Category: Authors

  • Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?

    Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?

    Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?

    by Şaban Kardaş

    Today’s Zaman, 20 March 2011, Sunday

    Turkey’s policy on Libya so far has drawn criticism from many angles, most notably due to the growing dissonance between Ankara and the international community on the issue of pursuing coercive policies against the Gaddafi regime’s use of brutal force against its own people to crack down first on the peaceful demonstrations and later the uprising across the country.
    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other Turkish officials have expressed opposition to imposing sanctions on Libya, as the United Nations Security Council was evaluating the unfolding crisis. Later, as the attention shifted towards the establishment of a no-fly zone or even a military intervention against the Gaddafi forces, Turkey again objected to those calls.

    Against this background, it is often possible to hear criticism that Turkey is pursuing immoral policies or taking a pro-Gaddafi stance. Interestingly, however, Erdoğan not only claims that Turkey is in fact the only country that follows moral politics in this case, but he also maintains that the Western powers contemplating coercive policies against Libya are driven by material interests. There is indeed a dilemma here: How come a country claiming to follow an ethical approach to the crisis has been against the actions whose declared aim is to end the crimes against humanity perpetrated by Gaddafi forces?

    One can point to various reasons why Turkey is openly opposed to a more robust international reaction to the Gaddafi regime. As some Turkish diplomatic sources underline, in a situation where Turkey has investments in the country worth billions of dollars and many Turkish citizens have been stranded in Libya, it would not be wise to take a clear side in the unfolding civil war between the Gaddafi regime and the opposition forces. One can sympathize with this argument, for above all, the Turkish government is obliged to protect the interests of its own citizens and cannot be expected to take any action which might put them in harm’s way. Moreover, one can also debate the justifiability of military action on practical grounds. Indeed, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu made such an argument when he stated his reservations to a military option, saying that it would make the situation even worse and that a foreign military presence would not be welcome by the Libyan people, including the leaders of the rebellion against Gaddafi. From a realpolitik point of view, these are all plausible arguments, and many other Western leaders have utilized similar justifications.

    Yet, one is puzzled by Erdoğan’s statements on the subject, which makes one think that there is more to Turkey’s objections to sanctions or a no-fly zone. Erdoğan’s position is rather categorical in the sense that his opposition is not based necessarily on the content of the policy instruments under consideration. For instance, when he said he was against the introduction of sanctions because they would hurt the Libyan people and that sanctions would never work, there was in fact nothing in the list of sanctions approved by the UN Security Council to harm the Libyan people per se. They targeted the Gaddafi regime and called for an investigation into the violations of human rights. Similarly, on the issue of using military instruments or inviting NATO to play a role in such a scenario, Erdoğan again raised a categorical objection. He not only maintained that a military option would create more trouble, he also questioned the involvement of NATO. For him, intervention in Libya will not be NATO’s business, as its only task is to protect member states. This was quite a puzzling statement coming from a Turkish leader, if one recalls that it was Turkey that advocated NATO’s humanitarian interventions in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. Although no NATO member was under attack, Turkey worked hard to convince the alliance to intervene in Bosnia and later Kosovo to protect its coreligionists against the Serbian forces. This is quite a dramatic change, indeed.

    ‘The seduction by analogy’

    Such categorical objections raised by Turkish leaders suggest that they might partly be suffering from what Yuen Foong Khong once called “the seduction by analogy” problem. Analogies guide the thinking of leaders in crisis situations. When confronted with a situation full of unknowns, many decision makers relate the crisis at hand to past instances that have resemblance to the case at hand. When carefully selected, analogies in fact are useful tools; for instance, they might help reduce the time for processing information and choose the right policy responses. However, analogies may also result in disastrous foreign policy decisions. Decision makers may resort to analogies as an excuse to avoid investing the necessary time to study the particularities of each case. Moreover, once formed, analogies can become self-perpetuating myths and act as mental shortcuts, in that decision makers may be seduced to interpret new developments under the light of familiar experiences from the past. As a result, more often than not, the lessons drawn from past analogies are applied to new cases without careful consideration of the underlying differences and similarities.

    A close examination of Erdoğan and other Turkish officials’ statements on Libya shows that the analogies they often resort to are the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. The misguided American interventions in these two cases and the resulting destruction have affected the thinking of Turkish leaders in the last decade. For years, Turkish leaders have watched how sanctions imposed on the Saddam regime produced nothing but misery for the Iraqi people. Moreover, having spent much of their energy on addressing the threats and risks created by the US military interventions, Turkish decision makers have grown increasingly skeptical of the ability of the international community to implement military instruments. This formative experience has bred an aversion against foreign involvement which has come to be seen as a source of humanitarian tragedy and regional instability.

    The analogies of Afghanistan and Iraq have shaped Turkey’s thinking in recent years, when foreign involvement in Turkey’s neighborhood was up for debate. A large part of Turkey’s opposition to US policy on Iran is based on the negative lessons drawn from these two experiences. Turkey’s thinly veiled opposition to American assistance to Georgia during the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 was also affected by the same mode of thinking on foreign intervention. It seems the same analogies are at work again and have come to determine Turkey’s position on Libya as well. At the same time, the use of such analogies, blended with anti-imperialistic rhetoric, resonate well with the Turkish public, which has turned increasingly nationalistic.

    What is at stake in Libya is the risk that the unfolding civil war might take a dramatic turn and warrant an international military action that might fall under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Although Turkey has taken part in humanitarian interventions in the past, it has failed to develop a principled position, and its approach has evolved case-by-case. Short of any principled position on humanitarian intervention, Turkish leaders are easily seduced to follow analogies that happen to fit to their domestic political agenda. However, they need to engage in a serious reconsideration as to whether they are using the right analogies in Libya, and whether Bosnia or Kosovo would not be better fits. More importantly, if they are serious about pursuing moral politics, they need to come to terms with cosmopolitan ideas and formulate a principled position on humanitarian intervention, independent of contextual factors.

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  • Erdogan’s Moscow Visit Produces Mixed Results

    Erdogan’s Moscow Visit Produces Mixed Results

    Erdogan’s Moscow Visit Produces Mixed Results

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 54

    March 18, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    On March 15, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, accompanied by a large delegation of businessmen and cabinet members, travelled to Moscow. Though on balance it produced mixed results, the visit constitutes yet another major step in the flourishing Turkish-Russian ties, characterized as a multi-dimensional strategic partnership. Both during his meetings with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and other bilateral gatherings he attended, Erdogan underscored the multi-dimensional character of the relationship and the determination to further deepen it (Anadolu Ajansi, March 15).

    On March 15, Erdogan attended the Turkish-Russian Business Forum in Moscow, organized jointly by leading Turkish business associations. Addressing around one thousand businessmen from both nations, Erdogan reiterated earlier objectives set by his government to boost the bilateral trade volume, in order that it reaches $100 billion in the coming years (EDM, January 25).

    Despite the announcement of such ambitious objectives, however, Turkish-Russian trade volume stood at around $27 billion last year, down from $38 billion in 2008, reflecting the impact of the global financial crisis. Most of this trade is accounted for by Turkey’s energy imports from Russia, creating a trade deficit in Russia’s advantage. To address this deficit, Turkey has requested that Russia implement some measures to bolster the import of Turkish goods. Thus far, there has been no major progress in this area.

    Traditionally, the construction projects Turkish contractors undertook in Russia have partly compensated for the trade deficit. Through such investments, Turkish businesses have recorded valuable profits, and many Turkish engineers and workers have found employment opportunities in the Russian construction market. However, in recent years Turkish developers have faced difficulties in securing new projects in Russia. This was due partly to the contraction of the construction industry as a result of the global financial crisis and to the growing competition from other countries. As Russia launches new highway projects and prepares for a fresh round of infrastructure investments in preparation for the 2013 Summer Universiade Games in Kazan and 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Turkish contractors hope to benefit. Erdogan raised this issue with his Russian counterparts, and reportedly the Russian authorities also expressed their desire to see greater Turkish participation in the upcoming construction boom. It remains to be seen if the Russians will really offer privileged treatment to Turkish constructors in the months to come, or if such words are only sweeteners to please the Turkish side.

    However, both parties agreed to finalize the ongoing preparations for visa free travel. Starting from mid-April 2011, citizens from the two countries will be able to visit the other country visa free for 30 days. This development is expected to accelerate not only mutual visits but also the bilateral trade volume. Turkey has been placing great value on this agreement, as the government uses many of the recently initiated visa liberalization deals as an indicator of success for its new foreign policy doctrine of integration with its neighbors.

    Another area where the parties demonstrated commitment to further the bilateral relationship was cooperation in nuclear energy. Turkey had awarded the contract for the construction and operation of its first nuclear power plant to Russia. Joining the worldwide wave of going nuclear, Turkey has been planning to build up to three nuclear plants in the coming decades. In the wake of the recent catastrophes in Japan which resulted in damage to its nuclear reactors, however, nuclear safety issues appeared on the agenda, forcing many countries to reconsider their plans for opening new nuclear power plants. In Turkey, the groups that had objected to nuclear power plants reignited this debate, calling for the suspension of the projected plants, especially given the fact that Turkey is situated on geological fault-lines. Before his departure for Russia, Erdogan ruled out any cancellation of the nuclear contract, adding that no project was risk-free (Anadolu Ajansi, March 15). During his meetings in Moscow, Erdogan reassured his Russian counterparts about his commitment to see this project through and announced that construction would start as early as May. Yet, it seems Turkey asked Russia to improve the safety precautions for the project. While currently the plant was expected to withstand magnitude 8 earthquakes, it might have raise it to an even higher magnitude.

    However, limited progress was made on other energy projects. Turkey has been asking for price reductions for the natural gas it imports from Russia and the easing of “take-or-pay” clauses, especially in view of its declining energy consumption due to the financial crisis. Despite Ankara’s insistence and ongoing negotiations for some time, the Russian side has not accommodated Turkish concerns on this issue and in the planned Samsun-Ceyhan bypass oil pipeline. Reports indicate that there was no concrete progress on the remaining disagreements in energy projects, and Moscow deferred the issue for further discussion of the technical details. Responding to a question on this topic during the joint press briefing with Erdogan, President Medvedev said they would evaluate Turkey’s demands within the framework of existing agreements. Turkish media even speculated that when he failed to receive any concessions from Medvedev, Erdogan’s delegation raised this issue again during the meeting with Putin (www.turkrus.com, March 16). In contrast, the Russian side complained about Ankara’s delays in authorizing the construction of part of South Stream in Turkey’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, which in their view obstructs the further progress of the project (Cihan, March 16).

    On March 16, in a ministerial meeting attended by both sides the two countries held their High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) meeting. This is a new framework for bilateral cooperation, which Turkey established with various neighboring states in recent years. Following the initiation of a HLSCC with Syria and Iraq, Turkey moved on to sign similar agreements with Jordan, Greece and Russia and has recently taken a step towards forming one with Azerbaijan. Under this framework, both sides form committees to discuss ways to improve cooperation in various areas, and the leaders hold biannual summits to set the broader direction of bilateral partnership. Although Turkey publicizes such summits as indicators of strategic cooperation with its neighbors, the failure to bridge the remaining differences with Russia show that there are significant diverging interests which might set serious barriers to further cooperation.

     

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogans-moscow-visit-produces-mixed-results/

     

  • Turkish student travels the Caucasus, lands in Armenia

    Turkish student travels the Caucasus, lands in Armenia

    turk studied in baku learning in armenia 2011 03 17 lTurkish student Mehmet Fatih Öztarsu, who calls himself an idealist, set out directly for the Caucasus. His first stop was the Azerbaijani capital of Baku. Having characterized Azerbaijan as a “kindred country,” he studied international relations at Baku’s Caucasus University. After his education, while pursuing his research in Georgia, he decided to cross over to the other side of the border, passing into Armenia. (more…)

  • Sassounian’s column of March 17, 2011

    Sassounian’s column of March 17, 2011

    Lawsuit Against U.S. Federal Reserve

    Seeks Armenian Gold Looted by Turkey


    Publisher, The California Courier

    The Glendale-based nonprofit Center for Armenian Remembrance (CAR) sued the U.S. Federal Reserve on March 4, seeking information on its acquisition of a large amount of Armenian gold looted by the Ottoman government in 1915.

    CAR filed the lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act. The gold, originally valued at five million Turkish Gold Liras ($22 million dollars), is now estimated to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York recently claimed that they have no records of any Armenian gold in their possession.

    It was not easy to trace the circumstances under which the Armenian-owned gold was transferred from Istanbul to the United States almost a century ago. The results of our research on the convoluted series of transactions are summarized below:

    The Ottoman government had seized the gold and other valuables belonging to Armenians deported and killed in the 1915 genocide, expropriating their bank accounts and safe deposit boxes. The Ottoman Liquidation Commission used a complex set of bank transfers to hide the trail of this “blood money.” The Turkish Treasury placed the looted Armenian gold initially in the German Deutschebank in Istanbul. In 1916, the gold was transferred to the Bleichroeder Bank in Vienna, and from there moved to the Reichsbank (German Central Bank) in Berlin, and deposited in the account of Ottoman Public Debt.

    At the end of World War I, when the Allied Powers demanded reparations from Germany and its Ottoman Turkish ally, German officials had no choice but to comply with that request, agreeing to turn over to the Allies the Armenian gold held by the Reichsbank. Accordingly, the expropriated Armenian gold was transferred to France and Great Britain in 1921.

    A subsequent British document confirms the true ownership of this gold. On September 26 1924, leaders of the two main opposition parties in Great Britain, Liberal Party leader and former Prime Minister H.H. Asquith and Conservative Party leader and future Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin sent a memorandum to Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald pleading for British assistance to Armenians in view of their support for the Allied cause and the great suffering they endured during World War I. The two British leaders argued that “the sum of 5 million pounds (Turkish gold) deposited by the Turkish Government in Berlin in 1916, and taken over by the Allies after the Armistice, was in large part (perhaps wholly) Armenian money. After the enforced deportation of the Armenians in 1915, their bank accounts, both current and deposit, were transferred by order to the State Treasury at Constantinople. This fact enabled the Turks to send five million sterling to the Reichsbank, Berlin, in exchange for a new issue of notes.”

    Subsequently, instead of returning the Armenian gold to its original owners, Britain and France sold it to the United States Government through J.P. Morgan Bank in Paris, by exchanging it for U.S. Treasury Certificates.

    On January 29, 1925, Senator William H. King submitted resolution 319 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee demanding that the looted gold be “set aside in trust” for Armenians. The resolution stated: “The Turkish Government had arbitrarily seized and transferred to the Turkish treasury all bank accounts, both current and deposit, belonging to Armenians, by which Armenian gold in the sum of 5 million Turkish pounds, amounting to $22,450,000, was transferred to the Turkish treasury, which gold was afterwards deposited by the Turkish Government in the Reichsbank at Berlin…. Said deposit of Armenian gold in the Reichsbank at Berlin was by article 259 of the Treaty of Versailles transferred and surrendered to the principal allied and associated powers, including the United States…. Said deposit in equity and right belongs to the Armenians from whom the same was seized, or to their legal representatives…. Said deposit should be set aside in trust to be hereafter paid over to the persons from whom said gold was seized, or to their lawful representatives….”

    This gold is just a small portion of the billions of dollars of Armenian assets stolen by Turkey and various other countries during and after the Armenian Genocide. The restitution of all looted Armenian assets, wherever they may be, should be one of the highest priorities for those pursuing justice for the horrendous crimes committed against the Armenian nation.

  • Tanrı misafiri “God’s Guest”

    Tanrı misafiri “God’s Guest”

    33726 102409639826068 102386316495067 17145 2607167 n1Hospitality is one of the cornerstones of the Turkish way of life. Turkish people are the most gracious and generous hosts as a result of their naturalinstincts. In every corner of the country such a traditional hospitality will meet you. Every individual feels bound to honor his guest in the best possible manner. They will open their houses to every guest with a smiling face and withall their sincerity give the best seat and cook the best food for their guest. Turkish people are very understanding about foreigners’ different customs and they try to communicate in order to help visitors according to their code of hospitality. The mentality of that hospitality is “whatever religion you are from, whichever country you come from, whatever language you speak, you are’God’s Guest’ ,” so you deserve to be welcomed in the best manner.

  • Sassounian’s column of March 10, 2011

    Sassounian’s column of March 10, 2011


     

    Who Rules Turkey: Erdogan or Aliyev? 

    Publisher, The California Courier

     

    Turkish leaders often brag about their success in transforming Turkey from a country with a failing economy and serious domestic problems, to a robust regional power that projects its influence far and wide.

     

    Indeed, Turkey has the second largest army in NATO after the United States, and the 15th largest economy in the world in terms of GDP. As a self-appointed mediator and powerbroker, Turkey often meddles in regional and international hot spots. Such hegemonic behavior has earned Prime Minister Recep Erdogan the nickname of “Sultan” who is hell-bent on restoring the long-defunct Ottoman Empire.

     

    The founding principle of Turkey’s expansionist foreign policy is the often repeated mantra — “zero problems with neighboring states” — which has not been always successfully implemented. While Turkey has managed to improve its relations with Syria and Iran, its disingenuous reconciliation efforts with Armenia have been a total failure. Its bungled attempt to create the false impression of better relations with Armenia has not fooled anyone, least of all Diaspora Armenians who are painfully familiar with such deceptive Turkish tactics.

     

    Apparently, the one leader who was tricked by Turkey’s fake gestures of reconciliation with Armenia was Pres. Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan. Ironically, Turkey’s policy of “zero problems with neighbors” had the unexpected and counter effect of creating problems with Azerbaijan where none existed before.

     

    Azerbaijan’s President became furious upon learning that Ankara was about to sign the Armenia-Turkey Protocols which called for opening the border between the two countries and establishing diplomatic relations. Turkish assurances that the Protocols were simply an attempt to extort concessions from Armenia did not mollify Azerbaijan. Pres. Aliyev demanded the immediate termination of the negotiated agreement, because he did not want Armenia’s blockade lifted until Artsakh (Karabagh) was returned to Azerbaijan.

     

    Even though the Protocols were clearly in the national interest of Turkey, Prime Minister Erdogan buckled under Azeri pressure and abandoned their ratification. Why would he obey Baku’s orders and not conclude an agreement that is clearly in his country’s best interest? Here are some likely explanations: First, Turkey receives some of its energy supplies from Azerbaijan. Second, Azeris living in Turkey strongly oppose the Protocols. Third, Erdogan is sensitive to accusations that he is flirting with his Armenian adversaries, at the expense of “brotherly” Azerbaijan!

     

    Of course, a truly strong leader would be able to defend his country’s national interests and withstand both external and internal pressures. Despite all of his boisterous talk during his global travels, the fact remains that Erdogan’s rule is neither secure nor stable. While he presents himself to his foreign counterparts as the leader of an all-powerful country, he has plenty of enemies at home who are constantly plotting his demise!

     

    Last week, fresh evidence surfaced about Prime Minister Erdogan’s tenuous hold on power and Pres. Aliyev’s ability to exploit his weakness. The former Mayor of Kars revealed that Azerbaijan’s President had urged Erdogan to have the partially completed Armenia-Turkey Friendship Monument demolished. The Turkish leader dutifully obliged after a short visit to Kars. Using the pretext that the statue was grotesque and ugly, he demanded its demolition. The former Mayor told students at Marmara University that the statue was torn down at the explicit request of Aliyev. The Kars city council subsequently voted to destroy the massive monument. By promptly following Aliyev’s orders, Erdogan tarnished his own reputation around the world. Some likened his unsavory action to the Taliban who had destroyed the sacred Buddha statues in Afghanistan!

     

    It is a bizarre situation when the leader of a small state is able to impose his will repeatedly on his more powerful neighbor. When Aliyev demanded that Ankara not ratify the Armenia-Turkey Protocols, “Big Brother” obliged and carried out the request of Aliyev Junior. The spoiled “Junior Brother” then demanded that a Turkish statue be demolished. That order was also carried out with no questions asked.

     

    If Erdogan thinks that by appeasing Aliyev he will be able to secure Turkey’s energy supplies, he is sadly mistaken. Appeasement is a slippery slope that paves the way for more concessions. Having learned that his wishes are unquestionably carried out by Turkey’s leaders, Aliyev will now escalate his demands. What would he ask Erdogan to do next? How far is the all-powerful “Sultan” willing to go to accommodate the demands of the junior bully next door? Who calls the shots in Ankara: Erdogan or Aliyev?

     

    Armenians, however, have no reason to be dissatisfied that Aliyev is bullying Erdogan. By demanding that Turkey not ratify the Protocols, Aliyev inadvertently saved Armenia from an ill-advised agreement; and by urging Erdogan to have the statue in Kars torn down, he made the Turkish leader the laughing stock of the civilized world!