Turkish Forum

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  • Lale “Tulip”

    Lale “Tulip”

    Everybody thinks that tulips come from Holland. Actually, Tulips are native to Central Asia and Turkiye. In the 16th Century they were brought to Holland from Turkiye, and quickly became widely popular.

    The Tulip period or Tulip era is a period in Ottoman history from 1718 to the rebellion of Patrona Halil in 1730. This was a relatively peaceful period, during which the Ottoman Empire can be said to have begun to orient itself towards Europe.

    The name of the period derives from the tulip craze among the Ottoman court society. Cultivating this culturally ambiguous emblem had become a celebrated practice. The tulip period illustrated the conflicts brought by early modern consumer culture and was a shared material symbolism. During this period the elite and high-class society of the Ottoman Period had established an immense fondness for the tulip, which were utilized in various occasions. Tulips defined nobility and privilege, both in terms of goods and leisure time.

    The tulips begin to bloom around the end of March or beginning of April, depending on the weather. They bloom for several weeks and may delight the eye and the spirit for nearly a month.200790 143682605698771 102386316495067 262303 1630699 n

  • Altunköprü the ancient name of Türkmen Township

    Altunköprü the ancient name of Türkmen Township

    By Mofak Salman Kerkuklu

    altunkopru01

    Altunköprü is a small Türkmen [1] sub district located 40km north of Kerkuk and the city lies to the north-west of Kerkuk. It is a 50km away from Erbil. [2] Altunköprü means ‘Golden Bridge’ in the Turkish language.

    The history of the city of Altunköprü dates back to 228Bc. The indigenous inhabitants of Altunköprü are Türkmens, but in the mid of fifties and also in the recent years a large number of Kurds and Arabs migrated to this town seeking work as economical migrants especially after the Kurdish rebels in 1975 were quelled by the Iraqi Ba’ath regime.


    Altunköprü     is a Türkmen authentic and it is one of the many Türkmen ancient sub district. [3] [4] Altunköprü is approximately located between Erbil and Kerkuk. It is situated on the bank of Azab Alsfel (Little Zab) River.

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    1 The Iraqi Türkmen live in an area that they call “Türkmenia” in Latin or “Türkmeneli” which means, “Land of the Türkmen”. It was referred to as “Turcomania” by the British geographer William Guthrie in 1785. The Türkmen are Turkic groups that have a unique heritage and culture as well as linguistic, historical and cultural links with the surrounding Turkic groups such as those in Turkey and Azerbaijan. Their spoken language is closer to Azeri but their official written language is like the Turkish spoken in present-day Turkey. Their real population has always being suppressed by the authorities in Iraq for political reasons and estimated at 2%, whereas in reality their numbers are more realistically between 2.5 to 3 million, i .e. 12% of the Iraqi population.

    2 Turkmenelinden Notlar, Year 1 Issue 2 June 1999, Altunköprü Katliami Page. 2.

    3 The Turkmen and Kerkuk, by Yucel Guclu, ISBN 978-1-4257-1853-4, Page 26.

    4 The Turkmen and Kerkuk, by Yucel Guclu, ISBN 978-1-4257-1853-4, Page 58

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  • Nevruz

    Nevruz

    The day accepted as the New Year’s Day by the Turks living in Central Asia, Anatolian Turks and Iranians is called Nevruz. It is a combination of the Persian words Nev (New) and Ruz (Day). It corresponds to March 21st  according to the Western calendar and March 9th according to the Moslem one, when the day and the night are of equal length and ıs known by such names as “Nevruz-i Sultani,” “Sultan Nevruz,” “Sultan Navriz” and “Mart Dokuzu” (Ninth of March).

    Although it is has been claimed that Nevruz was a Persian conception, it also appears in the Twelve Animal Turkish Calendars, and had been known to the Turks and celebrated by them for a very long time.

    The principle view of Nevruz is that it is a celebration of 197925 141981122535586 102386316495067 252797 5043671 nindependence. In other words that it marks the day of departure from Ergenekon. Hence, Nevruz has been accepted as the beginning of the new year by Turks and has still been celebrating with festivals.

    Among the Turkish communites of Central Asia, the Azeris, Kazakhs, Khirghiz, Türkmens, Uzbeks and Uyghur Turks, the Anatolian Turks and the Balkan Turks have kept the Nevruz traditon alive up to the present day.

  • Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?

    Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?

    Turkey’s ‘moral politics’ in Libya: Seduction by analogy?

    by Şaban Kardaş

    Today’s Zaman, 20 March 2011, Sunday

    Turkey’s policy on Libya so far has drawn criticism from many angles, most notably due to the growing dissonance between Ankara and the international community on the issue of pursuing coercive policies against the Gaddafi regime’s use of brutal force against its own people to crack down first on the peaceful demonstrations and later the uprising across the country.
    Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other Turkish officials have expressed opposition to imposing sanctions on Libya, as the United Nations Security Council was evaluating the unfolding crisis. Later, as the attention shifted towards the establishment of a no-fly zone or even a military intervention against the Gaddafi forces, Turkey again objected to those calls.

    Against this background, it is often possible to hear criticism that Turkey is pursuing immoral policies or taking a pro-Gaddafi stance. Interestingly, however, Erdoğan not only claims that Turkey is in fact the only country that follows moral politics in this case, but he also maintains that the Western powers contemplating coercive policies against Libya are driven by material interests. There is indeed a dilemma here: How come a country claiming to follow an ethical approach to the crisis has been against the actions whose declared aim is to end the crimes against humanity perpetrated by Gaddafi forces?

    One can point to various reasons why Turkey is openly opposed to a more robust international reaction to the Gaddafi regime. As some Turkish diplomatic sources underline, in a situation where Turkey has investments in the country worth billions of dollars and many Turkish citizens have been stranded in Libya, it would not be wise to take a clear side in the unfolding civil war between the Gaddafi regime and the opposition forces. One can sympathize with this argument, for above all, the Turkish government is obliged to protect the interests of its own citizens and cannot be expected to take any action which might put them in harm’s way. Moreover, one can also debate the justifiability of military action on practical grounds. Indeed, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu made such an argument when he stated his reservations to a military option, saying that it would make the situation even worse and that a foreign military presence would not be welcome by the Libyan people, including the leaders of the rebellion against Gaddafi. From a realpolitik point of view, these are all plausible arguments, and many other Western leaders have utilized similar justifications.

    Yet, one is puzzled by Erdoğan’s statements on the subject, which makes one think that there is more to Turkey’s objections to sanctions or a no-fly zone. Erdoğan’s position is rather categorical in the sense that his opposition is not based necessarily on the content of the policy instruments under consideration. For instance, when he said he was against the introduction of sanctions because they would hurt the Libyan people and that sanctions would never work, there was in fact nothing in the list of sanctions approved by the UN Security Council to harm the Libyan people per se. They targeted the Gaddafi regime and called for an investigation into the violations of human rights. Similarly, on the issue of using military instruments or inviting NATO to play a role in such a scenario, Erdoğan again raised a categorical objection. He not only maintained that a military option would create more trouble, he also questioned the involvement of NATO. For him, intervention in Libya will not be NATO’s business, as its only task is to protect member states. This was quite a puzzling statement coming from a Turkish leader, if one recalls that it was Turkey that advocated NATO’s humanitarian interventions in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. Although no NATO member was under attack, Turkey worked hard to convince the alliance to intervene in Bosnia and later Kosovo to protect its coreligionists against the Serbian forces. This is quite a dramatic change, indeed.

    ‘The seduction by analogy’

    Such categorical objections raised by Turkish leaders suggest that they might partly be suffering from what Yuen Foong Khong once called “the seduction by analogy” problem. Analogies guide the thinking of leaders in crisis situations. When confronted with a situation full of unknowns, many decision makers relate the crisis at hand to past instances that have resemblance to the case at hand. When carefully selected, analogies in fact are useful tools; for instance, they might help reduce the time for processing information and choose the right policy responses. However, analogies may also result in disastrous foreign policy decisions. Decision makers may resort to analogies as an excuse to avoid investing the necessary time to study the particularities of each case. Moreover, once formed, analogies can become self-perpetuating myths and act as mental shortcuts, in that decision makers may be seduced to interpret new developments under the light of familiar experiences from the past. As a result, more often than not, the lessons drawn from past analogies are applied to new cases without careful consideration of the underlying differences and similarities.

    A close examination of Erdoğan and other Turkish officials’ statements on Libya shows that the analogies they often resort to are the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq. The misguided American interventions in these two cases and the resulting destruction have affected the thinking of Turkish leaders in the last decade. For years, Turkish leaders have watched how sanctions imposed on the Saddam regime produced nothing but misery for the Iraqi people. Moreover, having spent much of their energy on addressing the threats and risks created by the US military interventions, Turkish decision makers have grown increasingly skeptical of the ability of the international community to implement military instruments. This formative experience has bred an aversion against foreign involvement which has come to be seen as a source of humanitarian tragedy and regional instability.

    The analogies of Afghanistan and Iraq have shaped Turkey’s thinking in recent years, when foreign involvement in Turkey’s neighborhood was up for debate. A large part of Turkey’s opposition to US policy on Iran is based on the negative lessons drawn from these two experiences. Turkey’s thinly veiled opposition to American assistance to Georgia during the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 was also affected by the same mode of thinking on foreign intervention. It seems the same analogies are at work again and have come to determine Turkey’s position on Libya as well. At the same time, the use of such analogies, blended with anti-imperialistic rhetoric, resonate well with the Turkish public, which has turned increasingly nationalistic.

    What is at stake in Libya is the risk that the unfolding civil war might take a dramatic turn and warrant an international military action that might fall under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Although Turkey has taken part in humanitarian interventions in the past, it has failed to develop a principled position, and its approach has evolved case-by-case. Short of any principled position on humanitarian intervention, Turkish leaders are easily seduced to follow analogies that happen to fit to their domestic political agenda. However, they need to engage in a serious reconsideration as to whether they are using the right analogies in Libya, and whether Bosnia or Kosovo would not be better fits. More importantly, if they are serious about pursuing moral politics, they need to come to terms with cosmopolitan ideas and formulate a principled position on humanitarian intervention, independent of contextual factors.

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  • Erdogan’s Moscow Visit Produces Mixed Results

    Erdogan’s Moscow Visit Produces Mixed Results

    Erdogan’s Moscow Visit Produces Mixed Results

    Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 54

    March 18, 2011

    By: Saban Kardas

    On March 15, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, accompanied by a large delegation of businessmen and cabinet members, travelled to Moscow. Though on balance it produced mixed results, the visit constitutes yet another major step in the flourishing Turkish-Russian ties, characterized as a multi-dimensional strategic partnership. Both during his meetings with the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and other bilateral gatherings he attended, Erdogan underscored the multi-dimensional character of the relationship and the determination to further deepen it (Anadolu Ajansi, March 15).

    On March 15, Erdogan attended the Turkish-Russian Business Forum in Moscow, organized jointly by leading Turkish business associations. Addressing around one thousand businessmen from both nations, Erdogan reiterated earlier objectives set by his government to boost the bilateral trade volume, in order that it reaches $100 billion in the coming years (EDM, January 25).

    Despite the announcement of such ambitious objectives, however, Turkish-Russian trade volume stood at around $27 billion last year, down from $38 billion in 2008, reflecting the impact of the global financial crisis. Most of this trade is accounted for by Turkey’s energy imports from Russia, creating a trade deficit in Russia’s advantage. To address this deficit, Turkey has requested that Russia implement some measures to bolster the import of Turkish goods. Thus far, there has been no major progress in this area.

    Traditionally, the construction projects Turkish contractors undertook in Russia have partly compensated for the trade deficit. Through such investments, Turkish businesses have recorded valuable profits, and many Turkish engineers and workers have found employment opportunities in the Russian construction market. However, in recent years Turkish developers have faced difficulties in securing new projects in Russia. This was due partly to the contraction of the construction industry as a result of the global financial crisis and to the growing competition from other countries. As Russia launches new highway projects and prepares for a fresh round of infrastructure investments in preparation for the 2013 Summer Universiade Games in Kazan and 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Turkish contractors hope to benefit. Erdogan raised this issue with his Russian counterparts, and reportedly the Russian authorities also expressed their desire to see greater Turkish participation in the upcoming construction boom. It remains to be seen if the Russians will really offer privileged treatment to Turkish constructors in the months to come, or if such words are only sweeteners to please the Turkish side.

    However, both parties agreed to finalize the ongoing preparations for visa free travel. Starting from mid-April 2011, citizens from the two countries will be able to visit the other country visa free for 30 days. This development is expected to accelerate not only mutual visits but also the bilateral trade volume. Turkey has been placing great value on this agreement, as the government uses many of the recently initiated visa liberalization deals as an indicator of success for its new foreign policy doctrine of integration with its neighbors.

    Another area where the parties demonstrated commitment to further the bilateral relationship was cooperation in nuclear energy. Turkey had awarded the contract for the construction and operation of its first nuclear power plant to Russia. Joining the worldwide wave of going nuclear, Turkey has been planning to build up to three nuclear plants in the coming decades. In the wake of the recent catastrophes in Japan which resulted in damage to its nuclear reactors, however, nuclear safety issues appeared on the agenda, forcing many countries to reconsider their plans for opening new nuclear power plants. In Turkey, the groups that had objected to nuclear power plants reignited this debate, calling for the suspension of the projected plants, especially given the fact that Turkey is situated on geological fault-lines. Before his departure for Russia, Erdogan ruled out any cancellation of the nuclear contract, adding that no project was risk-free (Anadolu Ajansi, March 15). During his meetings in Moscow, Erdogan reassured his Russian counterparts about his commitment to see this project through and announced that construction would start as early as May. Yet, it seems Turkey asked Russia to improve the safety precautions for the project. While currently the plant was expected to withstand magnitude 8 earthquakes, it might have raise it to an even higher magnitude.

    However, limited progress was made on other energy projects. Turkey has been asking for price reductions for the natural gas it imports from Russia and the easing of “take-or-pay” clauses, especially in view of its declining energy consumption due to the financial crisis. Despite Ankara’s insistence and ongoing negotiations for some time, the Russian side has not accommodated Turkish concerns on this issue and in the planned Samsun-Ceyhan bypass oil pipeline. Reports indicate that there was no concrete progress on the remaining disagreements in energy projects, and Moscow deferred the issue for further discussion of the technical details. Responding to a question on this topic during the joint press briefing with Erdogan, President Medvedev said they would evaluate Turkey’s demands within the framework of existing agreements. Turkish media even speculated that when he failed to receive any concessions from Medvedev, Erdogan’s delegation raised this issue again during the meeting with Putin (www.turkrus.com, March 16). In contrast, the Russian side complained about Ankara’s delays in authorizing the construction of part of South Stream in Turkey’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, which in their view obstructs the further progress of the project (Cihan, March 16).

    On March 16, in a ministerial meeting attended by both sides the two countries held their High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) meeting. This is a new framework for bilateral cooperation, which Turkey established with various neighboring states in recent years. Following the initiation of a HLSCC with Syria and Iraq, Turkey moved on to sign similar agreements with Jordan, Greece and Russia and has recently taken a step towards forming one with Azerbaijan. Under this framework, both sides form committees to discuss ways to improve cooperation in various areas, and the leaders hold biannual summits to set the broader direction of bilateral partnership. Although Turkey publicizes such summits as indicators of strategic cooperation with its neighbors, the failure to bridge the remaining differences with Russia show that there are significant diverging interests which might set serious barriers to further cooperation.

     

    https://jamestown.org/program/erdogans-moscow-visit-produces-mixed-results/

     

  • Turkish student travels the Caucasus, lands in Armenia

    Turkish student travels the Caucasus, lands in Armenia

    turk studied in baku learning in armenia 2011 03 17 lTurkish student Mehmet Fatih Öztarsu, who calls himself an idealist, set out directly for the Caucasus. His first stop was the Azerbaijani capital of Baku. Having characterized Azerbaijan as a “kindred country,” he studied international relations at Baku’s Caucasus University. After his education, while pursuing his research in Georgia, he decided to cross over to the other side of the border, passing into Armenia. (more…)