partnership framework being developed. He added that their goal is to achieve the most comprehensive economic integration between the two countries. His Iraqi counterpart reciprocated by saying that “we desire cooperation that could help shape the future of the region” (Anadolu Ajansi, September 17).

This intensive diplomatic traffic also provides another opportunity for Turkey to act in a mediation role. On the sidelines of the Turkey-Iraq HSCC, Davutoglu brought together Mualem and his Iraqi counterpart Hoshyar Zebari, joined by the Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa. The meeting was held to facilitate the ongoing dialogue between Syria and Iraq aimed at reducing tensions between the two countries following Baghdad’s claim that Damascus was behind the terrorist attacks in the Iraqi capital in August. They mutually withdrew their ambassadors and Turkish diplomats have been working intensively to heal the strained relations, which it views in terms of developing closer regional integration. Earlier, Davutoglu toured the two capitals and attended an Arab League meeting in Cairo to address this problem. Although no specific steps to solve Syrian-Iraqi tensions were announced, Davutoglu emphasized that Turkey would promote confidence building measures between the two brotherly nations, and he will also explore the involvement of the United Nations in the crisis (Cihan, September 17).

The removal of barriers between Turkey and Syria has a strong symbolic meaning, and reflects a deliberate attempt on the part of the two governments to overcome the political divisions that kept them apart for decades. When the Turkish-Syrian border was formed following the First World War, many families were separated on both sides of the border. During the Cold War even mutual family visits on the occasion of religious feasts were difficult to conduct. In the post-Cold War era, such border crossings were facilitated through the issuing of short term visas. Nonetheless, for decades, the Turkish-Syrian border and those visa difficulties symbolized the political and ideological isolation of Turkey from its Middle Eastern, cultural hinterland. This decision, therefore, complements earlier initiatives undertaken by the AKP government to normalize Turkish-Syrian relations, such as the clearing of the mines on the Turkish side of the border (EDM, May 21), or holding joint military exercises in border areas (EDM, May 1). Through such steps, Turkey has moved toward reconnecting with its Middle Eastern neighbors. Moreover, it sees this reorientation as more than a cultural project: rather, it is part of Turkey’s efforts to develop platforms to resolve security problems in the region through the involvement of local actors.

Indeed, Assad also underscored a similar vision when he addressed the fast-breaking dinner. After emphasizing that for centuries people sharing the same culture were divided, he maintained that this problem was caused by the local leaders’ failure to appreciate the pitfalls of acting in line with the manipulations of great powers. However, he avoided apportioning the blame exclusively on great powers, and engaged in self-criticism by noting that many of the problems in the region were of their own making. He called for the resolution of “regional problems by the regional countries themselves,” a sentiment that resonates well with Turkey’s foreign policy vision (www.cnnturk.com, September 17).

Nonetheless, such initiatives raise the question of whether Turkey is reorienting its foreign policy priorities. Although the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Deputy Head Onur Oymen, a former diplomat, supported the establishment of the HLSCC and the normalization of relations with the country’s neighbors, he still raised key questions: “Given its values, Turkey belongs to Europe. We do not even have mutual visa lifting agreements with our E.U. neighbors… But we sign such agreements with Syria and other Muslim countries with which [we do not share the same world view]. Is this indicating a break with Turkey’s traditional foreign policy orientation?” (ANKA, September 17).

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-boosts-its-ties-with-syria-and-the-middle-east/

September 23, 2009
Patriot Missile Procurement Option Sparks Controversy in Turkey

Patriot Missile Procurement Option Sparks Controversy in Turkey

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 170September 17, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

The Turkish government’s possible purchase of missile defense systems from the United States, as part of an ongoing tender, has sparked a new debate on Ankara’s new regional policies and its domestic arms procurement projects. On September 9, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified the U.S. Congress of a possible sale to Turkey of 13 Patriot fire units, various Patriot missiles including the advanced capability (PAC-3) missiles, and other related support equipment. Raytheon Corporation and Lockheed-Martin are the principal contractors and if they are awarded the tender, the project is estimated to cost $7.8 billion. The statement described Turkey as the major U.S. ally in the region and added that by acquiring these systems Turkey will “improve its missile defense capability, strengthen its homeland defense, and deter regional threats” (www.dsca.mil, September 9).

Although this notice is a legal requirement for an ongoing tender, and did not mean a sale was concluded, the Turkish press widely covered this development and labeled it as one of the largest arms sales agreements in the country’s history. The extensive coverage of the story led to an impression that Ankara had already “decided to purchase” the Patriot systems.

The Turkish media maintained that Turkey wants Patriot platforms to defend itself against Iran and linked this decision to U.S. plans to build a missile shield. Others, by contrast, claimed that the U.S. decision was sparked by a concern to thwart Turkey’s negotiations with Russia over the purchase of the new generation S-400 platforms. Moreover, the Turkish press also highlighted that the country would be returning as a major customer of U.S. weapons systems, after having granted several multi-billion projects to other countries (Turkiye, Vatan, Hurriyet, September 13; Radikal, September 14).

To defuse such speculation, the Turkish defense ministry released a statement in which it said that the notice was part of Turkey’s ongoing international tender to acquire long-range air and missile-defense systems. Under this program, which was launched in June 2006, the under secretariat for the defense industry (SSM) issued a request for a proposal in April 2009 for the direct purchase of missile systems. The statement also underscored that in addition to the U.S. companies Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, requests for proposals were also sent to China’s Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation (CPMIEC) and Russia’s Rosoboronexport. Moreover, since possible U.S. exports will take place under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits, a separate letter of request was also sent to the U.S. administration (ANKA, September 14).

The statement, however, did not end the debate. Critics raised two questions: from whom Turkey plans to purchase these systems and whether this multi-billion dollar project is justified given the huge financial burden involved.

Several Turkish and international observers quoted by the Turkish press maintained that the project was developed to quell threats from Iran. They believe that despite its flourishing ties with Iran, Turkey still perceives a threat from Iran’s nuclear program. Through the missile defense system, allegedly, Turkey seeks to enhance its defensive capabilities against Iran’s medium-range Scud missiles or long-range Sahab missile program. To substantiate their arguments, they referred to a report submitted to the U.S. Congress in February 2008, (Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East), in which it was stated that the United States should acknowledge Turkey’s concerns and contribute to its development of a missile defense capability (www.superonline.com, September 13; Vatan, September 15).

The congressional report concluded that considering Iran’s ballistic missile program has a range to strike any part of Turkish territory, combined with the prospect of eventual Iranian nuclear weapons capability, Turkey had concerns about the balance of power shifting in Iran’s favor. The report warned that if Turkey’s legitimate missile defense concerns were not met, it might opt for the development of a “Turkish bomb.” Since the U.S. plan for any future ballistic missile defense shield in Europe would not include Turkey, the report proposed that “the U.S. government should remove unnecessary obstacles to the speedy development of a missile defense system that addresses Turkey’s needs” (www.gpo.gov, February 27, 2008).

Several Turkish experts, however, criticized the plans for the purchase of this weapons system and the designation of Iran as a source of threat. Some speculated that this project is not driven by Turkey’s real needs. Rather, it is promoted by the “weapons lobby,” which is trying to make profits by sowing seeds of distrust between Turkey and its neighbors, Iran and Russia. They add that the media reports about Turkey’s perception of Iran as a threat are merely the manipulations of these weapons lobbies. Others maintain that “if this purchase ever takes place, it will be inflammatory, especially while Turkey is trying to be a peacemaker in the region” (Today’s Zaman; www.usak.org.tr, September 15).

Asked about how the purchase of these systems can be reconciled with the government’s policy of normalization with its neighbors, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu ruled out any specified target. “[Developing projects to meet our security needs] is not an alternative to [Turkey’s regional policies]. It does not mean that we perceive threats from any neighbors. Our policy of ‘zero problem with our neighbors’ is still intact” Davutoglu said (Cihan; ANKA, September 15).

The second line of criticism emphasizes the financial burden of the project. Some maintain that given the economic difficulties the country is experiencing and in light of the soaring budget deficit, such spending on expensive weapons systems, which in their view does not correspond to Turkey’s real security needs, cannot be justified. The critics call for redesigning Turkey’s defense procurement policies and significant cuts on arms expenditures (Taraf, September 14; Yeni Asya, September 16). Others emphasize that this development underscores an underlying problem: the lack of democratic and parliamentary scrutiny over Turkey’s arms procurement policy, which creates an imbalance between the country’s improving relations with its neighbors and the priorities of the military establishment (Taraf, September 16).

While improving relations with its neighbors, Turkey is also intent on hedging against future threats, reflecting the volatile nature of the region. Although as a member of the transatlantic alliance, it is a part of NATO’s security umbrella, Turkey realizes that in the past, there were problems in the activation of NATO security guarantees. Most notably, the dispatch of Patriot systems during the Gulf War (1991) and Iraq War (2003) were delayed due to intra-NATO disagreements, which fostered a legacy of developing national capabilities. Despite the domestic criticisms, the Turkish defense industry is unlikely to drop its plans to acquire missile defense systems any time soon.

https://jamestown.org/program/patriot-missile-procurement-option-sparks-controversy-in-turkey/

September 18, 2009
Poor Richard’s Report

Poor Richard’s Report

                                                                                                Over 300,150 readers

My Mission: God has uniquely designed me to seek, write, and speak the truth as I see it. Preservation of one’s wealth while providing needful income is my primary goal in these unsettled times. I have been given the ability to evaluate, study, and interpret world and national events and their influence on the future of the financial markets. This gift allows me to meet the needs of individual and institution clients. I evaluate situations first on a fundamental basis then try to confirm on a technical basis. In the past it has been fairly successful.

                             SPECIAL BULLITEN:

                             Our President is about to be Tested – Big Time

            The Middle East is about to blow sky high. We have now involved the UN Security counsel plus Germany (called P-5+1) to make Iran negotiate their nuclear weapons program. The due date is September 24, 2009. To make matters worse the President promised Israel that if they did not take military action with Iran, he would deliver crippling sanctions with Iran.

Big deal. What we withhold, China and Russia will deliver. This is now guts ball diplomacy that will reverberate across the whole world.

            Here is a scary and realistic scenario that could happen while everyone is concerned with what is going on in the kiddy pool of health care reform and economic recovery.

            ISRAEL will never, never allow itself to be at mortal risk. If and when their intelligence concludes the Iranians are close to getting a bomb, diplomacy will end. Russian expansionism has always been in the setting of somebody else’s war. Putin will ignite the match if he ever gets the chance. Imagine. They get Georgia without a contest, and open the door to secure Ukraine, and make trillions of Rubles selling “high test” to Europe after the Iranians close the Straits of Hormuz. It would stir up a real blizzard and they could retake the Baltic region while NATO is off figuring out how to get the gulf oil turned back on.

Buy GLD (NYSE-$99+) or CEF (NYSE-$13+) and top off your home fuel tanks.

Have a strong cash position also.

Richard C De Graff

256 Ashford Road

RER      Eastford Ct 06242

860-522-7171 Main Office

800-821-6665 Watts

860-315-7413 Home/Office

rdegraff@coburnfinancial.com

This report has been prepared from original sources and data which we believe reliable but we make no representation to its accuracy or completeness. Coburn & Meredith Inc. its subsidiaries and or officers may from time to time acquire, hold, sell a position discussed in this publications, and we may act as principal for our own account or as agent for both the buyer and seller.

September 17, 2009
Turkish Opposition Remains Skeptical of Government’s “Armenian Opening”

Turkish Opposition Remains Skeptical of Government’s “Armenian Opening”

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 6 Issue: 169

September 16, 2009

By: Saban Kardas

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met the leaders of opposition parties as part of his attempt to brief them about recent developments in Turkish foreign policy, and solicit their support for the government’s “Armenian opening.” On August 31, Turkey and Armenia announced the details of a roadmap for the normalization of bilateral relations. The parties initialed two protocols regulating the steps to be taken toward the resolution of contentious issues. To allay concerns among domestic opposition parties and in Azerbaijan, the Turkish government emphasized that the final decision would rest with parliament and that Baku’s views would be taken into account during the parliamentary approval process (EDM, September 8).

Since accomplishing the objectives of normalization would require bold steps and political determination on the part of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, this new initiative is denoted as the “Armenian opening,” echoing the recent Kurdish opening. Given the necessity of parliamentary approval, the focus of the policy on Armenia has shifted to the domestic political processes.

Davutoglu, at the urging of Prime Minister of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has taken time out from his heavy international diplomatic agenda to win over the opposition parties for the normalization policy. Davutoglu met Deniz Baykal, the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the leaders of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Felicity Party (SP) Numan Kurtulmus and Masum Turker respectively. However, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli, who has been the most outspoken critic of the Armenian opening, refused to meet him. Earlier, Davutoglu met Parliamentary Speaker Mehmet Ali Sahin, and he is scheduled to have additional meetings with the leaders of parties that received at least 1 percent of the popular vote in the July 2007 parliamentary elections. He also met the opposition leaders in May, following his appointment as foreign minister (Today’s Zaman, September 16).

One common theme emerging from Davutoglu’s contacts is that the opposition leaders unequivocally state that any progress in Turkish-Armenian relations needs to be contingent upon the protection of Azerbaijan’s concerns over Karabakh. In response, Davutoglu sought to reassure them that normalization with Armenia would not come at the expense of harming ties with Azerbaijan, and that Baku was being informed about the progress of Turkish-Armenian talks (Anadolu Ajansi, September 15).

Another common theme is the skepticism of the opposition parties toward the contents and the form of the Armenian opening, especially the involvement of foreign actors. They continue to view the opening as an agenda imposed upon Turkey by external forces, and believe that the main benefactor of the process will be Armenia.

For instance, SP’s Kurtulmus maintained that according to popular perceptions, the process seemed to be driven by Armenia, and that Turkey appeared to be only a passive player. He asked Davutoglu to correct this image. He also expressed his reservations about the committee of historians, and maintained that the committee would be unlikely to reach a decision disproving Armenian genocide claims. Kurtulmus also criticized the government’s recognition of Switzerland as the mediator between Turkey and Armenia, arguing that as a country that punishes the denial of the “Armenian genocide” claims, Switzerland could not be considered as impartial in this issue. DSP’s Turker, also shared similar concerns (Cihan, September 15).

The main opposition leader Baykal raised the most vocal criticisms. During the joint press brief after meeting with Davutoglu, Baykal noted that the CHP considered foreign policy issues as “state policies” that require a national consensus. He added that his party’s decision to meet Davutoglu was meant to make a contribution to state policy, and should not be interpreted as representing “support” for the government’s agenda. He stated his disappointment with the government’s overall approach to this issue, and reiterated his earlier position that the normalization agenda is imposed upon Turkey. “There is a process and a roadmap underway which is beyond the knowledge of the opposition parties. Now, through these contacts, the government is not asking ‘Let us discuss Turkey’s interests, and formulate [the policies] together.’ The government is saying to us. ‘We are given a roadmap. We decided to implement it; come, help us realize this roadmap.’ This is not an effort to formulate a policy. This is an effort to find support for a program that is already formed,” Baykal objected (ANKA, September 15).

Baykal also characterized the two protocols as “traps.” He argued that although the protocols satisfy Armenian concerns by laying out the details of Turkey’s re-opening of the border, they fall short of meeting Turkish demands regarding Armenia’s recognition of the Kars Treaty on defining the Turkish-Armenian border, or the renunciation of its policy of having its genocide claims recognized worldwide, and ending its occupation of Karabakh. He expressed concern that the protocols offered no safeguards against the possibility that after Turkey opens the border, Armenia might later renege on its promises. Therefore, he demanded that the government must refuse to sign the protocols. Baykal also speculated that the government would sign the protocols with Armenia on October 13 (Hurriyet, September 16).

Both the Turkish and Armenian governments have to tackle domestic opposition, in addition to the dilemmas of overcoming differences of opinion and building trust in the bilateral talks. Indeed, the Turkish-Armenian declarations recognize the challenges of obtaining broad-based social and political support, and give the parties six weeks to engage in domestic discussions before the protocols are forwarded to parliaments for final ratification.

Given the strength of nationalistic sentiments in Turkey, one challenge for the AKP government has been to present the Armenian opening as a “national” policy, rather than a parochial agenda promoted by the AKP, or a project externally imposed upon Turkey. The six-week deadline has provided an impetus for each government to stimulate debate on the issue, but as the Turkish case suggests this deadline is too unrealistic to facilitate any meaningful and genuine democratic deliberation on a dispute mired in historical memories and current geopolitical conflicts. Davutoglu’s meetings further show that a new conflict is looming over the AKP’s foreign policy when the Armenian opening comes before parliament.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-opposition-remains-skeptical-of-governments-armenian-opening/

September 17, 2009