Category: Authors

How Turkey was lost

Sunday, October 18, 2009

“Turkey is lost and we’d better make our peace with this devastating fact.” (Jerusalem Post)

Column One: How Turkey was lost

Oct. 15, 2009

Caroline Glick, THE JERUSALEM POST

Once the apotheosis of a pro-Western, dependable Muslim democracy, this week Turkey officially left the Western alliance and became a full member of the Iranian axis.

It isn’t that Ankara’s behavior changed fundamentally in recent days. There is nothing new in its massive hostility toward Israel and its effusive solicitousness toward the likes of Syria and Hamas. Since the Islamist AKP party first won control over the Turkish government in the 2002 elections, led by AKP chairman Recip Tayyip Erdogan, the Turks have incrementally and inexorably moved the formerly pro-Western Muslim democracy into the radical Islamist camp populated by the likes of Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, al-Qaida and Hamas.

What made Turkey’s behavior this week different from its behavior in recent months and years is that its attacks were concentrated, unequivocal and undeniable for everyone outside of Israel’s scandalously imbecilic and flagellant media.

Until this week, both Israel and the US were quick to make excuses for Ankara. When in 2003 the AKP-dominated Turkish parliament prohibited US forces from invading Iraq through Kurdistan, the US blamed itself. Rather than get angry at Turkey, the Bush administration argued that its senior officials had played the diplomatic game poorly.

In February 2006, when Erdogan became the first international figure to host Hamas leaders on an official state visit after the jihadist group won the Palestinian elections, Jerusalem sought to explain away his diplomatic aggression. Israeli leaders claimed that Erdogan’s red carpet treatment for mass murderers who seek the physical destruction of Israel was not due to any inherent hostility on the part of the AKP regime toward Israel. Rather, it was argued that Ankara simply supported democracy and that the AKP, as a formerly outlawed Islamist party, felt an affinity toward Hamas as a Muslim underdog.

Jerusalem made similar excuses for Ankara when during the 2006 war with Hizbullah Turkey turned a blind eye to Iranian weapons convoys to Lebanon that traversed Turkey; when Turkey sided with Hamas against Israel during Operation Cast Lead, and called among other things for Israel to be expelled from the UN; and when Erdogan caused a diplomatic incident this past January by castigating President Shimon Peres during a joint appearance at the Davos conference. So, too, Turkey’s open support for Iran’s nuclear weapons program and its galloping trade with Teheran and Damascus, as well as its embrace of al-Qaida financiers have elicited nothing more than grumbles from Israel and America.

Initially, this week Israel sought to continue its policy of making excuses for Turkish aggression against it. On Sunday, after Turkey disinvited the IAF from the Anatolian Eagle joint air exercise with Turkey and NATO, senior officials like Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon and opposition leader Tzipi Livni tried to make light of the incident, claiming that Turkey remains Israel’s strategic ally.

But Turkey wasted no time in making fools of them. On Monday, 11 Turkish government ministers descended on Syria to sign a pile of cooperation agreements with Iran’s Arab lackey. The Foreign Ministry didn’t even have a chance to write apologetic talking points explaining that brazen move before Syria announced it was entering a military alliance with Turkey and would be holding a joint military exercise with the Turkish military. Speechless in the wake of Turkey’s move to hold military maneuvers with its enemy just two days after it canceled joint training with Israel, Jerusalem could think of no mitigating explanation for the move.

Tuesday was characterized by escalating verbal assaults on the Jewish state. First Erdogan renewed his libelous allegations that Israel deliberately killed children in Gaza. Then he called on Turks to learn how to make money like Jews do.

Erdogan’s anti-Israel and anti-Semitic blows were followed on Tuesday evening by Turkey’s government-controlled TRT1 television network’s launch of a new prime-time series portraying IDF soldiers as baby- and little girl-killers who force Palestinian women to deliver stillborn babies at roadblocks and line up groups of Palestinians against walls to execute them by firing squad.

The TRT1 broadcast forced Israel’s hand. Late on Tuesday, the Foreign Ministry announced it was launching an official protest with the Turkish Embassy. Unfortunately, it was unclear who would be coming to the Foreign Ministry to receive the demarche, since Turkey hasn’t had an ambassador in Israel for three weeks.

Turkey’s break with the West; its decisive rupture with Israel and its opposition to the US in Iraq and Iran was predictable. Militant Islam of the AKP variety has been enjoying growing popularity and support throughout Turkey for many years. The endemic corruption of Turkey’s traditional secular leaders increased the Islamists’ popularity. Given this domestic Turkish reality, it is possible that Erdogan and his fellow Islamists’ rise to power was simply a matter of time.

But even if the AKP’s rise to power was eminently predictable, its ability to consolidate its control over just about every organ of governance in Turkey as well as what was once a thriving free press, and change completely Turkey’s strategic posture in just seven years was far from inevitable. For these accomplishments the AKP owes a debt of gratitude to both the Bush and Obama administrations, as well as to the EU.

The Bush administration ignored the warnings of secular Turkish leaders in the country’s media, military and diplomatic corps that Erdogan was a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Rather than pay attention to his past attempts to undermine Turkey’s secular, pro-Western character and treat him with a modicum of suspicion, after the AKP electoral victory in 2002 the Bush administration upheld the AKP and Erdogan as paragons of Islamist moderation and proof positive that the US and the West have no problem with political Islam. Erdogan’s softly peddled but remorselessly consolidated Islamism was embraced by senior American officials intent on reducing democracy to a synonym for elections rather than acknowledging that democracy is only meaningful as a system of laws and practices that engender liberal egalitarianism.

In a very real sense, the Bush administration’s willingness to be taken in by Erdogan paved the way for its decision in 2005 to pressure Israel to allow Hamas to participate in the Palestinian elections and to coerce Egypt into allowing the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in its parliamentary poll.

In Turkey itself, the administration’s enthusiastic embrace of the AKP meant that Erdogan encountered no Western opposition to his moves to end press freedom in Turkey; purge the Turkish military of its secular leaders and end its constitutional mandate to preserve Turkey’s secular character; intimidate and disenfranchise secular business leaders and diplomats; and stack the Turkish courts with Islamists. That is, in the name of its support for its water-downed definition of democracy, the US facilitated Erdogan’s subversion of all the Turkish institutions that enabled liberal norms to be maintained and kept Turkey in the Western alliance.

As for the Obama administration, since entering office in January it has abandoned US support for democracy activists throughout the world, in favor of a policy of pure appeasement of US adversaries at the expense of US allies. In keeping with this policy, President Barack Obama paid a preening visit to Ankara where he effectively endorsed the Islamization of Turkish foreign policy that has moved the NATO member into the arms of Teheran’s mullahs. Taken together, the actions of the Bush and Obama White Houses have demoralized Westernized Turks, who now believe that their country is doomed to descend into the depths of Islamist extremism. As many see it, if they wish to remain in Turkey, their only recourse is to join the Islamist camp and add their voices to the rising chorus of anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism sweeping the country.

Then there is the EU. For years Brussels has been stringing Turkey along, promising that if it enacts sufficient human rights reforms, the 80-million strong Muslim country will be permitted to join Europe. But far from inducing more liberal behavior on the part of Turkey, those supposedly enlightened reforms have paved the way for the Islamist ascendance in the country. By forcing Turkey to curb its military’s role as the guarantor of Turkish secularism, the EU took away the secularists’ last line of defense against the rising tide of the AKP. By forcing Turkey to treat its political prisoners humanely and cancel the death penalty, the EU eroded the secularists’ moral claim to leadership and weakened their ability to effectively combat both Kurdish and Islamist terror.

At the same time, by consistently refusing to permit Turkey to join the EU, despite Ankara’s moves to placate its political correctness, Brussels discredited still further Turkey’s secularists. When after all their self-defeating and self-abasing reforms, Europe still rejected them, the Turks needed to find a way to restore their wounded honor. The most natural means of doing so was for the Turks writ large to simply turn their backs on Europe and move toward their Muslim brethren.

For its part, as the lone Jewish state that belongs to no alliance, Israel had no ability to shape internal developments in Turkey. But still, Turkey’s decision to betray the West holds general lessons for Israel and for the free world as a whole. These lessons should be learned and applied moving forward not only to Turkey, but to a whole host of regimes and sub-national groups in the region and throughout the world.

In the first instance it is crucial for policy-makers to recognize that change is the only permanent feature of the human condition. A country’s presence in the Western camp today is no guarantee that it will remain there in the future. Whether a regime is democratic or authoritarian or somewhere in the middle, domestic conditions and trends play major roles in determining its strategic posture over time. This is just as true for Turkey as it is for the US, for Iran and for Sweden and Egypt.

The loss of Turkey shows that countries can and do change. The best way to influence that change is to remain true to one’s friends, even if those friends are imperfect. Only by strengthening those who share one’s country’s norms and interests – rather than its procedures and rhetoric – can governments exert constructive influence on internal changes in other states and societies.

Moreover, it is only by being willing to recognize what makes an ally an ally and an adversary an adversary that the West will adopt policies that leave it more secure in the long run. A military-controlled Turkish democracy that barred Islamists from political power was more desirable than a popularly elected AKP regime that has moved Turkey into the Iranian axis.

So, too, a corrupt Western-dependent regime in Afghanistan is more desirable than a Taliban-al-Qaida terror state. Likewise an unstable, weakened mullocracy in Iran challenged by a well-funded, liberal opposition is preferable to a strong, stable mullocracy that has successfully repressed its internationally isolated liberal rivals.

Turkey is lost and we’d better make our peace with this devastating fact. But if we learn its lessons, we can craft policies that check the dangers that Turkey projects and prepare for the day when Turkey may decide that it wishes to return to the Western fold.

caroline@carolineglick.com

Posted by Cem Ryan, Ph.D. at 1:05 AM

October 18, 2009
The Cypriot Stumbling Block

This analysis by Robert Ellis was first published at PoliGazette.

Like Ireland, Cyprus has been a victim of geography and both are today still divided. As the Arab geographer Muqaddasi wrote in 985: “The island of Qubrus is in the power of whichever nation is overlord in these seas”. And with its position 40 miles off the southern coast of Turkey and 70 miles from Syria it has been a strategic prize for centuries.

This outpost of Hellenic civilisation was conquered by the Crusaders in the twelfth century to secure their route to the Holy Land and later by Venice. When Famagusta fell to the Ottomans in 1571, the island’s fate was sealed. Therefore it is ironic that the British took over Cyprus with its mixed population in 1878 as a result of a deal with Turkey to protect the Ottoman Empire against the Russians, who have lurked in the background ever since.

The island’s Greek identity was emphasized in its support of the Greek revolt against Ottoman rule in 1821 and with the participation of both the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority in a legislative council under British rule. When other Greek islands under Turkish occupation such as Crete and the Dodecanese were united with Greece, the same demand grew in Cyprus. As a result, a plebiscite held among Greek Cypriots in 1950 showed a 96.5 percent support for enosis (union with Greece).

As the British were only prepared to give the Cypriots limited self determination, a terrorist organisation EOKA was formed, which in 1955 launched a campaign to force Britain to withdraw. But the campaign was counter-productive, as this was met by the formation of the Turkish Cypriot paramilitary TMT with a demand for taksim (partition).

However, as Britain depended on the Middle East for 70 percent of its oil imports, it was not prepared to give up control of the island. As Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden put it at the time: “No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It’s as simple as that.”

Consequently, Britain invited both Greece and Turkey to a conference in London to discuss questions concerning the Eastern Mediterranean. But as defence minister Selwyn Lloyd explained to the Cabinet before the conference: “Throughout the negotiations our aim would be to bring the Greeks up against the Turkish refusal to accept enosis and so condition them to accept a solution, which would leave sovereignty in our hands.”

Independence
The ruse was only partly successful, because under American pressure for guaranteed independence, a deal between was brokered between Greece and Turkey in 1959, which resulted in a power-sharing constitution and independence the following year. A Treaty of Establishment also provided for two permanent British bases, and a Treaty of Guarantee between the new Republic, Greece, Turkey and the UK, prohibited the union of Cyprus with any other state or partition.

Nevertheless, Greek Cypriot nationalists under the leadership of their new President, Archbishop Makarios, continued to strive for “Enosis and only enosis”. When Makarios three years later proposed a number of amendments to the Constitution, which reduced the status of the Turkish Cypriots to that of a minority, fighting broke out between the two communities. In March 1964 this resulted in a UN resolution to put in a peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, which has been in place for the last 45 years.

After an attack by the Greek Cypriot National Guard on Turkish Cypriot positions Turkey recciprocated with the bombing of Greek Cypriot villages and the situation was critical. Makarios, who had already joined the non-aligned movement, appealed to the Soviet Union for arms and support, and George Ball, the US Acting Secretary of State, told President Johnson they faced the most dangerous confrontation since the Cuban missile crisis.

With the additional risk of war between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, Johnson addressed a severe warning to Turkey against military intervention. Consequently, Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State, and Ball put forward a plan for the partition of Cyprus to solve what Johnson had called “one of the most complex problems on earth”.

Because of US preoccupation with the situation in Vietnam the plan was shelved but another outbreak of fighting in 1967 once again brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. By 1974 Makarios, “the Castro of the Mediterranean”, had succeeded in alienating the Greek junta, Turkey and the United States, who together brought about his downfall.

Partition
In July the same year the Greek junta instigated a coup to topple Makarios and five days later – when Britain failed to intervene – Turkey took matters in its own hands and invaded, dividing the island into two zones. The coup failed and Makarios was reinstated but a few months before he died in 1977 he came to the conclusion: “It is in the name of enosis Cyprus has been destroyed.”

Since 9/11 the strategic importance of the island has increased and a solution to the Cyprus question is the key to improved relations between EU and NATO. Turkey’s refusal to recognize the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, which became a member of the EU in 2004, is also a stumbling block to its own accession talks.

There have been numerous initiatives on the part of the UN to reunify Cyprus, latest the Annan Plan in 2004. This was, however, rejected by the Greek Cypriots, because it failed to provide for the complete withdrawal of Turkish troops and adequate restitution and compensation for the loss of Greek Cypriot property. There is also the fact that Turkey since the occupation has maintained a policy of colonisation and assimilation by mainland Turks.

In 1983 the Turkish Cypriots declared the northern part of the island to be an independent state, which has only been recognized by Turkey. This, or a confederation with the Greek Cypriot south, is the preferred Turkish solution but recently Turkey has struck an ominous note. In an echo of Germany’s “Heim ins Reich” (Back to the Reich) policy in 1938 Prime Minister Erdogan has indicated his patience is exhausted and Foreign Minister Davutoglu cannot say whether Turkey has reached its final borders as established by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.

Given Turkey’s strategic importance, it would be unfortunate if Europe faced a new Sudetenland crisis, which would put an end to Turkey’s prospects of EU membership. And to do as Neville Chamberlain and dismiss the Cyprus issue as “a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing” could be fatal.

Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in Denmark and from 2005-2008 was a frequent contributor to the Turkish Daily News.

October 17, 2009
ATAA’s analysis of Turkish-Armenian protocols gives no comfort

by Ferruh Demirmen

After the signing of Turkish-Armenian normalization protocols in Zurich on October 10, the Washington-based ATAA (Assembly of Turkish American Associations) issued an analysis of the protocols to clarify the reasons for its earlier endorsement of the normalization process. The announcement was issued by President Gunay Evinch.

Relying on the language in the protocols that refer to “territorial integrity,” “inviolability of frontiers,” “foreign sovereignty,” “refrain from the use of force,” and “recognition of the existing border,” the ATAA analysis draws the conclusion that, once the protocols take effect, Armenia would no longer have territorial claims against Turkey.

It further infers that Armenia would withdraw from the occupied Azeri territory of Nagorno-Karabagh, account for its human violations in the territory, and allow the return of over one million Azeri refugees.

Based on another clause that condemns terrorism, it is argued that ASALA-type terrorism and other acts of violence against Turks and Turkish interests would henceforth come to an end.

ATAA believes that the establishment of historical commission as envisioned in the protocols would prevent US Congressional resolutions on genocide allegations.

After making cross linkages between several clauses, the ATAA analysis further concludes, in a quasi-legal manner, that the opening of the common border between Turkey and Armenia should logically lead to the realization of goals embraced by the Turkish side noted above.

But the ATAA’s analysis is far from convincing. The conclusions reached are not based on any concrete steps that the protocols call for Armenia to implement. Rather, the analysis relies on the goodwill of Armenia, on expectations that a well-intentioned Armenia would deliver.

And herein lies the problem: counting on the sincerity and goodwill of Armenia. Considering Armenia’s past hostility toward Turkey, the instruments contained in its Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, and the Armenian officials’ public pronouncements, e.g., on the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and genocide allegations, prior to the signing of the protocols, it is naive to rely on the goodwill of Armenia.

The fact that the Armenian side objected to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s prepared statement to be delivered after the signing of the protocols in Zurich, says much about the supposed goodwill of Armenia. Without naming the conflict, Davutoğlu was going to make only an indirect reference to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, expressing the hope that the signing of protocols would lead to the resolution of the conflict. The Armenian side demurred, arguing behind doors that the statement would unnecessarily draw linkage between the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict and the normalization process.

So much about good intentions!

Judging from the language in the protocols, there are also serious reservations as to the usefulness of a historical commission to resolve, once and for all, the thorny issue of genocide allegations.(1)

If Armenia is to be believed in its good intentions, the protocols would contain unambiguous clauses as to the steps Armenia would take, e.g., amend its Constitution, withdraw from Nagorno-Karabagh, in return for the opening of the border. The protocols contain no such quid pro quo.

In contrast, the language in the protocols on the opening of the common border is clear and unmistakable: Once the protocols are ratified, the common border would be opened within two months.

The open border, of course, would overwhelmingly benefit Armenia.

For all it cares, Armenia can easily stonewall for years the implementation of steps it is expected to take, prevaricating on its acts, while in the meantime the Turkey-Armenia border remains open. It can maintain, for example, that it is not making (overt) territorial claims on Turkey while at the same time refusing to amend its Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, or change the design of its national flag.

Or it can claim it is not actively pursuing “genocide” claims while winking at, and even secretly encouraging, genocide recognition efforts by the Armenian diaspora.

Or it can make a cosmetic withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabagh, arguing that it has fulfilled its obligations as far as “promoting peace in the region.”

And should Turkey contemplate re-closing the border because Armenia has not “delivered,” volleys of criticism from the American and European sympathizers of Armenia would surely follow.

Further, should the Turkish Parliament refuse to ratify the protocols for lack of progress on the Nagorno-Karabagh issue, as Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has inexplicably suggested recently, Turkey would surely be singled out for having bad faith in the Turkish-Armenian normalization process.

(Diplomatically, Erdoğan’s suggestion is a major faux pas, because there is no linkage in the protocols between the Nagorno-Karabagh issue and the normalization process. After giving repeated assurances to the Azeris on Nagorno-Karabagh, yet without any backing from the protocols, the PM has forced himself into a corner. Now he is expecting the Turkish Parliament to bail him out).

In conclusion, ATAA’s analysis, no doubt reflecting an idealistic outlook, is based on presumptive logic, or wishful thinking, and cannot be supported. ATAA says the normalization protocols are based on the concept of “constructive ambiguity” by which each side interprets the language as it sees fit. This is an interesting approach, but offers no comfort for the Turkish side – or, for that matter, the Azeri side.

ATAA should ponder: Would it ever sign a binding contract based pre-eminently on “constructive ambiguity,” wherein the only expressed certainty is for the advantage of the other side, but everything else is predicated on goodwill?

Nations signing intergovernmental agreements should be held to the same standards of credibility and accountability as persons who conclude private or business transactions.

ATAA issued its analysis on behalf of its Board of Directors. But ATAA also claimed in its announcement that it spoke on behalf of the Turkish-American community. A relevant question is: Has ATAA polled its members on the issue?

It is worth noting that almost all opposition parties in Turkey, certainly the major ones, are opposed to the Turkish-Armenian normalization process in its present form. They remember what happened in Cyprus.

(1) Current Turkish “opening” to Armenia cannot be supported: by Ferruh Demirmen, “Turkish Forum,” October 9, 2009.

ferruh@demirmen.com

Note to Turkish Forum readers: On October 10, the Azeri news outlet Trend News (http://en.trend.az)/ published on its website excerpts from my article cited above. The excerpted article, “Normalization of Ankara -Yerevan relations cannot be supported: Turkish expert,” was also published on the same day in Turkish Forum. The article contained a photo, purportedly depicting me. Turkish Forum readers are advised that the person depicted in that photo is not me. F. Demirmen.

October 16, 2009
Sarafian speaks on massacre

By Michael Hamlin Jr. | October 14, 2009, Brianna Campbell / The Collegian –

Ara Sarafian, an archival historian who specializes in late Ottoman history, presented information to California State University, Fresno students Monday night about the Adana massacre of Armenian’s in the Ottoman Empire.

The year 2009 marks the 100 year anniversary of the state led massacre that killed at least 20,000 Armenians in 1909. The massacre was entrenched in political, economical and religious differences.

In his presentation entitled ‘Remembering Adana’, Sarafian illustrated the destruction the massacre caused through the use of vivid pictures and hauntingly descriptive text that described the devastation and tragedy that occurred in Adana.

“The massacre was completely out of the blue,” Sarafian said during his presentation. “The devastation is breathtaking; the pictures bring the damage to life. I like to show them because if I did not, you would think I was lying or telling a story.”

Fresno State student and audience member Lauren Beal believes Fresno State students can learn many things from Sarafian’s presentation.
“Students can learn a lot about Armenian history,” Beal said. “If you can learn from history, it most likely will not be repeated.”

Barlow Der Mugrdechian, director for the center for Armenian studies, agrees that history can teach many things.

“History tells us a lot about ourselves,” Mugrdechian said after Sarafian’s lecture had concluded. “It [history] can happen again, we have to be careful of that fact and learn from our past mistakes.”

The Turkish government disputes the history of the events in Adana in 1909. The government contends that the Adana Massacre was an Armenian attack on the Muslim majority.

Sarafian addressed this issue while speaking about the importance of writing the correct history of the past. He said there is no place for lies or inaccuracies.

“The Turkish government said the Armenians were rebels [speaking about the Adana massacre of 1909]. That is a flat-out lie,” said Sarafian, founding director of the Gomidas Institute in London, a leading research center which republishes English translations of Armenian texts about the Armenian Genocide. “Historical writing is up to you. History does not write itself, states do not write history, people do.”

As well as speaking about the Adana massacre, Sarafian also had a message for Fresno State students.

“Students should have awareness for prejudice,” Sarafian said. “We are the guardians of our own freedom. We need to take a moral stance. Maybe the real question we should ask is how to stop the violence.”

On Oct. 10, the countries of Turkey and Armenia signed an agreement to establish diplomatic relations and open their border after one century of hostility towards each other. The issue of whether or not the killings of Armenians during the end of the Ottoman Empire is only hinted at, but none the less, the peace treaty was still signed.

Sarafian also put a positive perspective on the tragic massacre of 1909.

“History doesn’t always have to be negative, it can bring people together,” Sarafian said. “The legacy of Adana may not be to divide people, but to bring them together.”

Comments posted by Ergun KIRLIKOVALI:

Salahi Sonyel’s book “The Great War and the Tragedy of Anatolia”, TTK, Ankara, 2001, has an entire chapter on Adana; “Chapter 3: The Counter-Revolution” whose four sub-chapters are:

“The Events of 13 April 1909 (31 Mart Val’asi), pages 48-52

“The Adana Incidents”, pages 52-60

“Who was responsible for the Adana Incidents”, pages 61-64

“The Commission of Inquiry into the Adana Incidents”, pages 65-70.

All of these findings squarely refute Sarafian’s claims. Here is one excerpt from page 66 where one of the most experienced American missionaries in Anatolia, Rev. Dr. Christie, gives an account to of the very origin of the Adana incident to the American diplomatic representative who, in turn, furnishes it to British ambassador in Istanbul (Lowther):

“… that the young Armenians of Adana were nearly all revolutionaries, that arms and ammunition were on sale for months, and that both sides had been laying in store of them. He also attributed a large share in the (Adana) events to the ‘evil counsels’ of the Armenian bishop, whom (Dr. Christie) described as ‘a very bad man’…”

These comments of Dr. Christie refute Sarafian’s claims and show that the idea of a revolutionary plot did in fact exist among many Armenians headed by their ‘evil’ bishop. The Armenians were well armed and supplied, motivated, even arrogant, and quite aggressive; attributes in stark contradiction with the Sarafian misrepresentation of innocent, unarmed Armenians.

There is much more in this book and elsewhere to clearly demonstrate to truth-seekers that one-sided accounts of historic controversies, such as that by Sarafian of Adana incidents, do not help promote scholarship, truth, peace, or closure.

Dr. Gwynne Dyer, a London-based independent journalist, may have put it best in1976 after all:

“… The deafening drumbeat of the propaganda, and the sheer lack of sophistication in argument which comes from preaching decade after decade to a convinced and emotionally committed audience, are the major handicaps of Armenian historiography of the Diaspora today…”

October 14, 2009
Normalization of Ankara-Yerevan relations cannot be supported: Turkish expert

The United States, New York, Oct.10 /Trend News K. Pashayeva /

The process of normalizing the Ankara -Yerevan relations, developed on the incorrect basis, cannot be supported, Energy Expert Ferruh Demirmen told the Turkish Forum website.

The protocols give no assurance or confidence that Armenia will take steps expected with normalization. The indications are that the Turkish government has forced itself into a predicament, possibly even a trap, of its own making, Demirmen said.

Earlier Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan told Trend News in an exclusive interview that Turkey and Armenia will sign a deal to establish diplomatic ties on Oct. 10 or 11.

Three major Turkish-American umbrella organizations, the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA), Turkish Coalition of America (TCA), and the Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA) have supported the normalization process. They considered this step as a step towards regional peace and as a blow to the Armenian diaspora, making it ineffective in its lobbying efforts against Turkey, the Turkish Forum wrote.

However Demirmen believes, the normalization process, in its present form, is ill-founded, ill-advised, and cannot be supported from the Turkish point of view. The arguments advanced for normalization, while sounding reasonable, and in principle commendable, represent to a large extent wishful thinking for the Turkish side, not backed by the two diplomatic protocols announced by Turkey and Armenia

No caveat or pre-conditions are attached to normalization and the opening of the common border,” the expert said. Given that the opening of the border will overwhelmingly benefit Armenia, the protocols call for no concessions from Armenia, Demirmen added.

Genocide allegations and the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict are the chief thorny issues between the two countries; but for Turkey, Armenia’s hitherto hostile behavior is also a cause for deep resentment, the Turkish expert added.

On the genocide issue, the protocols call for the establishment of a bilateral commission to study “the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including … an examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations.” There is no mention to specifically address the genocide issue, whether it happened or not, Demirmen said.

This work may continue for years, during which time the border will remain open. Because, the Armenians diaspora would continue to insist on recognizing the genocide, Demirmen wrote.

There are also reports from Armenian sources that the Armenian government will insist that the historical commission should focus not on whether “genocide” occurred – because this is a given “fact” – but rather, how it occurred.

In a recent interview with the Armenian Reporter in New York, Armenian President Serzh Sargisyan noted that Armenia and the diaspora are “one family,” and that recognition of “genocide” is a “long-awaited victory for justice.”

A clear message, but not a helpful one for normalizing relations, Demirmen believes.

The language in the protocols on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is even fuzzier. Other than a “commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional and international disputes,” the protocols contain no concrete reference to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There is no mention of ending the illegal occupation of the Azeri territory by Armenia – notwithstanding the UN resolutions – of the innocent Azerbaijani civilians that fell victim to ethnic cleansing by Armenian forces, and of the plight of one million Azerbaijani refugees, Demirmen noted.

The author also noted that on a recent visit to Moscow, the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian stated that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue never entered into negotiations with Turkey, and never will.

In any case, while the Nagorno-Karabakh issue drags on in negotiations, the Turkey-Armenia border will remain open, the expert believes.

Normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations without the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be a “sellout” by Turkey of brotherly Azerbaijan, and a betrayal of Azeri nation’s trust in Turkey.

The chief fallout from a rift in Azerbaijani-Turkish relations will be energy projects – including Shah Deniz II gas supply for the Nabucco project. Throughput to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude pipeline may also be curtailed, the expert added.

Source: en.trend.az, 10.10.2009

October 11, 2009
Current Turkish “opening” to Armenia cannot be supported

By Ferruh Demirmen

The Turkey-Armenia normalization process, due to take effect soon, in its present form carry imponderables that raise serious questions as to its merits for Turkey.

Three major Turkish-American umbrella organizations, the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA), Turkish Coalition of America (TCA), and the Federation of Turkish American Associations (FTAA), regrettably issued statements recently in support of the normalization process.

In their endorsement, ATAA and TCA stressed, as has the Turkish government, the importance of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia in pursuit of regional peace, while FTAA, being more prophetic, argued that the process would be a blow to the Armenian diaspora, making it ineffective in its lobbying efforts against Turkey.

There is, however, fierce opposition to the normalization process both in Turkey and Armenia.

No pre-conditions

The normalization process, in its present form, is ill-founded, ill-advised, and cannot be supported from the Turkish point of view. The arguments advanced for normalization, while sounding reasonable, and in principle commendable, represent to a large extent wishful thinking for the Turkish side, not backed by the two diplomatic protocols announced by Turkey and Armenia. The protocols, initialed on August 31 and due to be signed on October 10, form the blueprint for the normalization process.

Reading through the protocols, the one thing that is striking is the generality of the language and the lack of concrete steps to be taken to resolve the outstanding issues between Turkey and Armenia. No caveat or pre-conditions are attached to normalization and the opening of the common border.

Given that the opening of the border will overwhelmingly benefit Armenia, the protocols call for no concessions from Armenia.

Genocide allegations and the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict are the chief thorny issues between the two countries; but for Turkey, Armenia’s hitherto hostile behavior is also a cause for deep resentment.

Genocide issue

On the genocide issue, the protocols call for the establishment of a bilateral commission to study “the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including … an examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations.” There is no mention to specifically address the genocide issue, whether it happened or not.

Nor is there any commitment to open Armenian archives for examination. Turkish archives are already open.

Likewise, the time frame for the completion of the commission’s work is left open. This work may continue for years, during which time the border will remain open.

Swiss and other international experts will be joining Armenian and Turkish experts, and herein lies a potential trap for Turkey – considering how the West is already biased against the Turkish position. Switzerland is one country where denial of “Armenian genocide” is punishable by law. France is another one.

Furthermore, assuming that the commission will reach a well-defined conclusion, there is no commitment on the part of Armenia that it would abide by this conclusion, or that it would try to dissuade the diaspora Armenians from continuing the genocide rhetoric.

In its August 23, 1990 Declaration of Independence, Armenia stated that it will continue supporting international recognition of “the 1915 genocide,” and has done so ever since.

It is probable that the Armenian diaspora will press for genocide recognition with undiminished fervor, with implicit if not explicit support of Armenia, regardless of the conclusions reached by the historical commission. The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), the chief lobbying arm of the diaspora in America, is firmly against the Turkish-Armenian protocols. The Armenian-American community, in general, is also opposed.

With the diaspora’s anti-Turkish lobbying efforts continuing in full force, Armenia can, as a last resort, “wash its hands off,” arguing that it has no “control” on the diaspora.

There are also reports from Armenian sources that the Armenian government will insist that the historical commission should focus not on whether “genocide” occurred – because this is a given “fact” – but rather, how it occurred.

In a recent interview with the Armenian Reporter in New York, Armenian President Serge Sargsian noted that Armenia and the diaspora are “one family,” and that recognition of “genocide” is a “long-awaited victory for justice.”

A clear message, but not a helpful one for normalizing relations.

So, how is the establishment of the historical commission as foreseen in the protocols really make a difference as far as genocide allegations? A check of reality is in order here.

Nagorno-Karabagh conflict

The language in the protocols on the Nagorno-Karabagh issue is even fuzzier. Other than a “commitment to the peaceful settlement of regional and international disputes,” the protocols contain no concrete reference to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. There is no mention of ending the illegal occupation of the Azeri territory by Armenia – notwithstanding the UN resolutions – of the innocent Azeri civilians that fell victim to ethnic cleansing by Armenian forces, and of the plight of one million Azeri refugees.

On a recent visit to Moscow, the Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian stated that the Nagorno-Karabagh issue never entered into negotiations with Turkey, and never will.

Still, as part of the normalization process, Armenia may implement a cosmetic withdrawal from the occupied territory, but this will fall well short of the UN demands, and will not in any way satisfy Azerbaijan. The Minsk Group has been ineffective to date.

In any case, while the Nagorno-Karabagh issue drags on in negotiations, the Turkey-Armenia border will remain open.

Occupation of Nagorno-Karabagh by Armenian forces was the reason Turkey closed the Turkey-Armenia border in 1993.

Normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations without the solution of the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict will be a “sellout” by Turkey of brotherly Azerbaijan, and a betrayal of Azeri nation’s trust in Turkey.

Other than trust, the chief fallout from a rift in Azeri-Turkish relations will be energy projects – including Shah Deniz II gas supply for the Nabucco project. Throughput to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) crude pipeline may also be curtailed, and the Kazakh oil reaching Baku (due to increase following recent agreement between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) across the Caspian Sea, instead of the BTC outlet, will likely be exported from the Black Sea ports of Supsa (Georgia) or Novorossiysk (Russia).

Economics aside, that will increase oil tanker traffic through the Bosporus.

Should these eventualities materialize, Turkish politicians, or rather the AKP leaders, will have a lot in their hands to “explain.”

Other issues

Other thorny issues between Turkey and Armenia include refusal of Armenia to recognize the 1921 Kars Agreement (signed between Turkey and the three neighboring Soviet Republics defining the borders), reference to Mount Ararat as a national symbol in Armenia’s Constitution, inclusion of the Mount Ararat insignia on Armenia’s national flag, and reference to eastern Turkey as “Western Armenia” in the Armenian Declaration of Independence.

Such stance on the part of Armenia is an antithesis of good intentions towards a neighbor. Yet, apart from a veiled reference to the Kars Agreement, the issue is largely ignored in the Turkish-Armenian protocols.

How could a country like Turkey normalize relations with a neighbor when the latter signals territorial claims on its neighbor – and does not want to alter its mind-set?

Could the U.S. have a normal diplomatic relation with Mexico if the latter claimed in its Constitution that the southwest U.S. is part of a larger Mexico?

Lingering in the background, of course, is the nefarious ASALA terror that caused the death of more than 40 Turkish diplomats in various countries in the 1970’s and ‘80’s.

Armenia cannot be directly blamed for ASALA’s terror, but the Armenian officials have not publically condemned the dastardly acts of ASALA.

Memories are still fresh on Armenian president Andranik Makarian’s warm welcome extended to the ASALA terrorist Varadian Garabedian when the latter was released from French prison in 2001. The Yerevan mayor Rober Nazarian gave the terrorist assurance that he would be given food, shelter and a job in Yerevan. In fact, Garabedian received a hero’s welcome when he stepped into Armenian soil. He had been convicted in France of the 1983 bombing of the Turkish Airlines bureau at the Paris-Orly airport, killing 8 people and wounding 61.

Call for judgment

The notion of normalizing relations between Turkey and Armenia is applaudable. Peace and political stability in the region require such normalization, and no reasonable person can oppose this process. Normalization, however, should be predicated on the ending of all hostile elements in the relations between the two countries.

Other than closing the border in 1993, Turkey has not nurtured any adversarial notions towards Armenia. Countless Turkish citizens of Armenian origin, with their churches, hospitals, charities, etc. live peacefully in Turkey, enjoying the full rights of any Turkish citizen, including the right to vote, while at the same time the presence of some 70,000 illegal Armenian workers in Turkey is tolerated.

No Armenian flags are publically burned or trampled upon on national holidays in Turkey, and children are not indoctrinated with anti-Armenian sentiments – in families, schools or mosques – from day one of reaching their consciousness.

The despicable murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink – by unknown forces still under investigation – in January 2007 in Istanbul was widely condemned in Turkey, many Turks taking to the streets chanting “We are all Armenians,” or “We are all Hrant Dink.”

Compare these realities with those in Armenia, and the Armenian diaspora, and what a stark, depressing contrast emerges! One would be hard put, for example, to find a single functioning mosque in Armenia.

And no president of a Turkish-American organization was charged with and convicted of terror activities, like the ex-ANCA president Murat Topalian, who received, in 2001, a 3-year prison sentence in Ohio court for his involvement in a bomb attack against the Turkish House in New York in 1981.

Notwithstanding some gross exaggerations, e.g., 1.5 million purported deaths, Armenians have a genuine sorrowful history to tell going back to World War I, and they want Turkey to account for the sad history. But Turks also have a painful, traumatic history, with 2.5 million Moslems (Turks and Kurds) contemporaneously perished in Anatolia, some half a million at the hands of renegade Armenian bands that joined the invading Russian and French forces, hitting the Ottoman forces from behind.

Wartime tragedies are like the two sides of a coin, and if Armenia insists on accounting of history, it must also show empathy for the other side and face the excesses of its own history.

That is why, it is essential that the historical commission that is envisioned in the protocols have access to all archival documents, Armenian and Turkish included, and the commission’s purview should be making a comprehensive review of the World War I events in their entirety.

Turkey is prepared to face its history. Is Armenia prepared to face its own?

Christian sympathies for the Armenian claims should not ignore or overlook tragedies visited on the Moslems.

Wrap-up

Wrapping up, reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia in principle is commendable, and in fact, long overdue. But such a process must first remove hostile attitudes that exist between the two countries. Because the animus, or an attitude of hostility, has been very largely on the Armenian side, Armenia must first change its attitude toward Turkey, e.g., by revising its Constitution.

An expression of sorrow on the ASALA terror would be also helpful.

The two Turkish-Armenian protocols, however, give no assurance or confidence that Armenia will take these steps. Based on ambiguous, noncommittal language in the protocols, one can only hope for a positive change on the Armenian side.

But hope is not sufficient. There should be greater certitude in the protocols as to how Armenia will alter its conduct.

The only certain clause in the protocols is the one that calls for the opening of the Turkey-Armenia border within 2 months after the protocols take force. There is little doubt that the land-locked Armenia, with most of its population living in poverty, will reap major economic gains from the free-trade opportunities afforded by a re-opened border.

Once the border is opened, it will be virtually impossible to reverse the process regardless of how Armenia behaves. Closure of the border would draw harsh criticism from the U.S. and the EU.

The Turkish-Armenian protocols, devoid of any pre-conditions, are being pushed by Turkey’s AKP government at the strong urging of the U.S., in particular President Obama in person. The EU is also pressuring Turkey. By signing these protocols, the government hopes to earn “brownie points” from the U.S. and the EU in an effort to further advance its Islamic political agenda.

This is regrettable. While the issue is one of political convenience for the AKP government, it is essentially a matter of national dignity for Turkey.

A fundamental question that the government must explain is, other than “brownie points,” what it will actually gain from the signing of the two protocols. If the purpose is to deflect the Obama administration from recognizing Armenian “genocide” – as President Obama said he would during the election campaign – it is a black mark for the Turkish foreign policy. It would be caving in to what is effectively a blackmail.

When he visited Turkey in April, Obama inveighed that he had not changed his “thinking” on genocide allegations. The implication – a veiled threat – was not lost on Turks.

Another key question is, if the protocols are ratified by the Turkish Parliament and they become binding, how the government will handle the Azeris’ certain displeasure. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly assured the Azeris that he will not disappoint them. Yet, the protocols give little hope of a diplomatic breakthrough in the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict.

Perhaps the government is hoping secretly that the Parliament will decline to ratify the protocols, letting the PM effectively “off the hook.” That eventuality, of course, will trigger another headache. Parliamentary ratification is a Constitutional requirement in Turkey. The Parliament, however, cannot make any alterations to the protocols. It can only ratify or reject them.

The indications are that the Turkish government has forced itself into a predicament, possibly even a trap, of its own making.

In this context, it is particularly disconcerting that, according to Nalbandian, the text of the Turkish-Armenian protocols was prepared entirely by the Armenian side, with Turkey suggesting only minor revisions. Why such passivity on the part of Turkish foreign ministry?

There is a perception that the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s vision of “strategic depth” and “zero problems with neighbors” is turning the country into a weakling of a country lacking resolve and respectability.

It is also regrettable that ATAA, TCA and FTAA have lent support to the normalization process in its present form. Apparently they (at least ATAA and TCA) have chosen to toe the line with the official Turkish government policy. Living on a day-to-day basis with the realities of the Armenian propaganda perpetrated across America, these organizations should have known better. At the very least, they should have stayed neutral on the issue.

ferruh@demirmen.com

October 9, 2009