Turkish Energy Minister, Taner Yildiz, welcomed the recent progress in Turkey’s first nuclear power plant project that will be built by Russia and underscored Ankara’s determination to develop nuclear energy through foreign partnerships. Yildiz told reporters that Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, signed the inter-governmental agreement, which was recently ratified by both houses of the Russian parliament (Anadolu Ajansi, November 29).
After various futile efforts to issue a license for the construction of the country’s first nuclear plant in Akkuyu-Mersin on the Mediterranean coast through competitive bidding, Ankara opted for a more controversial method. Instead of an open tender, Turkey pursued a bilateral cooperation route and signed an inter-governmental agreement with Russia in May during Medvedev’s visit to Turkey (EDM, May 20). Under this agreement, Rosatom will build, own and operate the Akkuyu-Mersin plant comprising four 1,200 mega watt (MW) units. Rosatom will also raise the finances for the project and will posses 100 percent equity in the $20 billion project company undertaking the construction and operation of the plant. In the long-term, the Russian side will likely retain at least 51 percent of the company. A Turkish firm, Park Teknik, and the Turkish state electricity generation company –EUAS– may take significant shares in the project, while the state company will provide the site, and the state electricity distribution company, TETAS, will buy a designated proportion of the electricity generated at a fixed price of $12.35 (www.worldnuclear.org, November 29).
Through the completion of this project and other subsequent nuclear plants, the Turkish government hopes to bolster Turkey’s energy interdependence. In the new energy strategy document published in April, Turkey vowed to reduce its heavy dependence on imported fossil fuels, through greater utilization of Turkey’s renewable resources and nuclear energy. The construction of the first plant is expected to begin by 2014 and 5 percent of Turkey’s total electricity consumption will come from nuclear plants by 2023 (EDM, April 29).
Eager to see the construction work start, the Turkish government finalized the ratification process for the inter-governmental agreement this summer. However, the debates in the Turkish parliament reflect how the government’s energy policies and nuclear policy continue to evoke criticism from opposition parties. Representatives from the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), junior opposition Nationalist Action Party and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party criticized the government for failing to protect Turkish interests. Overall, they maintained that under the current agreement, Turkey would be unable to receive nuclear technology transfers and will remain a sole consumer of “Russian” electricity produced on Turkish soil. CHP representatives went as far as accusing the government of “betraying the country and insulting the Turkish nation… [succumbing to Russian plans]” (Anadolu Ajansi, July 15). Thanks to its majority, the government managed to secure the ratification of the agreement in parliament.
Speaking of Medvedev’s approval of the agreement, Yildiz noted that it will accelerate the work on the project. Yildiz expects to meet Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Sechin, in Istanbul in mid-December to discuss the details related to forming the project company. Once those issues are resolved, Yildiz expects the project to proceed at a much smoother pace and overcome licensing issues, and obtain permission for the construction to commence (Cihan, November 29).
Ankara believes that from its partnership with Moscow, it will also receive help in developing its own nuclear technological know-how and infrastructure. Unlike its critics, the government believes that foreign partnerships will not hinder this objective. For instance, responding to questions in parliament, Yildiz referred to the experience of South Korea, noting that while that country relied upon imports to start building its nuclear plants in the 1970’s, it is now one of the countries which has developed its own nuclear technology.
Perhaps, in appreciation of the South Korean success story, Ankara held talks with the South Korean Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) over the construction of the second plant in the Black Sea coastal city of Sinop. This coincided with South Korea’s new strategy of expansion in a bid to construct nuclear plants overseas (EDM, March 24). After an optimistic start, marked by various bilateral meetings and an exchange of high level visits, it was revealed that due to conflict over prices, state purchase guarantees and the share of state ownership in the nuclear plant, the talks had broken down. Yildiz argued that Turkey had a “plan B” if it proved unable to reach an agreement with South Korea and it will remain committed to its objective of having two plants by 2023 (www.usak.org.tr, Today’s Zaman, November 10). Quite expectedly, it was announced during Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s, visit to South Korea that the talks came to an inconclusive end (Anadolu Ajansi, November 13).
After the failure of the talks with South Korea, Yildiz said that Turkey would continue its quest for a second agreement. Yildiz also ruled out the possibility that Ankara may grant the second site to Moscow. “Neither Russia, nor Turkey are considering [a second agreement],” Yildiz said. Yildiz announced that the Japanese Toshiba would be invited to Turkey for negotiations on the planned construction of the second plant. Although Tokyo has wanted to enter into such talks with Ankara for some time, the Turkish government has avoided this, “out of courtesy for the ongoing talks with South Korea,” as Yildiz put it (Anadolu Ajansi, November 15, November 25).
Nonetheless, it is instructive to note that, although no official contact with Japan on nuclear cooperation had taken place, the Turkish energy ministry and the Japanese New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization signed a letter of intent to cooperate on clean energy, energy productivity and the use of renewable energy in Ankara (Anadolu Ajansi, November 9). Therefore, the “plan B”’ Yildiz referred to was evidently the Japanese option. Turkey seems determined to consider seriously the diversification of its nuclear partnerships, by exploring, and perhaps pitting against each other, all options on the table.
The prime minister of Turkey has made a policy, indeed a habit, indeed a rather nasty, sneaky habit, of listening to the private conversations of Turkish citizens. Accordingly, he has destroyed many reputations and killed many careers, all on the basis of circumstantial and ill-gotten evidence. He has done this under the guise of protecting the nation from terrorism. To that end, hundreds of those opposed to his regime have been jailed. Many have become seriously ill from their confinement, some have died. And many more live in fear wondering about just who is the terrorist.
Now it is the prime minister’s turn. Wikileaks has lent more smoke to the fire of what has been well and widely known about the Turkish prime minister. Few aside from his most ardent supporters would quibble with the documentary descriptions of him as willful, arrogant, and harsh. And the dimensions of his newly gained wealth, and that of his loyal followers, and their children is of no surprise to anyone marginally alert and living in today’s Turkey.
One trademark of loud-mouthed bullies is that when they are confronted, physically or otherwise, they shut up. Tonight, in the face of a tidal wave of information indicating how corrupt and morally bankrupt he and his minions may be, the prime minister shut up. But his eager nation awaits and deserves a well-considered response. Perhaps when he returns from Libya after receiving the Distinguished Statesman Award from that distinguished statesman and humanitarian Moammar Gadhafi, a fellow leakee? Perhaps then the Turkish prime minister will bless the Turkish nation with his usual eloquence? Like that master of revenge, the Count of Monte Cristo, who summed up all human knowledge in three words, we “wait and hope.”
Family Relations are very close among Turks. They respect their elders and support each other in every way possible. Parents do support their children financially until they get married. When the child gets married the financial support may continue but it is expected that the new family could earn enough to take care of themselves. Children care very much about their elders. They take care of their elders and support them when they get old or sick both financially and emotionally. This close relationship is a kind of boomerang, elders support children when they are young, children support their elders when they are old..
After much anticipation and lengthy preparations, the Institute of Armenian Studies at the University of Southern California (USC) held on November 20 a successful international symposium — “The Armenian Diaspora: Elective Leadership and Worldwide Structure.”
The symposium was attended by 600 enthusiastic participants from throughout the United States, Canada, Russia, Australia, and Europe. The speakers were: Dr. Z.S. Andrew Demirdjian, Cal State University, Long Beach, “The Persuasive Power of Numbers: A Call for Political Clout”; Dr. Archalus Tcheknavorian-Asenbauer, Senior UN Advisor, Vienna, “Armenian Unity and International Politics”; Harut Sassounian, , “Proposal for a Popularly Elected Structure to Represent Diaspora Armenians”; Dr. Gaidz Minassian, Foundation for Strategic Research, Paris, “Toward a World Council of Armenians: Why, How, Who?”; Gov. George Deukmejian, “Personal Reflections of California’s First Armenian Governor”; Honorable Grigor Hovhannissian, Consul General of Armenia, Los Angeles, “Welcoming Remarks”; former U.S. Ambassador to Armenia John Evans, “Maximizing Influence in a World of Nation-States: A Challenge for the Armenian Diaspora”; journalist/author Mark Arax, Fresno, “The Power of Speaking to the Media with One Collective Voice”; Dr. Levon Marashlian, Glendale Community College, “The Necessity and Difficulty of Establishing a Diaspora Congress”; Dr. Stephan Astourian, Univ. of California, Berkeley, “The Traditional Armenian Parties and the Problem of Pan-Armenian Coordination”; Dr. R. Hrair Dekmejian, USC and Dr. Nyree Derderian, Stanford University, “Models and Modalities of Creating a Trans-Diaspora Framework,” followed by a round table discussion between the speakers and the audience.
My own remarks were an expanded version of the article I wrote nine months ago, proposing the creation of a democratically-elected structure that would represent all Armenians in the Diaspora.
I stated that a growing number of Armenians have realized that a collective effort is necessary if they are to survive as a dispersed ethnicity detached from its homeland. Beyond the need to preserve the Diaspora’s vibrancy and cultural identity, Armenians share a common quest for justice from Turkey and a firm commitment for the security and economic prosperity of the twin Republics of Armenia and Artsakh. Armenians have finally concluded that they can benefit immensely from pooling their limited resources and jointly tackling common problems facing all Diaspora communities.
As outlined in my February article, I elaborated about the framework of establishing an elected body that would legitimately represent Armenians throughout the Diaspora, except those in Armenia and Artsakh, who already reside in state structures with elected governments. Thus, for the first time in Diaspora’s history, Armenians would elect their own representatives or leaders, on the basis of one-man, one vote.
I also suggested that elections be held by Armenian communities to choose one representative for each group of 20,000 Armenians. The collective body of 350 representatives from all electoral districts throughout the Diaspora would become the entity that can legitimately claim to speak in the name of all seven millions Armenians, outside of Armenia and Artsakh. Popular elections would encourage the silent majority to get involved in community affairs. This would be a dramatic shift from the current situation where a small number of individuals work around the clock, sacrificing their time and effort, while most Armenians, who are unaffiliated with any organization remain disengaged and disinterested. Should such grassroots elections succeed, large numbers of Armenians would feel empowered and energized, having actively participated in choosing their leaders.
The academic symposium held on Nov. 20 is the first of many steps necessary before launching the ambitious initiative of creating a worldwide representative structure. A team of researchers should now explore and determine the optimum mechanisms to conduct such elections, estimate the demography of each community, establish qualifications for both voters and candidates, and recommend measures to prevent voter fraud.
Conference participants were particularly interested in hearing Dr. Minassian’s presentation of a detailed plan unanimously approved by French-Armenian organizations to hold popular elections for a representative leadership early next year. The French experience could serve as a most valuable precedent for other Diaspora communities.
It was made clear at the conference that a single electoral plan cannot be applied uniformly to all Armenian communities. Since each community lives in a unique legal and political environment, it would be necessary to devise an appropriate plan for selecting representatives in each country, in consultations with local leaders.
It was interesting to note that when Prof. Dekmejian asked the audience if they favored an elective Diaspora structure, almost everyone raised their hands, indicating enthusiastic support for establishing a united Diaspora leadership framework.
The proceedings of the symposium could be viewed on the following website:
Taner Akçam, Associate Professor of History at Clark University (Worcester, MA) and the “prince charming” of the Armenian lobby, got himself trapped in contradictions on interpreting the results of Turkey’s recent (September 12) referendum on Constitutional changes. He inadvertently brought to surface some unsavory aspects of his past. Akçam’s younger brother, Cahit Akçam, used the occasion to mock the elder brother and charged him with betrayal.
taner akcam
Taner Akçam is an occasional contributor to Turkey’s Taraf, an off-base newspaper that is a staunch supporter of Turkey’s AKP (AK Party, Justice and Development Party). Rumored to be funded by the USA-based Gülen movement, and according to some also by the CIA, it is staffed largely by ex-liberal socialists that are now far to the right. Cahit Akçam is a columnist at Turkey’s left-leaning Birgün newspaper. The AKP is Turkey’s Islamic-rooted ruling party.
What got Taner Akçam into trouble was an op-ed he wrote in Taraf titled “Seeking Milosevic” that attacked Birgün. He took issue with Birgün’sheadline news that the referendum had confirmed the 60% right-wing and 40% left-wing split in the country, and that the nationalist conservative votes had consolidated at the AKP. In what was a victory for the AKP, the referendum passed by a margin of 58%.
By drawing an analogy between Birgün and Slobodan Milosevic of ex-Yugoslavia, Akçam implicitly accused the newspaper of supporting nationalistic, racist and genocidal sentiments.
Neighborhood concept
Taner Akçam couldn’t accept Birgün’s view that the 40% of the referendum voters, that had voted “no,” were really left-wing. Noting that mass-killer Slobodan Milosevic, while called a communist and a socialist, had done horrible things, he argued that likewise in Turkey those who voted “no” couldn’t be called true socialists. The naysayers were the main opposition party CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the military-bureaucracy faction. The latter had organized and defended military coups in Turkey, he argued.
According to Akçam, labeling these groups “socialists,” as Birgün did, stemmed from a hatred of the AKP. Akçam called the 40% the “bourgeois group.” He maintained that this hatred is best explained through the “neighborhood” metaphor.
In Akçam’s view, Turkey is founded on “our” and “other” neighborhoods. The first neighborhood is one of “city people” that includes bureaucrats, the military, and the like. The CHP and the Ottoman-era İttihat ve Terakki Partisi (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) are included in this group.
The “other” neighborhood comprises artisans and peasants that have strong religious identities. This neighborhood is now expanding and encroaching on the “city people” neighborhood.
Akçam sees himself in the “city people” neighborhood, which he calls “ours.”
Contradiction and myopia
But by doing so, Akçam fell into a gasping contradiction, because this is also the group that he labeled “bourgeoisie.” How could someone, with a well-known Marxist background, and calling himself a socialist, be part of the bourgeois group? (Separate from his self-confessed connection to the terrorist PKK organization during 1981-84, Akçam escaped from Turkish prison in 1977 after having been convicted of left-wing terrorist activities aimed at, among others, NATO military and American personnel).
Surprisingly enough, Akçam supports the “other” neighborhood – the conservative, Islamic group solidly backed by Taraf. This is because he thinks this group has strong democratic credentials.
It doesn’t take a professor’s prescience to know that such an argument is plain vacuous.
With the AKP in control – political lords of the 60% group – Turkey today is far removed from democracy – the illegal wiretappings, indefinite detentions and imprisonment of the opponents (including 47 journalists) of the government, an atmosphere of fear permeating the country, mandatory religious education, widespread penetration of Gülenist elements in the state apparatus, in particular the police, appalling inequality between men and women, systematic efforts (re: the referendum) to bring the judiciary under the control of the government, parliamentary immunity, etc. None of these inequities seems to bother the professor.
In Turkey today the press is under siege, and by Prime Minister’s own admission, “Those that are impartial [to the AKP] should be eliminated.” There are more detainees in prison than those convicted. Many detained under the so-called “Ergenekon case” don’t even know the exact charges against them.
No scruples, and no loyalty
Akçam’s contradictions and distortions also caught the attention of his younger brother Cahit Akçam. Responding to the elder Akçam in Birgün, Cahit Akçam couldn’t hide his scorn. In a blistering, two-part rebuttal titled “Really, you are the child of which neighborhood?” he chastised his brother, and mockingly called on him to come to his senses. His article started with a quotation (and an admonition) from Anton Chekhov: “Others’ sins do not make you a saint.”
Cahit Akçam called the elder Akçam’s “our” vs. “other” neighborhood analysis, with “Marxist-smelling” questions, “light” and meaningless because it was not founded on class distinction. Neither neighborhood as described by Taner embraced the working class. Asking the rhetorical question as to how Taner could overlook the working class, the younger Akçam thought that his brother, in what appeared to be sheer hypocrisy, didn’t really care for the working class.
Continued the younger brother sarcastically: “Luckily, Taner at least didn’t ignore the bourgeois class in ‘our’ neighborhood.” He chaffed at his brother for not mentioning the bourgeois class in the “other” neighborhood, i.e., the Islamist businessmen that the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan had braggingly called “The Anatolian Tigers.”
Wondering how his brother could not know that the bourgeois class cannot exist without a working class, Cahit mocked his brother: “He is a big professor. True, not a sociology professor, but a history professor nonetheless. He has licked and swallowed a thousand times more than we have. He knows that, to be so ignorant, one does not have to be a professor. For Taner, the working class has little value.”
The elder Akçam was tersely reminded of the struggles of Turkey’s working class since 1900.
Cahit continued his criticism by making reference to a Turkish metaphor – referring to lentil meal – that this is all that the Taner could muster as an argument. Referring to Taner’s claim that all the “infamous” events in Turkey’s history emanated from “our” class, he bristled at Taner’s suggestion that the socialists, through the CHP, were like relatives to the military-bureaucracy.
He mockingly called attention to the fact that the socialists had suffered immensely from the 1980 fascistic military coup.
Recalling how the elder Akçam had defended the causes of right-wing, fascist elements in Turkey’s recent history, how he had failed to come to the defense of socialists who had been falsely accused of coup attempts, his denialist past, and how he had let down even his own family, the younger Akçam weighed in angrily: “How can Taner accuse his old friends, and even his own brother, as potential perpetrators of genocide?”
Barely concealing his disdain, Cahit asked of his brother: “As you place the blame on your own neighborhood, can there be a more harrowing psychological ruin [for you]? … Where is your heart, and your conscience?”
The ultimate indignity came when the younger Akçam concluded that only someone who was politically and ideologically blind, and someone who had lost his scruples and his sense of loyalty, could do what his brother had done.
In the background of such emotional outburst was the fact that, while Taner Akçam jumped the prison in 1977 into the safety of Germany and escaped the tribulations of the 1980 military coup, in the coup’s aftermath his brother was put on trial for unauthorized activities, faced death by hanging, and was imprisoned for 8 years. Obviously, a lecture on fascism and the struggles of socialists was the last thing the younger Akçam wanted to hear from a sibling he considered unscruppled and untrustworthy.
A revisionist professor
There was more to Akçam’s false accusations. He twisted history and put finger on “our neighborhood’ as the perpetrator of the May 27 (1960), March 12 (1971) and – obliquely – September 12 (1980) military interventions in Turkey. Evidently to hide his own past, and the embarrassment therewith, in his accounting he glossed over the 1980 military coup and the events (including his role) that preceded it.
He dallied further into the past and noted that his “neighborhood” was also responsible for the so-called “Armenian genocide” and the Dersim events (1937).
But he was quick to disown any blame – a point that also drew ridicule from the younger Akçam. Instead, Taner Akçam conveniently placed the blame on “our administrators.” Socialists like him, while closely affiliated with the administrators, had deep disagreements with them. It was all the fault of the administrators, not the socialists like him, he argued.
Nice scapegoat, these administrators were! All that exonerated Akçam and made him squeaky clean!
As to why “we socialists” never faced up to the criminal acts in Turkish history, Akçam argued that animosity toward the “other” neighborhood was far more important than facing up to criminal acts. “Our culture was such that we [preferred to] blame the Armenians for cooperating with the imperialists while we were fighting our war of independence, and the Dersimians represented a backward and feudal system.”
Then Akçam made his grandstand by calling on “our” neighborhood to face up to its crimes.
In such argumentation Akçam conveniently dismissed the criminality of the Armenian gangs in the massacre of more than a half-million Moslems, the fatal blow that the Armenian rebellion had inflicted on the fighting ability of the Ottoman armies in wartime, and ignored the fact the Dersim episode was instigated by reactionary feudal lords that had conspired against the young Turkish republic.
Akçam also chose not to mention the bloody 1993 Madimak episode in the Anatolian city of Sivas. A crowd of fanatic Islamists (from the “other” neighborhood), amid chants of “Allah-ü Ekber,” set fire to a hotel where a group of left-leaning intellectuals had assembled. In the ensuing mayhem 37 artists and writers lost their lives.
Akçam’s analysis of past events is the hallmark of an academician who follows a one-track, necessarily biased, approach to historical events.
In his call to confront one’s criminal history, Akçam should turn the tables and first ask the Armenians and “other” neighborhood to confront their criminality. Why, for example, are the Armenian archives in Yerevan and Boston closed while all Turkish ones open? What are the Armenians hiding?
And when will the likes of the “Madimak crowd” see the light of Enlightenment?
Summing it up
The Taraf-Birgün episode raised the specter of a history professor who, by the reckoning of his own brother, was long in false accusations but short in scruples and trustworthiness. The episode also caught the professor in contradictions and brought to light his biased, one-track approach to traumatic events in Turkish history in the past 100 years.
Will all this make any difference as regards Akçam’s credibility as a scholar for the Armenian money masters who sponsor his academic career – like the Zoryan Institute and the Cafesjian Family Foundation when Akçam was at the University of Minnesota, and now the Arams, the Kaloosdians and the Mugars at Clark University? Considering that the professor’s criminal past has so far made no difference, the answer must be a firm “no.” Obviously, the professor is serving a useful – in fact very useful – purpose for the Armenian lobby.
It must be a wondrous world when the “golden” Armenian coffers can sustain an academic chair in history when, as in Akçam’s case, the holder of that chair happens to have his degree in sociology.
In fact, we should not be too surprised if the spinmasters of the Armenian lobby call on their “prince charming” to come to the aid of the Armenian mob charged last month with the largest Medicare fraud in U.S. history. Could the professor argue that the mob job was actually the “dirty work” of the Turks? Never say “no.”
To rephrase his brother’s question, in which “neighborhood” does Taner Akçam stand when it comes to truth?
Surely, the professor must be able to answer that question himself without help from his old-time mentor, Professor Vahakn Dadrian.
A deeper question is, why Akçam-the-professor would write in a newspaper such as Taraf which has a reputationof acting as a rogue agent of the government on unsubstantiated allegations relating to the opposition, and whose executive editor, Ahmet Altan, in his own words, would be willing to sell out his country “for a woman’s breast and the shade of a cherry tree.” …. But that would be a different story.
Addendum: The above article was first submitted (as an exception) to “Armenian Genocide Resource Center,” . Initially, the host welcomed the article and published it as an “exclusive” on its website. Half a day later the post was mysteriously removed from the website. Query as to why it was removed elicited no satisfactory response.
In a highly informative book, “Children of Armenia: A Forgotten Genocide and Century-long Struggle for Justice,” Michael Bobelian has exposed important, but little known facts about the long history of attempts to get the Armenian Genocide recognized by the United States.
One of Bobelian’s more notable revelations is the apparent contradiction between Vice President George H. W. Bush senior’s promise to the Armenian-American community to acknowledge the Genocide after he is elected President and his administration’s agreement with Turkey to block such an acknowledgment.
While running for President in 1988, Vice President George Bush issued the following statement: “The United States must acknowledge the attempted genocide of the Armenian people in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, based on the testimony of survivors, scholars, and indeed our own representatives at the time, if we are to ensure that such horrors are not repeated.” Bush is the only Vice President who has made such a pledge on the Armenian Genocide.
After assuming the presidency in January 1989, however, Pres. Bush ignored his commitment on the Armenian Genocide, and actively tried to persuade the U.S. Congress not to recognize it. Within months of his election, Bush wrote to Senators Bob Dole and George Mitchell, and Congressmen Tom Foley, Richard Michel, Richard Gephardt, Janet Mullins, and Richard Lehman, informing them of his opposition to the pending congressional resolution on the Armenian Genocide.
On April 20, 1990, Pres. Bush issued his only “Presidential Message” on the occasion of “Armenian Remembrance Day,” without, however, using the term “Armenian Genocide.” He spoke about “…the terrible massacres suffered in 1915-1923 at the hands of the rulers of the Ottoman Empire. The United States responded to the victims of the crime against humanity by leading international diplomatic and private relief efforts…. On this 75th anniversary of the massacres, I wish to join with Armenians and all peoples in observing April 24, 1990 as a day of remembrance for the more than a million Armenian people who were victims. I call upon all peoples to work to prevent future acts of inhumanity against mankind, and my comments of June 1988 represent the depth of my feeling for the Armenian people and the sufferings they have endured.”
Over the years, analysts have offered different explanations as to why recent U.S. Presidents (except for Ronald Reagan) have not kept their promises to recognize the Armenian Genocide. Bobelian revealed that in 1987, a year before Vice President Bush made his promise to the Armenian-American community, the United States and Turkey had signed an extensive military and economic agreement, according to which the American government pledged to oppose any “inappropriate actions,” such as the pending congressional resolution on the Armenian Genocide.
During the official signing ceremony held at the State Department on March 16, 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz and Turkish Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoglu exchanged letters extending through December 1990 the bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement that had been in effect since March 29, 1980. According to this agreement, the United States made a commitment to provide high levels of military and economic support for Turkey. More significantly, Washington agreed to “vigorously oppose inappropriate actions which would be harmful to healthy U.S.-Turkish relations, to U.S.-Turkish military cooperation or to our efforts to provide security assistance to Turkey based on the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces.”
When the 1980 agreement expired in 1985, the Turkish government cleverly dragged out the negotiations for its extension, while escalating its demands from the United States. After a series of diplomatic exchanges that lasted two full years, the Turkish side succeeded in extracting more and more concessions from the U.S., including the commitment to block congressional resolutions on the Armenian Genocide.
Vice President Bush must have known in 1988, when he made his deceptive promise on the Armenian Genocide, that the United States government had already signed an agreement with Turkey in 1987, pledging to “vigorously oppose inappropriate actions” that would damage U.S.-Turkish relations.
After Pres. Reagan’s Proclamation of April 22, 1981 and the two House resolutions adopted in 1975 and 1984 acknowledging the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish government had good reason to insist on language in the 1987 agreement to block any further acknowledgments of the Armenian Genocide.
The Turkish scheme worked! Breaking his pledge to the Armenian community, Pres. Bush successfully lobbied the Senate in 1990 to prevent the passage of a resolution on the Armenian Genocide.
