Category: Authors

Jihad is not a crime

Before I lived in Turkey, I thought the word “jihad” was a word of hate and violence. I associated it with suicide bombers and crazed fanatics who flew airplanes into buildings.

But then I went to Turkey. And I started meeting people named Jihad!

I remember this one day in particular, when I met my first Jihad (actually, his name was “Cihat”, the Turkish spelling of “Jihad”).

My wife and I went to this beautiful tea garden. It was up on this high bluff with an incredible view of the Bosphorus Straits and the blue Marmara Sea stretching all the way to the horizon.

We met up with my wife’s cousin, his wife, and their kids. And this guy, this cousin, his name was Cihat!

But this guy with the radical, violent name, he was just a big teddy bear. I mean, you could see it in his eyes, in his face, in the way he looked at his wife and kids. You could even hear it in the way he talked to me. He was one the gentlest souls I had ever met.

When we parted ways that day, I was feeling a little confused, wondering, my god, how can this gentle teddy bear of a man have a crazy, violent, hateful name like Cihat? What on earth were his parents thinking? Did they even know what that word meant?

Turns out I was the one who didn’t know what that word meant.

Because in the months that followed, I met tons of Cihats in Turkey. It turns out Cihat is actually a pretty common guy’s name.

And I figured, the parents must know something I don’t. I mean, it doesn’t matter where in the world you are, parents love their children. No parents in the world are going to give their kid a hateful, violent name.

So I figured I would look into what this word meant, jihad. And here’s what I found…

The word “jihad” has multiple meanings. And yes, “violent war against an external infidel” is one of them. But an equally valid, equally accepted meaning of “jihad” is “war against the infidel within the self”. The phrase “I am conducting a jihad” means, “I am rooting out sin within MY OWN heart”!

Now, this is not some niche, alternative meaning bandied about by a few academic philosophers.

I didn’t go to some obscure, Middle East-loving, crazy peacenik source to find this definition. I just went to Wikipedia. I went to Wikipedia and typed in “jihad”. And then just to verify what I learned, I went to a couple other mainstream American websites like Yahoo, and Ask.com.

Turns out this other meaning, “purging your own heart of sin”, is a mainstream, widely-accepted meaning. In fact, it is the majority meaning of this word. Most of the people who use this word mean “purge the infidel within your own heart”.

Now, I’m not saying that suicide bombers are peace-loving, gentle souls. I am saying that for every crazed lunatic, there are a hundred gentle, loving souls who say jihad is about purifying your own heart. They are saying never mind the non-believers, our hands are full just living God’s words in our own hearts.

This theme is common to pretty much every religion around the world. For every Christian who thinks Christianity is about grabbing a sword and slaying the heathens in the name of the Lord, there are a hundred who think Christianity is about saying, “Never mind the heathens, my job is to purify my own heart.”

It means one of the primary meanings of Jihad is very similar to what Gandhi said: “Be the change you want to see in the world”. And Gandhi, he was a gentle Indian guy who walked around in a white robe talking about peace. Everybody loves Gandhi. And yet he was basically telling people, “Yeah man, let’s all do some jihad!”

So it turns out that our conventional-wisdom, popular understanding of the word “jihad” is ridiculously myopic. It means that when some crazy American woman goes off the deep end and moves to Pakistan, and we call her “Jihad Jane”, we’re just highlighting our own ignorance.

And if we’re myopic about that, what else are we myopic about?

When we meet someone else, someone from another religion, or another country, or another job or social class, it is our duty to humanity to remind ourselves that our understanding of that person is probably incorrect. And it is our duty to the world to try to overcome that incorrectness.

When we allow an incorrect understanding to drive our actions, those actions will be misguided. And even if we do reach our goal, we will probably find out, too late, that we have chosen the wrong one.

Matt Krause

Originally published at mattkrause.com on 18 june 2010

September 28, 2010
A guidebook for new Congresspersons for January 2011

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September 23, 2010
Turkey Bolsters Ties With Turkic States

Turkey Bolsters Ties With Turkic States Turkey Bolsters Ties With Turkic States

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 170

September 22, 2010

By Saban Kardas

Turkey hosted the tenth summit of Turkic-speaking countries in Istanbul on September 16. The Istanbul summit, bringing together Turkish, Kazakh, Azeri, Kyrgyz and Turkmen leaders, took steps towards furthering institutionalizing this inter-governmental platform, in line with the conclusions of the previous meeting in Nakhchivan in October 2009. Through the Nakhchivan declaration, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had formed a Turkic-Speaking Countries Cooperation Council –or Turkish Council, as Turkey seeks to promote it. In Istanbul, the leaders agreed to implement measures to make the new bodies operational, including the Council of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers, Council of Senior Foreign Ministry Officials, Wise Men’s Council and Permanent Secretariat. Moreover, they agreed to set up other institutions to protect joint cultural heritage, form a union of universities, and create a fund to support research activities (Anadolu Ajansi, September 16; for an English text of the final declaration, see: Today’s Zaman, September 17).

Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, the host of the summit, emphasized the importance of the meeting to strengthen the commonalities among the brotherly nations in terms of language, history, religion and cultural values. He called upon the leaders to diversify relations in various areas. The leaders attending the summit highlighted the role of this burgeoning cooperation in contributing to peace and pledged to deepen solidarity to boost regional stability, human rights and a market economy.

The conclusions of the meeting reflect the Turkish government’s desire to play a greater leadership role in the Turkish speaking world. Although Ankara sought to forge closer ties among these states in the early post-Cold War period, it failed to realize this ambitious objective. However, in recent years, the Turkish government has demonstrated its willingness to revitalize cooperation among Turkic countries. The recent decisions are, thus, products of Ankara’s determined moves in that direction (EDM, November 23, 2008). After the Nakhchivan declaration was passed last year, Gul presented it as a major success on Turkey’s part (www.euractiv.com.tr, October 6, 2009). Turkey expects the Turkish Council to develop based on the model of other similar organizations, such as the Commonwealth, Arab League or Francophonie (www.tcbb.gov.tr, September 16). Nonetheless, in an example of the limitations before this objective the Kazakh, Turkmen and Kyrgyz leaders spoke at times in Russian during the summit (Dogan Haber Ajansi, September 16).

In a move that underscored Turkey’s leadership role, the first rotating presidency was assumed by Turkey and a senior Turkish diplomat, Halil Akinci, former ambassador to Moscow, was appointed as the Secretary-General of the council (Zaman, September 16). So far, there have been irregular summits as well as bilateral meetings between different states. Ankara believes the establishment of a permanent secretariat in Istanbul would increase the visibility of the council in regional and international affairs and contribute to the institutionalization of governmental ties.

Speaking at the summit, Gul went as far as maintaining that “from now on, we are one nation, but six states.” The phrase “one nation, two states,” has been used to define the warm ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan. It remains to be seen if other Turkic states will embrace it to the same extent to identify themselves so closely with Turkey. Ankara has been unable to convince all Turkic states to participate. Uzbekistan has deliberately avoided attending the summits since the early 2000’s. Turkmenistan has also been aloof to this platform for some time. In that sense, Turkmenistan’s representation at the Istanbul summit can be considered as a positive step. Nonetheless, referring to its foreign policy principle of “positive neutrality,” Turkmenistan did not sign the Nakhchivan declaration. Uzbekistan again was absent from the Istanbul summit, underscoring continuing divisions.

Besides its importance for intra-Turkic cooperation, the Istanbul summit also provided a venue for the participating leaders to hold various bilateral meetings with their counterparts to discuss issues of specific relevance. Turkey, for its part, used that opportunity to deepen ties with Azerbaijan. On the margins of the summit, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Azeri President, Ilham Aliyev, signed a framework agreement to form the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (Hurriyet, September 15). Ankara has signed similar agreements with several countries, mainly its Middle Eastern neighbors. The agreement with Baku was in preparation for some time, and its conclusion further highlights Ankara repairing its ties with Azerbaijan following the row caused by the Turkish-Armenian normalization process.

Moreover, the energy ministers from Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan discussed energy cooperation. Ankara already has an agreement to purchase Turkmen gas, provided that transit problems are resolved. Thus, Turkey wants to contribute to the resolution of the disputes between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, for it would also deepen cooperation as part of the East-West energy corridor and enable the export of Turkmen gas to Europe through Turkey. Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, noted that they avoided discussing the status of the Caspian Sea, especially border issues. He stressed that it could still be possible to develop trilateral cooperation in some undisputed sectors of the Caspian even before other major issues were resolved. Azeri Energy Minister, Natiq Aliyev, also expressed hope that the remaining disagreements could be resolved so that Turkmen gas could be exported through the Caspian and Azerbaijan. The Turkish side welcomed this meeting as a positive step, which might boost prospects for the Nabucco pipeline (Anadolu Ajansi, September 15).

For some time, the Turkish government has been criticized for its neglect of Central Asia in its foreign policy priorities (EDM, June 25). In contrast, the government has presented its recent steps in the South Caucasus and Central Asia as proof that it has been pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy. Therefore, Ankara widely publicized the Istanbul summit as a great success. Nonetheless, those skeptical of the government urge caution and argue that one should wait to see if the declaration will be matched with deeds before judging the success of the government’s recent initiatives within the Turkic world (www.211yyte.org, September 17).

https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-bolsters-ties-with-turkic-states/

September 22, 2010
Who Won Akhtamar Propaganda War: Armenians or Turks?

The Turkish government failed to attract the expected crowd of thousands of worshippers from around the world to the first Mass in almost a century, held at the Holy Cross Church in Akhtamar Island, on Sept. 19. Only a few hundred Armenians showed up, mostly from Istanbul.

Turkey failed miserably in trying to deceive world opinion into believing that it is tolerant towards Armenians. Eventually, it became obvious that Turkish leaders were more interested in putting on a political show than allowing a religious ceremony in a thousand-year old Armenian house of worship.

I wrote a column three years ago criticizing the Turkish government for converting the Holy Cross Church into a state museum. At the time, I urged Turkish officials to 1) place a cross on the church’s dome; 2) designate it as a church rather than a museum, and allow regular celebration of Divine Liturgy; and 3) revert ownership of the church to the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul instead of placing it under the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism.

Earlier this year, the Turkish government promised to place a cross on the dome of the church and allow services to be performed there on Sept. 19. I urged Armenians not to participate, knowing that Turkish officials’ true intent was to stage a political show under the guise of religious ceremonies.

An intense debate ensued among Armenians on whether to boycott or attend the church services. Articles exposing the Turkey’s sinister plans did little to settle the controversy. Making matters worse, the Holy See of Etchmiadzin and the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem announced plans to send representatives to the Akhtamar church, although the Catholicosate of Cilicia declined to participate.

Finally, a lucky break! The Turkish government came to the rescue. A few weeks before the scheduled ceremony, a Turkish official announced that it would not be possible to place the promised cross atop the church, making the ridiculous excuse of “technical difficulties.”

Prime Minister Erdogan was caught in a dilemma. Had he allowed the cross to be placed on the dome, he would have scored points with world public opinion, but would have lost crucial votes in the hotly-contested Sept. 12 referendum on constitutional reforms.

The cross finally saved the day! The Holy See of Etchmiadzin canceled its plans to send representatives to Akhtamar. The Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem did likewise. Tour operators called off their arrangements to take large numbers of Armenian worshippers to Lake Van. As a result, Turkey lost the propaganda campaign and considerable income.

In a last ditch effort to increase attendance, a few days before Sept. 19, Prime Minister Erdogan’s office sent invitations to the Armenia media, offering all expense paid visits to Akhtamar, including free round-trip airfare, hotel accommodations and meals. Another fifty Armenian commentators and analysts received similar invitations, all of whom refused to go because of Turkey’s refusal to install the cross.

Inadvertently, the Turks forced most Armenians to do the right thing and cancel their visits to the Holy Cross Church. Interestingly, the Turkish government behaved similarly when it declined to ratify the Armenia-Turkey Protocols, thereby safeguarding Armenia’s interests.

While the Armenian public, civic groups, and some political parties opposed the Turkish plans at Akhtamar, the Armenian government remained remarkably silent. For unknown reasons, Turkey did not invite Armenian officials to the Holy Cross ceremonies. In view of the embarrassing games Ankara played with the Armenia-Turkey Protocols and the subsequent collapse of soccer diplomacy, it appears that Armenia’s leaders were not too eager to join Turks in yet another ploy.

Regrettably, Armenians wasted far too much time and energy arguing with each other about going to Akhtamar. This distraction prevented them from organizing protests in major capitals to inform the world about the long history of Turkish atrocities, destruction of thousands of churches, and occupation of historic Armenian lands.

However, the boycott of the ceremonies because of the missing cross caught the attention of the international media. Ironically, Turkish officials helped further undermine their own cause, by placing the cross on the ground next to the Holy Cross Church, in full view of the public and TV cameras.

The Turkish government has now promised to place the cross atop the church in six weeks. Regardless of what Turkey decides to do with the cross, Armenians should pursue their own course of action, rather than simply react to the petty games of Turkish officials.

At this point, the only announcement Armenians are interested in hearing from Ankara is the return of the Holy Cross Church to the Armenian Patriarchate of Turkey.

September 22, 2010
Referendum Deepens Fragmentation in Turkey

Referendum Deepens Fragmentation in Turkey

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 168

September 20, 2010

By Saban Kardas

In the Turkish referendum held on September 12, voters supported the constitutional amendment package promoted by the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP). Despite earlier forecasts and opinion polls, the changes were approved by a wide margin: 58 percent voted in favor, while 42 percent opposed the amendment (Anadolu Ajansi, September 13). This rather surprising outcome will have significant implications for Turkish politics, possibly accelerating social fragmentation.

The referendum marks a major victory for the ruling AKP. Through their aggressive campaign, the opposition parties Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) had worked hard to present the referendum as a vote of confidence for the government (EDM, July 13). These two parties, which formed a “no front” against the reform package both during the parliamentary debates and in the referendum, had substantial reasons for objecting to the proposed constitutional changes. Yet, overall their mobilization strategy was based on a knee-jerk criticism of the AKP’s policies. In contrast, the AKP stated on many occasions that they would not capitalize on yes votes and present them as support for the AKP. The AKP, instead, defined the changes as a move towards the democratization of Turkish politics. Other smaller parties on the right of the political spectrum, which supported the AKP’s argument, mobilized their supporters in favor of the changes. However, for a great portion of Turkish voters the content of the constitutional changes was less important than their party affiliation (Hurriyet Daily News, September 15).

The results can be interpreted as a reaffirmation of domestic support for the AKP’s tenure in power. This success represents the sixth major electoral victory for the AKP under Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Since 2002, the AKP has won two parliamentary elections and two municipal elections, and managed to pass constitutional amendment packages in two referendums. Following the latest result, many observers expect the AKP to win the next national elections slated for 2011. With this unprecedented track record, the AKP machinery has emerged almost as an invincible force in the Turkish political scene, raising the question as to how it will use its power. AKP representatives already indicated that they would revive the debate on introducing a new constitution, most likely following the 2011 elections. Many liberal and reformist groups, as well as the European Union, therefore, welcomed the referendum result, because they believe that the expression of support for the constitutional changes will put pressure on the AKP to maintain its momentum towards the further democratization of the Turkish political system. Earlier, the AKP had come under criticism for slowing the pace of political reform required by the EU membership process (Hurriyet Daily News, September 14).

A more interesting question, however, concerns how Erdogan, who can claim credit for AKP’s unprecedented track record, will use this power to secure his personal position in Turkish politics. Many observers expect Erdogan to run for the presidency after the current President Abdullah Gul’s term expires in 2012. The next president will be elected by popular vote according to the constitutional changes of 2007. One drawback for Erdogan is that in Turkey’s parliamentary system, presidents can exercise only limited influence. Given Erdogan’s interest in political power, he might also push for a more radical overhaul of the Turkish political system. Erdogan has already initiated a debate on replacing the current parliamentary system with a presidential system. It remains a possibility that Erdogan will revive such a debate, in order that he might eventually lead a strong presidential system (Anadolu Ajansi, September 13).

This unprecedented popular support and resulting latitude that the AKP and Erdogan have gained in restructuring the Turkish political system has triggered anger among the AKP’s opponents. Erdogan announced that his party will seek consensus with other parties, as they work on a new constitution. However, many of the AKP’s critics argue that after the AKP managed to curb the power of the Turkish military, it has moved on to undermine the power of other state institutions, mainly the independent judiciary. The AKP’s critics believe that as a result of the recent constitutional changes, the system of checks and balances has already been undermined, and if the AKP continues on its current path, it might eventually form a civilian despotism and suppress secular segments of the society.

Therefore, the representatives of Turkey’s secularist opposition and speakers from the high courts have maintained that although they respect the people’s choice in the referendum, they would continue their struggle to maintain judicial independence and not allow the AKP to take complete control of all state institutions. As a result, the fragmentation in Turkish politics and society appears to be deepening. The aggressive campaign prior to the referendum and the statements from the representatives of the AKP and its opponents indicate that secularist and nationalist groups represented by the CHP and MHP on the one side, and conservative and liberal groups represented by the AKP on the other, will remain engaged in a fierce battle over how to define Turkey’s political system and values. Moreover, this fragmentation also has geographic ramifications. While the provinces in central Anatolia and the Black Sea region supported the constitutional changes, the provinces in the western coastal areas and Thrace voted against the changes. This distribution corresponds closely to the results of the 2009 municipal elections, whereby coastal areas voted for the CHP and MHP and central Anatolian provinces voted for the AKP (EDM, March 31, 2009).

Another division is hidden in the voting patterns in the Kurdish speaking provinces in Eastern Turkey. Pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) called on its supporters to boycott the referendum. Low voter turnout in many of the eastern provinces shows that the BDP controls a large section of the Kurdish vote, which corresponds to the results of the 2009 elections. With this boost of self-confidence, the BDP is likely to intensify its campaign to disconnect the Kurdish-speaking areas from Turkey’s mainstream political system, in line with its strategy of demanding “democratic autonomy” for the Kurds. As such, the referendum results might also deepen the divisions around the Kurdish issue, further accelerating Turkey’s social fragmentation.

https://jamestown.org/program/referendum-deepens-fragmentation-in-turkey/

September 20, 2010
Senate Should not Confirm Bryza As U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan

By Harut Sassounian
Publisher, The California Courier

At the request of Sen. Barbara Boxer, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had postponed from early August to mid-September its vote on Matt Bryza, nominee for U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan. Senators Boxer, Harry Reid, and Robert Menendez were satisfied neither with Bryza’s answers during the confirmation hearing nor subsequently with his written responses.

Harut Sassounian

While Congress was in recess for the past 40 days, a number of newspapers and websites questioned the appropriateness of Bryza’s nomination to such an important post. They raised several conflict of interest issues regarding Bryza and his Turkish-born wife, Zeyno Baran, who until recently was director of the Center for Eurasian Policy at the Hudson Institute, a Washington think tank.

This article shall focus on a single issue — the allegation that Bryza and Baran had received gifts during their August 23, 2007 wedding in Istanbul. If true, this would not only abort Bryza’s chances of becoming ambassador, but more importantly, it would get him into serious legal trouble. Under U.S. laws, government officials and their spouses are prohibited from receiving gifts, even wedding presents, unless these are given by close acquaintances. Such gifts have to be reported to the U.S. government, and the Internal Revenue Service. Bryza’s case is more complicated. If he got gifts that he did not report, while telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee under oath that he did not receive such gifts, he could be charged with non-reporting of a gift, tax evasion, and perjury.

Bryza’s celebrity wedding triggered a major controversy when Azeri jouranlist Adil Khalil reported in the opposition newspaper Azadlig that Haydar Babayev, Azerbaijan’s Minister of Economic Development, had paid most of the couple’s wedding expenses. Babayev refuted the accusation and filed a lawsuit for libel, causing Khalil to be arrested, severely beaten, stabbed, and forced to flee to France. The newspaper’s editor, Ganimat Zahid, was also arrested on unsubstantiated charges. Last month, Azadlig suspended publication, after it was evicted from its offices by the authorities. Having exhausted all domestic court appeals, the newspaper’s editor filed a claim against Azerbaijan with the European Court of Human Rights.

According to Azeri and Turkish media reports, around 400 prominent guests from several countries attended Bryza’s 2007 lavish wedding, held under tight security. Among the attendees from Turkey were the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, the U.S. Consul General in Istanbul, the Armenian Patriarch of Turkey, members of parliament, and major media figures. Bryza also invited Armenian officials to his wedding, including Pres. Robert Kocharian and Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian, neither of whom attended. At the time, Bryza was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and U.S. co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the mediators of the Artsakh (Karabagh) conflict.

Several high-ranking Azeri officials also attended Bryza’s wedding in Istanbul: Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov who served as a wedding witness, Minister of Economic Development Haydar Babayev, Azeri National Petroleum Company President Rovnaq Abdullaev, Deputy Speaker of Parliament Valeh Aleskerov, and Azerbaijan’s Consul General in Los Angeles Elin Suleymanov. Pres. Ilham Aliyev’s letter of congratulation was read at the start of the wedding. According to documents obtained by this writer from the European Court of Human Rights, the Azeri editor claimed that Pres. Aliyev sent “a special gift to the bride.”

Even though Bryza and Baran requested that in lieu of gifts guests make a contribution to a Turkish charity, it is common practice in the Middle East to hand gifts — particularly jewelry — to a newlywed couple. For example, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, during a meeting with Hillary Clinton in Kabul in July, told her that he would be sending a gift to the Secretary of State, on the occasion of her daughter’s wedding.

According to the Media Rights Institute, Minister Babayev’s lawyers confirmed during a court hearing in Baku that he attended the wedding and “even had a gift” for Bryza. Yet, at his Senate confirmation hearing, Bryza refuted the allegation that an Azeri official had financed his wedding, adding that its entire cost was paid by the couple’s families.

The allegation that Bryza received wedding gifts should be thoroughly investigated before the Senate votes on his nomination. Even though Senators and members of the Armenian, Greek, and Cypriot communities oppose Bryza for multiple reasons, the wedding expenses and gifts are the only issues that could have serious legal ramifications. Therefore, the Senate should wait for the outcome of the lawsuit filed by the Azeri editor in the European Court of Human Rights.

Bryza should fully cooperate with such an investigation in order to clear the clouds of suspicion hanging over his head, before he is rushed to Baku. He should provide the complete list of his wedding guests and disclose all gifts received by the newlyweds and their families.

U.S. investigators should contact everyone who attended Bryza’s wedding to verify what gifts they gave to the couple on that occasion. He should also be asked to produce a record of his wedding expenses and how they were paid.

A few days ago, Sen. Boxer wrote a letter to this writer expressing her serious concern about Bryza’s inadequate responses to her questions both during and after the confirmation hearing. She pledged to continue her efforts “to determine if he is the appropriate representative for the United States in this highly volatile region of the world.”

Sen. Boxer and her colleagues should either reject Bryza’s nomination outright or place a hold on it until all allegations against him are investigated and proven to be true

September 15, 2010