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Turkish Propaganda Campaign, Part II:
Exploiting Akhtamar Church Once Again
 Readers may recall that the Turkish government embarked on a worldwide publicity stunt in 2007 when it renovated and reopened as a museum the Armenian Holy Cross Church on Akhtamar Island in Lake Van.
At the time, Turkey had gone to great lengths to lure to the opening ceremonies Armenians from around the world. Turkish officials did not conceal that their real purpose was to exploit this event for propaganda purposes. Even before the “Holy Cross Museum” was inaugurated, a Turkish Parliamentary delegation had arrived in Washington with a bulky photo album. Mehmet Dulger, then Chairman of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Commission, relayed the following message to Members of the U.S. Congress: “See, the Turks, whom you accuse of genocide, have renovated an Armenian Church with taxes collected from Turks. And those photos are the evidence.” The photo album was distributed worldwide to all organizations advocating “Armenian genocide claims,” according to the Turkish newspaper Zaman. Furthermore, Turkey invited to the opening of the “Holy Cross Museum” the culture ministers of all countries that had adopted or were considering to adopt resolutions recognizing the Armenian Genocide.
In my column of March 22, 2007, I had asked that the Turkish government designate Holy Cross, not as a museum, but a Church with a cross on its dome, and place it under the jurisdiction of the Armenian Patriarchate in Turkey. If not, I had urged Armenians to boycott the opening ceremonies, in order to avoid being used as tools for Turkey’s campaign of genocide denial. In the end, the Turkish propaganda effort failed, as only a handful of Armenians from overseas traveled to Lake Van to attend the event.
Now that Turkish officials have grudgingly allowed church services to be performed for one day only — on Sept. 19, 2010 — and a cross to be placed on the dome of this 10th Century Church, they have embarked on Part II of their publicity campaign. All Turkish Embassies and Consulates worldwide have been instructed to invite large numbers of Armenians to this one-time church service in order to accomplish three objectives: 1) Earn millions of dollars in revenue from 5,000 tourists expected on Sept. 19 and another million visitors during the next year; 2) secure concessions from Armenians in return for Ankara’s “magnanimous gesture”; and 3) score propaganda points with Europeans and Americans by presenting the image of a tolerant Turkish society.
Hakan Tekin, Turkey’s energetic Consul General in Los Angeles, told “Today’s Zaman” that California’s “one million Armenians” are looking forward to take part in the upcoming religious worship. To impress his bosses in Ankara, Tekin proudly announced that the “one-day church service” has caused “a stir” among the Armenian community in Los Angeles — no doubt the result of his hard work! He expressed the wish that Armenia would take “reciprocal steps” in return for Turkey’s “constructive policy.” Tekin also hoped that such a “normalization process” would have a significant impact on Turkey’s relations with the Armenian Diaspora, “especially with Armenians living in California who are hard-liners.”
In sparing no efforts to publicize the planned “one-day worship,” the Turkish government has undertaken the following preparations:
— Special solar panels are being installed on Akhtamar Island, so that tourists can visit the Holy Cross Church by day and night.
— Since hotels are supposedly fully booked, plans are being made to house tourists in school dormitories and private homes in Van.
— Large video screens are to be placed outside the Church so the thousands of expected visitors can follow the services, as the building can only accommodate 50 worshipers.
— A 90-page guidebook will be published in the Armenian language.
— A 10-day Turkish-Armenian Cultural Festival is planned in Van.
— The border may be opened for a few days, so that tourists can directly travel from Armenia to Van, rather than spending a dozen hours to get there via Georgia, according to the President of Van Chamber of Commerce.
I urge all Armenians to boycott this new propaganda ploy, unless Turkish officials take the following steps:
Archbishop Aram Ateshian, Locum Tenens of the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul, is the appropriate religious official to present these demands to the Turkish authorities, without whose participation they would be unable to carry out the September 19 church services and propaganda campaign. It is doubtful, however, that such demands would be met by the Turkish government, given its traditional policy of callous disregard for the rights of the Armenian community in Turkey.
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Category: Authors
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Sassounian’s column of July 1, 2010
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Turkish Government Criticized for its Policy on Kyrgyzstan
Turkish Government Criticized for its Policy on Kyrgyzstan
June 25, 2010—Volume 7, Issue 123
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Saban Kardas
On June 21, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, paid a visit to Kazakhstan. Davutoglu met his Kazakh counterpart, Kanat Saudabayev, and President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, to discuss the situation in Kyrgyzstan as well as bilateral relations. The two nations agreed to coordinate their assistance to Kyrgyzstan. They announced their agreement on a joint action plan, which would be put into effect following the constitutional referendum on June 27. They sent a letter to the Kyrgyz interim leader, Roza Otunbayeva, expressing support for her plans to hold a referendum and readiness to assist the nation’s reconstruction. Although no details of the roadmap was announced immediately, Davutoglu said that upon consultation with other friendly nations, they would form the contents of the action plan. Davutoglu and the Kazakh leadership underscored that long-term stability in Kyrgyzstan depends on the formation of a workable and self-sufficient political system in the country (Anadolu Ajansi, Cihan, June 21; Zaman, June 22).
The declaration follows Turkey’s earlier diplomatic efforts during the recent crisis. When the first signs of violence were reported in the region, it caught Ankara by surprise, as the government was preoccupied with other international crises. Turkey established crisis desks at the foreign ministry in Ankara and its embassy in Bishkek. Ankara initially committed to provide humanitarian aid through the Turkish Red Crescent and undertook measures to ensure the safety of Turkish citizens living in Kyrgyzstan. Turkey dispatched planes to evacuate Turkish citizens in the two cities that were affected the most by the conflicts, Osh and Jalalabad. Davutoglu and Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Recep Erdogan, contacted the interim Kyrgyz government and conveyed their readiness to take all steps required aimed at contributing to regional stability. Turkish leaders urged their Kyrgyz counterparts to avoid provocations and maintain calm in the crisis (Anadolu Ajansi, June 13, June 14).
Meanwhile, Turkey sent a special envoy to Bishkek who met with the Kyrgyz interim government officials to gauge their expectations from Turkey. Prior to his departure for Astana, Davutoglu stressed that Turkey’s utmost priority was to maintain a neutral position in the conflict and ensure that the country would not split into two separate parts (Today’s Zaman, June 18). The joint declaration with Kazakhstan reflects Turkey’s desire to realize those objectives.
Several factors explain Turkey’s attempts to address the crisis in cooperation with Kazakhstan. First, the two countries’ current tenure in regional organizations has naturally pushed them to the forefront in efforts to address the unrest in Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan holds the rotating Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Turkey has also assumed the term presidency of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) from Kazakhstan. The two countries, thus, will seek to implement the joint road map on behalf of their respective organizations, which might enhance the effectiveness of such action.
Moreover, Kazakhstan occupies a key role in Turkey’s Central Asia policy. As part of its recent efforts to revitalize its presence in Central Asia, Turkey has sought closer coordination with Kazakhstan. During a June 18 security conference in Istanbul, a representative from Turkish foreign ministry labeled Astana as the lynchpin of Ankara’s Central Asian policy and maintained that the Turkish-Kazakh axis could serve as the best guarantor of regional stability. Nonetheless, Turkish experts expressed reservations, arguing that the rapprochement with Kazakhstan was hardly based on realistic calculations and Ankara might find it difficult to sustain.
Nonetheless, a growing volume of bilateral contacts is apparent. During the Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s, visit to Turkey last year, both sides agreed to deepen their “strategic partnership” in economic and political affairs, especially in energy cooperation (EDM, October 26, 2009). In May, the Turkish Chief of Staff, General Ilker Basbug, also visited Kazakhstan to foster closer bilateral military cooperation (Anadolu Ajansi, May 21). Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, visited Kazakhstan in the same month, during which he emphasized that Turkey was watching closely the rising power of Kazakhstan in the region. The parties signed various agreements intended to carry bilateral relations to higher levels (Anadolu Ajansi, May 24). Gul is also scheduled to visit Kazakhstan next month.
However, the Turkish government was still criticized by opposition parties and many civil society organizations, alleging it had failed to respond adequately to the crisis in Kyrgyzstan on the one hand, and having ignored the Turkish speaking countries in Central Asia due to its excessive involvement in the Middle East, on the other. In support of their arguments, for instance, critics pointed to how Turkey wasted the opportunity provided by the recent CICA summit in Istanbul, where Turkey assumed the chairmanship of the organization. The meeting was overshadowed by Israel’s attack on the humanitarian aid convoy, which resulted in the deaths of several Turkish activists (www.cnnturk.com, June 7). For government critics, the fact that Ankara invested time and energy in persuading the participating nations to issue a declaration condemning Israel’s attack, instead of addressing the volatile security situation in Kyrgyzstan was a sign of neglect on the government’s part (Hurriyet Daily News, June 18).
In his address to parliament on June 16, and during his Astana trip, Davutoglu defied critics, referring to the various high-level contacts Turkey established with the region in recent months. Davutoglu also pointed to several projects being carried out by Turkey’s state-run development agency, TIKA, in Kyrgyzstan, in particular and more widely within Central Asia (Anadolu Ajansi, June 21).
Davutoglu might be correct to highlight the recent Turkish activism, while defending his government’s Central Asia, policy. Nonetheless, it is also difficult to deny that, in the first few years of the Justice and Development Party government, Turkey’s involvement in the Central Asian Turkish-speaking republics remained rather limited. Only in recent years, has Turkey refocused its attention on the region, owing largely to President Gul’s efforts and Davutoglu’s appointment as foreign minister last year. It remains to be seen if the newly found Turkish interest may make a modest contribution to stability in Central Asia, or whether its role will prove “too little, too late.”
https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-government-criticized-for-its-policy-on-kyrgyzstan/
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Sassounian’s column of June 27, 2010
Armenians Must Take Bold, Pre-emptive
Measures to Counter all Hostile Acts
By Harut Sassounian
Publisher, The California Courier
Having been victimized by many conquerors throughout history, Armenians have developed a strong instinct for survival. To stay out of trouble, they have learned to be loyal and even subservient to the states that ruled over them.
While Armenians gained plenty of “moral victories,” their actual battlefield successes have been few and far between. One has to go back to two thousand years to find a rare example of a conquering Armenian ruler, King Tigran the Great (140-55 BC) whose vast empire extended from the Caspian to the Mediterranean Sea. In the modern era, prior to the Armenian Genocide, Armenian Freedom Fighters (Fedayees) fought back against the murderous Turks and Kurdish mercenaries. During the Genocide, the Armenians of Aintab, Hajin, Musa Dagh, Sassoun, Van, and Zeitoun bravely defended themselves, while 1.5 million of their kinsmen were slaughtered like sheep. The heroic Battle of Sardarabad saved the remnants of the Armenian people in Eastern Armenia, culminating in the establishment of the first Armenian Republic in 1918. Finally, beginning in 1988, brave young men and women battled the much larger and better armed forces of Azerbaijan to liberate Artsakh (Karabagh).
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many western missionaries, tradesmen, writers and adventurers, often described the Armenians they encountered in the Ottoman Empire as “cringing.” Canadian-Armenian website Keghart.com, in an editorial posted last week, quoted Dr. William Goodell’s depiction of the Armenians of Constantinople in 1871: “Four centuries of torture, of oppression, and of suspense have stamped its impress upon an entire community… constant fear, constant agony, constant humiliation have so crushed out every trace of manhood, that they are still cringing, fawning, an abject race. Several generations of happier descendants can alone efface the mental taints acquired in those long years of vassalage.”
Regrettably, many Armenians have yet to overcome the “slave mentality” — deeply ingrained in their psyche — inherited from ancestors who lived for centuries under foreign yoke. One comes across countless examples of self-effacing behavior in Armenian communities throughout the Diaspora and in Armenia itself. All too often Armenians meekly accept injustices and insults heaped on them by others.
It is high time that Armenians throw off their shackles and defend their inalienable rights. They must not remain silent in the face of abuse or physical attack, but respond appropriately without resorting to reckless actions that may endanger their communities or the homeland.
In the United States, for example, when elected officials, journalists or writers distort the facts of the Armenian Genocide, they must be severely criticized and discredited, so others would be warned to refrain from Genocide denial.
The most recent example of Armenian inaction is the feeble Armenian response to last week’s night-time attack by Azeri forces on Artsakh, causing the deaths of four Armenian soldiers and the wounding of four others. Beyond expressions of sympathy for the victims and condemning the attack, no concrete action was taken by Armenian officials.
In the aftermath of this vicious and unprovoked attack, Armenia should have announced the cancellation of the next round of negotiations with Azerbaijan over Artsakh. It is completely unacceptable to conduct peace talks, while Azerbaijan is engaged in warfare. Under these circumstances, Armenians have the right to take all possible actions to defend themselves from future attacks. Rather than merely issuing a condemnation, the Armenian side at a time of its choosing should carry out punishing pre-emptive strikes so that Azeris would think long and hard before mounting another attack. Azerbaijan should clearly understand that any further aggression on their part would:
1. Cause the suspension of the peace talks, thus delaying the resolution of the conflict rather than expediting the negotiating process.
2. Lead Armenia to eventually abandon all peace talks, since it has little to gain from these negotiations. Azerbaijan is the one that desperately needs to negotiate in order to secure concessions from Armenia.
3. Signal to the world that the government of Azerbaijan is not interested in finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict and is responsible for its collapse.
4. Discredit the good faith effort of the mediating countries – France, Russia and the United States.
5. Force Armenia to initiate military action, causing a disproportionate amount of destruction, even damaging the oil pipelines, in order to discourage Azerbaijan from further attacks.
Armenians must realize that they no longer live in the Ottoman Empire and are no one’s slave. They should shake off their psychological shackles and take all necessary measures to defend their national interest!
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A Visit Inside Turkey’s Islamist IHH
A journalist’s trip to the headquarters of the extremist group that sponsored the Mavi Marmara.
BY CLAIRE BERLINSKI
June 21, 2010 12:00 AMIstanbul
The street outside the IHH, the Turkish organization that recently dispatched the Mavi Marmara to its sanguinary fate in the eastern Mediterranean, suggests a hopeful world of multi-ethnic and religious harmony. Men and women in various forms of secular and religious dress—beards, clean-shaven, headscarves, burqas—walk in and out of the building in urgent conversation with Africans in dashikis, Swedes in stained proletarian-wear, anti-Zionist rabbis sweating nervously in black suits and payot. A gangly teenager strolls by in a T-shirt that reads, “Virgins required: No experience necessary.” It isn’t clear whether he’s off-message, highly ironic, or yet another Turkish kid who bought a T-shirt he didn’t quite understand.
Full Story >>
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Eastward Bound
This article first appeared at FrontPage Magazine.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates recently blamed Europe for alienating Turkey from the West. On a visit to London last Wednesday, he stated, “If there’s anything to the notion that Turkey is moving eastwards, it is in no small part because it was pushed, and it was pushed by some in Europe refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought.”
When Turkey was accepted as a European Union candidate at the Helsinki summit in 1999, the Ecevit government subsequently enacted two important constitutional reform packages and a revision to the Civil Code which established the principle of gender equality in the family. When the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002, it was with the promise of further reform, and seven more reform packages were passed.
Despite reservations about implementation, in October 2004 the European Commission found that Turkey had “sufficiently” fulfilled the political criteria for membership and recommended the start of accession talks. However, when these talks began the following year, the AKP government under Recep Tayyip Erdogan lost interest in the European perspective and concentrated on a domestic agenda with the main aim of securing its power base. This included a policy of kadrolaşma in state and local administration, which means filling leading positions with party supporters and fellow believers. Through “neighborhood pressure,” the government embarked on a process of social engineering to enforce conservative, Islamic standards throughout Turkish society.
High on the AKP government’s agenda was making it possible for graduates of religious high schools (the imam-hatip schools) to enter university on an equal footing with students from state high schools. However, because of secular opposition, these attempts have so far been unsuccessful.
The headscarf – that is, the tightly knotted Islamic headscarf and not the loosely worn village headscarf – is widely regarded as a symbol of political Islam, and Prime Minister Erdogan admitted as much at a meeting of the Alliance of Civilizations Forum in Madrid in 2008. However, the fact that the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban on the Islamic headscarf at Turkish universities was a setback that Mr. Erdogan was not prepared to accept.
As has been illustrated by Turkey’s vote in the UN Security Council against further sanctions on Iran, Turkey’s “multi-dimensional” foreign policy has been directed more towards cementing its relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors than advancing its cause in Europe. Particularly, after the Turkish government’s endorsement of the alleged aid flotilla and the stand-off with Israel, Turkey’s claim of being “the honest broker of the Middle East” rings hollow. This is all not to mention, of course, the Armenian issue, Turkey’s own Kurdish problem, and the fact that Turkey, for the last 36 years, has occupied a third of what is now an EU member state – Cyprus.
In a television interview in 2004, Libya’s leader, Muammar Gaddafi, let his views be known on Europe letting Turkey into the European Union, stating: ”The Islamic world, even the Islamic extremists, even bin Laden, rejoice for the entrance of Turkey in the European Union. This is their Trojan horse.” Last week, addressing a delegation of European Muslim leaders, Gaddafi supported Turkey’s membership, using the same argument.
If Robert Gates wants to blame anyone for the West losing Turkey, he should perhaps take a look closer to home – i.e. the U.S. State Department, which, as far as Turkey is concerned, has also been out of touch. For example, in May 2007, Condoleeza Rice stated that the AKP is “a government dedicated to pulling Turkey west toward Europe.” Seven months earlier, when President Sezer and the Turkish military warned about the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, the U.S. Ambassador to Ankara, Ross Wilson, described the debate as “cacophonic” and added: “There is nothing that I see imminently on the horizon that makes me particularly worried.”
The main stumbling block to the continuation of EU accession talks with Turkey is the Cyprus question. Here Ross Wilson’s successor, James Jeffrey, tops the bill when, in a February interview with the Turkish daily Sabah, he stated: “Geographically, Turkey is closer to the EU than Cyprus. Cyprus was still an EU member when I last checked. As a matter of fact, most of Turkey is closer to Berlin or Paris. Under these conditions, what keeps Turkey out of the EU?”
There is a further truth which has eluded Robert Gates. As the little-known Turkish philosopher from the 1950’s, Celal Yaliniz, once wrote: “Turkey is a ship heading for the East. Those aboard think they are heading for the West. In fact, they are just running westwards in a ship sailing eastwards.”
Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish and international press.
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Turkish-Azeri Deal May Herald New Competition in Southern Corridor
Turkish-Azeri Deal May Herald New Competition in Southern Corridor
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 115
June 15, 2010
By: Saban Kardas
On the sidelines of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit held in Istanbul, Turkey and Azerbaijan concluded agreements on natural gas cooperation. On June 7, during a ceremony attended by Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Recep Erdogan, Azeri President, Ilham Aliyev, the Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, and his Azeri counterpart, Natiq Aliyev, signed an agreement which will end a two year long price dispute on Turkey’s gas imports from the first phase of Azerbaijan’s offshore Shah Deniz-I, as well as setting the volume and price for Turkey’s imports from the second phase of the field, expected to come online in 2016-17. A related agreement will regulate the terms and mechanisms for the sale and transit of Azeri gas to Europe through Turkey.
Turkey currently imports 6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas from Shah Deniz-I, paying $120/thousand cubic meter (tcm), well below the current market prices. However, the original agreement allowed for price renegotiation, which is exactly what Azerbaijan asked for when the pricing terms expired in April 2008. As the negotiations were underway, Turkey continued to import gas, though stressing that it would compensate for the price differences retroactively. Despite several rounds of negotiations, which were eclipsed by the discussions on gas transit, the parties failed to bridge their differences, which also raised concerns in the West that the delays might undermine Nabucco and other projects seeking to ensure supply diversification from the Caspian basin to Europe (EDM, February 26). Moreover, the gas disagreements also aggravated the diplomatic row between Baku and Ankara, caused by Turkey’s efforts to normalize relations with Armenia, raising questions about future relations between the two fraternal countries (EDM, October 21, 2009).
Earlier, both parties announced that they had reached a breakthrough, and during Erdogan’s Baku visit in May, they expressed their determination to sign the deal in Istanbul (EDM, June 1). The recent deal, which apparently came about only after intense negotiations, signifies not only their willingness to reactivate the energy partnership, but also in repairing Turkish-Azeri strategic ties. As statements issued during Aliyev’s trip attest, Turkey will continue to place Baku at the center of its South Caucasus policy.
Still, energy is likely to remain the most important component of Turkish-Azeri ties. For instance, the Azeri State energy company SOCAR is already a major player in Turkey’s energy market, through its control of the country’s largest petrochemicals group PETKIM. Recently, it was announced that PETKIM would expand its operations through new multi-billion dollar investments in the coming years (www.azernews.az, June 3).
The exact details of the agreements have not been disclosed and some sources maintain that both parties still have to work towards elaborating many details. Yildiz declined to specify the revised price, indicating that it will be flexible in order to allow for adjustment to market conditions. Yildiz also added that it will be more favorable compared to what Turkey is currently paying to Russia (Anadolu Ajansi, June 8). However, Turkish media speculated that the price will be raised from $120 to $300/tcm. Turkey will have to pay around $1.5 to $2 billion to compensate for price differences. The price for Turkey’s imports from Shah Deniz-II, which will be around 6-7 bcm annually, is likely to be higher than $300 per tcm, and will be assessed by taking into account investment costs (www.haberturk.com, June 8).
The other major item, terms for the transit of further Azeri gas to Europe, was also settled. Ankara had been insisting on purchasing Azeri gas and then re-exporting it to Europe on its own terms, as was the case for Shah Deniz-I. Neither side clarified whether Turkey retained that right (Hurriyet Daily News, June 8), but Yildiz indicated that Turkey would be able to re-export the gas it imports from Azerbaijan in collaboration with PETKIM (Cihan, June 7). Some sources maintain that Azerbaijan will pay Turkey $45 per tcm in transit fees for its direct export to Europe, passing through Turkish territory (Sabah, June 8). There remains some uncertainty over who exactly will export Azeri gas to Europe, as Azeri sources failed to confirm that Turkey retains the re-exporting rights (www.enerjivadisi, June 9).
Previously, delays in negotiations with Turkey had invited the ire of Azerbaijan, because the development of the Shah Deniz-II had to be postponed. The resolution of the transit issue and the interest from different pipeline projects is definitely welcome news for Azeri officials, as they can now discuss with their European partners the commissioning of Shah Deniz-II. Both parties also publicized the agreement as a positive step that would facilitate other projects to transport gas to Europe, most notably Nabucco. Natiq Aliyev emphasized that they were willing to support Nabucco, but they still had not received any purchase commitment from Nabucco. Currently, Turkey is able to export Azeri gas to Greece through the Turkey-Greece Interconnector (TGI) which integrates Turkish and Greek grids. The planned Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will run from Greece to Italy, also seeks to tap into Azeri gas.
Impending competition between Nabucco and other pipelines forming the EU’s Southern Corridor seems certain. While many believe Nabucco will be a non-starter without locking in Azeri gas, TAP has been awaiting the conclusion of the Turkish-Azeri negotiations.
Representatives from both TAP and Nabucco welcomed the Turkish-Azeri deal (www.today.az, June 8). Azeri officials, anticipating the country’s gas output to increase substantially in future, welcome such outside demand which will boost their export potential. However, as the initial phase of Shah Deniz-II might only have limited extra output after it was allocated for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, it remains to be seen if Azerbaijan can supply all the Southern-corridor pipelines simultaneously at their desired levels. Turkish media maintain that Italy might soon sign a transit agreement with Ankara and a supply commitment agreement with Baku, which will commit the entire remaining volume from Shah Deniz-II to TAP, leaving no extra capacity for Nabucco (Referans, June 9). Yildiz stated that Turkey supports both projects and the final decision will be taken by the Shah Deniz consortium (ANKA, June 9). In any case, the Turkish-Azeri agreement might herald new competition in the Southern Corridor.
https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-azeri-deal-may-herald-new-competition-in-southern-corridor/