Turkish Forum

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  • Constitutional Court’s Partial Endorsement of Reform Package Divides Turkish Politics

    Constitutional Court’s Partial Endorsement of Reform Package Divides Turkish Politics

    Constitutional Court’s Partial Endorsement of Reform Package Divides Turkish Politics

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 134, July 13, 2010

    By Saban Kardas

    The Turkish Constitutional Court issued another controversial ruling on June 8, sparking a heated debate. Since the constitutional reform package initiated by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) failed to receive the necessary votes in parliament, it was submitted to a referendum, scheduled for September 12. The reform package introduces changes to the elections law, composition of higher courts, as well as allowing for the prosecution of past coup perpetrators and expanding various freedoms (EDM, May 5). However, a plea was brought to the court, asking for the annulment of the reform package on the grounds that it violated certain principles of the constitution. Although the court partially annulled some sections, it endorsed the overall package, clearing the way for the referendum.

    A major line of discussion concerns the repercussions of the ruling on Turkey’s state structure, in particular the separation of powers. According to the constitutional review system set by the 1982 constitution, prepared by the military regime at the time, the constitutional court is authorized to review parliamentary decisions only from a procedural point of view. Critics argue that by taking up this case on substantial grounds, the court exceeded its jurisdiction and curtailed parliament’s legislative powers. This debate is a reincarnation of the discussions in 2008, when the court overruled changes to the Turkish constitution, which would have ended the ban on the headscarf on university campuses. In contrast, those defending the court’s interpretation of its review powers in an expanding manner, argue that such judicial activism is necessary to ensure the survival of Turkey’s secular regime. In their view, by curbing the legislative autonomy of parliament on the basis of the “unchangeable articles of the Constitution,” the court is able to keep a lid on the excesses of the government; hence, preserving the secular characteristic of the current regime.

    Some AKP members questioned the legitimacy of the court’s ruling, arguing that it overstepped its authority. Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, however, refrained from adopting such a position, and instead maintained that they were content with the ruling, because the final package that will be put before the Turkish public met their expectations (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 10).

    While Erdogan also vowed that they would start a campaign to mobilize the Turkish public behind the reform package, the opposition parties, announced that they would start counter campaigns against it. As the referendum approaches, only minor rightist parties declared that they would favor the proposed changes. Major opposition parties have declined to support the AKP’s drive for constitutional reform. A shared concern among the opposition is that through such reforms, especially efforts to change the composition of higher courts, the AKP once again demonstrated that it is not interested in genuine democratization. Rather, it is seeking to deepen its grip over the state institutions, and creating a type of civilian despotism. Beyond that, each opposition party has its own specific objections.

    The main opposition, secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP), has argued that the AKP is intent on undermining the fundamental principles: consequently, its agenda should be objected to at any cost. It was, in fact, the CHP that pleaded to the constitutional court for the annulment of the reforms. Since the CHP appealed to the court with similar controversial requests in the past, the AKP criticizes it for conducting politics in court rooms, and avoiding the ballot box. Although the court removed some of the controversial provisions from the current package, the CHP is not fully satisfied with the ruling, and will campaign against the package in the referendum. The CHP has recently elected a new leader, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who gained popularity after his stern criticism of the AKP’s social and economic policies and publicizing corruption accusations against the AKP. Kilicdaroglu’s calls for an ethical policy have reenergized the CHP’s standing in Turkish politics, as anti-AKP voters increasingly turn to him as their new hope. The CHP, thus, sees the referendum as an opportunity to deal a blow to the AKP, and maintain the momentum generated by Kilicdaroglu’s election (www.cnnturk.com, July 10).

    The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) has been pursuing knee-jerk opposition to the AKP’s policies. As part of its policy of non-cooperation with the AKP, the MHP has opposed the reform package from the outset, saying that those policies will deepen social fragmentation. Nonetheless, the MHP expressed dissatisfaction with the court’s decision to review the reforms on substantial grounds. The MHP, in contrast, has suggested that Turkish people should be allowed to decide on the fate of the package, and it will ask its supporters to vote “no” (Anadolu Ajansi, July 10).

    Many observers expect Kurdish voters to support the reform package, but the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) would ask its supporters to boycott the referendum (Zaman, July 11). Overall, the BDP is critical of the political system and it has asserted that Turkey’s democratization depends upon rewriting the entire constitution on a civilian and pluralist platform. For the BDP, the partial amendments cannot eliminate the authoritarian legacy of the 1982 constitution and serve only the AKP’s own interests. Nonetheless, during the debates in parliament, the BDP first claimed that it would follow a constructive approach. It sought to negotiate with the AKP to include certain changes into the package, such as lowering the election threshold and changes to anti-terrorism laws (www.cnnturk.com, March 23). Faced with the AKP’s inflexibility over those demands, the BDP has expressed its opposition, and will now boycott the referendum.

    Increasingly, the referendum over the constitutional amendment is turning into a mini-election, ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for next year. The AKP has hoped to reenergize its grassroots support through the constitutional reform package, when it was coming under pressure for failing to maintain its reformist spirit. Now, it finds itself in a situation of having mobilized a counter coalition, whose only common denominator is the opposition to the AKP. Already troubled by other domestic issues, the AKP will have a difficult time mobilizing a winning coalition in the referendum, yet its success may also help it ensure victory in parliamentary elections next year.

    https://jamestown.org/program/constitutional-courts-partial-endorsement-of-reform-package-divides-turkish-politics/

  • Turkish-Israeli Relations Deteriorate Further

    Turkish-Israeli Relations Deteriorate Further

    Turkish-Israeli Relations Deteriorate Further

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 130

    July 7, 2010

    By Saban Kardas

    Turkish-Israeli relations continue to worsen, despite attempts to heal the divisions caused by the flotilla crisis. Ankara has asked Tel Aviv to issue an official apology for the killing of its citizens, pay compensation to the victims’ families, accept an independent international probe into the incident, return the confiscated ships and end its blockade on the Gaza strip. Although Turkey threatened to sever ties if Israel fails to deliver, how far Ankara might go with its “punitive” actions has been a matter of controversy (EDM, June 7).

    Thus far, the steps Israel has taken are far from meeting Turkish expectations, as acknowledged by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Burak Ozugergin (Anadolu Ajansi, June 30). For instance, Israel defied a UN-proposal to form an international commission and instead launched its own internal inquiry. The Israeli panel had only limited powers to examine “whether Israel’s Gaza blockade and the flotilla’s interception conformed with international law and also investigate the actions taken by the convoy’s organizers and participants.” Although the panel’s mandate was expanded slightly by the Israeli cabinet, Turkey continues to dismiss it (www.worldbulletin.net, July 4).

    There has been no progress on compensation for the killings. Similarly, Israel has not taken any steps to return the three ships it confiscated during the raid. Although Tel Aviv announced some measures to ease the Gaza blockade, humanitarian aid is not flowing into the area freely. Therefore, the Turkish government has continued its criticism of Israel on various domestic and international platforms. During the G20 summit in Toronto, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, labeled Israeli actions as state terrorism and vowed to pursue this issue until Israel changed its attitude on Turkey’s conditions (Anadolu Ajansi, June 28). Again, during his state of the union address, Erdogan continued with the same level of criticism against Israel (Anadolu Ajansi, July 1).

    Nonetheless, a secret meeting between Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, and Israeli Industry and Trade Minister, Ben-Eliezer, in Brussels altered the terms of the discussion (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 1). Although the meeting was allegedly “secret,” the manner in which it entered the press demonstrated that both sides did not want it to remain secret. They probably sought to send signals that they were willing and able to discuss ways of overcoming the stalemate, despite the confrontational public rhetoric adopted by their leaders.

    While government sources from both countries confirmed the meeting, it had significant reverberations on each side. In Israel, the meeting caused a major debate, as it turned out that Ben-Eliezer was acting in consultation with Prime Minister, Benyamin Netanyahu, and Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, while Israel’s hard-line Foreign Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, was not informed.

    The Turkish opposition also capitalized on this story, presenting it as an indication of the government’s “insincere” foreign policy. Opposition parties argued that while the government was lambasting Israel publicly for domestic political reasons, it continued dialogue with Israel behind closed doors. Responding to such criticism, Davutoglu ruled out any “inconsistency” in the government’s foreign policy and defended the meeting. He argued that, the meeting was requested by the Israeli side and he used that opportunity to state Ankara’s demands directly to Israeli officials (www.cnnturk.com, July 1).

    However, subsequent exchanges between Turkish and Israeli sources showed that the parties were far from overcoming differences. In defiance of Turkey’s account of the secret meeting, Netanyahu argued that no compensation was discussed and the panel formed by Israel would satisfy the demands of the international community. Although expressing regret for the loss of life, Netanyahu ruled out any apology and compensation (www.cnnturk.com, July 3).

    This statement prompted Davutoglu to issue further harsh remarks directed at Israel in an interview with Hurriyet, which appeared as an ultimatum: “Israelis have three options: they will either apologize or acknowledge an international impartial inquiry and its conclusion. Otherwise, our diplomatic ties will be cut off” (Hurriyet Daily News, July 4). Davutoglu also indicated that Turkey could not wait indefinitely and would continue to take measures to isolate Israel, which might include extending a flight ban on Israeli military aircraft over Turkish airspace to civilian flights as well.

    In response, Israeli sources again rebuffed Turkey’s demands for an apology. Liberman and Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Yigal Palmor, slammed Ankara’s harsh rhetoric. “When you want an apology, you do not use threats or ultimatums… Everything leads us to believe that Turkey has another agenda in mind,” Lieberman maintained (AFP, July 5; Today’s Zaman, July 6).

    Turkish-Israeli tensions have been an important issue affecting the course of Turkish-US relations, which also experienced recent turbulence. Since the Davutoglu-Ben-Eliezer talks took place after Erdogan’s meeting with the US President, Barack Obama, at the G20 summit, some speculated that Washington was behind this development. Moreover, Obama arguably sought to convince Erdogan to drop his demand for an international investigation into the flotilla incident (www.cnnturk.com, July 4). Davutoglu has rejected the suggestion that the meeting was held due to American pressure.

    Although it might be difficult to confirm what role US diplomatic sources played in the latest meeting, US efforts to mend ties between Turkey and Israel are no secret. Since the parties started bickering immediately after the revelation of the “secret” meeting, it might indicate that they were encouraged by Obama to meet. Indeed, Turkish-Israeli ties were one of the items on the Erdogan-Obama meeting, where Erdogan extended his gratitude to Obama for his constructive role in the flotilla crisis (Anadolu Ajansi, June 28).

    However, it seems Obama has been less successful in dampening the tension between the two allies in the Middle East and in convincing Erdogan to drop his critical rhetoric towards Israel. The row over the secret meeting, obviously seeking to bridge differences, demonstrated the depth of the Turkish-Israeli rift. As a final straw, it was announced that Turkey will not attend a US-Israeli-Turkish joint naval search-and-rescue exercise, scheduled in the Eastern Mediterranean next month. Dubbed “Reliant Mermaid,” the drill has been held regularly over the past decade (www.ntvmsnbc.com, July 5).

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-israeli-relations-deteriorate-further/

  • Foreign Business in Turkmenistan: to be or not to be

    Foreign Business in Turkmenistan: to be or not to be

    turkmenbusBy Merdan Shakhnazarov

    Open Door policy announced by Ashkhabad strongly increased the flow of foreign investors, hoping either to enter new market with their product or to profit from work contracts in formerly closed Turkmenistan. Evidently the power sector attracts the most foreign interest.  But experts of oil and gas market often underestimate the risks of their business in Turkmenistan, and after first taste of the local reality give up their plans of conquering the market. Among the factors that influence the decision not to come to Ashkhabad are the following: imperfection of laws, corruption and lawlessness of public servants, financial difficulties, non-disclosure of information about failure of foreign investors on the local market. We shall consider some of these.

    Corruption

    International nongovernmental organization Transparency International regularly includes Turkmenistan in the list of most corrupted countries.   This estimation should be some kind of indicator for foreign investors, wishing to start their business in that central Asian republic.

    Evidences of corruption are to be traced not only in the state structure but in all the spheres of life. On one hand it seems to ease the process of getting contracts, while bribery makes communication with  paper pushers easier. But it often turns out that businessmen spend a lot of money to establish contact with Turkmenian authorities but finally back at the bottom of the ladder.

    In some cases foreign investors who came across with local reality are no more capable of doing business in such conditions. According to a businessmen from UAE, who planned to invest  in development of Avaza resort, before he even started his activity he  faced severe retaliatory measures of local law-enforcement authorities, who confiscated his immovable property.

    At meanwhile the nephew of the President under cover of the name of G. Berdimukhamedov started to squeeze money from the Arabian businessman. These circumstances forced the businessmen to refuse from his plans in that country.

    It is difficult for a western businessmen, used to transparent and open business to negotiate with Turkmenian partners, who are vivid representatives of eastern civilization with its contrivances and half-words. There have occurred some cases, when Turkmen representatives of authority agreed to sign a contract with foreign company,  but the procedure of signing extended for an indefinite period.

    Ashkhabad financial difficulties

    Despite of launching Turkmenistan-China pipeline, expending gas pipeline in Iran, cutting down the volume of gas sales  in Russia caused decrease of revenue side of the state budget. In that regard Ashkhabad tries to decrease the budgetary gap, cutting down the expenses for second-term projects, and in some cases putting them on hold at all.

    For instance according to one of the employees of “Sekhil”, Turkish company, many of his nationals experience problems with financing in Turkmenistan now. For that reason the project of recreational resort in the resort area Avaza, developed by Sekhil by the order of Turkmenbashy complex of oil refinery plants is at risk.

    Some other companies, including Ozaylar and Ichkale experience same problems. Of course the management of Turkish companies is strongly unsatisfied with arrears in payments by Turkmen authorities, for it forces them to carry on the works at their own cost or take credits.

    Another indicator of financial difficulties, experienced by Ashkhabad, is borrowing funds from strategic partners. For instance in may of the previous year during his visit to PRC President Berdimukhamedov negotiated a grand from Beijing in the amount of $ 10 Mln.

    This amount even though granted on non-repayable basis and without any interest, still has its aim to secure economical preferences and to strengthen PCR’s position on the national market.

    Financial difficulties also force Turkmenistan to pay back foreign companies, carrying out important projects in Turkmenistan, by gas supply contracts. For example investments of the Iran Railways into construction of the a section of the railway Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan –Iran is to be repaid by Ashkhabad by supplying liquefied gas for 4 years.

    Non-disclosure of information about failures of foreign investors

    For foreign business considers the power sector to be the most attractive, it is important to notice, that investment into hydrocarbon field development is not always self-liquidate.

    For example in 2002 American ExxonMobil decided to stop works in Turkmenistan and close representative offices in Balkanabad and Ashkhabad. This was due to failed drilling in Garashsyzlyk, one of Turkmenistan’s biggest minefields. American company was operating the «Garashsyzlyk-2» project, the respective production-sharing contract for 25 years was signed in 1998. Low commercial impact of the block forced Americans to cancel the contract halfway in spite of the discontent and pressure of the Turkmenistan party.

    It’s also known, that in the beginning of 2000s TPAO, Turkish corporation experienced failure on one of the blocks, it had to scale down its activity and live the country.

    Therefore only those foreign companies shall obtain a place in the hot Turkmen sun near gas jets, who are ready to make immense material and moral investments, fight the pressure of the «guardians of law» and to fall on hard times. At the same time they have to be ready to patiently wait for repayments and possibility of inefficient Turkmen field development.

  • Sassounian’s column of July 1, 2010

    Sassounian’s column of July 1, 2010

    Turkish Propaganda Campaign, Part II:
    Exploiting Akhtamar Church Once Again
    SASSUN 24

    Readers may recall that the Turkish government embarked on a worldwide publicity stunt in 2007 when it renovated and reopened as a museum the Armenian Holy Cross Church on Akhtamar Island in Lake Van.
    At the time, Turkey had gone to great lengths to lure to the opening ceremonies Armenians from around the world. Turkish officials did not conceal that their real purpose was to exploit this event for propaganda purposes. Even before the “Holy Cross Museum” was inaugurated, a Turkish Parliamentary delegation had arrived in Washington with a bulky photo album. Mehmet Dulger, then Chairman of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Commission, relayed the following message to Members of the U.S. Congress: “See, the Turks, whom you accuse of genocide, have renovated an Armenian Church with taxes collected from Turks. And those photos are the evidence.” The photo album was distributed worldwide to all organizations advocating “Armenian genocide claims,” according to the Turkish newspaper Zaman. Furthermore, Turkey invited to the opening of the “Holy Cross Museum” the culture ministers of all countries that had adopted or were considering to adopt resolutions recognizing the Armenian Genocide.
    In my column of March 22, 2007, I had asked that the Turkish government designate Holy Cross, not as a museum, but a Church with a cross on its dome, and place it under the jurisdiction of the Armenian Patriarchate in Turkey. If not, I had urged Armenians to boycott the opening ceremonies, in order to avoid being used as tools for Turkey’s campaign of genocide denial. In the end, the Turkish propaganda effort failed, as only a handful of Armenians from overseas traveled to Lake Van to attend the event.
    Now that Turkish officials have grudgingly allowed church services to be performed for one day only — on Sept. 19, 2010 — and a cross to be placed on the dome of this 10th Century Church, they have embarked on Part II of their publicity campaign. All Turkish Embassies and Consulates worldwide have been instructed to invite large numbers of Armenians to this one-time church service in order to accomplish three objectives: 1) Earn millions of dollars in revenue from 5,000 tourists expected on Sept. 19 and another million visitors during the next year; 2) secure concessions from Armenians in return for Ankara’s “magnanimous gesture”; and 3) score propaganda points with Europeans and Americans by presenting the image of a tolerant Turkish society.
    Hakan Tekin, Turkey’s energetic Consul General in Los Angeles, told “Today’s Zaman” that California’s “one million Armenians” are looking forward to take part in the upcoming religious worship. To impress his bosses in Ankara, Tekin proudly announced that the “one-day church service” has caused “a stir” among the Armenian community in Los Angeles — no doubt the result of his hard work! He expressed the wish that Armenia would take “reciprocal steps” in return for Turkey’s “constructive policy.” Tekin also hoped that such a “normalization process” would have a significant impact on Turkey’s relations with the Armenian Diaspora, “especially with Armenians living in California who are hard-liners.”
    In sparing no efforts to publicize the planned “one-day worship,” the Turkish government has undertaken the following preparations:
    — Special solar panels are being installed on Akhtamar Island, so that tourists can visit the Holy Cross Church by day and night.
    — Since hotels are supposedly fully booked, plans are being made to house tourists in school dormitories and private homes in Van.
    — Large video screens are to be placed outside the Church so the thousands of expected visitors can follow the services, as the building can only accommodate 50 worshipers.
    — A 90-page guidebook will be published in the Armenian language.
    — A 10-day Turkish-Armenian Cultural Festival is planned in Van.
    — The border may be opened for a few days, so that tourists can directly travel from Armenia to Van, rather than spending a dozen hours to get there via Georgia, according to the President of Van Chamber of Commerce.
    I urge all Armenians to boycott this new propaganda ploy, unless Turkish officials take the following steps:

    1. Officially designate Holy Cross as a Church, not a museum, opening it for year-round worship services, rather than for one day only.
    2. Place the Church under the jurisdiction of the Armenian Patriarchate of Turkey, not the Ministry of Tourism.
    3. Allow Divine Liturgy to be celebrated regularly, after Holy Cross Church is properly consecrated in accordance with Armenian religious rites.

    Archbishop Aram Ateshian, Locum Tenens of the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul, is the appropriate religious official to present these demands to the Turkish authorities, without whose participation they would be unable to carry out the September 19 church services and propaganda campaign. It is doubtful, however, that such demands would be met by the Turkish government, given its traditional policy of callous disregard for the rights of the Armenian community in Turkey.
  • Turkish Government Criticized for its Policy on Kyrgyzstan

    Turkish Government Criticized for its Policy on Kyrgyzstan

    Turkish Government Criticized for its Policy on Kyrgyzstan

    June 25, 2010—Volume 7, Issue 123

    Eurasia Daily Monitor

    Saban Kardas

    On June 21, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, paid a visit to Kazakhstan. Davutoglu met his Kazakh counterpart, Kanat Saudabayev, and President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to discuss the situation in Kyrgyzstan as well as bilateral relations. The two nations agreed to coordinate their assistance to Kyrgyzstan. They announced their agreement on a joint action plan, which would be put into effect following the constitutional referendum on June 27. They sent a letter to the Kyrgyz interim leader, Roza Otunbayeva, expressing support for her plans to hold a referendum and readiness to assist the nation’s reconstruction. Although no details of the roadmap was announced immediately, Davutoglu said that upon consultation with other friendly nations, they would form the contents of the action plan. Davutoglu and the Kazakh leadership underscored that long-term stability in Kyrgyzstan depends on the formation of a workable and self-sufficient political system in the country (Anadolu Ajansi, Cihan, June 21; Zaman, June 22).

    The declaration follows Turkey’s earlier diplomatic efforts during the recent crisis. When the first signs of violence were reported in the region, it caught Ankara by surprise, as the government was preoccupied with other international crises. Turkey established crisis desks at the foreign ministry in Ankara and its embassy in Bishkek. Ankara initially committed to provide humanitarian aid through the Turkish Red Crescent and undertook measures to ensure the safety of Turkish citizens living in Kyrgyzstan. Turkey dispatched planes to evacuate Turkish citizens in the two cities that were affected the most by the conflicts, Osh and Jalalabad. Davutoglu and Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Recep Erdogan, contacted the interim Kyrgyz government and conveyed their readiness to take all steps required aimed at contributing to regional stability. Turkish leaders urged their Kyrgyz counterparts to avoid provocations and maintain calm in the crisis (Anadolu Ajansi, June 13, June 14).

    Meanwhile, Turkey sent a special envoy to Bishkek who met with the Kyrgyz interim government officials to gauge their expectations from Turkey. Prior to his departure for Astana, Davutoglu stressed that Turkey’s utmost priority was to maintain a neutral position in the conflict and ensure that the country would not split into two separate parts (Today’s Zaman, June 18). The joint declaration with Kazakhstan reflects Turkey’s desire to realize those objectives.

    Several factors explain Turkey’s attempts to address the crisis in cooperation with Kazakhstan. First, the two countries’ current tenure in regional organizations has naturally pushed them to the forefront in efforts to address the unrest in Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan holds the rotating Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Turkey has also assumed the term presidency of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) from Kazakhstan. The two countries, thus, will seek to implement the joint road map on behalf of their respective organizations, which might enhance the effectiveness of such action.

    Moreover, Kazakhstan occupies a key role in Turkey’s Central Asia policy. As part of its recent efforts to revitalize its presence in Central Asia, Turkey has sought closer coordination with Kazakhstan. During a June 18 security conference in Istanbul, a representative from Turkish foreign ministry labeled Astana as the lynchpin of Ankara’s Central Asian policy and maintained that the Turkish-Kazakh axis could serve as the best guarantor of regional stability. Nonetheless, Turkish experts expressed reservations, arguing that the rapprochement with Kazakhstan was hardly based on realistic calculations and Ankara might find it difficult to sustain.

    Nonetheless, a growing volume of bilateral contacts is apparent. During the Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s, visit to Turkey last year, both sides agreed to deepen their “strategic partnership” in economic and political affairs, especially in energy cooperation (EDM, October 26, 2009). In May, the Turkish Chief of Staff, General Ilker Basbug, also visited Kazakhstan to foster closer bilateral military cooperation (Anadolu Ajansi, May 21). Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, visited Kazakhstan in the same month, during which he emphasized that Turkey was watching closely the rising power of Kazakhstan in the region. The parties signed various agreements intended to carry bilateral relations to higher levels (Anadolu Ajansi, May 24). Gul is also scheduled to visit Kazakhstan next month.

    However, the Turkish government was still criticized by opposition parties and many civil society organizations, alleging it had failed to respond adequately to the crisis in Kyrgyzstan on the one hand, and having ignored the Turkish speaking countries in Central Asia due to its excessive involvement in the Middle East, on the other. In support of their arguments, for instance, critics pointed to how Turkey wasted the opportunity provided by the recent CICA summit in Istanbul, where Turkey assumed the chairmanship of the organization. The meeting was overshadowed by Israel’s attack on the humanitarian aid convoy, which resulted in the deaths of several Turkish activists (www.cnnturk.com, June 7). For government critics, the fact that Ankara invested time and energy in persuading the participating nations to issue a declaration condemning Israel’s attack, instead of addressing the volatile security situation in Kyrgyzstan was a sign of neglect on the government’s part (Hurriyet Daily News, June 18).

    In his address to parliament on June 16, and during his Astana trip, Davutoglu defied critics, referring to the various high-level contacts Turkey established with the region in recent months. Davutoglu also pointed to several projects being carried out by Turkey’s state-run development agency, TIKA, in Kyrgyzstan, in particular and more widely within Central Asia (Anadolu Ajansi, June 21).

    Davutoglu might be correct to highlight the recent Turkish activism, while defending his government’s Central Asia, policy. Nonetheless, it is also difficult to deny that, in the first few years of the Justice and Development Party government, Turkey’s involvement in the Central Asian Turkish-speaking republics remained rather limited. Only in recent years, has Turkey refocused its attention on the region, owing largely to President Gul’s efforts and Davutoglu’s appointment as foreign minister last year. It remains to be seen if the newly found Turkish interest may make a modest contribution to stability in Central Asia, or whether its role will prove “too little, too late.”

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-government-criticized-for-its-policy-on-kyrgyzstan/

  • Sassounian’s column of June 27, 2010

    Sassounian’s column of June 27, 2010

    Armenians Must Take Bold, Pre-emptive

    Measures to Counter all Hostile Acts

    SASSUN 23

    By Harut Sassounian

    Publisher, The California Courier

    Having been victimized by many conquerors throughout history, Armenians have developed a strong instinct for survival. To stay out of trouble, they have learned to be loyal and even subservient to the states that ruled over them.

    While Armenians gained plenty of “moral victories,” their actual battlefield successes have been few and far between. One has to go back to two thousand years to find a rare example of a conquering Armenian ruler, King Tigran the Great (140-55 BC) whose vast empire extended from the Caspian to the Mediterranean Sea. In the modern era, prior to the Armenian Genocide, Armenian Freedom Fighters (Fedayees) fought back against the murderous Turks and Kurdish mercenaries. During the Genocide, the Armenians of Aintab, Hajin, Musa Dagh, Sassoun, Van, and Zeitoun bravely defended themselves, while 1.5 million of their kinsmen were slaughtered like sheep. The heroic Battle of Sardarabad saved the remnants of the Armenian people in Eastern Armenia, culminating in the establishment of the first Armenian Republic in 1918. Finally, beginning in 1988, brave young men and women battled the much larger and better armed forces of Azerbaijan to liberate Artsakh (Karabagh).

    In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many western missionaries, tradesmen, writers and adventurers, often described the Armenians they encountered in the Ottoman Empire as “cringing.” Canadian-Armenian website Keghart.com, in an editorial posted last week, quoted Dr. William Goodell’s depiction of the Armenians of Constantinople in 1871: “Four centuries of torture, of oppression, and of suspense have stamped its impress upon an entire community… constant fear, constant agony, constant humiliation have so crushed out every trace of manhood, that they are still cringing, fawning, an abject race. Several generations of happier descendants can alone efface the mental taints acquired in those long years of vassalage.”

    Regrettably, many Armenians have yet to overcome the “slave mentality” — deeply ingrained in their psyche — inherited from ancestors who lived for centuries under foreign yoke. One comes across countless examples of self-effacing behavior in Armenian communities throughout the Diaspora and in Armenia itself. All too often Armenians meekly accept injustices and insults heaped on them by others.

    It is high time that Armenians throw off their shackles and defend their inalienable rights. They must not remain silent in the face of abuse or physical attack, but respond appropriately without resorting to reckless actions that may endanger their communities or the homeland.

    In the United States, for example, when elected officials, journalists or writers distort the facts of the Armenian Genocide, they must be severely criticized and discredited, so others would be warned to refrain from Genocide denial.

    The most recent example of Armenian inaction is the feeble Armenian response to last week’s night-time attack by Azeri forces on Artsakh, causing the deaths of four Armenian soldiers and the wounding of four others. Beyond expressions of sympathy for the victims and condemning the attack, no concrete action was taken by Armenian officials.

    In the aftermath of this vicious and unprovoked attack, Armenia should have announced the cancellation of the next round of negotiations with Azerbaijan over Artsakh. It is completely unacceptable to conduct peace talks, while Azerbaijan is engaged in warfare. Under these circumstances, Armenians have the right to take all possible actions to defend themselves from future attacks. Rather than merely issuing a condemnation, the Armenian side at a time of its choosing should carry out punishing pre-emptive strikes so that Azeris would think long and hard before mounting another attack. Azerbaijan should clearly understand that any further aggression on their part would:

    1.     Cause the suspension of the peace talks, thus delaying the resolution of the conflict rather than expediting the negotiating process.

    2.     Lead Armenia to eventually abandon all peace talks, since it has little to gain from these negotiations. Azerbaijan is the one that desperately needs to negotiate in order to secure concessions from Armenia.

    3.     Signal to the world that the government of Azerbaijan is not interested in finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict and is responsible for its collapse.

    4.     Discredit the good faith effort of the mediating countries – France, Russia and the United States.

    5.     Force Armenia to initiate military action, causing a disproportionate amount of destruction, even damaging the oil pipelines, in order to discourage Azerbaijan from further attacks.

    Armenians must realize that they no longer live in the Ottoman Empire and are no one’s slave. They should shake off their psychological shackles and take all necessary measures to defend their national interest!