Category: Authors

  • Taner Akçam, amid contradictions and charges of betrayal, loses credibility

    Taner Akçam, amid contradictions and charges of betrayal, loses credibility

    By Ferruh Demirmen, Ph.D.

    Taner Akçam, Associate Professor of History at Clark University (Worcester, MA) and the “prince charming” of the Armenian lobby, got himself trapped in contradictions on interpreting the results of Turkey’s recent (September 12) referendum on Constitutional changes. He inadvertently brought to surface some unsavory aspects of his past. Akçam’s younger brother, Cahit Akçam, used the occasion to mock the elder brother and charged him with betrayal.

    taner akcam
    taner akcam

    Taner Akçam is an occasional contributor to Turkey’s Taraf, an off-base newspaper that is a staunch supporter of Turkey’s AKP (AK Party, Justice and Development Party). Rumored to be funded by the USA-based Gülen movement, and according to some also by the CIA, it is staffed largely by ex-liberal socialists that are now far to the right. Cahit Akçam is a columnist at Turkey’s left-leaning Birgün newspaper. The AKP is Turkey’s Islamic-rooted ruling party.

    What got Taner Akçam into trouble was an op-ed he wrote in Taraf titled “Seeking Milosevic” that attacked Birgün. He took issue with Birgün’s headline news that the referendum had confirmed the 60% right-wing and 40% left-wing split in the country, and that the nationalist conservative votes had consolidated at the AKP. In what was a victory for the AKP, the referendum passed by a margin of 58%.

    By drawing an analogy between Birgün and Slobodan Milosevic of ex-Yugoslavia, Akçam implicitly accused the newspaper of supporting nationalistic, racist and genocidal sentiments.

    Neighborhood concept

    Taner Akçam couldn’t accept Birgün’s view that the 40% of the referendum voters, that had voted “no,” were really left-wing. Noting that mass-killer Slobodan Milosevic, while called a communist and a socialist, had done horrible things, he argued that likewise in Turkey those who voted “no” couldn’t be called true socialists. The naysayers were the main opposition party CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the military-bureaucracy faction. The latter had organized and defended military coups in Turkey, he argued.

    According to Akçam, labeling these groups “socialists,” as Birgün did, stemmed from a hatred of the AKP. Akçam called the 40% the “bourgeois group.” He maintained that this hatred is best explained through the “neighborhood” metaphor.

    In Akçam’s view, Turkey is founded on “our” and “other” neighborhoods. The first neighborhood is one of “city people” that includes bureaucrats, the military, and the like. The CHP and the Ottoman-era İttihat ve Terakki Partisi (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) are included in this group.

    The “other” neighborhood comprises artisans and peasants that have strong religious identities. This neighborhood is now expanding and encroaching on the “city people” neighborhood.

    Akçam sees himself in the “city people” neighborhood, which he calls “ours.”

    Contradiction and myopia

    But by doing so, Akçam fell into a gasping contradiction, because this is also the group that he labeled “bourgeoisie.” How could someone, with a well-known Marxist background, and calling himself a socialist, be part of the bourgeois group? (Separate from his self-confessed connection to the terrorist PKK organization during 1981-84, Akçam escaped from Turkish prison in 1977 after having been convicted of left-wing terrorist activities aimed at, among others, NATO military and American personnel).

    Surprisingly enough, Akçam supports the “other” neighborhood – the conservative, Islamic group solidly backed by Taraf. This is because he thinks this group has strong democratic credentials.

    It doesn’t take a professor’s prescience to know that such an argument is plain vacuous.

    With the AKP in control – political lords of the 60% group – Turkey today is far removed from democracy – the illegal wiretappings, indefinite detentions and imprisonment of the opponents (including 47 journalists) of the government, an atmosphere of fear permeating the country, mandatory religious education, widespread penetration of Gülenist elements in the state apparatus, in particular the police, appalling inequality between men and women, systematic efforts (re: the referendum) to bring the judiciary under the control of the government, parliamentary immunity, etc. None of these inequities seems to bother the professor.

    In Turkey today the press is under siege, and by Prime Minister’s own admission, “Those that are impartial [to the AKP] should be eliminated.” There are more detainees in prison than those convicted. Many detained under the so-called “Ergenekon case” don’t even know the exact charges against them.

    No scruples, and no loyalty

    Akçam’s contradictions and distortions also caught the attention of his younger brother Cahit Akçam. Responding to the elder Akçam in Birgün, Cahit Akçam couldn’t hide his scorn. In a blistering, two-part rebuttal titled “Really, you are the child of which neighborhood?” he chastised his brother, and mockingly called on him to come to his senses. His article started with a quotation (and an admonition) from Anton Chekhov: “Others’ sins do not make you a saint.”

    Cahit Akçam called the elder Akçam’s “our” vs. “other” neighborhood analysis, with “Marxist-smelling” questions, “light” and meaningless because it was not founded on class distinction. Neither neighborhood as described by Taner embraced the working class. Asking the rhetorical question as to how Taner could overlook the working class, the younger Akçam thought that his brother, in what appeared to be sheer hypocrisy, didn’t really care for the working class.

    Continued the younger brother sarcastically: “Luckily, Taner at least didn’t ignore the bourgeois class in ‘our’ neighborhood.” He chaffed at his brother for not mentioning the bourgeois class in the “other” neighborhood, i.e., the Islamist businessmen that the Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan had braggingly called “The Anatolian Tigers.”

    Wondering how his brother could not know that the bourgeois class cannot exist without a working class, Cahit mocked his brother: “He is a big professor. True, not a sociology professor, but a history professor nonetheless. He has licked and swallowed a thousand times more than we have. He knows that, to be so ignorant, one does not have to be a professor. For Taner, the working class has little value.”

    The elder Akçam was tersely reminded of the struggles of Turkey’s working class since 1900.

    Cahit continued his criticism by making reference to a Turkish metaphor – referring to lentil meal – that this is all that the Taner could muster as an argument. Referring to Taner’s claim that all the “infamous” events in Turkey’s history emanated from “our” class, he bristled at Taner’s suggestion that the socialists, through the CHP, were like relatives to the military- bureaucracy.

    He mockingly called attention to the fact that the socialists had suffered immensely from the 1980 fascistic military coup.

    Recalling how the elder Akçam had defended the causes of right-wing, fascist elements in Turkey’s recent history, how he had failed to come to the defense of socialists who had been falsely accused of coup attempts, his denialist past, and how he had let down even his own family, the younger Akçam weighed in angrily: “How can Taner accuse his old friends, and even his own brother, as potential perpetrators of genocide?”

    Barely concealing his disdain, Cahit asked of his brother: “As you place the blame on your own neighborhood, can there be a more harrowing psychological ruin [for you]?  … Where is your heart, and your conscience?”

    The ultimate indignity came when the younger Akçam concluded that only someone who was politically and ideologically blind, and someone who had lost his scruples and his sense of loyalty, could do what his brother had done.

    In the background of such emotional outburst was the fact that, while Taner Akçam jumped the prison in 1977 into the safety of Germany and escaped the tribulations of the 1980 military coup, in the coup’s aftermath his brother was put on trial for unauthorized activities, faced death by hanging, and was imprisoned for 8 years. Obviously, a lecture on fascism and the struggles of socialists was the last thing the younger Akçam wanted to hear from a sibling he considered unscruppled and untrustworthy.

    A revisionist professor

    There was more to Akçam’s false accusations. He twisted history and put finger on “our neighborhood’ as the perpetrator of the May 27 (1960), March 12 (1971) and – obliquely – September 12 (1980) military interventions in Turkey. Evidently to hide his own past, and the embarrassment therewith, in his accounting he glossed over the 1980 military coup and the events (including his role) that preceded it.

    He dallied further into the past and noted that his “neighborhood” was also responsible for the so-called “Armenian genocide” and the Dersim events (1937).

    But he was quick to disown any blame – a point that also drew ridicule from the younger Akçam. Instead, Taner Akçam conveniently placed the blame on “our administrators.” Socialists like him, while closely affiliated with the administrators, had deep disagreements with them. It was all the fault of the administrators, not the socialists like him, he argued.

    Nice scapegoat, these administrators were! All that exonerated Akçam and made him squeaky clean!

    As to why “we socialists” never faced up to the criminal acts in Turkish history, Akçam argued that animosity toward the “other” neighborhood was far more important than facing up to criminal acts. “Our culture was such that we [preferred to] blame the Armenians for cooperating with the imperialists while we were fighting our war of independence, and the Dersimians represented a backward and feudal system.”

    Then Akçam made his grandstand by calling on “our” neighborhood to face up to its crimes.

    In such argumentation Akçam conveniently dismissed the criminality of the Armenian gangs in the massacre of more than a half-million Moslems, the fatal blow that the Armenian rebellion had inflicted on the fighting ability of the Ottoman armies in wartime, and ignored the fact the Dersim episode was instigated by reactionary feudal lords that had conspired against the young Turkish republic.

    Akçam also chose not to mention the bloody 1993 Madimak episode in the Anatolian city of Sivas. A crowd of fanatic Islamists (from the “other” neighborhood), amid chants of “Allah-ü Ekber,” set fire to a hotel where a group of left-leaning intellectuals had assembled. In the ensuing mayhem 37 artists and writers lost their lives.

    Akçam’s analysis of past events is the hallmark of an academician who follows a one-track, necessarily biased, approach to historical events.

    In his call to confront one’s criminal history, Akçam should turn the tables and first ask the Armenians and “other” neighborhood to confront their criminality. Why, for example, are the Armenian archives in Yerevan and Boston closed while all Turkish ones open? What are the Armenians hiding?

    And when will the likes of the “Madimak crowd” see the light of Enlightenment?

    Summing it up

    The Taraf-Birgün episode raised the specter of a history professor who, by the reckoning of his own brother, was long in false accusations but short in scruples and trustworthiness. The episode also caught the professor in contradictions and brought to light his biased, one-track approach to traumatic events in Turkish history in the past 100 years.

    Will all this make any difference as regards Akçam’s credibility as a scholar for the Armenian money masters who sponsor his academic career – like the Zoryan Institute and the Cafesjian Family Foundation when Akçam was at the University of Minnesota, and now the Arams, the Kaloosdians and the Mugars at Clark University? Considering that the professor’s criminal past has so far made no difference, the answer must be a firm “no.” Obviously, the professor is serving a useful – in fact very useful – purpose for the Armenian lobby.

    It must be a wondrous world when the “golden” Armenian coffers can sustain an academic chair in history when, as in Akçam’s case, the holder of that chair happens to have his degree in sociology.

    In fact, we should not be too surprised if the spinmasters of the Armenian lobby call on their “prince charming” to come to the aid of the Armenian mob charged last month with the largest Medicare fraud in U.S. history. Could the professor argue that the mob job was actually the “dirty work” of the Turks? Never say “no.”

    To rephrase his brother’s question, in which “neighborhood” does Taner Akçam stand when it comes to truth?

    Surely, the professor must be able to answer that question himself without help from his old-time mentor, Professor Vahakn Dadrian.

    A deeper question is, why Akçam-the-professor would write in a newspaper such as Taraf which has a reputation of acting as a rogue agent of the government on unsubstantiated allegations relating to the opposition, and whose executive editor, Ahmet Altan, in his own words, would be willing to sell out his country “for a woman’s breast and the shade of a cherry tree.” …. But that would be a different story.

    ferruh@demirmen.com

    Addendum: The above article was first submitted (as an exception) to “Armenian Genocide Resource Center,” .  Initially, the host welcomed the article and published it as an “exclusive” on its website. Half a day later the post was mysteriously removed from the website. Query as to why it was removed elicited no satisfactory response.

  • Turkish Traditional Archery (flight shooting)

    Turkish Traditional Archery (flight shooting)

    The history of the arrow and bow of the Turks stretches back to very distand times. In the legend of Oguz Khagan we see it taking its place either as a means of war or as a symbolic element.In Central Asia the arrow and bow, together with the sword, whether in hunting or wars was a most important weapon. The sword was used as the close range weapon and the arrow and bow as the long range weapon.

    Seljuks have opened the doors of Anatolia to Turks. It was the skill of Seljuk mounted archers that brought them to their destiny. The historians of that era described them as an highly effective, moving force with the long-ranged weaponry. They were hesitating to “impact” the enemy and to get into close quarter fighting. What they preferred was a lightning-fast “attack and retreat” strategy based on horseback archery skills. Their shorter recurved bows were easier to handle on horseback and gave the warriors great flexibility.
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  • Turkey Tries to Engage Mongolia, Despite Dim Prospects

    Turkey Tries to Engage Mongolia, Despite Dim Prospects

    Turkey Tries to Engage Mongolia, Despite Dim Prospects

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 199

    November 3, 2010

    By Saban Kardas

    Turkey and Mongolia held their sixth Joint Economic Commission (JEC) meeting in Ulaanbaatar on October 26. Deputy Prime Minister, Bulent Arinc, headed the Turkish delegation, and Mongolia’s Environment and Tourism Minister, Luimed Gansukh, signed a memorandum of understanding to boost economic and commercial relations. Related protocols also signed during Arinc’s four-day trip concerned an exchange of experience between KOSGEB (Small and Medium Enterprises Development Organization) and its Mongolian counterpart, and cooperation between the Turkish State Planning Organization and Mongolia’s planning unit on development (Anadolu Ajansi, October 26; www.kosgeb.gov.tr, October 27).

    Turkey established diplomatic relations with Mongolia in 1967. As a corollary of Ankara’s growing interest in Central Asia following the independence of the Turkic republics, Mongolia also started to attract Ankara’s attention. The two countries signed a trade, economic and technical cooperation agreement in May 1992, which also initiated the JEC, and heralded a wave of other agreements to follow in subsequent years (www.tika.gov.tr, Mongolia Country Report, July 2005). Turkey set up its permanent diplomatic mission in Ulaanbaatar in 1996, while Mongolia opened its representation in Ankara in 1997. Through various agreements, Turkey stepped in to share the experience it accumulated in free market economics with Mongolia, which was seeking to move away from a socialist economy, and facilitate the latter’s integration into the world economy. Ankara specifically concentrated its assistance on the creation of basic economic and administrative infrastructure and the emergence of small and medium scale companies in a free market economy.

    Although Mongolia joined the World Trade Organization in 1997, its overall foreign trade volume remains low. Its exports are largely in minerals, leather and textiles, while it imports machinery and fossil fuels. Trade relations between Turkey and Mongolia also remained very limited, largely due to distance, and lack of direct transportation routes. The bilateral trade volume reached $14 million in 2008, while it dropped to $5.5 million in 2009 after the global financial crisis. There is an enormous trade imbalance in Turkey’s favor (www.mfa.gov.tr). While Turkey exports processed food, machinery and soap, it imports some animal products. Turkish investments and construction operations in the country have also remained at negligible levels. Various Turkish trade associations, seeking to expand Turkish business opportunities in Mongolia, had urged Turkish firms to invest in energy, natural resources, agriculture, telecommunications, construction and tourism (www.btso.org.tr, May 4, 2005).

    During Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s historic visit to Ulaanbaatar in July 2005, the first prime ministerial visit since the establishment of diplomatic ties, both parties issued a joint declaration to boost bilateral cooperation. The Turkish Eximbank offered a $20 million credit to Mongolia, an issue which had been lingering for some time (www.ankara.mfat.gov.mn, July 19, 2005).

    Although this visit and subsequent JEC’s increased Turkey’s assistance to Mongolia’s economic transformation, such calls overall failed to prompt Turkish businessmen to invest in Mongolia. The Turkish-Mongolian Business Council, organizing a meeting in Istanbul ahead of Arinc’s trip, stressed the low volume of Turkish investment. The council pointed to the growth potential of Mongolia in the future, and called on Ankara not to fall behind Chinese, Russian and Western companies that increasingly invest in the untapped natural resources of this country (www.deik.org.tr, October 7).

    Unlike the poor standing of their economic ties, Turkey and Mongolia had close political relations, as was reflected in a myriad of bilateral agreements and mutual visits. Mongolia became one of the major recipients of development assistance, provided by Turkey’s official agency, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA). Since 1994, TIKA has carried out various educational, social and cultural programs in Mongolia, and opened a coordination office in 2005. TIKA projects focused on the improvement of Mongolia’s administrative infrastructure, training of bureaucrats and security personnel, developing statistics and accounting practices, among other initiatives (www.tika.gov.tr, July 2005).

    TIKA has also run a project since 1995, entitled “Turkish Monuments in Mongolia,” which emphasized the historical-cultural dimension of Turkey’s interest in this country. Mongolia hosts many historical monuments remaining from the earlier Turkish states established in Central Asia. Energized by the approaching eighth centennial celebrations of the Mongolian Empire in 2006, the Turkish government accelerated this project. Following Erdogan’s 2005 visit, Turkey has spent substantial resources on the excavation and renovation of many Turkic and Mongol monuments. Moreover, in recent years Turkey has funded the construction of roads to enable access to those historical sites. Perhaps, this historical significance of the country and the linguistic affinity explain Turkey’s political interest in Mongolia, incommensurate with the extent of their economic ties. The Turkish foreign ministry also acknowledges the role played by shared the cultural background in facilitating political ties (www.mfa.gov.tr).

    Similarly, Turkey has provided scholarships to many Mongolian students to enable them to study at Turkish universities and military academies. Various private Turkish-Mongolian schools also offer education up to high school level in Mongolia, while Turkology departments have been opened in some Mongolian universities. The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs offers scholarships to Muslim Mongolian citizens of Kazakh origin to receive Islamic education in Turkey. Overall, there is a lively educational and cultural exchange between the two countries.

    Most Turkish analysts agree that Mongolia is a distant, yet culturally close country. Nonetheless, some Turkish analysts find Ankara’s policy towards Mongolia lacking. They portray Mongolia as a country seeking to balance the pressures from its large neighbors, namely China and Russia. They believe Turkey could serve as the virtual “third neighbor,” if it pursues correct policies. Turkish analysts further contend that the poor standing of economic relations between Turkey and Mongolia, and most importantly their inability to develop closer military cooperation, are largely due to pressures from Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing have blocked Turkey’s shipments of military equipment to Mongolia or joint exercises between the Turkish and Mongolian Special Forces. Therefore, some analysts support the Turkish government’s development assistance, educational exchange programs and cultural projects, while urging Ankara to go further and facilitate Ulaanbaatar’s efforts to play a more influential role in international organizations in order to break its encirclement. Moreover, Turkish Airlines have failed to launch direct flights to Ulaanbaatar, which would symbolically mark establishing of a direct link to Turkey (www.usak.org.tr, January 4; Turkiye, March 31).

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-tries-to-engage-mongolia-despite-dim-prospects/

  • Sassounian’s column of Nov. 4, 2010

    Sassounian’s column of Nov. 4, 2010

    VP Biden’s Sensational Revelation of
    Phone Calls with Pres. Sargsyan

    sassounian3
    Armenians worldwide were scandalized last week by Vice President Joe Biden’s revelation that Pres. Sargsyan had told him: “look, do not force this issue [Armenian Genocide recognition] now, while we are in negotiations [with Turkey].”

    Biden’s statement posted later that day on YouTube — www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-vVX2B1H3k — was so shocking that most Armenians refused to believe that Pres. Sargsyan would have discouraged the American President from recognizing the Armenian Genocide! Some went as far as to question if the speaker shown on video was really Biden, and if his words had been altered. Others wondered about the identity of the young man conversing with Biden, suspecting him to be an impostor or a foreign agent.

    Given the far-reaching consequences of the words attributed to Pres. Sargsyan, his press secretary immediately issued a categorical denial. Two days later, the US Embassy in Armenia issued a clarification/retraction. Taking into account these confusing and contradictory statements, I will try to shed some light on the lesser known aspects of this episode:

    1) The young man speaking with VP Biden on YouTube is not an impostor. He is an Armenian-American activist.

    2) It is not widely known that right after Pres. Obama issued his April 24, 2009 commemorative statement, Biden phoned three prominent Armenian-Americans. He informed them that Pres. Obama had omitted the Genocide word from his statement after Pres. Sargsyan gave his consent during a phone call with the Vice President. Clearly, Biden was using his conversation with Sargsyan to excuse Pres. Obama’s failure to keep his campaign promise to Armenian-Americans.

    3) Biden repeated the same statement last week, this time on video. He was trying to win over Armenian-Americans to support Democratic candidates in the tightly contested November 2nd elections. When the young man asked Biden what message did he have for the Armenian community which was “burned” or deceived by Pres. Obama, the Vice President reassured him that the administration was “not backing off” from its promise on the Genocide. He added: “The Turks have to come to the realization of what the reality is.” Biden then conveniently blamed Sargsyan for Pres. Obama’s lack of acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide. The Vice President concluded his comments by cynically stating with a chuckle: “Reality has a way of intruding.”

    4) Armen Arzumanian, Pres. Sargsyan’s press secretary, issued a prompt rebuttal, stating that the President “did not use the expression ascribed to him in the video, directly or indirectly.” Arzumanian boldly called upon the White House to release the transcripts of the two phone conversations between Pres. Sargsyan and VP Biden in April 2009.

    5) On October 29, the US Embassy in Armenia reacted by announcing that during his two phone conversations with Biden in April 2009, “Pres. Sargsyan did not raise the issue of the content of Pres. Obama’s statement for Armenian Remembrance Day or seek a delay in consideration of House Resolution 252.” This carefully worded statement was meant to soothe the Armenian government’s severe irritation at Biden’s surprising disclosures.

    It would have been far more informative, however, had the U.S. government released the transcripts of the two phone conversations between Pres. Sargsyan and VP Biden. The Armenian side could have also clarified matters by releasing its transcripts of the phone calls, if they were taped, or a summary record. Furthermore, since the two leaders were using an interpreter, it would be interesting to compare Pres. Sargsyan’s Armenian words with those translated into English – which was what Biden actually heard!

    In the absence of a transcript, outsiders have no knowledge of what was actually said during these phone calls. Yet it is clear that starting in early 2009, Obama administration officials were pressuring the Armenian government to sign an agreement with Turkey, so they could use it as an excuse for not recognizing the Armenian Genocide. And that is exactly what happened, when Armenia and Turkey signed a preliminary agreement, “a roadmap,” on the eve of April 24, 2009. Pres. Obama quickly capitalized on it. In his “Armenian Remembrance Day” statement, he avoided the word genocide by claiming that Armenia and Turkey “have agreed on a framework and roadmap for normalization.”

    The controversy regarding what Pres. Sargsyan may have told Vice President Biden is one more unwelcome outcome of the Armenia-Turkey Protocols. However, the video had the unintended side effect of raising the Armenian Genocide issue to the highest echelons of the U.S. government and received coverage by worldwide media. A week before the Armenian activist’s conversation with Vice President Biden, Armine Babayan of Los Angeles also had an important personal encounter. She had the rare opportunity to speak directly with Pres. Obama about the Armenian Genocide during his campaign stop in Las Vegas. Turkish denialists must not be too pleased that within one week the President and Vice President of the United States were reminded of their unfinished agenda on the Armenian Genocide

  • Tespih

    Tespih

    It is often seen in Turkey. Particularly men carry them,  they finger the string of beads while drinking tea and chatting. Originally prayer beads, Muslims use the Tesbih to recite Allah’s name with every bead that passes through their fingers. Nowadays, Tespihs are also used as accessories, decoration or, in most cases to occupy the hands. The word Tespih originates from the word Süpah, which means ‘reciting the glory of God’. It is an aid to keep count of prayers. In the beginning of the Islam, believers used small stones which later developed into a Tespih. The Christian pilgrims probably adopted the Tesp67386 102410989825933 102386316495067 17164 7351379 nih from the Muslims and introduced the rosary in Christianity. A Tespih is composed of 99 beads, representing the 99 names of Allah. The string is used to praise Allah as follows: 33 times the word ‘Süpannalah’ is spoken, which means ‘Praise be to God’. Then ‘Elhümdullilah’ is repeated 33 times, meaning ‘Glory be to God’. For the final 33 beads ‘Allahu Akbar’ is repeated which means ‘God is most great’. After these repetitions a final prayer is said, bringing the total number of prayers to one hundred. In the Koran the Prophet Mohammed said: ‘Whoever completes a hundred, by telling these beads, all his sins shall be forgiven.’ Some Tespihs have 33 beads.  They are used in the same way but are more manageable.”

  • Turkey Considers Cooperation with Greece on Illegal Immigration to Europe

    Turkey Considers Cooperation with Greece on Illegal Immigration to Europe

    Turkey Considers Cooperation with Greece on Illegal Immigration to Europe

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 194

    October 27, 2010

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, met his Greek counterpart, George Papandreou, on the margins of the Mediterranean Climate Change Initiative conference near Athens last week. The positive reporting of the Erdogan-Papandreou meeting marks the deepening rapprochement between the two countries, after their normalization slowed down in the second half of the 2000’s.

    Characterized traditionally by historical enmity and territorial disputes, Turkish-Greek relations have undergone a remarkable improvement in the past decade. The so-called Greek-Turkish rapprochement started with the two earthquakes that devastated both countries in 1999. The mutual assistance and solidarity the two nations extended to each other in response provided fertile ground to develop closer political ties. As a result, Greece, which had blocked Turkey’s EU membership process, changed its policy and became an advocate of the EU’s enlargement to include Turkey. Since coming to power, Erdogan has ascribed special importance to normalizing ties with Greece, as reflected in his close personal relationship with the former Greek Prime Minister, Kostas Karamanlis.

    However, in parallel with the deterioration of Turkish-EU relations, Turkish-Greek relations also experienced difficult times in the second half of the 2000’s. Although the Turkish-Greek trade volume has expanded throughout the decade, there has been little concrete progress over the political disputes that had traditionally dominated their relationship. The Turkish side largely preferred to pursue a policy of constructive ambiguity, and adopt a gradual approach to solving the disputes, while the Greeks from time to time expressed their disappointment over the ongoing uncertainty. Turkey’s resistance to referring the Aegean disputes to the International Court of Justice and the ongoing “dog fights” between Turkish and Greek fighter jets in the Aegean Sea remained a major source of disagreement, resulting in an occasional heightening of tension (EDM, June 22, 2009).

    The global financial crisis, which dealt a serious blow to the Greek economic system, ironically, provided another fresh impetus to resolve bilateral disputes. In that context, the recent talks follow on Erdogan’s historic trip to Greece in May, when the two countries signed over 20 agreements to develop relations in various fields, including energy, the environment and illegal immigration. They also decided to launch the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council, which complemented similar arrangements Turkey has formed with its other neighbors. Erdogan also expressed Turkey’s readiness to help Greece to recover from the financial crisis, through what he called “enhanced economic partnership” The two sides, however, failed to reach any concrete agreement on the major issues in the bilateral relationship, such as the conflicting claims in the Aegean Sea, the status of the minorities, or the Halki seminary and the Cyprus issues (Anadolu Ajansi, May 15).

    Granted, Turkish leaders’ extension of a friendly hand to Greece and their statements calling for dampening military tensions in the Aegean through closer bilateral dialogue was ground-breaking in many ways. This thinking is largely in line with Ankara’s recent policy of pursuing “zero problems with neighbors,” and prioritizing economic cooperation over political disputes. Indeed, as a stark reflection of this new thinking, Turkey will reportedly not include Greece, Russia, Iran and Iraq as enemy countries in its national security document, which is currently being revised.

    Speaking to Greek TV stations, Erdogan, also expressed clearly that Turkish flights in the Aegean have decreased significantly and that Ankara supports the idea of ceasing them entirely (Today’s Zaman, October 21). By de-securitizing its relationship with Greece and its other neighbors, Turkey hopes to reap the benefits of peace dividends, by significantly cutting military expenditures and instead focus on mutual economic gains. In the case of Greece, by turning the Aegean into a basin of peace, the Turkish government hopes, for instance, to enable the exploration of offshore hydrocarbon resources, and further cooperation in the transportation of oil and gas to European markets.

    It appears that the technical level contacts between both countries have continued since May, seeking common ground in their political disputes. In the wake of the latest trip, both parties are talking more resolutely about a shared strategic vision and pursuing win-win cooperative policies. Toward these objectives, there are stronger indicators that they might be involved in serious discussions on the resolution of thorny issues, including the Ecumenical Patriarchate and joint Turkish-Greek initiatives to curb illegal immigration to the EU. Following his meeting with Papandreou, Erdogan vowed to start cooperation on illegal immigration, so that they could tackle what he called a “common problem.” The Greek media even speculated that by the end of the year the parties might finalize a compromise agreement on the resolution of the Aegean disputes, on which they had already agreed in principle (Anadolu Ajansi, October 22; www.ekathimerini.com, October 25).

    Most Turkish media outlets preferred to present Erdogan’s trip as a major achievement which boosted his popularity in Greece. Similarly, the Greek media also underscored the optimism generated by the Erdogan-Papandreou meeting (Taraf, October 24). However, some Greek observers maintain that the Papandreou government’s closer dialogue with the Turkish government “may ring alarm bells in many circles in Greece which would interpret it (and they do) as an indication of Greece losing diplomatic ground in the Aegean, or even in Greek Thrace” (Hurriyet Daily News, October 24).

    In any case, the resolution of the remaining disputes with Greece serves the Turkish government’s foreign policy objectives. Especially by addressing the illegal immigration issue and the reopening of the Halki seminary, Turkey can remove major obstacles which have bedeviled its accession process into the EU. The EU has been expecting Turkey to harmonize its practices on illegal immigration with European regulations, and reopen the Greek Orthodox seminary to show its support for human rights. Moreover, through its constructive dialogue with Greece, Ankara solicits the support of Athens within the EU. Recently, the Turkish government has tried to mobilize the pro-Turkey EU members so that they could break the stalemate over membership talks. Reportedly, in exchange for its cooperation on the illegal immigration issue, Turkey expects Greece to at the very least, assist with the relaxation of European visa regulations for Turkish citizens.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-considers-cooperation-with-greece-on-illegal-immigration-to-europe/