Damascus Repeats Call For Turkish Involvement In Talks With Israel
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 180
October 6, 2010 03:26 PM
By: Saban Kardas
Turkey and Syria held the second ministerial meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council in Syrian city of Latakia. The Turkish delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, was composed of twelve ministers including Taner Yildiz, Vecdi Gonul and Besir Atalay (the energy, defense and interior ministers respectively). The meetings reviewed the agreements and protocols, signed between the two countries. The conclusions will be followed up with a monitoring mechanism and more concrete decisions will be made during the next prime ministerial meeting in December (Cihan, October 3).
Much of the talks concerned economic cooperation. In line with their earlier demonstration of intent to move towards economic integration in the Middle East, comprising also Lebanon and Jordan (Sabah, June 10), the Turkish and Syrian delegations discussed the details of creating a free trade zone, easing customs procedures, building new transportation networks including fast trains between Turkish and Syrian cities, among other initiatives. Moreover, they also considered cooperation in agriculture, environment, health, energy and other fields (Anadolu Ajansi, October 3).
The bilateral energy partnership was a major item on the agenda. Yildiz announced that Turkish and Syrian national petroleum companies agreed to form a joint oil exploration company. Syria also allocated seven fields to Turkey without a tender, where exploration will start as soon as both sides resolve the remaining details of their joint enterprise. Yildiz announced that the work on the connection of the Arab natural gas pipeline with the Turkish grid, which might eventually supply Nabucco pipeline with gas from Egypt through Syria, might be concluded within one year (Anadolu Ajansi, October 4).
However, for Ankara, such initiatives in the Middle East have a broader meaning than strictly commercial concerns. During the joint press briefing, Davutoglu emphasized Turkish views on security in the Middle East. Davutoglu maintained that two competing “visions” prevailed in the Middle East: one seeking to destabilize the regional order by sowing the seeds of conflict and supporting terrorism, and the other seeking to maintain regional peace and stability through mutual cooperation. He referred to the high level strategic cooperation councils Turkey launched with Syria and other neighbors as instruments that will contribute to the second vision. He also underscored how Syria joined Turkey in its commitment to a peaceful neighborhood through dialogue and cooperation (Dogan Haber Ajansi, October 4).
In Davutoglu’s view, to the extent that regional countries could expand the scope of the second vision and build regional organizations, they will be able to narrow the scope of the first one, hence eradicate the sources of instability in the Middle East. If such regional cooperation succeeds, it will not only benefit the entire region, but bolster Turkey’s own security by creating a belt of stability around the country.
Perhaps, the most immediate area where this approach has manifested itself is Turkey’s fight against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Aware of the cross-border dimensions of the Kurdish problem and PKK terrorism, Ankara has been working to address this issue through both domestic reforms and regional diplomacy (EDM, September 29). Turkey wants to engage its Middle Eastern neighbors through various cooperation platforms in order to thwart any logistical, financial or manpower support the PKK might receive from the region. Especially in light of the Turkish government’s recent initiatives to solve the Kurdish issue, Syria, perhaps, has been the most cooperative neighbor, as the Syrian government has repeatedly expressed its support for Ankara’s Kurdish initiative as well as its right to fight against terrorism.
As an extension of these collegial ties, Atalay (playing a leading role in the Turkish government’s Kurdish initiative) and Gonul held important talks with their counterparts during the meetings in Latakia. The head of the Syrian delegation, Hasan Turkmani, President Bashar al-Assad’s aide, reiterated their willingness to deepen security cooperation with Turkey (Anadolu Ajansi, October 3). Last week, Turkmani, accompanied by some military officers, visited Ankara to discuss the Syrian contribution to Turkey’s fight against the PKK (Anadolu Ajansi, September 29).
For its part, Syria also hopes to gain strategic leverage from its closer ties with Turkey, beyond the immediate economic benefits. Syria increasingly considers Turkey as a reliable ally against Israel, though Turkey’s involvement in Syrian-Israeli relations has been confined largely to the role of a mediator. Turkey managed to facilitate indirect contacts between the Syrian and Israeli sides in the second half of 2008, which arguably came very close to reaching a settlement on the Golan Heights. This process, however, was interrupted by Israel’s offensive on Gaza in December 2008-January 2009.
Israel’s Palestine policy also opened a new era in Turkish-Israeli relations. Ankara and Tel Aviv were increasingly mired in a cycle of crises, which resulted in the replacement of the so-called Turkish-Israeli “strategic partnership” with a pattern of enmity. As a result, Israel lost its trust in Turkey and questioned the latter’s impartiality. Turkish leaders repeated on many occasions their readiness to resume indirect talks with Ankara’s support. Despite Damascus welcoming the Turkish proposal, the Israeli side continuously rejected it given its lack of trust in Turkey (EDM, July 23, 2009).
Recently, international efforts to revive the Syrian-Israeli dialogue have intensified. As France and the US, among others, have sought to convince Assad to agree to a new round of talks, Assad conveyed his willingness to see Turkey involved in this process (Zaman, September 17). Following the strategic council meeting in Latakia, the Syrian Foreign Minister, Velid el-Muallim, reiterated that Damascus views Ankara as an honest and reliable actor, while international efforts should focus on supporting Turkey’s mediator role (www.sana.sy, October 4).
Although constantly glorifying Turkey’s successful mediation in 2008, the Syrian side refuses to acknowledge that this was made possible by Israel’s view of Turkey as an impartial broker that could open a channel between Tel Aviv and Arab capitals. Syria’s insistence on Turkey’s “impartial mediation,” even after it is long foregone in Israel’s eyes, serves only to underscore that, after all, Ankara is valuable to Damascus not as a reliable mediator per se, but as a reliable ally.
https://jamestown.org/program/damascus-repeats-call-for-turkish-involvement-in-talks-with-israel/
DARKNESS MADE VISIBLE BY THE TURKISH ZOLA
A dungeon horrible, on all sides round,
As one great furnace flamed; yet from those flames
No light; but rather darkness visible
Served only to discover sights of woe,
Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace
And rest can never dwell, hope never comes
That comes to all, but torture without end
Still urges, and a fiery deluge, fed
With ever-burning sulphur unconsumed.
John Milton
Paradise Lost
When Emile Zola published his historic letter, J’Accuse, addressed to the President of France, in L’Aurore newspaper on 13 January 1898, he was rich and famous. But that did not stop his mighty anger. Outraged by the travesty of justice that resulted in the false arrest, conviction, and imprisonment of Alfred Dreyfus, a loyal Jewish army officer, he appealed to the president and the nation for reason and justice to prevail.
Dreyfus was convicted by falsified evidence and forged documents, and was a scapegoat for the thoroughly corrupt French Army general staff. He had been imprisoned at a hell hole called Devil’s Island for three years when Zola wrote his letter. (1)
Zola did so for two reasons. First, to draw the public’s attention to the shameful miscarriage of justice. Second, to provoke his own arrest for libel so that new evidence could be introduced that would prove Dreyfus innocent. He succeeded on both counts. Dreyfus was cleared in 1899 and fully exonerated and reinstated in the French Army in 1906. Zola died under suspicious circumstances on 29 September 1902, “a moment in the history of human conscience,” as eulogized by Anatole France. (2)
On 29 September 2010, 108 years to the day after Zola’s death, the ongoing disaster called Turkey received yet another Pinochet-style shock in its struggle to retain its secularity. Hanefi Avcı, the head of the police department in the city of Eskişehir, was arrested for writing a best seller. His book laid bare the widely suspected fact that Turkey’s highest government institution’s—police, army, and judicial system—had been infiltrated and indeed subverted by a religious cemaat, the Fethullah Gülen movement. (3) Since Avcı himself was once an eager activist for Gülen’s cemaat, the book has a certain whiff of authenticity.
And yesterday, Avcı was arrested. The reason? The usual nonsense of the Ergenekon prosecutor. It seems that suddenly the previously highly esteemed police chief has connections with a terrorist organization. Was the terror organization the Gülen movement? Ha, ha, ha, no not quite. The Gülenista government of Turkey, also known as the AKP, paid no attention to the compelling information in Avcı’s book about their sugar daddy, Gülen. It decided on some other “terror group,” some socialist or maybe, horror of horrors, some communist operation. Another Alice-in-Wonderland group, cobbled together with false documents and bogus telephone conversations, using the latest listening and stealth technology provided by…guess who?
Avcı refused to file a petition suggested by his lawyer to demand release from prison pending presentation of formal charges. Like Zola, he wants to experience the whole disgusting mess called Turkish justice. He also refuses to speak to any judicial or prosecutorial officials that he suspects of being members of the Gülen cemaat. But Avcı says that he will talk, at his trial. Like Emile Zola, may he sing long and loud.
Hanefi Avcı, KORKMA!
Cem Ryan
Istanbul
NOTES:
1. An excellent summary of the Zola/Dreyfus affair by University of Georgia law professor Donald Wilkes can be found at:
For those interested in a dramatic representation of this incident see the stunning classic film (1937) The Life of Emile Zola:
2. “Il fut un moment de la conscience humaine.” Anatole France, 5 October 1902.
3. Gülen lives in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania. It is well and widely known that his activities are aided, abetted, and otherwise supported by the United States government, in particular by the CIA. The latter’s officials were signatories to Gülen’s permanent residency application (“green card”), which he was granted in 2008. For more detailed information see ISLAM, SECULARISM, AND THE BATTLE FOR TURKEY’S FUTURE at:
By: Saban Kardas
Having received unequivocal backing from voters in the constitutional referendum, the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) has moved to address Turkey’s structural problems, most notably the Kurdish question, through a combination of domestic measures, as well as regional and international diplomacy.
The resolution of the Kurdish issue has been one of the main targets of the AKP government. The AKP first sought to address this issue through domestic political reforms in the early 2000’s, also benefiting from the relative calm prevailing in southeastern Anatolia, thanks to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) suspending its operations. However, granting greater cultural rights to the Kurds as part of Turkey’s EU accession process or devising socio-economic policies proved to be ineffective. The threat posed by the PKK’s separatist terrorism lingered, as the organization managed to maintain its manpower in safe havens in Northern Iraq.
The PKK’s resumption of its campaign of violence in the second half the decade caught Ankara by surprise, triggering a heated debate. Faced with the PKK’s deadly attacks against Turkish military outposts from its bases in Northern Iraq, the AKP bowed to pressure and considered seriously pursuing stronger military measures to tackle this problem. Coordinating its policies with the US and the Northern Iraqi Kurdish authorities, the Turkish army undertook incursions into Northern Iraq in pursuit of PKK militants in the winter of 2007-2008. Greater security cooperation and intelligence sharing between Turkey, the US and Iraq, or the enhanced military operations inside Turkey could put an end to the PKK’s terrorist attacks.
Meanwhile, the AKP government launched an ambitious “Kurdish opening” in 2009, yet failed to garner popular and political support for the measure. The government’s mishandling of the opening, coupled with the PKK’s and pro-Kurdish parties’ uncooperative attitude turned the entire Kurdish initiative into a near fiasco (Terrorism Monitor, February 19). The government could change the terms of the debate only through its smart moves to table the constitutional amendment package in the first part of 2010, arguing that the Kurdish issue could also be addressed as part of a broader “democratization agenda” (EDM, May 5).
PKK violence, however, continued throughout the spring and summer, which exposed the failure of the Turkish security apparatus in fighting against the PKK formations inside and outside Turkey (Terrorism Monitor, July 8). The escalation of the conflict could be avoided only through the PKK’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire prior to the referendum, which was partly facilitated by some civil society organizations. Following the referendum, the PKK sent signals that it would resume its campaign, unless Turkish security forces halted their operations by a self-declared deadline of September 20. A deadly mine explosion killing nine civilians on September 16 reignited the debate on terrorism (www.haber7.com, September 16). Though the PKK denied its involvement in the attack, it was a stark reminder that the PKK remained a potent force that could deal a serious blow to Turkey’s security. The PKK decided to extend the “non-action” period until this week as a goodwill gesture (Radikal, September 20).
Moreover, the success of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in boycotting the referendum in the Kurdish-speaking provinces reiterated once again that the ethnic Kurdish movement still enjoys substantial support in the region and continues to harbor ambitious demands for greater political rights. Indeed, the BDP representatives even went as far as demanding democratic autonomy (EDM, September 20).
Faced with this double-edged challenge, the AKP now seeks to address this issue through complex diplomatic traffic. There have been numerous visits undertaken by cabinet members and security bureaucrats. Turkish Interior Minister, Besir Atalay, was in Arbil over the weekend, where Kurdistan Regional Government sources expressed their support for Turkey’s fight against terrorism and the peaceful resolution to the problem (www.trt.net.tr, September 27). He is expected to soon meet his Syrian and Iraqi counterparts. The Head of the Turkish Intelligence Agency, Hakan Fidan, visited Washington last week, and might visit northern Iraq soon. On September 28, a US delegation led by Lloyd James Austin, commanding general of the American forces in Iraq, visited Turkey to discuss the joint efforts (Yeni Safak, September 29).
These contacts are undertaken within the framework of a joint “action plan” agreed in April to combat the PKK, as a result of the trilateral security mechanism between Turkey, the US and Iraq (IHA, April 11). Through closer cooperation with the US and the Iraqi Kurds, the action plan would have helped Turkey to take stronger military measures to eliminate the threat posed by the PKK, which to date has proved ineffective.
Although the recent initiatives also seek to address the security aspects of PKK terrorism, security cooperation through the trilateral mechanism might be secondary to the AKP government’s policy of exploring a non-military solution to the problem in a new political setting. The goal of the contacts is to somehow convince the PKK to extend its unilateral ceasefire, halt its operations inside Turkey, and turn its non-action into a permanent truce (Hurriyet Daily News, September 27). Once the guns fall silent, the government hopes to find a suitable environment within which it can address the Kurdish problem through domestic political reforms.
The crux of the issue is what will happen to the thousands of PKK militants. In this process, the PKK will possibly withdraw its forces from Turkey into Northern Iraq. In the most optimistic scenario, PKK militants might voluntarily turn themselves in and reintegrate themselves into civilian life, if the AKP’s democratic solution succeeds. Since this is highly unlikely, Turkey expects the Iraqi Kurds and the US to take steps towards the disarmament of these PKK militants and eventually end the PKK’s military presence.
However, given the uncertainty over the future of Iraq and the US military presence in the region, it might be unrealistic to expect either the US or the Iraqi Kurds to demilitarize the PKK. Turkey will still need to maintain its operational capability to carry out operations inside Iraq, as reflected by the government’s decision to table a motion for the extension of the Turkish army’s mandate to do so. It seems that there is no easy choice between the use of force and diplomacy.
https://jamestown.org/program/kurdish-question-dominates-turkish-politics/