Category: Authors

Sassounian’s column of Nov. 4, 2010

VP Biden’s Sensational Revelation of
Phone Calls with Pres. Sargsyan

Armenians worldwide were scandalized last week by Vice President Joe Biden’s revelation that Pres. Sargsyan had told him: “look, do not force this issue [Armenian Genocide recognition] now, while we are in negotiations [with Turkey].”

Biden’s statement posted later that day on YouTube — www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-vVX2B1H3k — was so shocking that most Armenians refused to believe that Pres. Sargsyan would have discouraged the American President from recognizing the Armenian Genocide! Some went as far as to question if the speaker shown on video was really Biden, and if his words had been altered. Others wondered about the identity of the young man conversing with Biden, suspecting him to be an impostor or a foreign agent.

Given the far-reaching consequences of the words attributed to Pres. Sargsyan, his press secretary immediately issued a categorical denial. Two days later, the US Embassy in Armenia issued a clarification/retraction. Taking into account these confusing and contradictory statements, I will try to shed some light on the lesser known aspects of this episode:

1) The young man speaking with VP Biden on YouTube is not an impostor. He is an Armenian-American activist.

2) It is not widely known that right after Pres. Obama issued his April 24, 2009 commemorative statement, Biden phoned three prominent Armenian-Americans. He informed them that Pres. Obama had omitted the Genocide word from his statement after Pres. Sargsyan gave his consent during a phone call with the Vice President. Clearly, Biden was using his conversation with Sargsyan to excuse Pres. Obama’s failure to keep his campaign promise to Armenian-Americans.

3) Biden repeated the same statement last week, this time on video. He was trying to win over Armenian-Americans to support Democratic candidates in the tightly contested November 2nd elections. When the young man asked Biden what message did he have for the Armenian community which was “burned” or deceived by Pres. Obama, the Vice President reassured him that the administration was “not backing off” from its promise on the Genocide. He added: “The Turks have to come to the realization of what the reality is.” Biden then conveniently blamed Sargsyan for Pres. Obama’s lack of acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide. The Vice President concluded his comments by cynically stating with a chuckle: “Reality has a way of intruding.”

4) Armen Arzumanian, Pres. Sargsyan’s press secretary, issued a prompt rebuttal, stating that the President “did not use the expression ascribed to him in the video, directly or indirectly.” Arzumanian boldly called upon the White House to release the transcripts of the two phone conversations between Pres. Sargsyan and VP Biden in April 2009.

5) On October 29, the US Embassy in Armenia reacted by announcing that during his two phone conversations with Biden in April 2009, “Pres. Sargsyan did not raise the issue of the content of Pres. Obama’s statement for Armenian Remembrance Day or seek a delay in consideration of House Resolution 252.” This carefully worded statement was meant to soothe the Armenian government’s severe irritation at Biden’s surprising disclosures.

It would have been far more informative, however, had the U.S. government released the transcripts of the two phone conversations between Pres. Sargsyan and VP Biden. The Armenian side could have also clarified matters by releasing its transcripts of the phone calls, if they were taped, or a summary record. Furthermore, since the two leaders were using an interpreter, it would be interesting to compare Pres. Sargsyan’s Armenian words with those translated into English – which was what Biden actually heard!

In the absence of a transcript, outsiders have no knowledge of what was actually said during these phone calls. Yet it is clear that starting in early 2009, Obama administration officials were pressuring the Armenian government to sign an agreement with Turkey, so they could use it as an excuse for not recognizing the Armenian Genocide. And that is exactly what happened, when Armenia and Turkey signed a preliminary agreement, “a roadmap,” on the eve of April 24, 2009. Pres. Obama quickly capitalized on it. In his “Armenian Remembrance Day” statement, he avoided the word genocide by claiming that Armenia and Turkey “have agreed on a framework and roadmap for normalization.”

The controversy regarding what Pres. Sargsyan may have told Vice President Biden is one more unwelcome outcome of the Armenia-Turkey Protocols. However, the video had the unintended side effect of raising the Armenian Genocide issue to the highest echelons of the U.S. government and received coverage by worldwide media. A week before the Armenian activist’s conversation with Vice President Biden, Armine Babayan of Los Angeles also had an important personal encounter. She had the rare opportunity to speak directly with Pres. Obama about the Armenian Genocide during his campaign stop in Las Vegas. Turkish denialists must not be too pleased that within one week the President and Vice President of the United States were reminded of their unfinished agenda on the Armenian Genocide

November 3, 2010
Tespih

It is often seen in Turkey. Particularly men carry them, they finger the string of beads while drinking tea and chatting. Originally prayer beads, Muslims use the Tesbih to recite Allah’s name with every bead that passes through their fingers. Nowadays, Tespihs are also used as accessories, decoration or, in most cases to occupy the hands. The word Tespih originates from the word Süpah, which means ‘reciting the glory of God’. It is an aid to keep count of prayers. In the beginning of the Islam, believers used small stones which later developed into a Tespih. The Christian pilgrims probably adopted the Tespih from the Muslims and introduced the rosary in Christianity. A Tespih is composed of 99 beads, representing the 99 names of Allah. The string is used to praise Allah as follows: 33 times the word ‘Süpannalah’ is spoken, which means ‘Praise be to God’. Then ‘Elhümdullilah’ is repeated 33 times, meaning ‘Glory be to God’. For the final 33 beads ‘Allahu Akbar’ is repeated which means ‘God is most great’. After these repetitions a final prayer is said, bringing the total number of prayers to one hundred. In the Koran the Prophet Mohammed said: ‘Whoever completes a hundred, by telling these beads, all his sins shall be forgiven.’ Some Tespihs have 33 beads. They are used in the same way but are more manageable.”

October 31, 2010
Turkey Considers Cooperation with Greece on Illegal Immigration to Europe

Turkey Considers Cooperation with Greece on Illegal Immigration to Europe

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 194

October 27, 2010

By: Saban Kardas

Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, met his Greek counterpart, George Papandreou, on the margins of the Mediterranean Climate Change Initiative conference near Athens last week. The positive reporting of the Erdogan-Papandreou meeting marks the deepening rapprochement between the two countries, after their normalization slowed down in the second half of the 2000’s.

Characterized traditionally by historical enmity and territorial disputes, Turkish-Greek relations have undergone a remarkable improvement in the past decade. The so-called Greek-Turkish rapprochement started with the two earthquakes that devastated both countries in 1999. The mutual assistance and solidarity the two nations extended to each other in response provided fertile ground to develop closer political ties. As a result, Greece, which had blocked Turkey’s EU membership process, changed its policy and became an advocate of the EU’s enlargement to include Turkey. Since coming to power, Erdogan has ascribed special importance to normalizing ties with Greece, as reflected in his close personal relationship with the former Greek Prime Minister, Kostas Karamanlis.

However, in parallel with the deterioration of Turkish-EU relations, Turkish-Greek relations also experienced difficult times in the second half of the 2000’s. Although the Turkish-Greek trade volume has expanded throughout the decade, there has been little concrete progress over the political disputes that had traditionally dominated their relationship. The Turkish side largely preferred to pursue a policy of constructive ambiguity, and adopt a gradual approach to solving the disputes, while the Greeks from time to time expressed their disappointment over the ongoing uncertainty. Turkey’s resistance to referring the Aegean disputes to the International Court of Justice and the ongoing “dog fights” between Turkish and Greek fighter jets in the Aegean Sea remained a major source of disagreement, resulting in an occasional heightening of tension (EDM, June 22, 2009).

The global financial crisis, which dealt a serious blow to the Greek economic system, ironically, provided another fresh impetus to resolve bilateral disputes. In that context, the recent talks follow on Erdogan’s historic trip to Greece in May, when the two countries signed over 20 agreements to develop relations in various fields, including energy, the environment and illegal immigration. They also decided to launch the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, which complemented similar arrangements Turkey has formed with its other neighbors. Erdogan also expressed Turkey’s readiness to help Greece to recover from the financial crisis, through what he called “enhanced economic partnership” The two sides, however, failed to reach any concrete agreement on the major issues in the bilateral relationship, such as the conflicting claims in the Aegean Sea, the status of the minorities, or the Halki seminary and the Cyprus issues (Anadolu Ajansi, May 15).

Granted, Turkish leaders’ extension of a friendly hand to Greece and their statements calling for dampening military tensions in the Aegean through closer bilateral dialogue was ground-breaking in many ways. This thinking is largely in line with Ankara’s recent policy of pursuing “zero problems with neighbors,” and prioritizing economic cooperation over political disputes. Indeed, as a stark reflection of this new thinking, Turkey will reportedly not include Greece, Russia, Iran and Iraq as enemy countries in its national security document, which is currently being revised.

Speaking to Greek TV stations, Erdogan, also expressed clearly that Turkish flights in the Aegean have decreased significantly and that Ankara supports the idea of ceasing them entirely (Today’s Zaman, October 21). By de-securitizing its relationship with Greece and its other neighbors, Turkey hopes to reap the benefits of peace dividends, by significantly cutting military expenditures and instead focus on mutual economic gains. In the case of Greece, by turning the Aegean into a basin of peace, the Turkish government hopes, for instance, to enable the exploration of offshore hydrocarbon resources, and further cooperation in the transportation of oil and gas to European markets.

It appears that the technical level contacts between both countries have continued since May, seeking common ground in their political disputes. In the wake of the latest trip, both parties are talking more resolutely about a shared strategic vision and pursuing win-win cooperative policies. Toward these objectives, there are stronger indicators that they might be involved in serious discussions on the resolution of thorny issues, including the Ecumenical Patriarchate and joint Turkish-Greek initiatives to curb illegal immigration to the EU. Following his meeting with Papandreou, Erdogan vowed to start cooperation on illegal immigration, so that they could tackle what he called a “common problem.” The Greek media even speculated that by the end of the year the parties might finalize a compromise agreement on the resolution of the Aegean disputes, on which they had already agreed in principle (Anadolu Ajansi, October 22; www.ekathimerini.com, October 25).

Most Turkish media outlets preferred to present Erdogan’s trip as a major achievement which boosted his popularity in Greece. Similarly, the Greek media also underscored the optimism generated by the Erdogan-Papandreou meeting (Taraf, October 24). However, some Greek observers maintain that the Papandreou government’s closer dialogue with the Turkish government “may ring alarm bells in many circles in Greece which would interpret it (and they do) as an indication of Greece losing diplomatic ground in the Aegean, or even in Greek Thrace” (Hurriyet Daily News, October 24).

In any case, the resolution of the remaining disputes with Greece serves the Turkish government’s foreign policy objectives. Especially by addressing the illegal immigration issue and the reopening of the Halki seminary, Turkey can remove major obstacles which have bedeviled its accession process into the EU. The EU has been expecting Turkey to harmonize its practices on illegal immigration with European regulations, and reopen the Greek Orthodox seminary to show its support for human rights. Moreover, through its constructive dialogue with Greece, Ankara solicits the support of Athens within the EU. Recently, the Turkish government has tried to mobilize the pro-Turkey EU members so that they could break the stalemate over membership talks. Reportedly, in exchange for its cooperation on the illegal immigration issue, Turkey expects Greece to at the very least, assist with the relaxation of European visa regulations for Turkish citizens.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-considers-cooperation-with-greece-on-illegal-immigration-to-europe/

October 28, 2010
Turkish Simit

Simit is one of the most traditional and common types of Turkish food. It is made from flour, formed in the shape of a ring and cooked in an oven, and is typically covered with a large quantity of sesame seeds. Simit is both inexpensive and flavorful. One can find fresh simit at every hour of the day in bakeries and shops which sell baked flour goods. You also might encounter simit merchants, with their glass-pane wagons, walking along the city’s bustling streets. In the past few years, several simit chain restaurants, which only sell different types of simit have become popular. Feeding the seagulls with simits, a typical Turkish fun. You will see seagulls following the boat at the same speed as the boats for a while so they will look as if they are hanged from the sky by some invisible cord.

October 25, 2010
Turkey Maintains Reservations About US Missile Defense

Turkey Maintains Reservations About US Missile Defense

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 190

October 21, 2010 02:11

By: Saban Kardas

Turkey’s position on US efforts to create a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Europe has emerged as another source of tension in US-Turkish relations. The Bush administration originally contemplated the installment of a missile shield in Eastern Europe, yet failed to achieve its stated objectives in the face of strong Russian opposition. At the time, Turkey expressed a cautious position on such proposals, arguing that it should not proceed in a manner threatening to Russia. Recently, the Obama administration revived the idea as a central component of its policy of containing the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program.

Turkey has been considered as a possible location for the system, possibly hosting a radar battery on its soil, which would detect missiles launched from its surrounding regions so that they could be intercepted by missiles stationed in Turkey or Eastern Europe. The US also moved to present the revamped program as a joint NATO project, in obvious attempts to garner wider diplomatic support, and perhaps ease Ankara’s concerns. However, given Turkey’s position on the Iranian nuclear issue, which already had pitted it against the US, Ankara has remained lukewarm towards invitations from Washington to join the project. The recent trend in Turkish foreign policy towards pursuing independent policies and growing questions as to whether it is still committed to the Alliance and its traditional relations with the US has made Turkey’s position all the more puzzling.

This issue has been at Turkey’s doorsteps visibly at least since Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Turkey in early September (EDM, September 8). Similarly, during his visit to Turkey in early October, NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, discussed this issue (www.cnnturk.com, October 8). Ankara’s position was again one of the main items when NATO foreign and defense ministers met on October 14 in Brussels to discuss the Alliance’s new strategic concept, which will be adopted at the NATO summit in Lisbon next month. Rasmussen urged alliance members to consider the proposal for adopting a missile shield seriously against threats from rogue states, as underlined in the draft strategic concept.

In Brussels, Turkish foreign and defense ministers, Ahmet Davutoglu and Vecdi Gonul, respectively, held a separate meeting with their US counterparts Hillary Clinton and Robert Gates. They conveyed Turkish concerns, especially its uneasiness with the proposed system being perceived as targeting Iran and Syria. They emphasized that the project must proceed as a defensive system, without designating any country as a potential aggressor. Otherwise, it could make these countries feel encircled and heighten tensions in the region. Turkey also reportedly expressed its desire to place the system under NATO’s command, and have it cover the entire territory of NATO members. Regarding the use of Turkish territory as a possible site for the system, the Turkish side apparently maintained its reservations (Dogan, October 14; Cihan, October 16).

Speaking to reporters upon his return to Turkey, Gonul, however, did not rule out Turkey’s participation. Gonul rejected labeling Turkey’s stance as simply putting up objections, noting that the two sides were negotiating, which will continue until the Lisbon summit. Interestingly, Gates also denied speculation that the US was pressuring Turkey and said they were simply continuing negotiations with an ally. Gonul preferred to highlight the potential benefits of the missile shield for Turkey’s own security. Referring to some smaller scale defense systems Turkey is undertaking, Gonul maintained that if a future NATO missile shield also covers Turkey, it might help the country save huge costs (Zaman, October 16, October 17).

Gonul apparently sees some opportunity for Turkey to participate in the missile shield project, since most of the costs would be borne by the United States. Turkey has considered missile defense systems since the 1990’s, but has failed to build an operational system, given its inability to shoulder the enormous costs of such a project and its limited technological know-how. One Turkish defense expert, Mustafa Kibaroglu, stressed that Turkey might opt to benefit from this project by seeking to gain a say in the decision making processes of the system and sharing technological expertise (Hurriyet Daily News, October 20).

During his trip to the US where he attended the 29th annual American-Turkish Council (ATC) conference in Washington, Gonul, accompanied by Turkish government officials and diplomats, continued the talks on the issue with their American counterparts. “Contrary to some press reports, we are not pressuring Turkey to make a contribution. But we do look to Turkey to support NATO’s adoption at the Lisbon summit of a territorial missile defense capability,” Gates said, underscoring the ongoing difficulties in bridging the differences of opinion (Today’s Zaman, October 20).

Unlike Davutoglu, who has been the architect of Turkey’s controversial Iran policy, Gonul might be less concerned about Turkey’s Iran portfolio and more sympathetic to the idea of benefiting from the missile shield project. Nonetheless, Ankara’s reservations over the ramifications of the project for its relations with its neighbors still run deep. Davutoglu has emphasized on many occasions that Turkey does not perceive any threats from the Middle East, and recently added that regional countries do not pose a threat to NATO, either (www.cnnturk.com, October 20).

Turkey might increasingly find itself between a rock and a hard place. Irrespective of whether NATO designates any targets, Iran, whom the US has already dubbed as a “rogue state,” might nonetheless perceive the missile shield as a threat. Turkey, thus, will find it hard to explain its support for the missile shield to its Middle Eastern neighbors, especially as it pursues a “zero problems with neighbors” policy and forges deeper regional integration in the Middle East. In contrast, given the deep-running problems currently bedeviling US-Turkish relations, caused by the row over the Iranian nuclear issue and Turkey’s disputes with Israel, Turkey might not afford to be the deal-breaker at NATO. Ankara already sparked the ire of the US and other NATO members, when it contemplated vetoing Rasmussen’s election last year (EDM, April 6, 2009).

Nonetheless, it may still be too early to determine the conditions under which Turkey could give its consent. Indeed, Turkey might prefer to continue “negotiations” on this issue until the Lisbon summit, and perhaps beyond.

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-maintains-reservations-about-us-missile-defense/

October 21, 2010
Turkish Traditional Shoe “Çarık”

Research has so far traced the history of Turkish costume back to the eighth century, before the Turkish conquest of Anatolia. The Turks of Central Asia were a nomad people whose needs were mostly supplied by their herds, so leather wool and hair were used in many diverse ways to make tents, furnishings, clothing and other daily needs. Of course one of these uses was shoes, and the earliest type of leather shoe made by the Turks was the çarık, and there are still traditional çarık makers in some Anatolian villages.

October 21, 2010