Turkish Forum

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  • Who Won Akhtamar Propaganda War: Armenians or Turks?

    Who Won Akhtamar Propaganda War: Armenians or Turks?

    sassounian33
    The Turkish government failed to attract the expected crowd of thousands of worshippers from around the world to the first Mass in almost a century, held at the Holy Cross Church in Akhtamar Island, on Sept. 19. Only a few hundred Armenians showed up, mostly from Istanbul.
    Turkey failed miserably in trying to deceive world opinion into believing that it is tolerant towards Armenians. Eventually, it became obvious that Turkish leaders were more interested in putting on a political show than allowing a religious ceremony in a thousand-year old Armenian house of worship.
    I wrote a column three years ago criticizing the Turkish government for converting the Holy Cross Church into a state museum. At the time, I urged Turkish officials to 1) place a cross on the church’s dome; 2) designate it as a church rather than a museum, and allow regular celebration of Divine Liturgy; and 3) revert ownership of the church to the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul instead of placing it under the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism.
    Earlier this year, the Turkish government promised to place a cross on the dome of the church and allow services to be performed there on Sept. 19. I urged Armenians not to participate, knowing that Turkish officials’ true intent was to stage a political show under the guise of religious ceremonies.
    An intense debate ensued among Armenians on whether to boycott or attend the church services. Articles exposing the Turkey’s sinister plans did little to settle the controversy. Making matters worse, the Holy See of Etchmiadzin and the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem announced plans to send representatives to the Akhtamar church, although the Catholicosate of Cilicia declined to participate.
    Finally, a lucky break! The Turkish government came to the rescue. A few weeks before the scheduled ceremony, a Turkish official announced that it would not be possible to place the promised cross atop the church, making the ridiculous excuse of “technical difficulties.”
    Prime Minister Erdogan was caught in a dilemma. Had he allowed the cross to be placed on the dome, he would have scored points with world public opinion, but would have lost crucial votes in the hotly-contested Sept. 12 referendum on constitutional reforms.
    The cross finally saved the day! The Holy See of Etchmiadzin canceled its plans to send representatives to Akhtamar. The Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem did likewise. Tour operators called off their arrangements to take large numbers of Armenian worshippers to Lake Van. As a result, Turkey lost the propaganda campaign and considerable income.
    In a last ditch effort to increase attendance, a few days before Sept. 19, Prime Minister Erdogan’s office sent invitations to the Armenia media, offering all expense paid visits to Akhtamar, including free round-trip airfare, hotel accommodations and meals. Another fifty Armenian commentators and analysts received similar invitations, all of whom refused to go because of Turkey’s refusal to install the cross.
    Inadvertently, the Turks forced most Armenians to do the right thing and cancel their visits to the Holy Cross Church. Interestingly, the Turkish government behaved similarly when it declined to ratify the Armenia-Turkey Protocols, thereby safeguarding Armenia’s interests.
    While the Armenian public, civic groups, and some political parties opposed the Turkish plans at Akhtamar, the Armenian government remained remarkably silent. For unknown reasons, Turkey did not invite Armenian officials to the Holy Cross ceremonies. In view of the embarrassing games Ankara played with the Armenia-Turkey Protocols and the subsequent collapse of soccer diplomacy, it appears that Armenia’s leaders were not too eager to join Turks in yet another ploy.
    Regrettably, Armenians wasted far too much time and energy arguing with each other about going to Akhtamar. This distraction prevented them from organizing protests in major capitals to inform the world about the long history of Turkish atrocities, destruction of thousands of churches, and occupation of historic Armenian lands.
    However, the boycott of the ceremonies because of the missing cross caught the attention of the international media. Ironically, Turkish officials helped further undermine their own cause, by placing the cross on the ground next to the Holy Cross Church, in full view of the public and TV cameras.
    The Turkish government has now promised to place the cross atop the church in six weeks. Regardless of what Turkey decides to do with the cross, Armenians should pursue their own course of action, rather than simply react to the petty games of Turkish officials.
    At this point, the only announcement Armenians are interested in hearing from Ankara is the return of the Holy Cross Church to the Armenian Patriarchate of Turkey.

  • Referendum Deepens Fragmentation in Turkey

    Referendum Deepens Fragmentation in Turkey

    Referendum Deepens Fragmentation in Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 168

    September 20, 2010

    By Saban Kardas

    In the Turkish referendum held on September 12, voters supported the constitutional amendment package promoted by the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). Despite earlier forecasts and opinion polls, the changes were approved by a wide margin: 58 percent voted in favor, while 42 percent opposed the amendment (Anadolu Ajansi, September 13). This rather surprising outcome will have significant implications for Turkish politics, possibly accelerating social fragmentation.

    The referendum marks a major victory for the ruling AKP. Through their aggressive campaign, the opposition parties Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) had worked hard to present the referendum as a vote of confidence for the government (EDM, July 13). These two parties, which formed a “no front” against the reform package both during the parliamentary debates and in the referendum, had substantial reasons for objecting to the proposed constitutional changes. Yet, overall their mobilization strategy was based on a knee-jerk criticism of the AKP’s policies. In contrast, the AKP stated on many occasions that they would not capitalize on yes votes and present them as support for the AKP. The AKP, instead, defined the changes as a move towards the democratization of Turkish politics. Other smaller parties on the right of the political spectrum, which supported the AKP’s argument, mobilized their supporters in favor of the changes. However, for a great portion of Turkish voters the content of the constitutional changes was less important than their party affiliation (Hurriyet Daily News, September 15).

    The results can be interpreted as a reaffirmation of domestic support for the AKP’s tenure in power. This success represents the sixth major electoral victory for the AKP under Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Since 2002, the AKP has won two parliamentary elections and two municipal elections, and managed to pass constitutional amendment packages in two referendums. Following the latest result, many observers expect the AKP to win the next national elections slated for 2011. With this unprecedented track record, the AKP machinery has emerged almost as an invincible force in the Turkish political scene, raising the question as to how it will use its power. AKP representatives already indicated that they would revive the debate on introducing a new constitution, most likely following the 2011 elections. Many liberal and reformist groups, as well as the European Union, therefore, welcomed the referendum result, because they believe that the expression of support for the constitutional changes will put pressure on the AKP to maintain its momentum towards the further democratization of the Turkish political system. Earlier, the AKP had come under criticism for slowing the pace of political reform required by the EU membership process (Hurriyet Daily News, September 14).

    A more interesting question, however, concerns how Erdogan, who can claim credit for AKP’s unprecedented track record, will use this power to secure his personal position in Turkish politics. Many observers expect Erdogan to run for the presidency after the current President Abdullah Gul’s term expires in 2012. The next president will be elected by popular vote according to the constitutional changes of 2007. One drawback for Erdogan is that in Turkey’s parliamentary system, presidents can exercise only limited influence. Given Erdogan’s interest in political power, he might also push for a more radical overhaul of the Turkish political system. Erdogan has already initiated a debate on replacing the current parliamentary system with a presidential system. It remains a possibility that Erdogan will revive such a debate, in order that he might eventually lead a strong presidential system (Anadolu Ajansi, September 13).

    This unprecedented popular support and resulting latitude that the AKP and Erdogan have gained in restructuring the Turkish political system has triggered anger among the AKP’s opponents. Erdogan announced that his party will seek consensus with other parties, as they work on a new constitution. However, many of the AKP’s critics argue that after the AKP managed to curb the power of the Turkish military, it has moved on to undermine the power of other state institutions, mainly the independent judiciary. The AKP’s critics believe that as a result of the recent constitutional changes, the system of checks and balances has already been undermined, and if the AKP continues on its current path, it might eventually form a civilian despotism and suppress secular segments of the society.

    Therefore, the representatives of Turkey’s secularist opposition and speakers from the high courts have maintained that although they respect the people’s choice in the referendum, they would continue their struggle to maintain judicial independence and not allow the AKP to take complete control of all state institutions. As a result, the fragmentation in Turkish politics and society appears to be deepening. The aggressive campaign prior to the referendum and the statements from the representatives of the AKP and its opponents indicate that secularist and nationalist groups represented by the CHP and MHP on the one side, and conservative and liberal groups represented by the AKP on the other, will remain engaged in a fierce battle over how to define Turkey’s political system and values. Moreover, this fragmentation also has geographic ramifications. While the provinces in central Anatolia and the Black Sea region supported the constitutional changes, the provinces in the western coastal areas and Thrace voted against the changes. This distribution corresponds closely to the results of the 2009 municipal elections, whereby coastal areas voted for the CHP and MHP and central Anatolian provinces voted for the AKP (EDM, March 31, 2009).

    Another division is hidden in the voting patterns in the Kurdish speaking provinces in Eastern Turkey. Pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) called on its supporters to boycott the referendum. Low voter turnout in many of the eastern provinces shows that the BDP controls a large section of the Kurdish vote, which corresponds to the results of the 2009 elections. With this boost of self-confidence, the BDP is likely to intensify its campaign to disconnect the Kurdish-speaking areas from Turkey’s mainstream political system, in line with its strategy of demanding “democratic autonomy” for the Kurds. As such, the referendum results might also deepen the divisions around the Kurdish issue, further accelerating Turkey’s social fragmentation.

    https://jamestown.org/program/referendum-deepens-fragmentation-in-turkey/

  • Senate Should not Confirm Bryza As U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan

    Senate Should not Confirm Bryza As U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan

    By Harut Sassounian
    Publisher, The California Courier

    At the request of Sen. Barbara Boxer, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had postponed from early August to mid-September its vote on Matt Bryza, nominee for U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan. Senators Boxer, Harry Reid, and Robert Menendez were satisfied neither with Bryza’s answers during the confirmation hearing nor subsequently with his written responses.

    Harut Sassounian

    While Congress was in recess for the past 40 days, a number of newspapers and websites questioned the appropriateness of Bryza’s nomination to such an important post. They raised several conflict of interest issues regarding Bryza and his Turkish-born wife, Zeyno Baran, who until recently was director of the Center for Eurasian Policy at the Hudson Institute, a Washington think tank.

    This article shall focus on a single issue — the allegation that Bryza and Baran had received gifts during their August 23, 2007 wedding in Istanbul. If true, this would not only abort Bryza’s chances of becoming ambassador, but more importantly, it would get him into serious legal trouble. Under U.S. laws, government officials and their spouses are prohibited from receiving gifts, even wedding presents, unless these are given by close acquaintances. Such gifts have to be reported to the U.S. government, and the Internal Revenue Service. Bryza’s case is more complicated. If he got gifts that he did not report, while telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under oath that he did not receive such gifts, he could be charged with non-reporting of a gift, tax evasion, and perjury.

    Bryza’s celebrity wedding triggered a major controversy when Azeri jouranlist Adil Khalil reported in the opposition newspaper Azadlig that Haydar Babayev, Azerbaijan’s Minister of Economic Development, had paid most of the couple’s wedding expenses. Babayev refuted the accusation and filed a lawsuit for libel, causing Khalil to be arrested, severely beaten, stabbed, and forced to flee to France. The newspaper’s editor, Ganimat Zahid, was also arrested on unsubstantiated charges. Last month, Azadlig suspended publication, after it was evicted from its offices by the authorities. Having exhausted all domestic court appeals, the newspaper’s editor filed a claim against Azerbaijan with the European Court of Human Rights.

    According to Azeri and Turkish media reports, around 400 prominent guests from several countries attended Bryza’s 2007 lavish wedding, held under tight security. Among the attendees from Turkey were the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, the U.S. Consul General in Istanbul, the Armenian Patriarch of Turkey, members of parliament, and major media figures. Bryza also invited Armenian officials to his wedding, including Pres. Robert Kocharian and Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian, neither of whom attended. At the time, Bryza was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and U.S. co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the mediators of the Artsakh (Karabagh) conflict.

    Several high-ranking Azeri officials also attended Bryza’s wedding in Istanbul: Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov who served as a wedding witness, Minister of Economic Development Haydar Babayev, Azeri National Petroleum Company President Rovnaq Abdullaev, Deputy Speaker of Parliament Valeh Aleskerov, and Azerbaijan’s Consul General in Los Angeles Elin Suleymanov. Pres. Ilham Aliyev’s letter of congratulation was read at the start of the wedding. According to documents obtained by this writer from the European Court of Human Rights, the Azeri editor claimed that Pres. Aliyev sent “a special gift to the bride.”

    Even though Bryza and Baran requested that in lieu of gifts guests make a contribution to a Turkish charity, it is common practice in the Middle East to hand gifts — particularly jewelry — to a newlywed couple. For example, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, during a meeting with Hillary Clinton in Kabul in July, told her that he would be sending a gift to the Secretary of State, on the occasion of her daughter’s wedding.

    According to the Media Rights Institute, Minister Babayev’s lawyers confirmed during a court hearing in Baku that he attended the wedding and “even had a gift” for Bryza. Yet, at his Senate confirmation hearing, Bryza refuted the allegation that an Azeri official had financed his wedding, adding that its entire cost was paid by the couple’s families.

    The allegation that Bryza received wedding gifts should be thoroughly investigated before the Senate votes on his nomination. Even though Senators and members of the Armenian, Greek, and Cypriot communities oppose Bryza for multiple reasons, the wedding expenses and gifts are the only issues that could have serious legal ramifications. Therefore, the Senate should wait for the outcome of the lawsuit filed by the Azeri editor in the European Court of Human Rights.

    Bryza should fully cooperate with such an investigation in order to clear the clouds of suspicion hanging over his head, before he is rushed to Baku. He should provide the complete list of his wedding guests and disclose all gifts received by the newlyweds and their families.

    U.S. investigators should contact everyone who attended Bryza’s wedding to verify what gifts they gave to the couple on that occasion. He should also be asked to produce a record of his wedding expenses and how they were paid.

    A few days ago, Sen. Boxer wrote a letter to this writer expressing her serious concern about Bryza’s inadequate responses to her questions both during and after the confirmation hearing. She pledged to continue her efforts “to determine if he is the appropriate representative for the United States in this highly volatile region of the world.”

    Sen. Boxer and her colleagues should either reject Bryza’s nomination outright or place a hold on it until all allegations against him are investigated and proven to be true

  • Admiral Mullen Discusses Critical Military Engagement in Turkey

    Admiral Mullen Discusses Critical Military Engagement in Turkey

    Admiral Mullen Discusses Critical Military Engagement in Turkey

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 160

    September 8, 2010

    By Saban Kardas

    Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Turkey last week. Although the official purpose of Mullen’s visit was to congratulate his Turkish counterpart General Isik Kosaner, recently appointed as the Chief of the General Staff, this introductory visit had no fixed agenda. Mullen had a chance to gauge Turkey’s position on many of US policies in the surrounding regions. In his meetings with Turkish military and civilian leaders, Mullen exchanged opinions on US withdrawal from Iraq, the Iranian nuclear issue and the international military presence in Afghanistan, as well as reiterating US support for Turkey on various issues such as its struggle against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and sales of military equipment for the Turkish armed forces (Hurriyet, Cumhuriyet, Radikal, September 5).

    On the issue of Iran, Mullen downplayed recent disagreements, arguing that both Turkey and the US share the common objective of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. However, as Ankara’s earlier diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear standoff attested, such blanket mutual understanding was not enough to eliminate major differences of opinion over how best to deal with Iran (EDM, June 1). Ankara’s objections to a tougher US position and insistence on a diplomatic solution culminated in Turkey’s vote against a US-brokered UN Security Council resolution authorizing a new round of sanctions in June. Coupled with other crises, such as the problems encountered in Turkish-Israeli relations, this development further strained bilateral relations, prompting many US politicians and interest groups to question the strategic partnership with Turkey. In this tense environment, in August the Republicans blocked President Barack Obama’s nominee for the next Ambassador to Turkey, Frank Ricciardione. The vacant post highlighted how tenuous Obama’s Turkey policy remained, as well as the impact of Ankara’s recent policies on US domestic politics.

    While for Washington a combination of diplomatic efforts and punitive sanctions is needed to deal with Iran, Ankara still believes that constructive diplomacy must be prioritized. Earlier in August, Mullen had raised tensions in the region, following his statement that military options against Iran remain on the table, which invited a harsh reaction from Iran, placing Turkey in a difficult diplomatic position (AFP, August 3).

    In this context, Mullen adopted a rather balanced tone in Ankara and said that he had no plan to question Turkey over the Security Council vote and emphasized that he welcomed Turkish leaders’ statements that they would comply with UN sanctions against Iran. Nonetheless, this last point underscored continued differences over Iran. The Turkish government has reiterated on many occasions that it would implement only sanctions authorized by the UN, not the stricter set of measures being introduced by the US and the European countries.

    Mullen also referred to ongoing discussions within NATO pertaining to the formation of a missile defense system against Iran, which will be part of the agenda of the upcoming NATO summit in November. Turkey is one of the possible locations for radars and interceptors. However, the Turkish position on this issue remains unclear, and it is unlikely to welcome such a proposal considering Ankara’s sensitivity to Tehran’s concerns.

    Turkey’s contribution to the international military effort in Afghanistan was also discussed. Praising Turkey’s critical role in ensuring Afghanistan’s security through its provision of troops and training to Afghan security personnel, Mullen requested that Turkey maintains its military contribution after its command over international troops in Kabul and the surrounding area expires in October. Turkey has contributed to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) since its inception immediately after the US invasion of the country in 2001, and has assumed the command of ISAF on many occasions. Although the US has pressured Turkey to increase its troop levels, Ankara has refused to do so, on the grounds that non-military means should be used to address the root causes of the conflict. Washington has come to acknowledge Ankara’s concerns on this issue, but wants to ensure that Turkey maintains at least its current level of commitment to ISAF.

    An additional area discussed during the bilateral talks was Turkey’s specific role in US withdrawal plans from Iraq. Ever since the Obama administration announced its withdrawal plans, there has been speculation that Turkey would serve as one of the exit routes for US troops and military equipment (EDM, March 9, 2009). Denying such reports, Mullen stressed that he was not in Ankara to negotiate the terms of the US military exit from Iraq through Turkey. Since the transfer of military units will require authorization from the Turkish parliament, it is unlikely that Washington will seriously consider this option. Indeed, a recent statement from the Turkish foreign ministry also ruled out such an option, though welcoming the possibility of moving non-combat elements through the country. If an agreement is reached, Turkey would be ready to create a safe zone for the transfer of technical equipment (Sabah, September 3).

    The visit by Mullen underscores the extent to which US-Turkish relations are characterized by military-strategic issues, and how the United States needs Turkey’s cooperation at best and at the very least its acquiescence for the successful execution of its military engagements in the regions surrounding Turkey. Therefore, Turkey is a key part of discussions on major US military campaigns, which serves as a constraint on Washington and prevents it from severing ties with this critical ally over its independent policies. Turkey, in contrast, relies on US assistance and the transfer of military technology, which curbs any tendency on its part to pursue unilateral policies. Aware of this mutual interdependence in military-security affairs, civilian and military bureaucrats from both sides have intensified their efforts to maintain the pace of cooperation. Recently, Turkish foreign ministry officials visited Washington to reiterate Ankara’s determination to maintain strategic ties with the US. This message will perhaps be repeated during the visit to the US later this month by Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, and Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, as part of the UN General Assembly.

    https://jamestown.org/program/admiral-mullen-discusses-critical-military-engagement-in-turkey/

  • Top Three Armenian Church Leaders Boycott Turkish Show in Akhtamar

    Top Three Armenian Church Leaders Boycott Turkish Show in Akhtamar

    By Harut Sassounian

    Publisher, The California Courier

    The Turkish scheme of luring Armenian Church leaders to participate in a religious show at Holy Cross (Sourp Khach) Church on Akhtamar Island, Lake Van, backfired last week.

    The heads of three Hierarchical Sees of the Armenian Church — in Armenia, Lebanon, and Jerusalem — will neither attend nor send representatives to the celebration of Divine Liturgy at Holy Cross Church on September 19. All three turned down the invitation of Archbishop Aram Ateshyan, Deputy Patriarch of the Armenian Patriarchate of Turkey.

    Catholicos Aram I of Cilicia, headquartered in Antelias, Lebanon, was the first to announce that he would boycott the Sept. 19 ceremonies. In this regard, the Catholicosate announced: “In an attempt to convince the European Union and UNESCO that Turkey safeguards the cultural heritage of its occupied lands, the Turkish government restored the Holy Cross Armenian Church, but instead of keeping it as a church, transformed it into a museum.” It described the ceremonies orchestrated by Turkey as “an attempt to obscure its consistent policy of denying the Armenian Genocide and the rights of its survivors.”

    The Holy See of Etchmiadzin, on the other hand, had initially announced that it would send to Akhtamar two high-ranking clergymen. In an earlier column, this writer had expressed the wish that Karekin II, Catholicos of All Armenians, would reconsider his decision. Last week, after the Turkish government broke its promise to place a cross atop the Holy Cross Church, the Catholicos, as expected, withdrew Etchmiadzin’s participation from the Sept. 19 ceremonies.

    The third Hierarchical See, the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem, had initially decided to dispatch to Akhtamar Archbishop Aris Shirvanian, Director of Ecumenical and Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Patriarchate’s Holy Synod. When questioned about his planned attendance, Archbishop Shirvanian told this writer on Sept. 5 that in line with the decision of Holy Etchmiadzin, he would not participate in the church service, because of Turkey’s refusal to install a cross on the dome of the Holy Cross Church.

    All three church leaders now have a unified position on this issue. They are to be commended for their decision not to support a political show sponsored by the Turkish regime, under the guise of a religious ceremony!

    Regrettably, the Armenian Patriarchate of Turkey, the fourth Hierarchical See of the Armenian Church, is still planning to participate in the Sept. 19 show, despite the fact that the Turkish government lied to Deputy Patriarch Aram Ateshyan, and refused to restore the promised cross on the church’s dome. The Governor of Van made the ridiculous claim that the Turkish state did not have the technical means to lift the 400 lb. cross to the top of the church. All those who bought airline tickets and booked hotel rooms, misled by Turkey’s false promises, should promptly cancel their trip, demand a refund and an apology from Turkish authorities for their deceptive bait and switch tactics!

    Even though Archbishop Ateshyan is a hostage of the Turkish regime and therefore does not have the freedom to take independent decisions, he risks losing all credibility with Armenians worldwide and all three Hierarchical Sees, should he go ahead and celebrate Mass in what Turkish officials describe as the “Akdamar Memorial Museum!” He should threaten not to show up at the Holy Cross Church on Sept. 19, unless Ankara installs the promised cross. Turkish officials would have to take his threat seriously, because without him there would be no religious ceremony. His absence would turn Turkey’s expected propaganda coup into a public relations nightmare!

    The last important actor in the Sept. 19 “extravaganza” is the Armenian government. While large segments of the public in Armenia have reacted strongly against Ankara’s once a year church service in the Holy Cross “museum,” little has been heard from Yerevan officials on this subject. Last month, the Armenian Foreign Ministry announced that it has not received an official invitation from Turkey. It is generally assumed that Armenian officials would refuse to participate in such a scandalous show, particularly after Ankara tricked Armenia’s leaders into signing the Armenia-Turkey Protocols, without any intention to ratify them.

    Just as the Turkish government inadvertently protected Armenia’s interests by refusing to ratify the Protocols, this time around, Ankara is causing Armenians to refrain from participating in this charade by breaking its promise to place a cross atop the Holy Cross Church!

  • Congress Should Investigate State Dept. For Holding Back Aid to Artsakh

    Congress Should Investigate State Dept. For Holding Back Aid to Artsakh

    By Harut Sassounian
    Publisher, The California Courier
    sassounian3
    The State Department has acted negligently and possibly in contempt of Congress by withholding assistance that it had expressly allocated to Nagorno Karabagh (Artsakh) during the past 12 years.
    The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) revealed last week that the State Department only spent about half of the amount allocated by Congress to Artsakh. From 1998 to 2010, Congress appropriated to Artsakh $61 million, not including an additional amount estimated at $10 million, allocated during 2000-2002. U.S. government documents obtained by ANCA reveal that the State Dept. spent only $36 million on humanitarian aid to Artsakh in those dozen years.
    Successive Democratic and Republican administrations have attempted to block congressional efforts to provide aid to Artsakh, in order to appease Azerbaijan. Failing to prevent approval of such allocations, the State Dept. devised a clever ploy to obstruct the will of Congress — it spent only a portion of the funds intended for Artsakh. Azerbaijan had been insisting that any U.S. assistance to Artsakh be channeled through Baku. Despite objections from the administration and Azerbaijan, Congress has continued to allocate aid to Artsakh, and made it less restrictive; its 2010 allocation of $8 million is earmarked for “programs and activities in Nagorno Karabagh,” not exclusively for humanitarian projects.
    Throughout these dozen years, neither Armenia nor Artsakh, and apparently no one from the Armenian American community has complained to Congress about the State Dept.’s refusal to spend fully the allocated funds. Amazingly, after this shortfall was revealed by ANCA, a senior Artsakh official downplayed the failure to deliver the allocated aid. According to Radio Free Europe, Vahram Atanesian, Chairman of the Artsakh parliament’s foreign relations committee, excused the withholding of the aid by attributing it to Artsakh’s robust economic growth!
    While Armenians remained surprisingly quiet, Congress, starting in 2001, repeatedly urged the administration “to release, without further delay, the remainder of the $20 million in humanitarian assistance initially provided in the fiscal year 1998 Act.” Furthermore, the House of Representatives asked the Secretary of State to report back the amount of assistance provided by the United States to Artsakh within 15 days of the enactment of the aid bill. In 2004 and 2005, the Senate demanded that USAID present its plans for the disbursement of the allocated funds within 60 days after the enactment of the aid bill. Unfortunately, the Obama administration bears the lion’s share of the blame. During its first two years in office, it has held back $12 million or one-third of the funds not spent on Artsakh since 1998.
    Sen. Barbara Boxer had the opportunity to pursue this issue with Matthew Bryza, nominee for U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan, during his confirmation hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee on July 22. She wanted to know why only $4 million was spent out of the $16 million allocated for Artsakh in the past two years. In response to Bryza’s evasive answer, Sen. Boxer asked him to provide in writing “a detailed accounting on the disbursement of all U.S. assistance to Nagorno Karabagh for the past five years.” She pointedly inquired: “Why weren’t the full amounts allocated by Congress for Nagorno Karabagh in 2009 and 2010 spent?” Bryza, once again, did not provide an adequate response to the Senator’s questions.
    Consequently, Sen. Boxer asked the Foreign Relations Committee to postpone voting on Bryza’s confirmation, until the Senate returns from recess around mid-September. This would hopefully give Bryza the opportunity to prepare an honest accounting of why the aid from Washington did not fully reach Artsakh. The delay in his confirmation would also allow the Senate to check more thoroughly the issues raised regarding his background.
    Clearly, Bryza and his predecessors at the State Department had resorted to various tricks to frustrate the intent of Congress. They attempted to appease Azerbaijan by limiting and delaying the aid desperately needed in Artsakh.
    Armenian-Americans should now ask Congress to investigate the State Department’s failure to comply with the legislature’s mandate, by under-spending $35 million of the allocation to Artsakh, during the past 12 years.
    Should the investigation uncover misconduct by State Dept. officials, Armenian-Americans should then ask Congress to make a one-time allocation of $35 million to Artsakh, in compensation for the amount the U.S. government failed to spend, as required by law.
    The uproar caused by such a congressional investigation would hopefully make State Dept. officials more cautious in the future when handling the disbursement of funds intended for Artsakh!