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Category: Authors
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Sassounian’s column of March 17, 2011
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Tanrı misafiri “God’s Guest”
Hospitality is one of the cornerstones of the Turkish way of life. Turkish people are the most gracious and generous hosts as a result of their naturalinstincts. In every corner of the country such a traditional hospitality will meet you. Every individual feels bound to honor his guest in the best possible manner. They will open their houses to every guest with a smiling face and withall their sincerity give the best seat and cook the best food for their guest. Turkish people are very understanding about foreigners’ different customs and they try to communicate in order to help visitors according to their code of hospitality. The mentality of that hospitality is “whatever religion you are from, whichever country you come from, whatever language you speak, you are’God’s Guest’ ,” so you deserve to be welcomed in the best manner. -
Sassounian’s column of March 10, 2011
Who Rules Turkey: Erdogan or Aliyev? Publisher, The California Courier
Turkish leaders often brag about their success in transforming Turkey from a country with a failing economy and serious domestic problems, to a robust regional power that projects its influence far and wide.
Indeed, Turkey has the second largest army in NATO after the United States, and the 15th largest economy in the world in terms of GDP. As a self-appointed mediator and powerbroker, Turkey often meddles in regional and international hot spots. Such hegemonic behavior has earned Prime Minister Recep Erdogan the nickname of “Sultan” who is hell-bent on restoring the long-defunct Ottoman Empire.
The founding principle of Turkey’s expansionist foreign policy is the often repeated mantra — “zero problems with neighboring states” — which has not been always successfully implemented. While Turkey has managed to improve its relations with Syria and Iran, its disingenuous reconciliation efforts with Armenia have been a total failure. Its bungled attempt to create the false impression of better relations with Armenia has not fooled anyone, least of all Diaspora Armenians who are painfully familiar with such deceptive Turkish tactics.
Apparently, the one leader who was tricked by Turkey’s fake gestures of reconciliation with Armenia was Pres. Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan. Ironically, Turkey’s policy of “zero problems with neighbors” had the unexpected and counter effect of creating problems with Azerbaijan where none existed before.
Azerbaijan’s President became furious upon learning that Ankara was about to sign the Armenia-Turkey Protocols which called for opening the border between the two countries and establishing diplomatic relations. Turkish assurances that the Protocols were simply an attempt to extort concessions from Armenia did not mollify Azerbaijan. Pres. Aliyev demanded the immediate termination of the negotiated agreement, because he did not want Armenia’s blockade lifted until Artsakh (Karabagh) was returned to Azerbaijan.
Even though the Protocols were clearly in the national interest of Turkey, Prime Minister Erdogan buckled under Azeri pressure and abandoned their ratification. Why would he obey Baku’s orders and not conclude an agreement that is clearly in his country’s best interest? Here are some likely explanations: First, Turkey receives some of its energy supplies from Azerbaijan. Second, Azeris living in Turkey strongly oppose the Protocols. Third, Erdogan is sensitive to accusations that he is flirting with his Armenian adversaries, at the expense of “brotherly” Azerbaijan!
Of course, a truly strong leader would be able to defend his country’s national interests and withstand both external and internal pressures. Despite all of his boisterous talk during his global travels, the fact remains that Erdogan’s rule is neither secure nor stable. While he presents himself to his foreign counterparts as the leader of an all-powerful country, he has plenty of enemies at home who are constantly plotting his demise!
Last week, fresh evidence surfaced about Prime Minister Erdogan’s tenuous hold on power and Pres. Aliyev’s ability to exploit his weakness. The former Mayor of Kars revealed that Azerbaijan’s President had urged Erdogan to have the partially completed Armenia-Turkey Friendship Monument demolished. The Turkish leader dutifully obliged after a short visit to Kars. Using the pretext that the statue was grotesque and ugly, he demanded its demolition. The former Mayor told students at Marmara University that the statue was torn down at the explicit request of Aliyev. The Kars city council subsequently voted to destroy the massive monument. By promptly following Aliyev’s orders, Erdogan tarnished his own reputation around the world. Some likened his unsavory action to the Taliban who had destroyed the sacred Buddha statues in Afghanistan!
It is a bizarre situation when the leader of a small state is able to impose his will repeatedly on his more powerful neighbor. When Aliyev demanded that Ankara not ratify the Armenia-Turkey Protocols, “Big Brother” obliged and carried out the request of Aliyev Junior. The spoiled “Junior Brother” then demanded that a Turkish statue be demolished. That order was also carried out with no questions asked.
If Erdogan thinks that by appeasing Aliyev he will be able to secure Turkey’s energy supplies, he is sadly mistaken. Appeasement is a slippery slope that paves the way for more concessions. Having learned that his wishes are unquestionably carried out by Turkey’s leaders, Aliyev will now escalate his demands. What would he ask Erdogan to do next? How far is the all-powerful “Sultan” willing to go to accommodate the demands of the junior bully next door? Who calls the shots in Ankara: Erdogan or Aliyev?
Armenians, however, have no reason to be dissatisfied that Aliyev is bullying Erdogan. By demanding that Turkey not ratify the Protocols, Aliyev inadvertently saved Armenia from an ill-advised agreement; and by urging Erdogan to have the statue in Kars torn down, he made the Turkish leader the laughing stock of the civilized world!
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Turkey Diverges From Western Position On Libya
Turkey Diverges From Western Position On Libya
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 44
March 4, 2011
By: Saban Kardas
Turkey has pursued a policy over the popular uprising in Libya reflecting the unique ties it had developed with this country. More importantly, Turkey’s position in the ongoing debate concerning the involvement of the international community in the form of sanctions or possible military intervention increasingly sets Turkey apart from Western policy.
Turkish construction firms have penetrated the Libyan market, signing major contracts in the country since the 1970’s. With the lifting of international sanctions against Libya in the early 2000’s, the construction industry experienced a new boom, as well as creating fresh business opportunities. During his visit to Libya in 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made an effort to further improve economic ties with Libya, as part of Turkey’s proactive foreign trade strategy of gaining new markets for businesses abroad. Indeed, Turkish contractors received a good share of the new business opportunities. Turkish firms undertook projects worth over $15 billion in recent years, and over 20,000 Turkish people were living in Libya, mostly employed in the construction sector. Moreover, in recent years, Turkey’s exports to this country also increased, reaching $2 billion in 2010 (www.cnnturk.com, February 21).
When the protests started to spread across Libya, the fate of Turkish investments and workers in the country was the main concern shaping Ankara’s response. Initial reports of looting in some construction sites, and growing concerns about the safety of Turkish workers, forced the government to open a crisis desk. According to Trade Minister, Zafer Caglayan, Turkish investments in the country were guaranteed by the Libyan government and their first priority would be to ensure the physical safety of Turkish citizens (Zaman, February 22). With the rapid deterioration of the situation, the Turkish government launched what it called the largest evacuation operation in history. Through the utilization of aircraft and ferries, Turkey successfully evacuated its citizens and people from many other nations, which received widespread coverage in domestic and international media.
However, as international attention shifted towards the atrocities committed by the Gaddafi regime against the protestors, Turkey’s policy diverged from the US or Western position. The Turkish opposition criticized the government for failing to openly condemn Gaddafi’s brutal use of force and expressing support for the Libyan people (www.ntvmsnbc.com, February 21). Given the presence of large numbers of its citizens, Turkey, perhaps understandably, was timid in its reaction to the Gaddafi regime. However, the government’s subsequent statements on Libya demonstrated that it pursued a different policy based on differing assumptions, compared to its Western partners.
Ahead of the UN Security Council meeting last weekend, where the UN decided to impose a range of sanctions against the Libyan regime, President Barack Obama telephoned Erdogan to discuss the developments. Although the statement released by the White House maintained that the two sides agreed on joint action, representatives from the Turkish government stressed that Turkey would not support any action that could be considered in contravention of the principle of “nonintervention in domestic affairs” and Turkey would prefer that international involvement remained limited to providing humanitarian assistance. Turkish journalists based in Washington started to talk about a “rift” between Ankara and Washington (Zaman, February 28).
Indeed, Erdogan’s subsequent statements clearly revealed those diverging policy perspectives. Addressing the Turkish public over the weekend on the eve of the UN Security Council meeting, Erdogan expressed his strong opposition to sanctions, arguing that sanctions did not work in the past and they would hurt only the people. Interestingly, he called on the international community and Western countries to approach the Libyan issue from a humanitarian perspective, not on the basis of oil interests (Anadolu Ajansi, February 27).
As the discussions gained pace on the imposition of a no fly zone over Libyan airspace to prevent Gaddafi forces from crushing the opposition forces, Turkey’s differences with Western policy also became visible. Meanwhile, having evacuated its citizens from Libya, the US, in line with many Western governments, adopted harsher language critical of the Libyan regime, calling on Gaddafi to step down or face the consequences. While the US boosted its naval presence in the Mediterranean, attention also focused on the role of NATO in possible military action against Libya.
Again, Erdogan took a clear stance against NATO’s involvement in any operation against Libya. While visiting Germany to meet with Turkish people living in the country, Erdogan reacted to the news stories. “All sanctions and interventions that will hurt Libyan people cannot be accepted… What does NATO have to do in Libya? … We are against it,” Erdogan said (Hurriyet, February 28). Those statements made headlines in many newspapers on the following day, which indicated how well Erdogan’s views resonate with Turkish public opinion on the issue. Moreover, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, also expressed objections to foreign intervention, arguing that the deployment of foreign troops in the country would not be welcome by the local people and foreign involvement would further complicate the situation (Hurriyet, March 2).
Through his recent statements, Erdogan has implied that the West was driven by material interests, rather than genuine humanitarian considerations about the Libyan people. Such rhetoric mirrors the position advocated by the leaders of Iran or Venezuela, who have been arguing that the West is seeking to capitalize on the unrest in the country to re-colonize Libya, or occupy it to extract its oil. Moreover, Erdogan’s statements, for instance, on sanctions reveal that his objection to sanctions is not based on content per se. Although Erdogan has maintained that sanctions would hurt the people, there was in fact nothing in the list of sanctions approved by the UN Security Council to that effect, as they were specifically targeting the Gaddafi regime and called for investigations into human rights violations. In that sense, Erdogan has been presenting a categorical objection to any sanctions or international intervention, which reflects not only policy differences but also ideological dissonance with the international community.
https://jamestown.org/program/turkey-diverges-from-western-position-on-libya/
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“Revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda
“Revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia Highlight Dilemmas of Turkey’s Democracy Promotion Agenda
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 24
February 3, 2011
By: Saban Kardas
Turkey has been following closely the unfolding popular “revolutions” in Tunisia and Egypt. While the Turkish public expressed support towards the masses demanding political liberalization, the Turkish government adopted a cautious approach initially, indicative of some of the contradictions that have been inherent in its policies towards the Middle East for some time.
Turkey, like many other countries, was taken by surprise over a crisis of this magnitude. Nonetheless, Turkish leaders’ rather delayed response to the popular demands in the region points to larger factors underpinning the government’s foreign policy. Especially, as this development risks straining the delicate balancing act Turkey has been performing in the region, between the Arab states on the one hand and the undemocratic authoritarian or monarchic regimes on the other. The Turkish government has gained the sympathy of the “Arab streets” owing to the successes of Turkish cultural products and to Turkey’s recent foreign policy activism in defense of some Arab causes, such as the Palestine issue. Partly in order to avoid antagonizing many of the regimes in the region, with whom it has been trying to forge closer ties, Turkey at the same time has refrained from pursuing an openly pro-democratization agenda.
Despite the emphasis Turkish government occasionally places on democracy as a foundational principle for its domestic and foreign policies, it has come under criticism on the grounds that it prioritized its relations with these regimes at the expense of people’s demands for greater democratic rights. The most controversial case in point was the Iranian elections in 2009, where Turkey was one of the first countries to congratulate President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and remained silent on the regime’s ensuing violent crackdown on the opposition (EDM, June 18, 2009).
Despite the Turkish government’s rather ambiguous position on democracy promotion, it must be acknowledged what Turkish scholar Kemal Kirisci once called the “demonstration effect” Turkey has in the region. Turkey’s experiment with popular democracy and a free market economy, especially its integration of Islamic groups into legitimate political channels, has been closely followed by many reformists in the Muslim world. The transformation of political Islamist groups in Turkey and their renunciation of non-democratic methods, which culminated in the incumbent AKP Party adopting a liberal-democratic economic and political platform, are taken as the most obvious indication of the success of this so-called Turkish model. Seen from this perspective, it is possible to hear somewhat inflated arguments among many Turkish analysts to the effect that Turkey’s rising profile in regional affairs and its vocal advocating of Arab causes, which demonstrated the failures of the authoritarian regimes, played a role in the recent wave of revolutions. According to different versions of this argument, the Turkish model of democratization inspired the “Arab streets” and precipitated these revolutions. Such views are also raised by the members of the AKP Party (Hurriyet, January 30).
Among Islamists and to some extent liberals, there is a tendency to identify positively with the demonstrators demanding for greater political rights and transparency. This struggle reminds many Turks of Turkey’s experience with democratization, whereby they managed to fight against authoritarianism or military control over civilian politics and move towards a government representative of popular will. For instance, many Islamist intellectuals draw parallels between Turkey’s experience with a one-party regime and the Kemalist ideology and the experience of Tunisia under Bin Ali. By labeling the ousted Tunisian leader’s rule as Kemalism par excellence, they seek to drive home the argument that such authoritarian forms of government are no longer sustainable in the region, including Turkey. Consequently, they use it as a basis to call for further reform of the Turkish political system (Today’s Zaman, January 25). That positive identification of Islamist with the transformations there also might have an ideological dimension to it, as the Tunisian Islamic thinker and the leader of the En-Nahda movement Rashid Al-Ghannushi and the Egyptian Muslim brotherhood have had an intellectual impact on the Islamic groups and intellectuals in Turkey.
As a reflection of such widely-held sympathy towards these revolutions shared by Turkish people and many political groups, there have been protests outside Egyptian diplomatic representations, demanding Mubarak’s resignation. It is increasingly possible to hear arguments calling on the government to play a more proactive role towards the resolution of the deepening crisis Egypt. One Turkish expert on Egypt, Ahmet Uysal, called on the government to give up its complacency, and interject itself more resolutely to prevent Egypt’s descent into instability by showing a way out of this stalemate towards democracy. In this view, only then will the Turkish government be able live up to its promises that it will play a leadership role in the region (www.sde.org.tr, February 1).
Davutoglu, however, denied the criticisms that Turkey has remained silent on the developments in Tunisia and Egypt. Davutoglu rather put the blame on the Turkish media, arguing that despite his statements in support of people’s democratic demands, Turkish commentators largely overlooked them and created such a false image about the government’s policy (IHA, February 1).
Perhaps with such criticism accumulating, Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan finally came out and invited Mubarak to respond to his people’s desire for change. “Hear the people’s outcry and their humane demands… governments cannot stand against people,” Erdogan said (Anadolu Ajansi, February 1). Many Turkish media outlets provided wide coverage of Erdogan’s statement and took it as an indication of Turkey’s emergence as a major actor that could help to resolve this crisis. Nonetheless, during our conversation on the subject in Dubai, a long-time observer of Turkish and Middle Eastern politics, Yusuf Serif of Al-Arabiyya, underscored that Erdogan’s response came rather late. Though finding Erdogan’s statement daring compared to other regional leaders’ silence, Serif draw attention to the fact that Erdogan delivered it only after the United States and other Western actors made similar arguments publicly and US President, Barack Obama, telephoned Erdogan last weekend.
The “revolutions” in the region are still unfolding and it will be interesting to observe as to whether and how the Turkish government will maneuver in a timely and efficient manner in these uncharted waters.
https://jamestown.org/program/revolutions-in-egypt-and-tunisia-highlight-dilemmas-of-turkeys-democracy-promotion-agenda/
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Turkish-Iranian Economic Ties Flourish
Turkish-Iranian Economic Ties Flourish
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 35
February 18, 2011
By: Saban Kardas
Turkish President, Abdullah Gul, paid a four-day state visit to Iran starting on February 13, to discuss ways to further bilateral cooperation. The sheer frequency of such high level mutual visits between the two countries in recent years indicates the growing multi-dimensional ties between Ankara and Tehran. Coupled with the convergence of both countries’ positions on many regional problems, the Turkish-Iranian cooperative relationship in economic and political affairs has been one of the most constant elements in the emerging Middle Eastern geopolitical map which is often fluid and full of uncertainties.
Given Turkey’s involvement in international efforts to find a solution to the diplomatic standoff over Iran’s nuclear program, this issue has occupied a large part of Gul’s agenda. So far, Turkey has objected to the Western policy of pursuing coercive instruments to halt the Iranian nuclear enrichment program which has raised suspicions in the West that Iran might eventually opt to acquire nuclear weapons. Turkey has, instead, operated on the assumption that the Iranian nuclear program was driven by peaceful purposes and advocates a diplomatic solution through dialogue and engagement with Iran, which occasionally pits it against the United States (EDM, June 1, 2010).
Gul’s remarks on this issue highlighted the extent to which Turkey seeks to take into account Iran’s concerns. Gul underlined that Iran needs to be offered an honorable solution to end this standoff. Commenting on this issue, Gul said that he agreed with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to continue joint efforts on a new road map to explore the possibilities of addressing this issue. Gul also added that Turkey will remain committed to its facilitator role so that this issue could be solved through diplomacy and dialogue. Indeed, Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, accompanying Gul in Tehran, met his Iranian counterpart as well as Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. In the wake of the latest meeting between Iran and P5+1 countries held in Istanbul last month, which ended in failure (EDM, January 25), Turkey has remained steadfast in its insistence on a diplomatic solution. While Western leaders, including European officials issued statements calling on Iran to be forthcoming, Turkey is worried about any further escalation of tension and has been calling for the continuation of dialogue. Thus, in talks with his Iranian counterparts, having evaluated the Istanbul meeting, Davutoglu discussed the details of Turkey’s future contributions to this issue. Davutoglu said that the next meeting between Iran and world powers might also take place in Istanbul (Anadolu Ajansi, February 15, 17).
Bilateral economic cooperation was another item pursued during Gul’s visit to Tehran. In parallel to the Turkish government’s recent policy of deepening economic exchange with its neighbors, Ankara has wanted to further trade ties with Tehran. In recent years, the Turkish-Iranian trade volume has grown enormously. In 2010, bilateral trade reached around $10 billion. However, it has been a major challenge for Turkey to fix the major trade deficit in Iran’s favor, generated by Turkey’s hydrocarbon imports from Iran. While Turkey’s exports were about $3 billion, its imports were around $7 billion last year. At least since Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Iran in October 2009, where he had vowed to raise the trade volume to $30 billion (EDM, October 29, 2009), Turkey has endeavored to increase its exports, through various measures, including forming joint economic commissions, easing border trade, trade fairs and plans to use national currencies in bilateral trade. Despite an absolute increase in exports, those policies have so far failed to break Turkey’s vulnerability, partly due to Iran’s rather protectionist economic policies. Moreover, Turkish firms’ plans to boost the volume of their investments in Iran have been stalled because of restrictive Iranian regulations on foreign investments.
Thus, reflecting Turkey’s determination to break this unfavorable economic pattern, Gul brought with him a large group of businessmen who sought to agree on trade deals with their prospective Iranian partners. During Gul’s visit, several Turkish-Iranian business forums were convened in major Iranian cities including Tehran, Esfahan and Tabriz, by the representatives of Turkish business associations. Attending those forums, Gul reiterated the target of raising the trade volume to $30 billion. He emphasized clearly Turkey’s dissatisfaction with “over-protectionist” economic policy in Iran and called for the elimination of restrictions. For some time, there had been bilateral talks on preferential trade agreement. Gul said that some Turkish officials accompanying him would remain in Iran to negotiate conditions for a free trade deal instead (Anadolu Ajansi, February 15).
Indeed, the conditions seem ripe for such a deal, as both countries have their own incentives to increase the bilateral trade volume. For its part, Turkey’s recent foreign economic strategy is built on diversifying export markets as a tool to stimulate growth and cushion the negative effects of the global economic crisis. Partly as a result of Turkish exporters’ penetration into new markets in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, Turkey has managed to overcome the crisis, without major assistance from international financial institutions.
For Iran, trade with Turkey has assumed a vital importance in the wake of the new round of sanctions initiated by the US. Although Turkey announced that it would comply with the UN-authorized sanctions, it would not implement the more stringent list of sanctions imposed by the US and European countries. There has been speculation that Iran might be subjected to more economic pressures following its “uncooperative” attitude during the talks in Istanbul. Moreover, recent reports indicate that the sanctions have started to hit Iran hard after some of Iran’s traditional partners including the UAE decided to restrict their trade with Iran.
Against this background, Turkey is becoming a major lifeline for Iran. As underlined by Turkish expert Bayram Sinkaya in a recent report, “thanks to both Turkish-Iranian political rapprochement and their policy of furthering economic cooperation, Turkey has started to replace Dubai, which has been Iran’s most important trade partner and operations center. Especially since June 2010 … Iranian businessmen have redirected [their operations] towards Turkey as an alternative to Dubai. As a result, over 600 firms have been set up by Iranian businessmen in Istanbul alone” (www.orsam.org.tr, February 10). It remains to be seen if growing Turkish-Iranian trade might arise as yet another divisive issue in Turkish-US relations and how Turkey will handle those tensions.
https://jamestown.org/program/turkish-iranian-economic-ties-flourish/