Turkish Forum

Category: Authors

  • A Visit Inside Turkey’s Islamist IHH

    A Visit Inside Turkey’s Islamist IHH

    A journalist’s trip to the headquarters of the extremist group that sponsored the Mavi Marmara.

    BY CLAIRE BERLINSKI
    June 21, 2010 12:00 AM

    Istanbul

    The street outside the IHH, the Turkish organization that recently dispatched the Mavi Marmara to its sanguinary fate in the eastern Mediterranean, suggests a hopeful world of multi-ethnic and religious harmony. Men and women in various forms of secular and religious dress—beards, clean-shaven, headscarves, burqas—walk in and out of the building in urgent conversation with Africans in dashikis, Swedes in stained proletarian-wear, anti-Zionist rabbis sweating nervously in black suits and payot. A gangly teenager strolls by in a T-shirt that reads, “Virgins required: No experience necessary.” It isn’t clear whether he’s off-message, highly ironic, or yet another Turkish kid who bought a T-shirt he didn’t quite understand.

    Full Story >>

  • Eastward Bound

    Eastward Bound

    This article first appeared at FrontPage Magazine.

    U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently blamed Europe for alienating Turkey from the West. On a visit to London last Wednesday, he stated, “If there’s anything to the notion that Turkey is moving eastwards, it is in no small part because it was pushed, and it was pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought.”

    When Turkey was accepted as a European Union candidate at the Helsinki summit in 1999, the Ecevit government subsequently enacted two important constitutional reform packages and a revision to the Civil Code which established the principle of gender equality in the family. When the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002, it was with the promise of further reform, and seven more reform packages were passed.

    Despite reservations about implementation, in October 2004 the European Commission found that Turkey had “sufficiently” fulfilled the political criteria for membership and recommended the start of accession talks. However, when these talks began the following year, the AKP government under Recep Tayyip Erdogan lost interest in the European perspective and concentrated on a domestic agenda with the main aim of securing its power base. This included a policy of kadrolaşma in state and local administration, which means filling leading positions with party supporters and fellow believers. Through “neighborhood pressure,” the government embarked on a process of social engineering to enforce conservative, Islamic standards throughout Turkish society.

    High on the AKP government’s agenda was making it possible for graduates of religious high schools (the imam-hatip schools) to enter university on an equal footing with students from state high schools. However, because of secular opposition, these attempts have so far been unsuccessful.

    The headscarf – that is, the tightly knotted Islamic headscarf and not the loosely worn village headscarf – is widely regarded as a symbol of political Islam, and Prime Minister Erdogan admitted as much at a meeting of the Alliance of Civilizations Forum in Madrid in 2008. However, the fact that the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban on the Islamic headscarf at Turkish universities was a setback that Mr. Erdogan was not prepared to accept.

    As has been illustrated by Turkey’s vote in the UN Security Council against further sanctions on Iran, Turkey’s “multi-dimensional” foreign policy has been directed more towards cementing its relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors than advancing its cause in Europe. Particularly, after the Turkish government’s endorsement of the alleged aid flotilla and the stand-off with Israel, Turkey’s claim of being “the honest broker of the Middle East” rings hollow. This is all not to mention, of course, the Armenian issue, Turkey’s  own Kurdish problem, and the fact that Turkey, for the last 36 years, has occupied a third of what is now an EU member state – Cyprus.

    In a television interview in 2004, Libya’s leader, Muammar Gaddafi, let his views be known on Europe  letting Turkey into the European Union, stating: ”The Islamic world, even the Islamic extremists, even bin Laden, rejoice for the entrance of Turkey in the European Union. This is their Trojan horse.” Last week, addressing a delegation of European Muslim leaders, Gaddafi supported Turkey’s membership, using the same argument.

    If Robert Gates wants to blame anyone for the West losing Turkey, he should perhaps take a look closer to home – i.e. the U.S. State Department, which, as far as Turkey is concerned, has also been out of touch. For example, in May 2007, Condoleeza Rice stated that the AKP is “a government dedicated to pulling Turkey west toward Europe.” Seven months earlier, when President Sezer and the Turkish military warned about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, the U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Ross Wilson, described the debate as “cacophonic” and added:  “There is nothing that I see imminently on the horizon that makes me particularly worried.”

    The main stumbling block to the continuation of EU accession talks with Turkey is the Cyprus question. Here Ross Wilson’s successor, James Jeffrey, tops the bill when, in a February interview with the Turkish daily Sabah, he stated: “Geographically, Turkey is closer to the EU than Cyprus. Cyprus was still an EU member when I last checked. As a matter of fact, most of Turkey is closer to Berlin or Paris. Under these conditions, what keeps Turkey out of the EU?”

    There is a further truth which has eluded Robert Gates. As the little-known Turkish philosopher from the 1950’s, Celal Yaliniz, once wrote: “Turkey is a ship heading for the East. Those aboard think they are heading for the West. In fact, they are just running westwards in a ship sailing eastwards.”

    Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish and international press.

  • Turkish-Azeri Deal May Herald New Competition in Southern Corridor

    Turkish-Azeri Deal May Herald New Competition in Southern Corridor

    Turkish-Azeri Deal May Herald New Competition in Southern Corridor

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 115

    June 15, 2010

    By: Saban Kardas

    On the sidelines of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit held in Istanbul, Turkey and Azerbaijan concluded agreements on natural gas cooperation. On June 7, during a ceremony attended by Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Recep Erdogan, Azeri President, Ilham Aliyev, the Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, and his Azeri counterpart, Natiq Aliyev, signed an agreement which will end a two year long price dispute on Turkey’s gas imports from the first phase of Azerbaijan’s offshore Shah Deniz-I, as well as setting the volume and price for Turkey’s imports from the second phase of the field, expected to come online in 2016-17. A related agreement will regulate the terms and mechanisms for the sale and transit of Azeri gas to Europe through Turkey.

    Turkey currently imports 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from Shah Deniz-I, paying $120/thousand cubic meter (tcm), well below the current market prices. However, the original agreement allowed for price renegotiation, which is exactly what Azerbaijan asked for when the pricing terms expired in April 2008. As the negotiations were underway, Turkey continued to import gas, though stressing that it would compensate for the price differences retroactively. Despite several rounds of negotiations, which were eclipsed by the discussions on gas transit, the parties failed to bridge their differences, which also raised concerns in the West that the delays might undermine Nabucco and other projects seeking to ensure supply diversification from the Caspian basin to Europe (EDM, February 26). Moreover, the gas disagreements also aggravated the diplomatic row between Baku and Ankara, caused by Turkey’s efforts to normalize relations with Armenia, raising questions about future relations between the two fraternal countries (EDM, October 21, 2009).

    Earlier, both parties announced that they had reached a breakthrough, and during Erdogan’s Baku visit in May, they expressed their determination to sign the deal in Istanbul (EDM, June 1). The recent deal, which apparently came about only after intense negotiations, signifies not only their willingness to reactivate the energy partnership, but also in repairing Turkish-Azeri strategic ties. As statements issued during Aliyev’s trip attest, Turkey will continue to place Baku at the center of its South Caucasus policy.

    Still, energy is likely to remain the most important component of Turkish-Azeri ties. For instance, the Azeri State energy company SOCAR is already a major player in Turkey’s energy market, through its control of the country’s largest petrochemicals group PETKIM. Recently, it was announced that PETKIM would expand its operations through new multi-billion dollar investments in the coming years (www.azernews.az, June 3).

    The exact details of the agreements have not been disclosed and some sources maintain that both parties still have to work towards elaborating many details. Yildiz declined to specify the revised price, indicating that it will be flexible in order to allow for adjustment to market conditions. Yildiz also added that it will be more favorable compared to what Turkey is currently paying to Russia (Anadolu Ajansi, June 8). However, Turkish media speculated that the price will be raised from $120 to $300/tcm. Turkey will have to pay around $1.5 to $2 billion to compensate for price differences. The price for Turkey’s imports from Shah Deniz-II, which will be around 6-7 bcm annually, is likely to be higher than $300 per tcm, and will be assessed by taking into account investment costs (www.haberturk.com, June 8).

    The other major item, terms for the transit of further Azeri gas to Europe, was also settled. Ankara had been insisting on purchasing Azeri gas and then re-exporting it to Europe on its own terms, as was the case for Shah Deniz-I. Neither side clarified whether Turkey retained that right (Hurriyet Daily News, June 8), but Yildiz indicated that Turkey would be able to re-export the gas it imports from Azerbaijan in collaboration with PETKIM (Cihan, June 7). Some sources maintain that Azerbaijan will pay Turkey $45 per tcm in transit fees for its direct export to Europe, passing through Turkish territory (Sabah, June 8). There remains some uncertainty over who exactly will export Azeri gas to Europe, as Azeri sources failed to confirm that Turkey retains the re-exporting rights (www.enerjivadisi, June 9).

    Previously, delays in negotiations with Turkey had invited the ire of Azerbaijan, because the development of the Shah Deniz-II had to be postponed. The resolution of the transit issue and the interest from different pipeline projects is definitely welcome news for Azeri officials, as they can now discuss with their European partners the commissioning of Shah Deniz-II. Both parties also publicized the agreement as a positive step that would facilitate other projects to transport gas to Europe, most notably Nabucco. Natiq Aliyev emphasized that they were willing to support Nabucco, but they still had not received any purchase commitment from Nabucco. Currently, Turkey is able to export Azeri gas to Greece through the Turkey-Greece Interconnector (TGI) which integrates Turkish and Greek grids. The planned Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will run from Greece to Italy, also seeks to tap into Azeri gas.

    Impending competition between Nabucco and other pipelines forming the EU’s Southern Corridor seems certain. While many believe Nabucco will be a non-starter without locking in Azeri gas, TAP has been awaiting the conclusion of the Turkish-Azeri negotiations.

    Representatives from both TAP and Nabucco welcomed the Turkish-Azeri deal (www.today.az, June 8). Azeri officials, anticipating the country’s gas output to increase substantially in future, welcome such outside demand which will boost their export potential. However, as the initial phase of Shah Deniz-II might only have limited extra output after it was allocated for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, it remains to be seen if Azerbaijan can supply all the Southern-corridor pipelines simultaneously at their desired levels. Turkish media maintain that Italy might soon sign a transit agreement with Ankara and a supply commitment agreement with Baku, which will commit the entire remaining volume from Shah Deniz-II to TAP, leaving no extra capacity for Nabucco (Referans, June 9). Yildiz stated that Turkey supports both projects and the final decision will be taken by the Shah Deniz consortium (ANKA, June 9). In any case, the Turkish-Azeri agreement might herald new competition in the Southern Corridor.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-azeri-deal-may-herald-new-competition-in-southern-corridor/

  • Sassounian’s column of June 17, 2010

    Sassounian’s column of June 17, 2010

    Growing Turkish Influence in Middle East
    Leads to Restrictions in Armenian Rights

    SASSUN 22

    Turkey’s growing influence in the Middle East, even before the naval confrontation with Israel over Gaza , had prompted some Arab countries to restrict the political rights of local Armenian communities.

    It is feared that the latest Gaza conflict, which catapulted Prime Minister Erdogan to a heroic stature throughout the Islamic world, would result in further limitations on Armenian activities deemed to be “anti-Turkish.”

    In recent months, Jordan , Lebanon and Syria have taken specific actions to place some restrictions on the activities of their Armenian citizens either out of concern for a backlash from Turkey or under direct pressure from Turkish authorities.

    A case in point was the Jordanian government’s cancellation of AGBU’s Middle East Young Professionals Forum that was to take place in Amman , June 3-6. Talin Suciyan, reported in The Armenian Weekly that Jordanian authorities had expressed reservations for the gathering of 150 young Armenians from various parts of the world. Suciyan, who was invited to speak on the “Legacy of Hrant Dink” and the Armenian community in Turkey , stated that the organizers were informed the night before that the forum was canceled by orders “from above.” Some observers attributed the cancellation of the AGBU forum to the agreement to set up a Free Trade Zone, which was to be signed between Jordan , Lebanon , Syria , and Turkey , on June 10. A commentator pointed out the irony of Armenian conferences being allowed to take place in Turkey , but not in Jordan !

    Earlier this year, when a Lebanese TV crew was about to enter Syria to record footage on “the Armenian killing fields” in Der Zor, border guards refused to admit them, even though they had secured the necessary filming permits from the Syrian authorities in advance. This incident took place shortly after CBS aired in its “60 Minutes” program a segment on the Armenian Genocide. The program depicted the protruding bones of Armenian Genocide victims from the desert sands of Der Zor. Turkish officials lodged a complaint with the Syrian government for allowing CBS to film an “anti-Turkish” program in their country.

    The third incident, unexpectedly, took place in Lebanon , home to one of the most influential Armenian communities in the Diaspora. In a surprise move, government officials banned the airing of Eileen Khatchadourian’s music video, “Zartir Vortyag,” a genocide era song calling for resistance against oppression. Even though the song makes no reference to Turkey , Lebanese authorities were concerned that it would negatively affect Lebanese-Turkish relations.

    These are troubling examples of blatant interference with Armenian citizens’ right to free expression. In all three countries, Armenians have long enjoyed the most cordial relations with their respective governments and are viewed by them as loyal citizens. Local Armenian community leaders must strongly protest such arbitrary violations of their basic rights as citizens of these countries. They should consider carrying out a campaign to educate their fellow citizens about the extensive damage Turkey has caused to Arab interests for decades, as a close military ally of Israel .

    Armenians should point out that, despite Erdogan’s blistering anti-Israeli rhetoric, he has not canceled any of the 16 agreements with Israel , including the exchange of intelligence, according to Today’s Zaman newspaper. Sedat Laciner, head of Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organization, told Hurriyet that the military leaders of the two countries had also signed several secret agreements. According to the Middle East magazine, the intelligence agencies of Israel and Turkey have cooperated “since the 1950’s in the fight against radical Islamist groups and Iranian clandestine operations in the region.” Furthermore, Turkey was reported to have allowed Israel “to monitor Syrian military maneuvers from Turkish soil.” In addition, Turkey awarded $1.8 billion in military contracts to Israeli companies. The total trade turnover between the two countries reached $2.5 billion in 2009. More than 900 large Israeli corporations have been operating in Turkey and over 1,000 small Israeli exporters have established commercial ties with it.

    Erdogan has cleverly capitalized on the political vacuum created by the inaction of Arab leaders regarding the plight of the Palestinian people, thus raising his own as well as his party’s political rating in advance of the September 12 referendum on constitutional amendments, and next year’s crucial parliamentary elections. It is a pity that Arab leaders have totally abdicated their own responsibility, allowing an outsider to claim the mantle of Arab leadership!

    Prior to Prime Minister Erdogan’s scheduled visit to Lebanon next month, where he might receive an undeserved hero’s welcome by some Lebanese, Armenians must expose his hypocritical show of solidarity with Palestinians, and convince their fellow citizens that he is acting in his own, rather than Lebanon’s, best interest.
  • Erdogan’s Troubling Friends

    Erdogan’s Troubling Friends

    This article first appeared at FrontPage Magazine.

    In 1974, when Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan was president of the Istanbul youth group of the MSP (the Islamist National Salvation Party), he wrote, directed, and starred in a play called Mas-Kom-Ya, which addressed subversive elements in Turkish society: masons, communists and yahudi (Jews). This very same performer has managed to convince gullible Western politicians that Turkey is committed to EU membership. Equally convincingly, he has played to the Arab gallery since his AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002.

    Erdogan’s tirade against Shimon Peres during a panel discussion at last year’s World Economic Forum in Davos – “you know very well how to kill” – earned plaudits all around the Arab world. The Lebanese daily Dar A-Hayatsuggested that Erdogan should restore the Ottoman Empire and be the Caliph of all Muslims. By some accounts, this has been identified as the driving force behind Turkey’s expansionist foreign policy, which has been dubbed “neo-Ottoman.”

    This new course obviously played out in Turkey’s role in the Gaza flotilla incident. According to Debka (an open source intelligence website) the flotilla was personally sponsored by Erdogan, and according to the same source, he is even prepared to sail aboard the next flotilla himself. Some awareness of the consequences must have been know, as a week before the flotilla sailed, Ankara threatened Israel with reprisals if it was impeded.

    The connection between the flotilla’s organizer, the Turkish-based IHH (Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief), and Hamas is well documented, and it created a stir when Hamas leader Khaled Mashal was officially invited to Ankara in 2006.

    Ankara’s support for Iran’s nuclear program, ostensibly for peaceful purposes, is likewise a cause for concern in the Western world, and President Abdullah Gül has admitted in an interview with Forbes magazine that “it is their final aspiration to have a nuclear weapon in the end.”

    Turkey and Syria have agreed on a long-term strategic partnership and Erdogan continues to defend Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir (who is on the International Criminal Court’s wanted list) with the claim that “a Muslim can never commit genocide.”

    Also alarming is the secret meeting between Prime Minister Erdogan and a Sudanese financier, Dr. Fatih al-Hassanein, during an Arab League summit in Khartoum in 2006. Dr. al-Hassanein is believed to have ties with al-Qaeda and other Islamist movements (e.g. in Bosnia).

    What has caused another stir is the friendship between Prime Minister Erdogan and a Saudi businessman, Yassin al-Qadi, who, according to the U.S. Treasury and the United Nations Security Council, is a major financier of Islamic terrorism. Erdogan’s advisor and co-founder of the AKP, Cüneyd Zapsu, was also al-Qadi’s partner.

    Erdogan defended al-Qadi publicly on Turkish television, declaring: “I trust him the same way I trust my father.” And a case against al-Qadi was dropped when in 2006 the Chief Public Prosecutor decided: “Al-Qadi is a philanthropic businessman and no connection has been found between him and terrorist organizations.”

    The truth is beginning to catch up with Erdogan. Last week, in an interview given to the Wall Street Journal, Fethullah Gülen, who, although a resident in the USA, is reckoned to be Turkey’s most influential religious leader, criticized the Gaza flotilla. He also commented: “.. some people in the United States consider Turkey as sitting at the epicenter of radicalism.”

    It is now up to the hot-tempered Mr. Erdogan and his government to dispel this image — or to continue confirming it.

    Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish and international press.

  • Economic and Defense Ties Between Turkey and Israel in Crisis

    Economic and Defense Ties Between Turkey and Israel in Crisis

    Economic and Defense Ties Between Turkey and Israel in Crisis

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 109

    June 7, 2010

    By: Saban Kardas

    In the wake of the flotilla crisis between Israel and Turkey, attention is shifting to the question of what this development might mean for their bilateral relationship. Angered by the Israeli army’s treatment of Turkish citizens seeking to break Israel’s blockage of Gaza, which resulted in nine deaths and various injuries, the Turkish public has expressed deep outrage. While demonstrations throughout the country called for punitive retaliatory actions, the Deputy Prime Minister, Bulent Arinc, set the limits of Turkey’s response. “No one should expect us to declare war against Israel,” said Arinc (Anadolu Ajansi, May 31).

    Granted, Turkish leaders unanimously used harsh language, accusing Israel of state terrorism and vowing that they would hold Tel Aviv accountable for its actions. However, representatives of opposition parties and many NGO’s found the government’s response insufficient, demanding concrete measures rather than “political rhetoric” (www.ntvmsnbc.com, May 31).

    Amidst these discussions, the Turkish parliament held an extraordinary session to adopt a declaration condemning Israel. The debates in parliament reflect the depth of feeling in the country against Israel, which exerts pressure on the government. Reportedly, the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) expressed reservations over a clause in the draft declaration that stated: “Parliament expects the Turkish government to reconsider economic and military ties with Israel and take the necessary effective measures.” Only after the AKP bowed to growing pressure from opposition parties could parliament adopt the declaration (www.haberturk.com, June 2).

    Overall, the Turkish government has stressed that it would prefer to explore instruments provided by international law and diplomacy to force Israel to compensate victims for its actions. So far, Israel has proven reluctant to accept an independent international inquiry into the flotilla incident and it is unclear if it will agree to pay reparations for the material and human losses suffered by Turkish citizens. Inevitably, Turkish-Israeli relations might come down to coercive instruments short of force. Therefore, it is necessary to ponder the following questions: what instruments can Turkey bring to bear on Israel, and how effective will they be in terms of achieving Turkey’s stated objective of punishing Israel? What price will Turkey pay if it continues on this confrontational path?

    The economic and military relationship might suffer from the nationalist urge to punish Israel. As regards economic ties, the public has called for boycotting Israeli products. However, experts point out that even if the crisis results in the limitation of the bilateral trade volume, it will not have a major impact either on Turkey or Israel. In 2009, Turkey’s imports from Israel were $1.1 billion, while Turkish exports to Israel were $1.5 billion. Since this trade volume accounts for only 1 percent of Turkey’s foreign trade, its economy will not suffer from any escalation of the crisis. Experts further note that despite similar calls to limit economic activity with Israel following the Gaza crisis in January 2009, Turkish-Israeli trade continued unabated. Nonetheless, analysts observed that since the 2009 crisis, Turkish businessmen doing business in Israel have faced bureaucratic obstacles and those problems are likely to accelerate (Referans, June 2). Turkish Finance Minister, Mehmet Simsek, also expressed similar opinions, arguing that given the limited trade volume, economic measures against Israel will not undermine Turkey’s economic recovery efforts (Anadolu Ajansi, June 3). Nonetheless, major Turkish firms scheduled to invest in Israel announced that they might freeze their investment or downgrade their operations to support the government’s policies (Milliyet, June 1).

    Since severing Turkish-Israeli economic ties will hurt neither Israel nor Turkey to a considerable extent, Ankara is evaluating energy cooperation. Although Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, said it was too early to talk about sanctions in the energy sector early on in the crisis (Star, June 2), he later supported nationalist arguments, saying “we are not considering any projects with Israel, until things return to normal” (www.haberturk.com, June 3). Yildiz emphasized that major energy and infrastructure projects with Israel will be suspended. He was obviously referring to the plans for the construction of multiple pipelines to transport oil, gas and water from Turkey to Israel, commonly termed Med-stream. These are, however, multinational projects that also involve other countries including Russia, Azerbaijan and India (EDM, November 25, 2008; August 7, 2009), and it remains to be seen how they will react to Turkey’s plans to politicize these projects.

    Escalation of tensions may have considerable repercussions in military affairs. Israel has been a major supplier to the Turkish army, especially in sophisticated weapons systems. Moreover, Israel has, in the past, undertaken various multi-billion-dollar contracts to modernize Turkey’s aging military hardware. Turkish Defense Minister, Vecdi Gonul, highlighted that although no new large-scale projects with Israeli defense companies were being considered, the ongoing programs, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, would continue (Hurriyet Daily News, June 3). Attending a TV show, a representative from the AKP argued that all agreements with Israel, including defense cooperation, would be cancelled (www.ntvmsnbc.com, June 6). It is, however, too early to tell if Turkey will indeed take this route.

    Even if military cooperation continues, relations will fall short of earlier levels, which had led observers to describe Turkish-Israeli ties as a “strategic partnership.” The new era might harm both sides to a significant degree. Previously, in addition to reaping the gains of lucrative Turkish defense contracts, Israel had also benefited from military-defense cooperation with Turkey in strategic terms. Various agreements signed in the 1990’s enabled Israel to conduct joint military exercises and develop defense cooperation with Turkey, which expanded its strategic depth vis-à-vis Syria and Iran. Following the 2009 crisis, Turkey limited Israeli access to its airspace, and have now announced cancellation of further exercises with Israel. Overall, Israel might suffer from the loss of such a valuable “ally,” not to mention its possible alienation in the Middle East due to the deterioration of diplomatic relations with Turkey. Ankara, also might have to pay a price, as Israel is reportedly reluctant to transfer to Turkey advanced strategic weapons systems which are considered essential for the country’s security needs, especially those required in the fight against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

    https://jamestown.org/program/economic-and-defense-ties-between-turkey-and-israel-in-crisis/