Turkey’s reserved position on the US-led missile shield ahead of NATO’s Lisbon Summit on November 19-20 continues to remain a major issue affecting Turkish-US relations. Since the US values this project as part of its overall policy on the Iranian nuclear program and its agenda of transforming NATO, Turkey’s rather reluctant attitude has raised questions about its commitment to the Alliance and its relations with the United States (EDM, October 21).
There is growing consensus among foreign and domestic observers that pressure has been building on Turkey to clarify its position, especially at a time when most other NATO members (as well as Russia) seemingly adopted a cooperative position. If Turkey still treats NATO as the centerpiece of its defense and security policies, according to the argument, Turkey cannot diverge from its allies at this critical juncture.
Earlier, Turkish officials dismissed any suggestion that Turkey is being pressured to support the project. However, one cannot deny the requirement of acting in concert with its allies, which is increasingly forcing Turkey to make a decision. In preparation for the Lisbon Summit, President Abdullah Gul convened a meeting, bringing together Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, and other top officials (Anadolu Ajansi, November 5). Recent statements by Turkish leaders reflect a broad consensus at the apex of the Turkish state, formed through such meetings. Overall, it appears that Turkey is unlikely to yield to pressure, and will perhaps continue to negotiate until the Lisbon summit to have its demands recognized by its allies.
The missile shield also emerged on the agenda during Erdogan’s meeting with President Barack Obama at the G20 Summit in Seoul, where he conveyed Turkey’s sensitivities regarding the project (www.cnnturk.com, November 13). Commenting on his meeting with Obama, Erdogan reiterated Ankara’s position on the missile shield. First, he emphasized that as a NATO member, Turkey would take part in the project provided that it is developed within the NATO umbrella. Second, in Ankara’s view, the plans for the missile shield should not list any country as the potential target. Third, the project should provide protection for the entire Turkish territory as well as other members, underscoring the principle of the indivisibility of security. Moreover, the US needs to offer Turkey clarifications about the location of the system, and the technical details about its deployment and decision-making procedures.
Erdogan also added that Turkey has yet to reach a decision. However, Erdogan underlined that he found the US responsive to Turkish demands for further clarification in the ongoing talks, and the points he listed would constitute the basis of Ankara’s position. At the Lisbon summit, Turkey will be represented by Gul, Davutoglu and Defense Minister, Vecdi Gonul. Depending on whether NATO officials satisfy Turkish concerns, Ankara would make a decision on participation in the program.
During a hearing in the Turkish parliament on the foreign ministry’s budget, Davutoglu, ruled out any pressure on Turkey, yet admitted that NATO is justified to make contingency plans against the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. However, Davutoglu made a nuanced point, which he has been reiterating for some time. Davutoglu accepts that as a member of the Alliance, Turkey will act in coordination with its allies, but he emphasized that as an equal partner, or “owner” as he described it, of the Alliance, Turkey wants its voice to be fully heard since decisions in NATO are taken collectively (Anadolu Ajansi, November 12, Hurriyet Daily News, October 30).
In other words, Davutoglu believes that Turkey’s role in NATO is not solely confined to saying “yes” or “no” to a decision already taken; rather it wants to take part in making critical decisions that will affect the future of the Alliance as a whole. Davutoglu rejects the presentation of Turkey as an outlying country that needs to be convinced by the rest of the allies. Rather, Turkey is at the center of Alliance and wants to actively shape its threat perceptions. In that regard, the missile shield debate has a broader meaning for Turkish foreign policy. It provides a major test for the sustainability of Davutoglu’s new foreign policy doctrine that emphasizes independent action and agenda-setting in international affairs.
Likewise, Davutoglu maintains that the US-led missile shield should not undermine Turkish relations with its neighbors. As Erdogan emphasized, Turkey opposes mentioning any country as the target of the anti-ballistic system. Although ballistic missile programs of many countries are cited as posing a risk of proliferation, hence they are used in justifying developing a NATO missile shield, it is no secret that Iran has been viewed as the most immediate source of such a threat. Since Turkey raised reservations about referring to Iran as a potential threat during an earlier NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels last month, there have been signs of acknowledging Ankara’s concerns by US and NATO officials. In an interview, NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, declined to name Iran as a potential threat that the planned missile shield is designed to counter (The New York Times, November 2).
Turkish concern over the impact of the missile shield for relations with its neighbors again shows how another pillar in the new Turkish foreign policy affects Turkey’s thinking on this issue. Turkey has been working to overcome historical rivalries and build friendlier relations with its neighbors, as summarized in the “zero-problems-with-neighbors” doctrine. Turkey is concerned that if the proposed missile shield ends up singling out Iran or Syria, it might compromise its regional policy. Therefore, Davutoglu has been repeatedly arguing that NATO should avoid taking action that might draw new lines of division, making Turkey a “frontier country” as in the Cold War.
Granted, Turkey so far has refrained from categorically rejecting the project, which adds some degree of predictability to its response in Lisbon. Turkey also has laid out its priorities unequivocally, which seem to be appreciated by other NATO members. It will be up to the other Allies to reach a common understanding with Turkey, so that a joint position is adopted in Lisbon.
On November 9, the European Commission published its 2010 progress report on Turkey’s performance in the accession process. Against the background of the declining popularity of EU membership in Turkey, the report has raised interest in the EU process. Yet, it remains to be seen if this renewed attention might really re-energize Turkey’s long-stalled membership drive.
Turkish-EU relations entered a period of stalemate in the second half of the decade, which followed a period where the rapid pace of reforms helped Turkey secure a date for the start of accession talks in 2005. The causes of this deadlock have appeared enigmatic, as both the Turkish government and the EU highlighted each other’s mistakes. European circles criticized the slow-down in the Turkish government’s political reform agenda, and its uncompromising position on the Cyprus dispute. Ankara’s resistance to opening its ports to Greek Cypriot vessels was a case in point from the EU perspective. For the Turkish government, by contrast, factors internal to the EU were largely responsible for the slow progress. The EU was unable to remove the obstacles created by some anti-Turkish member states, such as the Greek Cypriot or French veto against the opening of negotiating chapters or the debate on “privileged partnership” initiated by the French and German leaders. More importantly, the Turkish government has complained that the EU has failed to fully reciprocate the reforms delivered by Turkey, and has treated the Turkish Cypriots unjustly (EDM, June 29, 2009).
As the mutual blame game led nowhere, there were concerns as to whether Turkish-EU relations might grind to a halt. The debate following the 2008 progress report, where the EU again urged Turkey to take reforms more seriously, coincided with many international experts advancing the provocative argument that 2009 would be a make or break year (EDM, January 12, 2009). Although the Turkish government streamlined its efforts for preparation towards membership in 2009, through the establishment of a new ministerial post for EU affairs, nothing the Turkish government accomplished was close to a breakthrough that could end the stalemate. As a result, Turkish-EU relations remained in its rather stagnant state throughout 2009 and 2010, though none of the parties dared to take steps that might end the membership process.
The 2010 progress report did not contain any elements of surprise, as it was largely written in a balanced manner in both its criticism and praise of the Turkish government’s performance (www.avrupa.info.tr, November 9; Hurriyet, November 10). Overall, it was based on the commission’s earlier position that Turkey will have to recognize that it is subject to a rigorous set of criteria for accession, similar to those applied to other candidates, and Turkey should focus on maintaining a convincing track record and avoid any expectation of short-cuts. Similarly, the EU is also expected to be credible so that it could provide Turkey with a legitimate membership prospect. The report also retained another theme which has attracted greater sympathy in recent years, that Turkey’s new foreign policy activism could be an asset for EU’s external relations.
Overall, the report underlined Turkey’s mixed progress towards aligning its own regulations with the EU. While the EU recognized the improvements in immigration, it also underlined other areas where Turkey needed to undertake further reforms. Again, in foreign policy issues, while the EU welcomed Turkey’s constructive role and contribution to energy security, it also noted that no major initiatives were undertaken on the Cyprus issue, urging it to play a more constructive role
In a development which was welcomed by the opposition parties and other groups critical of the government, the report pointed out Turkey’s shortcomings on many issues pertaining to political and cultural rights. It raised growing concerns about the freedom of the press, the ongoing problems in the treatment of minorities, and the inability of the government to produce any tangible results through the Kurdish initiative. While the report welcomed the steps towards democratization and supported the recent constitutional referendum package, which introduced some changes to the composition of high courts, it expressed concern over presidential appointments to those institutions as well as some university presidents. In anticipation of the government’s likely drive for rewriting the constitution following the 2011 elections, EU sources also noted the importance of building consensus for future constitutional reforms.
The opponents of the AKP preferred to highlight those aspects of the EU’s view of Turkey, which are critical of the government’s track record on individual rights. They particularly highlight parts of the report listing the prosecution of journalists, writers or politicians for their expression of opinions. Also, many experts attending a panel discussion in Ankara on November 11 agreed that, though the report overall offered a balanced account of Turkey’s progress, its critical tone towards certain practices of the government has never been clear.
Ironically, government sources also welcomed the report, arguing that it largely met Turkey’s expectations. Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, interpreted the report’s affirmation of Turkey’s new foreign policy as an indication that discussion on whether Turkey was shifting its strategic axis was baseless. Yet, Davutoglu criticized the EU for its unfair assessment of the situation in Cyprus, arguing that the current situation on the island was not of Turkey’s own making and that Ankara could not be expected to solve the problem in isolation. A press release posted on foreign ministry’s website reiterated Davutoglu’s views on the issue (www.mfa.gov.tr, November 9).
Similarly, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and State Minister for EU Affairs, Egemen Bagis, were positive about the report as the EU’s affirmation of Turkey’s place in the EU. Responding to the criticism in relation to limiting individual rights and freedom of expression, Erdogan denied those charges, arguing that there cannot be a completely uncontrolled exercise of freedom in any democracy. Regarding the specific cases of rights’ violations or legal investigations mentioned in the report, Erdogan maintained that they were committed by the judiciary, not the government.
Overall, both the government and the opposition seem to prefer to maintain their commitment to the EU, because they can manipulate it to support their own positions politically, as they see fit.
Regional approach in Turkish foreign policy and the case of Afghanistan
by
Şaban Kardaş*
11 November 2010, Thursday
Today’s Zaman
The activism of late observed in Turkish foreign policy demonstrates a clear preference for a regional approach to international relations. It has been almost a mantra for Turkey’s new foreign policy elite to promote regional actors’ ownership of economic and security affairs in their own neighborhood. Various such initiatives that Turkey has been spearheading recently in its adjacent regions, including the Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans and beyond, underscore Turkey’s emergence as a regional power willing and able to assume leadership roles in those regions. Turkey has been pursuing customs and visa liberalization with many of its neighbors, while initiating strategic cooperation councils with others. Similar to Turkey’s initiation of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in the 1990s, Turkey has also launched a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Complementing these efforts are various other bilateral or trilateral processes under its patronage, such as the ones between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, or between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
These regional cooperation schemes are driven by a unique mix of principled and instrumental reasons. On the one hand, by forging closer economic and political ties among regional actors and providing a venue for the exchange of opinions between rival forces, Turkey hopes to promote interdependence, hence the formation of peaceful regional orders, as an end in itself. In that sense, Turkey can be seen as acting as a “good international citizen,” seeking to project a progressive, liberal internationalist outlook in its own neighborhood. Perhaps, Ahmet Davutoğlu’s depiction of Turkey as an “order instituting” power — though some find this term implies imperialistic tendencies, as reflected in the notorious debate on neo-Ottomanism — summarizes well Turkey’s desire to foster peaceful neighborhoods.
On the other hand, Turkey definitely has some self-interested reasons to invest in these sometimes costly projects, as the eventual rise of peaceful neighborhoods is likely to create a belt of stability surrounding Turkey, thus boosting its own security. Moreover, this new approach to regional affairs, equipped with soft power instruments, can reduce the anxiety of other actors, thus facilitating Turkey’s penetration into new areas in pursuit of commercial and political interests. It is, therefore, no wonder that the Turkish business community is also actively supporting the new cooperation schemes initiated by the government, as they are the most immediate benefactors of the new “trade and economic development promote peace” approach.
A recent case to show the contours of this new approach is Turkey’s efforts to form a platform to aid the stabilization and recovery of Afghanistan in the wake of the decades-old civil war and a devastating foreign intervention. In addition to various other contributions it has made towards the stabilization of Afghanistan, Turkey also initiated the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA). The fourth meeting of RECCA, co-chaired by Davutoğlu and his Afghan counterpart, Zalmai Rassoul, was held in İstanbul on Nov. 3, bringing together officials from neighboring countries as well as representatives from international organizations. On the sidelines of the conference, a business forum organized by the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK), and an academic forum organized by the Foreign Ministry and Boğaziçi University, also took place, underscoring the multidimensionality of Turkey’s new approach.
The RECCA idea follows on Turkey’s accumulated experience from the platform of countries neighboring Iraq, which has played a critical role by forestalling the involvement of regional countries in Iraqi domestic affairs to capitalize opportunistically on the internal weaknesses of the country in the transition period. As such, regional actors’ coordination of their policies, though to a limited extent, has played a substantial role in dampening the tensions in the Middle East, and preventing further destabilization of Iraq and the region.
Afghanistan’s challenges and prospects
The discussions taking place at the RECCA academic platform, which I also attended, highlighted the challenges as well as the prospects of the regional approach to Afghanistan. The RECCA process has yet to produce concrete outcomes, but even the clear expression of support and commitment from Afghanistan’s neighbors to regional cooperation model as the best way to ensure Afghanistan’s economic development and political stabilization can be considered as a substantial achievement.
If the neighbors get together around the same table to discuss their possible contributions and coordinated action, instead of jockeying for power, in Afghanistan, Turkey deserves some credit. If the idea of regional ownership takes hold in this volatile corner of the world and trust among the neighboring countries can be established, it might offer the best way to tackle the many destabilizing forces that are all trans-boundary and require regional responses, such as terrorism, drug and human trafficking and organized crime. Such a regional approach can also facilitate the undertaking of massive investments needed to build transportation infrastructure and health and education facilities, as well as (re)building a functioning government apparatus. Especially promising is the prospect of constructing roads, railways and pipelines traversing Afghanistan so that it emerges as a transportation hub to facilitate the free flow of minerals, goods and people both in East-West and North-South directions.
A major challenge before this rather optimistic vision, however, is the poor condition of the existing regional institutional architecture, both in terms of physical infrastructure and legal regulations. Turkey has been single-handedly advocating this project, yet it is unclear if other regional countries do share the same degree of enthusiasm and commitment to sustain it, short of Turkey’s contributions. The countries in the region have lagged behind other parts of the world that have come a long way towards setting up effective regional organizations. In an environment where many of the regional countries are beset with political and economic crises of their own, there are grounds to maintain skepticism towards the prospects of a regional approach. Therefore, outside involvement from the international community seems necessary to maintain the momentum.
At this juncture, there emerges yet another major challenge before the regional cooperation approach to Afghanistan: What role outside players, or the international community, should be allowed to play. Ideally, one might argue that outside actors could play constructive roles by bringing in valuable technical expertise or financial resources to build functioning regional institutional mechanisms and ease Afghanistan’s socioeconomic restructuring. Despite the bad reputation of foreign involvement, which in many ways is responsible for the current standing of this country, the current Afghan government wants to see the continuation of foreign involvement, including that of the US. In the Afghan view, which is also shared by Turkey in principle, regional cooperation should proceed in tandem with the assistance of the international community. Other actors, especially Iran, are rather eager to approach regional cooperation from an exclusivist point of view, seeking to reserve the management of regional security and stability to regional actors exclusively and confine the involvement of the international community to the provision of development assistance only. This is part of Iran’s power play, in which it works to end the penetration of the US in its immediate periphery to the extent possible, as in its advocating of a similar position in the Persian Gulf.
This is a dispute Turkey definitely does not want to take part in, but it will have to confront those questions increasingly, as the regional emphasis in its foreign policy gains pace. Turkey will come under pressure to weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing its regional approach on the basis of regional exclusivity or greater harmonization with the international community.
Taner Akçam, Associate Professor of History at Clark University (Worcester, MA) and the “prince charming” of the Armenian lobby, got himself trapped in contradictions on interpreting the results of Turkey’s recent (September 12) referendum on Constitutional changes. He inadvertently brought to surface some unsavory aspects of his past. Akçam’s younger brother, Cahit Akçam, used the occasion to mock the elder brother and charged him with betrayal.
taner akcam
Taner Akçam is an occasional contributor to Turkey’s Taraf, an off-base newspaper that is a staunch supporter of Turkey’s AKP (AK Party, Justice and Development Party). Rumored to be funded by the USA-based Gülen movement, and according to some also by the CIA, it is staffed largely by ex-liberal socialists that are now far to the right. Cahit Akçam is a columnist at Turkey’s left-leaning Birgün newspaper. The AKP is Turkey’s Islamic-rooted ruling party.
What got Taner Akçam into trouble was an op-ed he wrote in Taraf titled “Seeking Milosevic” that attacked Birgün. He took issue with Birgün’sheadline news that the referendum had confirmed the 60% right-wing and 40% left-wing split in the country, and that the nationalist conservative votes had consolidated at the AKP. In what was a victory for the AKP, the referendum passed by a margin of 58%.
By drawing an analogy between Birgün and Slobodan Milosevic of ex-Yugoslavia, Akçam implicitly accused the newspaper of supporting nationalistic, racist and genocidal sentiments.
Neighborhood concept
Taner Akçam couldn’t accept Birgün’s view that the 40% of the referendum voters, that had voted “no,” were really left-wing. Noting that mass-killer Slobodan Milosevic, while called a communist and a socialist, had done horrible things, he argued that likewise in Turkey those who voted “no” couldn’t be called true socialists. The naysayers were the main opposition party CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the military-bureaucracy faction. The latter had organized and defended military coups in Turkey, he argued.
According to Akçam, labeling these groups “socialists,” as Birgün did, stemmed from a hatred of the AKP. Akçam called the 40% the “bourgeois group.” He maintained that this hatred is best explained through the “neighborhood” metaphor.
In Akçam’s view, Turkey is founded on “our” and “other” neighborhoods. The first neighborhood is one of “city people” that includes bureaucrats, the military, and the like. The CHP and the Ottoman-era İttihat ve Terakki Partisi (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) are included in this group.
The “other” neighborhood comprises artisans and peasants that have strong religious identities. This neighborhood is now expanding and encroaching on the “city people” neighborhood.
Akçam sees himself in the “city people” neighborhood, which he calls “ours.”
Contradiction and myopia
But by doing so, Akçam fell into a gasping contradiction, because this is also the group that he labeled “bourgeoisie.” How could someone, with a well-known Marxist background, and calling himself a socialist, be part of the bourgeois group? (Separate from his self-confessed connection to the terrorist PKK organization during 1981-84, Akçam escaped from Turkish prison in 1977 after having been convicted of left-wing terrorist activities aimed at, among others, NATO military and American personnel).
Surprisingly enough, Akçam supports the “other” neighborhood – the conservative, Islamic group solidly backed by Taraf. This is because he thinks this group has strong democratic credentials.
It doesn’t take a professor’s prescience to know that such an argument is plain vacuous.
With the AKP in control – political lords of the 60% group – Turkey today is far removed from democracy – the illegal wiretappings, indefinite detentions and imprisonment of the opponents (including 47 journalists) of the government, an atmosphere of fear permeating the country, mandatory religious education, widespread penetration of Gülenist elements in the state apparatus, in particular the police, appalling inequality between men and women, systematic efforts (re: the referendum) to bring the judiciary under the control of the government, parliamentary immunity, etc. None of these inequities seems to bother the professor.
In Turkey today the press is under siege, and by Prime Minister’s own admission, “Those that are impartial [to the AKP] should be eliminated.” There are more detainees in prison than those convicted. Many detained under the so-called “Ergenekon case” don’t even know the exact charges against them.
No scruples, and no loyalty
Akçam’s contradictions and distortions also caught the attention of his younger brother Cahit Akçam. Responding to the elder Akçam in Birgün, Cahit Akçam couldn’t hide his scorn. In a blistering, two-part rebuttal titled “Really, you are the child of which neighborhood?” he chastised his brother, and mockingly called on him to come to his senses. His article started with a quotation (and an admonition) from Anton Chekhov: “Others’ sins do not make you a saint.”
Cahit Akçam called the elder Akçam’s “our” vs. “other” neighborhood analysis, with “Marxist-smelling” questions, “light” and meaningless because it was not founded on class distinction. Neither neighborhood as described by Taner embraced the working class. Asking the rhetorical question as to how Taner could overlook the working class, the younger Akçam thought that his brother, in what appeared to be sheer hypocrisy, didn’t really care for the working class.
Continued the younger brother sarcastically: “Luckily, Taner at least didn’t ignore the bourgeois class in ‘our’ neighborhood.” He chaffed at his brother for not mentioning the bourgeois class in the “other” neighborhood, i.e., the Islamist businessmen that the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan had braggingly called “The Anatolian Tigers.”
Wondering how his brother could not know that the bourgeois class cannot exist without a working class, Cahit mocked his brother: “He is a big professor. True, not a sociology professor, but a history professor nonetheless. He has licked and swallowed a thousand times more than we have. He knows that, to be so ignorant, one does not have to be a professor. For Taner, the working class has little value.”
The elder Akçam was tersely reminded of the struggles of Turkey’s working class since 1900.
Cahit continued his criticism by making reference to a Turkish metaphor – referring to lentil meal – that this is all that the Taner could muster as an argument. Referring to Taner’s claim that all the “infamous” events in Turkey’s history emanated from “our” class, he bristled at Taner’s suggestion that the socialists, through the CHP, were like relatives to the military-bureaucracy.
He mockingly called attention to the fact that the socialists had suffered immensely from the 1980 fascistic military coup.
Recalling how the elder Akçam had defended the causes of right-wing, fascist elements in Turkey’s recent history, how he had failed to come to the defense of socialists who had been falsely accused of coup attempts, his denialist past, and how he had let down even his own family, the younger Akçam weighed in angrily: “How can Taner accuse his old friends, and even his own brother, as potential perpetrators of genocide?”
Barely concealing his disdain, Cahit asked of his brother: “As you place the blame on your own neighborhood, can there be a more harrowing psychological ruin [for you]? … Where is your heart, and your conscience?”
The ultimate indignity came when the younger Akçam concluded that only someone who was politically and ideologically blind, and someone who had lost his scruples and his sense of loyalty, could do what his brother had done.
In the background of such emotional outburst was the fact that, while Taner Akçam jumped the prison in 1977 into the safety of Germany and escaped the tribulations of the 1980 military coup, in the coup’s aftermath his brother was put on trial for unauthorized activities, faced death by hanging, and was imprisoned for 8 years. Obviously, a lecture on fascism and the struggles of socialists was the last thing the younger Akçam wanted to hear from a sibling he considered unscruppled and untrustworthy.
A revisionist professor
There was more to Akçam’s false accusations. He twisted history and put finger on “our neighborhood’ as the perpetrator of the May 27 (1960), March 12 (1971) and – obliquely – September 12 (1980) military interventions in Turkey. Evidently to hide his own past, and the embarrassment therewith, in his accounting he glossed over the 1980 military coup and the events (including his role) that preceded it.
He dallied further into the past and noted that his “neighborhood” was also responsible for the so-called “Armenian genocide” and the Dersim events (1937).
But he was quick to disown any blame – a point that also drew ridicule from the younger Akçam. Instead, Taner Akçam conveniently placed the blame on “our administrators.” Socialists like him, while closely affiliated with the administrators, had deep disagreements with them. It was all the fault of the administrators, not the socialists like him, he argued.
Nice scapegoat, these administrators were! All that exonerated Akçam and made him squeaky clean!
As to why “we socialists” never faced up to the criminal acts in Turkish history, Akçam argued that animosity toward the “other” neighborhood was far more important than facing up to criminal acts. “Our culture was such that we [preferred to] blame the Armenians for cooperating with the imperialists while we were fighting our war of independence, and the Dersimians represented a backward and feudal system.”
Then Akçam made his grandstand by calling on “our” neighborhood to face up to its crimes.
In such argumentation Akçam conveniently dismissed the criminality of the Armenian gangs in the massacre of more than a half-million Moslems, the fatal blow that the Armenian rebellion had inflicted on the fighting ability of the Ottoman armies in wartime, and ignored the fact the Dersim episode was instigated by reactionary feudal lords that had conspired against the young Turkish republic.
Akçam also chose not to mention the bloody 1993 Madimak episode in the Anatolian city of Sivas. A crowd of fanatic Islamists (from the “other” neighborhood), amid chants of “Allah-ü Ekber,” set fire to a hotel where a group of left-leaning intellectuals had assembled. In the ensuing mayhem 37 artists and writers lost their lives.
Akçam’s analysis of past events is the hallmark of an academician who follows a one-track, necessarily biased, approach to historical events.
In his call to confront one’s criminal history, Akçam should turn the tables and first ask the Armenians and “other” neighborhood to confront their criminality. Why, for example, are the Armenian archives in Yerevan and Boston closed while all Turkish ones open? What are the Armenians hiding?
And when will the likes of the “Madimak crowd” see the light of Enlightenment?
Summing it up
The Taraf-Birgün episode raised the specter of a history professor who, by the reckoning of his own brother, was long in false accusations but short in scruples and trustworthiness. The episode also caught the professor in contradictions and brought to light his biased, one-track approach to traumatic events in Turkish history in the past 100 years.
Will all this make any difference as regards Akçam’s credibility as a scholar for the Armenian money masters who sponsor his academic career – like the Zoryan Institute and the Cafesjian Family Foundation when Akçam was at the University of Minnesota, and now the Arams, the Kaloosdians and the Mugars at Clark University? Considering that the professor’s criminal past has so far made no difference, the answer must be a firm “no.” Obviously, the professor is serving a useful – in fact very useful – purpose for the Armenian lobby.
It must be a wondrous world when the “golden” Armenian coffers can sustain an academic chair in history when, as in Akçam’s case, the holder of that chair happens to have his degree in sociology.
In fact, we should not be too surprised if the spinmasters of the Armenian lobby call on their “prince charming” to come to the aid of the Armenian mob charged last month with the largest Medicare fraud in U.S. history. Could the professor argue that the mob job was actually the “dirty work” of the Turks? Never say “no.”
To rephrase his brother’s question, in which “neighborhood” does Taner Akçam stand when it comes to truth?
Surely, the professor must be able to answer that question himself without help from his old-time mentor, Professor Vahakn Dadrian.
A deeper question is, why Akçam-the-professor would write in a newspaper such as Taraf which has a reputationof acting as a rogue agent of the government on unsubstantiated allegations relating to the opposition, and whose executive editor, Ahmet Altan, in his own words, would be willing to sell out his country “for a woman’s breast and the shade of a cherry tree.” …. But that would be a different story.
Addendum: The above article was first submitted (as an exception) to “Armenian Genocide Resource Center,” . Initially, the host welcomed the article and published it as an “exclusive” on its website. Half a day later the post was mysteriously removed from the website. Query as to why it was removed elicited no satisfactory response.
The history of the arrow and bow of the Turks stretches back to very distand times. In the legend of Oguz Khagan we see it taking its place either as a means of war or as a symbolic element.In Central Asia the arrow and bow, together with the sword, whether in hunting or wars was a most important weapon. The sword was used as the close range weapon and the arrow and bow as the long range weapon.
Seljuks have opened the doors of Anatolia to Turks. It was the skill of Seljuk mounted archers that brought them to their destiny. The historians of that era described them as an highly effective, moving force with the long-ranged weaponry. They were hesitating to “impact” the enemy and to get into close quarter fighting. What they preferred was a lightning-fast “attack and retreat” strategy based on horseback archery skills. Their shorter recurved bows were easier to handle on horseback and gave the warriors great flexibility.
Turkey and Mongolia held their sixth Joint Economic Commission (JEC) meeting in Ulaanbaatar on October 26. Deputy Prime Minister, Bulent Arinc, headed the Turkish delegation, and Mongolia’s Environment and Tourism Minister, Luimed Gansukh, signed a memorandum of understanding to boost economic and commercial relations. Related protocols also signed during Arinc’s four-day trip concerned an exchange of experience between KOSGEB (Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization) and its Mongolian counterpart, and cooperation between the Turkish State Planning Organization and Mongolia’s planning unit on development (Anadolu Ajansi, October 26; www.kosgeb.gov.tr, October 27).
Turkey established diplomatic relations with Mongolia in 1967. As a corollary of Ankara’s growing interest in Central Asia following the independence of the Turkic republics, Mongolia also started to attract Ankara’s attention. The two countries signed a trade, economic and technical cooperation agreement in May 1992, which also initiated the JEC, and heralded a wave of other agreements to follow in subsequent years (www.tika.gov.tr, Mongolia Country Report, July 2005). Turkey set up its permanent diplomatic mission in Ulaanbaatar in 1996, while Mongolia opened its representation in Ankara in 1997. Through various agreements, Turkey stepped in to share the experience it accumulated in free market economics with Mongolia, which was seeking to move away from a socialist economy, and facilitate the latter’s integration into the world economy. Ankara specifically concentrated its assistance on the creation of basic economic and administrative infrastructure and the emergence of small and medium scale companies in a free market economy.
Although Mongolia joined the World Trade Organization in 1997, its overall foreign trade volume remains low. Its exports are largely in minerals, leather and textiles, while it imports machinery and fossil fuels. Trade relations between Turkey and Mongolia also remained very limited, largely due to distance, and lack of direct transportation routes. The bilateral trade volume reached $14 million in 2008, while it dropped to $5.5 million in 2009 after the global financial crisis. There is an enormous trade imbalance in Turkey’s favor (www.mfa.gov.tr). While Turkey exports processed food, machinery and soap, it imports some animal products. Turkish investments and construction operations in the country have also remained at negligible levels. Various Turkish trade associations, seeking to expand Turkish business opportunities in Mongolia, had urged Turkish firms to invest in energy, natural resources, agriculture, telecommunications, construction and tourism (www.btso.org.tr, May 4, 2005).
During Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s historic visit to Ulaanbaatar in July 2005, the first prime ministerial visit since the establishment of diplomatic ties, both parties issued a joint declaration to boost bilateral cooperation. The Turkish Eximbank offered a $20 million credit to Mongolia, an issue which had been lingering for some time (www.ankara.mfat.gov.mn, July 19, 2005).
Although this visit and subsequent JEC’s increased Turkey’s assistance to Mongolia’s economic transformation, such calls overall failed to prompt Turkish businessmen to invest in Mongolia. The Turkish-Mongolian Business Council, organizing a meeting in Istanbul ahead of Arinc’s trip, stressed the low volume of Turkish investment. The council pointed to the growth potential of Mongolia in the future, and called on Ankara not to fall behind Chinese, Russian and Western companies that increasingly invest in the untapped natural resources of this country (www.deik.org.tr, October 7).
Unlike the poor standing of their economic ties, Turkey and Mongolia had close political relations, as was reflected in a myriad of bilateral agreements and mutual visits. Mongolia became one of the major recipients of development assistance, provided by Turkey’s official agency, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA). Since 1994, TIKA has carried out various educational, social and cultural programs in Mongolia, and opened a coordination office in 2005. TIKA projects focused on the improvement of Mongolia’s administrative infrastructure, training of bureaucrats and security personnel, developing statistics and accounting practices, among other initiatives (www.tika.gov.tr, July 2005).
TIKA has also run a project since 1995, entitled “Turkish Monuments in Mongolia,” which emphasized the historical-cultural dimension of Turkey’s interest in this country. Mongolia hosts many historical monuments remaining from the earlier Turkish states established in Central Asia. Energized by the approaching eighth centennial celebrations of the Mongolian Empire in 2006, the Turkish government accelerated this project. Following Erdogan’s 2005 visit, Turkey has spent substantial resources on the excavation and renovation of many Turkic and Mongol monuments. Moreover, in recent years Turkey has funded the construction of roads to enable access to those historical sites. Perhaps, this historical significance of the country and the linguistic affinity explain Turkey’s political interest in Mongolia, incommensurate with the extent of their economic ties. The Turkish foreign ministry also acknowledges the role played by shared the cultural background in facilitating political ties (www.mfa.gov.tr).
Similarly, Turkey has provided scholarships to many Mongolian students to enable them to study at Turkish universities and military academies. Various private Turkish-Mongolian schools also offer education up to high school level in Mongolia, while Turkology departments have been opened in some Mongolian universities. The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs offers scholarships to Muslim Mongolian citizens of Kazakh origin to receive Islamic education in Turkey. Overall, there is a lively educational and cultural exchange between the two countries.
Most Turkish analysts agree that Mongolia is a distant, yet culturally close country. Nonetheless, some Turkish analysts find Ankara’s policy towards Mongolia lacking. They portray Mongolia as a country seeking to balance the pressures from its large neighbors, namely China and Russia. They believe Turkey could serve as the virtual “third neighbor,” if it pursues correct policies. Turkish analysts further contend that the poor standing of economic relations between Turkey and Mongolia, and most importantly their inability to develop closer military cooperation, are largely due to pressures from Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing have blocked Turkey’s shipments of military equipment to Mongolia or joint exercises between the Turkish and Mongolian Special Forces. Therefore, some analysts support the Turkish government’s development assistance, educational exchange programs and cultural projects, while urging Ankara to go further and facilitate Ulaanbaatar’s efforts to play a more influential role in international organizations in order to break its encirclement. Moreover, Turkish Airlines have failed to launch direct flights to Ulaanbaatar, which would symbolically mark establishing of a direct link to Turkey (www.usak.org.tr, January 4; Turkiye, March 31).
