Turkish Forum

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  • Turkey Diverges From Western Position On Libya

    Turkey Diverges From Western Position On Libya

    Turkey Diverges From Western Position On Libya

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 44

    March 4, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey has pursued a policy over the popular uprising in Libya reflecting the unique ties it had developed with this country. More importantly, Turkey’s position in the ongoing debate concerning the involvement of the international community in the form of sanctions or possible military intervention increasingly sets Turkey apart from Western policy.

    Turkish construction firms have penetrated the Libyan market, signing major contracts in the country since the 1970’s. With the lifting of international sanctions against Libya in the early 2000’s, the construction industry experienced a new boom, as well as creating fresh business opportunities. During his visit to Libya in 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made an effort to further improve economic ties with Libya, as part of Turkey’s proactive foreign trade strategy of gaining new markets for businesses abroad. Indeed, Turkish contractors received a good share of the new business opportunities. Turkish firms undertook projects worth over $15 billion in recent years, and over 20,000 Turkish people were living in Libya, mostly employed in the construction sector. Moreover, in recent years, Turkey’s exports to this country also increased, reaching $2 billion in 2010 (www.cnnturk.com, February 21).

    When the protests started to spread across Libya, the fate of Turkish investments and workers in the country was the main concern shaping Ankara’s response. Initial reports of looting in some construction sites, and growing concerns about the safety of Turkish workers, forced the government to open a crisis desk. According to Trade Minister, Zafer Caglayan, Turkish investments in the country were guaranteed by the Libyan government and their first priority would be to ensure the physical safety of Turkish citizens (Zaman, February 22). With the rapid deterioration of the situation, the Turkish government launched what it called the largest evacuation operation in history. Through the utilization of aircraft and ferries, Turkey successfully evacuated its citizens and people from many other nations, which received widespread coverage in domestic and international media.

    However, as international attention shifted towards the atrocities committed by the Gaddafi regime against the protestors, Turkey’s policy diverged from the US or Western position. The Turkish opposition criticized the government for failing to openly condemn Gaddafi’s brutal use of force and expressing support for the Libyan people (www.ntvmsnbc.com, February 21). Given the presence of large numbers of its citizens, Turkey, perhaps understandably, was timid in its reaction to the Gaddafi regime. However, the government’s subsequent statements on Libya demonstrated that it pursued a different policy based on differing assumptions, compared to its Western partners.

    Ahead of the UN Security Council meeting last weekend, where the UN decided to impose a range of sanctions against the Libyan regime, President Barack Obama telephoned Erdogan to discuss the developments. Although the statement released by the White House maintained that the two sides agreed on joint action, representatives from the Turkish government stressed that Turkey would not support any action that could be considered in contravention of the principle of “nonintervention in domestic affairs” and Turkey would prefer that international involvement remained limited to providing humanitarian assistance. Turkish journalists based in Washington started to talk about a “rift” between Ankara and Washington (Zaman, February 28).

    Indeed, Erdogan’s subsequent statements clearly revealed those diverging policy perspectives. Addressing the Turkish public over the weekend on the eve of the UN Security Council meeting, Erdogan expressed his strong opposition to sanctions, arguing that sanctions did not work in the past and they would hurt only the people. Interestingly, he called on the international community and Western countries to approach the Libyan issue from a humanitarian perspective, not on the basis of oil interests (Anadolu Ajansi, February 27).

    As the discussions gained pace on the imposition of a no fly zone over Libyan airspace to prevent Gaddafi forces from crushing the opposition forces, Turkey’s differences with Western policy also became visible. Meanwhile, having evacuated its citizens from Libya, the US, in line with many Western governments, adopted harsher language critical of the Libyan regime, calling on Gaddafi to step down or face the consequences. While the US boosted its naval presence in the Mediterranean, attention also focused on the role of NATO in possible military action against Libya.

    Again, Erdogan took a clear stance against NATO’s involvement in any operation against Libya. While visiting Germany to meet with Turkish people living in the country, Erdogan reacted to the news stories. “All sanctions and interventions that will hurt Libyan people cannot be accepted… What does NATO have to do in Libya? … We are against it,” Erdogan said (Hurriyet, February 28). Those statements made headlines in many newspapers on the following day, which indicated how well Erdogan’s views resonate with Turkish public opinion on the issue. Moreover, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, also expressed objections to foreign intervention, arguing that the deployment of foreign troops in the country would not be welcome by the local people and foreign involvement would further complicate the situation (Hurriyet, March 2).

    Through his recent statements, Erdogan has implied that the West was driven by material interests, rather than genuine humanitarian considerations about the Libyan people. Such rhetoric mirrors the position advocated by the leaders of Iran or Venezuela, who have been arguing that the West is seeking to capitalize on the unrest in the country to re-colonize Libya, or occupy it to extract its oil. Moreover, Erdogan’s statements, for instance, on sanctions reveal that his objection to sanctions is not based on content per se. Although Erdogan has maintained that sanctions would hurt the people, there was in fact nothing in the list of sanctions approved by the UN Security Council to that effect, as they were specifically targeting the Gaddafi regime and called for investigations into human rights violations. In that sense, Erdogan has been presenting a categorical objection to any sanctions or international intervention, which reflects not only policy differences but also ideological dissonance with the international community.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-diverges-from-western-position-on-libya/

  • “Revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda

    “Revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda

    “Revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 24

    February 3, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkey has been following closely the unfolding popular “revolutions” in Tunisia and Egypt. While the Turkish public expressed support towards the masses demanding political liberalization, the Turkish government adopted a cautious approach initially, indicative of some of the contradictions that have been inherent in its policies towards the Middle East for some time.

    Turkey, like many other countries, was taken by surprise over a crisis of this magnitude. Nonetheless, Turkish leaders’ rather delayed response to the popular demands in the region points to larger factors underpinning the government’s foreign policy. Especially, as this development risks straining the delicate balancing act Turkey has been performing in the region, between the Arab states on the one hand and the undemocratic authoritarian or monarchic regimes on the other. The Turkish government has gained the sympathy of the “Arab streets” owing to the successes of Turkish cultural products and to Turkey’s recent foreign policy activism in defense of some Arab causes, such as the Palestine issue. Partly in order to avoid antagonizing many of the regimes in the region, with whom it has been trying to forge closer ties, Turkey at the same time has refrained from pursuing an openly pro-democratization agenda.

    Despite the emphasis Turkish government occasionally places on democracy as a foundational principle for its domestic and foreign policies, it has come under criticism on the grounds that it prioritized its relations with these regimes at the expense of people’s demands for greater democratic rights. The most controversial case in point was the Iranian elections in 2009, where Turkey was one of the first countries to congratulate President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and remained silent on the regime’s ensuing violent crackdown on the opposition (EDM, June 18, 2009).

    Despite the Turkish government’s rather ambiguous position on democracy promotion, it must be acknowledged what Turkish scholar Kemal Kirisci once called the “demonstration effect” Turkey has in the region. Turkey’s experiment with popular democracy and a free market economy, especially its integration of Islamic groups into legitimate political channels, has been closely followed by many reformists in the Muslim world. The transformation of political Islamist groups in Turkey and their renunciation of non-democratic methods, which culminated in the incumbent AKP Party adopting a liberal-democratic economic and political platform, are taken as the most obvious indication of the success of this so-called Turkish model. Seen from this perspective, it is possible to hear somewhat inflated arguments among many Turkish analysts to the effect that Turkey’s rising profile in regional affairs and its vocal advocating of Arab causes, which demonstrated the failures of the authoritarian regimes, played a role in the recent wave of revolutions. According to different versions of this argument, the Turkish model of democratization inspired the “Arab streets” and precipitated these revolutions. Such views are also raised by the members of the AKP Party (Hurriyet, January 30).

    Among Islamists and to some extent liberals, there is a tendency to identify positively with the demonstrators demanding for greater political rights and transparency. This struggle reminds many Turks of Turkey’s experience with democratization, whereby they managed to fight against authoritarianism or military control over civilian politics and move towards a government representative of popular will. For instance, many Islamist intellectuals draw parallels between Turkey’s experience with a one-party regime and the Kemalist ideology and the experience of Tunisia under Bin Ali. By labeling the ousted Tunisian leader’s rule as Kemalism par excellence, they seek to drive home the argument that such authoritarian forms of government are no longer sustainable in the region, including Turkey. Consequently, they use it as a basis to call for further reform of the Turkish political system (Today’s Zaman, January 25). That positive identification of Islamist with the transformations there also might have an ideological dimension to it, as the Tunisian Islamic thinker and the leader of the En-Nahda movement Rashid Al-Ghannushi and the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood have had an intellectual impact on the Islamic groups and intellectuals in Turkey.

    As a reflection of such widely-held sympathy towards these revolutions shared by Turkish people and many political groups, there have been protests outside Egyptian diplomatic representations, demanding Mubarak’s resignation. It is increasingly possible to hear arguments calling on the government to play a more proactive role towards the resolution of the deepening crisis Egypt. One Turkish expert on Egypt, Ahmet Uysal, called on the government to give up its complacency, and interject itself more resolutely to prevent Egypt’s descent into instability by showing a way out of this stalemate towards democracy. In this view, only then will the Turkish government be able live up to its promises that it will play a leadership role in the region (www.sde.org.tr, February 1).

    Davutoglu, however, denied the criticisms that Turkey has remained silent on the developments in Tunisia and Egypt. Davutoglu rather put the blame on the Turkish media, arguing that despite his statements in support of people’s democratic demands, Turkish commentators largely overlooked them and created such a false image about the government’s policy (IHA, February 1).

    Perhaps with such criticism accumulating, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan finally came out and invited Mubarak to respond to his people’s desire for change. “Hear the people’s outcry and their humane demands… governments cannot stand against people,” Erdogan said (Anadolu Ajansi, February 1). Many Turkish media outlets provided wide coverage of Erdogan’s statement and took it as an indication of Turkey’s emergence as a major actor that could help to resolve this crisis. Nonetheless, during our conversation on the subject in Dubai, a long-time observer of Turkish and Middle Eastern politics, Yusuf Serif of Al-Arabiyya, underscored that Erdogan’s response came rather late. Though finding Erdogan’s statement daring compared to other regional leaders’ silence, Serif draw attention to the fact that Erdogan delivered it only after the United States and other Western actors made similar arguments publicly and US President, Barack Obama, telephoned Erdogan last weekend.

    The “revolutions” in the region are still unfolding and it will be interesting to observe as to whether and how the Turkish government will maneuver in a timely and efficient manner in these uncharted waters.

    https://jamestown.org/program/revolutions-in-egypt-and-tunisia-highlight-dilemmas-of-turkeys-democracy-promotion-agenda/

  • Turkish-Iranian Economic Ties Flourish

    Turkish-Iranian Economic Ties Flourish

    Turkish-Iranian Economic Ties Flourish

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 35

    February 18, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, paid a four-day state visit to Iran starting on February 13, to discuss ways to further bilateral cooperation. The sheer frequency of such high level mutual visits between the two countries in recent years indicates the growing multi-dimensional ties between Ankara and Tehran. Coupled with the convergence of both countries’ positions on many regional problems, the Turkish-Iranian cooperative relationship in economic and political affairs has been one of the most constant elements in the emerging Middle Eastern geopolitical map which is often fluid and full of uncertainties.

    Given Turkey’s involvement in international efforts to find a solution to the diplomatic standoff over Iran’s nuclear program, this issue has occupied a large part of Gul’s agenda. So far, Turkey has objected to the Western policy of pursuing coercive instruments to halt the Iranian nuclear enrichment program which has raised suspicions in the West that Iran might eventually opt to acquire nuclear weapons. Turkey has, instead, operated on the assumption that the Iranian nuclear program was driven by peaceful purposes and advocates a diplomatic solution through dialogue and engagement with Iran, which occasionally pits it against the United States (EDM, June 1, 2010).

    Gul’s remarks on this issue highlighted the extent to which Turkey seeks to take into account Iran’s concerns. Gul underlined that Iran needs to be offered an honorable solution to end this standoff. Commenting on this issue, Gul said that he agreed with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to continue joint efforts on a new road map to explore the possibilities of addressing this issue. Gul also added that Turkey will remain committed to its facilitator role so that this issue could be solved through diplomacy and dialogue. Indeed, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, accompanying Gul in Tehran, met his Iranian counterpart as well as Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. In the wake of the latest meeting between Iran and P5+1 countries held in Istanbul last month, which ended in failure (EDM, January 25), Turkey has remained steadfast in its insistence on a diplomatic solution. While Western leaders, including European officials issued statements calling on Iran to be forthcoming, Turkey is worried about any further escalation of tension and has been calling for the continuation of dialogue. Thus, in talks with his Iranian counterparts, having evaluated the Istanbul meeting, Davutoglu discussed the details of Turkey’s future contributions to this issue. Davutoglu said that the next meeting between Iran and world powers might also take place in Istanbul (Anadolu Ajansi, February 15, 17).

    Bilateral economic cooperation was another item pursued during Gul’s visit to Tehran. In parallel to the Turkish government’s recent policy of deepening economic exchange with its neighbors, Ankara has wanted to further trade ties with Tehran. In recent years, the Turkish-Iranian trade volume has grown enormously. In 2010, bilateral trade reached around $10 billion. However, it has been a major challenge for Turkey to fix the major trade deficit in Iran’s favor, generated by Turkey’s hydrocarbon imports from Iran. While Turkey’s exports were about $3 billion, its imports were around $7 billion last year. At least since Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Iran in October 2009, where he had vowed to raise the trade volume to $30 billion (EDM, October 29, 2009), Turkey has endeavored to increase its exports, through various measures, including forming joint economic commissions, easing border trade, trade fairs and plans to use national currencies in bilateral trade. Despite an absolute increase in exports, those policies have so far failed to break Turkey’s vulnerability, partly due to Iran’s rather protectionist economic policies. Moreover, Turkish firms’ plans to boost the volume of their investments in Iran have been stalled because of restrictive Iranian regulations on foreign investments.

    Thus, reflecting Turkey’s determination to break this unfavorable economic pattern, Gul brought with him a large group of businessmen who sought to agree on trade deals with their prospective Iranian partners. During Gul’s visit, several Turkish-Iranian business forums were convened in major Iranian cities including Tehran, Esfahan and Tabriz, by the representatives of Turkish business associations. Attending those forums, Gul reiterated the target of raising the trade volume to $30 billion. He emphasized clearly Turkey’s dissatisfaction with “over-protectionist” economic policy in Iran and called for the elimination of restrictions. For some time, there had been bilateral talks on preferential trade agreement. Gul said that some Turkish officials accompanying him would remain in Iran to negotiate conditions for a free trade deal instead (Anadolu Ajansi, February 15).

    Indeed, the conditions seem ripe for such a deal, as both countries have their own incentives to increase the bilateral trade volume. For its part, Turkey’s recent foreign economic strategy is built on diversifying export markets as a tool to stimulate growth and cushion the negative effects of the global economic crisis. Partly as a result of Turkish exporters’ penetration into new markets in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, Turkey has managed to overcome the crisis, without major assistance from international financial institutions.

     

    For Iran, trade with Turkey has assumed a vital importance in the wake of the new round of sanctions initiated by the US. Although Turkey announced that it would comply with the UN-authorized sanctions, it would not implement the more stringent list of sanctions imposed by the US and European countries. There has been speculation that Iran might be subjected to more economic pressures following its “uncooperative” attitude during the talks in Istanbul. Moreover, recent reports indicate that the sanctions have started to hit Iran hard after some of Iran’s traditional partners including the UAE decided to restrict their trade with Iran.

    Against this background, Turkey is becoming a major lifeline for Iran. As underlined by Turkish expert Bayram Sinkaya in a recent report, “thanks to both Turkish-Iranian political rapprochement and their policy of furthering economic cooperation, Turkey has started to replace Dubai, which has been Iran’s most important trade partner and operations center. Especially since June 2010 … Iranian businessmen have redirected [their operations] towards Turkey as an alternative to Dubai. As a result, over 600 firms have been set up by Iranian businessmen in Istanbul alone” (www.orsam.org.tr, February 10). It remains to be seen if growing Turkish-Iranian trade might arise as yet another divisive issue in Turkish-US relations and how Turkey will handle those tensions.

    https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-iranian-economic-ties-flourish/

     

  • Istanbul Armenians Document Violations of Minority Rights in Turkey

    Istanbul Armenians Document Violations of Minority Rights in Turkey

    By Harut Sassounian

    Publisher, The California Courier

    Two recent documents from Istanbul shed new light on violations of minority rights in Turkey. The authors of these reports make cautious, yet accurate assessments of the problems facing the Armenian, Greek and Jewish communities.

    The first document, dated February 2011, is titled: “Report on non-Muslim Minorities.” It is written by three well-known Istanbul Armenians: Krikor Doshemeciyan, Yervant Ozuzun, and Murat Bebiroglu.

    The authors’ stated aim is to seek solutions to the problems of minority populations in Turkey, at a time when the government is planning to revise the constitution to bolster its chances of joining the European Union. Even though the writers do not indicate as to whether their report has been submitted to Turkish officials, the authorities undoubtedly are aware of its contents. It has been posted in Turkish on the Istanbul-based hyetert.com website. The main points of the report are presented below in translation:

    The authors trace the difficulties facing the non-Muslim minorities to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 as a monolithic, homogeneous state based on a single culture and religion. This policy had serious consequences for the minorities, forcing them to flee or be assimilated.

    The non-Muslim minorities were viewed either as foreigners or internal enemies of the state. One cannot find a single policeman or officer who is a member of a minority group. The 1934 displacement of the Jews of Thrace, the exorbitant 1942 Wealth Tax on minorities, and the large-scale attacks on Greeks in Istanbul on Sept. 6-7, 1955, resulted in the impoverishment of these communities and the devastation of their culture. Such discriminatory policies and brutal attacks led to a significant decrease in Turkey’s minority population from 350,000 in 1927 to 80,000 today, while the number of Turks increased six-fold.

    The writers point out that the Turkish government has recently returned a few of the properties belonging to minority institutions that were confiscated starting in 1974. Due to contradictions and shortcomings in the new law on minority foundations, the returned properties can not be put to good use, because none of the communities are allowed to repair them.

    The government has further violated Articles 41 and 42 of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty which obligated Turkey to provide funding and facilities to non-Muslim minorities for educational, religious, and charitable purposes, and to protect their religious establishments. Beyond the Lausanne Treaty, several provisions of UN conventions and the European Convention on Human Rights are continuously violated by the Turkish government.

    One of the most serious problems facing these minorities is the Turkish government’s non-recognition of the Armenian Patriarchate and the Jewish Rabbinate as legal entities. The Greek Patriarchate was finally recognized as a legal entity last year.

    Another problem is the government’s appointment of Turkish Vice Principals to oversee minority schools which causes deep mistrust. The preparation of new teachers and clergymen has also become impossible due to the closing down of religious seminaries by the Turkish state. The writers of the report request that clergymen be allowed to teach religion in minority schools, as they had done previously.

    In conclusion, the authors urge the Turkish authorities to take into account all of the foregoing legal issues when drafting a “democratic and modern” constitution.

    The second document is an interview conducted by Agounk Center’s Meline Anoumyan with Archbishop Aram Ateshian, Vicar General of the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, as the Patriarchate is preparing to celebrate its 550th anniversary. According to Abp. Ateshian, 67,000 Armenians live in Istanbul, while another 3,000 reside in the country’s interior — 500 in Ankara, 300 in Iskenderoun, 70 in Sepastia, 50 in Malatia, and 20 families in Kharpert. In addition, the Vicar General revealed that there are 100,000 Armenians in Turkey who fear disclosing their true identity. This figure does not include the undocumented workers from Armenia who are not allowed to get married and whose children cannot be baptized by the Patriarchate due to their illegal status.

    Abp. Ateshian is pleased that a few of the confiscated properties have been returned to Armenian foundations in recent years. He disclosed that there are 44 functioning Armenian Apostolic churches in Turkey — 37 in Istanbul, 3 in Iskenderoun, 2 in Dickranagerd, 1 in Mardin, and 1 in Gessaria. In addition, there are 12 Armenian schools associated with the Patriarchate, and Armenian Catholics have 3 schools and 10 churches. A total of 3,000 Armenian Catholics and 1,000 Armenian Protestants live in Turkey.

    It is encouraging that after nine decades Armenian religious and lay leaders in Istanbul have mustered enough courage to raise their voices in defense of their violated civil rights!


  • Kapalıçarşı “Grand Bazaar”

    Kapalıçarşı “Grand Bazaar”

    168663 133946430005722 102386316495067 206823 1539362 nKapalicarsi (Grand Bazaar) in İstanbul  is one of the the largest covered markets in the world with its 4400 shops, 3000 firms, some 17 hans (separate inns for specific type of products), 64 streets,25.000 employees, 4 fountains, 2 mosques and 22 gates. It’s a real heaven for shoppers and a good opportunity for people to discover the Turkish hospitality.

    It looks like a labyrinth at first sight but it’s actually not that complicated. All you have to do is to keep your eyes on the main street (Kalpakcilarbasi Street, the jewelry street). The Bazaar was first constructed in 1464 with the order of Mehmed II ‘the Conqueror’ and had many restorations over the years due to the extensive fires and destructive earthquakes. There are tens of cafés, a police station, little mosques, in the bazaar tourists information points .

  • Sassounian’s column of Feb. 24, 2011

    Sassounian’s column of Feb. 24, 2011

    Three Questions Turkey’s Ambassador

    Would not Answer…

    By Harut Sassounian

    Publisher, The California Courier

    Turkey’s Ambassador to the United States, Namik Tan, spoke at the University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy on February 16. His topic was: “Public Diplomacy: The Turkish Experience.”

    The Turkish Ambassador assumed his post in Washington last February, but shortly after his arrival was recalled to Ankara when the House Foreign Affairs Committee adopted a resolution acknowledging the Armenian Genocide.

    Amb. Tan is no stranger to Washington, where he served as the Embassy’s Counselor from 1991 to 1995 and First Counselor from 1997 to 2001. During his long diplomatic career, he also was Ambassador to Israel, Second Secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Russia, and Deputy Undersecretary at the Foreign Ministry in Ankara.

    During his first visit to Los Angeles this month, the smooth-talking Ambassador managed to meet with Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, spoke to the World Affairs Council, and held meetings with the American Jewish Committee, Turkish community leaders, and the Editorial Board of the Los Angeles Times.

    Prior to his arrival, the Association of Turkish-Americans of Southern California had posted a note on its website, urging local Turks to attend the Ambassador’s public appearances and “show visible support… especially in the face of usual anticipated detractors.”

    Running the risk of being labeled “a detractor,” I decided to attend the Ambassador’s talk which ironically was held at USC’s Ronald Tutor Campus Center — named after its Armenian benefactor, the son of Al Tutor (Varjabedian), a genocide survivor. I made my way through scores of U.S. Secret Service agents, campus security, and Turkish bodyguards who almost outnumbered the guests at the event. Even more surprising was the fact that there were only a handful of Armenians and Turks among the attendees, consisting mostly of USC students and professors.
    Amb. Tan, who spoke in fluent English for half an hour, presented his country in the best possible light. Since he had not addressed Armenian issues, I decided to pose the following interrelated questions:

    The Turkish government recently renovated a couple of Armenian churches. There were thousands of Armenian churches and monasteries throughout Turkey before the genocide, most of which were converted into mosques, warehouses and stables, and many were destroyed. Isn’t it time for the Turkish government to turn over these Armenian churches to the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul? Also, after Armenians were deported and killed, they left behind their houses, lands and belongings. Isn’t time for the Turkish government to return these properties to the heirs of their original Armenian owners? Finally, regarding the Armenian Genocide issue, Pres. Obama declared in his statement of last April 24: “95 years ago, 1.5 million Armenians were massacred or marched to death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire.” If you say that is not true, wouldn’t you be calling the President of the United States a liar?

    Here is Amb. Tan’s response:

    “This hate should end. We should put it behind as early as possible. That’s why we are trying to reach out to our Armenian friends and we have signed the [Armenia-Turkey] Protocols. In these Protocols, one of the suggestions that we put is that we want an independent historical inquiry commission which will include representatives from every country — from US, France, and whichever country you like. They will study those claims and we will see the decision all together. But history cannot be legislated. This is not the way that history could be judged. So, I think this has created a lot of ill feelings in our societies. Armenians have given a lot of contribution to our social life historically. Therefore we need to continue such kind of engagements, but this hate should be stopped.”

    I politely reminded Amb. Tan that he had not answered my questions. He responded by saying: “That is my answer.” He probably was not prepared to face such politically sensitive questions. By sidestepping my queries, he left a negative impression on his audience, despite his highly-skilled diplomatic credentials.

    At the program’s conclusion, Amb. Tan walked over, shook my hand, and thanked me for my questions. I told him that his assessment was inaccurate, as the Armenian issue had nothing to do with “hatred.” I explained that a great crime was committed by Turkey against the Armenian nation, and that Armenians are not blinded by “hatred,” but simply demanding “justice.” The Ambassador turned around and walked away with a mysterious smile on his face!

    Even though Amb. Tan avoided answering my questions, our public exchange had the beneficial effect of exposing the university audience, the Ambassador and his entourage to the just demands of the Armenian people for the crimes committed by Turkey. Indeed, it is also imperative to challenge Turkish officials at every opportunity, so that neither they nor their audience would be able to ignore the Armenian grievances.