Category: Authors

  • Election Process in Nagorno Karabakh

    Election Process in Nagorno Karabakh

    After the collapse of Soviet Union there was unsolved problem of Caucasus which is named Nagorno Karabakh. In the date of May 23, 2010 very important progress has been experienced in Karabakh. Seperatist government of Karabakh realised an election which is not accepted by governments and international organizations because of giving message of it is an independent government. It was the fifth election since 1993 and 4 party and 45 candidate was competed for 33 chairs and Free Motherland Party has performed to the leadership. The election which is involved of 70 percent of Karabakh public has born big discussions in a few time.

    Arayik Harutyunyan which is the Prime Minister of de-facto Karabakh government is still maintaining leadership of Free Motherland Party. Karabakh Democratic Party, Karabakh Communist Party and Armenian Revolutionist Federation are the other parties which involved to these elections. Free Motherland Party has taken approximately 50 percent of votes and there was more than 100 international observers in these elections.

    Seperatist regime in Karabakh caused a new paradox especially in Minsk Group’s peace progress. Nagorno Karabakh is actually in the land of Azebaijan but it is occupied bu Armenia without any law suitable to intenational law and now it is making election as it is independent government this was took a hard response from international community. Approaching of Azerbaijani community in Karabakh to this election was firstly occupiers must leave Karabakh and Azerbaijani community must return to their land, Azerbaijani and Armenian people must leave together with a new order. After these conditions provided then any election can be legitamate. Any election without these points would be the continous of unlawful status. If subject is critised with Madrid Principles which is the last point of Minsk Process Armenian one sided attitude in peace process. After the elections Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Nalbandyan declared that elections were free and democratic and it had created a legitimate government. He said many independent observes had been in elections. And international community has to have good relationships with new government if they wants the problems solved. Bako Sahakyan who is President of seperatist Karabakh government said that elections were independently and independency of Karabakh has to be recognised and people of Karabakh choices has to be respected.
    At the point reached in this situation Turkey, Azerbaijan and Russia and international organizations in many countries of the Minsk Group declared elections have no legal basis and neither side expressed concern. Azerbaijan has condemned the situation with a sharp tongue and wanted to show the same reaction from the United Nations. OSCE (European Security and Cooperation Organization), United Nations, European Union, the United States and Russia underlined that choices do not solve the problem, contrary it would cause to continue stated problem.(1) The parties that emphasized current trend must continue and for ensuring legitimacy Madrid Principles have to be accepted by Armenia.
    According to the recommedations in full text in Madrid Principles created in 2007 and presented in last year so far many problems have to be solved and agreement for Karabakh’s new status have to be reached. Realisation of substances in recommendations has become more difficult because of final steps of Armenia.
    Recommendations to the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia:

    1. Until the elections which will be held in 2008, consists of the following principles must be tailored to the bill:
    a. The location of the security and international peace-keeping force must be guaranteed.
    b. Armed forces of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, Lachin Kelbajar and especially around the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh must leave the entire land.
    c. Forced immigrants must return to their lands .
    d. Current status of Nagorno Karabakh should be determined by the voting system, and until that its temporary status should be designated and, all traffic and trade routes should be opened
    2. All shares are being agreed for the controversial section should be indicated.
    3. With elections to be held in 2008 in the campaign appropriate environment should be prepared to political leaders to create positive atmosphere for peace and tranquility.
    Recommendations for Armenia, Azerbaijan and de-facto government Nagorno-Karabakh

    4. Sides should act in accordance with the cease-fire signed in 1994. Should leave the show of force, to increase their defense budgets, the mutual accusations, agitations and drive away from peace statements should be left.
    5. Diplomacy outside activities, including the above principles have been agreed at talks about the decision should continue. Even countries councils should be encouraged to do the negotiations and relations between Azerbaijanis and Armenians should try to strengthen.
    6. Nagorno-Karabakh’s de-facto administration should put an end to the to be placed on the Armenians in the occupied land , to the continuation of privatization activities in the region, the creation of new building space, to the construction of local buildings.
    7. Azerbaijan Nagorno should recognise the possibility Azerbaijani leaders to select their own community should recognize the possibility of oil revenues to benefit all citizens and immigrants to increase transparency and reduce corruption in the trials should be done. (2)
    Many of the issues, Armenia’s “rejection of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan” could not be applied over because of Armenia’s “rejection of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan”. Time to time, Armenia use it put forward in the country fear mood to impress international community and the world public opinion should recognize Karabakh as an independent state.
    New Approaches of Regional Powers

    Elections have been held in Karabakh since 1993, lack of response as big as this because there is no positive state before 2000. But in the reached point Armenia’s passive-Karabakh policy stopped peace negotiations to accelerate, the Minsk Group to the region continuously for the loss of visits to perform. By following this policy in Bishkek Protocol, 1994 Management and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh problem has managed to pass to the official notes that Armenia has been pursuing the same policy in the new era. If the last review in 2009 will be seen that the rhetoric, stating that Azerbaijan has always followed an aggressive policy to Armenia, the situation does not continue in their favor they would recognize Karabakh as an independent state has indicated.
    In 2010 Turkey, Russia and the U.S. about the growing activities impress Armenia to new conditions. Igor Popov told the Russian Co-chairman of the Minsk Group, Russia’s active policy in solving the problem in this country will follow soon matter stated. Again, after elections in the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko, Karabakh in any way they don’t recognise Karabakh as an independent state and they respect to integrity of Azerbaijan and that the Karabakh problem should be resolved in this framework stated.(3) Turkey, aim at develop the relations with Armenia prerequisite to emphasize reiterating the urgent need to solve the Karabakh issue and the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan guarantee is not broken by any power. They think to bring Turkey to Co-chairman status to Minsk Group and give very active part to Turkey to solve this problem. After a long break while the U.S. ambassador to Baku was appointed as the Minsk Group Matthew Bryza of the United States has made a Co-chairman. Karabakh in particular the U.S usually in the Caucasus policy, the new expansions will be performed in the new era of Armenia’s stance will be shaped by the U.S. and other countries.
    Armenia may be exposed to various pressures because of attitude in the new era may be exposed to various pressures and position themselves in the region will open to outside intervention can make out. In this issue of Turkey in Turkish-Armenian relations towards Karabakh any objection to the requirement did not matter. Regardless of the region as a unilateral world needs to accept that indicates that Armenia will take steps soon again will be determined by the attitude of the international community. Follow-driven politics since independence, Armenia, because of the Russian new attitude it can not see the hope. The increasing U.S. influence in Azerbaijan, with its headquarters location becomes more difficult for Armenia, the adoption of the principles can be subjected to the pressure on the inside. The economic problems of the Armenian people living today, the social crisis brought and vast majority of people do not give importance about the Karabakh issue as they has in the past.
    Mehmet Fatih ÖZTARSU – Institute of Strategic Thinking
    http://sde.org.tr/

    (1) ATET Dağlıq Qarabağda Keçirilen Seçkini Tanımır, ,
    (2) Mehmet Fatih Öztarsu, Madrid Prensipleri ve Karabağ Görüşmeleri, Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, ,
    (3) Panorama Armenia, https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2010/05/24/rf-mid-nkr/1103483
  • Turkey Prioritizes Independent Regional Policies in the Middle East and the South Caucasus

    Turkey Prioritizes Independent Regional Policies in the Middle East and the South Caucasus

    Turkey Prioritizes Independent Regional Policies in the Middle East and the South Caucasus

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 105

    June 1, 2010

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey continued its regional diplomacy, following the historic visit by Russian President Medvedev to Ankara (EDM, May 20). Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan paid back-to-back trips to Greece, Iran and Azerbaijan, which underscored Turkey’s rising activism in its neighborhood, as well as highlighting divergence with the United States.

    The most controversial development was the deal Turkey brokered jointly with Brazil regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Building on the groundwork laid by their foreign ministers, Turkish and Brazilian leaders convinced their Iranian counterpart to agree on a proposal made earlier by the international community, under which it would swap its low-enriched uranium with enriched rods for a medical research reactor. The exchange will take place in Turkey.

    Turkey portrayed the agreement as a historic achievement that would end the stalemate over Iran’s nuclear program, and bring peace to the Middle East, emphasizing that Iran agreed to sign a document stipulating concrete obligations (www.cnnturk.com, May 17). However, the reactions to the deal from the United States and Western powers put Turkey in a rather controversial position rather than to earn the sort of praise it was anticipating. Since the deal came amidst news that the United States succeeded in getting other permanent members of the UN Security Council agree on new sanctions, this development increasingly pit Ankara and Washington against each other.

    From an American perspective, the deal was not satisfactory because Iran agreed to the conditions proposed back in October 2009 while it did not commit to end its nuclear program. In particular it is emphasized that while the amount of fuel Iran agrees to return, 1,200 kilograms, was significant at the time it was first proposed, since then Iran is likely to have expanded its stockpile of enriched uranium, which is not under inspection. Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, remained defiant. Arguing that the United States was kept informed about the negotiations with Iran, Davutoglu contended that Iran’s promises were satisfactory and should be the basis of efforts to solve the diplomatic standoff (Today’s Zaman, May 20). Meanwhile, a recent development somehow adds credibility to Turkey’s arguments. Reportedly, Obama sent a letter to Brazilian President in April wherein he urged him to pursue the efforts to convince Iran to accept the exchange the 1,200 kilograms of uranium on Turkish territory, though noting that the US would also pursue the sanctions path (letter available at:www.politicaexterna.com/archives/11023.

    Amid statements coming from the United States and other powers that concerns over Iran’s nuclear program did not disappear, Erdogan sought to mobilize the international community behind the deal with Iran. He telephoned President Barack Obama, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and many other leaders, as well as sending letters to many others, asking them to prevent sanctions against Iran and give diplomacy a chance. Although Obama appreciated Turkish efforts, he underlined that they would expect to see Iran’s interpretation of the deal, and kept the option for sanctions open (Anadolu Ajansi, May 20, May 22).

    Iran sent a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Monday explaining the deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil in detail. As anticipated, while the United States did not find Iran’s commitments satisfactory, Turkey insisted on its earlier position. Meanwhile, Erdogan started his historic tour of South America. Speaking in Brazil, he reiterated in strong words that the deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey was a historical breakthrough, and they would continue to work toward a nuclear free world (www.haberturk.com, May 28).

    The challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear program are unlikely to subdue, as Iran remains committed to continue with its program. Turkey’s policy so far demonstrates that it is increasingly self-confident in undertaking foreign policy initiatives in its region and toward that end it could even risk confrontation with the United States. Especially the fact that Turkey went ahead with these efforts despite the news about a new draft UN Security Council being prepared is worth mentioning here. Turkey has made clear on many occasions that it would not approve tougher measures against Iran considering the negative repercussions of such a move (EDM, March 20). Reiterating this position on several regional and international platforms, Davutoglu invested much of his time on this issue over the last couple of months, as he and his team held numerous meetings with their Iranian counterparts to find a negotiated solution. Therefore, Turkish leaders would not like to see all their efforts go in vain as a result of a new round of sanctions, which would pose a serious blow to their credibility in the region and at home.

    Overall, the Turkish leaders seem to assume good will on Iran’s part and do not seriously consider the possibility that Iran might be manipulating their willingness to mediate in this crisis to undermine the quasi-coalition the United States has delicately managed to form. Given Iran’s track record, the United States is increasingly concerned that Iran might not be acting in good faith and is using such last-minute deals to avoid tougher reactions (Today’s Zaman, May 24). Given these conflict interpretations of Iran’s nuclear program, we might observe growing divergence of opinions between Ankara and Washington.

    Erdogan also paid a visit to Baku and Tbilisi, following his trip to Tehran, which also underscored another dimension of Ankara’s regional policies, conducted independently of Washington’s priorities. After the normalization with Armenia, which was promoted by Washington, hit an apparent deadlock, Erdogan’s trip to Baku served as yet another affirmation of Ankara’s determination to keep Baku at the center of its Caucasus policy. Erdogan reiterated support for the Azeri position on Karabakh, which seemed to go a long way toward repairing the damage caused by Turkey’s efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Armenia.

    As a concrete indication of such a thaw, it is expected that Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev will visit Turkey in early June. Aliyev had avoided visiting Turkey in apparent protest of Turkish-Armenian normalization and Turkey’s position on the natural gas negotiations (EDM, October 21, 2009). A deal recently reached between the two countries would bring an end to the negotiations concerning the price for Turkey’s purchases from Azerbaijan and conditions for the passage of Azeri gas to Europe through Turkish territory. Although the agreement was expected to be signed during Erdogan’s visit, it is postponed for Aliyev’s visit by which time the two parties will also finalize the remaining details. While saying that they “will crown the agreement during Mr. President’s visit,” Erdogan perhaps expressed how much he attaches significance to Aliyev’s upcoming trip (Hurriyet, May 17).

  • Sassounian’s column of June 3, 2010

    Sassounian’s column of June 3, 2010

    Cancellation of Erdogan’s Argentina Trip
    Is the Price Turkey Pays for Genocide
    SASSUN 2
    Not satisfied with its neo-Ottoman policies of regional domination, Turkey has decided to extend its influence far and wide, to the four corners of the globe.
    While making inroads into the Islamic world by pretending to sympathize with Palestinian suffering, Turkey has alienated Israel, its long-standing political and military partner, and its NATO allies.
    Encouraged by his much publicized recent visit to Iran with Brazil’s President, and anxious to counter growing recognition of the Armenian Genocide by South American countries, Prime Minister Erdogan embarked last week on his first trip to Argentina, Brazil and Chile.
    In paving the way for that visit, Turkey’s Ambassador in Argentina had worked diligently with local officials to allow Erdogan, accompanied by seven ministers and 300 businessmen, to inaugurate the installation of Kemal Ataturk’s bust in a major Buenos Aires park.
    In response to the Turkish Ambassador’s lobbying efforts, the local Armenian community launched a counter-attack, placing paid announcements in two major newspapers and asking Buenos Aires City officials not to honor Ataturk, blaming him for continuing the genocide initiated by the previous Young Turk regime.
    Armenians also objected to Erdogan’s visit, accusing him of heading a denialist government.
    Buenos Aires officials responded positively to Armenian concerns, because of long-standing cordial ties with the local community. Moreover, in recent years, the city government had published two textbooks on the Armenian Genocide, which are used in city schools. Importantly, these books include references to Ataturk’s role in continuing the genocidal activities of his predecessors.
    Ultimately, what caused the collapse of the Turkish scheme was the discovery that Turkey’s Ambassador had attempted to deceive Buenos Aires City officials. He had falsely claimed that he was merely requesting permission to replace Ataturk’s bust, which had been supposedly missing for several years. The Ambassador had asked for a prompt decision from city officials in order to have Ataturk’s bust unveiled during Prime Minster’s visit to Argentina on May 31.
    Upon review of the Turkish Ambassador’s demands, Buenos Aires officials discovered that there had never been a bust of Ataturk in that park. The missing bust actually was that of a well-known Egyptian human rights activist. Argentina’s large Arab community was extremely unhappy learning that the Turkish Ambassador, using false pretenses, was trying to replace their beloved hero’s missing bust with that of Ataturk.
    Turkey’s envoy must have intentionally misrepresented the facts, knowing full well that city officials would not agree to pass a law allowing the installation of Ataturk’s bust. The Ambassador tried to trick them by requesting a permit simply to replace the “missing” bust.
    When Erdogan found out that there would not be an installation of Ataturk’s bust, he asked Argentina’s President Cristina Kirchner to overrule city officials. However, Kirchner explained that she was not empowered to take such action, because Buenos Aires had an autonomous government and any attempt to interfere in local matters would violate Argentina’s democratic constitution.
    Despite the fact that Erdogan is an Islamist and not an Ataturk admirer, he had no choice but to defend “the honor” of Turkey’s revered founder and national hero. Otherwise, the Prime Minister would have come under severe attack back home from Turkish nationalists and the powerful military.
    Recent polls show that his party (AKP), for the first time since coming to power, has fallen slightly behind the opposition Kemalist Party (CHP), which could spell trouble for the Prime Minister in next year’s parliamentary elections. Under these circumstances, Erdogan was forced to cancel his much-touted trip to Argentina, after visiting Brazil. Not surprisingly, the Turkish foreign ministry angrily denounced the Armenian community of Argentina for undermining Prime Minister’s critical visit.
    This is the first time that the Prime Minister of Turkey has been forced to cancel an overseas trip due to the vigilance of an Armenian community.
    Argentinean-Armenians must be commended for their effective activism. Armenian communities worldwide should follow their footsteps by taking legally appropriate actions to cause cancellation of visits by Turkish officials, annulment of military and commercial contracts, and disruption of diplomatic relations with Turkey, including the recall of its ambassadors.
    Turkey’s leaders should be constantly reminded of the massive crimes committed by their predecessors. As long as the Turkish government does not acknowledge the Armenian Genocide and make appropriate amends, it should be made to pay a heavy political and economic price for years to come!

  • Sassounian’s column of May 27, 2010

    Sassounian’s column of May 27, 2010

    Senate Should Scrutinize Bryza Before

    Confirming him as Ambassador to Baku

    SASSUN 21

    After a lengthy delay, Azerbaijan consented last week to the appointment of Matthew Bryza as U.S. Ambassador to Baku, an unnamed American official told EurasiaNet.org. The California Courier confirmed Bryza’s nomination through its own Washington sources. The White House is expected to shortly issue an official announcement.

    It is noteworthy that there has not been an American Ambassador in Azerbaijan since last July. When John Evans was recalled as Ambassador to Armenia in 2006 for using the term Armenian Genocide, the Bush administration pressured the Senate to quickly confirm his successor, claiming that the United States urgently needed an Ambassador in that country. Surprisingly, there has not been a similar sense of urgency in Washington, during the year-long absence of a U.S. Ambassador from Azerbaijan! Pres. Aliyev must have viewed this holdup as a snub to his country.

    Until 2009, Matthew Bryza served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and U.S. Co-Chair of the Minsk Group negotiators on the Karabagh (Artsakh) conflict. Interestingly, he was dubbed by colleagues as “Baby DAS” (Deputy Assistant Secretary) for his swift promotion, despite his youthful age and limited diplomatic experience.

    The delay in his appointment to Baku could be attributed to Azerbaijan’s misgivings concerning Bryza and discontent with recent U.S. foreign policy initiatives. During the course of his upcoming Senate confirmation, Bryza should be questioned regarding his past actions and recent tensions between Azerbaijan and the United States.

    Here are some questions that members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should consider asking Bryza during his nomination process:

    — Why did it take so long for Azerbaijan to consent to your appointment? What complaints did Azerbaijan have against you and against U.S. foreign policy in the region? What assurances were given by the United States to Azerbaijan to allay its concerns before consenting to your appointment?

    — Despite your and Minsk Group’s persistent efforts to resolve the Karabagh conflict, Armenia and Azerbaijan are still far from reaching a peace agreement. What do you think are the remaining obstacles to resolving this conflict? Given your expertise in this region, what steps would you take as U.S. Ambassador to secure Azerbaijan’s consent to a peaceful resolution of the Karabagh conflict rather than resorting to war?

    — Pres. Aliyev has been pressuring Turkey not to lift its blockade of Armenia. How would you dissuade Azerbaijan from undermining Armenia-Turkey relations?

    — Given the absence of democratic norms in Azerbaijan, known for forged elections, lack of media freedom, and repressive measures against opposition parties and minorities, how would you persuade Azerbaijan’s leaders to establish rule of law?

    — What messages did you convey to Georgia’s leadership prior to the Georgia-Russia war of 2008? Is there any truth to reports that you had advised the Georgians that the United States would intervene militarily in case of an attack by Russia?

    — Do you believe you can carry out your diplomatic duties professionally and objectively, given your wife’s outspoken views on Armenian, Azeri and Turkish issues? [Bryza married Zeyno Baran, a Turkish-born foreign policy analyst at the Hudson Institute. Their wedding took place at the former home of the prominent Balian family of architects on an island near Istanbul. It was attended by Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and high-ranking Turkish, Georgian, and American officials].

    — Did you have any role in the recall and premature retirement of Amb. John Evans? Do you think that an Ambassador should be fired simply for using the term Armenian Genocide? What are your own views on the Armenian Genocide? Do you think it is appropriate for Pres. Obama to break his campaign promise to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide?

    — In a letter to Secretary Clinton, the Armenian National Committee of America accused you of not being impartial on “Armenia-related matters,” harboring a “pro-Azerbaijani bias in the Nagorno Karabagh peace process,” and advocating “U.S. complicity in Turkey’s denials of the Armenian Genocide.” What assurances can you give the American people that you would fairly and objectively carry out your diplomatic duties in Azerbaijan as the official representative of the United States?

    The members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should closely scrutinize Bryza’s nomination to ensure that, if confirmed, he represents U.S. interests in Baku, and not the other way around, since both he and his wife, Zeyno Baran, have had extensive ties with both Turkey and Azerbaijan. In her 2005 Senate testimony, Baran expressed her opposition to the congressional resolution on the Armenian Genocide, while her husband, Bryza, told a reporter that Turkey was his “second home.”

    


  • Thoughts About Forum

    Thoughts About Forum

    I have been observing that there is lots of ill will among our members and/or people who can post articles on the Forum, against Fethullah Hoca. This may or may not be justified. I personally am not a religious person at all. I am sorry to say that I am 68 years old and still don’t know namaz and most of the prayers. However, being an astute student of Ottoman History, I know that The Ottoman Empire was dismembered somewhat by acts and lies of Christian Missionaries, whose schools I had attended later on. Shouldn’t there be a Moslem Missionary or two also? Maybe if powerful enough, they can help Turkey and other Moslem nations.

    I am a graduate of Talas American School, Tarsus American College, and Robert College School of Engineering. There was no Christian propaganda by the missionaries, when I went to school at these institutions. However, their predecessors were instrumental in dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and/or invented as well as flamed and armed, and financed armenian and greek rebellions.

    Bulgaria was lost mainly due to the efforts of Robert College missionaries. Missionaries at Anatolia College started the Pontus Empire lie. They were instrumental in death of many innocent Moslems. Missionaries at the schools in Talas, Tarsus, Central Anatolia College, Euphrates College, and American Missions at Trebizonde(Trabzon), Harpout (Harput), Mouche (Mus), and Van encouraged armenians to rebel. Their lies attracted donations from USA, where the word Turk, became synonymous with a dirty monster. You know the rest of the story.
    Ladies and gentlemen, please think about what I just said. Maybe you can look at Fettullah Hoca from a different point of view from now on.

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  • Ankara-Yerevan Accords Point toward Armenia’s Withdrawal from the Occupied Territories

    Ankara-Yerevan Accords Point toward Armenia’s Withdrawal from the Occupied Territories

     

    foto -geography.about.com

     

    Gulnara Inandzh
    Director
    International Online Information Analytic Center Ethnoglobus

    The emotions, whipped up by commentaries which followed the signing on October 10 of the protocols between Turkey and Armenia, have prevented a logical analysis of the situation.  In order to begin such an analysis, we need to recognize that at the roots of the signing of these accords lie a multi-sided game of significance far beyond the South Caucasus region.

    If at the outset, the opening of the borders with Armenia was one of the conditions on Turkey’s path toward joining the European Union, then at the present time, the rapprochement of the two countries depends on the geopolitical situation and Ankara’s participation in these processes.  Immediately after the signing of the Turkish-Armenian accords, as one should have expected, the EU put forward some new demands for Turkey, about which the latter could not have but known about in advance.  This means that Turkey signed the agreements with Armenia not as part of its effort to join the EU, something that provides one of the points of departure for understanding why Turkey decided to reach an agreement with Armenia.

    At the same time, we must not ignore the pressures on Turkey both direct and behind the scenes.  And those came from more places than just the capitals of the countries which were represented at the signing ceremony.  (Here, we intentionally are not touching on the role of Israel in all these complicated political games, the situation around Iran, the transportation routes for Iraqi oil and the Kurdish element in Iraq, as each of these represent a distinctive subject for discussion).

    Turkey, who bear the genetic code of the Ottoman Empire as far as great power games are concerned, will not agree to play the role of a defeated country even under the pressure of world powers.  Ankara is not in such a weak geopolitical situation that it has to act in ways that harm its national interests.  Not long ago, we should remember, Turkey felt itself strong enough to refuse the United States the right to use the military base at Incirlik for the supply of the anti-Saddam operations of the coalition forces in Iraq.

    When pointing to the harm the protocols between Ankara and Yerevan create for Azerbaijan in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, one must not forget that the Armenian diaspora has terrorized Turkey with the issue of the so-called “Armenian genocide.”  In its turn, Turkish diplomacy, which connects this question with the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict until recently took a position absolutely the same as Azerbaijan both because of their common Turkishness and because of Turkey’s own national interests.  These two issues also served as a factor which united the Azerbaijani and Turkish diaspora, which resisted recognition of “the Armenian genocide” by pointing to the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani lands.

    Viewed from that perspective, it would seem that Turkey, which has little to gain economically and politically by reaching an accord with Armenia, signed the protocols in a way that both undercut its own interests and angered its fraternal and strategic relationship with Azerbaijan.

    Of course, in contrast to the 1990s, Azerbaijan today is not the weak “younger brother” who needs support but an equal state that is confident in its own forces and demands respect on that basis.  This cannot entirely please the current Turkish powers that be, but it is not the occasion for a break with a reliable partner.  Differences in the question of the transportation of Azerbaijani gas to Turkey also cannot be the subject for speculation on such a strategic question as the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border.

    During the entire period of talks with Armenia, official representatives of Turkey at various levels repeated that the relationship Ankara sought would not harm the interests of Azerbaijan and that the Turkish-Armenian borders will not be opened until the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Among those who have constantly said this are Turkish President Abdulla Gul, Prime Minister Erdogan, Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu, members of the parliament, opposition figures and others both before and after the signing of the protocols.

    At the same time, every step of Armenian-Turkish negotiations was discussed with Baku, and talks about the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue continued in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group.

    And in this context, the declaration of Turkish President Gul concerning the impact in “a short time” of the Armenian-Turkish accords on “the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” merits attention and should calm many of the concerns in Azerbaijan.

    At the present time, when Azerbaijan has acquired major geopolitical importance, ignoring its interests on such an important issue is impossible.  Consequently, the interests of Baku were taken into consideration.  Note that immediately after the signing in Switzerland of the Armenian-Turkish agreement Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev arrived in Zurich where the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was discussed.  Further, a short time after the signing of the agreement with the very same mission, Tina Kaidanow, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia arrived in Baku, and in the framework of the meetings of the foreign ministers of the Black Sea countries, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu met with President Ilham Aliyev and his foreign minister, Elmar Mammadyarov.  And the visit to Baku of General Ishyk Koshaner, commander of Turkish ground forces, to meet with Azerbaijani Defense Minister Col. Gen. Safar Abiyev is yet another confirmation of this.

    Taken together, it is clear that this cycle of visits was not a matter of chance.

    And if there were any doubt about this, the reaction both within Armenian society and also in the diaspora to the accord which should allow Armenia to escape from the blockade has been negative.  Evidently, Armenian society and politicians recognize that they will have to free the occupied territories, because otherwise no one intends to save Armenia.  It is not accidental that after the signing of the Zurich agreement, all sides represented at the ceremony except for Armenian Foreign Minister Edvard Nalbandyan did not hide their satisfaction with what had taken place.

    In other words, everything shows that the Zurich agreement will have a positive consequence on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Judging by the presence at the signing ceremony of the representatives of the OSCE Minsk Group, it is possible to assert that all interested sides are informed about this process and about its impact on the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

    If under the pressure of the diaspora Armenia will not ratify the agreement, Azerbaijan and Turkey will return to where they were before.  If the Turkish and Armenian parliaments all the same give legal force to the agreement, then Armenia will have to free Azerbaijani territories in order to secure the opening of the Turkish borders.  Otherwise, Ankara, responding to public pressure in Azerbaijan and in Turkey will not be able to open the borders with Armenia.  In that case, Azerbaijani and Turkish public opinion will be in a position to increase international pressure on Yerevan and the Armenian diaspora regarding the liberation of the occupied territories.

    If Armenia does not follow through, then Turkey will always be in a position to find reasons to close the borders.  In such a case, Azerbaijan will be left with only one choice – the liberation of the occupied territories by military means; and the countries involved in the division of spheres of influence in the region will have to agree with this.  Otherwise Azerbaijan, using its status as “the most reliable country for the transportation of gas,” will have every reason for refusing to allow the Nabucco project to pass through its territory.


    Every country has its own interests and priorities, and in this case, that means that there is no chance that Turkey will sacrifice its relations with Azerbaijan for new ties with Armenia.